Pseudolaw

Yet another judgment re pseudolaw. In Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Cahill & Anor [2025] VCC 1860 the Court notes 

The amended defences deny the existence of any lawful credit agreement between the parties, assert that CBA is a “corporate fiction,”and contend that no valid mortgage was created or that CBA lacks standing to enforce it. The defendants also dispute the quantum of the debt and demand production of “wet-ink” originals of various loan and title documents. Judge’s amended counterclaim makes bald and sweeping allegations that CBA engaged in misleading or deceptive conduct, relied on an unfair standard form contract contrary to the Australian Consumer Law, and “securitised” the mortgage in breach of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), thereby losing the right to enforce it. It further alleges that enforcement of the mortgage constitutes modern slavery and seeks, among other relief, the return of all payments made, the discharge of the mortgage, and damages.

In referring to 'Sovereign Citizens and pseudo law' the judgment  states

 The documents and submissions made by the defendants fall into a by now well-known quasi-philosophy known as the “sovereign citizen” movement. The guiding philosophy appears to be that these persons consider that they are not subject to the laws of the Commonwealth of Australia unless they have expressly “contracted” or consented to be so bound. This philosophy has no basis in law and has been rejected in many cases to date. All persons living under the protection of the Crown in right of the Commonwealth or State are, as a matter of law, subject to the laws of the Commonwealth. Any suggestion to the contrary is both dangerous and undermines the orderly arrangement of any society. The courts of this country will give no credence to such philosophy. 

The documents and submissions filed by the defendants are informed by half-baked statements that contain traces of legal tit-bits scraped from current and ancient sources otherwise also referred to as “ pseudo-law ”. They are legal gibberish and do not constitute proper statements of principles known to law. 

In Re Coles Supermarkets Australia Pty Ltd [2022] VSC 438, Hetyey Asj said the following of such submissions:

The defendants appear to be seeking to draw a distinction between themselves as ‘natural’ or ‘living’ persons, on the one hand, and their status as ‘legal’ personalities, on the other. However, contemporary Australian law does not distinguish between a human being and their legal personality. Any such distinction would potentially leave a human being without legal rights, which would be unacceptable in modern society. The contentions put forward by the defendants in this regard are artificial and have no legal consequence. 

I adopt the analysis of John Dixon J in Stefan v McLachlan [2023] VSC 501, dealing with the fictional concept of the ‘living man’, stating that:

The law recognises a living person as having status in law and any person is, in this sense, a legal person. Conceptually, there may be differences between the legal status of a person and that of an entity that is granted a like legal status, but whatever they might be they have no application on this appeal. In asserting that he is a ‘living man’, the appellant does no more than identify that he is a person, an individual. Every person, every individual, and every entity accorded status as a legal person is subject to the rule of law. There are no exceptions in Australian society. 

I also refer to AsJ Gobbo’s decision in Nelson v Greenman & Anor [2024] VSC 704 in which her Honour gives a comprehensive treatment of the fallacies underlying the sovereign citizen and pseudo law movements. I concur with and adopt her Honour’s treatment of the subject at paragraphs [53] – [78].

Flameout

In Hepburn SC v Coward [2025] VCAT 784 the Tribunal - following up Hepburn SC v Coward [2024] VCAT 517 - states 

Maureen Coward alleges that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction over her to hear and determine a prosecution for contempt because: 

She contends that the State of Victoria, VCAT and the Hepburn Shire Council are the incorrect jurisdictions – see her submissions para 219 – 223; 

She submits that she has the right to correct due process and jurisdiction – see her submissions para 224 – 225; 

She submits that correct due process and jurisdiction – over what she calls ‘subjects of the Imperial crown’ accused of a crime – is governed by Imperial Law including all Imperial Acts, including the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution and Bill of Rights 1688 – see her submissions para 229 – 238; and 

She submits that the Authority of Australian Governments is subject to the right to self-determination of whom she calls ‘the people’ who, she says, are ‘known in the title of the United Kingdom of Australia’ represented in title by the ‘Australian Privy Council’ and in title by the ‘Most Noble Order of the Desert Flame’ – see her submissions para 116 – 210. ... 

In short, Maureen Coward submits she is not an Australian subject, that Victorian law does not apply (or that it does not apply to her), and that the State of Victoria, the Tribunal and the Shire have no jurisdiction over her for various reasons. 

Maureen Coward also asserts that ‘all courts, police and government departments of every state who are now incorporated under ABN numbers’ are somehow invalid. She also asserts that their ‘acts statutes rules and regulations are governed by the Australia Act 1986’ which she says is somehow invalid. She also asserts she is being ‘coerced to joinder into a contract with the Hepburn Shire Council’ which she alleges has an ABN and she says is trying to extort who she calls ‘the people’ on trespass without following the ‘proper line of authority against we the people’. 

She says she does not wish to partake in or against her ancestors’ lineage, or she says ‘take part in the foreign occupied administration government the State of Victoria’ which she alleges (along with the Treasury Corporation of Victoria) are both registered to the US SEC and that she does not have any contracts with what she calls these ‘entity corporations’. Maureen Coward, in an email to the Tribunal dated 17 May 2024, stated that the proceeding should be taken to a ‘higher court either county court or the high court’.

In response the Tribunal comments 

... the legal issue for determination at this Preliminary Hearing is whether the Tribunal has jurisdiction to hear and determine an application for contempt of the Tribunal. 

It clearly does. 

Mrs Coward’s written and oral submissions are incorrect and misguided and have no foundation in law. She candidly states in her written submissions that she is ‘a little familiar with the legal world’. If her submissions have been prepared by her, she is legally mistaken. 

Section 137 of the VCAT Act confers statutory jurisdiction on VCAT to hear and determine a prosecution for contempt of the Tribunal. That jurisdiction is well established by law. 

It is also well established that the categories of contempt include where there has been non-compliance with an order made by VCAT: see s 137(1)(ea). 

The Court of Appeal has expressly held that VCAT has the jurisdiction under s 137 of the VCAT Act to deal with contempt in accordance with that statutory provision. The power to deal with contempt extends to punishing the disobedience of an order of the Tribunal and to enforce compliance with it, including by issuing a fine or imposing a sentence of imprisonment. 

Accordingly, Maureen Coward – being the person against whom the Tribunal has made its Enforcement Orders – is bound by those orders and the Tribunal has undoubted contempt jurisdiction over her. 

Maureen Coward’s arguments are what have been categorised in decisions of superior courts in Australia and overseas as belonging to a collection of erroneous beliefs or arguments sometimes called ‘pseudo-legal commercial arguments’. Such arguments have been rejected in common law courts and legal systems around the world as having no legal foundation. 

Maureen Coward referred to various irrelevant Australian court decisions in support of her arguments and an out-of-context discussion in a transcript of hearing from a case before another court in another Australian state. 

There is no legal basis for any contention in this case for Mrs Coward to assert that the laws of the Victorian Parliament do not apply to her and bind her. I also accept the Council’s submission that there is no inconsistency between s 137 of the VCAT Act and any Commonwealth law. 

Maureen Coward is a person who, like all ordinary human beings, in accordance with the rule of law is amenable to and answerable to the laws applicable to ordinary persons. She is equal under the law, not exceptional. 

Maureen Coward’s assertion of some citizen or other status giving her immunity from the law is legally flawed. The rights, freedoms and privileges people enjoy with others in society also carry responsibility to adhere to its laws, and the legal obligations they place on people, whether or not a person believes they do. Society’s laws apply to people who may or may not be citizens and apply with equal effect whether or not a person believes they are a citizen or subject to the law. 

Maureen Coward’s assertions of invalidity about Victorian law, and her assertions about orders of the Tribunal or actions of the Shire Council in seeking to enforce the Enforcement Order against her as somehow being invalid or somehow not applying to her, are also erroneous and have no legal foundation. 

Her arguments amount to legal nonsense and are incapable of coherent legal argument.

The Tribunal in its commendably clear 2014 decision explained

... private ownership rights need to be considered in the situation where (as part of having a functioning and workable community) we can all own certain things, but still need to comply with relevant laws and regulations prescribing how each such thing is used. 

To use two simple examples: A person who owns a plane still needs to fly the plane in accordance with extensive Federal aviation safety laws and regulations. Without this ‘safety regime’, it would become inherently unsafe for any of us to travel by air. 

To promote safer driving on our Victorian roads, a person who owns a car is legally required by State laws to wear a seat belt and only drive a road-registered car. Hence whether you own a car or are hiring one, either way, there are some real restrictions to how the car must be used on public roads. Surely none of us want to be driving on unregulated public roads where you might encounter/have a crash with unroadworthy cars and/or unlicensed dangerous drivers. 

In the same manner, the private ownership of land confers certain rights, but still operating within the broader framework of those relevant Victorian laws and regulations that apply day-to-day. These two features of ‘the private rights of a landowner’ and ‘complying with relevant laws and regulations’ are not mutually exclusive, but work alongside each other. 

These basic concepts and parameters are reinforced by the Queensland Supreme Court decision Bone v Mothershaw [2002] QCA 120. The key feature of this case for our purposes was it involved a dispute whether certain Queensland laws regulating ‘tree removal’ were valid. In upholding the validity of these contested laws, it is very on point and significant that Justice McPherson states at [19] that “In addition to historical considerations like these, a mere reference in a statute to an interest in land that is recognised at common law, such as an estate in fee simple, does not have the effect of transforming that interest, or the rights incidental to it, into statutory interests and rights”. 

