Espionage Costs

The AIC Costs of Espionage report (in partnership with the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation) claims

 Espionage has become one of the most significant national security threats to Australia, impacting government, businesses and the university sector. The highly secretive nature of espionage makes it extremely difficult to measure. In this study we estimated, for the first time, the actual and prevented costs of espionage. Building on the Australian Institute of Criminology’s method for measuring the costs of serious and organised crime, we estimated the mitigation and response costs and the direct costs of espionage impacting Australia. We also estimated the preventable costs associated with a number of possible scenarios. The numbers are conservative and an underestimate of the true cost, given the challenges in identifying and measuring espionage activity and its consequences. 

 

In 2023–24, espionage cost Australia at least $12.5 billion. This includes the direct costs of the consequences of known or probable espionage activity – primarily losses due to state or state-sponsored cyber attacks, insider threats and intellectual property theft – as well as the public and private sector response, remediation and mitigation costs. There are also tens of billions in additional costs that Australia may have prevented by countering potential espionage. For example, in just one week, a single incident of espionage-enabled sabotage from a large-scale cyber attack could cost the Australian economy nearly $6 billion. These prevented costs are significant, and highlight the importance and benefit of investing in efforts to reduce the threat of espionage and minimise the harm in high-risk settings.

The report states 

The threat of espionage – the state or state-sponsored theft of Australian information or capabilities – is now at extreme levels, posing an enormous risk to Australia’s national security. This threat is expected to worsen in future. Understanding the real and potential harm from espionage to the government, private and university sectors, and to the wider community is an important step in ensuring that appropriate action is taken to build our resilience to the threat posed by state and state-sponsored actors. We relied on a review of known cases, published and unpublished research, and data on espionage and espionage-related harms, along with input from subject matter experts, to estimate the mitigation and response costs, direct costs of espionage, and the prevented costs of espionage. We limited our analysis of direct, mitigation and response costs to the 2023–24 financial year. Some calculations of espionage-related expenditure were based on sensitive and classified data, and therefore these costings are not itemised in this report. 

It is important to note at the outset that these numbers, while significant, underestimate the true cost of espionage in Australia. Espionage, by definition, is difficult to detect, and many of its most serious impacts cannot be assigned a dollar value. We have chosen to be conservative in our calculations. 

This is an important first attempt to measure the range of costs from known and suspected incidents of espionage, using a methodology that has been applied to other areas of national security. While this report highlights the importance of taking action to prevent espionage to protect Australia’s national interests, it also draws attention to the need for further work to help us better understand the impact that espionage has on government, businesses, universities and the wider community. 

Actual costs from espionage Our estimate of the actual costs from espionage includes both the direct costs of known or suspected espionage activity, and the mitigation and response costs to government, businesses and universities. 

Direct costs of known or suspected espionage activity 

We estimated the actual cost of state or state-sponsored cyber espionage, insider threats and intellectual property (IP) theft through a range of methods including:

„ Cyber security incidents impacting Australian medium and large businesses were estimated to cost up to $1,193.8 million. 

„ Cyber security incidents impacting Australian public universities were estimated to cost up to $14.5 million. 

„ Insider threats involving state or state-sponsored actors impacting Australian businesses were estimated to cost up to $324.8 million. 

„ Cyber security incidents involving state or state-sponsored actors impacting federal government agencies (not itemised here). 

„ Insider threats involving state or state-sponsored actors impacting Australian public universities were estimated to cost up to $25.0 million. 

„ Cyber-enabled theft of IP and trade secrets from businesses was estimated to cost up to $1,901.0 million. 

„ IP theft from government, the not-for-profit sector and universities was estimated to cost up to $628.0 million in 2023–24. 

These costs were incurred in a single financial year (2023–24). These represent a significant underestimate of the true cost of espionage, given the challenges in identifying, quantifying and valuing some of the consequences. 

Mitigation and response costs 

Significant resources are invested in the public and private sectors to mitigate and respond to espionage. These include the cost to federal government agencies entities related to the identification, investigation, disruption and prosecution of espionage incidents in Australia, as well as the development and enactment of policy and legislation regarding espionage in Australia. Other costs of mitigation include those associated with implementing and maintaining security measures, community outreach, and education and awareness raising. Many of these mitigation measures (particularly legislation) have been introduced in response to previous incidents of espionage or foreign interference, and thus can be considered long-term costs of espionage in Australia. We used a combination of top-down and bottom-up approaches to estimate these costs, relying on data on the operating expenditure of each agency and expert input from senior representatives from these agencies and other stakeholders. 

We also estimated the cost of cyber security to state, territory and local government agencies, businesses and universities. We determined the operating expenditure of each sector and relied on industry estimates of the proportion of total expenditure that is spent on information and communications technology (ICT) and, of that, the proportion spent on cyber security. We then estimated the proportion of these cyber security costs associated with espionage. There are also costs to businesses associated with personnel security and vetting, as well as the costs associated with applying for commercial foreign investments to the Foreign Investment Review Board (which assesses, among other things, risks to national security). 

Critical infrastructure is a major target for foreign actors seeking to undermine Australia’s national security and, in addition to the costs to the Australian Government, there have been costs to industry associated with several major reforms to the regulation of critical infrastructure to reduce the risk of espionage. Universities also incur costs associated with due diligence activity, including vetting of international students and assessing the risks associated with partnerships with foreign institutions. We used a range of methods and data sources to estimate these costs. These mitigation and response costs have not been itemised, and the full detail regarding our costing methodology has not been provided because it relies on sensitive and classified data. The mitigation and response costs are included in the total cost estimate. Several additional costs are incurred as a consequence of the action taken by government, businesses and the university sector to mitigate the risk of espionage. 

Among these are:

„ the costs of having to use more expensive technology, or technology that is less than optimal, rather than technology that may be available from a foreign adversary 

„ the costs incurred by government suppliers in certain high-risk sectors in order to meet security requirements 

„ declines in potential foreign investment due to our current national security posture „ missed opportunities for international research collaborations with leading academics and organisations. 

Although these costs are likely to be significant, they have not been estimated in the current research due to a lack of sufficient data. 

Prevented costs from espionage 

We estimate the counter-espionage efforts of governments, businesses and universities may have prevented tens of billions of dollars of additional costs to the Australian economy. While there have been many examples of espionage impacting Australia and our international partners, other harms have been avoided. 

We modelled a range of scenarios to estimate the potential costs that may have – to the best of our knowledge – been prevented, but which would be incurred in the future if efforts to prevent espionage were not successful.

„ Sabotage of critical infrastructure enabled by espionage could cost up to $1,161.2 million per incident. 

„ An economy-wide, week-long disruption to digital technology-intensive industries, enabled by sabotage, could cost the Australian economy $5,930.4 million. 

„ Theft of trade secrets from a large, publicly listed Australian company could result in share market losses of up to $887.2 million per incident. 

„ Cyber espionage attacks targeting a large, publicly listed Australian company could result in share market losses of up to $439.6 million per incident. 

„ Diminishing trust in government security due to espionage activity could result in an annual decrease in foreign direct investment inflows of up to $10,291.2 million. 

„ The potential annual losses from a decline in international student revenue because of a need to tighten controls following major espionage activity could be up to $890.7 million. 

„ A 10% decrease in annual US funding for research following espionage activity impacting Australian and US relationships could lead to potential same-year economic losses of up to $376.7 million. 

Many of these costs relate to, or would result from, single incidents of espionage. The cost from multiple repeated attacks targeting government, businesses and university sectors would be significantly higher. As such, the total prevented costs depend on the nature and scale of future espionage activity impacting Australia but are estimated to be tens of billions of dollars. 

Total actual and prevented costs from espionage 

When we combine the mitigation and response costs and the direct costs of espionage that could be measured, the total known cost to government, businesses, universities and the broader community in 2023–24 is estimated to be at least $12.5 billion. We estimate that tens of billions further in espionage costs may have been prevented through effective mitigation and counter-espionage activity. These costs are preventable – but only if appropriate action is taken to address the threat from those who seek to harm Australia’s national interests. 

Total actual costs: $12.5B Direct costs of known or suspected espionage Public and private sector mitigation and response costs 

Prevented costs: Tens of billions of dollars

Export Controls

'The spoilers from within: Allies and export controls' by Eliza Gheorghe in (2025) Journal of Strategic Studies comments 

Do alliances help or hinder non-proliferation efforts? Existing theories of nuclear non-proliferation have looked at the direct effects of having allies on the spread of nuclear weapons, i.e., whether protégés are more or less likely to obtain atomic arsenals. However, there is value in examining the indirect impact of alliances on non-proliferation, namely how allies make it easier or harder for third parties to acquire nuclear weapons. In this article, I argue that transfers from suppliers allied with enforcers spoil the non-proliferation regime more than assistance from other suppliers, which underlines the difficulties enforcers face when combatting proliferation. ...

Alliances also play an indirect role in the spread of nuclear weapons, especially through the influence enforcers’ allies can have on the non-proliferation regime. ... The literature on sanctions highlights that allies pose a significant challenge for sanctioning states because they can ‘exploit the political cover provided by their alliances’ to engage in sanctions busting. Given the close relationship between sanctions and export controls, the question arises: do allies help or hinder the enforcement of export controls? 

Allies can support non-proliferation efforts by aiding enforcers in cracking down on proliferants through unilateral, bilateral, or multilateral action. However, when states are both enforcers’ allies and suppliers of nuclear technology, they can undermine the non-proliferation regime by transferring nuclear technology to proliferants. Existing quantitative studies have shown that both civilian and sensitive nuclear assistance catalyze proliferation, but they have not examined whether, on average, nuclear technology transfers from spoilers are more damaging than those from other suppliers. This article offers the first comparison of these two types of nuclear assistance to highlight the challenge spoilers pose to enforcers’ non-proliferation efforts. I find that technology transfers from enforcers’ allies accelerate nuclear weapons programs, demonstrating how the non-proliferation regime can be undermined from within. 

