Another two unsurprisingly unsuccessful sovereign citizen claims in Queensland, alongside one in New Zealand.
In Bradley v The Crown [2020] QCA 252 Sofronoff P states
The applicant was charged with one count of unlicensed driving. He was convicted and fined $150 with no conviction recorded. He applied to the magistrate to dismiss the charge on the ground that for reasons that are not clear a police officer had no power to charge him or to commence the proceedings in question. The argument was obvious nonsense and the magistrate rightly rejected it. After hearing the evidence led by the prosecution, the magistrate found the applicant guilty as charged.
Not satisfied with this outcome, the applicant appealed to the District Court and argued that he was something which he called a citizen sovereign and that the laws of Queensland did not apply to him. If that was true, then it would be hard to understand why the applicant was agitating his complaints before this court, which is one that has been established under the laws that he says do not apply to him. This paradox did not trouble the applicant and he has now applied for leave to appeal against Judge Moynihan QC’s order dismissing his appeal. That the applicant is merely persisting in putting forward a jumble of gobbledygook to support his application in this court can be seen at once if one reads only the two opening sentences of his purported outline of argument:
“My BRADLEY person (conjoined with the BRADLEY ‘spiritual’ family body-politic) is my own “body politic” by succession, at Law. It is my natural body incorporated at the supreme Christian Law and is my own jurisdiction.”
This application is an abuse of the court’s process and should be dismissed.
Bradley and Sweet are cited in Sorensen v Queensland Police Service [2022] QDC 121 ...
I have had regard, of course, to the submissions he has made and the submissions file. The notice of appeal he has filed is largely unintelligible but he did allege that evidence was tampered with and he has new evidence. In his written submissions, Mr Sorensen alleges the Magistrates Court had no jurisdiction to hear the matter. He was not allowed to present his case and he was unlawfully arrested. He also alleges the Constitution of Queensland is invalid.
The respondent, on the other hand, submits the evidence established the elements of the offence and the convictions are valid.
In order to consider this appeal, it is necessary for me to review the evidence. The Magistrate, at page 5, was at pains to explain the procedure to Mr Sorensen. He explained the rule in Browne v Dunn and the right to object to evidence. He did explain to the appellant that he could choose whether or not to call or give evidence and explained the consequences of such decision. He explained the good character rule and the charges to the appellant.
The appellant chose not to give or call evidence. The prosecution submitted the police gave truthful evidence and the charges were proved. The appellant was using the phone whilst driving and there was no issue he was subject to a SPER suspension and the charges were proved beyond reasonable doubt. The appellant submitted he was not guilty, as the police were mistaken. He pointed to the difference in phone colour, which I have already mentioned. He said there were no admissions made by him. He submitted the police acted illegally. He said double jeopardy applied to charge 2, which I have already mentioned. He said he was a citizen and had been discriminated against. ...
As to the arguments raised by the appellant concerning the Court’s jurisdiction, a Magistrates Court clearly had jurisdiction to hear these charges. See section 19 and 22A of the Justices Act 1886 and section 123V of the TORUM Act. As to his arguments concerning the invalidity of the Constitution and his rights as a sovereign citizen, they provide no defence to the charge. See Brady v R [2020] QCA 252 and R v Sweet [2021] QDC 216.
Having reviewed the evidence and giving due weight to the Magistrate’s credibility findings, I find, on the evidence, each element of each charge was established beyond reasonable doubt. I find the decision is not attenuated by either factual or legal error and I dismiss the appeal. Anything else at this stage?
In Warahi v Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections [2022] NZCA 105 Katz J states
[1] The appellant, Maui Warahi, also known as Jay Maui Wallace, is currently detained at Northland Region Corrections Facility. (We will refer to him as “Maui” in the remainder of this judgment, as that is his preferred form of address). Maui faces charges of contravening a protection order, common assault, threatening to kill and injuring with intent to injure.