Similarly His Honour at [25] says in relation to the private landowner in question who was affected by the ‘tree removal’ laws – “He retains unimpaired, for what it is worth, his estate in fee simple absolute of the land”. 

The key point here is that Bone v Mothershaw reinforces the fundamental feature of our modern society that where tension arises, our private interests (including the notion of ‘fee simple’) are constrained by those relevant laws and regulations that provide a legal framework for all of us to together live a workable and civilised life (not the other way around).

Pseudolaw and GenAI

'Pseudolaw and the illusion of legal meaning' by Joe McIntyre in (2025) Alternative Law Journal states 

This article is an overview of the contemporary phenomenon of pseudolaw and argues that, at its heart, it involves a mistaking of the form of legal argumentation for its substance. Essentially, through the use of legalistic language, archaic sources and strange rituals, an illusion of legal meaning is created which tricks users into believing their actions are legally meaningful. This article argues that it shares common features with generative AI, in that it produces an illusion of meaning which users mistake for actual meaning. It then explores this juxtaposition and its implications for responses to pseudolaw. 

Anyone who has spent extended time in Australian courts in the last five years will be familiar with the very strange phenomenon that is pseudolaw. A confident, assertive, self-represented litigant will rise to make their appearance only to argue the judge has no authority as the court is displaying the wrong coat of arms; or they will assert they are a ‘natural person’ not subject to the law; or they argue that the judge has somehow committed treason. A vivid illustration is provided in the case of Georganas v Georganas, when a pseudolaw ‘guru’ interceded from the public gallery:

Unknown Speaker: Stand down … Judge [X], you are concealing treason against the King of England … you are now charged, you are under arrest … You are trading in necromancy, you are treating dead people in this courtroom. You are in treason. You are in treason, you must stand down under the Bill of Rights now.

These types of arguments are, of course, without any legal merit. They do not work, and are rightly regarded as ‘obvious nonsense’, ‘pseudo-legal gibberish’, or ‘gobbledygook’. Yet these forms of argument continue to proliferate, with a significant growth seen in the years since the COVID-19 pandemic. This is no longer a fringe concern: such matters are now occurring on a daily basis in Australian courts, and in some jurisdictions is already being seen to profoundly reshape litigation. 

Courts are busy places, and pseudolaw can be particularly disruptive, not least because of the disproportionate impact of each pseudolaw case compared to other cases. The case law involving pseudolaw matters commonly includes statements of judicial concern about the systemic impact of such cases. For example, in Rossiter v Adelaide City Council, Livesey J observed that pseudolegal arguments have ‘without reservation been rejected as involving both legal nonsense and an unnecessary waste of scarce public and judicial resources.’ The burden of dealing with pseudolaw matters is having a profound impact on the courts. As one judicial officer put it:

It uses up so much court resources because every time they want to file something they end up making the lives of the Registry staff miserable. [The clerk’s] email inbox … [is] full of emails from them. They have changed the whole face of the civil justice system.

In this article, I provide an overview of the contemporary phenomenon of pseudolaw and argue that – at its heart – it involves a mistaking of the form of legal argumentation for its substance. Essentially, through the use of legalistic language, archaic sources and strange rituals, an illusion of legal of meaning is created which tricks users into believing their actions are legally meaningful. That these users lack legal literacy, are largely alienated from the law, and desperately want to believe in the promise of pseudolaw means that this illusion is difficult to displace. I argue, however, that it is critical the scale and nature of this threat to the good administration of justice is recognised and countered – not least because it is quickly merging with another emerging phenomenon, the use of generative AI (‘GenAI’), which shares many of these same characteristics. 

This article briefly draws out the similarities between GenAI and pseudolaw, with the goal of helping the reader better understand both phenomena. Unfortunately, the collision between GenAI and pseudolaw is already beginning to disrupt our courts, and it is increasingly necessary that we are all familiar with the contours of both the overlap between them and their impact upon the administration of justice. 

Ultimately, I argue that – as amusing as some of the examples may be – pseudolaw itself is no laughing matter. It is, as I have written elsewhere, ‘disrupting our courts … threatening our judicial officers and administrators [and] harming all who come into contact with it.’ The same is true on the increasing use of GenAI in litigation – it can appear humorous, but is increasingly problematic. As these two phenomena collide, it is critical we stop laughing and start learning.

'The Impact of Pseudolaw on Local Government' by Stephen Young and Harry Hobbs in (2025) 36(4) Public Law Review comments 

The COVID-19 pandemic saw a significant rise in the number of people making pseudolegal arguments in an effort to avoid public health measures. Legal scholarship exploring this phenomenon has largely focused on its impact on the administration of justice. However, as the level of government closest to the community, local governments have also faced a growing strain from pseudolegal adherents and conspiracy theorists. In this article, we explore their (misuse) of law and its impact on local government in Australia and New Zealand. We find three main impacts. Pseudolegal adherents have: attempted to construct parallel governance institutions as a means to exert power and control; intimidated and harassed local government authorities by issuing threats and disrupting public meetings; and, imposed a substantial administrative burden on staff by inundating offices with baseless correspondence. While pseudolaw may seem like obscure or picayune legal quirkiness, its impact on local government is anything but minor—it constitutes a growing threat to governance, public safety, and the rule of law. ... 

In May 2024, Lance Vervoort, Chief Executive Officer of the Hamilton City Council, received a letter submitted as part of a Local Government Official Information and Meetings Act 1987 (NZ) (‘LGOIMA’) request. The letter contained excerpts from the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZ), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (‘ICCPR’), and the 1947 Nuremberg Code. The excerpts were liberally annotated with explanations such as, ‘New Zealand became a member of the ICCPR 1978 and being INTERNATIONAL LAW, it supersedes all Legislation’. The letter explained further that these ‘are VERYY [sic] IMPORTANT DOCUMENTS which all peoples should be aware of, but most people aren’t’. The author of the letter asserted that Hamilton City Council is breaching international law because it is illegally conducting medical experiments on the people of Hamilton by fluoridating drinking water. The author declared that the obligation to follow the law is based on consent freely given. As he had not consented to fluoridation, the Council is operating criminally. 

Almost every legal claim in the letter is wrong. In New Zealand (and Australia), international law does not automatically supersede domestic legislation; the relationship between the state and its citizens is not based on contract; and a duly enacted law applies regardless of whether a person consents to its operation. The veracity of the factual claims is no better. Fluoride is a naturally occurring compound that is found in almost all fresh water. Fluoridation is the addition of fluoride to drinking water to protect against tooth decay, a well-established public health measure with decades of evidence demonstrating that it effectively improves oral health. The legal basis for fluoridation in New Zealand is also sound. Prior to 2021, the judiciary consistently found that local governments possessed the legal authority to fluoridate water. Since 2021, amendments to the Public Health Act 1956 (NZ) have made the position even clearer. Under s 116E of the Act, the Director-General may direct a local authority to add fluoride to its drinking water. Even if Mr Vervoort agreed with the author of the letter, he has no power to counteract a direction and remove fluoride. In any event, as this example demonstrates, concerns around fluoridation are often mixed with conspiracy theory and pseudolaw, such as the claim that it ‘removes freedom of choice by consumers’. The result is that any potentially meritorious legal questions are buried among voluminous and incoherent claims. 

The letter did not clearly ask a question of the council. Nonetheless, because it was filed as a LGOIMA request, the Hamilton City Council was required by law to respond. While the Council’s response was short, merely explaining that it was following the laws and regulations of New Zealand, it necessitated time, attention and resources that might have been better placed elsewhere. One strange letter is not a problem. However, this is just one of many conspiracy and pseudolaw-inflected LGOIMAs that the Council has responded to in the last few years. Hamilton is not alone. Local governments across New Zealand and Australia increasingly face administrative burdens derived from pseudolegal conspiracies. In some cases, they also face intimidation, threats and a real risk of physical harm. 

This is not new to those working in local government. The growing legal literature on pseudolaw and sovereign citizens, however, largely focuses on the origins, spread and manifestation of pseudolegal beliefs worldwide and their impact on law and the administration of justice rather than on the burdens it imposes on local government authorities. Similarly, while scholars in other disciplines examine pseudolaw through the lens of conspiracy theorising, extremism, criminal justice, and linguistics, there remains a dearth of study of pseudolegal adherents’ impact on local government. This is especially concerning now that pseudolaw has a ‘global reach’, having ‘migrated across the common law world and appear[ing] also in arrange of civil law countries’. We address this lacuna in this article. We focus specifically on its impact on local governments in Australia and New Zealand. Our study allows us to identify that pseudolaw is affecting local government in several significant ways. Furthermore, it reveals that although the impact is felt similarly across jurisdictions, the conduct of adherents manifests itself in diverse styles as pseudolaw evolves and adapts as it migrates. Pseudolaw in Australia and New Zealand has latched onto local legal, political and moral issues and arguments, including those based on the rights of Indigenous peoples. 

Our article is divided into two substantive parts. Recognising that pseudolaw remains an understudied phenomenon, in Part II, we contextualise our subject. We explain what pseudolaw is, orient our article in the wider legal literature, and provide background to understand what is occurring in New Zealand and Australia. In Part III, we explore the three primary impacts pseudolaw and sovereign citizens have on local government in Australia and New Zealand. First, adherents are establishing alternative and parallel governance institutions, including ‘Common Law Courts’ to enforce their vision of society. Second, members of these groups threaten and intimidate elected councillors and council staff by serving warrants and judgments issued from their fake courts and disrupting public meetings. Third, members waste the time and resources of local government by abusing local government obligations and by refusing to pay for services. Ultimately, the costs of responding to pseudolegal claims are more than financial — they represent a broader erosion of public institutions and a challenge to democratic governance.

