Conspiracism

'Conspiracy theory, anti-globalism, and the Freedom Convoy: The Great Reset and conspiracist delegitimation' byr Corey Robinson and Scott D. Watson in (2025) Review of International Studies comments

In this article, we analyse how anti-globalist conspiracy theories were mobilised online to delegitimise national authorities and policies designed to curb the Covid-19 pandemic in Canada. These conspiracy theories attacked the political authority underpinning public health measures and targeted purportedly ‘liberal’ policies and ‘globalist’ actors. Our case study examines the Freedom Convoy, a series of protests against Covid-19 vaccine mandates that began in Canada but inspired global demonstrations. The Freedom Convoy fostered and relied upon anti-globalist conspiracy theories, including the ‘Great Reset’ and ‘Great Replacement’, both of which posit a global conspiracy to erode national sovereignty and impose a ‘liberal’ international order. We investigate far-right social media commentary from 4chan’s Politically Incorrect imageboard /pol/, Infowars, and Rebel News, showing how conspiratorial claims were marshalled in alt-tech spaces. These narratives were used to delegitimise public health measures to combat Covid-19 and the Liberal Trudeau government by linking them to various ‘globalist’ forces. In exploring three mechanisms of delegitimation – externalisation, personification, and Othering – we argue that far-right movements like the Freedom Convoy, motivated by anti-globalist conspiracism, mobilise the international realm by leveraging the legitimacy gap of international organisations and agendas to undermine the political authority of actors at the national level. 

 

The Freedom Convoy (FC) began in January 2022 as a series of protests, blockades, and online campaigns opposing Covid-19 vaccine mandates for commercial truckers crossing the Canada–US border. The protests quickly evolved into a broader movement, both within Canada and internationally, against ‘globalism’ and various issues associated with liberal global governance. These issues ranged from vaccine mandates to intentional depopulation and world government. The FC, which united a loose coalition of far-right groups alongside vaccine sceptics, organised via social media and travelled across Canada to gather in Ottawa and at key border points. The movement mobilised far-right anti-globalist conspiracy theories to articulate its opposition to a range of measures associated with the World Economic Forum (WEF) and the ‘Great Reset’. 

 

Using semi-trailer trucks, protestors established an encampment and demanded the repeal of public health measures and the dissolution of the Trudeau government. Sustained by the deafening chorus of honking from 400 to 500 semi-trailer trucks and supported by approximately $24 million CAD in online donations – 56 per cent of which came from the United States – the protests grew to an estimated 10,000 people in Ottawa’s downtown core, paralysing city services for over three weeks. The Ottawa protest sparked demonstrations at provincial capitals and blockades at numerous Canada–US border crossings. It obstructed at least 19 ports of entry, resulting in $3.9 billion CAD in lost trade activity. At the Coutts Port of Entry, along the Alberta border, police uncovered a cache of guns, ammunition, a pipe bomb, and body armour. Four protestors, some with alleged ties to Diagolon – a far-right accelerationist group – were charged with conspiracy to murder RCMP officers. 

 

Driven by anti-globalist conspiracies and extremist rhetoric, the FC and the Canadian government’s invocation of the Emergencies Act to end the protest garnered significant international attention, leading to smaller but notable copycat demonstrations worldwide. Countries such as Austria, Bolivia, Israel, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, the United States, Australia, and New Zealand saw groups rally against what they perceived as the authoritarianism of public health orders, framing the situation as a populist battle for ‘freedom’ against alleged government overreach and a ‘globalist’ agenda. In Wellington and Helsinki, vehicles blocked roads around Parliament, while Paris and Brussels took steps to prohibit anti-vaccine protests inspired by the FC. French police arrested dozens of individuals and intercepted vehicles heading to Brussels. In the United States, former president Donald Trump criticised Prime Minister Trudeau as a ‘far-left lunatic’ who ‘destroyed Canada with insane COVID mandates’. Senator Ted Cruz visited the ‘People’s Convoy’ in Washington, DC, to show his support, while Florida Governor Ron DeSantis vowed to investigate GoFundMe after the crowdfunding platform suspended fundraising for the protestors. Pierre Poilievre, leader of the Conservative Party and the official opposition in Canada, enthusiastically supported the FC as a popular campaign against Trudeau and the ‘gatekeeping elite’.  In his campaign to become the next prime minister, Poilievre continues to engage with many of the groups that participated in the Convoy and to weaponise conspiracy theories that found a discursive vehicle in the protests, such as the Great Reset. 

 

Focusing on the conspiracy theories surrounding the FC that circulated online, this article explores the question: how does anti-globalist conspiracism function in the delegitimation of political authority? Contextualising these transnational protests within broader scholarly debates about the global far right and populist internationalism, this article examines how far-right populists and movements have increasingly mobilised conspiracy theories to undermine national governments and ‘elites’ associated with ‘globalist’ institutions and agendas. 

 

Our analysis illustrates that the anti-globalist conspiracism surrounding the FC functioned discursively to delegitimise the political authority of the Canadian government (and public health measures like vaccine mandates) by associating them with international institutions and ‘globalist’ agendas held responsible for the pandemic response. As we show in the following sections, conspiracist delegitimation employs three primary mechanisms: externalisation, personification, and Othering. 

 

First, externalisation involves projecting problems of national politics onto the international level and attributing their causes to foreign actors, institutions, and agendas, to the exclusion of internal/domestic processes, policies, and complex, multilevel governance structures. This process redirects concerns about domestic issues onto representative figures of the global elite, delegitimising national actors (such as Prime Minister Justin Trudeau), international institutions (like the WEF), and agendas (such as the Great Reset). Of course, this is not unique to anti-globalism; identifying foreign, international actors as the driving force in history is a fundamental feature of conspiracy theories. External figures such as Klaus Schwab, George Soros, and Bill Gates were prominent in the Convoy discourse, as was the general term ‘globalists’. Externalisation functioned discursively by linking public health measures and post-Covid recovery policies to international organisations such as the WEF, the World Health Organization (WHO), and the United Nations (UN). At the same time, externalisation obscured key factors that shaped the response, such as the division of federal and provincial powers, and the rejection of legitimate democratic processes and actors, which were discredited through their association with the legitimacy deficit of international institutions. Externalisation thus served to delegitimise democratic norms and procedures by mobilising the international and the legitimacy deficit of international institutions and agendas. 

 

Second, personification entails reducing various processes and structures to the actions of single individuals or groups – what Popper referred to as ‘psychologism’ in his early critique of conspiracism – a phenomenon also captured by terms such as ‘hyperagency’. Personification assumes that individuals hold near-total control over outcomes and that outcomes are always intended. Consequently, it attributes both unintentional effects and negative outcomes of impersonal and abstract structures to the intentional conspiratorial design of powerful individuals or groups, such as Schwab, Soros, or Gates. Domestically, Trudeau personified the Covid public health measures associated with ‘globalism’, while externally, Klaus Schwab of the WEF was considered responsible for the ‘Great Reset’. The focus on Trudeau, along with his association with Schwab, obscured the mistakes and unintended outcomes that contributed to the pandemic and simplified complex global processes into a narrative of intentional design by individuals. These processes, and the complex governance of public health, border controls, international trade, and supply chains in Canada, were reduced to the intentions of specific elites. By focusing on Trudeau and associating him with Schwab and the WEF’s Great Reset, anti-globalist conspiracism offered a simplistic diagnosis of the pandemic that challenged the legitimacy of the Canadian government and public health measures by discursively linking the prime minister to elitist, illegitimate, and undemocratic forces of ‘globalism’. 

 

Finally, Othering draws on racist, civilisational, and gendered discourses to identify those allegedly engaging in or facilitating conspiratorial behaviour intended to alter social norms and practices against the values and interests of the national community. Certain groups are consistently Othered in anti-globalist conspiracism, including Jews, homosexuals, and communists, either explicitly or through the use of coded language like ‘globalists’. As we explore in subsequent sections, the FC online narratives focused their discursive energy on these ‘Others’, with communists (Trudeau and Castro), women and homosexuals (globohomo), and Jews (George Soros) all featured in the discourse about the FC. 

 

Through an analysis of the anti-globalist conspiracy theories that discursively fuelled the FC, this article makes a twofold contribution to International Relations (IR). First, it adds to the emerging body of research situated at the intersection of IR, the global far right, and conspiracy theories by extending the study of anti-globalist conspiracism beyond the realms of populist foreign policy and far-right ideology to focus on alt-tech spaces, which are becoming increasingly influential in these movements. Second, this article advances the study of populist internationalism by highlighting the role of anti-globalist conspiracism in the FC’s resistance to the perceived forces of globalism, and by analysing the mechanisms of delegitimation directed towards national authorities, who were cast as front organisations for global elites. 

 

Before analysing the process of conspiracist delegitimation in the alt-tech space, the following section reviews the multidisciplinary literature on conspiracy theory. While existing scholarship identifies individual and cultural responses to globalisation, it has not sufficiently addressed the national and international political dynamics at the root of anti-globalist conspiracism. Subsequently, we examine the emerging scholarship on conspiracy theory in IR. We then turn quickly to the literature on the global far right, which has drawn attention to the internationalisation of the far right but has largely neglected anti-globalist conspiracism. Finally, before the empirical analysis, we outline our methodological approach.