The following analysis is organized into five sections that aim to show how allies complicate export controls. The first section looks at the literature on the role of allies in creating and enforcing cartels, lays out a theory of non-proliferation spoiling, and specifies its key predictions. The second part discusses the methodology and the data I draw on. The third section presents the results of the quantitative analysis and shows that allied suppliers spoil the enforcers’ efforts to stem the spread of nuclear weapons more than other nuclear technology providers. I find that spoilers have contributed to the acceleration of nuclear weapons programs via nuclear trade after the creation of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). The fourth part provides a case study of Italy as a non-proliferation spoiler. The fifth and concluding section offers a summary of the findings, discusses implications for emerging technologies, and proposes avenues for future research.

'From nonproliferation to strategic competition: US export controls and China' by Mathilde Velliet in (2025) International Politics comments 

Technological competition is at the heart of the renewed great-power competition that has characterized relations between the USA and China since the 2010s. The role of technological innovation in the evolution of power relations is already recognized in the literature of international relations. However, developments in US technology policy under the last two administrations raise the reverse question: how does the perception of changing power relations (in this case, Chinese technological catch-up perceived as a threat to US leadership) transform policies granting or denying access to technological innovation? This study sheds light on the transformation in the American conception of export controls: mainly conceived in the post-Cold War era as a law enforcement and nonproliferation tool, it has become a strategic instrument to restrict technology transfers to the People’s Republic of China. Using a Foreign Policy Analysis approach based on the analysis of legal texts, speeches, and interviews with the political actors involved, this article examines the policy process, leading to this fundamental change in US export control policy. As this study demonstrates, this change reflects a new interpretation of the link between economic and security interests, as well as the expansion of the perimeter of American national security.

'The trojan submarine: AUKUS, Pillar II, and the U.S. ITAR' by Paul Esau in (2024) 2 Journal of Strategic Trade Control comments 

Since the announcement of the AUKUS trilateral security partnership in September 2021, critics have attacked the U.S. International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) as a key obstacle to its success. Echoing long-standing frustrations over the regulatory burden of the ITAR, these critics manufactured an “AUKUS-ITAR dilemma” which seemed to require a general ITAR exemption for military trade between the three partner countries. This dilemma minimized critical disparities between the Australian, U.K., and U.S. military export control regimes and exaggerated the impact of ITAR reform on the success of AUKUS, especially on the emerging technology collaboration envisioned in the second pillar of the partnership. Yet recent U.S. legislation and regulatory reform indicate that rather than eliminating U.S. military export controls, the AUKUS-ITAR dilemma has resulted in a more robust, ITAR-based plurilateral export control regime dominated by U.S. interests and primed for further expansion. 

In September 2021, the United States, Australia, and the United Kingdom jointly announced a trilateral security partnership to address evolving threats in the Indo-Pacific region—AUKUS. Described as “the most significant security arrangement among the three countries in a generation,” this partnership was initially perceived as a vehicle for the transfer of nuclear propulsion technology to Australia for use in conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarines. External analysis, especially in the U.S., focused on the controversial export of nuclear technology and reactions from the impetus for the new partnership: China. While the second-last paragraph of the official joint statement also promised new collaboration in “cyber capabilities, artificial intelligence, quantum technologies, and additional undersea capabilities,” this second pillar of AUKUS seemed like an ambiguous afterthought. Submarines, not science fiction, were the core deliverable of the partnership. 

Yet as the timeline for the submarine sales (Pillar I) lengthened, Pillar II emerged as not only central but also essential to the AUKUS partnership. In the words of one former U.S. official and industry analyst in March 2023, “If Pillar Two fails, AUKUS will be a failure. Plain and simple.” Industry representatives and several former U.S. ambassadors to Australia positioned U.S. military export controls, specifically the U.S. International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) as obsolete Cold War-era relics and impediments to collaboration among the three AUKUS partners, creating an “AUKUS-ITAR dilemma.” The ITAR was called a “unique threat” to U.S. national security, and the “most significant obstacle” to winning a strategic competition with China. These arguments echoed long-standing frustrations over the regulatory burden of the ITAR in all three countries, and inspired a series of radical proposals from hawkish members of Congress to implement a blanket ITAR exemption for AUKUS partners. 

However, the passage of the 2024 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) in December 2023 revealed that these arguments had not been as persuasive as advocates had originally hoped. Instead, the U.S. Congress pursued a more moderate version of ITAR reform predicated on ensuring comparability between that the U.S., Australian and U.K. export control regimes, with implementation entrusted to conservative elements within the U.S. Department of State. In May 2024, the State Department released a proposed rule outlining a limited ITAR exemption that was finalized in August and implemented on September 1. Instead of receiving the crown jewels without caveat, Australia and the U.K. were forced to adopt ITAR-like regimes of their own. 

Does this result mean Congress missed a “generational opportunity” to implement AUKUS and ensure a new era of allied collaboration and innovation? Not quite. This article argues that Congress has evaded an attempt to use the AUKUS/ITAR dilemma as a “trojan horse” for long- standing commercial frustrations with the ITAR. This attempt built on previous initiatives to exempt Australian and British entities from ITAR licensing requirements and minimized critical disparities between the Australian, U.K., and U.S. military export control regimes. It also misaligned the goals of Pillar II and the probable outcomes of blanket ITAR exemptions, exaggerating the impact of the ITAR on military trade between the three countries – especially exports of critical and emerging technologies. As shown by the existing Canadian ITAR exemption, licensing relief has limited potential to realize the sort of seamless military integration and research collaboration envisioned under Pillar II. Ultimately, rather than eliminating U.S. military export controls, the AUKUS/ITAR dilemma has created a more robust ITAR-based regime dominated by U.S. interests and primed for further expansion. This article begins by describing the re-emergence of export controls amidst increasing competition between the U.S. and China. After introducing the ITAR and contrasting it with the Australian and U.K. military export control regimes, it summarizes a series of recent attempts to reducing export licensing requirements among the three AUKUS partners and highlights the key obstacles to greater collaboration. Finally, it contextualizes three major arguments used to criticize the ITAR prior to the passage of the 2024 NDAA and explores the possibility that AUKUS constitutes not only a security partnership but also lays the groundwork for a new plurilateral military export control regime.

Extremism

Chapter Seven of the Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Committee report Right Wing Extremist Movements In Australia states 

7.1 Australia is a healthy and vibrant democracy. Freedom of speech is fundamental to Australia’s values. Political views become unacceptable when individuals or groups use fear, terror, or violence to further or achieve ideological aims. Ashift from peaceful political engagement to the promotion, or use, of violence is incompatible with liberal democracy. The threat or use of violence against specific groups of people is an attack against our shared values. Violent extremism must not be tolerated in Australia. 

Defining extremism 

7.2 It is challenging to precisely define right wing extremism. A wide range of defining characteristics were provided to the committee. This included hostility towards minority groups, liberal democracy, a pluralistic society, and equality. 

7.3 Some right wing extremists condone the threat or use of violence to further their goals or defend their position in what they see as a decaying social order. They justify violence to advance their extreme ideology. 

7.4Australian intelligence and law enforcement agencies explained that it is not helpful to categorise extremism according to a binary left-right conceptualisation of political ideologies. Those agencies reported that extremists increasingly adopt hybrid ideologies that do not fit neatly on the political spectrum. 

7.5 Australian intelligence and law enforcement agencies have developed two broad categories of politically motivated violence that are further divided into more specific sub-‍categories. Those broad categories are: religiously motivated violent extremism; and ideologically motivated violent extremism. 

7.6 Ideologically motivated violent extremism is further divided into a range of sub-‍categories including: nationalist and racist violent extremism; anarchist and revolutionary violent extremism; and specific issue violent extremism. 

7.7 For the purposes of this inquiry, much of the evidence received by the committee related to individuals and groups who fall within the category of nationalist and racist violent extremism, including neo-Nazis and white supremacist groups. 

Nature and extent of extremism in Australia 

7.8 There is a long history of extremism in Australia. The views of Australian extremist movements reflect the sociopolitical context of the time and evolve according to that context. 

7.9 Ideologically motivated violent extremism is rising globally, and Australia is not immune to that trend. Disturbing evidence was received by the committee of communication between extremists based elsewhere in the world and those based in Australia, often in the online environment. 

7.10 Australian extremists have built links with international movements that reflect their ideological position. They have developed these links to create a shared community that can provide ideological, discursive, financial, and organisational support. 

7.11 Extremists opportunistically co-opt elements of mainstream culture to give their movements and ideological views greater credibility, to appeal to a wider audience, and to lure people into their extreme world view. Radicalised individuals can be encouraged to consider, or even commit, violent acts. 

7.12 The internet facilitates the rapid sharing of this culture and the creation of a globalised extremist movement. For some individuals, joining a large and active community can satisfy an unmet need for social connection. 

7.13 For example, the committee learned of the transnational so called active club network, which is used by extremists to build a community on shared principles. Those communities are designed to appear innocuous to outside observers as well as law enforcement and intelligence agencies. 

7.14 Active clubs are usually decentralised and are only loosely connected to each other. To outside observers they appear to focus on brotherhood and physical fitness. However, they may provide participants with an introduction to extremist ideologies and promote an extreme ideology. 

7.15It is noted that the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) reported that it is aware of the active club model and, at the time of giving evidence to the committee, it had assessed that it presents a low risk of politically motivated violence. 

7.16Concerningly, in August 2024, during this inquiry, ASIO raised the terrorism threat level to PROBABLE. There is a greater threat of people radicalising and using violence to further their ideological cause. 

7.17 As at November 2024, there have been nine attacks, disruptions or suspected terrorist incidents in Australia. In ASIO's assessment, most of those incidents were motivated by nationalist and racist ideologies or a hybrid of ideologies. All those incidents involved lone actors or small groups and low-capability weapons. 

7.18 It is deeply concerning that law enforcement and intelligence agencies reported that many radicalised individuals the subject of their investigations are young people. TheAustralian Federal Police informed the committee that it has commenced investigations and conducted operational activity against a number of people under the age of 16, with the youngest person being 11 years old. 