Procedure

In Re Thorpe [2025] VSCA 172 the Court states 

 In October 2023, Uncle Robbie Thorpe (‘the applicant’) sought to file a charge sheet and summons in the Magistrates’ Court of Victoria naming King Charles III as the accused and alleging that he had committed ‘continuing acts of genocide ... against First Peoples’. The Magistrates’ Court refused to issue the summons and did not initiate a proceeding. 

By originating motion filed in the Trial Division on 7 March 2024, the applicant sought judicial review of the Magistrates’ Court decision. A trial was conducted on 19 July 2024 and on 5 February 2025 Richards J handed down her judgment. Her Honour held that the charge sheet did not disclose an offence known to law and that the Magistrates’ Court was correct to refuse to issue the proposed proceeding. 

An application for leave to appeal from a decision of Richards J to refuse to accept an affidavit for filing was refused by McLeish JA on 2 August 2024. 

The applicant has since filed an application for leave to appeal Richards J’s decision. He has also filed various applications other than for leave to appeal, which are voluminous and overlapping. Some of these additional applications have been accepted for filing. However, the Registrar refused to accept for filing four of the applications, pursuant to r 64.43 of the Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2015 (the ‘Rules’). Together these four applications seek more than 15 different orders, including orders for the joinder of additional parties, orders concerning intervenors, orders concerning the identity or racial background of the judges who are to hear his applications, and other orders concerning the conduct of the proceedings. 

The applicant now seeks to have a Judge or Judges of Appeal direct the Registrar to accept for filing the four applications that were refused, pursuant to r 64.43(5) of the Rules. 

For the reasons that follow, we will not direct the Registrar to accept the four documents for filing. ... 

The issue in this case is whether the documents fall within r 64.43(1) or (2) — that is, whether: (1) they are irregular (r 64.43(1)(a)); (2) they are frivolous or vexatious on their face or by reference to any materials already filed or submitted for filing (r 64.43(1)(b)); (3) the filing of them would give rise to an abuse of the process of the Court (r 64.43(1)(c)); (4) they do not comply with the Rules or the requirements of any applicable practice note (r 64.43(2)(b)); and/or (5) they are not accompanied by all the documents required by O64 or any applicable practice note (r 64.43(2)(d)). 

Consideration 

In our opinion the four documents that have not been accepted for filing are irregular, and/or frivolous or vexatious on their face and by reference to other materials that have been filed or submitted for filing, and/or would give rise to abuse of process. In addition, some of the documents do not comply with the applicable rules or a practice note, or were not accompanied by all the required documents. 

Document 495374 

As noted above, document 495374 seeks 13 orders (set out in the annexure to these reasons). Many of these orders are not orders that the Court can or would make. In light of that fact, it was appropriate for the Registrar to refuse to accept the document for filing, even if some of the other orders sought might have been orders that the Court can or would make. It is thus necessary only to identify some examples of entirely inappropriate orders in order to make clear that the Registrar was correct not to accept the document for filing. 

Proposed order 1 is that ‘Chief Justice Niall has conduct of these proceedings and this court file’. 

This is not a suitable order to be made by the Court of Appeal on the motion of a party. A party has no entitlement to seek to have an identified judicial officer conduct a proceeding. Nor would a judge or judges of the Court of Appeal make such an order. The application for this order is frivolous, vexatious and irregular. 

Proposed order 2 is that a ‘bench of five Aboriginal judicial officers be assembled to hear the application for leave to appeal and the appeal’. 

Again, this is not a suitable order to be made by the Court of Appeal on the motion of a party. A party has no entitlement to seek to have a bench of a particular size or composition hear a proceeding. Nor would a judge or judges of the Court of Appeal make such an order. The application for this order is frivolous, vexatious and irregular. 

Proposed order 3 is as follows: If there are not sufficient Aboriginal judicial officers in the Supreme Court of Victoria to assemble a bench of five Aboriginal judicial officers, then Chief Justice Niall to write to and seek to meet with the Attorneys-General of the State of Victoria and the Commonwealth of Australia to request the special appointment of sufficient Aboriginal judicial officers including the appointment of (i) Professor Irene Watson, Research Professor of Law, University of South Australia, and (ii) law graduate Dr Jaqui Katona , Moondani Balluk Indigenous Unit, Victoria University, and (iii) lawyer Paul Coe (iv) lawyer Michael Mansell (v) puralia meenamatta (“Uncle Jim Everett”), the Palawa man from the clan plangermairreenner (vi) Dr Aunty Mary Graham, Kombumerri and Hakka Wakka, Adjunct Associate Professor, University of Queensland — six names listed here in case of illness or other unavailability on the hearing dates. 

It is plain that this Court cannot order Niall CJ to take the step sought. The application for this order is frivolous, vexatious and irregular. 

Proposed order 10 is as follows: The Magistrates Court of Victoria is directed to retain counsel and participate properly in these proceedings as a normal party and respondent. 

Again, it is plain that this Court cannot make an order in such terms directed to the Magistrates’ Court of Victoria. The application for this order is frivolous, vexatious and irregular.

In Thorpe v Magistrates' Court of Victoria [2025] VSC 22 the headnote notes that Thorpe sought to file a charge-sheet and summons in the Magistrates’ Court of Victoria to commence private prosecution against King Charles III for crimes of genocide under First Peoples’ sovereign laws, the common law, and div 268 of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) 

The judgment states

On 20 October 2023, Uncle Robbie Thorpe sought to commence a private prosecution against King Charles III for crimes of genocide. He did so by filing a charge-sheet and summons in the Magistrates’ Court of Victoria, naming himself as the informant and Charles Phillip Arthur George Windsor as the accused. The offences alleged in the charge-sheet were continuing acts of genocide against First Peoples, contrary to First Peoples’ sovereign laws, the common law of Victoria, and div 268 of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth). 

On 29 December 2023, a senior registrar of the Magistrates’ Court refused to issue the proceeding, on the basis that the proper source of law had not been particularised and the proposed accused may be misled or prejudiced by this omission, and in those circumstances the issue of the proceeding would be an abuse of process. The proceeding was therefore returned unissued. 

In this proceeding, Uncle Robbie seeks judicial review of the Magistrates’ Court’s decision. He seeks an order requiring the Magistrates’ Court to accept the charge-sheet and summons for filing and issue the summons. ... 

At a directions hearing on 22 April 2024, I ordered that the Attorney-General of Victoria be joined as second defendant to the proceeding, on the basis that as the first law officer of the State of Victoria, her presence was necessary to ensure that all questions in the proceeding are effectually and completely determined and adjudicated upon. The Attorney-General subsequently filed written submissions and briefed Crown Counsel to appear at the trial of the proceeding on 19 July 2024. 

At the trial, Uncle Robbie applied for me to disqualify myself from further conduct of the proceeding. I refused that application, and provide my reasons for that decision below. 

In the course of his submissions at trial, Uncle Robbie challenged the legal foundation of the State of Victoria, in light of the widely acknowledged truth that the sovereignty of the First Peoples of Victoria was never ceded. He questioned the legitimacy of the Court’s jurisdiction, given the High Court’s rejection of the fiction of terra nullius and the previous use of that fiction to justify the Crown’s acquisition of Victoria. These large and important questions are currently being considered by the Yoorrook Justice Commission, and have prompted the Victorian Government to commence treaty negotiations with Victoria’s First Peoples. 

While acknowledging the significance of the questions raised by Uncle Robbie, the only jurisdiction that I can exercise is the jurisdiction of this Court. I can only do that by applying the law of the State of Victoria to the questions for determination in this proceeding. 

For the reasons that follow, I have concluded that the Magistrates’ Court was correct to refuse to issue the proposed proceeding. The charges alleged in the charge-sheet did not disclose an offence known to the law of Victoria. 

The proceeding must therefore be dismissed. 

Disqualification application   

By summons filed 15 July 2024, Uncle Robbie sought orders including an order that I be disqualified from further conduct of the proceeding. The basis for this application was set out in his accompanying affidavit, as follows: (a) In my decision of Re Thorpe (No 2), I had quoted his submissions in full while making no comment about ongoing Aboriginal genocide and injustice to Aboriginal people at the hands of non-Aboriginal people. This amounted to ‘white denial’ that Aboriginal people would perceive as bias; (b) I am not Aboriginal; (c) There are no documents evidencing that I have accepted that Aboriginal sovereignty has never been ceded and that Aboriginal law is the only true law of this land; (d) I have publicly sworn allegiance to the monarchy, and have not publicly repudiated the Windsor family as genocidal invaders; (e) Consequently, I am reasonably likely to be perceived by Aboriginal peoples and others as biased against Aboriginal peoples. 

The Attorney-General opposed the application, saying that the circumstances relied on by Uncle Robbie did not give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias. 

A judge is disqualified from hearing a case if a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the judge might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the questions for decision in the case. Applying this test involves first identifying what it is said might lead the judge to decide the case other than on its legal and factual merits, and then articulating a logical connection between that matter and the fear that the judge might not decide the case on its merits. The final step in the analysis is assessing the reasonableness of the asserted apprehension of bias.