The Aesthetic Turn and the Absurd Turn

'Sovereignty and the Persistence of the Aesthetic' by Illan Wall and Daniel Matthews in (2024) Modern Law Review comments 

British constitutional thought tends to understand sovereignty in legalistic terms, with the concept often equated with the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. In the absence of a developed theory of popular sovereignty, sovereignty has become largely synonymous with this rule concerning the legislative competence of parliament. As Loughlin and Tierney have recently argued, this approach obscures the political dimensions of sovereignty which undergird the legal precept. They describe sovereignty as taking shape through the ongoing articulation of both legal and political relations. As Loughlin has argued elsewhere, sovereignty is best understood as having the form of a ‘double helix’ with the legal and the political running as anti-parallel strands. This article seeks to supplement this approach, arguing that instead of a doubled relation between law and politics, we should instead conceptualise a threefold process in which the legal, the political and the aesthetic are the essential elements which constitute sovereign forms. 

The article has two aims. The first is to retrieve, and give prominence to, the aesthetic dimensions of sovereignty within the history of political modernity. In the next section, we introduce the nature of aesthetics – as both a matter of appearances and perceptions – and indicate some of the reasons why this aspect of civil order has often been elided. Following this (in the third section) we engage with some well-known articulations of sovereignty − from the Hobbesian imaging of sovereignty, to early-modern efforts to map sovereign territory; from Rousseau's evocation of national sentiment, to Burke's description of how ‘dignity’ and ‘majesty’ are essential to the claim to sovereignty − before we conclude by examining the habituated feelings and instincts which Bentham understood to be central to the reproduction of sovereign relations. Our reading of this history draws out how the aesthetic persists across these varied approaches, but also aims to give a sense of the diversity of functions the aesthetic fulfils vis-à-vis sovereignty. Our account is obviously incomplete, both in terms of personnel and the range of aesthetic qualities it surveys; we tend to emphasise, for instance, the visual and affective qualities more than the sonic or haptic dimensions of sense perception. Nonetheless, our aim is to give priority to the aesthetic within the tradition of writing on sovereignty, in contrast to dominant approaches within constitutional thought which have either ignored, downplayed or obscured these concerns. 

Our second aim is more speculative. Whilst our reading of the history of political modernity suggests an important corrective, which draws out often underappreciated themes, it tells us nothing of how the aesthetic should be included in a theory of sovereignty. In a final, shorter, fourth section of the article we consider the different ways in which the aesthetic might be incorporated into constitutional theory, identifying three theses on the aesthetics of sovereignty: a totalisation thesis; an inadvertent or ‘weak’ inclusion; and finally, a ‘strong’ inclusion of the aesthetic, which we ultimately endorse. We conclude by suggesting that Loughlin's account of the double helix structure of sovereignty might be amended, contending that sovereignty takes the form of a triple helix in which law, politics and aesthetics are the strands which constitute the basic structure of the concept. Our aim here is speculative in that our approach opens the theorisation of sovereignty to new terrain, by insisting that the concept – particularly in the context of legal studies – needs to embrace not simply political but a range of aesthetic qualities and concerns if its meaning, implications and enduring importance are to be fully appreciated.

Claims in Turnbull v Clarence Valley Council [2023] NSWSC 83 reflect what might be unkindly characterised as pseudolaw as a manifestation of an absurd turn.

The judgment states 

 Mr Turnbull pursues damages in excess of $25 million against the Clarence Valley Council, most of it said to be the result of various claimed unlawfulness and the rest, wrongdoing by the Council specifically towards him. 

The proceedings are the result of events which began in February 2019 when Mr Turnbull was erecting a building on a property at Pillar Valley, owned by the grandparents of his children, without having sought prior Council approval. He claims that after he returned from an overseas trip, he found a stop work order issued by the Council, which amounted to his eviction from the property. ... Mr Turnbull claimed that as a result, he was wrongly left homeless, sleeping on the streets where he was subjected to ongoing harassment by employees of the Council, when he was fined for parking his motor home contrary to parking signs Council had erected. 

Mr Turnbull’s amended statement of claim pleads many events and his resulting beliefs and opinions about the illegality of the Council and its actions, as well as:

(1) numerous claimed breaches of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) allegedly committed by the Council, including when Council rangers issued him with three fines for parking and sleeping in a public car park where a no parking between the hours of 12 am and 5 am had been erected. Other alleged offences included treachery by intending to overthrow the Commonwealth Constitution; obtaining a financial advantage by deception; dishonestly causing a loss; and conspiracy to defraud; 

(2) numerous claimed breaches of the Commonwealth Constitution, referenda to amend it to refer to local government having failed; 

(3) racketeering by Council, in various alleged ways; 

(4) that the Council is a corporation with a CAN number; (5) that the Council had denied his right to exist, injecting themselves into his life as a “Mafia crime syndicate” would do, setting up a rule book of unlawful laws, acts, permits and certificates, in order to steal from and control people and all the land; 

(6) that the Council is responsible for land use regulations as directed by the State and thus also responsible for increased land valuations which preclude people from land ownership; result in the enforcement of unlawful laws; and the unlawful restriction of privately owned land; and 

(7) the Council wrongfully outlawing camping in various areas where homeless people sleep in cars during sleeping hours.

The claims are defended by the Council.

The Court states 

... Mr Turnbull relied on affidavits and other documents and a USB which he had served before the hearing, as well as written and oral submissions in which he explained his case. That included his various beliefs and opinions and why he resisted the orders which the Council pursued. In the circumstances, I am satisfied both that he did have a reasonable opportunity to advance his case and that he took advantage of it, given all that he relied on. 

That included, for example, claims such as

• that it was treachery for the State to enforce a stop work order using laws that contravened the Commonwealth Constitution; 

• that there had been alleged intentional frauds and conspiracies pursued, including one that had been uncovered in the 1960s and involved secret IMF banking policies to control the global financial system and all governments under a world government; 

• that other conspiracies had been pursued by Australian prime ministers, to remove the people from the Commonwealth of Australia; 

• his understanding of God’s laws; and 

• that before the 1993 enactment of the Local Government Act 1993 (NSW), everyone who owned land had specified rights, including the right to build any dwelling or structure there, or any number of buildings and since then, the system had gone mad at the expense of peace, welfare and good government. 

Mr Turnbull also advanced explanations for his conduct and events which had unfolded. They included, for example: 

a statement and declaration of truth affidavit, where Mr Turnbull states that his purpose (occupation) is “Galactic Emissary”; explains that he is the living man incarnated into Christopher Luke of the tribe/family/house/clan Turnbull; explains his various beliefs about matters such as the soul, the living man and competence; as well as various assertions, including about his own Universal sovereignty; deficiencies in his birth registration; that he is not lost at sea; claimed fictions; personage flowing from the Creator; and claimed violations of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, on which he relies, despite his rejection of the United Nations. It, he says is a false authority and fictitious entity of identified claimed governments, including of this State. He also explains the reclaimed rights of his living body; private property; privacy data; as well as presumptions of claimed law on which he relied, including as to contracts, legal liability and the consequences of claimed responses, including silence. This statement was said to be given in order to: “i. establish, signify, proclaim, and verify the status of this living being; and ii. to eliminate/deny any and all presumptions by any and all fictitious, corporate or private entities; and iii. to rebut any and all alleged claimed authority and/or jurisdiction of any and all fictitious, corporate or private entities, over the deponent, those entities being without standing upon the land”; 

photographs of the building before and after Mr Turnbull began to erect it on the property, in addition to those taken by the Council on its inspection; 

a USB containing other documents and links to videos on which Mr Turnbull relies. They include videos which he has taken on occasions when he spoke and at times shouted at a Council ranger and another Council employee and others where someone is riding a motorbike around a campground, filming what is there to be seen; photographs of vehicles; as well as a link to a YouTube video, First Nation Mandamus. There people explain their call for an International Human Rights Abuse Tribunal to be conducted in relation to the genocide of Indigenous Australians, the oldest living culture on the planet and their reasons for that call. They include their sovereignty over the land which they have retaken; their need to protect their children, who they consider have been stolen from them and their call for a meeting with King Charles, for reasons which they explain; a notice issued to Council by the Velvet Revolution, which Mr Turnbull claims evidences service of a Moratorium on all Local Council members, charging them with misprision of treason, which rested on the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), UK legislation, the Nuremburg Code, Helsinki Code and Magna Carta, as well as claimed inalienable rights; and a statement by Ms Lascelles, a Council Ranger, about parking infringement notices issued to Mr Turnbull.

Mr Turnbull claimed in his extensive submissions, that what he relies on, including late served documents to which objection was taken based on relevance and in one case, disputed authenticity, establishes the illegality and wrongfulness of the Council’s actions, which he would be able to prove at trial. 

The disputed documents were received on the motion on the basis that the weight which they could be given would have to be determined, given their contents and the cases which the parties advanced. 

In the case of the document claimed to be a copy of a letter written by the former Chief Justice Sir Harry Gibbs, said to have been published in May 2021 by “TrueBlue Observer”, I am satisfied, having considered it, that it can be given no real weight. That is because the document does not take the form of a letter; is headed “Explanatory Statement”; contains a photograph of Sir Harry; is not printed on letterhead; and is neither dated nor signed. That it is a copy of the letter which Mr Turnbull understands it to be, is thus not apparent. 

Shortly before the hearing Mr Turnbull had also served what he claimed to be an interlocutory application brought to this people’s Court under the common law, which serves the interest of this land, Terra Australis, which he considered had to be determined before the motion. What he thereby sought to pursue was allegations that the Council had not served evidence about matters such as its authority to conduct business on this land; ownership of buildings, caravan parks and reserves; and authority over him as a living man. 

