Pragmatism

'Pragmatism, Realism and Moralism' by Matthew Festenstein in (2016) 14(1) Political Studies Review 39-49 comments

Pragmatism is often seen as an unpolitical doctrine. This article argues that it shares important commitments with realist political theory, which stresses the distinctive character of the political and the difficulty of viewing political theory simply as applied ethics, and that many of its key arguments support realism. Having outlined the elective affinities between realism and pragmatism, the article goes on to consider this relationship by looking at two recent elaborations of a pragmatist argument in contemporary political theory, which pull in different directions, depending on the use to which a pragmatist account of doxastic commitments is put. In one version, the argument finds in these commitments a set of pre-political principles, of the sort that realists reject. In the other version, the account given of these commitments more closely tracks the concerns of realists and tries to dispense with the need for knowledge of such principles.

Festenstein states

The political seems to be difficult terrain for pragmatists. The most prominent pragmatist social and political theorist, John Dewey, forcefully presses an avowedly unpolitical conception of democracy, as ‘primarily a mode of associated living, of conjoint communicated experience’, ‘the idea of community life itself’, or a ‘personal way of individual life’ (e.g. Dewey, 1916: 93, 1927: 328, 1939: 226). Pragmatism is often thought to view politics as primarily a matter of collective problem-solving, glossing over core political phenomena such as power and conflict which subvert the hopes for such a shared enterprise.

The purpose of this article is to explore the relationship of pragmatism to the ‘realist’ current in recent political theory which has sought to emphasise the specifically political character of political theorising. The recent interest in realism in political theory seeks to trace the distinctive contours of politics as a dimension of human activity and to overturn what it identifies as the moralistic tendencies in political philosophy. The article begins by offering an overview of key realist themes and the overlap between these themes and pragmatist commitments. With this basic position blocked out, the article goes on to explore two contrasting recent versions of a pragmatist political argument, developed by Cheryl Misak and Robert Talisse, on the one hand, and by Thomas Fossen, on the other. These pull in different directions, I will suggest, depending on the account they offer of practical doxastic commitments and the implications that they draw from this. In the first version, the argument finds in these commitments a set of pre-political principles, of the sort that realists reject. In the other version, the account given of these commitments tries to dispense with the need for knowledge of such principles.

It should be noted that pragmatism and realism are both constituted by an undisciplined rabble of doctrines, temperaments and sensibilities: there is no scope to do justice to this variety and I will impose some artificial tidiness on each position. Furthermore, this is not a study in influence or ‘genealogy’. For some realists, pragmatists are indeed an interesting reference point or source of inspiration: Raymond Geuss (2001) and Chantal Mouffe (2000) for example are directly responsive to authors usually classified as pragmatist. For others, notably Bernard Williams (2002, 2005) in much of his later work, Richard Rorty in particular serves as a foil and a goad: however far Williams was going, it was not that far, or in that direction. However, nothing in the [article] hangs on establishing paths of influence.

US BodyCams

'Justice Visualized: Courts and the Body Camera Revolution' by Mary D. Fan in (2016-17) 50 UC Davis Law Review (forthcoming) comments

 What really happened? For centuries, courts have been magisterially blind, cloistered far away from the contested events that they adjudicate, relying primarily on testimony to get the story – or competing stories. Whether oral or written, this testimony is profoundly human, with all the passions, partisanship and imperfections of human perception. Now a revolution is coming. Across the nation, police departments are deploying body cameras. Much of the current focus is on how body cameras will impact policing and public opinion. Yet there is another important audience for body camera footage – the courts that forge constitutional criminal procedure, the primary conduct rules for police. This article explores what the coming power to replay a wider array of police enforcement actions than ever before means for judicial review and criminal procedure law. The body camera revolution means an evidentiary revolution for courts, transforming the traditional reliance on reports and testimony and filling in gaps in a domain where defendants are often silent. 

The article envisions a future where much of the main staple events of criminal procedure law will be recorded. Analyzing body camera policies from departments across the nation reveals that this future is unfolding now. The article proposes rules of judicial review to cultivate regular use of the audiovisual record in criminal procedure cases and discourage gaps and omissions due to selective recording. The article also offers rules of restraint against the seductive power of video to seem to depict the unmediated truth. Camera perspective can subtly shape judgments. Personal worldviews impact image interpretation. And there is often a difference between the legally relevant truth and the depiction captured on video. Care must be taken therefore to apply the proper perceptual yardsticks and reserve interpretive questions for the appropriate fact-finders.