At the same time, judges are obliged to hear cases assigned to them in which the Court’s jurisdiction has been regularly invoked. Judges ‘do not select the cases they will hear, and they are not at liberty to decline to hear cases without good cause’. In this case, which has been assigned to me to hear and determine, Uncle Robbie has regularly invoked the judicial review jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Victoria. 

On my appointment to the Court, I pledged allegiance to Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II and her heirs and successors according to law. I also took the affirmation of office as a judge, to discharge the duties of my office according to law, without fear or favour, affection or ill-will. 

The Court’s jurisdiction is conferred by the Constitution Act 1975 (Vic) and is recognised in ch III of the Commonwealth Constitution. The law to be applied by a judge of the Court is the law of the State of Victoria, in accordance with Victoria’s Constitution Act and the Commonwealth Constitution. 

I do not accept Uncle Robbie’s assertion that pledging allegiance to the Crown and taking the affirmation of office might give rise to a reasonable apprehension that I might not decide this judicial review proceeding on its merits. These promises are essential to the office of a judge of the Supreme Court of Victoria, and have been made by every judge of this Court. One of us must hear and determine the case that Uncle Robbie has brought, and it has been allocated to me.;

Magna

In Ponzio v Ashley Services Group Limited [2025] FedCFamC2G 289 the Court addressed claims by Ponzio, stating 

In relation to Magna Carta the Court observes (adapting slightly what it said in Ledger Acquisitions Australia MB Pty Ltd v Kiefer [2014] FCCA 2216 at [59]- [66] per Judge Lucev) that: 

(a) the Charter of Magna Carta was signed by King John of England “in the meadow that is called Runnymede between Windsor and Staines” on 15 June 1215. Only three of the original clauses remain in effect in the United Kingdom, one of those clauses being cl 39 which became cl 29 in 1225. The current enactment dates from 1297; 

(b) the Immigration Restriction Act 1901 (Cth) (“Restriction Act”) was challenged in Chia Gee & Ors v Martin [1905] HCA 70; (1905) 3 CLR 649; (1905) 12 ALR 425 (“Chia Gee”) as “unconstitutional, on the basis that its provisions were contrary to the provisions of Magna Charta and the Statutes which had since confirmed it”: Chia Gee, CLR at 652-653 per Griffith CJ. Sir Samuel Griffith, the first Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia, and arguably the principal drafter of what became the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia (“Constitution”), brooked no argument on this contention, dismissing it in a single sentence: “The contention that a law of the Commonwealth is invalid because it is not in conformity with Magna Charta is not one for serious refutation”: Chia Gee, CLR at 653 per Griffith CJ The other two initial Justices of the High Court of Australia, Barton and O’Connor JJ, contented themselves with concurring with the Chief Justice: Chia Gee, CLR at 654 per Griffith CJ. Barton J, who was the first Prime Minister of the Commonwealth, and O’Connor J, were both involved in the Constitutional conventions which led to the drafting of the Constitution, Barton extensively so. Such was the authority of the first three Justices of the High Court of Australia that no more needed to be said; 

(c) in Ex parte Walsh and Johnson; in re Yates [1925] HCA 53; (1925) 37 CLR 36 (“Walsh and Johnson”), also a case concerning the Restriction Act, Isaacs J discussed the Constitutional significance of Magna Carta in an Australian context. Referring to cl 29 of Magna Carta Isaacs J said, Walsh and Johnson, CLR at 79, that:

The chapter, ... recognises three basic principles, namely, (1) primarily every free man has an inherent individual right to his life, liberty, property and citizenship; (2) his individual rights must always yield to the necessities of the general welfare at the will of the State; (3) the law of the land is the only mode by which the State can so declare its will. 

(d) Isaacs J recognised that personal liberty and property give way to a declaration by the State (in this case the Commonwealth) of the law of the land, observing, Walsh and Johnson, CLR at 79, that: These principles taken together form one united conception for the necessary adjustment of the individual and social rights and duties of the members of the State. 

(e) in Skyring v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1991) 23 ATR 84; (1991) ATC 4028 (“Skyring”) the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia, faced with a contention that Commonwealth tax legislation violated property rights secured by Magna Carta, held that the power conferred on the Commonwealth Parliament by the taxation power in s 51(ii) of the Constitution, to legislate with respect to taxation, extends to the imposition of taxation and its collection, even though it has the effect of requiring the person on which taxation is levied to pay the tax out of property which he owns: Skyring, ATR at 87 per Gummow, Einfeld and Heerey JJ; 

(f) in Arnold & Anor v State Bank of South Australia & Ors (1992) 38 FCR 484 (“Arnold”) the appellants sought to attack a mortgage on the basis that the debt secured by the mortgage involved the creation by the respondent bank of a book entry credit at no cost to itself. Magna Carta was invoked as guaranteeing the rights of the appellants to their matrimonial home and livelihood. Challenges were also made on the basis of passages from the Bible, and in particular those striking at usury. The Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia, in dismissing the appellants’ appeal, did not specifically refer to Magna Carta in its reasoning, but approved what had been said in two recent cases before single Judges of the Federal Court: Arnold at 485-486 per Burchett, Hill and Drummond JJ, including in Fisher & Anor v Westpac Banking Corporation & Ors (unreported, Federal Court of Australia, No 64/92, 18 August 1992) (“Fisher”) 

(g) in Fisher the plaintiffs sought to set aside a claim made by a bank under a mortgage to their matrimonial home on the basis that the matrimonial home was guaranteed not to be abrogated from or interfered with by anyone by reason of authority derived ultimately from Magna Carta. Similar pleas were also made by reference to biblical authority. In the Federal Court of Australia French J, like the first Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia in Chia Gee, dismissed the plea by reference to Magna Carta in a single sentence, Fisher at p 15 per French J, as follows:

In relation to the remaining pleas based on the Magna Carta and the Bible, it is sufficient to say they disclose no legally tenable cause of action. It follows that Magna Carta has no apparent operation in the circumstances of this case, the law of the land in relation to the unlawful termination action being that set out in the FW Act, and to the extent that this issue concerns the process and procedure of this Court, then as set in the FCFCA Act and the GFL Rules.

Shipwrecked

In Bank of Queensland v Fahy [2025] WASC 180 the WA Supreme Court considered a self-represented litigant's pseudolaw argument in litigation over a mortgage gone wrong. 

The Court states 

In conducting the hearing and determining the Application, I was, and am, mindful that Mr Fahy is a litigant in person. As a litigant in person, he is entitled to some leniency in relation to compliance with the court rules. 

The court is required to approach the documents in which he articulates his case with some flexibility. The court needs to be astute to ensure that, in a poorly expressed or unstructured document in which he sets out his case, there is no viable case which, with appropriate amendment or permissible assistance from the court, could be put into proper form. A 'frequent consequence of self‑representation is that the court must assume the burden of endeavouring to ascertain the rights of parties which are obfuscated by their own advocacy'. 

One 'abiding difficulty' faced by the court is 'the tension between the duty of a ... judge to ensure a fair and just trial and the requirement that the court maintain a position of neutrality and impartiality as between the parties'. The court also needs to ensure that any latitude given to one party as a litigant in person does not deprive the other of their right to procedural fairness and a fair hearing. The balance is ordinarily struck by limiting the assistance given to a litigant in person to that which is necessary to overcome, so far as is reasonably practicable, the procedural disadvantages a litigant in person faces by reason of not being legally trained. 

It goes on to note that

 The terms of the Mortgage and Memorandum relevantly included that if an event of default occurs BOQ shall serve any notice required by law, and if such notice (if any) has not been complied with then:

(a) the moneys owed to BOQ shall immediately become due and payable; and 

(b) in addition to any other powers conferred on BOQ, BOQ can do anything that BOQ can lawfully do in respect of the Land as if it was the absolute owner of the Land including any of the following: (i) take possession of the Land; (ii) evict Mr Fahy from the Land; (iii) sell the Land; and (iv) exercise any power or right conferred under the Mortgage or Loan Agreement or the law at the time. 

Further, the Mortgage and Memorandum empowered BOQ to recover from Mr Fahy any reasonable costs incurred by BOQ which are reasonable to the exercise of its powers under the Mortgage.

In considering the argument it states 

Does Mr Fahy have an arguable defence to the claim? 

The burden then shifts to Mr Fahy to satisfy the court why judgment should not be given against him. This is an evidentiary burden, the overall legal burden of persuasion remaining on BOQ as the applicant. 

Specifically, Mr Fahy must satisfy the court 'with respect to the claim ... that there is an issue or question in dispute which ought to be tried, or that there ought for some other reason to be a trial of that claim'. Mr Fahy does not have to show a defence on the balance of probabilities, but he must at least show cause why there is an arguable defence. 

Mr Fahy has not filed a defence. I have carefully read the Fahy February Submissions, the Fahy May Submissions and all the other material before the court in which Mr Fahy says he sets out his defence (see [4] and [6]). In assessing these documents, at times Mr Fahy makes factual assertions which ought properly to have been the subject of affidavit evidence. I will take these assertions as submissions. Even with that indulgence, the documents relied on do not disclose anything resembling an arguable defence. 

The following paragraph is indicative of the arguments made:

i christopher-francis openly state the SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA HELD AT PERTH... is a maritime vessel that is “held” in dry dock. It is a trusteeship. This vessel is flagged under THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA which is a foreign corporate entity registered under USSEC CIK 0000805157 to the address 1601 Massachusets Avenue N.W C/O AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY WASHINGTON DC, 20036. The jurisdiction of the COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA is only the waters around the islands of Norfolk Island Christmas Island and the Cocos and Keeling Islands, and any trusts created by this entity. 

i christopher-francis openly state that land cannot be administered from the sea or a vessel from it and any attempt to do so is an act of piracy and robbery ashore.