[2] On 3 November 2021, Maui filed a document in the High Court at Auckland headed “Application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus”. The document included portions of the Habeas Corpus Act 2001 and various other material. A supporting “Statutory Declaration of Identity” and an “Affidavit of Identity” were also filed, which Brewer J noted “fit the “sovereign being” model that the Court is well familiar with”.
[3] An application for the writ of habeas corpus is a challenge to the legality of a person’s detention.As no specific allegations regarding the lawfulness of Maui’s detention were raised in the documents that Maui filed, Brewer J held that the application was invalid. It was accordingly struck out.
[4] Maui appeals that decision. On appeal, the Crown engaged with the merits of what it understood Maui’s arguments to be, based on his written and oral appeal submissions (which were more comprehensive than those advanced in the High Court). We will take the same approach, rather than focus on the validity of Maui’s original habeas corpus application.
Is Maui lawfully detained?
[5] The onus is on the Department of Corrections to establish that Maui’s detention is lawful. If it is not, the Court must order his release.
[6] The Crown has provided the Court with copies of the warrants to detain in respect of Maui covering the period that is relevant to this appeal. At the time of the appeal hearing Maui was detained pursuant to a warrant to detain issued by Judge Bayley in the Whangarei District Court on 9 February 2022. The earlier warrants provided by the Crown cover the period from 27 October 2021 until March 2022. They were issued in respect of various charges including assault, breach of conditions of intensive supervision, obtaining by deception and assaulting Police.
[7] In Bennett v Superintendent, Rimutaka Prison (No 2), this Court held that once a prison superintendent or other official produces a committal warrant or other authorisation, the applicant for a writ of habeas corpus must show why the warrants are not a sufficient answer to his application: In practice, once a prison superintendent or other official named as respondent produces a committal warrant or other authorisation ... it would then be necessary for an applicant for habeas corpus to demonstrate that the documentation did not in fact provide a lawful justification in the particular circumstances.
[8] The onus, therefore, shifts to Maui to show why the warrants provided by the Crown do not provide a lawful basis for his detention.
[9] Maui adheres to a belief system that has its roots in the Sovereign Citizen movement, an ideology that first emerged in the United States in the 1970s. His core belief, for present purposes, is that he is not subject to the jurisdiction of the State (including legislation enacted by Parliament or decisions made by the courts). This belief is based (at least in part) on the dual persona theory — the proposition that individuals have two personas, one of flesh and blood and the other a separate legal or “corporate” personality that is subject to the jurisdiction of the State. Followers of the Sovereign Citizen movement believe that it is possible to dissociate themselves from their legal or corporate persona, and hence free themselves from the jurisdiction of the State. Maui believes that he has successfully done this and, as a result, the State has no authority over him. Applying this reasoning, Maui believes that his current detention is unlawful. This is reflected in his “Affidavit of Identity” which states, in full:
1. That My Christian name is Jay Maui: with the initial letters capitalised as required by the Rules of English Grammar for the writing of names of sovereign soul flesh and blood people. My patronymic or family name of Wallace with the initial letters capitalised.
2. That the name JAY MAUI WALLACE or any other drivitation [sic] of that name is a dead fictitious foreign situs trust or quasi corporation/legal entity not the sovereign soul flesh and blood Man that I am.
3. That I am a free will flesh and blood Suri Juris sovereign man and as such I am private, non resident, non domestic, non person, non citizen, non individual and not subject to any real or imaginary statutory acts, rules, regulations or quasi laws.
4. That I am who I say that I am NOT who the overt or covert agents of the State say that I am.
5. That I do not knowingly, willingly, intentionally, or voluntarily surrender my sovereign inalienable rights according to the law of nature.
6. That the state has no legal jurisdiction or sovereign authority justified in origin to hear this matter.
7. That it is the responsibility of the complainant to bring the correct parties before the courts.
[10] Arguments about a person’s legal personality, including the “dual persona” theory associated with the Sovereign Citizen movement, are not uncommonly raised in applications for habeas corpus. They are also raised in a variety of other contexts.