ICC on specialised IP jurisdictions

The International Commerce Commission (ICC) has released a report on Adjudicating Intellectual Property Disputes: An ICC report on specialised IP jurisdictions worldwide.

The report comments

Along with the rapid progress of the global innovative economy, the importance of intellectual property rights to businesses has grown and the number of intellectual property (IP) applications and registrations has been increasing dramatically each year. In 2014, patent applications worldwide grew by 4.5% to around 2.7 million, and trademark applications rose to around 7.44 million, with a growth of 6% (compared to 2013). Concurrently, more filings of IP rights in recent years have also resulted in more disputes related to IP. In China alone, the number of new first instance IP-related lawsuits in 2014 came to 116,528, marking a 15.6% increase over the previous year. More IP-related lawsuits have not only raised public awareness of the importance of IP enforcement, but have also led to increased reflection concerning the efficiency, impartiality and predictability of court trials for IP disputes. 

These developments have led some countries to establish — or to consider establishing — specialised IP jurisdictions (SIPJs) for resolving IP-related disputes.

A SIPJ is broadly defined as

as a tribunal or court, or a permanent division or a chamber within a civil or commercial court or administrative body, having exclusive authority to hear IP disputes or a particular kind of IP dispute. The report focuses on contentious proceedings relating to IP infringements and the invalidation of registered IPRs; it does not deal with proceedings relating to the registration of IPRs or tribunals focused on the valuation of remunerative IPRs, such as copyright royalty tribunals.

The report states

Although created in the context of diverse legal, economic, cultural and historical frameworks, SIPJs have often been established in different countries for similar reasons — to increase judicial specialisation in IP-related issues, promote consistency and predictability in trials and case outcomes, and reduce the risk of judicial error — even if with local nuances. 

However, the form that SIPJs take and the scope of their competence can vary widely from country to country. Some are empowered to try both administrative and civil IP disputes, such as China, Japan and Russia, while others may be purely civil or administrative. Some are established as separate judiciary institutions, totally independent of civil and administrative courts, and others are structured as a chamber or tribunal within a civil or commercial court. The modes of trial practiced by SIPJs also differ to some extent.

The ICC states that it has

prepared the present study to assist countries in their consideration of whether, and how, to establish or improve SIPJs so as to enhance overall efficiency and expertise in IP-related trials. The report provides an overview of the structures and trial procedures of SIPJs in various jurisdictions around the world, with a view to contributing to a better understanding of the current landscape of SIPJs and the way they function. It is intended to build on and complement work already done by the International Bar Association, and by the US Patent and Trademark Office and the International Intellectual Property Institute in this area by exploring more specific issues related to the functioning of SIPJs. 

 The report was based

on a survey of ICC members which aimed to obtain first-hand information from parties and practitioners on the litigation mechanisms in their countries for trying IP disputes. The respondents are all attorneys or IP practitioners with hands-on litigation experience and expertise in IP. Altogether, information was obtained from a diverse group of 24 countries from Europe, Asia, and North, Central and South America. The survey was designed to first determine if a country had an SIPJ and, if so, to collect information on various SIPJ-related issues, from the rationale behind the establishment of SIPJs to their structures and the speci cs of the trial process. Among the issues surveyed, particular attention was paid to the standing and qualification of representatives of parties in the SIPJs and the selection of judges for SIPJs.

The ICC's conclusions are -

... a significant number of countries around the world have established SIPJs that are very diverse. This diversity can especially be seen in their different structures and in their mechanisms in relation to the appointment of judges and experts and the representation of parties. The same basic principles are however applied across the different countries surveyed, e.g. in relation to expedited proceedings and legal doctrines.

Based on the information obtained, this study draws the following conclusions, which could assist countries in their consideration of whether, and how, to establish or improve SIPJs.

 SIPJs can improve the efficiency and quality of IP-related litigation processes and outcomes

A large majority of the countries surveyed for this study has established SIPJs in various forms, and the respondents from most of the countries that have not established them believe it would be desirable to do so.