The matters raised by Mr Fahy embody what courts have taken to refer to as 'pseudo-law'. Pseudo‑law is not law. Arguments of the type which Mr Fahy seeks to raise have been repeatedly rejected by this court, including when raised to resist enforcement of a mortgage. As Lemonis J observed in Moir:

In effect, the defendant seeks to construct a distinction between himself as a living person and his legal status or personality. That proposition has been routinely rejected by courts throughout Australia... The defendant's propositions do not provide any arguable defence or any basis upon which summary judgment should not be granted.

In Moir - ie Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Moir [2024] WASC 319 - the Court states

The defendant filed vast amounts of material in opposition to the application. These include the 377 page document that I have referred to at [17] above and a further 98 page document. Broadly speaking, the structure of these documents, and the arguments they seek to present, are not coherent. They are of little assistance in assessing whether summary judgment ought to be entered. 

It needs to be remembered that the court's role is to administer justice according to law. The presiding judge is not required to scour through vast reams of material put on by a party to make sure that there is no arguable defence or other reason why summary judgment should not be granted. It is contrary to the administration of justice for court resources to be used in such a way. 

That being said, where a person such as the defendant has strong views as to their perceived (lack of) legal identity, and places distinct emphasis on those views, it is important to ensure a possible defence is not obscured. Accordingly, during oral argument I had the defendant specifically address his complaints with the plaintiff's case against him. Further, separately to the matters raised by the defendant, I scrutinised the plaintiff's case to satisfy myself that the plaintiff was entitled to the relief it seeks. As I explain at [54] - [64] above, that scrutiny did reveal an error in the plaintiff's approach. However, that error is not fatal to the summary judgment application. 

It appears that the principal matters relied on by the defendant in opposition to the plaintiff's application are as follows. First, that the Supreme Court of Western Australia is a fiction. Second, that a Supreme Court Judge should not have heard the summary judgment application. Third, that the procedures implemented by the court in managing the summary judgment application were not appropriate. Fourth, a variant of what has been described as the pseudo-legal straw man theory. 

The Supreme Court is a fiction 

It is sufficient to deal with this aspect of the defendant's submissions by referring to s 6(1) of the Supreme Court Act 1935 (WA). It provides: The previously established court called the Supreme Court of Western Australia continues in existence for the State of Western Australia. Section 6(1) acknowledges the existence of the Supreme Court of Western Australia and provides that the court continues in existence. 

Accordingly, the submission that the Supreme Court of Western Australia is a fiction is unarguable. 

Whether the application should not have been heard by a judge of the court 

The defendant submitted the summary judgment application should have been referred to an independent referee consented to by both parties, for trial by jury. Pursuant to the rules of court I have set out at [20] - [21] above, the plaintiff was entitled to bring the application for summary judgment. The application, once brought, is to be heard in chambers in accordance with O 59. The Rules do not provide for the application to be heard before a jury or to be referred to a referee for disposition. Further, the defendant has not pointed to any arguable basis for the contention that the application should have been referred to arbitration, or to a hearing before a jury. 

Whether the correct procedures were followed in the case management of the proceedings 

The defendant objected to the prior involvement of a registrar in the case management of the proceedings. In that respect, a registrar made orders for substituted service of the writ of summons and, separately, of a form 36A notice necessary for the plaintiff to apply for default judgment. A registrar also issued a direction for a case management conference to be held on 30 October 2023. The defendant submits that a registrar does not have jurisdiction in respect of the proceeding because it is a proceeding under the TLA: see O 60A r 2(d)(i). However, while the proceeding pertains to land registered under the TLA, it is not a proceeding under the TLA. That is, it is not a proceeding brought pursuant to a provision of the TLA. Rather, it is a mortgage proceeding brought under O 4AA. 

In any event, the programming of the summary judgment application has been dealt with by a judge of the Supreme Court and I heard the application. Thus, a registrar of the court was not involved in the substantive disposition of the summary judgment application. 

The defendant complains about the registrars not permitting him to file certain documents. However, irrespective of whether that is the case, the defendant emailed substantive material to my associates prior to the final hearing of the application. Further, I received the 377 page document and the 98 page document, which were the principal documents relied on by the defendant during his oral submissions. It should be kept in mind that a party to proceedings does not have an unqualified right to file as much material as they want. 

The defendant also complains that the e-mail addresses the subject of the orders for substituted service were not his e-mail addresses. Irrespective of whether that is the case, the purpose of substituted service is to bring the Writ of Summons to the attention of the relevant defendant. That clearly happened, given a conditional appearance was subsequently filed. 

Accordingly, the complaints regarding the procedures adopted in dealing with the summary judgment application do not provide any arguable basis for me to decline to order summary judgment. 

Living man theory 

During the hearing of the application, I said to the defendant:  What I want you to do is to let me know if you have any submissions that are directed to the plaintiff's claim against you.

In response, the submission was made that:

Well, it's not my name. That's the whole fact. There was no disclosure, or full disclosure, at the start of the contract and that's why it is void [ab] initio. ...

There was no disclosure of the living man signing for a fictitious entity. 

... The fact is the full disclosure of the name has never come up, and I've only found out about this over the last couple of years. So the fraud was perpetrated a long time ago and now that I found out what it is I'm holding them to account.

The defendant also submitted this constituted fraud and unconscionable conduct, and that the relevant contracts were made under a mistake of fact. 

The defendant also submitted that:[

... the plaintiff has supplied no evidence supporting that the capital-lettered entity, Supreme Court of Western Australia, has any authority over or consent from the defendant, nor the living man, Glenn Desmond, acting in the capacity of executor of the named entity, Glenn Desmond Moir.

In effect, the defendant seeks to construct a distinction between himself as a living person and his legal status or personality. That proposition has been routinely rejected by courts throughout Australia. The defendant's propositions do not provide any arguable defence or any basis upon which summary judgment should not be granted. 

Also, the defendant's position does not sit consistently with his behaviour in respect of other properties owned by him. Mr Ralston's affidavit sets out that another of the defendant's properties was mortgaged to the plaintiff. In respect of that property, the defendant entered into a contract of sale, which he signed. Upon the sale being effected in accordance with that contract, the moneys owing to the plaintiff under the mortgage were paid out and the defendant received a surplus of $739,306.61. By acting in that way, the defendant effectively acknowledged his legal status in his dealings with the plaintiff. The defendant cannot pick and choose when he is regarded as a legal person. 

Additional matters 

The defendant also complained that the plaintiff did not provide him with 'wet-ink signed contracts'. 

The defendant's submission that '[t]here was no disclosure of the living man signing for a fictitious entity' ([87] above), implicitly accepts that he signed the relevant documents relied on by the plaintiff. Furthermore, as I have said at [28] above, Mr Di Gregorio in his affidavit that attached those documents described them as 'true copies'. That is sufficient for the documents to be received into evidence. 

The defendant also sought to have the transcripts amended because they referred to the person attending as 'Mr Moir'. As I have explained at [90] above, the courts do not accept the proposition that there is a delineation between a living person and their legal status or personality. That being so, the designation in the transcript is correct.

Independence

In Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited v Oldroyd & Anor [2025] NTSC 20 the defendants unsuccessfully argued Court lacked jurisdiction because they had diplomatic immunity as heads of a diplomatic mission for a sovereign nation of Aboriginal people and that they were only bound by tribal laws or religious laws. The Court disagreed.

The judgment states

[1] The plaintiff (‘ANZ’) holds a registered mortgage over the defendants’ property (‘Property’), securing a loan advanced to them in 2009. The defendants are in arrears on the loan and ANZ seeks to enforce the mortgage by an order for possession of the Property. 

[2] The first defendant (‘Oldroyd’) and the second defendant (‘Mrs Oldroyd’) are a married couple (together ‘Oldroyds’). They are the registered proprietors of the Property. Mrs Oldroyd did not enter an appearance to these proceedings and took no part in them. 

[3] Oldroyd raised numerous arguments challenging the existence or enforceability of the loan documents and the mortgage, alleging fraud and breaches of the National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth) (‘NCCPA’) on the part of ANZ, alleging various breaches of the defendants’ rights in ANZ’s dealings with the Oldroyds, and denying the service of the proceedings upon the Oldroyds and ANZ’s position that the Oldroyds are in arrears under the loan agreement. 

[4] At the hearing, I permitted Oldroyd to file in Court documents headed ‘originating motion’ and ‘notice of contention’ challenging the jurisdiction of this Court to hear and determine the proceedings. The challenge was put essentially on the bases that Oldroyd holds diplomatic immunity as an appointed ambassador of a nation comprised of tribal people, the Property is the premises of a diplomatic mission, the Oldroyds are bound only by tribal law and are not bound by the common and statute law of Australia, and the ANZ had broken ‘the Oaths of life the Customary tribal Lore/law of this land and the laws of Elohim God’ by committing fraud and making false allegations. I dismissed that jurisdictional challenge at the hearing and delivered ex tempore reasons for doing so. Those reasons are repeated below (with some minor non-substantive changes and the addition of footnotes). 

