Showing posts with label Contract. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Contract. Show all posts

23 January 2026

Pseudolaw

Yet another judgment re pseudolaw. In Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Cahill & Anor [2025] VCC 1860 the Court notes 

The amended defences deny the existence of any lawful credit agreement between the parties, assert that CBA is a “corporate fiction,”and contend that no valid mortgage was created or that CBA lacks standing to enforce it. The defendants also dispute the quantum of the debt and demand production of “wet-ink” originals of various loan and title documents. Judge’s amended counterclaim makes bald and sweeping allegations that CBA engaged in misleading or deceptive conduct, relied on an unfair standard form contract contrary to the Australian Consumer Law, and “securitised” the mortgage in breach of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), thereby losing the right to enforce it. It further alleges that enforcement of the mortgage constitutes modern slavery and seeks, among other relief, the return of all payments made, the discharge of the mortgage, and damages.

In referring to 'Sovereign Citizens and pseudo law' the judgment  states

 The documents and submissions made by the defendants fall into a by now well-known quasi-philosophy known as the “sovereign citizen” movement. The guiding philosophy appears to be that these persons consider that they are not subject to the laws of the Commonwealth of Australia unless they have expressly “contracted” or consented to be so bound. This philosophy has no basis in law and has been rejected in many cases to date. All persons living under the protection of the Crown in right of the Commonwealth or State are, as a matter of law, subject to the laws of the Commonwealth. Any suggestion to the contrary is both dangerous and undermines the orderly arrangement of any society. The courts of this country will give no credence to such philosophy. 

The documents and submissions filed by the defendants are informed by half-baked statements that contain traces of legal tit-bits scraped from current and ancient sources otherwise also referred to as “ pseudo-law ”. They are legal gibberish and do not constitute proper statements of principles known to law. 

In Re Coles Supermarkets Australia Pty Ltd [2022] VSC 438, Hetyey Asj said the following of such submissions:

The defendants appear to be seeking to draw a distinction between themselves as ‘natural’ or ‘living’ persons, on the one hand, and their status as ‘legal’ personalities, on the other. However, contemporary Australian law does not distinguish between a human being and their legal personality. Any such distinction would potentially leave a human being without legal rights, which would be unacceptable in modern society. The contentions put forward by the defendants in this regard are artificial and have no legal consequence. 

I adopt the analysis of John Dixon J in Stefan v McLachlan [2023] VSC 501, dealing with the fictional concept of the ‘living man’, stating that:

The law recognises a living person as having status in law and any person is, in this sense, a legal person. Conceptually, there may be differences between the legal status of a person and that of an entity that is granted a like legal status, but whatever they might be they have no application on this appeal. In asserting that he is a ‘living man’, the appellant does no more than identify that he is a person, an individual. Every person, every individual, and every entity accorded status as a legal person is subject to the rule of law. There are no exceptions in Australian society. 

I also refer to AsJ Gobbo’s decision in Nelson v Greenman & Anor [2024] VSC 704 in which her Honour gives a comprehensive treatment of the fallacies underlying the sovereign citizen and pseudo law movements. I concur with and adopt her Honour’s treatment of the subject at paragraphs [53] – [78].

16 December 2024

CISG

'Fantastic Precedents and Where to Find Them: An Argument for Limiting the Operation of Common Law Binding Precedent Rules When Interpreting the UN Sales Convention (CISG)' by Benjamin Hayward in (2024) 47(4) UNSW Law Journal comments 

 The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods’ (‘CISG’) trade facilitation purpose is undermined by divergent State interpretations. Homeward trend CISG interpretations, and the duty to consult international CISG precedents, are well-travelled ground. Common law precedent’s effect in perpetuating the homeward trend (and precluding reference to international case law), however, has not yet been satisfactorily examined. My analysis offers a novel interpretation of CISG article 7(1): it negates the binding effect of local CISG precedent that is inconsistent with its terms. This interpretation allows judges in both common law and civil law States to freely consult foreign CISG case law. Using an Australian case study, I show that neither of two potential public law objections (the principle of legality and the separation of powers) affect my argument. Comments are offered concerning my argument’s generalisability to other common law States, arbitration, and other private international law instruments.

14 July 2024

Social Media TOC overreach

Social networking sites' licensing terms: A cause of worry for users?' by Phalguni Mahapatra and Anindya Sircar in (2024) The Journal of World Intellectual Property comments 

Terms of service (ToS) for social networking sites (SNS) like Instagram, Meta, X, and so on, is a clickwrap agreement that establishes a legal relationship between platform owners and users, yet probably it is the most overlooked legal agreement. The users of these sites often overlook the ToS while registering themselves on these sites and even if users (especially those with no legal background) are attempting to read them, it is difficult for them to understand because of the legal jargon. As a result, they end up signing away legal rights about which they are unaware. According to these sites' ToS, though the ownership of the user-generated content is bestowed upon the user but the users grant to these sites “a non-exclusive, royalty-free, transferrable, sub-licensable, worldwide license” and this license can be used “to host, use, distribute, modify, run, copy, publicly perform or display, translate and create derivative works of user's content.” These sites even bestow on themselves the right to modify the content which poses challenges to the right-holders' moral rights. The fact that these platforms can sublicense the user's work creates complexities when a user intends to grant an exclusive license of his work. There is no clarity on the language of the terms like the manner of exploiting the user's content, what happens if the sublicensing is for a wrongful purpose? The problem magnifies as there is neither explicit indication about the duration of the license nor about the territorial extent. This would suggest that these sites can get a perpetual license on the content of the users. These SNS have consumers spread worldwide but in their ToS, they have forum selection clauses that list out the courts and districts in California. This means users will be discouraged to bring a copyright suit due to the lack of an option to file a claim in their home country. The US case Agence France Presse (AFP) v. Morel helps us conclude twofold mainly there is a hope that SNS will not take ToS to shield themselves from further use of the user's work and strengthen the idea that these platforms may choose to license to their partners. Further, in 2018, the Paris Tribunal declared most clauses of Twitter “null and void” due to the nature of the license and also, because it was not in compliance with French Intellectual Property Code. This gives a faint hope for a positive shift in the legal treatment of user-generated content. Though these sites claim to retain the sublicensing right to run their sites smoothly but the licensing is very broad and carries the possibility of many usages of the content that too without paying compensation to the user. Therefore, this paper aims to highlight and give insight into the unfair licensing terms of the most often used social networking sites and its implications.

18 February 2024

NotBot

In Moffatt v. Air Canada, 2024 BCCRT 149 Air Canada has unsuccessfully sought to duck liability with, among other things, a claim that its chatbot is a discrete legal person. 

The Tribunal states 

 1. This dispute is about a refund for a bereavement fare. 

2. In November 2022, following the death of their grandmother, Jake Moffatt booked a flight with Air Canada. While researching flights, Mr. Moffat used a chatbot on Air Canada’s website. The chatbot suggested Mr. Moffatt could apply for bereavement fares retroactively. Mr. Moffatt later learned from Air Canada employees that Air Canada did not permit retroactive applications. 

3. Mr. Moffatt says Air Canada must provide them with a partial refund of the ticket price, as they relied upon the chatbot’s advice. They claim $880 for what they say is the difference in price between the regular and alleged bereavement fares. 

4. Air Canada says Mr. Moffatt did not follow the proper procedure to request bereavement fares and cannot claim them retroactively. Air Canada says it cannot be held liable for the information provided by the chatbot. Finally, it relies on certain contractual terms from its Domestic Tariff. Air Canada asks me to dismiss Mr. Moffatt’s claim. 

5. Mr. Moffat is self-represented. Air Canada is represented by an employee. 

6. For the reasons that follow, I mostly allow Mr. Moffatt’s claim.... 

7. These are the Civil Resolution Tribunal’s (CRT) formal written reasons. The CRT has jurisdiction over small claims brought under Civil Resolution Tribunal Act (CRTA) section 118. CRTA section 2 states that the CRT’s mandate is to provide dispute resolution services accessibly, quickly, economically, informally, and flexibly. In resolving disputes, the CRT must apply principles of law and fairness. 

8. CRTA section 39 says the CRT has discretion to decide the format of the hearing, including by writing, telephone, videoconferencing, email, or a combination of these. Here, I find that I am properly able to assess and weigh the documentary evidence and submissions before me. Further, bearing in mind the CRT’s mandate that includes proportionality and a speedy resolution of disputes, I find that an oral hearing is not necessary in the interests of justice. 

9. CRTA section 42 says the CRT may accept as evidence information that it considers relevant, necessary, and appropriate, whether or not the information would be admissible in a court of law. 

10. Where permitted by CRTA section 118, in resolving this dispute the CRT may order a party to do or stop doing something, pay money or make an order that includes any terms or conditions the CRT considers appropriate. 

ISSUE 

11. Did Air Canada negligently misrepresent the procedure for claiming bereavement fares, and if so, what is the remedy? 

EVIDENCE AND ANALYSIS 

12. In a civil proceeding like this one, Mr. Moffatt, as applicant, must prove their claims on a balance of probabilities. This means “more likely than not”. I have read all the parties’ submissions and evidence but refer only to the evidence and argument that I find relevant to provide context for my decision. 

13. On November 11, 2022, Mr. Moffat’s grandmother passed away in Ontario. That same day, Mr. Moffat visited Air Canada’s website to find and book a flight from Vancouver to Toronto using Air Canada’s bereavement rates. It is undisputed that Air Canada provides certain accommodations, such as reduced fares, for passengers traveling due to the death of an immediate family member. 

14. Mr. Moffat says while using Air Canada’s website, they interacted with a support chatbot. While Air Canada did not provide any information about the nature of its chatbot, generally speaking, a chatbot is an automated system that provides information to a person using a website in response to that person’s prompts and input. The parties implicitly agree that Mr. Moffatt was not chatting with an Air Canada employee. 