I am satisfied that what is sought to be pursued by this application does not require consideration before the motion is heard and determined, the motion having been listed for hearing as it was, and the parties having complied as they had with the Court’s orders as to the service of their evidence and submissions. But I have taken into account what Mr Turnbull thereby sought to advance, the document being in evidence, in coming to a conclusion about the matters over which the parties joined issue. ... x ... 

 The Council’s case is that Mr Turnbull advances baseless claims against it which are frivolous and vexatious; have no conceivable prospects of success and so should be struck out. Further, that the proceedings should be dismissed, constituting as they do an abuse of the Court’s process which has a tendency to cause prejudice and embarrassment, given various scandalous and irrelevant claims advanced by Mr Turnbull in his affidavits and submissions. ...

The relevant law, which I will come to, is also well settled. Contrary to Mr Turnbull’s case, binding authority is contrary to the claims which he seeks to litigate. In the result, for reasons which I will explain, I am satisfied that the orders sought by the Council must be made, having approached what lies in issue between the parties in accordance with the authorities earlier referred to. On the evidence the Council has established, as it must, that the claims Mr Turnbull seeks to advance are untenable. 

The existence and authority of the Council 

Mr Turnbull has provided answers to particulars which the Council sought, on which it relied in its case. For his part Mr Turnbull also relied on those particulars, expanding them by his written and oral submissions. In essence he contends that there is no legal basis for the Council’s existence, claims which it contends are misconceived. 

Mr Turnbull advanced his arguments as to the claimed illegality which he seeks to pursue in various ways. This includes that the Local Government Act involves a conspiracy to overthrow the Commonwealth Constitution at the instigation of international bankers. As well as claims such as that all Prime Ministers have been paedophiles, without morals or ethics and susceptible to corruption and blackmail; that since 1923 there has been treason pursued in government to overthrow the Constitution; and that there is an ongoing campaign to overthrow the country’s political system, Constitution and money system. He also referred to an alleged conspiracy in relation to COVID-19. 

The case so advanced and the evidence Mr Turnbull relies on, all explain the Council’s submission that Mr Turnbull’s claims are frivolous and vexatious and without prospects of success. 

Some of what Mr Turnbull advances is unknown to the law and substantial aspects of the case he seeks to pursue have already been unsuccessfully pursued by others. Authorities by which the Court, as presently constituted, is bound, rejecting the kinds of case and arguments which he seeks to pursue, thus cannot be ignored. 

Mr Turnbull relies on ss 5 and 51 of the Constitution Act 1902 (NSW). His case is that the Local Government Act is not lawful, given the failure in 1974 and 1988 of referenda which sought to amend the Commonwealth Constitution. In the result he contends that municipal institutions and local government such as the Council are a department of a State government. Further, he said in oral submissions the Council is itself a corporation and he relies on s 109 of the Constitution, which provides for Commonwealth laws to prevail over State laws in the event of inconsistency, to support his case as to the illegality of the Council and the actions which it pursued, which resulted in his departure from the property. 

The claimed illegality on which Mr Turnbull relies underpins and is intertwined in the various ways he explained, in all aspects of the case which he seeks to pursue, including in respect of his agreements with the landowners. 

Mr Turnbull thus does not accept that his departure having been the result of the written agreement which he entered with the landowners, he must pursue any resulting grievance which he has with them. He considers that they had been coerced by Council to seek the approval which they obtained unnecessarily, with the result his eviction, for which the Council is responsible. 

I am satisfied that despite the way in which Mr Turnbull’s arguments were variously advanced, there is no reasonably available argument that the Local Government Act is inconsistent with the Commonwealth Constitution, or that it or the Council suffer from any illegality. The Constitution makes no reference to local government. That referenda which sought to insert such references in the Constitution failed is irrelevant to the laws made by the NSW Parliament, as its Constitution Act permits. 

Mr Turnbull does not rely on any Commonwealth legislation to advance his notions, on which his argument under s 109 of the Commonwealth Constitution depends. That the Local Government Act is not a legislative scheme which the NSW Parliament was empowered by the Constitution Act to make, is thus not a tenable argument. 

Further, what was decided in R v Vorhauer [2002] NSWCCA 483, where a number of similar claims were advanced, is binding and contrary to Mr Turnbull’s claims. 

There it was also contended that local Councils “are unconstitutional by reason of the failure of the constitutional referendum which would have included a reference in the Australian Constitution to local government”: at [14]. This was rejected, Spigelman CJ observing “There is no logic in this. Local governments are created by State legislation under the respective State Constitutions. The absence of any reference to local government in the Australian Constitution is just irrelevant”: at [14]. This conclusion was confirmed in Vorhauer v R [2007] NSWCCA 125 at [41]. 

The enactment of the Local Government Act has also been found to fall within the plenary power given the State Parliament by s 5 of the NSW Constitution: Hoxton Park Residents Action Group Inc v Liverpool City Council (No 2) [2011] NSWCA 363. There it was explained that “State laws may be invalid to the extent of any inconsistency with a valid law of the Commonwealth (Constitution, s 109) but a constraint on state legislative power must otherwise derive either from a specific provision of the Constitution or from an implication as to its operation, which necessarily impinges on state legislative power”: at [40]. Mr Turnbull also claims the Council is a corporation, but in Hoxton Park it was also observed at [44] that before the commencement of the Local Government Amendment (Legal Status) Act 2008 (NSW) on 20 November 2008, a council was said to be a body corporate. But that this was altered by these 2008 amendments, which introduced a new s 220. It still provides:

220 Legal status of a council (1) A council is a body politic of the State with perpetual succession and the legal capacity and powers of an individual, both in and outside the State. (2) A council is not a body corporate (including a corporation). (3) A council does not have the status, privileges and immunities of the Crown (including the State and the Government of the State). (4) A law of the State applies to and in respect of a council in the same way as it applies to and in respect of a body corporate (including a corporation).

It was also observed at [48] of Hoxton Park: that the power to enact this provision came from s 5 of the Constitution Act, which provides for the making of laws “for the peace, welfare and good government of New South Wales in all cases whatsoever”, subject to the provisions of the Commonwealth Constitution. While Mr Turnbull contends that the Council’s conduct has been contrary to the peace, welfare, and good government there envisaged, such opinions provide no basis for the conclusion that the Local Government Act is infected by illegality. The Constitution Act also provides in s 51: 51 Local government

(1) There shall continue to be a system of local government for the State under which duly elected or duly appointed local government bodies are constituted with responsibilities for acting for the better government of those parts of the State that are from time to time subject to that system of local government. (2) The manner in which local government bodies are constituted and the nature and extent of their powers, authorities, duties and functions shall be as determined by or in accordance with laws of the Legislature. (3) The reference in subsection (2) to laws of the Legislature shall be read as a reference to laws that have been enacted by the Legislature, whether before or after the commencement of this section, and that are for the time being in force.

Thus it was concluded in Hoxton Park that “While there may remain real questions as to the legal status of a council for different purposes, it is not possible to contend that s 220 [of the Local Government Act] fails to establish a collective body capable of exercising statutory functions, and particularly the consideration of the development applications in respect of land within geographically defined boundaries”: at [57]. 

In the result I am satisfied that it must be accepted that Mr Turnbull’s claims, resting as they do on his understanding of the meaning and operation of the Australian Constitution and Constitution Act, the illegality of the Local Government Act and the non-existence and lack of relevant authority of the Council under that legislative scheme, which has been rejected in these cases, do not disclose that he has any legally tenable cause of action for the claims which he seeks to advance. 

That includes his complaints about the Council’s operation of its campgrounds and reserves and its regulation of parking there and the claims he advances about the three fines imposed upon him as the result of actions taken by its rangers. 

Racketeering and other alleged offending 

The claims advanced in respect of alleged racketeering, conspiracy and other alleged Commonwealth offences similarly disclose no tenable cause of action, advanced as they are by way of Mr Turnbull’s opinions about the illegality of various laws and the conspiracies to which he referred. 

These claims relate to Mr Turnbull’s views about land usage; what can be built on real property; parking laws and fines imposed for breach of them; the regulation of camping grounds; claims advanced in relation to Councils’ claimed responsibility for increases in land value over time, which Mr Turnbull believes has impoverished people and wrongly precluded them from land ownership; as well as the claimed wrongful issue of the stop work order. 

Contrary to Mr Turnbull’s understanding, what he seeks to pursue also does not depend on the prior authorisation by first nations people of steps which the Council pursued, about which Mr Turnbull complains. They are simply not given such powers, by either the Commonwealth or State Constitutions nor any laws made under them to which he referred, even if the Council has recognised such peoples to be traditional landowners of the land falling within its local council area.  

Nor are the laws of God, as Mr Turnbull claims them to be, relevant to his claims. Australia’s legal system is the product of the common law and the legislative actions of British, Commonwealth and State parliaments. All are the result of steps which human beings, not the divine, have taken over the course of centuries, no matter what opinions Mr Turnbull has about them. 

In the result it must be accepted that these claims also have no tenable prospects of success. 

Claimed breaches of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 

Mr Turnbull also particularised his reliance on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and its claimed breaches by the Council, to advance his claims. But what Mr Turnbull so claimed and what he submitted about the Declaration was somewhat contradictory. 

But in so far as he relies on claimed breaches of the Declaration, I agree with the observations of Garling J in Rahman v Dubs [2012] NSWSC 1065 at [55]-[56]. 