[5] Ultimately, for the further reasons set out below, I have concluded that the ANZ is entitled to an order for possession of the Property. Reasons for rejecting the challenge to the Court’s jurisdiction 

[6] On 18 March 2025 at 5.19pm, Oldroyd attempted to file an ‘originating motion’ and a ‘notice of contention’ containing a challenge to the jurisdiction of this Court to hear and determine these proceedings. 

[7] Those documents were not accepted for filing by the Registrar because they were not in the appropriate form and were emailed to the Court after business hours the day before the hearing. Despite those procedural problems, I permitted Oldroyd to put his jurisdictional argument before me. [ 

8] Essentially, as I understood it, Oldroyd argued that he is an Aboriginal person and therefore of an independent nation state and bound only by tribal laws and/or the laws of God. In addition, he argued that he has diplomatic status because he has been appointed by various signatories to various documents as an ambassador for an independent Aboriginal state or states, and has been ‘internationally recognised’ as such. In this regard, he relied on various correspondence and other documents from officers of embassies of certain countries, referring to meetings or correspondence and referring to Oldroyd under the title ‘Ambassador Oldroyd’. For both reasons, Oldroyd argued that he is not subject to the laws of the Northern Territory or the jurisdiction of this Court. 

[9] Oldroyd wished to call evidence from various witnesses to establish the factual assertions he made in support of his arguments. I did not receive that evidence because, even if the factual assertions were established by the proposed evidence, I rejected the arguments based upon them. 

[10] The short answers to the arguments are, firstly, that all Aboriginal people are subject to the laws of the Commonwealth and the laws of the States and Territories in which they live. There is a wealth of authority confirming that proposition from both this Courtand the High Court, as well as superior courts in other States. None of the cases referred to by Oldroyd have decided any differently. 

[11] The Supreme Court of the Northern Territory was established by statute and has the powers and jurisdiction conferred now by the Supreme Court Act 1979 (NT), which was passed by the Legislative Assembly of the Northern Territory pursuant to the power conferred on it by s 6 of the Northern Territory (Self-Government) Act 1978 (Cth). The Court’s jurisdiction in respect of Aboriginal people who are residents of the Northern Territory is no different to the Court’s jurisdiction in respect of non-Aboriginal people who are residents of the Northern Territory. 

[12] Secondly, I do not accept that Oldroyd or Mrs Oldroyd or the associations or groups who he or they purport to represent or stand with are states within the meaning of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, which has the force of law in Australia under and subject to the Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities Act 1967 (Cth). 

[13] Oldroyd does not have the recognition of the Australian Government as required by Article 4 of that Convention. Consequently, he and Mrs Oldroyd are not diplomatic agents within the meaning of that Convention and do not have any diplomatic status which would render them or the Property immune from the operation and effect of the laws of the Northern Territory, whether under statute or the common law. Consequently, I do not accept that the Property is the premises of a mission within the meaning of that Convention.[ 

[14] It follows from that conclusion that the immunity under Article 31 of the Convention of a diplomatic agent from the civil and administrative jurisdiction of the receiving state, here Australia, does not apply. By Article 31.1(a), that immunity does not apply in a real action relating to private immovable property situated in the receiving state, unless it is held on behalf of a sending state for the purposes of the diplomatic mission. As I have said, I do not accept that the Property is the premises of a mission.

[15] Oldroyd also asserted that the Property is a sacred site or a heritage site. He also asserted that all mortgage is a fraud. Even if any of those matters are so, they or any of them do not deny to the Supreme Court the power and jurisdiction to hear these proceedings and, if necessary, make determinations about those things. 

[16] I therefore rejected the submissions made by Oldroyd and concluded that this Court does have jurisdiction to decide these proceedings. 

[17] I add to the above reasons that, for similar reasons to those set out in paragraphs 10 to 11 above, all individuals, regardless of their faith or religious beliefs, are subject to the laws which operate in the place where they live  and the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory applies equally to all residents of the Northern Territory, regardless of their faith or religious beliefs. 

[18] Oldroyd’s request by email sent on 26 March 2025 for these proceedings to be ‘referred’ to the High Court as a matter within its original jurisdiction pursuant to s 75 of the Constitution is refused. It is trite that this Court has, at first instance, jurisdiction to determine the extent of its own jurisdiction and whether or not a particular proceeding falls within it. On 26 March 2025 and on a number of subsequent dates, Oldroyd sought to file by email a ‘motion’ for ‘strike out of the application and summary judgment’, which also purports to claim ‘the full amount of the Defendants Statement of Claim including cost on a full indemnity basis’ (referring the ‘registered commercial lien’ addressed below). The application to file that document is refused. The ‘motion’ was not in the proper form, the relief sought is misplaced and is grounded on matters put by Oldroyd in the hearing.

Nomophilia

'‘Sovereign Citizen Gets Roasted’: On the Nomophilia of Sovereign Citizens and Their Settler-Colonial Critics' by Liam Gillespie in (2025) Social & Legal Studies comments 

Sovereign Citizens have gained mainstream attention by refusing to recognise law. This attention often entails ridicule, as illustrated by viral Sovereign Citizen arrest videos. This article critically examines both Sovereign Citizen ideology and the voyeuristic enjoyment of their humiliation. First, I propose that although Sovereign Citizen ideology is premised on rejecting law, it nevertheless paradoxically exhibits ‘nomophilia’, a love of law, insofar as its rejection attempts to secure precisely what law affords Sovereign Citizens: namely, possession of expropriated lands. Next, I argue that the widespread ridicule of Sovereign Citizens also tends towards nomophilia insofar as it facilitates the enjoyment of seeing the law ‘done’ to others by subjects who, through their enjoyment, can position themselves on ‘the right side’ of the law. I argue that while this ridicule works to pathologise Sovereign Citizens, it also attempts to discursively counteract Indigenous sovereignty by reinforcing the putative supremacy of law.

Gillespie argues

While Sovereign Citizens are positioned as subjects worthy of derision and mockery, the law enforcement who‘humorously’ rein them in are portrayed favourably. They are, for example,‘quick-thinking’ judges and cops who ‘destroy’ Sovereign Citizens by upholding the law and doling out its‘lessons’. In this article however, I argue that although seemingly counterposed, both the phenomenon of Sovereign Citizenry – which is described below – and that of enjoying their ritual humiliation, occur as a function of what Maria Giannacopoulos (2011, 2020a, 2022) has called ‘nomophilia’: an uncritical love of Western law which works to obscure its relationship to settler-colonialism (which, as I explain, is precisely the context in which both Sovereign Citizens and Sovereign Citizen-related copaganda have thrived). I propose that this nomophilia works discursively and surreptitiously – and in the case of Sovereign Citizens, paradoxically and ironically – to reinforce law’s coloniality by enshrining what Goenpul scholar Aileen Moreton-Robinson has called the ‘white possessive’ function of Western law and notions of its rule (2015). 

To substantiate this argument and its relevance, the article will proceed in three substantive parts. First, I provide an overview of the Sovereign Citizen movement, which could more accurately be described as a series of loosely connected movements, clustered under an umbrella term (Baldino and Lucas, 2019: 248; Fiebig and Koehler, 2022: 35; Loeser, 2014: 1109). Here, I analyse materials generated by the movement, including its discourse, objectives, and bespoke legal documents in order to elucidate the core features of the movement and the structure of its ideology. As I explain, the central pillar of Sovereign Citizenry is the notion that contemporary governments and states are ‘illegitimate corporations’ whose law/s can be refused so that a supposedly original and radical individual sovereignty can be reclaimed. I show how Sovereign Citizens attempt to effectuate this restoration by creating and invoking their own alternative laws – often referred to as ‘pseudolaw’ by law enforcement, policymakers, and scholars alike – through which their closely bound communities can first be inaugurated and can then subsist. In outlining these ideological contours, I briefly canvass the origins of the movement, including its historical and contemporary links to white supremacist militia groups like the Ku Klux Klan, anti-government conspiracy theories, and so-called ‘paper terrorism’. 

In the second part of the article, I argue that despite their apparent rejection of law, and their claim to be its victim, Sovereign Citizens nevertheless exhibit a paradoxical form of nomophilia. This nomophilia relates to what Robert Cover has called ‘jurisgenesis’, a term denoting the formation and formulation of ‘tight communities’ through the production of ‘legal meaning’, to which shared narratives and mythologies are attached (1983: 11–15). This is because while Sovereign Citizens performatively reject what they take to be ‘official’ law, their rejection does not constitute a refusal of law tout court. Rather, it is designed to effectuate a conditional refusal that makes way for a ‘higher law’ supposedly generated both from within and for themselves, which they take to be grounded in what they call their ‘natural’, flesh-and-blood-persons’. Accordingly, I argue that the Sovereign Citizen rejection of state law is not purely an act of negation, but rather, is nomophilic and jurisgenerative to the extent that it works to produce and sustain Sovereign Citizen communities. 

While the notion Sovereign Citizen ideologies can be jurisgenerative and nomophilic already troubles common understandings of the movement – which is typically characterised as one built around a wholesale rejection of law – the purpose of my argument runs further. I argue that insofar as Sovereign Citizen movements have almost exclusively emerged in (settler-)colonial contexts, their attempts to ‘reclaim’ what they call their ‘sovereignty’ by rejecting law paradoxically amount to an attempt to secure precisely what that very law has afforded them in the first place: namely, presumed status within, and ownership over, expropriated lands. This is because Sovereign Citizens purport to reject what they imagine the law to be so that their presumed sovereignty can be grounded in their own individual bodies, à la white nativism. To this end, I argue Sovereign Citizens exhibit a paradoxical form of nomophilia whereby they ultimately love the law they claim to reject in a formation that resonates with Moreton-Robinson’s articulation of ‘the possessive logics of patriarchal white sovereignty’ (2015: xi). 