15. Mr. Moffat says they asked the Air Canada chatbot about bereavement fares. They include a screenshot of the chatbot’s response, which says, in part, as follows: Air Canada offers reduced bereavement fares if you need to travel because of an imminent death or a death in your immediate family. … If you need to travel immediately or have already travelled and would like to submit your ticket for a reduced bereavement rate, kindly do so within 90 days of the date your ticket was issued by completing our Ticket Refund Application form. (emphasis in original) 

16. It is undisputed the words “bereavement fares” were a highlighted and underlined hyperlink to a separate Air Canada webpage titled “Bereavement travel” with additional information about Air Canada’s bereavement policy. Air Canada provided a screenshot of part of what I infer is the hyperlinked Air Canada webpage. 17. The webpage says, in part, the bereavement policy does not apply to requests for bereavement consideration after travel has been completed. I address the inconsistency between Air Canada’s chatbot and webpage later in this decision. 

18. Relying on the information provided by the chatbot, on November 11, Mr. Moffatt booked a one-way flight from Vancouver to Toronto, departing on November 12, for $794.98. On November 16, relying on the same information, they booked a one-way flight from Toronto to Vancouver, departing on November 18, for $845.38. 

19. Mr. Moffat says on November 11, they spoke to an Air Canada representative by telephone about bereavement rates to determine what the discount may be. Mr. Moffatt says they were told the fare for each flight would be approximately $380. There is no evidence the Air Canada representative told Mr. Moffatt about whether or not they could retroactively apply for bereavement rates. 

20. Mr. Moffatt submitted their first application for the bereavement fare on November 17, 2022, well within the 90 days requested by the chatbot. Emails in evidence show Mr. Moffatt corresponded with Air Canada throughout December 2022 and February 2023 in an attempt to receive a partial refund of their fares. 

21. On February 5, 2023, Mr. Moffatt emailed Air Canada. They included the screenshot from the chatbot that set out the 90-day window to request a reduced rate and confirmed they had filled out the refund form and provided a death certificate. 

22. On February 8, an Air Canada representative responded and admitted the chatbot had provided “misleading words.” The representative pointed out the chatbot’s link to the bereavement travel webpage and said Air Canada had noted the issue so it could update the chatbot. 

23. The parties exchanged further emails after that but were unable to resolve matters. Negligent Misrepresentation 

24. While Mr. Moffatt does not use the words specifically, by saying they relied on Air Canada’s chatbot, I find they are alleging negligent misrepresentation. Negligent misrepresentation can arise when a seller does not exercise reasonable care to ensure its representations are accurate and not misleading. 

25. To prove the tort of negligent misrepresentation, Mr. Moffatt must show that Air Canada owed them a duty of care, its representation was untrue, inaccurate, or misleading, Air Canada made the representation negligently, Mr. Moffatt reasonably relied on it, and Mr. Moffatt’s reliance resulted in damages. 

26. Here, given their commercial relationship as a service provider and consumer, I find Air Canada owed Mr. Moffatt a duty of care. Generally, the applicable standard of care requires a company to take reasonable care to ensure their representations are accurate and not misleading. 

27. Air Canada argues it cannot be held liable for information provided by one of its agents, servants, or representatives – including a chatbot. It does not explain why it believes that is the case. In effect, Air Canada suggests the chatbot is a separate legal entity that is responsible for its own actions. This is a remarkable submission. While a chatbot has an interactive component, it is still just a part of Air Canada’s website. It should be obvious to Air Canada that it is responsible for all the information on its website. It makes no difference whether the information comes from a static page or a chatbot. 

28. I find Air Canada did not take reasonable care to ensure its chatbot was accurate. While Air Canada argues Mr. Moffatt could find the correct information on another part of its website, it does not explain why the webpage titled “Bereavement travel” was inherently more trustworthy than its chatbot. It also does not explain why customers should have to double-check information found in one part of its website on another part of its website. 

29. Mr. Moffatt says, and I accept, that they relied upon the chatbot to provide accurate information. I find that was reasonable in the circumstances. There is no reason why Mr. Moffatt should know that one section of Air Canada’s webpage is accurate, and another is not. 

30. Mr. Moffatt says, and I accept, that they would not have flown last-minute if they knew they would have to pay the full fare. I find this is consistent with Mr. Moffatt’s actions, which included investigating the options for bereavement fares and diligently following up for a partial refund in line with the chatbot’s information. 

31. To the extent Air Canada argues it is not liable due to certain terms or conditions of its tariff, I note it did not provide a copy of the relevant portion of the tariff. It only included submissions about what the tariff allegedly says. Air Canada is a sophisticated litigant that should know it is not enough in a legal process to assert that a contract says something without actually providing the contract. The CRT also tells all parties are told to provide all relevant evidence. I find that if Air Canada wanted to a raise a contractual defense, it needed to provide the relevant portions of the contract. It did not, so it has not proven a contractual defence. 

32. So, I find Mr. Moffatt has made out their claim of negligent misrepresentation and is entitled to damages.

14 February 2024

Competition, Rockets and Feathers

The 'Gouging' report from Alan Fels for the ACTU comments 

This report concludes that business pricing has added significantly to inflation in recent times. 

‘Profit push’ or ‘sellers inflation’ has occurred against a background of high corporate concentration and is reflected in the surge of corporate profits and the rise in the profit share of Gross Domestic Product. There is much support for the view that prices have added much to inflation. This is to be found in research from OECD, IMF, BIS, European Commission, European Central Bank, US Federal Reserve Bank, Bank of England and many think tanks globally and locally and many detailed research studies. Claims that the rise in profit share in Australia as explained by mining do not hold up. The profits share excluding mining has risen and energy and other prices associated with mining have been a very significant contributor to Australian inflation. ... 

The report analyses a selection of exploitative business pricing practices that enable the extraction of extra dollars from consumers in a way that would not be possible in markets that are competitive, properly informed and that enable overcharged consumers to readily switch from one supplier to another. The fact that there is a quite widespread lack of competition in Australian markets means that pricing practices that might be accepted in very competitive markets are unduly exploitative of consumers in that setting.

 Fels identifies a range of 'not unlawful' practices 

 Loyalty taxes set initial prices low and then sharply increase them in subsequent years when consumers cannot easily detect, question, or renegotiate them and where the ‘transaction costs’ of changing to other competitors are high. Examples come from banking, insurance, energy, and other areas. 

Loyalty schemes are often low cost means of retaining and exploiting consumers by providing them with low value rewards of dubious benefit. These schemes are also often badly run. 

Drip pricing where firms only advertise part of a product’s price and reveal other prices later as the customer goes through the buying process is spreading including in airlines, accommodation, entertainment, pre-paid phone charges, credit cards and others. 

Excuse-flation where general inflation provides camouflage for businesses to raise prices without justification is also more prevalent in the current environment. As inflation starts to fall excessive inflationary expectations and future cost increases can be built into prices. 

Confusion pricing involves confusing consumers with a myriad of complex price structures and plans making price comparisons difficult and dulling price competition. It occurs more and more in areas such as telecommunications, financial or maintenance services and other fields. 

Asymmetric or ‘rockets and feathers’ pricing is of much concern in the current environment especially as inflation is starting to come down. When costs rise prices go up quickly ‘like a rocket’ but when costs fall prices fall slowly ‘like a feather falling to the ground’. This practice of delaying price falls when costs have fallen can be very profitable for businesses. A recent example concerned meat prices when prices paid to farmers for lamb fell but retail prices did not, at least until there was publicity including from this inquiry about the delay. 

Algorithmic pricing is the practice of using algorithms to set prices automatically (but taking account of competitor responses) raises issues about whether this reduces price competition and is analogous to cartel pricing. Price discrimination which in its simplest form involves charging different consumers different prices for the same product enables businesses to set prices according to how much each consumer is willing and able to pay. It takes many forms. It is enabled by a lack of competition. If there were competition charging high prices to customers who wish to or have to pay higher prices would not be possible because competitors would bring those prices down to normal levels. 

This report identifies a number of examples ranging from banks (better rates from customers likely to leave them), electricity (better prices for business customers than for consumers even allowing for lower costs of supply) and medical specialists which offer vastly different prices for near identical services. Of particular concern is the rise of much greater use of price discrimination enabled by the rise of digital platforms, new technology, detailed customer data and sophisticated profit maximising pricing methodologies. These practices all result from an economy which is insufficiently competitive and gives room for businesses to engage in exploitative pricing practices. There is a case for a much more active public policy for investigating and analysing practices that operate at unwarranted cost to customers. 

In order to address these the report recommends policy outcomes which would:

• remove obstacles to competition by the application of competition law or a removal of government restrictions on competition 

• require the provision of better information to consumers 

• lessen or remove obstacles to consumers switching to other suppliers 

• exposing or sometimes shaming exploitative business practices of the kind shown in this report 6

All these business exploitative practices rest on a platform of weak competition in many parts of the economy and would be generally reduced by a strengthening of competition law and policy. Accordingly, recommendations to this effect are made in the report. The prices practices described are not unlawful, but they reflect an imbalance between consumers and the power of business. Price control is not seen as a solution in most or all cases. However, there is a case for governments exercising much closer scrutiny over these practices and for such scrutiny to be a regular part of the policy agenda.

 Fels' recommendations are summarised as

1.1: The Australian Government should use its power to require the ACCC to conduct more price and market investigations. 

1.2: The Australian Government should have power to require the ACCC to undertake market studies as well as price studies. 

1.3: The ACCC should have power of its own to initiate price and market studies. 

1.4: The GST pricing legislation of 2000-2003 provisions regarding the naming of businesses and industries that overcharge should be reinstated. 

1.5: Section 46 of the Australian Competition and Consumer Act should be amended to make it an offence to charge excessive prices in terms similar to the European Union provisions. 

1.6: The Government could establish a Commission on Competition and Prices to review Government and other restrictions on competition and high prices caused by a lack of competition. 

MERGERS AND DIVESTITURE 

2.1: The Australian government should establish a pre-merger notification system along similar lines to most OECD countries. 

2.2: That in merger matters the onus should be on applicants to satisfy the ACCC and on appeal the Australian Competition Tribunal that the merger is not anticompetitive and is in the public interest. 