Mainstreaming of extremist ideas 

7.19 The committee received evidence to suggest that extremists aim to make their ideas and ideologies more politically and culturally accessible and acceptable. They do that through the spread of propaganda both in physical spaces and on widely used online platforms. 

7.20 Mainstream online platforms can act as gateways to more radical or extremist content hosted elsewhere online. 

7.21 Some extremists overtly pursue radical social change using violence or through the distribution of vile propaganda material intended to vilify and instil fear in minority groups. Others adopt more nuanced tactical approaches, distorting and manipulating mainstream political issues to lure people, including young Australians, into their extreme ideological domain. 

The threat posed by extremism 

7.22 Extremist movements pose a threat to Australian society and Australian values. Certain communities and groups of Australians are at particular risk. Thecommittee received evidence that highlighted how these Australians are subjected to dehumanising propaganda and targeted by extremists. 

7.23 A range of communities were identified as being at particular risk from extremist actors. Those communities include: First Nations peoples; culturally diverse communities; religious communities; women; migrants; LGBTQIA+ people; and young people. 

7.24 Australians who belong to minority groups reported the feeling of alienation and exclusion associated with being targeted by extremists. Their evidence demonstrated that even non-violent actions can have severe consequences for their sense of belonging and participation in society. 

7.25 Nationalist and racist violent extremism is incompatible with Australian democracy. It is anathema to Australian values. 

Radicalisation 

7.26 The radicalisation process can be complex and idiosyncratic. There are a range of factors that could contribute to someone becoming susceptible to radicalisation. 

7.27 Those factors include: social isolation; a real or perceived loss of status or privilege; economic insecurity; a sense of marginalisation; 

7.28 Several inquiry participants cautioned against a simplistic approach to addressing radicalisation and violence. They warned that there is no straightforward 'conveyor belt' that carries individuals from exposure to extremist ideas, to radicalisation, to committing violent acts. 

7.29 The Australian Institute of Criminology identified three broad risk factors that contribute to radicalisation: sociodemographic characteristics, such as being male, young, unemployed or underemployed; psychological characteristics, such as low self-control, personal grievance, certain mental health conditions; and contextual characteristics, such as criminal history or associations with other radicalised persons. 

Measures to address extremism 

7.30 Throughout the inquiry, the committee heard that the criminalisation of extremist behaviour is unlikely to fully address the threat of violence and reduce the risk posed to the wider community. 

7.31 Some inquiry participants recommended that the response to extremism should primarily focus on addressing the potential for extremists to resort to violence and not on the ideology itself. People should be free to hold extreme ideas. However, they should be strongly deterred from using violence in furtherance of those ideas. 

7.32 Other inquiry participants suggested that a holistic approach is more appropriate. That approach would include providing resources that support civic engagement, strengthen civic institutions, and provide tools that weaken the appeal of extremist ideologies. 

7.33 Inquiry participants recommended that governments focus on: community outreach and engagement programs; deradicalisation initiatives; education programs that foster critical thinking skills, improve knowledge of civics, and instil a greater sense of empathy; and antiracism programs.  

Community outreach and engagement programs 

7.34 Civil society was recognised as an integral part of any response to extremism. Community organisations are often best placed to respond to extremism, asindividuals who belong to those communities often view those organisations as having greater credibility. The family also plays an important role. The committee received evidence regarding the effectiveness of involving parents in deradicalisation programmes. 

7.35 While government can provide assistance to community organisations, this does not necessarily provide a solution to the issue. Some individuals may mistrust government and government-led initiatives. 

7.36 Notwithstanding this, it was suggested that civil society organisations should be broadly supported so that they are able to continue to meet the social needs of individuals who may be drawn to radical ideologies. Civil society organisations provide individuals with meaning, connectedness, respect, and recognition. If they are not able to provide those outcomes, some individuals may turn to other sources and thereby become more susceptible to radicalisation. 

Deradicalisation initiatives 

7.37 The committee received evidence highlighting the importance of deradicalisation programs in countering violent extremism. 

7.38 A distinction was drawn between disengagement and deradicalisation. Disengagement refers to the disavowal of violence in the pursuit of an extreme ideology, while deradicalisation is a complete abandonment of a radical ideology. Individuals who have disengaged may still hold extreme beliefs but do not condone violence in the pursuit of that ideology. 

7.39 Violent extremists are often driven by emotion. Effective deradicalisation programmes may seek to engage people who have been radicalised on an emotional level to properly understand the factors in their lives that have motivated them to view violence as an appropriate means to further their ideological position. 

7.40 As individuals adopt extremist ideologies for idiosyncratic reasons, deradicalisation programs should be tailored to the specific needs of the individual. 

7.41 That support may require access to a multidisciplinary team of professionals depending on the unique needs of the individual. In some cases, it might also be appropriate to provide radicalised individuals with a mentor to help guide them on the path to rehabilitation. 

7.42 Some organisations with experience in providing deradicalisation programs suggested that former extremists who have been deradicalized may assist through the process. Their personal insights into extremism and radicalisation may be of particular benefit in some cases. 

7.43 The committee understands that deradicalisation and countering violent extremism initiatives require continuous evaluation and refinement to ensure that they are fit-for-purpose and responsive to the evolving threat environment. 

Recommendation 1 

7.44 The committee recommends that the Australian government undertakes periodic evaluation of Australian deradicalisation and countering violent extremism programs. That evaluation should involve experts engaged in those programs, law enforcement and intelligence agencies, and organisations that research countering violent extremism and deradicalisation. Any such periodic review should draw upon the experience both in Australia and overseas in other liberal democracies. Education and youth engagement programs 7.45Education was repeatedly highlighted as an effective tool in reducing the appeal of extremist ideology and weakening the propaganda disseminated by extremists. 

7.46 Instilling empathy for others was identified as an important facet of education. Empathy helps individuals better understand the perspectives of others and avoid the adoption of hateful ideologies. 

7.47 Several inquiry participants commented that the increased use of online platforms required a new approach to, and focus on media literacy, and critical thinking skills. 

7.48 Young people are at particular risk of developing links with extremist movements, as extremists often tailor their messages to appeal to young people. 

7.49 Young people are often at a stage of their life where they are testing their sense of self and developing their unique identity. They may be in positions of vulnerability and susceptible to insidious targeting from those purporting to provide social connection. Sometimes extremists position themselves to meet those psychological needs and to draw young people into the thrall of their extreme and hateful ideology. 

Recommendation 2 

7.50 The committee recommends that the Australian government develops a national framework for engaging with young people to deter them from radical extremism. That framework should provide best practice guidance to the states and territories and the broader civic community on how to engage with young people to: assist them in identifying harmful ideologies promoting violent extremism; deter them from adopting harmful ideologies promoting violent extremism; and provide them with the means to engage with the wider community in a socially positive way. 

The online environment 

7.51 The committee heard evidence in relation to the difference between ‘in real life’ and online extremism. The anonymity of the online environment is conducive to the sharing of violent rhetoric and harassment of individuals belonging to minority groups. Some people feel comfortable to say things online that they would never consider communicating in public. 

7.52 Some individuals find social fulfilment in online communities. They can meet a strong psychological need to feel part of a bigger movement. In the vast majority of cases, many of those communities contribute positively to wider society and perform a valuable social role. However, violent extremists may prey upon the psychological need of vulnerable people to perpetuate hate and promote their destructive cause. 

7.53 The online environment is where people are most likely to be exposed to fringe ideas and extreme ideologies. Individuals are likely to be exposed to that material even if they are not actively seeking it. 

7.54 Extremists are drawn to the internet not only for the anonymity, but also for the low barriers to access and its global reach. The internet provides them with a vehicle to recruit, radicalise, and inspire new adherents or reinforce the beliefs of other extremists. 

7.55 Efforts to remove offensive or objectionable content from the internet can be difficult. The committee received evidence that video footage of the despicable Christchurch terrorist attack and the perpetrator’s twisted manifesto continue to circulate online despite the New Zealand Chief Censor classifying it as objectionable content that is illegal to possess or distribute. 

7.56 It is clear that offensive, objectionable, and harmful material is likely to continue to circulate online despite efforts to regulate the online environment and remove that material. 

7.57 The Office of the eSafety Commissioner stated that it had not conducted research into the presence of ideologically motivated violent extremism online. It has conducted research into online hate, including in relation to children and young people’s experiences of hate on online gaming platforms. 

Recommendation 3 

7.58 The committee recommends that the Australian government conducts research into violent extremism in the online environment, including on: social media platforms; gaming platforms; and gaming-adjacent platforms. That research should examine how those platforms may be used by extremist actors to spread propaganda and recruit members, particularly in relation to young people. 

Social media platforms 

7.59 Social media platforms use algorithms to deliver content to their users. Those algorithms often prioritise similar material to the same user. Hence, there can be a compounding effect produced by the continual receipt by a user of emotive, shocking, and salient content, which can include extreme material. 

7.60 Depending on how individual users of those platforms engage with that content, over time they can find themselves presented with a larger volume of similar content. 

7.61 Extremists often use mainstream social media platforms as an initial point of contact with potential recruits, including vulnerable young people. If individuals engage with extremist content in a favourable way on mainstream platforms, they can be invited to closed sites where plans for violence can be discussed or promoted. 

7.62 In relation to the use of algorithms for content filtering on social media platforms, the committee heard that social media companies have in many instances reduced the level of transparency around how their platforms operate. 

7.63 The Christchurch Call, to which many social media companies are signatories, called for greater transparency around how those companies operate and the measures they have in place to regulate their platforms. The Office of the eSafety Commissioner told the committee that no social media company operating in Australia is adequately meeting its expectations under the Christchurch Call. 

7.64 The committee was told that independent researchers are not able to access the social media monitoring tools that were once available to them. Social media companies have discontinued the use of those tools, which make it difficult, if not impossible, for their efforts to enforce terms of service to be assessed by outside observers. The eSafety Commissioner indicated that the discontinuation of those tools has decreased public transparency and limited her office’s ability to monitor the presence of hate speech, abuse, disinformation, and extremist content on social media platforms. 