In the third part of the article, I shift to critically examine popular discourse about Sovereign Citizens. As noted above, this discourse is largely perfunctory and mocking in nature, as the popularity of copaganda content showing Sovereign Citizens getting ‘rekt’, ‘roasted’ and ‘destroyed’ well attests. As with the Sovereign Citizen movement itself, I also identify the workings of nomophilia and an attachment to (settler-)colonial law within this discourse. While this love of law is apparent in the ‘comedy’ associated with seeing Sovereign Citizens receive their supposed comeuppance, I suggest again that the contours of this glee run deeper. This is because the pathologisation of Sovereign Citizens as ‘crazy’ practitioners of ‘pseudolaw’ works to discursively mask the contingency of law itself, and its ‘rule’, which are merely taken for granted and counterposed as banal and necessary, and indeed, non-violent. My argument here is not that the phenomenon of Sovereign Citizenry is not problematic and worthy of sustained critique (as I explain, its links to white supremacy and white nativism clearly demonstrate that it is). Instead, my argument is that the predominant manner by which Sovereign Citizens are pathologised – be it through depictions of danger, worthiness of ridicule, or both – is itself also problematic insofar as it both reifies and takes the law for granted, while simultaneously pathologising resistance towards the state, the police, and the law/s they uphold. As I explain, these features of the ridicule and pathologisation of Sovereign Citizens are especially problematic in settler-colonial contexts insofar as they take the law for granted, working to normatively conceal the slow violence, epistemicide, juricide and nomocide it facilitates (Adebisi, 2023; Benjamin, 1978; Derrida, 1986; Giannacopoulos, 2020b; Watson, 2014, 2017) through the production of law’s ‘nomopoly’ (Giannacopoulos, 2020b, 2022, 2023). 

I argue that the juxtaposition of the nomophilia of both Sovereign Citizen ideology and that of the phenomenon of ridiculing and policing them reveals an important structural affinity between the two positions: namely, that both are predicated on their vision of law as being ‘real’ and monolithic and incontestable. For Sovereign Citizens, this law is the ‘natural’ law they locate in their ‘flesh-and-blood-persons’ (as described below). By contrast, for their detractors, it is the singular‘rule of law’ that can and according to them does apply equally to all bodies, irrespective of whether or not they explicitly consent to its rule and application therein. By revealing this affinity, I argue that the respective ideologies of the Sovereign Citizen movement and those who ridicule and police them work discursively to attempt to foreclose Indigenous claims to sovereignty by shoring up their own respective formulations of sovereignty and the alleged sanctity of law.

'Prefigurative Neoliberalism: A Provisional Analysis of the Global Sovereign Citizen Movement' by Amy Cohen and Ilana Gershon in (2025) PoLAR: Political and Legal Anthropology Review comments 

Much contemporary research on prefigurative legality turns to left‐leaning activists for ethnographic insights into practices that call forward an alternative legal world. We turn instead to a right‐leaning movement commonly known by scholars as the Pseudolaw movement—or self‐named (by some involved) as the sovereign citizen movement—filled with loosely affiliated groups that share a common ideological approach to law. We discuss the underlying logics motivating sovereign citizens' practices, discussing how a nostalgically based form of prefiguration shapes sovereign citizens' responses to contemporary neoliberal dilemmas. We then compare this right‐leaning movement's approach to prefigurative legality with the approach of left‐leaning activists.

Fitness, Fictions and Naivety

In Pivotto v Queensland Police Service – Weapons Licencing [2025] QCAT 130 the Tribunal has considered sovereign citizen claims in relation to revocation of a firearms licence. 

The Tribunal states 

 [1] Ms Pivotto is a young lady who, until being caught driving her car at a speed exceeding the prescribed limit, was the holder of a licence entitling her to possess and use firearms. Her conduct after receiving the infringement notice and fine resulted in her licence being revoked. I expect that most people reading this will immediately ask - what does a speeding fine have to do with a firearms licence? The answer to this lies in the manner in which Ms Pivotto chose to challenge that fine. 

[2] Having received the infringement notice and fine, she wrote a letter to the Queensland Police Service espousing views that, on any reading of the letter, indicated she held sovereign citizen ideologies. She effectively asserted that the Queensland Police had no authority to fine her for speeding, and that she was not the named person on the infringement notice but rather her ‘strawman’ name was what appeared thereon. 

[3] By the time of the hearing before me, she had seen the error of her way. She had accepted that what she had learned through her own research was not only entirely misguided it was simply wrong. As I listened to her, and observed her, during the hearing she had accepted that when choosing to challenge the fine in the manner she did, presenting her case as it was put in that letter, she was not only naïve, but her actions were also stupid. 

[4] That being said, whilst I understand the reason why the respondent took the step it did to revoke her firearms licence on the strength of the letter written and the ideologies expressed therein, something I say more about later in these reasons, having listened to and considered all that Ms Pivotto had to say in the hearing I was satisfied that a finding she was not a fit and proper person on the ground of public interest for her to hold a firearms licence is one that should not stand. Accordingly I set aside the respondent’s decision to revoke her licence. 

Background 

[5] On 6 December 2022, Ms Pivotto was issued with a firearms licence under the Weapons Act 1990 (Qld), licence number 26657936 (the Firearms Licence). 

[6] On 26 September 2023, she was charged with a traffic infringement, namely exceeding the designated speed limit of 100 KMH by at least 11KMH but not exceeding 20 KMH. It carried a fine of $464.00. 

[7] She chose not to pay the fine. Rather she sought to challenge the validity of the asserted infringement and fine. In doing so she sent an undated letter to the Queensland Police Service. It was short. It contained the following comments: (the Challenge Letter)

An infringement notice dated 26/09/23 addressed to AMELIA ROSE PIVOTTO was received containing an ‘Alleged Speed Travelled 113.’ ... This letter is being written to refute this alleged speeding fine as, according to section 8, sub-section 12 of the Imperial Acts Application Act, ‘All fines and forfeitures before conviction are illegal and void.’ 

This letter is also being written to address that my name is not on this infringement notice, rather my strawman’s name AMELIA ROSE PIVOTTO is whom this infringement notice is addressed to. Police, being a corporate entity, cannot claim power, authority or have jurisdiction over a living human, therefore, this alleged spending fine will not be paid by the living human, Amelia Rose Pivotto. 

Lastly, according to section 71 of the Commonwealth Constitution ‘Department of the States have no lawful authority to issue fines or take property as they are not a court’. The Commonwealth Constitution is the highest law of the land and dictates that there are only two levels of government, Federal and State. Police act as a third tier of Government, coming under the State Government. Local Government bodies, such as the Police force, are not recognised and/or given authority to act as a de-facto third tier of Government.

[8] Having received the Challenge Letter, on 30 October 2023 the respondent, via its authorised officer, caused a notice (the Revocation Notice) to be served on Ms Pivotto revoking her Firearms Licence. (the Decision) 

[9] The premise for the Decision was that the content of the Challenge Letter indicated to the respondent that Ms Pivotto held sovereign citizen beliefs relating to the laws of Queensland not being applicable to her. In the reasons provided to her accompanying that notice the decision-maker noted that he had considered the requirement under the Act that to be entitled to hold a firearms licence the person must be a ‘fit and proper person’, and as a result of the content of the Challenge Letter indicating those apparently held sovereign citizen beliefs he reached this conclusion:

I am satisfied that there is a real risk to public safety as you have advised you do not intend on complying with the laws of this State, and those which are enforced by Police. Accordingly, I have determined that it is in the public interest for your licence to be revoked. 

[10] As Ms Pivotto was then entitled to do, on 27 November 2023 she applied to this Tribunal for a review of the Decision. The premise for her application was expressed as follows:

I am a law abiding citizen and personally believe that the law must be upheld. I have every intention of complying with the law, and do so daily. I never intended to come across as a Sovereign Citizen or to hold Sovereign Citizenship beliefs. I thought I was quoting the Constitution, (sic) however, I obviously received some poor legal advice without fully understanding what this advice meant. I have since paid the fine. ... 

The Revocation notice served states ‘The expression “fit and proper person” standing alone, carries no precise meaning’ therefore, it is difficult to understand how this decision was made. One cannot judge another’s character based solely on one letter, rather, the whole character must be known and all facts considered. 

[11] It was against this background that the application came before me for hearing. It is hoped that the reasoning as I have expressed it herein assists Ms Pivotto to understand the basis upon which the Decision was made, albeit one which now I have set-aside. ... 

[14] The background facts gave rise to a singular issue to be decided in this proceeding. That is whether, on the premise of public interest, Ms Pivotto was not a fit and proper person to hold a firearms licence. As I discussed it with the respondent’s representative during the hearing after he had concluded his opening remarks, this could be dealt with by answering a single question, namely – ‘Does Ms Pivotto hold sovereign citizen ideologies ?’. If the answer to that was yes, then the Decision must be affirmed, although I say something more about that later in these reasons. If the answer to that was no, then the Decision must be set-aside. 

[15] That something more, which for the sake of completeness and hopefully future reference when the issue of the sovereign citizen argument rears its head, is the extent to which more than just the expression of sovereign citizen ideologies may be required in some circumstances where a decision-maker is being called up to consider the discretion which is enshrined in the Weapons Act to revoke a firearms licence. ... 