2.3: The merger test should be augmented to continue to prohibit mergers which substantially lessen competition but there should be an additional provision prohibiting mergers that give rise to substantial market power (a more structural and immediate test) and/or which entrench, create, or add to market power. 

2.4: A divestiture power should be introduced into the competition law. 

COMPETITION 

3.1: The Australian Consumer and Competition Act needs to be shortened. 

3.2: If the secondary boycott law is retained in the Competition Law there should be a provision that secondary boycotts are only unlawful if they substantially lessen competition. 

3.3: Australia should ban non-compete clauses in employment contracts affecting both employees during and post-employment. 

3.4: The current National Competition Review should examine policies and laws that prevent Governments from needlessly restricting competition. 

3.5: The ACCC receives further funding for strong enforcement of the cartel law. It should also apply the criminal sanctions available for unlawful price fixing and other cartel agreements. 

3.5: Treasury should conduct a public consultation to determine the need for improvement in the drafting of the criminal elements of the cartel law in view of recent difficulties in the bank cartel case. 

AVIATION 

4.1: Airport prices should be regulated in the same way as other utility prices. 

4.2: The Australian Government should use the opportunity of its current aviation review to remove international and domestic restrictions on competition. Any remaining restrictions should be reviewed by the Treasury led Competition Policy Review. 

EARLY CHILDHOOD EDUCATION AND CARE 

4.3: The ACCC should be empowered to investigate pricing decisions made by for-profit providers to ensure gaming is not occurring. 

4.4: Prices in relation to disability care and support and aged care should be kept under continuous review by the ACCC. 

BANKING AND FINANCIAL SERVICES 

4.5: The ACCC should be provided with a standing Ministerial Direction to monitor prices and competitiveness in the retail banking sector. 

4.6: The ACCC should be issued with a Ministerial Direction to undertake a further inquiry into pricing practices in foreign exchange markets to develop mechanisms for a fairer transmission of cost information to consumers as well as to provide specific assistance to prevent exploitation of those with low English language proficiency. 

ENERGY 

4.7: There should be a review of the design and operation of the wholesale market as to whether it requires refinements or a fundamental change in the form of a ‘capacity market’ as in North America and in Western Australia. This review should be chaired by an independent expert with input and resources from the AER, AEMO, and ASIC. The level of electricity generation concentration should be kept under review, and there should be close scrutiny of the impact on competition, positive or negative, that could occur in the transition to a re-designed energy market. 

4.8: ASIC should be provided with a Ministerial Direction to investigate the energy derivatives market to ensure that participants in both the National Electricity Market and the markets for derivatives are not misusing their position in either to gain an unfair advantage or influence the price of energy to meet derivatives conditions. 

4.9: Network prices should continue to require close regulatory scrutiny with the long-term interests of consumers put first. 

4.10: There should be a regulatory review of the high degree of price discrimination in the retail electricity and gas markets. 

4.11: State Governments and regulators should continue to introduce initiatives to improve retail outcomes brought about by current market imperfections. 

FOOD AND GROCERIES 

4.12: It is recommended that there should be a comprehensive ACCC inquiry into competition and prices in the retail food and grocery industry. 

4.13: The Food and Grocery Code Review should be fully mandatory. 

4.14: The Food and Grocery Code Review should investigate creating a price register for farmers to assist them in understanding market prices across primary industries. 

SHIPPING COSTS IMPACTING FNQ AND NT 

4.15: The ACCC should once again have an ability to challenge and overturn unreasonable prices charged by Sea Swift to ensure the service is not exploiting its market position. 

ELECTRIC VEHICLES 

4.16: Regulations in the Road Vehicle Safety Act 2018 which block parallel imports of electric vehicles be immediately lifted. 

4.17: Regulations under the Road Vehicle Safety Act 2018 which block parallel imports of cars into Australia should also be repealed in coming months. 

OUT OF POCKET CHARGES BY MEDICAL SPECIALISTS 

4.18: The National Competition policy review should conduct or commission a contemporary study of specialist fees backed by an analysis of restrictions on competition and of the role of information imbalances between patients and specialists. 

4.19: The ACCC or the Productivity Commission or another appropriate body should, separately, review specialist fees and the policy steps that could be taken to make them more transparent or to reduce them. 

PHARMACEUTICALS 

4.20: A mandatory reporting scheme should be implemented in relation to originator and generic agreements to improve the detectability of pay for delay agreements similar to the reporting arrangements in the United States.

23 August 2023

Consent

'Murky Consent: An Approach to the Fictions of Consent in Privacy Law' by Daniel J Solove in (2023) 104 Boston University Law Review (Forthcoming) comments 

Consent plays a profound role in nearly all privacy laws. As Professor Heidi Hurd aptly said, consent works “moral magic” – it transforms things that would be illegal and immoral into lawful and legitimate activities. Regarding privacy, consent authorizes and legitimizes a wide range of data collection and processing. 
 
There are generally two approaches to consent in privacy law. In the United States, the notice-and-choice approach predominates, where organizations post a notice of their privacy practices and then people are deemed to have consented if they continue to do business with the organization or fail to opt out. In the European Union, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) uses the express consent approach, where people must voluntarily and affirmatively consent. 
 
Both approaches fail. The evidence of actual consent is non-existent under the notice-and-choice approach. Individuals are often pressured or manipulated, undermining the validity of their consent. The express consent approach also suffers from these problems – people are ill-equipped to make decisions about their privacy, and even experts cannot fully understand what algorithms will do with personal data. Express consent also is highly impractical; it inundates individuals with consent requests from thousands of organizations. Express consent cannot scale. 
 
In this Article, I contend that in most circumstances, privacy consent is fictitious. Privacy law should take a new approach to consent that I call “murky consent.” Traditionally, consent has been binary – an on/off switch – but murky consent exists in the shadowy middle ground between full consent and no consent. Murky consent embraces the fact that consent in privacy is largely a set of fictions and is at best highly dubious. 
 
Abandoning consent entirely in most situations involving privacy would involve the government making most decisions regarding personal data. But this approach would be problematic, as it would involve extensive government control and micromanaging, and it would curtail people’s autonomy. The law should allow space for people’s autonomy over their decisions, even when those decisions are deeply flawed. The law should thus strive to reach a middle ground, providing a sandbox for free play but with strong guardrails to protect against harms. 
 
Because it conceptualizes consent as mostly fictional, murky consent recognizes its lack of legitimacy. To return to Hurd’s analogy, murky consent is consent without magic. Instead of providing extensive legitimacy and power, murky consent should authorize only a very restricted and weak license to use data. This would allow for a degree of individual autonomy but with powerful guardrails to limit exploitative and harmful behavior by the organizations collecting and using personal data. In the Article, I propose some key guardrails to use with murky consent. 

26 July 2022

Wage Theft

Criminal Liability for ‘Wage Theft’: A Regulatory Panacea' by Tess Hardy, John Howe and Melissa Kennedy in 47(1) Monash University Law Review comments 

In response to concerns over the growing problem of ‘wage theft’, the federal government, as well as various state governments, have committed to introducing criminal sanctions for underpayment contraventions. While policymakers and the public have largely assumed that criminal sanctions will address a perceived deterrence gap and promote employer compliance with basic employment standards, there has been far less scholarly appraisal of how this regulatory shift might shape enforcement decisions and affect compliance outcomes. Drawing on literature from criminology, as well as regulation and governance, this article evaluates a range of conceptual justifications put forward in support of criminalising certain forms of wage theft. It also considers key practical issues which may arise in a dual track system where both criminal and civil sanctions are available for the same or similar contraventions. This article concludes with some suggestions on how criminal offences might be framed in the federal system so as to optimise employer compliance and reduce regulatory tensions.

The authors argue

 There is mounting evidence that many workers have experienced serious and systemic underpayment of basic employment entitlements, notwithstanding the efforts of the Office of the Fair Work Ombudsman (‘FWO’) over the past decade. ‘Wage theft’ has been uncovered in high-profile businesses, such as 7-Eleven, Domino’s Pizza, Woolworths and the well-known restaurant empire formerly owned and operated by the celebrity chef, George Calombaris. The economic recession resulting from the COVID-19 crisis is likely to further exacerbate these pre-existing problems. 

The term ‘wage theft’ was first coined in the United States (‘US’), where wilful breach of wage and hours regulation constitutes a criminal offence. More generally, ‘wage theft’ has been used to label a range of unscrupulous employer practices from sham contracting to unlawful deductions. The range of practices captured by the term ‘wage theft’ is potentially quite varied; however, the outcome for affected employees is somewhat similar — that is, ‘each deprives the victims of what is lawfully due to them as remuneration for their labour’. 

The use of the term ‘wage theft’ in the Australian context is increasingly popular but is somewhat misplaced in that it suggests that underpayment entails a level of criminality. In actual fact, failure to comply with minimum wages prescribed by the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (‘FW Act’), or a term of an industrial instrument made under that Act, is solely treated as a breach of a civil remedy provision under the federal law. Up until June 2020, breach of employment standards regulation did not constitute a criminal offence in any Australian jurisdiction — Commonwealth or state. However, this longstanding position is now in a state of great flux. 

In June 2020 and September 2020 respectively, the Victorian and Queensland governments passed legislation introducing criminal sanctions for wage theft offences. It also initially looked like the Western Australian government would follow a similar regulatory path. However, it remains possible that these state developments may be superseded by law reform in the federal sphere. In particular, following the Report of the Migrant Workers’Taskforce (‘Taskforce Report’), and an extensive consultation process undertaken by the Attorney-General’s Department (‘AGD’), the Coalition government introduced the Fair Work Amendment (Supporting Australia’s Jobs and Economic Recovery) Bill 2020 (Cth) (‘Omnibus Bill’). Amongst other matters, this Bill included a new criminal offence where an employer ‘dishonestly engages in a systematic pattern of underpaying one or more employees’. Ultimately, and somewhat unexpectedly, at the time of completion of this article, the criminal offence provisions were withdrawn by the Coalition Government following chaotic negotiations in the Australian Senate over passage of the Bill. During this same period, and running alongside the various wage theft inquiries, the Australian Law Reform Commission (‘ALRC’) conducted an inquiry into corporate criminal responsibility under federal laws, including the FW Act. 