Contrary to Mr Turnbull’s case, I consider that his Honour was correct in observing that causes of action based on breaches of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights are not justiciable in this Court. There being no domestic Commonwealth or State legislation which makes it part of the law of NSW, a claimed breach of the Declaration is not justiciable, applying Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Ah Hin Teoh (1995) 183 CLR 273; [1995] HCA 20.

On appeal in Turnbull v Clarence Valley Council [2023] NSWCA 295 Court stated 

 The applicant (who identifies himself as “‘Christopher Luke’ of the family ‘Turnbull’ for the appellant ‘Christopher Turnbull’”) seeks leave to appeal against orders made on 14 February 2023 in the Common Law Division of the Supreme Court dismissing with costs proceedings commenced by him by Statement of Claim filed on 15 March 2022: Turnbull v Clarence Valley Council [2023] NSWSC 83. The applicant filed an amended Statement of Claim on 1 August 2022. He named the Clarence Valley Council (the respondent) as the sole defendant. On 17 August 2022 the respondent filed a notice of motion seeking, in the alternative: (1) an order pursuant to Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW), r 13.4(1)(b) (“UCPR”) that the proceedings be dismissed on the basis that no reasonable cause of action is disclosed; (2) an order pursuant to UCPR 13.4(1)(c) that the proceedings be dismissed as disclosing no cause of action for personal injury or wrong against the second defendant (it may be that “second defendant” is a typographical error – as noted above, only one defendant is named in the Statement of Claim and the Amended Statement of Claim); or on the basis that the proceedings are an abuse of process; (3) an order pursuant to UCPR r 14.28 that the proceedings (the Amended Statement of Claim) be struck out on the basis that the Amended Statement of Claim – (a) discloses no cause of action appropriate to the nature of the pleading or (b) has a tendency to cause prejudice, embarrassment or delay in the proceedings; or (c) is otherwise an abuse of process of the court. On 8 November 2022 the respondent’s notice of motion was fixed for hearing on 6 February 2023. On 30 January 2023 the applicant served on the solicitors for the respondent (but did not file) a document entitled “Interlocutory Application” and an affidavit sworn on 27 January 2023. In para 1 of the “Interlocutory Application” the applicant sought orders that the respondent “under Discovery ... provide written evidence” of: “(i) [the respondent’s] claim of Authority to conduct business on the land known as ‘Terra Australis’, and local areas known as ‘Bundjalung, Gumbaynggirr and Yaegl’[;] (ii) [the respondent’s] claim of Authority over ‘the claimant’, so as to make its claim over ‘the claimant’[;] (iii) [the respondent’s] claim of ownership of all its listed caravan camping grounds and parks, reserves and buildings.” In para 2 the applicant sought an injunction “to restrain or prevent the matter proceeding” until the documents sought were supplied and “a judge has ruled on each of the matters raised in 1. above”. In para 3 he claimed “and if such written evidence cannot be produced within 14 days, that the matter be ruled in favour of ‘the claimant’ and awarded in full including court costs”. As directed, the respondent’s notice of motion came on for hearing before the primary judge on 6 February 2023. The primary judge rejected the applicant’s request that his 30 January 2023 notice of motion be determined prior to the respondent’s 17 August 2022 notice of motion. As indicated above, after a contested hearing the primary judge made an order, pursuant to UCPR r 13.4(1)(b) that the proceedings be dismissed (on the basis that the Amended Statement of Claim disclosed no reasonable cause of action). 

The proceedings in the Supreme Court 

Having regard to the reasoning of the primary judge and the application for leave to appeal, it is necessary to begin by reference to the Amended Statement of Claim. 

The origin of the proceedings brought by the applicant appears to be his construction of a building, on land owned by “the grandparents of [the applicant’s] children” in the local government area controlled by the respondent. The Amended Statement of Claim begins with a narrative, recounted over more than two pages of typescript, of events said to have taken place in the early part of 2019. Put shortly, the applicant pleaded that, with the permission of the owners of the land, he had commenced the erection of a “shed” on the land, the purpose of which was to provide a workshop in which he could construct motor homes for sale. The applicant pleaded that, while he was out of the country on a short vacation, employees of the respondent had issued a “stop work” order on the construction on the basis that it was not a shed, but a dwelling, for which no development approval had been granted. The applicant recorded in the Amended Statement of Claim some confrontations with employees of the respondent. ... He pleaded that the so-called unlawful order constituted breaches of several provisions of the Local Government Act 1993 (NSW) as well as criminal offences under various provisions of the Criminal Code (Cth), including “Treatchory” (having been done with the intention of overthrowing the Commonwealth Government); conspiracy to defraud, and numerous others. The applicant also pleaded that the conduct constituted breaches (apparently of Articles 3, 8, 17 and 30) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. ... 

The applicant pleaded that this conduct was unlawful, that the respondent had “no legal law to exist with their self-entitled powers called Local Government Act 1993”. This, he pleaded, was because local government is not mentioned in the Australian Constitution, and because, in a referendum in 1988, Australian electors had declined to insert recognition of local government into the Constitution. The applicant then pleaded that the respondent had: “...made itself into a corporation with an ACN number, and pretended to represent the people of the commonwealth, but in fact, was not legitimate, and has been operating unlawfully ever since.” (WB 84 [58]). The applicant pleaded that the respondent had: “...made themselves the owners of all camping and caravan parks in the entire shire and made rules and regulations to keep the people under their power unlawfully when they have no right or power to empower themselves.” WB 84[59] He pleaded that, in doing so, the respondent had committed the same criminal offences as he had previously identified, and breaches of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The applicant next pleaded that the respondent’s conduct was “a classic case of racketeering”. He again pleaded that the respondent had committed the same criminal offences and breaches of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The applicant claimed “personal compensation” of $25,000,000, compensation for loss of income of $735,000, damages for loss of a stable place “for my lifestyle, workshop and place to park my life” of $128,700, personal compensation for harassment by the respondent of $100,000, and loss of tools and belongings of $15,000. (WB 87) 

On 22 November 2023 the applicant served on the respondent a “Statement and Declaration of Truth Affidavit”, which covered 43 pages of typescript. This was summarised by the primary judge as follows at [11]: “... [the applicant] states that his purpose (occupation) is ‘Galactic Emissary’; explains that he is the living man incarnated into Christopher Luke of the tribe/family/house/clan Turnbull; explains his various beliefs about matters such as the soul, the living man and competence; as well as various assertions, including about his own Universal sovereignty; deficiencies in his birth registration; that he is not lost at sea; claimed fictions; personage flowing from the Creator; and claimed violations of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, on which he relies, despite his rejection of the United Nations. It, he says is a false authority and fictitious entity of identified claimed governments, including of this State. He also explains the reclaimed rights of his living body; private property; privacy data; as well as presumptions of claimed law on which he relied, including as to contracts, legal liability and the consequences of claimed responses, including silence.” 

The “affidavit” opened with a statement of what were said to be “internationally accepted Maxims and Principles of Law”, and, in para 2, stated: “This ‘Statement and Declaration of Truth’/‘Affidavit’ is given to all in order to; i establish, signify, proclaim, and verify the status of this living being; and ii to eliminate/deny any and all presumption by any and all fictitious, corporate or private entities; and iii to rebut any and all alleged claimed authority and/or jurisdiction of any and all fictitious, corporate or private entities, over the deponent, those entities being without standing upon the land ... .” (WB 257) 

There was a great deal more in the Affidavit. For example, the applicant asserted:

4 We are a cosmic consciousness, also referred to as a ‘soul’; and 

5 We are a vibrational awareness; ... 

9 We are an aspect/creation of All That Is the Supreme Consciousness, also known as the Collective Consciousness, Allah, Yahweh, Source, and/or God Almighty, hereafter referred to as ‘The Creator’ ... 

17 Our ‘soul’ has had many incarnations in this ‘Earthly’ realm.” 

There were many more pages of similar assertions. Some can be related to the claims made in the Amended Statement of Claim. The applicant gave his “purpose (occupation)” as “Galactic Emissary”. 

The proceedings in the Supreme Court 

As mentioned above, the primary judge rejected the applicant’s request that his “Interlocutory application” of 30 January 2023 be addressed before the respondent’s earlier filed notice of motion. By reference to the “Statement and Declaration of Truth”, as well as to the Amended Statement of Claim, and other evidence provided by both the applicant and the respondent, the primary judge concluded that all the applicant’s claims are untenable. Her Honour dealt with the applicant’s claims under five headings, as follows: existence and authority of the respondent; allegations of racketeering; claimed breaches of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; alleged breaches of the Local Government Act; and damages claimed. 

Her Honour concluded, in each case, that the applicant’s claims were untenable. 

With respect to the applicant’s argument concerning “the existence and authority of [the applicant]”, her Honour concluded at [44]: “I am satisfied that despite the way in which [the applicant’s] arguments were variously advanced, there is no reasonably available argument that the Local Government Act is inconsistent with the Commonwealth Constitution, or that it or the [respondent] suffer from any illegality. The Constitution makes no reference to local government. That referenda which sought to insert such references in the Constitution failed is irrelevant to the laws made by the NSW Parliament, as its Constitution Act [1902 (NSW)] permits.” 

With respect to the applicant’s claims of “racketeering and other alleged offending”, her Honour recounted, in summary form, the applicant’s contentions, which included contentions concerning the respondent’s powers concerning land usage, the absence of prior authorisation by First Nation’s people and “the laws of God”. Her Honour considered (at [55]-[59]) that these claims also were untenable. 

