10 June 2023

Pseudos

Another OPCA judgment in James v District Court at Whanganui [2023] NZCA 181, with the Court referring to the appellant's approach as 'properly characterised as “sovereign citizen” type arguments. 

 [1] The appellant, who goes only by the name James, brought judicial review proceedings in the High Court in February 2022 in which he sought an injunction against the Whanganui District Court. The terms of the injunction were directed towards halting or challenging proceedings brought against James in District Court. It is not possible to discern the subject matter of the District Court proceedings with any certainty from the documents James has filed. 

[2] Churchman J struck out the judicial review proceeding as an abuse of process. James filed an appeal against Churchman J’s decision. In a minute, Miller J directed that the Court consider striking the appeal out as an abuse of process under r 44A of the Court of Appeal (Civil) Rules 2005 (the Rules). He directed that James be given the requisite notice under r 44A(2) and, on the expiry of the time for submissions, the Registrar refer the appeal to a panel for decision on the papers. This is the issue now before us. 

[3] Rule 44A relevantly provides: (1) In addition to any express power in these rules to strike out an appeal, the court may, on an interlocutory application or on its own initiative, make an order striking out or staying an appeal in whole or in part if— ... (c) the appeal is frivolous, vexatious, or otherwise an abuse of the process of the court. 

[4] In Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Chesterfields Preschools Ltd, this Court explained that:

... a “frivolous” pleading is one which trifles with the court’s processes, while a vexatious one contains an element of impropriety. ... [One that is] “otherwise an abuse of the process of the court” ... extends beyond the other grounds and captures all other instances of misuse of the court’s processes, such as a [proceeding] that has been brought with an improper motive or are an attempt to obtain a collateral benefit. 

The High Court decision 

[5] As noted, Churchman J struck out James’ proceeding under r 15.1(1) of the High Court Rules 2016.[4] Rule 15.1(1) permits the court to strike out a pleading that: (a) discloses no reasonably arguable cause of action, defence, or case appropriate to the nature of the pleading; or (b) is likely to cause prejudice or delay; or (c) is frivolous or vexatious; or (d) is otherwise an abuse of the process of the court. 

[6] In his pleading, James sought to distinguish between “the Man James” and “the Legal Fiction Person JAMES JONES” and asserted that District Court required the former’s written consent to “conduct any business” with the latter and that consent had been withdrawn. 

[7] It appeared to Churchman J that the form and wording of James’ statement of claim was consistent with that typically advanced by the “Organised Pseudolegal Commercial Argument Litigants” who adhere to the “Sovereign Citizen movement”.  Essentially, these arguments proceed on the premise that an individual has both a natural persona and a separate legal or “corporate” persona and that the natural person cannot be subject to the jurisdiction of the state without their consent. The Court has previously held that this position is untenable. Almost always, it will be viewed as an abuse of process by a litigant. Churchman J concluded that there was no legal basis for James’ claim against the Whanganui District Court and that the proceeding was an abuse of process. ...

[9] Otherwise, James’ submissions in response to Miller J’s minute can be summarised as being that his appeal is not an abuse of the process of the Court because his view of the law is right — that is, the District Court acted unlawfully, the High Court has failed to acknowledge his application for a “Void Order of Court”, and James now has a “fundamental Right of a hearing” in this Court. 

[10] The grounds of appeal, although expressed in a convoluted manner and although denying the concepts of “Organised Pseudolegal Commercial Argument” and “sovereign citizen”, nevertheless rest on the argument regarding the “separation” between natural and legal persons and the rejection of Acts of Parliament unless consent has been given. They can be summarised as being that the District Court has no jurisdiction over James without him giving his consent, which he has not done, and that Churchman J erred in rejecting this argument. 

[11] The arguments that James relies on are properly characterised as “sovereign citizen” type arguments. They cannot succeed. Apart from the sovereign citizen arguments, there is no genuinely identifiable legal or factual error asserted. We are satisfied that the appeal cannot succeed. We consider that it is properly viewed as both vexatious and an abuse of the Court’s process.