Recommendation 4 

7.65 The committee recommends that the Office of the eSafety Commissioner engages with stakeholders in relation to the development of best practice guidelines in relation to transparent and independent assurance measures to verify that social media platforms are enforcing terms of service to exclude harmful extremist content. Encrypted communication applications 

7.66 Online anonymity was raised as a major concern during the inquiry, particularly by law enforcement and intelligence agencies. The widespread use of encrypted communication applications allows violent extremists to conceal their identities and hide their communication from law enforcement and intelligence agencies. 

7.67 ASIO reported that virtually all of its priority counter-terrorism and counter-espionage investigations are frustrated by the use of encryption technology. 

7.68 While encrypted communication platforms may be used for nefarious ends, it is acknowledged that they can also have a socially beneficial role. Those platforms have been used to uncover information that has been suppressed by authoritarian governments and in investigations into corrupt or criminal practices by individuals and companies. 

7.69 Encrypted communications are integral to the proper functioning of the internet and play an important role in public transparency. Encryption protects privacy and assists in the investigation of wrongdoing. At the same time, encrypted communication technologies are used by violent extremist actors to conceal their activities from law enforcement and intelligence agencies. 

7.70 Law enforcement and intelligence agencies should be permitted access to encrypted communications in very specific cases that involve well-founded concerns for national security and where such access is regulated by the judicial system through the issue of warrants. That access is integral to those agencies being able to conduct their very important work that keeps Australians safe. As the extremist threat is globalised, Australian law enforcement and intelligence agencies are increasingly expected to be able to provide operational intelligence to their foreign counterparts. To ensure that violent extremism can be combatted wherever and whenever it emerges, it is vital that our law enforcement and intelligence agencies are equipped with the tools they need to effectively monitor and respond to national security threats, including those posed by extremists. 

Recommendation 5 

7.71 The committee recommends the Australian government considers introducing legislation that would enable Australian law enforcement and intelligence agencies to access encrypted communications if there is a well-‍founded threat to national security and a warrant has been issued by a judicial officer to access those communications. 

National hate crimes database 

7.72 Some participants in the inquiry advocated for the establishment of a national database to better track hate crimes. There are currently private organisations which are performing this invaluable civic function. It was also highlighted that there is no nationally consistent definition of what constitutes a hate crime in Australia, which can frustrate responses from law enforcement and human rights commissions. 

7.73 The lack of a nationally consistent understanding of what constitutes a hate crime has resulted in a reluctance to report those crimes and incomplete data about the extent of the problem. 

7.74 A nationally consistent approach to what constitutes a hate crime would facilitate a nationally consistent reporting and data collecting system. That system would: provide quantitative evidence of the efficacy of legislative measures that address hate and violence against targeted communities; assist law enforcement agencies in evaluating the effectiveness of their policing and education and training programs; and assist human rights commissions in developing advocacy programs and providing victim support programs. 

Recommendation 6 

7.75 The committee recommends the Australian government adopts a nationally consistent definition of what constitutes a hate crime and consider establishing a national hate crimes database.  

7.76 The committee recommends its finding and conclusions to the Senate.

Pandemic Planning

The COVID-19 Response Inquiry Report identifies Priorities for Australia’s preparedness 

Minimising harm 

 

Guiding recommendation 

 

Ensure decision-making processes in a pandemic fully account for the broader health, economic and social impacts of decisions, and the changing level and nature of risk to inform escalation and de-escalation of the response to minimise harm. 

 

Immediate actions – Do in the next 12-18 months 

 

1. Address critical gaps in health recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic, including prioritising greater investment in mental health support for children and young people and a COVID catch-up strategy in response to a decline in the delivery of key health prevention measures. 

 

2. Review the COVID-19 Vaccine Claims Scheme, with a view to informing the future use of similar indemnity schemes in a national health emergency for a wider profile of vaccines and treatments. 

 

3. Conduct post-action reviews of outstanding key COVID-19 response measures to ensure lessons are captured, including a review of the Biosecurity Act 2015 (Cth) and key economic measures. 

 

4. Establish structures to ensure young people and their advocates are genuinely engaged, and impacts on children are considered in pandemic preparedness activities and responses to future emergencies. This should include establishing the role of Chief Paediatrician and including the Chief Paediatrician and National Children’s Commissioner on the Australian Health Protection Committee. 

 

Medium-term actions – Do prior to the next national health emergency 

 

20. The Australian Government work with the states and territories to improve capability to shift to remote learning if required in a national health emergency. This should include: • incorporating competency in developing and delivering remote learning into initial teacher training and the Australian Professional Standards for Teachers • investing in the development of a suite of remote learning modules consistent with the Australian Curriculum, made available to all schools, teachers and students to improve preparedness for future emergencies that may require school closures. 

 

Planning and preparedness 

 

Guiding recommendation 

 

Develop and regularly stress-test preparedness and a national response to a pandemic that covers the broader health, economic and social response and fully harnesses capability and resources across governments, academia, industry and the community sector. 

 

Immediate actions – Do in the next 12-18 months 

 

5. Develop updated health emergency planning and response arrangements in conjunction with states and territories, and key partners, including consideration of escalation and de-escalation points, real-time review and a focus on post-emergency recovery. This should include: • An enhanced National Health Emergency Plan (updated National Health Emergency Response Arrangements) and updated National Communicable Disease Plan. These updated plans should align with the Australian Government Crisis Management Framework. • Management plans under the National Communicable Disease Plan for priority populations. • Modular operational plans for specific sectors, including high-risk settings, which can be deployed in response to a variety of hazards. 

 

6. Develop legislative and policy frameworks to support responses in a public health emergency, including for: • international border management • identifying essential services and essential workers • quarantine • the National Medical Stockpile • an Economic Toolkit. 

 

7. Finalise establishment of the Australian Centre for Disease Control (CDC) and give priority to the following functions for systemic preparedness to become trusted and authoritative on risk assessment and communication, and a national repository of communicable disease data, evidence and advice: • Build foundations for a national communicable disease data integration system, enabled for equity and high-priority population identification and data interrogation, with pre-agreements on data sharing. • Commence upgrade to a next-generation world-leading public health surveillance system, incorporating wastewater surveillance and early warning capability. • Work with the Department of Health and Aged Care and jurisdictions on updated communicable disease plans. • Conduct biennial reviews of Australia’s overall pandemic preparedness in partnership with the National Emergency Management Agency. • Establish an evidence synthesis and national public communications function. • Build foundations of in-house behavioural insights capability. • Establish structures including technical advisory committees to engage with academic experts and community partners. 

 

Medium-term actions – Do prior to the next national health emergency 

 

21. Build emergency management and response capability including through: • regular health emergency exercises with all levels of government, interfacing with community representatives, key sectors and a broad range of departments • regular economic scenario testing, to determine what measures would be best suited in different forms of economic shocks and keep an Economic Toolkit up to date • training for a pandemic response. 

 

22. Develop a whole-of-government plan to improve domestic and international supply chain resilience. 

 

23. Progress development of the Australian Centre for Disease Control in line with its initial progress review and to include additional functions to map and enhance national pandemic detection and response capability.   

 

Leadership 

 

Guiding recommendation Ensure the rapid mobilisation of a national governance structure for leaders to collaborate and support a national response that reflects health, social, economic and equity priorities. 

 

Immediate actions – Do in the next 12-18 months 

 

8. Establish mechanisms for National Cabinet to receive additional integrated expert advice for a whole-of-society emergency, including advice on social, human rights, economic and broader health impacts (including mental health considerations), as well as specific impacts on priority populations.  

 

9. Agree and document the responsibilities of the Commonwealth Government, state and territory governments and key partners in a national health emergency. This should include escalation (and de-escalation) triggers for National Cabinet’s activation and operating principles to enhance national coordination and maintain public confidence and trust. 

 

10. Agree and test a national Australian Government governance structure to support future health crisis responses, including an appropriate emergency Cabinet Committee and a ‘Secretaries Response Group’ chaired by the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet that brings together the lead Secretaries and heads of relevant operational agencies, to coordinate the Australian Government response. 

 

Medium-term actions – Do prior to the next national health emergency 

 

24. Maintain regularly tested and reviewed agreements between relevant national and state agencies on shared responsibilities for human health under the Biosecurity Act 2015 (Cth) with a focus on facilitating a ‘One Health’ approach that considers the intersection between plant, animal and human biosecurity.   

 

Evidence and evaluation 

 

Guiding recommendation 

 

Ensure systems are in place for rapid and transparent evidence collection, synthesis and evaluation. 

 

Immediate actions – Do in the next 12-18 months 

 

11. Improve data collection, sharing, linkage, and analytic capability to enable an effective, targeted and proportionate response in a national health emergency, including: • improvements to timeliness and consistency of data collection and pre-established data linkage platforms across jurisdictions, including for priority populations • expanded capability in Australian Government departments to gather, analyse and synthesise integrated economic, health and social data to inform decisions • finalising work underway to establish clear guardrails for managing data security and privacy and enabling routine access to linked and granular health data, and establishing pre-agreements and processes for the sharing of health, economic, social and other critical data for a public health emergency. 

 

Medium-term actions – Do prior to the next national health emergency 

 

25. Continue to invest in monitoring and evaluating the long-term impacts of COVID-19, including for long COVID and vaccination adverse events, mental health, particularly in children and young people, and educational outcomes.   

 

Agility 

 

Guiding recommendation Build, value and maintain capability, capacity and readiness across people, structures and systems.  

 

Immediate actions – Do in the next 12-18 months 

 

12. Develop a plan to build, value and maintain emergency management capability within the Australian Public Service, including planning and management of a surge workforce. 

 

13. Agree nationally consistent reforms to allow health professionals to work to their full training and experience. 

 

14. Embed flexibility in Australian Government grant and procurement arrangements to support the rapid delivery of funding and services in a national health emergency, including to meet urgent community needs and support populations most at risk. 

 

Medium-term actions – Do prior to the next national health emergency 

 

26. Include a focus as part of ongoing systems upgrades on modernising and improving data, systems and process capabilities to enable more tailored and effective program delivery in a crisis.   