Her Honour considered that the applicant’s claims of breaches of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights were not justiciable in the Supreme Court, there being no domestic, Commonwealth or state legislation making the provisions of the Declaration part of domestic law: at [60-[62]. Her Honour devoted several paragraphs to the applicant’s claim of breaches of the Local Government Act, but found that these, too, were untenable: at [63]-[76]. Her Honour then recorded the applicant’s claims for damages and concluded that there was no conceivable basis for the award of the claimed damages, noting that the applicant’s breaches of parking regulations were not disputed and that there was no basis for the applicant’s claims of illegality of the regulations. 

Her Honour considered that the “real question” was whether the applicant should be given leave to replead. At [32] she acknowledged that proceedings should not be dismissed if there may be a real question to be tried, but also recognised that, if there is a high degree of certainty about the ultimate outcome if the proceedings were allowed to go to trial and it appears that there is no legally tenable cause of action, summary dismissal is the appropriate course. Her Honour cited authority to that effect. 

The application for leave to appeal 

The applicant purported to file a notice of appeal on 25 May 2023 which he served on the respondent on 5 June 2023. At a directions hearing on 21 June 2023 the applicant was advised by the Registrar that, as the orders against which he sought to appeal were interlocutory, his proposed appeal required leave: Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW), s 101(2)(e). On 14 July 2023 the applicant filed a Summons Seeking Leave to Appeal. The grounds of appeal are stated (in the purported Notice of Appeal, which I will treat as a Draft Notice of Appeal) as:

“1. Conflict of interest of Judge ‘Schmidt AJ’ as she did not declare that she is a member of the ‘BAR’, and did not declare that she works for ‘SUPREME COURT’ no authority. 2. Lack of due process, as the interlocutory Application was not dealt with. 3. Not given the right to be heard by a Jury. 4. No one living man can sit in Judgment of another living man. ‘MAXIM OF LAW’ 5. Unchallenged Statement and Declaration of Truth Affidavit has been breached [with reference to paragraph numbers].”

The applicant sought orders that the appeal be allowed, “the [unspecified] allegations be dismissed”, that his notice of motion “be completed”, trial by a jury, and that the matter be “reheard de novo” (WB 26). The applicant provided a Summary of Argument in support of his summons seeking leave to appeal. This document consisted of 76 short paragraphs, all except two of which state a different proposition. The propositions bear little, if any, relation to the grounds stated in the purported Notice of Appeal. I set out below samples of the applicant’s propositions, with comments. The applicant’s sixth proposition was as follows: “6. I seek leave on the basis that due process was not followed.” There was no further explanation of the failure to follow due process. It may be taken that this was a reference to the rejection by the primary judge of the applicant’s request that his “Interlocutory application” be dealt with before the respondent’s notice of motion. The determination of the primary judge to deal with the respondent’s notice of motion was both open to her as a matter of discretion, and logical. Acceptance of the respondent’s contentions could have resulted (and did result) in the termination of the proceedings. The respondent was entitled to have its notice of motion disposed of before being required to respond to the applicant’s belated “Interlocutory application”. 

The applicant’s tenth proposition was: “10. The Judge has not addressed Constitutional issues involving its validity.” This is incorrect: the primary judge, at [44] rejected the applicant’s contentions of Constitutional invalidity. The applicant’s twelfth proposition was: “12. The Judge has not addressed the Separation of Powers.” No issue of separation of powers was raised by the applicant, and his contention in the Summary of Argument is not further explained. 

The applicant subsequently submitted that:

“24. The Judge has not addressed the issue of First Nations People and their calls for Justice. ... 34. The Judge has not addressed my title of Galactic Emissary and Diplomat. ... 37. The Judge has exhibited a deliberate bias in characterising and referring to me as a ‘citizen’ or a ‘person’ and calling me ‘Mr Turnbull’ so as to bring it under a jurisdiction of her choice and not of the matter.”

The applicant has not explained the relevance of his claim to the title of Galactic Emissary. No issue was raised before the primary judge as to his status in this respect. Nor was any issue raised in the Amended Statement of Claim about First Nations people; a contention that the powers of the respondent depend on the consent of First Nations peoples was dealt with, correctly, by the primary judge at [57]: “[First Nations people] are simply not given such powers, by either the Commonwealth or State Constitutions nor any laws made under them to which he referred, even if the Council has recognised such peoples to be traditional landowners of the land falling within its local council area.” His complaints about being referred to as a “citizen”, or “person”, or as “Mr Turnbull” are not explained. 

Further propositions were as follows:

“38. The Judge has consented to the press-ganging of our land and financial assets and those of our ancestors. ... 

42. The Judge has failed to mention her oath or membership with the ‘Private Bar Guild’. ... 

44. The Judge has failed to address my agreement with the Creator and its authority over all other earth based agreements and authority. 

The meaning of “press-ganging of our land” is obscure, as is the complaint about the primary judge’s oath or membership of “the Private Bar Guild”. Neither was raised during the proceedings. No issue was raised about the applicant’s agreement with the Creator. 

This is only a small sample of the applicant’s propositions contained in the Summary of Argument. I have read and considered each of the propositions. Nothing in those propositions establishes any error on the part of the primary judge. In my opinion the primary judge correctly disposed of all contentions made by the applicant in the proceedings before her. 

At the commencement of the hearing of the application for leave to appeal the applicant provided a document setting out his “Arguments for appeal”, under 11 headings. 

The first heading was “Procedure”. The applicant referred to the decision of this Court in Goktas v Government Insurance Office (NSW) (1993) 31 NSWLR 684, which is a decision concerned with apprehended bias by a judicial officer. Apart from his complaint about being referred to as a “citizen”, “a person” or “Mr Turnbull”, the applicant identified no factual basis for any apprehended bias on the part of the primary judge. The argument may relate to the ground of appeal that complains that the primary judge failed to declare her membership of “the BAR”, and that she “works for ‘SUPREME COURT’”. If the applicant’s complaint is reference to the primary judge’s asserted membership of the NSW Bar Association, there is no evidence of any such membership, and if, indeed, her Honour is a member (or associate member) of that organisation, it provides no basis for an assertion of apprehended bias. That the primary judge “works for the Supreme Court” must be obvious; the proceedings would not have been before her Honour had she not held a commission as an acting judge of the Supreme Court. The ninth heading in the applicant’s argument was “apprehended bias”. The argument made under that heading was that the primary judge did not admit the applicant’s affidavit into evidence. That assertion is incorrect. Her Honour did admit the affidavit and referred to parts of it in her judgment. 

The second heading in the applicant’s argument was “Circumstances arising during the hearing”. The applicant complained that the primary judge made “adverse observations” during the course of the hearing. The bulk of the applicant’s submissions under this heading concerned her Honour’s decision not to deal with his “Interlocutory application” before dealing with the respondent’s notice of motion. I have addressed this argument at [29] above. Under this heading the applicant also made reference to authorities concerning “undue interference by a judge”. Apart from, again, making reference to the primary judge’s determination to deal with the respondent’s notice of motion first, the applicant did not identify any instance of undue interference by the primary judge. 

The third heading in the applicant’s argument was “the opinion rule”, with reference to s 76 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) and to the decision of the High Court in Dasreef Pty Ltd v Hawchar (2011) 243 CLR 588; [2011] HCA 21. The applicant did not identify any instance in the proceedings before the primary judge in which opinion evidence was tendered and either admitted or rejected. This contention was that his affidavit: “...has to [be] accepted as it is, with all its relevance to the case, and it’s unrebutted authority, [sic] and, as the Council has failed to provide evidence requested in email of ownership and authority ... that brings the Interlocutory application into relevance as a priority, and has been requested of the court to make orders for ... [the sentence is incomplete].” The opinion rule was not invoked in the proceedings before the primary judge and has no bearing on the present application for leave to appeal. 

The fourth, fifth and sixth headings in the applicant’s argument were, respectively, “Discovery and inspection during proceedings”, “Discovery generally”, and “Relevant documents”. The applicant referred to UCPR r 21.2(1). He asserted that his “Interlocutory application” was a “document of discovery and is in alignment with rule for, order for discovery, of documents during proceedings”. That assertion is plainly incorrect. I have dealt with the primary judge’s treatment of the “Interlocutory application” at [29], above. No formal application for an order for discovery has been made and no order has been made. Discovery was immaterial in the proceedings before the primary judge, which were concerned with whether the Amended Statement of Claim disclosed any reasonable cause of action, had a tendency to cause prejudice, embarrassment or delay in the proceedings or was otherwise an abuse of the process of the court. The applicant also made reference to an Equity Division Practice Note concerning discovery. This is plainly immaterial to the present proceedings. 

The seventh heading in the applicant’s argument is “Jurisdiction”. The applicant referred to s 66(1) of the Supreme Court Act, which empowers the Supreme Court to grant orders restraining any threatened breach of contract or other injury. The applicant contended that the respondent had “breached a contract that [he] had in place”. Presumably, this was a reference to the arrangement he had with the owners of the land on which building the subject of the respondent’s “stop work” order was being constructed, which (the applicant asserts) was terminated as a result of the stop work order issued by the respondent. 

Again, the applicant’s argument was that his Interlocutory application should have been dealt with before the respondent’s notice of motion. I have disposed of this argument above. 