Although there has been a sustained push to introduce criminal sanctions in the context of employment standards regulation, and there is now political commitment to do so, there has been limited scholarly consideration of the relevant regulatory consequences of such a move. As Jennifer Collins observes: ‘principled decision-making between regulatory channels is a key and under-theorized juncture in appraising criminalization arguments about exploitation in work relations’. This article is directed at addressing some of the key issues arising at this juncture. 

The focus of our article is on the federal civil enforcement system under the FW Act and its interactions with criminal sanctions. This is linked to the fact that the majority of workers are covered by the FW Act and fall within the national system of workplace relations regulation. While we refer to a number of state developments in passing, we avoid sustained discussion of the state initiatives, as this raises the complex constitutional questions that go beyond the scope of this article.  Instead, we analyse the more foundational question of whether the introduction of criminal sanctions for underpayment contraventions in federal law is conceptually robust and likely to achieve the stated policy objectives, such as the delivery of greater deterrence and the promotion of more sustained compliance. We also consider some of the potential pitfalls associated with a ‘dual track’ system where both criminal and civil sanctions are available for the same or similar contraventions. 

We begin our analysis by reviewing the current enforcement regime under the FW Act and considering the common justifications for introducing criminal liability for breach of employment standards. We then evaluate these justifications against conceptual considerations drawn from criminology and regulation and governance literature, as well as the practical issues which should be considered in the implementation of such an approach. Much of this analysis is broadly directed at the question of whether criminalisation of underpayment contraventions is the most appropriate or effective vehicle for addressing systemic ‘wage theft’. 

We ultimately accept that the introduction of criminal liability is justified from a moral and regulatory perspective. However, in reaching this conclusion, we are also keen to ensure that criminal sanctions are integrated into the existing regulatory framework so as to optimise employer compliance and reduce regulatory resistance. In putting forward some suggestions about the shape of possible reform, we take account of key issues identified in the existing literature, as well as the ALRC’s recent review of the principles for designating criminal offences and civil penalty provisions in the regulation of corporations across different regulatory regimes in Australia.

11 January 2022

UK Smart Contracts

The UK Law Commission paper on Smart Contracts states 

1.1 Emerging technologies, such as distributed ledgers, are increasingly used to create “smart contracts”: computer programs which run automatically, in whole or in part, without the need for human intervention. Smart contracts can perform transactions on decentralised cryptocurrency exchanges, facilitate games and the exchange of collectibles between participants on a distributed ledger, and run online gambling programs. 

1.2 Smart contracts can also be used to define and perform the obligations of a legally binding contract. It is this specific type of smart contract – a “smart legal contract” – that is the subject of our analysis. For the purposes of this paper, we define a smart legal contract as a legally binding contract in which some or all of the contractual obligations are defined in and/or performed automatically by a computer program. Smart contracts, including smart legal contracts, tend to follow a conditional logic with specific and objective inputs: if “X” occurs, then execute step “Y”. 

1.3 Smart legal contracts are expected to revolutionise the way we do business, particularly by increasing efficiency and transparency in transactions. They are increasingly being considered by contracting parties as a means of automating specific processes within conventional contracts, from payment of insurance claims to managing supply chains. Currently, smart legal contracts are likely to be useful in respect of only fairly rudimentary agreements, such as to transfer an amount of cryptocurrency to a person’s wallet when certain conditions are met. However, as the technology underpinning smart legal contracts becomes increasingly sophisticated, a greater range of obligations may be suitable for coding, resulting in these contracts becoming increasingly more complex and able to perform a greater range of tasks. 

1.4 Smart legal contracts can take a variety of forms with varying degrees of automation. In the first instance, a smart legal contract may take the form of a natural language agreement with performance automated by code. Alternatively, a smart legal contract may be written solely in (and performed by) code. In between these two extremes, a smart legal contract may take the form of a hybrid contract, consisting of both natural  language and coded terms. Different forms of smart legal contract give rise to different legal considerations. 

1.5 Automation should be considered on a spectrum. Smart legal contracts which involve elements of standard automation, such as payment by way of direct debit, have been in use for many years and are therefore unlikely to give rise to novel legal issues. However, a smart legal contract drafted primarily or solely in code and recorded on a distributed ledger, is likely to give rise to novel legal questions; the automation in question takes the contract out of the realm of legal familiarity. 

Background 

1.6 The Law Commission was asked by the Lord Chancellor to include work on smart legal contracts as part of our 13th programme, agreed in December 2017. After discussions with stakeholders, our initial intention was to publish a call for evidence in January 2019. 

1.7 In the same period, the Lawtech Delivery Panel was created with the support of Government. There was clearly some common ground between the proposed Law Commission work and that of the Delivery Panel, and in particular its UK Jurisdiction Taskforce (“UKJT”). In those circumstances, we agreed to pause our work until such time as the conclusions of the UKJT were known. 

1.8 In November 2019, the UKJT published its legal statement on cryptoassets and smart contracts. The UKJT Legal Statement concluded that, in principle, smart contracts are capable of giving rise to binding legal obligations, enforceable in accordance with their terms. Following this, the Ministry of Justice asked the Law Commission to undertake a scoping study on smart legal contracts. 

1.9 The purpose of the scoping exercise is to provide an analysis of the current law as it applies to smart legal contracts, highlighting any uncertainties or gaps, and identifying such further work as may be required now or in the future. The project is intended to build on the foundations laid by the UKJT Legal Statement, and consider additional questions raised by stakeholders regarding smart legal contracts. Our terms of reference do not include other areas of law in so far as they relate to smart legal contracts, such as tax and data protection. Our full terms of reference are set out at Appendix 1. 

Call for evidence 

1.10 In December 2020, we published a call for evidence, which closed on 31 March 2021. The primary function of the call for evidence was to seek views about, and evidence of, the ways in which smart legal contracts were being used, and the extent to which the existing law could accommodate them. In each chapter of the call for evidence, we set out our understanding of law and practice, and asked consultees for their views. We did not make any proposals for law reform. 

1.11 We received 47 responses to the call for evidence. The responses were from a mix of stakeholders, including individuals who responded in their personal capacity, individuals who responded on behalf of organisations, and academics. We summarise our findings and conclusions to the consultation exercise in this paper. A list of all consultees who responded to the call for evidence is set out in Appendix 2. 

Extent 

1.12 This project focuses on the law of England and Wales. International conventions, including the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, are not considered. 

1.13 In relation to Wales, we consider that the subject matter of the project is reserved, being primarily a matter of private law.  

1.14 The project does not consider the law of Scotland or of Northern Ireland. 

Activity in other jurisdictions 

1.15 Some other countries have already taken steps to put smart legal contracts and associated concepts on a statutory footing. In addition, courts in other jurisdictions have had the opportunity to consider some of the issues that we discuss in this paper. Given the cross-border nature of many of the transactions which take place using smart legal contracts, it is and will continue to be important to be aware of developments elsewhere, with the hope that legal approaches will be broadly compatible. In the call for evidence, we asked consultees which other jurisdictions we should look to for their approach to smart legal contracts. 

1.16 Consultees noted that various states in the United States of America including Arizona, Illinois and Tennessee have introduced legislation which defines the term “smart contract”, and provides that a contract is not to be denied legal effect solely because it is a smart contract. 

1.17 Some consultees mentioned other jurisdictions which are perceived as being particularly proactive in the development and use of smart legal contracts and distributed ledger technology, including Australia, China, Dubai, Estonia, India, New Zealand, Sweden and Switzerland. Several consultees commented that Singapore is   particularly important because of its advanced use of smart legal contracts, and for its developing jurisprudence on smart legal contracts following High Court and Court of Appeal decisions in Quoine Pte Ltd v B2C2 Ltd. 

1.18 We refer to specific developments in other jurisdictions throughout this paper, where they are relevant to the particular issues being discussed. 

Related work within the Law Commission 

1.19 The UKJT Legal Statement also considered the legal status of cryptoassets. The Law Commission is currently working on a separate digital assets project drawing on this aspect of the UKJT Legal Statement. We published a call for evidence on digital assets in April 2021. We are analysing the responses received, and intend to publish a consultation paper next year.  

Structure of the paper 

1.20 This paper analyses the current law as it applies to smart legal contracts, particularly in relation to:

(1) formation and enforceability, including in relation to deeds; 

(2) interpretation; 

(3) remedies; 

(4) vitiating factors (mistake, misrepresentation, duress and undue influence); 

(5) consumer protection; and 

(6) jurisdiction. 

1.21 It comprises six further chapters. In each chapter, we provide a summary of the responses we received to the various questions raised in the call for evidence. We build on additional insights provided by consultees, and provide more complex and detailed examples. We also explain where, and why, our thinking has changed and developed since the call for evidence, and draw on consultee views to inform our thinking and to formulate our conclusions. 

1.22 In Chapter 2, we set out the background to smart legal contracts, our working definition of what a smart legal contract is, current use cases and a discussion of distributed ledger technology in the context of smart legal contracts. We include a discussion on the prevalence of the various forms of smart legal contracts, how they are used in practice, and the costs and benefits associated with smart legal contracts. 

1.23 The next three chapters provide an analysis of the “lifecycle” of a contract formed under the law of England and Wales (from negotiation through to remedies for breach) and explain how the law might apply to smart legal contracts. Chapter 3 considers the formation of a smart legal contract, including whether the parties intended to enter into legal relations, with all the associated legal rules and remedies. In Chapter 4, we consider how the courts might interpret a smart legal contract, looking at existing principles of interpretation. In Chapter 5, we consider the remedies which might be relevant if things “go wrong”, such as where the code does not execute as one or more of the parties intended. 

1.24 In Chapter 6, we specifically consider potential issues for consumers who enter into smart legal contracts, and consider how existing consumer protections might apply in the context of smart legal contracts. 

1.25 In Chapter 7, we consider the factors which may determine whether the courts of England and Wales have jurisdiction in relation to a smart legal contract, in the absence of a jurisdiction or choice of court agreement between the parties. 