Some of the specific reasons expressed by respondents in different countries as to why SIPJs are established include:

• “...to develop IP expertise in specialised judges, and unify standards of trials”,

• “to develop IP expertise in specialised judges; and to streamline the jurisdiction of national courts over intellectual property matters with a view to simplifying proceedings”, 

• “to develop IP expertise in courts, and for parties’ convenience” and 

• “creation of subject matter experts/expertise; effectiveness of the decision; enhance efficiency and accuracy; consistency and predictability of case outcomes”.

All of these clearly indicate that SIPJs are seen to increase the effectiveness of enforcement of IPRs and are welcomed by practitioners and litigants in the surveyed countries.

The contribution of SIPJs to developing IP expertise in courts, unifying standards of trials, enhancing the efficiency and accuracy of trials and ensuring the predictability of case outcomes thus argues in favour of their establishment and maintenance.

 The need for and the most appropriate form of SIPJs depend on individual country needs and circumstances

Despite the largely coincident reasons motivating di erent countries to establish SIPJs — as described above — the choice of form for SIPJs often varies according to the different national legal cultures, economic contexts and priorities. Where IP disputes are numerous and technically complicated, SIPJs may have a more elaborate structure and larger dedicated sta (e.g. a separate court with experienced judges). Where a country’s economic and legal environment suggests little demand for an SIPJ, it can be concluded that such a solution is not beneficial. Likewise, if civil or commercial courts are able to handle IP disputes effectively on their own, SIPJs may not be an urgent priority. The need for and design of SIPJs should emerge from actual social, economic and legal needs — as is the case in most countries.

China, for example, is a vast country with a huge number of IP-related disputes, requiring a large number of judges versed in IP. Nevertheless, the training of judges to meet this demand is a tremendous task; even if the judges are qualified for the job, different judges with distinct educational backgrounds and experience may have different views on similar legal or factual issues. Consequently, unifying IP trials, especially in respect of cases involving complex technological issues, was a fundamental consideration for establishing SIPJs in China. SIPJs could therefore be helpful for those countries with a large territory or population — and, therefore, usually with more courts — if they have sufficient IP disputes.

In short, if the aim of an SIPJ is to increase the efficiency and quality of IP-related dispute resolution, and thus to meet the needs of the national economy, it should only be established if it adequately serves these goals and should be designed in the most appropriate way to fulfil them.

Proper trial mechanisms and judicial expertise are essential

Where there is a need for SIPJs, the overall mechanism of the SIPJ (i.e. the procedures and personnel arrangements) is very important for the way IP cases are decided. It is advisable that SIPJs be staffed with knowledgeable judges and, especially for patent cases, be structured so as to enable the court to understand the technical issues in dispute — which are often complex — whether by involving judges with a certain technical background, technical experts (as court or party appointed experts) and/or IP practitioners or other specialists. This was particularly highlighted by respondents to the survey.

The appropriate mechanism for any particular SIPJ will again be influenced by the judicial system, legal tradition and ideology, and socio-economic context.

Based upon the analysis of the survey results, ICC concludes on balance that SIPJs present an advantage in the current economic and legal environment worldwide in jurisdictions where there is a suffcient body of IP litigation and can, in many circumstances, enhance the efficiency of IP enforcement.

The structure and mechanisms of SIPJs should be designed in response to the specific context of the country, and with the aim of developing IP expertise in the judiciary, unifying trial standards and practices, enhancing efficiency in trials and ensuring the predictability and accuracy of case outcomes.

ICC recommends that countries should consider establishing and adopting some form of SIPJs, or improving existing SIPJs, according to their respective economic and legal situations, and hopes that the present study will assist in this reflection.

Scams

Consumer Affairs Victoria has announced plans to litigate against scammer Belle Gibson and has secured an enforceable undertaking  by Gibson's publisher.

Consumer Affairs Victoria is preparing to take legal action against Inkerman Road Nominees Pty Ltd (in liquidation) ACN 164 850 748 (formerly known as Belle Gibson Pty Ltd) and its sole director, Ms Annabelle Gibson, following an in-depth investigation into alleged contraventions of the Australian Consumer Law and Australian Consumer Law (Victoria).

The alleged contraventions relate to false claims by Ms Gibson and her company concerning her diagnosis with terminal brain cancer, her rejection of conventional cancer treatments in favour of natural remedies, and the donation of proceeds to various charities.

Consumer Affairs Victoria Director Simon Cohen has applied for leave to commence proceedings against Inkerman Road Nominees Pty Ltd (in liquidation) in the Federal Court of Australia. Leave is required because the company is in liquidation.