The eighth heading in the applicant’s argument was “Relevant evidence”, with a reference to s 55 of the Evidence Act. The applicant referred to Papakosmas v The Queen (1999) 196 CLR 297; [1999] HCA 37 and BBH v The Queen (2012) 245 CLR 499; [2012] HCA 9 to the effect that evidence that is relevant is admissible so long as it has probative value. His complainant in this respect is difficult to identify, as the primary judge admitted, and had regard to, all of the evidence he put before her. 

As mentioned above, the ninth heading in the argument was “Apprehended bias”. I have dealt with that in conjunction with the first heading. The tenth heading in the argument is “Fraud”. The applicant cited a decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, and contended that “there is no place in Law for Fraud as outlined in the various points of Law presented to the Judge near the conclusion of the hearing, as Points of Fraud”. 

The primary judge comprehensively and correctly dealt with the applicant’s allegations in the Amended Statement of Claim that the respondent’s conduct constituted, inter alia, conspiracy to defraud and racketeering. The applicant has not identified any error in the approach taken by her Honour. 

The eleventh and final heading in the applicant’s argument was “Principals” (sic). The applicant complained that “breaches of Principles” were not dealt with (although the “principles” were not identified). 

Under this heading the applicant contended: 

“It seams [sic] that the entire last 100 years of recorded history that outlines the evidence of a global conspiracy is too much for the judge to fathom, despite the facts and science of the Covid-19 scam, and the calls of the W.E.F for a global control system of health, money, property, and genetics, by a private club that dictates to all governments, as outlined in the evidence, Yes this case can seam [sic] to be very complicated, as the councils are making deals with these private clubs, or the case can be seen very simply, as in the charges against the council of Racketeering and Fraud charges that have not been addressed by the judge, as she dismisses the Affidavit of Truth like it’s a fiction story, instead of the claimed authority as a living man, over the fiction name of the C.Q.V Trust accounts that the council uses in its course of business, as seen in the harassment and fines that the council rangers issued, once again the authority of the council to make contracts with living people is in question, as they only deal with the trust accounts and in fraud.” 

In the lengthy text that appears under this heading I can discern no identifiable error asserted to infect the reasoning of the primary judge.

Conspiracism, Contract and Sovereign Citizen Claims

'The Social Phenomenon of Romana Didulo: "Queen of Canada"' by Christine M Sarteschi in International Journal of Coercion, Abuse, and Manipulation comments 

Romana Didulo is a conspiracy theorist who claims to be the ruler of Canada, despite all evidence to the contrary. She has a fairly large following in social media. Her movement, though not easily categorized, can best be described as a combination of QAnon, sovereign citizen/pseudo-legal, conspirituality, and anti-vaccination motifs. This overview explores her belief system, her origins, the evolution of her movement, and the behavior of her followers. This review finds that Didulo poses two main kinds of threats. She: 1) encourages followers to engage in vigilantism, and 2) has created a pool of desperate people who have had their utilities shut off, and lost their vehicles and homes. People are suffering as a result of her edicts. ... 

Romana Didulo is a Philippine born immigrant, in her 50s, who contends she is the leader of Canada. She has adopted the titles of “Queen and Commander-in-chief, Head of State and Government, President and National Indigenous Chief of the Kingdom of Canada.” Didulo and eleven of her closest followers are currently on their third tour of Canada. They utilize multiple recreational vehicles (RVs) (see Figure 1) and travel to meet-and-greet locations where Didulo gives speeches, sometimes several times a week. Didulo maintains multiple Telegram channels and has approximately 50,000 followers who cheer her on and fund her travels. The purpose of this article is to expand the knowledge base of this social phenomenon using observation and analysis of Didulo’s social media postings and the content of her speeches. This article tracks Didulo’s rise, describes her belief system, and documents the activities of her and her followers. ... 

Didulo and her followers express beliefs that combine QAnon, sovereign citizen/pseudo-legal, conspirituality, and anti-vaccination motifs. QAnon is a conspiracy-based belief system. Its followers claim that high level Democratic politicians control the government and all media, and are harming children (Moskalenko & McCauley, 2021). QAnon followers are highly concerned about the “cabal,” powerful individuals who they believe are working covertly behind the scenes (Moskalenko & McCauley, 2021). The cabal, they believe, is also seeking to acquire adrenochrome from the blood of children to extend their personal lifespans (Garry, Walther, Mohamad, & Mohammed, 2021). Sovereign citizens are individuals who reject their respective governments as illegitimate, and do not believe conventional laws apply to them; they instead are subject to a different, superior law (Kalinowski, 2019; McRoberts, 2019; Netolitzky, 2021; Sarteschi, 2020). Conspirituality is a term coined by Ward and Voas (2011) that describes individuals who combine a New Age belief system with conspiracy theories where secret groups control the political and social order. New Age beliefs are characterized by four main elements: 1) “mythical individual transformation;” 2) “awareness of non-material realities;” 3) “the imposition of (a) personal vision onto society;” and 4) “belief in universally invisible but pervasive forms of energy” (Ward & Voas, 2011, p. 106). Research has shown that conspirituality is common among those in the QAnon movement (Robertson & Amarasingam, 2022; Ward & Voas, 2011). Much like QAnon, the conspirituality movement is decentralized and virtual (Ward & Voas, 2011). Finally, individuals who subscribe to anti-vaxx ideology are those who are “... wholly opposed to vaccinations” (Burgess, Osborne, Yongabi et al., 2021, p. 8). Those beliefs, and how they are expressed by Didulo, are described below.

In Ricks v Te Pukenga - New Zealand Institute of Skills and Technology t/a Ara Institute of Canterbury [2023] NZHC 936 the Court states 

 [1] Tahi Ricks successfully completed two years of a three-year Bachelor of Architectural Studies (BAS) degree at the Ara Institute of Canterbury (Ara). He says he did not undertake his final year of study in 2022 because of Ara’s COVID-19 vaccination policy. Under the Policy, Mr Ricks was not permitted to attend campus unless he was fully vaccinated against COVID-19 or had a Ministry of Health approved vaccine exemption. Mr Ricks did not accept the Policy and withdrew from the BAS and has not returned to his studies. 

[2] Mr Ricks seeks declarations that Ara breached a re-enrolment contract with him by changing the conditions of his study without his consent and breached also the Education (Pastoral Care of Tertiary and International Learners) Code of Practice 2021 (the Code). In addition, he seeks a declaration that Ara failed to rebut a “rebuttable affidavit” such that the affidavit has become a “judgement in commerce”. Finally, he seeks an order Ara must pay him $10,522,540 as stated in the unrebutted affidavit. ... 

[20] On 17 March 2022, Mr Ricks sent Ara another document, this time headed “Affidavit of Truth”. This document required Ara to dispute “claims, statements, assertions, facts contained herein” which were said to represent Mr Ricks’ “truth”. There followed 82 matters for Ara to respond to and it was stated that if Ara did not dispute any of the claims that were made within 14 days it would result in an automatic default judgment against Ara and it would be liable to Mr Ricks’ fee schedule. The fee schedule contained amounts payable by Ara totalling more than $10 million said to relate to losses Mr Ricks suffered, including $3 million for harm to his education and $7 million for harm to his future. 

[21] On 4 April 2023, Mr Ricks sent Ara a document headed “Notice of Recognition and Thanks”, noting that Ara had failed to rebut the Affidavit of Truth which “now stands as Truth in Law and a Judgement in Commerce, which no-one can overturn”. He stated that “ultimately, this means you — Darren Mitchell/Ara are now liable to the fee schedule which is remedy for the damages caused to me”. He advised that Ara had a further 10 working days to arrange a meeting with him if it would like to discuss a settlement figure or arrange payment options, otherwise he would pursue collection of the debt for the full amount.... 

Mr Ricks’ submissions 

[26] Mr Ricks seeks summary judgment for payment pursuant to the unrebutted affidavit. He identifies the issue as whether Ara has an arguable defence to overturn an unrebutted affidavit, and submits it cannot do so. Mr Ricks believes there are 10 commercial maxims, which are legal directives that must be upheld by the New Zealand courts and he relies on passages from the Bible in support of his submission that an unrebutted affidavit must stand and he is entitled to judgment accordingly. In a concession to his position, however, at the conclusion of the hearing Mr Ricks advised he was now prepared to accept just $1 million in satisfaction of this claim. 

My analysis 

[27] Mr Ricks’ belief in the efficacy of the Affidavit of Truth document is misguided and his claim for judgment based upon it has no prospect of success. The legal maxims that Mr Ricks relies upon are not legal directives which the courts must uphold regardless of context. Bible passages are not law enforceable in the courts. Further, the law does not recognise a process of entering judgment on the basis of an unrebutted affidavit and certainly not when such affidavit was not issued in respect of any proceeding then currently before the Court. 

[28] The pseudo-legal documents Mr Ricks relies upon are commonly presented to the courts by people influenced by the Sovereign Citizen movement. They have been consistently rejected by the courts. [note: Bank of New Zealand v Warahi v Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections [2021] NZHC 3059, Warahi v Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections [2022] NZCA 105 at [9]–[11]; Niwa v Commisioner of Inland Revenue [2019] NZHC 853; [2019] NZAR 1104; Department of Corrections [2017] NZSC 20 ; Rangitaawa v Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections [2013] NZCA 2; Martin v Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections [2016] NZHC 2811 at [20]; Wallace v Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections [2017] NZSC 1 at [4]–[5]; James v District Court at Whanganui [2022] NZHC 2196; James v District Court Whanganui [2022] NZHC 2309, Baker v Lawrence [2022] NZHC 2734, Brady v New Zealand Police [2019] NZHC 1040.] Mr Peers referred to Warren v Chief Executive of the Stewart which concerned an application for an order adjudicating Mr Stewart bankrupt. Mr Stewart sought to oppose the application on several bases, including that the bank had admitted certain allegations contained in an unrebutted affidavit which became a judgment in commerce. Associate Judge Bell dealt with this matter quickly by stating “[n]ext, Mr Stewart alleges that the bank, by not refuting his allegations, is deemed to have admitted them. That submission is simply wrong.” 