Conclusions 

Existing legal principles can accommodate smart legal contracts 

1.26 In this paper, we undertake a detailed analysis of the application of existing contract law to smart legal contracts. Our findings conclude that the current legal framework is clearly able to facilitate and support the use of smart legal contracts. Current legal principles can apply to smart legal contracts in much the same way as they do to traditional contracts, albeit with an incremental and principled development of the common law in specific contexts.  In general, difficulties associated with applying the existing law to smart legal contracts are not unique to them, and could equally arise in the context of traditional contracts. In addition, even though some types of smart legal contract may give rise to novel legal issues and factual scenarios, existing legal principles can accommodate them. 

1.27 This paper therefore builds on the conclusions reached by the UKJT Legal Statement, which established that the current legal framework is sufficiently robust and adaptable so as to facilitate and support the use of smart legal contracts. The conclusions reached in this paper echo the view expressed by Sir Geoffrey Vos below.

English law is in a good position to provide the necessary legal infrastructure to facilitate smart legal contracts if, but only if, we try to keep any necessary reforms simple. We should, I think, keep sharply in focus the advantages of the common law. It is dependable and predictable and able to build on clear principles so as to apply them to new commercial situations. We should, therefore, be looking to identify and, if necessary, remove any fundamental legal impediment to the use of smart contracts. We should try to avoid the creation of a new legal and regulatory regime that will discourage the use of new technologies rather than provide the foundation for them to flourish. 

1.28 The flexibility of our common law means that the jurisdiction of England and Wales provides an ideal platform for business and innovation, without the need for statutory law reform. 

1.29 The market also has an opportunity to anticipate and cater for potential uncertainties in the legal treatment of smart legal contracts by encouraging parties to include express terms aimed at addressing them. Throughout the paper, we identify particular issues that parties may wish to address in their smart legal contract in order to promote certainty and party autonomy. A non-exhaustive list of these issues is set out in Appendix 3 to this paper. In addition, as smart legal contracts become increasingly prevalent, we anticipate that the market will develop established practices and model clauses that parties can make use of when negotiating and drafting their smart legal contracts. We hope that work in this area could be led by the UKJT or LawtechUK. 

1.30 We also consider separate, related areas of law, such as the law of deeds and the rules on jurisdiction. Deeds and private international law are the two areas where we think future work is required to support the use of smart contract technology in appropriate circumstances. In relation to both of these areas, future law reform projects are in train. 

Related technological advancements 

1.31 Smart legal contracts should not be considered in isolation. Related technological developments, such as the evolution of sophisticated smart contract platforms and the digitisation of contracts, have a direct bearing on smart legal contracts and their uptake. Digital contract initiatives and associated technologies are aimed at digitising commercial and legal documentation.  Rather than being written in natural language and stored as such, such technologies enable a contract to be produced in structured formats, with supporting code that acts as a map or set of instructions, enabling a computer to read it.  Legal documents produced in such a format can have their contents more easily read for reporting, analysis, automated processing, and lifecycle management.16 Even though a digital contract does not need to be a smart legal contract, digital contracts will likely trend towards the inclusion of coded elements. Although these developments are outside the scope of this paper, it is worth noting their advancements. 

1.32 The development of smart legal contracts may introduce new issues and harms which the law needs to respond to. For example, oracles (external data sources which transmit information to a computer program) may require further consideration or indeed regulation. As technology and use cases develop, it will be important to keep the law under review, and consider whether reform or regulatory intervention is necessary to address novel issues which arise.

12 October 2021

Contract Management

Yesterday's ANAO report Management of the Civil Maritime Surveillance Services Contract comments 

1. Civil maritime surveillance has been identified by the Department of Home Affairs (Home Affairs) as important to deterring, preventing, detecting and responding to civil maritime threats, including illegal maritime arrivals as part of Operation Sovereign Borders. Following a tender process, on 3 March 2006 a contract commenced between the Australian Government1 and Surveillance Australia Pty Ltd (Surveillance Australia) for the provision of a ‘Detect-Classify-Identify-Report’ surveillance service to inform ‘maritime zone awareness’. 

2. The contract requires the provision of 10 fixed-wing Dash–8 aircraft (six Dash–8 202 and four Dash–8 315), modified with specialised surveillance information management system (SIM) equipment which links aerial surveillance assets to the Australian Border Operations Centre. The contractor is required to provide 15,000 flying hours per annum. Home Affairs is to make monthly payments comprising a service charge (covering one twelfth of the annual fixed charge, an hourly charge and any monthly performance deductions) and reimbursable expenses (including landing and navigation charges and accommodation and meal allowances). 

3. At the time it was entered into, the contract was to expire on 31 December 20192 and had a reported value of $1,187 million.3 Since the contract was executed, there have been 40 contract change proposals (CCPs) approved and Home Affairs has identified that these have significantly reshaped the contract. 

Rationale for undertaking the audit 

4. The contract with Surveillance Australia is the larger of two4 that are in place under ‘Project Sentinel’ for aerial surveillance to prevent people smuggling and manage other maritime threats across the North West approaches of Australia. This ANAO performance audit commenced in the second last year of the extended 14 year contract term to: assess and provide transparency over the services that have been provided to date; provide independent assurance to the Parliament as to whether Home Affairs is managing the provision of contracted services effectively given their importance to Project Sentinel; and examine whether there has been appropriate planning for the end of the contract on 31 December 2021. 

5. This audit was undertaken in a similar timeframe to a separate audit of the Management of the Search and Rescue Contract by the Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA), which provided an opportunity to compare and contrast two aircraft service contracts (and their management) with contractors that are subsidiaries of the same parent company, Cobham Ltd (Cobham). The report of the audit of AMSA was tabled on 18 January 2021 (Auditor-General Report No. 27 2020–21) and concluded that AMSA’s management of the search and rescue contract has been fully effective. 

Audit objective and criteria  

6. The audit objective was to assess whether the Department of Home Affairs is effectively managing the Civil Maritime Surveillance Services contract. 

7. To form a conclusion against the objective, the following high level criteria were adopted: Has the contract delivered against the planned cost, scope and delivery timeframe? Have the specified surveillance assets been provided? Have the specified surveillance services been provided? 

8. At the time the audit commenced, there was a fourth criterion (‘Has there been appropriate planning for the end of contract?’) and the audit scope was to include the transitional arrangements in place for the period post the expiry of the contract on 31 December 2021. In December 2020, twelve months6 out from the expiry of the contract and with no further extension options available, the Secretary of Home Affairs did not agree to a recommendation from his department that he agree to issue a Request for Quote to the incumbent provider to continue providing services. 

9. As a result of the path forward not having been resolved by Home Affairs by December 2020, the Auditor-General decided to remove the fourth criterion from the scope of the audit. As at August 2021 with four months remaining on the current contract, there are no arrangements in place for the next contract. 

Conclusion 

10. The department’s management of the Civil Maritime Surveillance Services contract has not been effective and, as a result, while surveillance services have been provided, the quantum and range of those services has fallen short of the contractual requirements. 

11. The contract has not been managed to secure delivery in line with the planned cost, scope and delivery timeframe. The contract has been varied on 40 occasions as of March 2021 with the effect of significantly changing the scope of the services to be delivered and increasing the term and value of the contract. The department has recognised that variations to the contract have significantly reshaped it and those variations have increased the cost by more than 29 per cent. There has been a high turnover of officers responsible for the management of the contract and the department has not ensured that each of its contract managers had appropriate training or experience. 

12. There were shortfalls and delays in the provision of the contracted surveillance assets. At the commencement of services under the contract, delays in the modification program meant that four fully compliant aircraft were not available and nine of the 26 required aircrews were not provided. There was also a delay in the provision of the SIM required for the acceptance of the full surveillance system. The department did not effectively apply the contractual framework to manage the shortfalls and delays. 

13. Home Affairs has not received the required quantum of surveillance services and the aircrew requirements have not been met. Under the contracted performance framework, Home Affairs has calculated that Overall Contract Performance (OCP) has met the specified 90 per cent threshold for 92 per cent of the period from 1 January 2008 to 31 December 2020. In contrast to this high level of calculated performance: the contracted Rate of Effort (RoE) in terms of hours flown has not been achieved in any year and has fallen short by an average of seven per cent each year; of the total missions planned, 25 per cent have only been partially completed and a further 11 per cent have been cancelled or aborted; and aircrew requirements have never been met with the number of aircrew on average each month 33 per cent below that contracted (where data is available for analysis). 

Supporting findings 

Contract delivery against planned cost, scope and timeframe 

14. With an authorised cost of $1,187.3 million or $98.9 million per annum, the department contracted in March 2006 for the delivery of civil maritime surveillance services to December 2019, with an option to extend for a further two years. The contract requires that Surveillance Australia provide 10 Dash–8 aircraft, to be operated from bases at Darwin, Cairns, Broome and Horn Island from the scheduled handover date of 1 January 2008; the delivery of the SIM, and the provision of 26 aircrew to meet the annual planned rate of 13,613 flying hours. 

15. The contract has been subject to 40 variations, with a significant variation to further extend the contract approved by the department in March 2021. The department has recognised that the variations have significantly reshaped the contract. The variations have also increased its duration by two years to date and have increased the authorised cost by more than 29 per cent. 

16. Contract managers have not been provided with appropriate training and have not had appropriate experience. Contract managers have also not received appropriate support due to there being no approved contract management plan in place until August 2018, more than 12 years after the contract commenced. There has been significant turnover in contract management staff, in addition to contract management responsibilities changing a number of times, exacerbated by the poor state of records from the time the contract was entered into. Action has recently been taken by the department to improve the resourcing of the management of the contract.

And on and on it goes. 

19 January 2021

Consent

'Consent as a Free Pass: Platform Power and the Limits of the Informational Turn' by Elettra Bietti in (2020) 40 Pace Law Review 307 comments

 Across the United States and Europe, notice and consent, the act of clicking that “I have read and agree” to a platform’s terms of service, is the central device for legitimating and enabling platforms’ data processing, acting as a free pass for a variety of intrusive activities which include profiling and behavioral advertising. Notwithstanding literature and findings that lay significant doubts on notice and consent’s adequacy as a regulatory device in the platform ecosystem, courts, regulators and other public authorities across these regions keep adopting and legitimating these practices. While consent seems a good proxy for ensuring justice in the platform economy, it is an empty construct. 