 

Relationships 

 

Guiding recommendation 

 

Maintain formal structures that include a wide range of community and business representatives, and leverage these in a pandemic response alongside the use of temporary structures.  

 

Immediate actions – Do in the next 12-18 months 

 

15. Ensure there are appropriate coordination and communication pathways in place with industry, unions, primary care stakeholders, local government, the community sector, priority populations and community representatives on issues related to public health emergencies. Structures should be maintained outside of an emergency, and be used to provide effective feedback loops on the shaping and delivery of response measures in a national health emergency.   

 

Trust 

 

Guiding recommendation Rebuild and maintain trust between government and the community including by considering impacts on human rights. 

 

Immediate actions – Do in the next 12-18 months 

 

16. Develop and agree transparency principles for the release of advice that informs decision-making in a public health emergency. 

 

17. Develop a national strategy to rebuild community trust in vaccines and improve vaccination rates.   

 

Equity 

 

Guiding recommendation 

 

Ensure pandemic support measures include all residents, regardless of visa status, prioritise cohorts at greater risk, and include them in the design and delivery of targeted supports.  

 

Immediate actions – Do in the next 12-18 months 

 

18. Proactively address populations most at risk and consider existing inequities in access to services (health and non-health) and other social determinants of health in pandemic management plans and responses, identifying where additional support or alternative approaches are required to support an emergency response with consideration for health, social and economic factors.   

 

Communications 

 

Guiding recommendation Build and maintain coordinated national public health emergency communication mechanisms to deliver timely, tailored and effective communications, utilising strong regional, local and community connections. 

 

Immediate actions – Do in the next 12-18 months 

 

19. Develop a communication strategy for use in national health emergencies that ensures Australians, including those in priority populations, families and industries, have the information they need to manage their social, work and family lives.

The report states that  

The Inquiry has identified nine guiding recommendations and 26 actions, including 19 immediate actions for implementation in the next 12 to 18 months. These are key foundations for pandemic preparedness and community resilience. Actions should be implemented with Commonwealth and state and territory governments and key partners where relevant. National Cabinet should have broad oversight of these actions, with support from relevant ministerial councils and First Secretaries. 

It goes on to identify 'key principles to guide implementation'. 

Minimising harm 

Ensure decision-making processes in a pandemic fully account for the broader health, economic and social impacts of decisions, and the changing level and nature of risk to inform escalation and de-escalation of the response to minimise harm. 

Immediate actions – Do in the next 12-18 months 

Action 1: Address critical gaps in health recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic, including prioritising greater investment in mental health support for children and young people and a COVID catch-up strategy in response to a decline in the delivery of key health prevention measures. 

Timing: in the next 12–18 months 

Lead: relevant department or entity/s with Health Ministers 

Prioritise additional mental health funding and investment in services for children and young people, to help manage the ongoing mental health impacts of the pandemic on this cohort. Health Ministers should coordinate a ‘COVID Catch-up’ strategy in response to a decline in the delivery of elective surgery and cancer screenings, including: • a national plan to reduce the elective surgery backlog, in consultation with the private and public hospital sectors • additional funding and an implementation strategy to re-engage regional, rural and remote and other high-risk populations in preventive care to help address undiagnosed cases of cancer, diabetes and other illnesses.   

Action 2: Review the COVID-19 Vaccine Claims Scheme, with a view to informing the future use of similar indemnity schemes in a national health emergency for a wider profile of vaccines and treatments. 

Timing: in the next 12–18 months 

Lead: relevant department or entity/s The COVID-19 Vaccine Claims Scheme review should: • examine barriers to access for the vaccine scheme based on feedback from the public, users and primary care providers, and links between the scheme and vaccine hesitancy • consider international research on vaccines claims schemes and their relation to public health and confidence in vaccination • include findings of how future processes could be improved. 

Action 3: Conduct post-action reviews of outstanding key COVID-19 response measures to ensure lessons are captured, including a review of the Biosecurity Act 2015 (Cth) and key economic measures. 

Timing: in the next 12–18 months 

Lead: relevant department or entity/s Review the human biosecurity provisions of the Biosecurity Act 2015 (Cth), including to: • examine whether further amendments are needed to ensure it can be deployed proportionately to the level of risk in human health emergencies • explore ways to ensure any decisions on extensions of determinations include consideration of broader advice on the health, economic, educational, social, equity and human rights impacts • consider inclusion of provisions for tabling or publishing relevant advice and rationale for the extension of determinations that implement restrictive measures under the Biosecurity Act 2015 (Cth). Review the effectiveness of the remaining key economic support measures deployed during the pandemic, to draw lessons for the development of the Economic Toolkit. • The following significant economic measures that have not been subject to a comprehensive review should be prioritised: Boosting Cash Flow for Employers, the Coronavirus Supplement, HomeBuilder, the Pandemic Leave Disaster Payment, the COVID-19 Disaster Payment, and the Early Release of Super. Review the aged care retention payment program. 

Action 4: Establish structures to ensure young people and their advocates are genuinely engaged, and impacts on children are considered in pandemic preparedness activities and responses to future emergencies. 

Timing: in the next 12–18 months 

Lead: relevant department or entity/s 

This should include: • Establishing the role of Chief Paediatrician. • Including the Chief Paediatrician and National Children’s Commissioner on the Australian Health Protection Committee. • Ensuring consultation mechanisms facilitate genuine engagement with children and young people and advocates charged with representing their interests in pandemic preparedness activities and responses to future emergencies. 

Medium-term actions – Do prior to the next national health emergency 

Action 20: The Australian Government to work with the states and territories to improve capability to shift to remote learning if required in a national health emergency. 

Led by the Department of Education, this should include: • incorporating competency in developing and delivering remote learning into initial teacher training and the Australian Professional Standards for Teachers • investing in the development of a suite of remote learning modules consistent with the Australian Curriculum, made available to all schools, teachers and students to improve preparedness for future emergencies that may require school closures.   

Planning and preparedness 

Develop and regularly stress-test preparedness and a national response to a pandemic that covers the broader health, economic and social response and fully harnesses capability and resources across governments, academia, industry and the community sector. 

Immediate actions – Do in the next 12-18 months 

Action 5: Develop updated health emergency planning and response arrangements in conjunction with states and territories, and key partners, including consideration of escalation and de-escalation points, real-time review and a focus on post-emergency recovery. As part of this, develop: • An enhanced National Health Emergency Plan (updated National Health Emergency Response Arrangements) and updated National Communicable Disease Plan. These updated plans should align with the Australian Government Crisis Management Framework • Management plans under the National Communicable Disease Plan for priority populations • Modular operational plans for specific sectors, including high-risk settings, which can be deployed in response to a variety of hazards. 