If leave is granted, Mr Cohen intends to commence proceedings against Inkerman Road Nominees and Ms Gibson.

Mr Cohen added he was pleased that Penguin Australia Pty Ltd, publishers of The Whole Pantry book, had willingly co-operated with a concurrent investigation that examined whether the company had also contravened the ACL (Vic).

Mr Cohen said Penguin had agreed to an enforceable undertaking acknowledging that it had not required Ms Gibson to substantiate her claims prior to the book’s publication.

Included in the terms of the enforceable undertaking is that Penguin will make a $30,000 donation to the Victorian Consumer Law Fund.

Penguin must also enhance its compliance, education and training program with a specific focus on ensuring all claims about medical conditions are substantiated, and that statements about natural therapies are accompanied by a prominent warning notice.

“This is an important step in ensuring that consumers receive only verified information and are not deceived, particularly where serious matters of health and medical treatment are concerned,” Mr Cohen said.

Meanwhile in New Zealand the Commerce Commission has reached an interim agreement with TM Publisher, an overseas company that sent invoices for unsolicited services to New Zealand trade mark holders.

 Under the interim court enforceable undertakings TM Publisher has agreed that anyone who paid the invoice from 6 April 2016 will be refunded directly by ANZ bank. 

The Commission is still in negotiations with TM Publisher about payments it received before 6 April 2016. ...   

TM Publisher’s bank account was frozen in March 2016. It contained over $200,000 in payments from New Zealand businesses. 

The invoice relates to an overseas, web-based trade mark publication service. It is not connected to the Intellectual Property Office of New Zealand (IPONZ). The invoice does not make clear that the recipient does not have to pay for the services.

In the UK there's been another appearance by Alan Blacker, whose claims were noted here. In BLacker (The Lord Harley) v The Law Society [2016] EWHC 947 (QB) the Court states

The Claimant has a variety of titles. His name is Alan Blacker and he also goes by the name Lord Harley. In various places in his correspondence, he is described as Dr Alan Blacker of Alan Blacker & Co, Dr The Rt. Hon. The Lord Harley of Counsel KGCStJ, DPhil, Senior Counsel of The Senior Courts, and Alan the Lord Harley. On the Claim Form commencing these proceedings issued on 14 September 2015, he chose Dr Alan Blacker The Lord Harley. His emails are identified as coming from "The Chambers of The Rt. Hon Lord Harley of Counsel". The prefix "The Rt. Hon" is conventionally used to refer to some peers and members of the House of Lords. "Rt. Hon" is used for members of the Privy Council, although the Claimant does not appear on the current list of members of that body, either under Blacker or Harley. He is a solicitor, and again in a variety of styles, he uses "Dr Alan Blacker & Co", which is described as an "in-house law firm where the partners and directors are regulated by the SRA and Dr Blacker is authorised and regulated by the FCA", and also "Joint Armed Forces Legal Advocacy Service" or "JAFLAS". The JAFLAS website, at www.jaflas.co.uk, refers to itself as "JAFLAS - Dr Alan Blacker & Co Solicitors" and "JAFLAS Dr Alan Blacker & Co.". It also refers to "Dr Alan Blacker and Company, Solicitor Advocates of the Supreme Court". I shall refer to the Claimant as Dr Blacker. 

The Defendant is the representative body for solicitors in England and Wales. Although the Law Society has been named as defendant in these proceedings, the substance of the proceedings concerns the activities of the Solicitors Regulation Authority ("SRA"). The SRA is an independent body created by the Law Society which exercises the regulatory powers of the Law Society. The SRA regulates law firms, solicitors and others who provide legal services under statutory powers provided for in the Solicitors Act 1974, the Administration of Justice Act 1985, the Legal Services Act 2007, and the various Codes and Rules made under those Acts. The SRA's regulatory work is independent from the Law Society and it is overseen by the Legal Services Board. 

JAFLAS does not, so far as I can tell, have any official connection with HM Armed Forces, although the name may suggest otherwise. JAFLAS is a registered charity. The evidence of Mr Johal, who is employed by the SRA as a Senior Legal Advisor and who provided a statement on behalf of the Defendant dated 4 November 2015, explains that the Claimant is a solicitor who provides in-house legal services to JAFLAS ("the Charity") through a company trading as "Dr A Blacker & Co. JAFLAS" ("the Company"). This is a company limited by guarantee. Neither the Charity nor the Company are directly regulated by the SRA, although the Charity has been given an SRA identification number because it employs a regulated solicitor, namely Dr Blacker. Neither the Charity nor the Company are parties to these proceedings.