This paper explains how notice and consent practices in the platform economy are not only normatively futile but also positively harmful. Narrow understandings that focus on voluntariness and disclosure such as the ones generally adopted by regulators and courts fail to account for the systemically unjust background conditions within which voluntary individual acts of consent take place. Through such narrow approaches, regulators are failing to acknowledge that consent cannot be reasonably taken to morally transform the rights, obligations and relationships that it purports to reshape. Further, it positively harms consumers in at least three ways: burdening them with decisions they cannot meaningfully make, subordinating their core inalienable rights to respect and dignity to the economic interests of platforms, and creating widespread ideological resistance against alternatives. Notice and consent as a discourse is hardly contestable and is currently part of the rigid background of assumed facts about our digital environment. 

As new legislation is devised in the US and new opportunities to reinterpret the GDPR present themselves in the EU, we must be more courageous in looking beyond the facade of individual control and instead must grapple with the core structure of corporate surveillance markets. The longer we fail to acknowledge consent’s irrelevance to data governance, the longer we will deny ourselves respect and protection from the ever-growing expansion of digital markets into our lives. 

07 October 2020

Big Tech and US Competition Policy

In the US the House Judiciary Committee’s Antitrust Subcommittee has released its 400 plus page Investigation of Competition in the Digital Marketplace: Majority Staff Report and Recommendations regarding competition in the digital economy, particularly challenges presented by the dominance of Apple, Amazon, Google, and Facebook and their business practices. 

The Subcommittee notes that the report draws on seven congressional hearings, the production of nearly 1.3 million internal documents and communications, submissions from 38 antitrust experts, and interviews with more than 240 market participants, former employees of the investigated platforms, and other individuals. 

 The report offers possible remedies to (1) restore competition in the digital economy, (2) strengthen the antitrust laws, and (3) reinvigorate antitrust enforcement.

Recommendations include: 

  •  Structural separations to prohibit platforms from operating in lines of business that depend on or interoperate with the platform; 
  • Prohibiting platforms from engaging in self-preferencing; 
  • Requiring platforms to make its services compatible with competing networks to allow for interoperability and data portability; 
  • Mandating that platforms provide due process before taking action against market participants; 
  • Establishing a standard to proscribe strategic acquisitions that reduce competition; 
  • Improvements to the Clayton Act, the Sherman Act, and the Federal Trade Commission Act, to bring these laws into line with the challenges of the digital economy; 
  • Eliminating anticompetitive forced arbitration clauses; 
  • Strengthening the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice; and 
  • Promoting greater transparency and democratization of the antitrust agencies.
The report comments 

A year after initiating the investigation, we received testimony from the Chief Executive Officers of [Amazon, Apple, Facebook, and Google]: Jeff Bezos, Tim Cook, Mark Zuckerberg, and Sundar Pichai. For nearly six hours, we pressed for answers about their business practices, including about evidence concerning the extent to which they have exploited, entrenched, and expanded their power over digital markets in anticompetitive and abusive ways. Their answers were often evasive and non-responsive, raising fresh questions about whether they believe they are beyond the reach of democratic oversight. 
 
Although these four corporations differ in important ways, studying their business practices has revealed common problems. First, each platform now serves as a gatekeeper over a key channel of distribution. By controlling access to markets, these giants can pick winners and losers throughout our economy. They not only wield tremendous power, but they also abuse it by charging exorbitant fees, imposing oppressive contract terms, and extracting valuable data from the people and businesses that rely on them. Second, each platform uses its gatekeeper position to maintain its market power. By controlling the infrastructure of the digital age, they have surveilled other businesses to identify potential rivals, and have ultimately bought out, copied, or cut off their competitive threats. And, finally, these firms have abused their role as intermediaries to further entrench and expand their dominance. Whether through self-preferencing, predatory pricing, or exclusionary conduct, the dominant platforms have exploited their power in order to become even more dominant. 
 
To put it simply, companies that once were scrappy, underdog startups that challenged the status quo have become the kinds of monopolies we last saw in the era of oil barons and railroad tycoons. Although these firms have delivered clear benefits to society, the dominance of Amazon, Apple, Facebook, and Google has come at a price. These firms typically run the marketplace while also competing in it—a position that enables them to write one set of rules for others, while they play by another, or to engage in a form of their own private quasi regulation that is unaccountable to anyone but themselves. 
 
The effects of this significant and durable market power are costly. The Subcommittee’s series of hearings produced significant evidence that these firms wield their dominance in ways that erode entrepreneurship, degrade Americans’ privacy online, and undermine the vibrancy of the free and diverse press. The result is less innovation, fewer choices for consumers, and a weakened democracy. 
 
Nearly a century ago, Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis wrote: “We must make our choice. We may have democracy, or we may have wealth concentrated in the hands of a few, but we cannot have both.” Those words speak to us with great urgency today. 
 
Although we do not expect that all of our Members will agree on every finding and recommendation identified in this Report, we firmly believe that the totality of the evidence produced during this investigation demonstrates the pressing need for legislative action and reform. These firms have too much power, and that power must be reined in and subject to appropriate oversight and enforcement. Our economy and democracy are at stake. 
 
As a charter of economic liberty, the antitrust laws are the backbone of open and fair markets. When confronted by powerful monopolies over the past century—be it the railroad tycoons and oil barons or Ma Bell and Microsoft—Congress has acted to ensure that no dominant firm captures and holds undue control over our economy or our democracy. We face similar challenges today. Congress—not the courts, agencies, or private companies—enacted the antitrust laws, and Congress must lead the path forward to modernize them for the economy of today, as well as tomorrow. Our laws must be updated to ensure that our economy remains vibrant and open in the digital age. 
 
Congress must also ensure that the antitrust agencies aggressively and fairly enforce the law. Over the course of the investigation, the Subcommittee uncovered evidence that the antitrust agencies failed, at key occasions, to stop monopolists from rolling up their competitors and failed to protect the American people from abuses of monopoly power. Forceful agency action is critical. 
 
Lastly, Congress must revive its tradition of robust oversight over the antitrust laws and increased market concentration in our economy. In prior Congresses, the Subcommittee routinely examined these concerns in accordance with its constitutional mandate to conduct oversight and perform its legislative duties. As a 1950 report from the then-named Subcommittee on the Study of Monopoly Power described its mandate: “It is the province of this subcommittee to investigate factors which tend to eliminate competition, strengthen monopolies, injure small business, or promote undue concentration of economic power; to ascertain the facts, and to make recommendations based on those findings.” 
 
Similarly, the Subcommittee has followed the facts before it to produce this Report, which is the product of a considerable evidentiary and oversight record. This record includes: 1,287,997 documents and communications; testimony from 38 witnesses; a hearing record that spans more than 1,800 pages; 38 submissions from 60 antitrust experts from across the political spectrum; and interviews with more than 240 market participants, former employees of the investigated platforms, and other individuals totaling thousands of hours. The Subcommittee has also held hearings and roundtables with industry and government witnesses, consultations with subject-matter experts, and a careful—and at times painstaking—review of large volumes of evidence provided by industry participants and regulators. ... 
 
Finally, as an institutional matter, we close by noting that the Committee’s requests for information from agencies and any non-public briefings were solely for the purpose of carrying out our constitutionally based legislative and oversight functions. In particular, the information requested was vital to informing our assessment of whether existing antitrust laws are adequate for tackling current competition problems, as well as in uncovering potential reasons for under-enforcement. The Report by Subcommittee staff is based on the documents and information collected during its investigation, and the Committee fully respects the separate and independent decisional processes employed by enforcement authorities with respect to such matters. 
 
Although the companies provided substantial information and numerous documents to the Subcommittee, they declined to produce certain critical information and crucial documents we requested. The material withheld was identified by the Committee as relevant to the investigation and included, primarily, two categories of information: (1) documents the companies’ claimed were protected by common law privileges; and (2) documents that were produced to antitrust authorities in ongoing investigations, or that related to the subject matter of these ongoing investigations. 
 
Institutionally, we reject any argument that the mere existence of ongoing litigation prevents or prohibits Congress from obtaining information relevant to its legislative and oversight prerogatives. We strongly disagree with the assertion that any requests for such materials and any compliance with those requests interfere with the decisional processes in ongoing investigations. Furthermore, while Congress is fully subject to constitutional protections, we cannot agree that we are bound by common law privileges as asserted by the companies. While we determined that insufficient time exists to pursue these additional materials during this Congress, the Committee expressly reserves the right to invoke other available options, including compulsory process, to obtain the requested information in the future. ..

Summarising the Subcommittee’s Investigation, the report states

 On June 3, 2019, the House Judiciary Committee announced a bipartisan investigation led by the Subcommittee on Antitrust, Commercial, and Administrative Law. The purpose of the investigation was to (1) document competition problems in digital markets; (2) examine whether dominant firms are engaging in anticompetitive conduct; and (3) assess whether existing antitrust laws, competition policies, and current enforcement levels are competition in digital markets. The Committee initiated the investigation in response to broad-ranging investigative reporting, and activity by policymakers and enforcers, that raised serious adequate to address these issues. concerns about the platforms’ incentives and ability to harm the competitive process.  
 
As part of the investigation, the Subcommittee held seven oversight hearings that provided Members of the Subcommittee with an opportunity to examine the state of competition in digital markets and the adequacy of existing antitrust laws. A diverse group of witnesses offered testimony on topics related to the effects of market power on the free and diverse press, on innovation, and on privacy. Other witnesses who testified included executives from businesses with concerns about the dominance of the investigated firms. The hearings also provided an opportunity for key executives from Facebook, Google, Amazon, and Apple—including the Chief Executive Officers of these firms— to address evidence that was uncovered during the investigation in a public-facing venue. After each of the hearings, Members of the Subcommittee submitted questions for the record (QFRs) to the witnesses. 
 