Timing: in the next 12–18 months 

Leads: • National Health Emergency Plan – Department of Health and Aged Care and the Minister for Health with input from relevant departments and agencies including the National Emergency Management Agency and the Australian Centre for Disease Control (CDC) • National Communicable Disease Plan – Department of Health and Aged Care with input from relevant departments and agencies including the CDC, and agreed at the Health Ministers Meeting • Management plans – Department of Health and Aged Care with input from the CDC, relevant departments and agencies, and state and territory governments • Modular operational plans – relevant lead department or entity/s, with state and territory governments The series of plans should: • have clearly defined scope, ownership and accountability, including a clear legal basis and defined roles for Commonwealth bodies (including the CDC), states and territories, and industry partners such as aged care providers • work in symphony with the Australian Government Crisis Management Framework; interface with emergency management plans at state and regional levels; and reference sub-plans including priority population management plans, workforce plans and the communications strategy • draw on technical expertise and be updated in light of risk assessments, and scientific and technological developments • embed pre-planned review mechanisms to support the real-time, rapid review of consequences as they arise, including quick assessments and corrections to emergency response measures without a protracted inquiry process • incorporate feedback from community, industry and academia into plans and response measure adjustments • be flexible enough to be used in response to a range of communicable disease or pandemic scenarios, while covering more likely events (such as an influenza pandemic) • include mitigations to address impacts of the planned response – for example, compassionate exemptions to public health orders (minimising harm) • consider transition and recovery • include arrangements that support workforce preparedness (such as surge models) • require post-action reviews, including on a whole-of-government basis • include external oversight and complaints handling and embed privacy principles. Develop management plans for priority populations under the National Communicable Disease Plan, including: • Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people   • people with disability • culturally and linguistically diverse communities • older Australians • children and young people • regional, rural and remote communities. Management plans should: • take into account the unique needs of priority populations and co-design with communities and experts from the relevant sectors including primary care and relevant service providers (such as aged care and disability providers) and Public Health Networks • consider the transition out of pandemic settings and take into account potential risks for priority populations as protective health measures are reduced • establish infrastructure and pre-agreements to support data sharing, and enable rapid research for real-time pandemic detection, risk assessment, and response evaluation • utilise the latest data and evidence and regularly test through health emergency scenario exercises that involve all partners identified in the plan (also see Action 21) • address recommendations arising from scenario testing in a timely way. The Management Plan for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people should include co-designing strategies to mitigate the risk of a virus spreading to remote Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities, limiting the impact of pandemic response measures on cultural practices, and ensuring culturally appropriate delivery of vaccination and healthcare services. This plan should be aligned with the Closing the Gap Priority Reform Areas and make explicit the central role of the community-controlled sector in responding to a pandemic. The Management Plan for people with disability should include co-designing strategies for in-reach vaccination services in residential settings, ensuring continued access to supported decision-making and oversight of closed settings, ensuring support workers and carers can access health settings, and expanding virtual and telehealth services. This plan should consider the interface between the disability and health systems and link to other related agreements and strategies, including the National Health Reform Agreement. The Management Plan for culturally and linguistically diverse communities should include co-designing strategies to ensure culturally appropriate delivery of vaccination and healthcare services that acknowledge the specific language and cultural barriers different communities may face. This plan should consider the role of community organisations, leaders and intermediaries. The Management Plan for older Australians should account for older Australians both in residential aged care facilities and their own homes. This should include co-designed strategies which embed a human rights approach to mitigate isolation and loneliness, prioritisation for vaccination and other treatments, and surge workforce requirements. Compassionate exemptions should be made to ensure people at the end of their lives are not denied visitation by family and friends. The Management Plan for children and young people should consider the differential health and indirect impacts children and young people may face and specific interventions that may be required. The plan should be aligned with the operational plan for early childhood education and care and schools. Develop modular operational plans for specific sectors to be deployed in response to a variety of hazards. Plans should be developed by relevant agencies in conjunction with the states and territories, and relevant service providers: • Early childhood education and care and schools – led by Department of Education • Managing the international border – led by Department of Home Affairs • Repatriation of Australian citizens – led by Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, with the Department of Home Affairs and National Emergency Management Agency • Quarantine – coordinated by Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, with the Department of Home Affairs and Department of Health and Aged Care • Supply chains – led by Department of Industry, Science and Resources • Aged Care – led by Department of Health and Aged Care • Housing – led by Department of Social Services The Early Childhood Education and Care and Schools plan should: • recognise access to education as an essential service for children and young people and consider strategies to maintain early childhood education and care (ECEC) attendance and keep schools open during public health emergencies, where consistent with health advice • document triggers and criteria for the closure of ECEC and schools where recommended by health advice, and criteria for reopening • be developed in consultation with states and territories, education providers, peak bodies, education and public health experts, and children and young people • commit governments to shared principles, triggers and criteria, while allowing flexibility to respond to local risks and circumstances • recognise that ECEC and school educators are essential workers if health advice recommends children and young people continue attending ECEC or school, and should receive priority access to vaccination; PPE and infection, prevention and control training • include development of a more responsive ECEC emergency funding model that can be deployed rapidly, respond to different needs, support consistency in children’s access to services, be predictable for parents and sustainable for providers, and account for a transition out of emergency settings. The Managing the International Border plan should: • document and stress-test pre-agreed roles and responsibilities across decision-making powers (Commonwealth) and implementation powers (states and territories), to ensure that the interface between the Australian Government agencies (such as the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the Department of Home Affairs and the Australian Border Force) and state and territory agencies (such as state police, health and hotel quarantine providers) is seamless – operationally and legally • recognise the interdependencies between any quarantine arrangements and international border controls (arrival caps, entry approvals and the movement of goods), the aviation and maritime sectors, and diplomatic relations. The Repatriation plan should: • clearly define how repatriation systems will be scaled up in a future pandemic and pay due consideration to humanitarian and domestic border intersections • include processes to review the exemption decision-making process and its underpinning rules during a future public health emergency to ensure exemptions are timely and equitable, align with the key health objectives they are intended to support, and seek to better balance health risks with personal circumstances and human rights. The Quarantine plan should: • draw on recommendations from the 2021 National Review of Quarantine • establish and regularly update best-practice guidance, informing practical implementation for quarantine facilities (including on infection prevention and control standards and changing technologies), which is informed by CDC advice. The Supply Chains plan should: • be developed in consultation with state and territory governments and industry • consider agreed protocols between Commonwealth and state and territory governments, should state border travel be restricted, to ensure ongoing operation of critical supply chains • include provision for scenario exercises with industry to simulate responses to supply chain disruptions. The Aged Care plan should: • document an agreed escalation response model for a sector-wide crisis • include clearly defined triggers and criteria for escalation and de-escalation • cover the clinical response, surge workforce capacity, infection prevention and control strategies, personal protective equipment, outbreak management strategies (such as compassionate quarantine, self-isolation and cohorting) • identify data required to inform the response • consider the interface between aged care and health services. The Housing plan should: • be aligned with the National Agreement on Social Housing and Homelessness • include development of potential emergency measures in advance of a future pandemic to ensure access to secure and affordable housing is maintained.   

Action 6: Develop legislative and policy frameworks to support responses in a public health emergency. This should include frameworks for: • international border management • identifying essential services and essential workers • quarantine • the National Medical Stockpile • an Economic Toolkit. 

Timing: in the next 12–18 months 

Leads: • Essential services and essential workers – Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet • International border management – Department of Home Affairs • National Quarantine Strategy – Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet with the Department of Home Affairs and the Department of Health and Aged Care • National Medical Stockpile – Department of Health and Aged Care • Economic Toolkit – Treasury Essential services and essential workers frameworks should include: • definitions of essential workers and essential services in a national health emergency • mechanisms to support rapid harmonisation between the Australian Government and state and territory governments where practicable • a set of agreed principles to guide decision-making, with respect to the movement of essential workers and the continued operation of essential services in a crisis • a commitment to clear and consistent communication of the definitions and how they will apply • clearly communicated rationale for localised approaches where required • arrangements for priority access to vaccination, PPE, and infection, prevention and control training in a national health emergency. The international border management framework should: • formalise a targeted legislative framework to give clear legal power to ‘close the border’ in an emergency that minimises any legal risks. The National Quarantine Strategy should: • formalise governance arrangements around the activation of quarantine, with a focus on triggers for de-escalation and recovery • clarify the roles and responsibilities of Commonwealth and state and territory governments, as well as industry bodies, formalising principles for cost-arrangements and workforce requirements • identify a full set of quarantine options, including home quarantine, to limit the use of hotel quarantine and ensure that purpose-built quarantine facilities can be quickly re-engaged • be designed closely with the Department of Health and Aged Care, the Department of Home Affairs and the Australian Centre for Disease Control, and states and territory agencies with experience operationalising quarantine arrangements during the pandemic • account for the complex pathways and many different cohorts which the COVID-19 experience has shown us will be processed through the system • establish culturally appropriate options for people in remote Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities to quarantine on country in a national health emergency, and culturally appropriate options for culturally and linguistically diverse communities. The National Medical Stockpile plan should: • address the recommendations from both the 2021 Australian National Audit Office audit and the 2022 Halton Review on National Medical Stockpile preparedness. The Economic Toolkit should: • be developed by Treasury and the Reserve Bank of Australia, in consultation with relevant departments and the states and territories • include measures that can be tailored to respond to different forms of economic crisis, including a public health emergency, with an appropriate gender lens applied. • cover the division of responsibilities of the Australian Government and state and territory governments for the development and implementation of economic response measures • draw on lessons from reviews of significant aspects of Australia’s COVID-19 response, including ensuring all residents, regardless of visa status, are supported during the response • be updated over time to reflect research and reviews of economic settings (see Actions 8 and 22) • consider the mechanisms for the implementation of measures, and whether these could be enhanced to better support delivery – such as upgrades to existing systems or data-sharing arrangements • consider the role of transparency mechanisms in promoting public trust. 

Action 7: Finalise establishment of the Australian Centre for Disease Control (CDC) and give priority to the following functions for systemic preparedness to become trusted and authoritative on risk assessment and communication, and a national repository of communicable disease intelligence capability and advice. 

Timing: in the next 12–18 months 

Lead: Australian Centre for Disease Control • Work to finalise the Australian Centre for Disease Control in cooperation with the Department of Health and Aged Care, state and territory governments and key non-government organisations. It needs to complement and enhance existing emergency and health governance architecture. Build foundations for a national communicable disease data integration system, enabled for equity and high-priority population identification and data interrogation, with pre-agreements on data sharing, including: • Finalising an evidence strategy and key priorities to drive optimal collection, synthesis and use of data and evidence, address data gaps and develop linkages to public health workforce capability data. This would include: o identifying inconsistencies and gaps in shared data with the states and territories to prioritise for national surveillance data linkage, and upgrading existing datasets by improving data consistency and enabling data linkage readiness (see Action 11) o establishing technical advisory groups that bring together technical expertise as required to contribute to preparation of pandemic guidelines and rapid research-gap advice; advise on developments in their fields that should be incorporated in future pandemic detection and response strategies; assist in designing and reviewing pandemic exercises; and advise on national technical capacity and training needs. This can rapidly contribute additional expertise in a crisis o finalising work underway to establish clear guardrails for managing privacy and enabling routine real-time access to linked, granular data. • Publishing a report on progress against key priorities identified in this data strategy.   Commence upgrade to a next-generation world-leading public health surveillance system, including: • commencing establishment of new comprehensive surveillance infrastructure that incorporates wastewater surveillance to facilitate disease detection and monitoring, risk assessment, national data sharing, and operating with state and territory systems to provide national updates on notifiable diseases • developing a plan to improve at-risk cohort data collection and linkages to ensure cohorts are visible in an emergency and responses can be appropriately tailored • ensuring captured surveillance data meet the analytical needs of public health responders and support rapid research and real-time evaluation • drafting enhanced surveillance protocols for potential use in pandemic settings, including for proactive community screening and for the cohort of first cases to monitor for persistent symptoms resulting from infection • enhancing early warning surveillance capability and related modelling to inform procurement planning for the National Medical Stockpile (to be undertaken by the Department of Health and Aged Care) • confirming linkages with New Zealand health authorities and other regional partners, and agreeing to near real-time data and intelligence sharing with them and other regional partners. Work jointly on updated communicable disease plans, including: • working with the Department of Health and Aged Care on finalising the: o National Health Emergency Plan, aligned to the Australian Government Crisis Management Framework (see Action 1) o National Communicable Disease Plan, which would be agreed by the Health Ministers Meeting (see Action 1) • jointly holding a major pandemic drill with NEMA to assess national, whole-of-government preparedness, involving the Prime Minister, First Ministers and senior officials from the Commonwealth, state and territory governments and the Australian Local Government Association • determining responsibility and accountability for implementing actions arising from these scenarios, enabling continual updating and quality improvement, with support from the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet and NEMA. These should also be reported to the Secretaries Board.   Conduct biennial reviews of Australia’s overall pandemic preparedness in partnership with NEMA, including: • summaries of new pandemic exercises held to date • detailed reporting on local and national incidents with advice on system strengths and weaknesses • recommendations for system improvement • a preliminary view of how many public and private health workers might need to be deployed in response to different pandemic scenarios, as informed by an assessment of national capacity • mapping of national technical public health pandemic response and research capability to identify skills gaps and coordinate and resource training programs in partnership with the Department of Health and Aged Care and states and territories • reporting to the Health Minister and National Cabinet prior to tabling in the Australian Parliament. Establish an evidence synthesis and public communications function, including: • support for both business-as-usual communication activity and crisis communications in a public health emergency • working with the Department of Health and Aged Care, NEMA and the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet to develop a national communication strategy for use in national health emergencies (see Action 19) • making communication a focus for technical advisory group input, drawing from public and private channels to provide risk communication data synthesis and behavioural and social science expertise • in-house expertise in evidence synthesis and communication. Build foundations of in-house behavioural insights capability, including: • mapping existing behavioural insights functions across the Australian Government with the Behavioural Economics Team of the Australia Government • working with experts to develop a fully scoped and costed business case for an in-house behavioural insights capability. Establish structures including technical advisory committees to engage with academic experts and community partners, including: • public reporting on work to support research and intelligence exchange with research institutes in Australia and abroad, including behavioural research, private scientists, and peak health industry bodies.   