[29] Mr Ricks sought to distinguish the decision in Bank of New Zealand v Stewart on its facts. He is correct that as that proceeding concerned an insolvency matter it arose in a different context than this case but, regardless, the decision demonstrates that an unrebutted affidavit of the kind Mr Ricks relies upon has no legal recognition and is of no legal effect. 

[30] The fact that Ara did not respond to Mr Ricks’ Affidavit of Truth document does not give rise to any cause of action recognised in law. Mr Ricks’ application for summary judgment is therefore dismissed.

OPCA and Contempt

In R. v. Hardy 2023 BCPC 65 the Supreme Court of British Columbia states 

[1] On September 1, 2022, day one of a scheduled one-and-a-half day trial, I found 46-year-old Cameron Hardy guilty of in facie contempt of court, otherwise known as contempt in the face of the court. 

[2] He is a disciple of "Organized Pseudo-legal Commercial Arguments" (OPCA) theory. As explained by him, he is a freeman. He proclaims that he was created by the creative source. He claims to be a man of mankind, being something other than a human being. Simply put, he says that he is a man, a mankind, not some legal identity on a piece of paper that was created by man and owned by man. Accordingly, in his mind, he is not a person or an individual, and therefore the courts of British Columbia hold no jurisdiction over him. He rejects the name, Cameron Hardy. Instead, he self- identifies by various names, including “A Man Known As Cameron Hardy” and “A Man Commonly Called Cameron Hardy.” For my decision, I will refer to him simply as Hardy. 

[3] Even if I am wrong about Hardy’s legal name or his status as the defendant on the substantive matter, today, I am sentencing the person who was standing in front of the court on September 1, 2022, who committed contempt in the face of the court. 

I. INTRODUCTION 

[4] The courts of British Columbia are legitimate, or they are not. There is no middle ground. There are no shades of grey. Unfortunately for Hardy, the courts of British Columbia, including the Provincial Court of British Columbia, are legitimate. 

[5] British Columbia and Canadian laws apply to Hardy, no matter how he identifies, what words he uses to describe himself, or his political orientation. The criminal law, and the procedures that govern its implementation, are part of the law of British Columbia and Canada and apply to all. Opting out is not an option. 

[6] As a result of his refusal to recognize the legitimacy of the court, heed court orders and directions, and participate in the trial process, Hardy finds himself before the court for sentencing for contempt of court. 

[7] The superior courts and s. 9 of the Criminal Code recognize the authority of a Provincial Court judge to forego the formal trappings of a criminal trial and summarily punish for in facie contempt of court. 

[8] One leading in facie contempt of court case is R. v. B.K., 1995 CanLII 45 (SCC). As set out by Justice Major (in dissent) in B.K., xx 26 I agree with the caution expressed by Lord Denning in Balogh that the power of summary punishment is a great but necessary one that is to be used with scrupulous care. 

[9] In the present case, because of Hardy’s behaviour and flagrant disregard for the directions and order of the court, there existed an urgent and imperative need to utilize the summary contempt procedure on day one of his substantive trial. Specifically, Hardy’s refusal to follow the court's directions and order was deliberate and premeditated, as evidenced by the written script he had in his possession and read to the court. He undertook a calculated and intentional course of action, as he had on previous court occasions, specifically to thwart the court from proceeding with his trial. He maintained his behaviour despite being encouraged to engage legal counsel and being told of his actions' potential consequences. His conduct was contemptuous of the court and the administration of justice. 

II. OPCA ARGUMENTS 

[10] As stated on page 764 in 'Enjoy The Silence: Pseudolaw At The Supreme Court of Canada': Because pseudolaw has no actual validity, OPCA litigants by definition abuse court processes when they advance these ideas. Furthermore, Canadian case law on this subject is now highly developed. Post-Meads, an OPCA litigant is unlikely to enter court, let alone an appeal court, unaware that the ideas he or she intends to argue have been the target of strong court criticism. Nevertheless, some OPCA litigants’ belief in pseudolaw is apparently sincere...Social scientists who have investigated these populations confirm there are true believers in this community who are driven by a combination of conspiratorial and political beliefs, reinforced in a kind of social echo chamber. 

When viewed exclusively from a government and court perspective, pseudolaw is nothing but a waste of state and institutional resources. That perspective misses something important. Pseudolaw leads to self-inflicted injury by those who advance these toxic ideas, including increased litigation damages and costs, criminal sanctions, psychiatric detention, foreclosed homes, and broken families. In a very real sense, OPCA litigants are the victims of the conman gurus who sell supposed secrets to the real but concealed law. Worse, OPCA theories authorize unorthodox and illegal actions against government, police, and court workers, including violence. xx Pseudolaw is a form of legal quackery or snake oil. Much as doctors and scientists are the most effective critics of pseudomedical and pseudoscience frauds, courts are the expert bodies logically and functionally positioned to refute OPCA misconceptions with clear, substantive, and responsive court decisions. 

[11] Whether Hardy is a “true believer” or simply an “opportunist” using OPCA to delay and disrupt the court process, his reliance on the discredited OPCA theory clearly contributed to his contemptuous behaviour on September 1, 2022. And even though no OPCA defence has been successful on its merits – see R. v. Hardy, 2007 BCCA 523 and R. v. Hardy, 2007 BCSC 125, for examples of how an OPCA defendant was successful on appeal because the Crown did not prove identity beyond a reasonable doubt at the trial court stage – the courts are still having to deal on a regular and on- going basis with civil court litigants and criminal defendants who embrace OPCA theory. So, in light of the zero percent chance of success on the merits in the courts, why do people still espouse OPCA theory? 

[12] In 'Overcoming Knowledge Resistance: A Systematic Review of Experimental Studies', the authors state: A well-known fact is that people surprisingly often believe in things that are simply not true. For example, the public stance on climate change in the US has become increasingly contentious (Leshner, 2015; van der Linden, 2015), and many believe that vaccination has negative health effects (Larson et al., 2016). Such unfounded beliefs predict a range of maladaptive perceptions and behaviors, including poor health choices, climate change denial, and decreased civic virtue (Grebe & Narrrass, 2012; Jolley & Douglas, 20l4). 

An obvious question then is why people, in this era of information abundance, hold beliefs that contradict reason and rigorous observation. While there is little doubt that humans are capable of rational thinking, research has made clear that we often don't form our beliefs by a rational weighing of evidence and data. Rather, research shows that our perceptions, interpretations, and beliefs about the world are strongly influenced by our previous beliefs, feelings, and personal motives to view the world in one way rather than the other. Thus, people selectively attend to information consistent with their interests or previous beliefs, interpret neutral information or evidence that counter their attitudes in a belief confirming manner, and distort or selectively remember objective facts in a way that support their attitudes and decisions. Hence our reasoning is often motivated by desires to view the world as we expect or want it to be (for an overview, see Kunda, 1999). While modern people thus in principle have access to more knowledge than ever before, our inherent mode of thinking continues to make us susceptible to erroneous conclusions and false beliefs. This type of motivated reasoning is an important factor behind misconceptions that helps explain knowledge resistance. 

[13] I may never understand the true reason Hardy has acted in the manner he has. Nonetheless, he has relied upon OPCA theory misinformation to delay and disrupt his court proceedings. He relied upon and spread his OPCA disinformation intending to harm or deceive the court and the administration of justice. 

[14] As with the defendant in R. v. Kuleba, 2021 ONSC 1016, Hardy’s stubbornly wrong reliance on the OPCA theory he advanced caused him to reject opportunities provided to him by the court. 

[15] Concerning OPCA theory, I repeat what I said in paragraph 1 of Ruling Re: Organized Pseudo-legal Commercial Arguments, in R. v. Hardy, 2022 BCPC 189, ...I also had the opportunity to reflect upon what has become known in Canada -- and other parts of the world, too -- as pseudo-legal arguments. And one of the interesting things about pseudo-legal arguments, regardless of whether one is of the detaxer or freeman of the land or sovereign citizen ideology/philosophy, is that there has not been a single case in Canada supporting this particular theory. Judges are, by precedent, allowed to look at previous decisions of the court and decisions of a superior court are binding on me. What that means is that superior courts have said that I may and should summarily dismiss these kind of arguments, and by summarily dismiss, that means not waste the taxpayers’ money, the court's time, your time, the prosecutor's time, the court clerk's time, or anyone else’s time, with an argument that has zero chance of success. 

[16] As a Provincial Court judge, I am bound by precedent. I also pay heed to persuasive case law from outside of British Columbia. Cases such as R. v. Trifunski, 2022 BCSC 609, Parhar v. British Columbia (Attorney General), 2021 BCSC 700, R. v. Merrill, 2021 BCSC 1017, R. v. August-Sjodin, 2020 BCSC 826, R. v. Ciciarelli, 2019 ONSC 6719, R. v. Penner, 2018 MBQB 200, R. v. Jacobi, 2017 BCSC 1106, R. v. Petrie, 2012 BCSC 2110, and R. v. Lindsay, 2011 BCCA 99, have considered the issues already. OPCA litigants cannot succeed when relying upon their OPCA theory as legally sound in Canadian courts. The case law makes it clear that the arguments and philosophies being advanced by Hardy have no legal authority and are nonsensical. Accordingly, I refused to re-litigate OPCA claims and engage with Hardy concerning OPCA contentions. 