The Committee requested information from the dominant platforms, from market participants, from the Federal antitrust agencies, and from other relevant parties, for the purpose of obtaining information that was not otherwise publicly available but was important to assembling a comprehensive record. The Committee also sent requests for submissions to various experts in the field, including academics, representatives of public interest groups, and practicing antitrust lawyers. The responses to these requests were indispensable to staff’s ability to complete this Report and its recommendations for congressional oversight of the antitrust agencies and legislative action. 
 
This Report is intended to provide policymakers, antitrust enforcers, market participants, and the public with a comprehensive understanding of the state of competition in the online marketplace. The Report also provides recommendations for areas of legislative activity to address the rise and abuse of market power in the digital economy, as well as areas that warrant additional congressional attention.

Its finding are summarised as 

a. Overview 
The open internet has delivered significant benefits to Americans and the U.S. economy. Over the past few decades, it has created a surge of economic opportunity, capital investment, and pathways for education. The COVID-19 pandemic has underscored the importance of internet access that is affordable, competitive, and widely available for workers, families, and businesses. 
 
The online platforms investigated by the Subcommittee—Amazon, Apple, Facebook, and Google—also play an important role in our economy and society as the underlying infrastructure for the exchange of communications, information, and goods and services. As of September 2020, the combined valuation of these platforms is more than $5 trillion—more than a third of the value of the S&P 100. As we continue to shift our work, commerce, and communications online, these firms stand to become even more interwoven into the fabric of our economy and our lives. 
 
Over the past decade, the digital economy has become highly concentrated and prone to monopolization. Several markets investigated by the Subcommittee—such as social networking, general online search, and online advertising—are dominated by just one or two firms. The companies investigated by the Subcommittee—Amazon, Apple, Facebook, and Google—have captured control over key channels of distribution and have come to function as gatekeepers. Just a decade into the future, 30% of the world’s gross economic output may lie with these firms, and just a handful of others. 
 
In interviews with Subcommittee staff, numerous businesses described how dominant platforms exploit their gatekeeper power to dictate terms and extract concessions that no one would reasonably consent to in a competitive market. Market participants that spoke with Subcommittee staff indicated that their dependence on these gatekeepers to access users and markets requires concessions and demands that carry significant economic harm, but that are “the cost of doing business” given the lack of options. 
 
This significant and durable market power is due to several factors, including a high volume of acquisitions by the dominant platforms. Together, the firms investigated by the Subcommittee have acquired hundreds of companies just in the last ten years. In some cases, a dominant firm evidently acquired nascent or potential competitors to neutralize a competitive threat or to maintain and expand the firm’s dominance. In other cases, a dominant firm acquired smaller companies to shut them down or discontinue underlying products entirely—transactions aptly described as “killer acquisitions.” 
 
In the overwhelming number of cases, the antitrust agencies did not request additional information and documentary material under their pre-merger review authority in the Clayton Act, to examine whether the proposed acquisition may substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly if allowed to proceed as proposed. For example, of Facebook’s nearly 100 acquisitions, the Federal Trade Commission engaged in an extensive investigation of just one acquisition: Facebook’s purchase of Instagram in 2012. 
 
During the investigation, Subcommittee staff found evidence of monopolization and monopoly power. For example, the strong network effects associated with Facebook has tipped the market toward  monopoly such that Facebook competes more vigorously among its own products—Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, and Messenger—than with actual competitors. 
 
As demonstrated during a series of hearings held by the Subcommittee and as detailed in this Report, the online platforms’ dominance carries significant costs. It has diminished consumer choice,  eroded innovation and entrepreneurship in the U.S. economy, weakened the vibrancy of the free and diverse press, and undermined Americans’ privacy. 
 
These concerns are shared by the majority of Americans. On September 24, 2020, Consumer Reports (CR) published a survey titled “Platform Perceptions: Consumer Attitudes on Competition and Fairness in Online Platforms.” Among its findings: 
 
• 85% of Americans are concerned—either very concerned or somewhat concerned— about the amount of data online platforms store about them, and 81% are concerned that platforms are collecting and holding this data in order to build out more comprehensive consumer profiles. 
 
• 58% are not confident that they are getting objective and unbiased search results when using an online platform to shop or search for information. 
 
• 79% say Big Tech mergers and acquisitions unfairly undermine competition and 
 
• 60% support more government regulation of online platforms, and mandating interoperability features, to make it easier for users to switch from one platform to another without losing important data or connections. 
 
b. Facebook 
 
Facebook has monopoly power in the market for social networking. Internal communications among the company’s Chief Executive Officer, Mark Zuckerberg, and other senior executives indicate that Facebook acquired its competitive threats to maintain and expand its dominance. For example, a senior executive at the company described its acquisition strategy as a “land grab” to “shore up” Facebook’s position, while Facebook’s CEO said that Facebook “can likely always just buy any competitive startups,” and agreed with one of the company’s senior engineers that Instagram was a threat to Facebook. 
 
Facebook’s monopoly power is firmly entrenched and unlikely to be eroded by competitive pressure from new entrants or existing firms. In 2012, the company described its network effects as a “flywheel” in an internal presentation prepared for Facebook at the direction of its Chief Financial Officer. This presentation also said that Facebook’s network effects get “stronger every day.” 
 
More recent documents produced during the investigation by Facebook show that it has tipped the social networking market toward a monopoly, and now considers competition within its own family of products to be more considerable than competition from any other firm. These documents include an October 2018 memorandum by Thomas Cunningham, a senior data scientist and economist at Facebook, for review by Mr. Zuckerberg and Mr. Javier Olivan, Facebook's Director of Growth. Among other things, the Cunningham Memo found that the network effects of Facebook and its family of products are “very strong,”  and that there are strong tipping points in the social networking market that create competition for the market, rather than competition within the market.   
 
According to a former senior employee at Instagram who was involved in the preparation of this document for Mr. Zuckerberg and Olivan, the Cunningham Memo guided  Facebook’s growth strategy, particularly with regard to Instagram. They explained: 
 
The question was how do we position Facebook and Instagram to not compete with each other. The concern was the Instagram would hit a tipping point . . . There was brutal in-fighting between Instagram and Facebook at the time. It was very tense. It was back when Kevin Systrom was still at the company. He wanted Instagram to grow naturally and as widely as possible. But Mark was clearly saying “do not compete with us.” . . . It was collusion, but within an internal monopoly. If you own two social media utilities, they should not be allowed to shore each other up. It’s unclear to me why this 
 
Facebook has also maintained its monopoly through a series of anticompetitive business practices. The company used its data advantage to create superior market intelligence to identify nascent competitive threats and then acquire, copy, or kill these firms. Once dominant, Facebook selectively enforced its platform policies based on whether it perceived other companies as competitive threats. In doing so, it advantaged its own services while weakening other firms. 
 
In the absence of competition, Facebook’s quality has deteriorated over time, resulting in worse privacy protections for its users and a dramatic rise in misinformation on its platform. 
 
c. Google 
 
Google has a monopoly in the markets for general online search and search advertising. Google’s dominance is protected by high entry barriers, including its click-and-query data and the extensive default positions that Google has obtained across most of the world’s devices and browsers. A significant number of entities—spanning major public corporations, small businesses, and entrepreneurs—depend on Google for traffic, and no alternate search engine serves as a substitute. 
 
Google maintained its monopoly over general search through a series of anticompetitive tactics. These include an aggressive campaign to undermine vertical search providers, which Google viewed as a significant threat. Documents show that Google used its search monopoly to misappropriate content from third parties and to boost Google’s own inferior vertical offerings, while imposing search penalties to demote third-party vertical providers. Since capturing a monopoly over general search, Google has steadily proliferated its search results page with ads and with Google’s own content, while also blurring the distinction between paid ads and organic results. As a result of these tactics, Google appears to be siphoning off traffic from the rest of the web, while entities seeking to reach users must pay Google steadily increasing sums for ads. Numerous market participants analogized Google to a gatekeeper that is extorting users for access to its critical distribution channel, even as its search page shows users less relevant results. 
 
A second way Google has maintained its monopoly over general search has been through a series of anticompetitive contracts. After purchasing the Android operating system in 2005, Google used contractual restrictions and exclusivity provisions to extend Google’s search monopoly from desktop to mobile. Documents show that Google required smartphone manufacturers to pre-install and give default status to Google’s own apps, impeding competitors in search as well as in other app markets. As search activity now migrates from mobile to voice, third-party interviews suggest Google is again looking for ways to maintain its monopoly over search access points through a similar set of practices. 
 
Since capturing the market for online search, Google has extended into a variety of other lines of business. Today Google is ubiquitous across the digital economy, serving as the infrastructure for core products and services online. Through Chrome, Google now owns the world’s most popular browser—a critical gateway to the internet that it has used to both protect and promote its other lines of business. Through Google Maps, Google now captures over 80% of the market for navigation mapping service—a key input over which Google consolidated control through an anticompetitive acquisition and which it now leverages to advance its position in search and advertising. And through Google Cloud, Google has another core platform in which it is now heavily investing through acquisitions, positioning itself to dominate the “Internet of Things,” the next wave of surveillance technologies. 
 
Internal communications also reveal that Google exploits information asymmetries and closely tracks real-time data across markets, which—given Google’s scale—provide it with near-perfect market intelligence. In certain instances, Google has covertly set up programs to more closely track its potential and actual competitors, including through projects like Android Lockbox. 
 
Each of its services provides Google with a trove of user data, reinforcing its dominance across markets and driving greater monetization through online ads. Through linking these services together, Google increasingly functions as an ecosystem of interlocking monopolies. 
 
d. Amazon 
 
Amazon has significant and durable market power in the U.S. online retail market. This conclusion is based on the significant record that Subcommittee staff collected and reviewed, including testimonials from third-party sellers, brand manufacturers, publishers, former employees, and other market participants, as well as Amazon’s internal documents. Although Amazon is frequently described as controlling about 40% of U.S. online retail sales, this market share is likely understated, and estimates of about 50% or higher are more credible. 
 