Medium-term actions – Do prior to the next national health emergency 

Action 21: Build emergency management and response capability. This should include: • Regular health emergency exercises with all levels of government, interfacing with community representatives, key sectors and a broad range of departments (led by the Department of Health and Aged Care), including: o large-scale exercises that bring in all levels of government, a broad range of departments/agencies, including the Australian Centre for Disease Control (CDC), as well as broader Australian academia, industry and civil society groups o exercises and stress tests for testing and contact tracing, including the utilisation of genomic surveillance across jurisdictions and analytic epidemiology capability o a primary coordination role for the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) and the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet to test the cooperation between the health system and broader emergency management arrangements, and apply relevant learnings to other crises o timing balanced against resourcing for other capability-building activities, including staff training and readiness reviews. • Regular economic scenario testing to determine what measures would be best suited in different forms of economic shocks and keep an Economic Toolkit up to date (led by Treasury), including: o a primary coordination role for Treasury and inclusion of state and territory treasuries o testing a system-wide response, including Treasury, the Reserve Bank of Australia and key economic and financial regulators at the Australian Government level o drawing on the Economic Toolkit to test the suitability of those measures to respond to different types of economic shocks o reflecting any learnings from scenario testing exercises in updates to the Economic Toolkit. • Training for a pandemic response (led by NEMA), including: o arrangements to train agency staff in emergency management to better equip them to surge to contribute to whole-of-government crisis responses o establishment of training programs to address technical expertise gaps identified through emergency exercises and add to response capacity at jurisdictional level when a crisis occurs during an active training period o a primary coordination role for the CDC/NEMA with input from technical advisory committees and states and territories, and embedded within jurisdictions. 

Action 22: Develop a whole-of-government plan to improve domestic and international supply chain resilience. This should include: • consideration for how resilience can be built across all critical supply chains • arrangements to collect supply chain data to support decision-making • engagement structures that encourage ongoing and regular communication between government and industry on the development and implementation of the whole-of-government plan and emerging supply chain issues. 

Action 23: Progress development of the Australian Centre for Disease Control in line with its initial progress review and to include additional functions to map and enhance national pandemic detection and response capability. This should include: • agreeing standardised case definitions and reporting requirements across jurisdictions • linking datasets prioritising residential aged care, the National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS), the Australian Bureau of Statistics, the Australian Taxation Office and the Department of Social Services • undertaking pandemic response capability mapping and coordinating national training programs with jurisdictions to address capacity gaps • acting on recommendations arising from scenario testing and post-incident reviews it has facilitated following health emergencies and through this Inquiry • establishing a library of living guidelines for high-risk clinical, residential and occupational settings and health professions that can be readily adapted for a new health emergency. This should include nationally agreed testing and tracing principles. These guidelines should be developed in partnership with: o the Department of Health and Aged Care, states and territories and relevant professional bodies o the NDIS Quality and Safeguards Commission in relation to disability settings • embedding behavioural insights capability to assess, refine and enhance the effectiveness of pandemic responses   • drawing on national health workforce trend data to inform advice on pandemic readiness of the health system. This would include oversight of national surge workforce capabilities and gaps to be mapped and ready to be operationalised in a future emergency response • developing dedicated ethical guidelines and processes for national health emergencies to enable rapid review in a changed risk context and enable real-time crisis-related research, overseen by the National Health and Medical Research Council.   

Leadership 

Ensure the rapid mobilisation of a national governance structure for leaders to collaborate and support a national response that reflects health, social, economic and equity priorities. 

Immediate actions – Do in the next 12-18 months 

Action 8: Establish mechanisms for National Cabinet to receive additional integrated expert advice for a whole-of-society emergency, including advice on social, human rights, economic and broader health impacts (including mental health considerations), as well as specific impacts on priority populations. 

Timing: in the next 12–18 months 

Lead: Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet • In parallel with making decisions based on key public health advice, National Cabinet should consider the differential impacts of a pandemic across the population and economy. This must include considering and mitigating unintended consequences, and seek to minimise negative impacts on broader health, mental health, educational, equity, economic and social outcomes. • Human rights considerations should be embedded into National Cabinet’s decision-making processes, particularly where measures are intended to significantly restrict rights and freedoms. • This might include mechanisms for a national health emergency that allow: o Health Ministers’ expertise to be utilised as a key source for whole-of-system health advice for National Cabinet o Heads of Treasuries to be expanded in a crisis to include the Reserve Bank of Australia Governor (and other key economic regulators as required) to bring together national economic expertise to support National Cabinet o expert advice to be sought from the Australian Human Rights Commissioner and other commissioners (e.g. National Children’s Commissioner) to support better understanding of the broader impacts of their decisions on human rights and priority populations.   

Action 9: Agree and document the responsibilities of the Commonwealth Government, state and territory government and key partners in a national health emergency. This should include escalation (and de-escalation) triggers for National Cabinet’s activation and operating principles to enhance national coordination and maintain public confidence and trust. 

Timing: in the next 12–18 months 

Lead: Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet This should include: • National Cabinet providing opportunities for more structured engagement and active consultation with local government to enhance the coordination and communication of a national response • agreeing escalation (and de-escalation) triggers for activation and operating principles to enhance national coordination and maintain public confidence and trust, including in relation to state border closures • greater clarification of roles and responsibilities, including around key areas of shared or intersecting responsibility such as vaccine distribution, health and social care of people with disability, older Australians and the provision of economic support in a national health emergency. 

Action 10: Agree and test a national Australian Government governance structure to support future health crisis responses, including an appropriate emergency Cabinet Committee and a ‘Secretaries Response Group’ chaired by the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet that brings together the lead Secretaries and heads of relevant operational agencies, to coordinate the Australian Government response. 

Timing: in the next 12–18 months 

Lead: Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet A purpose-specific governance structure, aligned with the revised Australian Government Crisis Management Framework, should be rapidly mobilised and tested in future pandemic incidents requiring a multi-sectoral response. Plans should be tested to ensure they are ready to be mobilised ahead of a crisis. The governance structure should include: • an Emergency Management Cabinet Committee to manage the Australian Government’s response, with appropriate membership and operating principles to reflect the nature of the risk, the role of statutory decision-makers and the importance of having the right people, with the right knowledge, at the right table, at the right time • a ‘Secretaries Response Group’ with a similar role to the Secretaries Committee on National Security, to support the Prime Minister and Cabinet to lead the coordination, development and implementation of the Australian Government response. o The Secretaries Response Group should be chaired by the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet and include lead Secretaries and heads of operational agencies that reflect the specific circumstances of the emergency and response. o There should be formal reporting lines between the Secretaries Response Group and other senior officials’ bodies, including supporting clusters of officials across relevant departments to progress work and enhance coordination with the states and territories. 

Medium-term actions – Do prior to the next national health emergency 

Action 24: Maintain regularly tested and reviewed agreements between relevant national and state agencies on shared responsibilities for human health under the Biosecurity Act 2015 (Cth) with a focus on facilitating a ‘One Health’ approach that considers the intersection between plant, animal and human biosecurity. • Agreements should ensure clarity and agreement on roles and responsibilities between governments and government agencies under the Biosecurity Act 2015 prior to the next crisis.   

Evidence and evaluation 

Ensure systems are in place for rapid and transparent evidence collection, synthesis and evaluation. 

Immediate actions – Do in the next 12-18 months 

Action 11: Improve data collection, sharing, linkage, and analytic capability to enable an effective, targeted and proportionate response in a national health emergency. 

Timing: in the next 12–18 months 

Lead: relevant department or entity/s Improvements to data collection and pre-established data linkage platforms, including: • Delivering actionable insights regarding optimal emergency response design to ensure emergency responses can be appropriately designed, tailored and adjusted through real-time evaluation of both intended outcomes and broader impacts. • For priority populations, this should include: o Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people – enhanced data collection in line with Indigenous Data Sovereignty and Indigenous Data Governance principles o Children and young people – investment in improved longitudinal data to monitor educational outcomes and wellbeing o Culturally and linguistically diverse communities – prioritising collection of key metrics in primary and acute healthcare settings, including country of birth, language spoken, interpreter requirements, ethnic/cultural background and year of arrival o People with disability – ongoing investment in and stewardship of the National Disability Data Asset, including enhanced data transparency such as facilitating access and analysis by researchers and relevant non-government organisations o People experiencing homelessness and housing insecurity – enhanced data collection on different types of homelessness and on ages, cultural backgrounds, hospitalisation and mortality rates of people experiencing homelessness. Expanded capability in Australian Government departments to collate and synthesise economic and health data to inform decision-making, including: • bolstering health departments at all levels of government with public health data analytic expertise to better inform policy decisions • translating health statistics and information for the wider health community and general public, helping to build health data literacy particularly in pandemic settings • leveraging research across academia and research institutions through the Australian Centre for Disease Control (CDC) technical advisory groups in key methods areas • coordinating and resourcing training programs in partnership with states and territories and research institutions to address gaps in applied public health analytic and evidence synthesis expertise identified within and across jurisdictions • planning for how Treasury and the CDC will work together to integrate health and economic data and analysis. Finalising work underway to establish clear guardrails for managing data security and privacy and enabling routine access to linked and granular health data, and establishing pre-agreements and processes for the sharing of health, economic, social and other critical data for a public health emergency, including: • ensuring rapid mobilisation of real-time evidence gathering and evaluation • sharing within the Australian Government, between the Commonwealth and states and territories and with relevant sectors • finalising agreements by the CDC on the sharing of health data between the Commonwealth and the states and territories (also see Action 7) • prioritising key health data on Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people, culturally and linguistically diverse communities and people with disability • prioritising key health and education data on children and young people • establishing appropriate arrangements for the sharing of data related to the delivery of economic support measures, as described in the Economic Toolkit. This could encompass data sharing within the Australian Government, and with the state and territories. 