The subsequent Solicitors Tribunal judgment is here. 

Medicalisation

'The Harmless Psychopath: Legal Debates Promoting the Decriminalization of Sodomy in the United States' by Marie-Amelie George in (2015) 24 Journal of the History of Sexuality 225 comments

Sexual psychopath statutes, under which courts committed individuals charged with or convicted of certain crimes, typically sex offenses, to psychiatric institutions, proliferated in the United States between the late 1930s and early 1960s. Twenty-nine states and the District of Columbia enacted versions of these statutes in response to a sex-crime panic that swept the nation after a wave of publicity about violent sex crimes committed against children. While the statutes varied widely in terms of the crimes that triggered the laws’ application and in their definitions of sexual psychopathy, they were almost always applied to men convicted of consensual sodomy and were used to commit homosexual men to institutions. However, in 1955 -- only four years after the rush to enact sexual psychopath laws ended -- the American Law Institute (ALI) voted to exclude consensual sodomy from its Model Penal Code (MPC), indicating that consensual sodomy was not a criminal matter. Therefore, in a very short period, a group of influential legal thinkers had moved consensual homosexual activity from a sign of possible pathology to a legally benign, albeit still immoral, practice. The MPC, a model criminal statute aimed at stimulating penal law reform throughout the United States, became highly influential in legislative efforts to revise state criminal codes, leading twenty-two states to repeal their sodomy statutes by 1978. 

This article explains how American law evolved from the widespread implementation of sexual psychopath statutes to the decriminalization of sodomy, arguing that this shift emerged out of debates around sexual psychopath laws and Alfred Kinsey’s reports on male and female sexual behavior, which questioned many of the assumptions underlying both sexual psychopath statutes and criminal code provisions on consensual sodomy. State commissions evaluating sexual psychopath laws relied on Kinsey’s data to argue that the statutory schemes were not based on scientific evidence and therefore needed to be amended or repealed. The majority of their reports commented on the inappropriateness of including consensual sodomy under the umbrella of psychopathy, thereby separating homosexuality not just from pedophilia but also from violence. Several commissions also questioned whether consensual sodomy should be criminalized at all. The sexual psychopath commission reports influenced the ALI’s decision to decriminalize sodomy, presaging and contributing to a significant change in American criminal law, as members of the MPC committee drew upon the commission debates in their arguments for the decriminalization of consensual sodomy. The state commission reports, by providing a forum for politicians and lawyers to develop and express a reformist viewpoint, created a discourse in favor of changing criminal laws on consensual sodomy. This thus article identifies the missing link between a legal regime that characterized homosexuality as psychopathy and one that adjudicated consensual homosexual sodomy as noncriminal conduct.

Defamation

Two US perspectives on online defamation.

'The Death of Slander' by Leslie Yalof Garfield (2011) 35 Columbia Journal of Law and Arts 17 argues 

Technology killed slander. Slander, the tort of defamation by spoken word, dates back to the ecclesiastical law of the Middle Ages and its determination that damning someone’s reputation in the village square was worthy of pecuniary damage. Communication in the Twitter Age has torn asunder the traditional notions of person-to-person communication. Text messaging, tweeting and other new channels of personal exchange have led one of our oldest torts to its historic demise.

At common law, slander was reserved for defamation by speech; libel was actionable for the printed word. This distinction between libel and slander, however, rests on a historical reality that is no longer accurate. Originally, permanence and breadth of dissemination always coincided. Slander carried only as far as one’s voice. Because of slander’s presumed evanescence, common law required plaintiffs to plead special damages—proof of economic harm—in order to recover for slander. The advent of broadcast technology, with its ability to amplify the spoken word, challenged the traditional division of defamation and forced courts and legislatures to reconsider old classifications. Jurisdictions split in their decision to characterize broadcast speech as libel or slander, largely because of divergent views about which aspect of the speech—permanence or breadth of dissemination—was more important. Post-broadcast technology has further complicated the defamation arena, leaving parties unsure of how best to plead their defamation case.