As the dominant marketplace in the United States for online shopping, Amazon’s market power is at its height in its dealings with third-party sellers. The platform has monopoly power over many small- and medium-sized businesses that do not have a viable alternative to Amazon for reaching online consumers. Amazon has 2.3 million active third-party sellers on its marketplace worldwide, and a recent survey estimates that about 37% of them—about 850,000 sellers—rely on Amazon as their sole source of income.   
 
Amazon achieved its current dominant position, in part, through acquiring its competitors, including Diapers.com and Zappos. It has also acquired companies that operate in adjacent markets, adding customer data to its stockpile and further shoring up its competitive moats. This strategy has entrenched and expanded Amazon’s market power in e-commerce, as well as in other markets. The company’s control over, and reach across, its many business lines enables it to self-preference and disadvantage competitors in ways that undermine free and fair competition. As a result of Amazon’s dominance, other businesses are frequently beholden to Amazon for their success. 
 
Amazon has engaged in extensive anticompetitive conduct in its treatment of third-party sellers. Publicly, Amazon describes third-party sellers as “partners.” But internal documents show that, behind closed doors, the company refers to them as “internal competitors.” Amazon’s dual role as an operator of its marketplace that hosts third-party sellers, and a seller in that same marketplace, creates an inherent conflict of interest. This conflict incentivizes Amazon to exploit its access to competing sellers’ data and information, among other anticompetitive conduct. 
 
Voice assistant ecosystems are an emerging market with a high propensity for lock-in and self- preferencing. Amazon has expanded Alexa’s ecosystem quickly through acquisitions of complementary and competing technologies, and by selling its Alexa-enabled smart speakers at deep discounts. The company’s early leadership in this market is leading to the collection of highly sensitive consumer data, which Amazon can use to promote its other business, including e-commerce and Prime Video. 
 
Finally, Amazon Web Services (AWS) provides critical infrastructure for many businesses with which Amazon competes. This creates the potential for a conflict of interest where cloud customers are forced to consider patronizing a competitor, as opposed to selecting the best technology for their business. 
 
e. Apple 
 
Apple has significant and durable market power in the mobile operating system market. Apple’s dominance in this market, where it controls the iOS mobile operating system that runs on Apple mobile devices, has enabled it to control all software distribution to iOS devices. As a result, Apple exerts monopoly power in the mobile app store market, controlling access to more than 100 million iPhones and iPads in the U.S. 
 
Apple’s mobile ecosystem has produced significant benefits to app developers and consumers. Launched in 2008, the App Store revolutionized software distribution on mobile devices, reducing barriers to entry for app developers and increasing the choices available to consumers. Despite this, Apple leverages its control of iOS and the App Store to create and enforce barriers to competition and discriminate against and exclude rivals while preferencing its own offerings. Apple also uses its power to exploit app developers through misappropriation of competitively sensitive information and to charge app developers supra-competitive prices within the App Store. Apple has maintained its dominance due to the presence of network effects, high barriers to entry, and high switching costs in the mobile operating system market. 
 
Apple is primarily a hardware company that derives most of its revenue from sales of devices and accessories. However, as the market for products like the iPhone have matured, Apple has pivoted to rely increasingly on sales of its applications and services, as well as collecting commissions and fees in the App Store. In the absence of competition, Apple’s monopoly power over software distribution to iOS devices has resulted in harms to competitors and competition, reducing quality and innovation among app developers, and increasing prices and reducing choices for consumers. 
 
f. Effects of Market Power 
 
The Subcommittee also examined the effects of market power in digital markets on the free and diverse press, innovation, privacy and data, and other relevant matters summarized below for ease of reference. 
 
As part of this process, the Subcommittee received testimony and submissions showing that the dominance of some online platforms has contributed to the decline of trustworthy sources of news,  which is essential to our democracy. In several submissions news publishers raised concerns regarding the “significant and growing asymmetry of power” between dominant platforms and news organizations, as well as the effect of this dominance on the production and availability of trustworthy sources of news. Other publishers said that they are “increasingly beholden” to these firms, and in particular, to Google and Facebook. Google and Facebook have an outsized influence over the distribution and monetization of trustworthy sources of news online, undermining the quality and availability of high-quality sources of journalism.  This concern is underscored by the COVID-19 pandemic, which has laid bare the importance of preserving a vibrant free press in both local and national markets. 
 
The rise of market power online has also materially weakened innovation and entrepreneurship in the US economy. Some venture capitalists, for example, report that there is an innovation “kill  zone” that insulates dominant platforms from competitive pressure simply because investors do not  view new entrants as worthwhile investments. Other investors have said that they avoid funding 
entrepreneurs and other companies that compete directly or indirectly with dominant firms in the
digital economy. In an interview with Subcommittee staff, a prominent venture capital investor explained that due these factors there is a strong economic incentive for firms to avoid head-on competition with dominant firms. 
 
Additionally, in the absence of adequate privacy guardrails in the United States, the persistent collection and misuse of consumer data is an indicator of market power online. Online platforms  rarely charge consumers a monetary price—products appear to be “free” but are monetized through 
people’s attention or with their data. In the absence of genuine competitive threats dominant firms offer fewer privacy protections than they otherwise would, and the quality of these services has deteriorated over time. As a result, consumers are forced to either use a service with poor privacy safeguards or forego the service altogether.
 
Finally, the market power of the dominant platforms risks undermining both political and economic liberties. Subcommittee staff encountered a prevalence of fear among market participants that depend on the dominant platforms, many of whom expressed unease that the success of their business and their economic livelihood depend on what they viewed as the platforms’ unaccountable and arbitrary power. Additionally, courts and enforcers have found the dominant platforms to engage in recidivism, repeatedly violating laws and court orders. This pattern of behavior raises questions about whether these firms view themselves as above the law, or whether they simply treat lawbreaking as a cost of business. Lastly, the growth in the platforms’ market power has coincided with an increase in their influence over the policymaking process. Through a combination of direct lobbying and funding think tanks and academics, the dominant platforms have expanded their sphere of influence, further shaping how they are governed and regulated.

The recommendations are summarised as  

As part of the investigation of competition in digital markets, the Subcommittee conducted a thorough examination of the adequacy of current laws and enforcement levels. This included receiving submissions from experts on antitrust and competition policy who were selected on a careful, bipartisan basis to ensure the representation of a diverse range of views on these matters. The Subcommittee also received other submissions from leading experts—including Executive Vice President Margrethe Vestager of the European Commission and Chair Rod Sims of the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission—to inform this inquiry. Most recently, on October 1, 2020, the Subcommittee held an oversight hearing on “Proposals to Strengthen the Antitrust Laws and Restore Competition Online” to examine potential solutions to concerns identified during the investigation to further inform the Report’s recommendations. 
 
Based on this oversight activity, Subcommittee Chairman Cicilline requested that staff provide a menu of reforms to Members of the Subcommittee for purposes of potential legislative activity during the remainder of the 116th Congress and thereafter. As he noted in remarks to the American Antitrust Institute in June 2019: [I]t is Congress’ responsibility to conduct oversight of our antitrust laws and competition system to ensure that they are properly working and to enact changes when they are not. While I do not have any preconceived ideas about what the right answer is, as Chairman of the Antitrust Subcommittee, I intend to carry out that responsibility with the sense of urgency and serious deliberation that it demands. 
 
In response to this request, Subcommittee staff identified a broad set of reforms for further examination by the Members of the Subcommittee for purposes of crafting legislative responses to the findings of this Report. These reforms include proposals to: (1) address anticompetitive conduct in digital markets; (2) strengthen merger and monopolization enforcement; and (3) improve the sound administration of the antitrust laws through other reforms. 
 
We intend these recommendations to serve as a complement to vigorous antitrust enforcement. Consistent with the views expressed by Chairman Nadler and Subcommittee Chairman Cicilline in the Foreword to this Report, we view these recommendations as complements, and not substitutes, to forceful antitrust enforcement. For ease of reference, these recommendations for further examination are summarized below. 
 
a. Restoring Competition in the Digital Economy 
 
• Structural separations and prohibitions of certain dominant platforms from operating in adjacent lines of business; 
 
• Nondiscrimination requirements, prohibiting dominant platforms from engaging in self- preferencing, and requiring them to offer equal terms for equal products and services; 
 
• Interoperability and data portability, requiring dominant platforms to make their services compatible with various networks and to make content and information easily portable between them; 
 
• Presumptive prohibition against future mergers and acquisitions by the dominant platforms; 
 
• Safe harbor for news publishers in order to safeguard a free and diverse press; and 
 
• Prohibitions on abuses of superior bargaining power, proscribing dominant platforms from engaging in contracting practices that derive from their dominant market position, and requiring due process protections for individuals and businesses dependent on the dominant platforms. 
 
b. Strengthening the Antitrust Laws 
 
• Reasserting the anti-monopoly goals of the antitrust laws and their centrality to ensuring a healthy and vibrant democracy; 
 
• Strengthening Section 7 of the Clayton Act, including through restoring presumptions and bright-line rules, restoring the incipiency standard and protecting nascent competitors, and strengthening the law on vertical mergers; 
 
• Strengthening Section 2 of the Sherman Act, including by introducing a prohibition on abuse of dominance and clarifying prohibitions on monopoly leveraging, predatory pricing, denial of essential facilities, refusals to deal, tying, and anticompetitive self-preferencing and product design; and 
 
• Taking additional measures to strengthen overall enforcement, including through overriding problematic precedents in the case law. 
 
c. Reviving Antitrust Enforcement 
 
• Restoring robust congressional oversight of the antitrust laws and their enforcement; 
 
• Restoring the federal antitrust agencies to full strength, by triggering civil penalties and other relief for “unfair methods of competition” rules, requiring the Federal Trade Commission to engage in regular data collection on concentration, enhancing public transparency and accountability of the agencies, requiring regular merger retrospectives, codifying stricter prohibitions on the revolving door, and increasing the budgets of the FTC and the Antitrust Division; and 
 
• Strengthening private enforcement, through eliminating obstacles such as forced arbitration clauses, limits on class action formation, judicially created standards constraining what constitutes an antitrust injury, and unduly high pleading standards.