[11] Arguments along such lines have been consistently rejected by the courts as legally untenable, including in a number of cases involving Maui. Acts of Parliament, including criminal enactments, are binding on all persons within the geographical territory of New Zealand. The Courts of New Zealand must uphold all Acts of Parliament as enacted. The Crimes Act 1961 is one such Act of Parliament. The courts have the power to deal with all actions that may amount to criminal offences in this country. No person within New Zealand is able to dissociate themselves from their “legal persona” so as to remove themselves from the jurisdiction of the courts. The arguments advanced by Maui are untenable and without legal foundation.
[12] In conclusion, we are satisfied that the warrants to detain produced by the Chief Executive demonstrate a lawful basis for Maui’s detention. Maui has not advanced any arguments that might justify a conclusion that his detention is unlawful.
The Court accordingly dismissed Maui’s appeal.
There was a similar dismissal in Warahi v Department of Corrections [2020] NZCA 587, with the Court stating
[1] The appellant, Maui Warahi, also known — amongst other names — as Jay Maui Wallace, appeals the refusal by Muir J on 4 November 2020 to grant him a writ of habeas corpus.
[2] Using the name Maui Warahi the appellant says he is not the person Jay Maui Wallace and, moreover, that Maui Warahi is not subject to the laws of New Zealand, pursuant to which he is currently remanded in custody on various charges. Accordingly, contrary to the Judge’s decision, that detention is unlawful, entitling him to a writ of habeas corpus.
[3] The appellant acknowledges that at birth he was given the name, and was subsequently known as, Jay Maui Wallace. But, he says, he subsequently disclaimed that name. Materials he filed for the purposes of this appeal included a copy of a document entitled “Certified Copy of birth entry in the Māori Chief Registrar Office”, recording the birth of “Maui Warahi ” on 16 December 1974. Others comprise standard forms of a statutory declaration, an affidavit of identity, and a declaration of rights, all premised on the assertion that the holder is Māori and not subject to the laws of New Zealand which authorise the appellant’s detention.
[4] The respondent, the Chief Executive, has placed before the Court a copy of a warrant to detain Jay Maui Wallace on charges of breach of conditions of intensive supervision, assaulting a person, obtaining by deception and failing to answer District Court bail dated 28 October 2020. That warrant is directed to every Constable and to the Manager of the Mt Eden Corrections Facility and authorises Jay Maui Wallace’s detention until Wednesday 2 December, when he is to be presented to the Manukau District Court at 11.45 am.
[5] Mr Warahi ’s challenge to the prima facie authorisation of his detention that warrant provides is based on propositions of identity, jurisdiction and sovereignty that he has, under a number of names, advanced on many occasions before.
[6] As to the specific issue of identity, in December 2016 this Court observed:
[9] We note in particular that there is no issue about the appellant’s identity. He admits that the name Jay Wallace was given to him by his natural parents at birth. He wishes to be known as Abdullah Maui Warahi and says he has taken steps through his Tribal Councils to achieve this. However, on his own admission, Jay Maui Wallace and Abdullah Maui Warahi are one and the same person.
Those comments apply equally here.
[7] As to the broader questions of jurisdiction and sovereignty, in declining the application of Jay Maui Wallace (also known as Abdullah Maui Warahi) to appeal that decision, the Supreme Court observed in February 2017:
[4] The applicant filed a number of documents in this Court in support of his application for leave, but none of these provided any basis for calling into question the lawfulness of his detention. Rather, the documentation appears to challenge the jurisdiction of the Courts over the applicant on Maori sovereignty grounds and assert that the applicant is himself sovereign and therefore beyond the jurisdiction of the Courts. There is nothing in these documents that provides any support for the applicant’s assertions.
[5] Similar arguments have been rejected by this Court in earlier cases.