In the past decade technology has again changed the way we communicate. The digital communication revolution has created instances of widespread dissemination through quick, nonreflective and often passing statements. This past year, for example, Wael Ghonim’s tweet to join him in an Egyptian village square lead to the downfall of Egypt’s political powers. His fleeting comments to those willing to listen caused an entire nation to fall. This Article considers how courts should rule when these tweets, or text messages, not quite printed, not quite spoken, are defamatory.

This Article argues that the advent of text messaging, tweeting and other forms of digital communication, which I call “technospeech,” renders the medieval tort of slander irrelevant in today’s technological world. The article provides new support for the contention that courts and legislatures should treat libel and slander uniformly and should abolish the archaic requirement of proof of special damages, a burden traditionally reserved for the spoken word. Maintaining slander in the Twitter Age, with its requirement of proof of economic harm, vitiates the common law purpose of defamation. Treating all defamation similarly promotes fairness for plaintiffs seeking to rehabilitate their damaged reputation and provides predictability to those bringing defamation claims. A thoughtful and orderly treatment of technospeech mandates that courts and legislatures put the proverbial final nail in the coffin of slander.

The libertarian 'Of Reasonable Readers and Unreasonable Speakers: Libel Law in a Networked World' by RonNell Andersen Jones and Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky in Virginia Journal of Social Policy and the Law (Forthcoming) argues

Social-media libel cases require courts to map existing defamation doctrines onto social-media fact patterns in ways that create adequate breathing space for expression without licensing character assassination. This Article explores these challenges by investigating developments involving two important constitutional doctrines — the so-called opinion privilege, which protects statements that are unverifiable or cannot be regarded as stating actual facts about a person, and the actual malice rule, which requires defamation plaintiffs who are public officials or public figures to prove that the defendant made a defamatory statement with knowledge of, or reckless disregard for, its falsity. Given the critical role these two constitutional doctrines play in protecting free expression, it is especially crucial that courts apply them in social-media cases with due regard for the unique aspects of the medium.

This article’s analysis of early social-media cases reveals that many — though by no means all — courts addressing these cases appreciate that social media are different than the media that preceded them. However, some of these courts have floundered in adapting constitutional doctrines. The Article addresses the most difficult new issues faced by courts and offers specific prescriptions for adapting the opinion privilege and actual malice rule to social media. It recommends that the opinion privilege be applied based on a thorough understanding of both the internal and external contexts of social-media expression and that this broad reading of the opinion privilege be offset by a narrow reading of actual malice in cases involving delusional or vengeful social-media speakers.

OAIC off death row

Attorney-General George Brandis appears to have belatedly resiled from his recurrently-stated commitment to abolish the Office of the Australian Information Commissioner (OAIC).

Last night's Budget Papers feature the following item -

The Office of the Australian Information Commissioner (OAIC) is an Australian Government entity established under the Australian Information Commissioner Act 2010.

The functions of the OAIC include:

• privacy functions - ensuring proper handling of personal information in accordance with the Privacy Act 1988 and other legislation

• freedom of information (FOI) functions - protecting the public’s right of access to documents under the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (FOI Act).

In the 2014–15 Budget, the Australian Government announced that the OAIC would cease operation as part of its commitment to smaller government. New arrangements for privacy and FOI regulation were to commence from 1 January 2015, following passage of legislation to implement these changes. Funding transfers to the Australian Human Rights Commission and other agencies to facilitate these changed arrangements occurred as part of the 2014–15 Budget.

The government has decided not to proceed with these proposed changes and the OAIC will have ongoing responsibility for privacy and FOI regulation. Ongoing funding for these functions is provided in the 2016–17 Budget. FOI funding is provided on the basis of the streamlined approach to FOI reviews adopted by the OAIC since the 2014–15 Budget. Accordingly, funding provided to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal in 2014–15 will remain with the tribunal on the basis that some matters may be considered by the tribunal, where the OAIC determines under section 54W(b) that it is in the interests of the administration of the FOI Act for this to occur.

In 2016–17 and the forward years, the OAIC will focus on its strategic goals of:

• promoting and upholding information access rights

• promoting and upholding information privacy rights

• achieving organisational excellence by supporting and developing the OAIC’s people, systems and processes.

No indication of a commitment to ensuring more coherent privacy protection through introduction of a statutory cause of action for serious invasions of privacy and no indication, amid the Turnbull Government's recent enthusiasm regarding open access, of a plan to disregard strange expressions by Public Service Commissioner John Lloyd about the supposed pernicious and inappropriate FOI Act.