[24] As it was required to do, the respondent provided its ‘List of Materials’ dated 2 January 2024 in which it included a copy of the Decision, the Challenge Letter, and a record of Ms Pivotto’s traffic record showing the speeding infringement. It also included extracts from the Weapons Act and references to a number of decisions of the Courts, which as I understood the purpose of same was to say they were relevant to the decision that was required to be made. 

[25] Ms Pivotto similarly provided a small bundle of documents as she was required to do. This is as filed on 23 June 2024. It described in relatively brief terms the circumstances that brought about the fine and the later attendance by Queensland Police Officers at her residence, at which time she was served with the Revocation Notice and her firearms were seized. Therein she also included copies of other correspondence from the Police Service and a copy of a receipt showing payment of the fine. Within the page entitled ‘Order of Events’, Ms Pivotto made these statements:

I was doubtful that I had really exceeded the speed limit by the amount stated and had previously heard of other people contesting speeding fines they thought were incorrect. I started to do some research on the Know Your Rights website, which advocates to assist people in ensuring Australia’s laws are properly applied and carries an endorsement from former Western Australian Senator Rod Culleton. I had read and watched videos on how to contest a speeding fine by writing a letter to the officer who issued the fine. After some research, I then wrote a letter quoting what I had read on the website as well as quoting the Constitution guidance. ... . 

I never thought sending a letter to contest the fine would have such negative consequences of affect my firearms licence in any way as I am a law abiding citizen and thus was my first offence. I wasn’t aware of the term “sovereign citizen”, which is not mentioned on the Know Your Rights website, and my research for this appeal reveals that it appears to relate to beliefs that I have never held. I quoted the Know Your Rights website and the Constitution as that was the advance that was given. ...

[26] Ms Pivotto also provided, and sought to rely on, five written reference from persons speaking to her character. Two of these are undated, the other three are dated in November 2023. None of the persons who provided these references were presented as witnesses in the hearing. 

[27] Ms Pivotto was extensively cross-examined by Mr Ferguson for the respondent. In my opinion it is unnecessary for me to set out in great detail that examination, it being sufficient to note the following that became very apparent during that examination: (a) The comments and views expressed in the Challenge Letter were for the most part Ms Pivotto quoting from what she had read on the Know Your Rights website, without any understanding of what it meant; (b) She accepts the arguments she was making in the Challenge Letter were not correct; (c) She accepts that the Queensland Government has the power to make laws, that the Queensland Police Services has the power to enforce laws, and that this Tribunal has the power to make decisions; (d) She now accepts that the content of the Know Your Rights website is not correct; and (e) She does not hold herself out as a sovereign citizen. 

[28] What also became apparent during the cross-examination is that Ms Pivotto had contravened the Weapons Act in two ways whilst holding her firearms licence, namely: (a) She left her rifle in her car whilst her car was parked in the carpark of her home unit, albeit whilst the car was locked and the bolt of the rifle removed and locked in the car’s glovebox; and (b) She uses her rifle for work purposes, such not permissible under the conditions of her licence such which was limited to recreational use and at a shooting club. 

[29] When these were brought to Ms Pivotto’s attention during the hearing she explained that her understanding of what she had done was correct in terms of securing her rifle, and in terms of work use of the rifle which she thought was covered by the recreational condition. But following the explanation given to her by Mr Ferguson as to the meaning of the legislation, she accepted neither was correct and that she had contravened the legislation. 

The Submissions 

[30] In her closing submissions, Ms Pivotto stated the following: (a) She relied on what she thought was a credible website; (b) Her actions in sending the Challenge Letter was based on her own research and the thought that was what she had to do and the basis for any challenge; (c) She accepts that her actions were misguided, misconceived, and based on ignorance; (d) She does not claim to be a sovereign citizen. 

[31] In his closing submissions, Mr Ferguson raised these points for my consideration: (a) The Challenge Letter clearly demonstrates sovereign citizen beliefs. It is the sort of rhetoric engaged in by a person holding such beliefs; (b) The Queensland Police Service must be satisfied that a person who wishes to hold a firearms licence is a fit and proper person to do so. Whilst the Police Service is aware of the two contraventions of the Weapons Act by Ms Pivotto, she had explained her understanding was that what she did was correct, and if that is accepted as being true then it is another example of Ms Pivotto’s naivety; (c) Whilst the persons giving the character references were not presented as witnesses, the content of those documents is consistent with what was observed of Ms Pivotto during the hearing; (d) Overall, based on what he heard from and observed of Ms Pivotto during the course of the hearing nothing gave him cause for concern other than the content of the Challenge Letter. ... 

[33] Shortly before the publication of that article [in Proctor], Cash QC DCJ on the District Court of Queensland had cause to consider the sovereign citizen argument in a matter before him in R v Sweet wherein the applicant, having been charged with offences under the Drugs Misuse Act 1986 (Qld), argued that he constituted two separate legal entities, which his honour noted was the sovereign citizen argument of the strawman duality, and as such the applicant submitted that the indictment had charged the incorrect entity. 

[34] The following short extract from his Honour’s reasons is instructive in understanding the manner in which the Court dealt with the sovereign citizen argument on that occasion:

 [2] The applicant now applies for these charges to be dismissed. The essence of the applicant’s argument is that he possesses two distinct personas. One the ‘real live flesh and blood man’ and the other a ‘straw man’ or ‘dummy corporation’. The former is designated in the applicant’s material as ‘Kym-Anthony:’ and the latter as KYM ANTHONY SWEET. According to the applicant’s argument, the real person is not subject to the laws of Queensland, and the charges should be dismissed. 

[3] Merely setting out the argument is sufficient to show it is nonsense. It is apparent that the applicant is one of a group of people who for some years have attempted, universally without success, to avoid the operation of laws with which they do not wish to comply. The term ‘organised pseudo legal commercial argument’ litigants (OPCA) was coined by Rooke ACJ in Meades v Meades to describe adherents to these discredited theories. The ideas promoted by OPCA litigants emerged, of course, in the United States. They have since spread to most parts of the common law world, including Queensland. Recognising that the arguments presented by OPCA litigants are largely incoherent, if not incomprehensible, courts have been increasingly willing to dismiss their claims summarily. 

[4] The ‘straw man’ argument has its origins in the premise that human beings do not inherently possess a legal personality. Instead, some separate legal identity is imposed upon them (through birth certificates and the like) by the government. This process creates a kind of contract, but one that can be repudiated by the human being, usually through a declaration or affidavit ... and ‘surrendering’ the birth certificate. The purported effect of such repudiation is to render the human being immune to the laws of the relevant polity. The processes adopted by OPCA litigants to achieve this repudiation can be arcane. Some of the language used, and documents relied upon, resemble spells or incantations. 

[6] In Australia, a human being is also a legal person. An adult human being with full capacity can sue and be sued. They are subject to the criminal laws of this state. These fundamental propositions cannot be doubted. It is true that a natural person can create a legal entity that has a distinct legal personality – such entities are commonly called companies – but this is an adjunct to, rather than a replacement for, the legal personality of the human being. One way of illustrating why this must be so is to consider the consequences of the ability to ‘renounce’ legal personhood. The law has at times recognised categories of person who did not possess a legal personality. These categories included, before 1833, slaves, who were regarded as chattel property, could be bought and sold, and who had no rights under the law. At times women and children were thought not to possess a legal personality. Blackstone regarded children as the property of their fathers, and women have been regarded as chattels without a distinct legal personality. The fates of people who were in these categories were rarely pleasant. If the applicant were somehow able to renounce his legal personality, he would become a human being without rights. He would be mere property. Such an outcome would be antithetical to our society and system of laws.

[35] Such bears a similarity to the argument raised by Ms Pivotto in the Challenge Letter noting that in that letter Ms Pivotto also asserted what she said was her ‘strawman’s name’ in capital letters, and used the language of a ‘living human’ not being subject to the jurisdiction of the State. Thus the reasoning and discussion by Cash QC DCJ is apposite to Ms Pivotto’s situation in this proceeding. 

[36] Yet when questioned during cross-examination about what she meant by these statements, Ms Pivotto could not explain it. The same can be said about the balance of what was contained in the Challenge Letter. Her only explanation for using the language and form of argument was that she followed what was on the website. This is clear evidence of Ms Pivotto’s naivety. 

[37] Having observed her during the hearing and listening to her answers to the questions posed of her by Mr Ferguson, I was readily able to conclude that she did not understand the meaning of that which she had written in compiling the Challenge Letter. She did so in total ignorance of what it meant and the effect it might have on her in the circumstances of how she may be viewed by the law. That being so, I accept she does not hold sovereign citizen ideologies. She stupidly embarked on a serious step without in any way endeavouring to properly inform herself of the correctness of what she was doing. She charged in totally blind as to its meaning and effect. ... 

[53] With those observations in mind, the position may be expressed in another way. In my opinion the mere holding of sovereign citizen ideologies would not be, of itself, sufficient to warrant the exercise of the discretion to revoke a firearms licence in the absence of some other evidence which points to the risk of misuse. But that is not to say that the mere holding of such ideologies would not be sufficient to warrant not issuing a firearms license in the first place. It seems to me that it would be sufficient of itself unless an applicant for such a licence could demonstrate awareness of the need for public and individual safety, and that he/she would take the requisite steps to ensure such safety.