[17] In the leading case of Meads v. Meads, 2012 ABQB 571, Associate Chief Justice Rooke of the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench said the following about courts’ responses to OPCA cases:

  [586] Canadian courts have adopted a variety and range of responses to OPCA litigants and litigation. Any judge who faces OPCA litigation should consider deployment of all tools in this arsenal, and others that may be developed for this difficult litigant category. 

[18] I am aware of the debate over whether OPCA-type defendants and litigants are delusional and suffering from a type of mental illness versus being anti-government ideologists, expressing their political philosophies in an unorthodox manner. The temptation is to lean towards believing some OPCA-type defendants and litigants have a form of mental illness when one observes how people like Hardy, confronted with the reality that their position cannot win, still carry on with their OPCA-type contentions and behaviour. 

[19] On pages 1174-5 in 'After The Hammer: Six Years of Meads v. Meads', Donald J. Netolitzky, author and legal researcher, addresses the issue head-on: The Meads OPCA indicia serve another useful role not suggested in that decision. Psychiatric investigation of Freemen and Sovereign Citizens has concluded adherence to pseudolaw conspiracies is an expression of extreme political beliefs, reinforced in small introspective social communities. However, the peculiar formulaic expression of these ideas mimics delusion. That has resulted in misdiagnosis of these persons as mentally ill. OPCA ideas such as the “Strawman” duality have been misidentified as a mental health issue, rather than pseudolaw. Court- ordered psychiatric examinations and detentions may result. The Meads OPCA indicia are therefore a helpful resource to distinguish between persons who litigate because of mental illness versus anti-government ideology expressed in an unorthodox manner. 

[20] I have not ordered a psychiatric assessment for Hardy, finding him intelligent, albeit an anti-government ideologist. He understands the difference between right and wrong. He has merely selected wrong over right. 

[21] Having rejected mental health issues playing a role in Hardy’s disruptive behaviour and reliance on OPCA theory, I next consider how misinformation has contributed to Hardy’s contempt of court. 

[22] OPCA theory falls into the category of misinformation, defined on page 13 in 'The psychological drivers of misinformation belief and its resistance to correction', as “any information that turns out to be false.” Scholarly articles such as 'After The Hammer: Six Years of Meads v. Meads, The psychological drivers of misinformation belief and its resistance to correction and Beyond Misinformation: Understanding and Coping with the “Post-Truth" Era' provide context to the reality that individuals, despite all evidence to the contrary, continue to rely upon misinformation, leading to poor judgement and decision-making. It is the way for OPCA theory proponents. 

[23] It seems that phraseology such as “post-truth" and “fake news" has become increasingly prevalent in public discourse. As a court system, we need to recognize how the growing abundance of misinformation influences people in the political, technological, and societal context, including the courtroom. Regarding OPCA theory proponents, we need to develop a concrete methodology to deal with them once rationale thought and societal norms have been rejected by the OPCA theory proponent. After all, if left unchecked, OPCA theory can and will harm the court system, as evidenced by Hardy’s success at turning what should have been a one to two-day trial into a costly and time-consuming exercise that has morphed into two separate files: the substantive trial file and the contempt of court file. 

[24] In trying to understand Hardy’s rationale for his contempt of court, I appreciate the warning given on pages 13 and 14 in 'The psychological drivers of misinformation belief and its resistance to correction':

The psychology and history of misinformation cannot be fully grasped without taking into account contemporary technology. Misinformation helped bring Roman emperors to power, who used messages on coins as a form of mass communication, and Nazi propaganda heavily relied on the printed press, radio and cinema. Today, misinformation campaigns can leverage digital infrastructure that is unparalleled in its reach. The internet reaches billions of individuals and enables senders to tailor persuasive messages to the specific psychological profiles of individual users. Moreover, social media users’ exposure to information that challenges their worldviews can be limited when communication environments foster confirmation of previous beliefs — so-called echo chambers. Although there is some controversy about echo chambers and their impact on people’s beliefs and behaviours, the internet is an ideal medium for the fast spread of falsehoods at the expense of accurate information. However, the prevalence of misinformation cannot be attributed only to technology: conventional efforts to combat misinformation have also not been as successful as hoped — these include educational efforts that focus on merely conveying factual knowledge and corrective efforts that merely retract misinformation. 

For decades, science communication has relied on an information deficit model when responding to misinformation, focusing on people’s misunderstanding of, or lack of access to, facts. Thus, a thorough and accessible explanation of facts should overcome the impact of misinformation. However, the information deficit model ignores the cognitive, social and affective drivers of attitude formation and truth judgements. For example, some individuals deny the existence of climate change or reject vaccinations despite being aware of a scientific consensus to the contrary. This rejection of science is not the result of mere ignorance but is driven by factors such as conspiratorial mentality, fears, identity expression and motivated reasoning — reasoning driven more by personal or moral values than objective evidence. Thus, to understand the psychology of misinformation and how it might be countered, it is essential to consider the cognitive architecture and social context of individual decision makers. ..... 

Different types of misinformation exist — for example, misinformation that goes against scientific consensus or misinformation that contradicts simple, objectively true facts. Moreover, the term disinformation is often specifically used for the subset of misinformation that is spread intentionally. More research is needed on the extent to which different types of misinformation might be associated with differential psychological impacts and barriers for revision, and to establish the extent to which people infer intentionality and how this might affect their processing of the false information. 

[25] The observations of Justice Graesser in A.V.I. v. M.H.V.B., 2020 ABQB 790, a recent case dealing with a defendant named Robinson who espoused OPCA and "Magna Carta Lawful Rebellion" (MCLR) theory, hold in Hardy’s case:

52 The consequences of contempt are not trivial. In Fearn v Canada Customs, 2014 ABQB 114, and in particular paragraphs 215-256, the Court concluded that gurus who promote OPCA schemes that purportedly defeat legitimate court authority are engaged in criminal contempt of court. 

53 This may appear to be the use of a sledgehammer to crush an ant. I would instead use the analogy of an inoculation to stop a virus. OPCA and MCLR gurus harm people. Ms. Robinson has already harmed MHVB and her family. These gurus teach illusions that will predictably fail. They promise much, but their clientele gets less than nothing. 

54 These schemes are nothing more than cons, led by people who rely and feed on the oft-quoted statement attributed to P.T. Barnum (of circus fame): a sucker is born every minute. That is as true now as it was when spoken more than 150 years ago. The Courts are not suckers. And the Courts will not be intimidated.

[26] Despite having been ordered not to do so, Hardy’s use and reliance upon OPCA theory – combined with his refusal to recognize the court's legitimacy, heed court orders and directions, and participate in the trial process – resulted in Hardy finding himself before the court for sentencing for contempt of court. 

[27] The procedural steps customarily required by natural justice would not have been of any benefit in the situation faced by the court in the present case, as evidenced by Hardy’s refusal to speak to a lawyer or have a lawyer represent him, combined with his reliance on OPCA theory and his disruptive behaviour before, during and after the finding of contempt, until his removal by the sheriffs from the courtroom. With Lord Denning’s warning in mind, the court decided that Hardy’s behaviour on September 1, 2022, demanded immediate action from the court. The court could not allow it to continue. ...

[138] To believe that one is exempt from the law because of how they self-identify and because they espouse OPCA beliefs is not only outrageous but creates great harm to the community as others consider whether a magical “get out of jail free card” exists, and after that stop paying taxes, fail to abide by laws and public health orders, and waste valuable court resources with nonsensical OPCA arguments. ... 

[161] confirm the same principles hold true when sentencing a person for contempt of court related to OPCA misconduct: The words of Justice Tilleman in Fearn v Canada Customs, 2014 ABQB 114, 

[254] The test identified in the appellate case law is that a criminal contempt of court sanction is appropriate when an activity constitutes a "clear and present danger", "real and imminent harm or threat to justice". OPCA gurus sell and promote techniques that damage the court. The judiciary regularly encounters litigants who attempt to apply these techniques. Only a small fraction of those events are documented in reported case law. This is not merely a theoretical issue, but one that is a regular and unwelcome event. 

[255] Thus, though what Mr. Fearn says likely would be preposterous, absurd, and probably offensive to the average Canadian, he is one of a community of like-minded persons. In their eyes Mr. Fearn's "truths" are very real. To permit the business of interfering with court processes to go unchallenged only reinforces this community's misguided, dystopian world perspective. ..... 

[260] Contempt of court is a mechanism to curb OPCA misconduct that is directed to and interferes with court operation and function. This response should be broad and meaningful. That reflects this authority as an expression of the inherent jurisdiction of this Court. That means that while freedom of expression is a value respected and protected both under the common law and the Charter, that right does not extend to speech and communication which is criminal, or is intended to or injures the administration of justice and the rights of justice system participants.

[162] I stress wholeheartedly that Hardy's reliance on OPCA theory was wrong. He attempted to circumvent justice system procedures. His arguments were not merely legally false but often just plain stupid. Hardy’s defence was vexatious and frivolous. He had no hope of success; thus, logically, his only purpose was to frustrate the court and waste government resources.