Medium-term actions – Do prior to the next national health emergency 

Action 25: Continue to invest in monitoring and evaluating the long-term impacts of COVID-19, including long COVID and vaccination adverse events, mental health, particularly in children and young people, and educational outcomes. • Where evidence from ongoing monitoring and evaluation shows long-term impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic continue to be seen, governments must ensure policies and programs in place are tailored to actively address the impacts. • Evidence collected from ongoing monitoring and evaluation should inform plans and responses to future public health emergencies in order to mitigate similar long-term impacts. 

Agility 

Build, value and maintain capability, capacity and readiness across people, structures and systems. 

Immediate actions – Do in the next 12-18 months 

Action 12: Develop a plan to build, value and maintain emergency management capability within the Australian Public Service, including planning and management of a surge workforce. 

Timing: in the next 12–18 months 

Lead: relevant department or entity/s This should: • prioritise investment in emergency management capability uplift across the public sector, especially within the Department of Health and the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, to ensure there is a sufficiently large pool of people who have knowledge and understanding of crisis management and delivery principles and approaches • establish arrangements to ensure agencies are able to appropriately fulfil their emergency management obligations and agreed roles and responsibilities under the Australian Government Crisis Management Framework.  • establish arrangements to train agency staff to better equip them to surge to contribute to whole-of-government crisis responses • ensure the Secretaries Board maintains a role in stewarding these priority emergency management capabilities • be aligned with the work done under Action 21 to improve capability and readiness, including through exercises and readiness reviews. 

Action 13: Agree nationally consistent reforms to allow health professionals to work to their full training and experience. 

Timing: in the next 12–18 months 

Lead: relevant department or entity/s Options outlined in the independent Scope of Practice Review should be prioritised, including harmonising existing legislation and regulation which govern what services pharmacists can provide. In addition, these reforms should include: • simplifying and streamlining the legal basis under which Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Health Practitioners are able to administer medications • supporting nurse-led clinics to work independently and be remunerated equitably for services provided that are commensurate with those of a GP, such as for vaccination • streamlining legislative changes made during the pandemic to engage the broadest possible range of health professionals in ongoing immunisation efforts. Action 14: Embed flexibility in Australian Government grant and procurement arrangements to support the rapid delivery of funding and services in a national health emergency, for instance to meet urgent community needs and support populations most at risk. 

Timing: in the next 12–18 months 

Lead: relevant department or entity/s This should include: • funding arrangements for community organisations and industry, and procurement processes • funding mechanisms that allow organisations to rapidly develop and deliver solutions tailored to their communities • funding to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander community service providers and the community-controlled health sector, culturally and linguistically diverse community organisations and Disability Representative Organisations during a national health emergency • flexible funding to Primary Health Networks to support innovations in primary care delivery • guidance and random audits embedded in program delivery. 

Medium-term actions – Do prior to the next national health emergency 

Action 26: Include a focus as part of ongoing systems upgrades on modernising and improving data, systems and process capabilities to enable more tailored and effective program delivery in a crisis. Consider preparedness for future crisis as part of ongoing investment in key data, system and process capabilities, including: • Prioritising the modernisation of Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade repatriation systems, which must be: o ready to make better use of existing data capture processes and to assist in mobilising the core consular structures to be scaled up in a global crisis o scalable in a future crisis to ensure those who want to come home can be regularly communicated with and supported. • Building on the successful use of the Australian Taxation Office’s Single Touch Payroll to deliver the JobKeeper payment, future IT system upgrades should consider potential ‘emergency capability’ that could support greater flexibility in program delivery in a crisis. • Working to address known data gaps, which could enhance the effectiveness of policy measures, while being cognisant of the burden on the business and community sector.   

Relationships 

Maintain formal structures that include a wide range of community and business representatives, and leverage these in a pandemic response alongside the use of temporary structures.  

Immediate actions – Do in the next 12-18 months 

Action 15: Ensure there are appropriate coordination and communication pathways in place with industry, unions, primary care stakeholders, local government, the community sector, priority populations and community representatives on issues related to public health emergencies. Structures should be maintained outside of an emergency, and be used to provide effective feedback loops on the shaping and delivery of response measures in a national health emergency. 

Timing: in the next 12–18 months 

Lead: relevant department or entity/s • Build and maintain engagement mechanisms outside of an emergency with the community sector and industry (including businesses and entities across the supply chain). • Maintain and build on effective structures that were established before or during the COVID-19 pandemic, including those with priority populations such as Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people, people with disability, culturally and linguistically diverse communities and older Australians. • Consult these groups on the development and updating of pandemic plans, and ensure they participate in stress-testing exercises. • Ensure there are clear mechanisms to feed into decision-making processes in an emergency, and genuinely engage relevant bodies in pandemic preparedness activities and responses to future emergencies. • Utilise these structures in national health emergencies to provide effective feedback loops on the delivery of response measures. As part of this: • make the Culturally and Linguistically Diverse Communities Health Advisory Group, or similar advisory body, a permanent subcommittee of the Australian Health Protection Committee • make the Advisory Committee for the COVID 19 Response for People with Disability, or a similar advisory body, a permanent subcommittee of the Australian Health Protection Committee. The advisory body should also have clear mechanisms to feed into the Disability and Health Sector Consultation Committee • ensure permanent advisory structures for culturally and linguistically diverse communities and people with disability have roles consistent with the National Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Health Protection subcommittee and the Aged Care Advisory Group, including reporting to the Australian Health Protection Committee • engage Primary Health Networks in emergency planning and fund them in a flexible way to ensure they can leverage community connections.   

Trust 

Rebuild and maintain trust between government and the community including by considering impacts on human rights. 

Immediate actions – Do in the next 12-18 months 

Action 16: Develop and agree principles for the transparent release of advice that informs decision-making in a public health emergency. 

Timing: in the next 12–18 months 

Lead: relevant department or entity/s • National Cabinet (and other key decision-making bodies) should be more transparent in disclosing the expert advice that underpins their decisions, and the other multi-sectoral factors that must necessarily influence policy decisions. • This should include the rationale for why decisions are being made that result in significant reduction of freedoms. • Principles should be developed in partnership with science communication experts to ensure consideration is given to how evidence and advice can be easily interpreted given the inherent complexities and nuances. 

Action 17: Develop a national strategy to rebuild community trust in vaccines and improve vaccination rates. 

Timing: in the next 12–18 months 

Lead: relevant department or entity/s with Health Ministers As part of this: • Health Ministers should urgently agree a strategy for addressing the broad decline in COVID-19 vaccination, especially among priority cohorts, with a view to formalising policy responsibility to improve these vaccination rates by target dates. • There should be an emphasis on lifting early childhood vaccination rates for other communicable diseases to pre-pandemic levels.   Equity Ensure pandemic support measures include all residents, regardless of visa status, prioritise cohorts at greater risk, and include them in the design and delivery of targeted supports. 

Immediate actions – Do in the next 12-18 months 

Action 18: Proactively address populations most at risk and consider existing inequities in access to services (health and non-health) and other social determinants of health in pandemic management plans and responses, identifying where additional support or alternative approaches are required to support an emergency response with consideration for health, social and economic factors. 

Timing: in the next 12–18 months 

Lead: relevant department or entity/s • All plans and response measures should have an equity lens applied, including for health, social, human rights and economic factors (see Action 1).   

Communications 

Build and maintain coordinated national public health emergency communication mechanisms to deliver timely, tailored and effective communications, utilising strong regional, local and community connections.  

Immediate actions – Do in the next 12-18 months 

Action 19: Develop a communication strategy for use in national health emergencies that ensures Australians, including those in priority populations, families and industries, have the information they need to manage their social, work and family lives. 

Timing: in the next 12–18 months 

Lead: relevant department or entity/s with the Australian Centre for Disease Control 

The strategy should: • create a central public health emergency communications hub that serves as a single source where the Australian public can find integrated information about the emergency response around the country • be informed by behavioural science and risk communication expertise • proactively seek to ensure consistency of messaging between levels of government, providing supporting rationale and evidence for different approaches • leverage existing communication channels through professional bodies, unions, local government and advocacy groups • meet the diverse needs of communities across Australia, including through co-design • include mechanisms to coordinate and consolidate communications, considering the timing and frequency of announcements • include a strategy for addressing the harms arising from misinformation and disinformation, which incorporates: o information environment and ongoing narrative monitoring to combat misinformation o transparent engagement with social media companies o promotion and coordination of policies to increase the resilience of the information environment o partnership between government and trusted organisations, experts, media, and other influencers to pre-bunk and debunk misinformation • build on the principles of crisis and risk communications and have clear communication goals, including: o being timely, transparent, empathetic and consistent, promoting action and effectively communicating risk to foster trust o being inclusive, addressing inequities in accessing information, and supporting two-way communication o reflecting an evidence-based approach relevant for the contemporary information and media environment o embedding ongoing evaluation practices to ensure communication activities are effective, are appropriate, and are meeting the diverse needs of the Australian public • account for the distinct communications preferences and requirements of priority populations – including: o reflecting the key role of community and representative organisations in communicating with priority populations, including Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander community organisations; peak bodies for children, young people and education providers; culturally and linguistically diverse community organisations; Disability Representative Organisations; peak bodies for older Australians; and community service providers o funding community and representative organisations to tailor and disseminate communications through appropriate channels and trusted voices o providing plain English messaging to community organisations for tailoring in a timely manner.