In James v District Court at Whanganui [2022] NZHC 2309 the High Court stated 

[4] The applicant says that his name is James, and I will therefore call him that. His statement of claim seeks an injunction against the Whanganui District Court in the following terms:

Article One; The District Court has proceeded without consent to conduct business with the Legal Fiction JAMES JONES, James JONES, Mr J Jones, and all similar constructs of the Person Registered with Births Deaths and Marriages and having a Birth Date of 8th January 1951. Such action is unlawful. 

Article Two; The District Court refuses to acknowledge the true identity of the Man James as identified in a Statutory Declaration made to the DEPARTMENT OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS who is an agent of the CROWN CORPORATION OF NEW ZEALAND INCORPORATED. The District Court obstructs the filing of documents which do not admit joinder Man to the Legal Fiction. Such action is unlawful. 

Remedy Sought 

There is a current matter to come before the District Court and the Applicant, because of previous District Court obstruction, seeks the High Court to issue an Injunction: Ordering the District Court to acknowledge that the living body of the Man, as indicated in the Statutory Declaration of Identity is the Man James and not the Legal Fiction Person JAMES JONES, date of birth 8th January 1951, and That the District Court, having been denied jurisdiction must obtain written consent from James in order to conduct any business with the Legal Fiction JAMES JONES, James JONES, J Jones, Mr J Jones, and all other similar constructs having the name Jones and with a birth date of 8th January 1951. 

[5] From the other documents that have been filed by James, it appears that his claim is based on the assertion that he is not subject to the laws of New Zealand. In an affidavit filed on 22 February 2022, James stated, among other things:

Jurisdiction follows a natural hierarchy. The order of jurisdiction is logical; Nature/God > Man/[Wo]Man > State/Government > Corporate/Person. Man lives in the jurisdiction of the Common Law, which is de jure “in Law”. A lesser creation cannot contradict the higher / creator. Corporations are the construction of Man and cannot rule over Man unless Man consents. Consent makes the law... ... There is no decree that the Office of Parliament can pass that can lawfully force One to consent to be subject to the rules of that Corporation, to argue otherwise would be a legal nonsense. I James, withdrew my consent to be governed by the CROWN on 17th January 2014 by way of a Claim of Right served on the Crown and perfected by my actions and a Default Notice creating an Estoppel by Silence, on the 28th January 2014.

[6] James alleges also that “Governments can never be Sovereign as they are Legal Fictions”, and that he has “never given informed, written consent to be governed or agreed to be Surety for the debt of a corporation”. 

Analysis 

[7] It appears that James has made his claim to the High Court with the goal of invalidating criminal proceedings taken against him in the District Court or various actions taken by the Police. 

[8] James’ statement of claim is made in terms commonly used by the ‘Sovereign Citizen’ movement. Such claims are made in the Courts not infrequently, and have been the subject of previous judicial commentary both in New Zealand and in other common law jurisdictions. They are often made in the context of applications for habeas corpus. 

[9] The Court of Appeal has recently described the Sovereign Citizen movement as:

...an ideology that first emerged in the United States in the 1970s. [The] core belief, for present purposes, is that [Sovereign Citizens are] not subject to the jurisdiction of the State (including legislation enacted by Parliament or decisions made by the courts). This belief is based (at least in part) on the dual persona theory — the proposition that individuals have two personas, one of flesh and blood and the other a separate legal or “corporate” personality that is subject to the jurisdiction of the State. Followers of the Sovereign Citizen movement believe that it is possible to dissociate themselves from their legal or corporate persona, and hence free themselves from the jurisdiction of the State. [They believe they have] successfully done this and, as a result, the State has no authority over [them].

[10] James’ statement of claim seeks to draw a distinction between “the Legal Fiction JAMES JONES”, “James JONES”, “J Jones”, “Mr J Jones”, and “all other similar constructs having the name Jones”. Such a practise is a hallmark of the behaviour described in the Canadian judgment Meads v Meads as being adopted by “Organised Pseudolegal Commercial Argument litigants”. In that case, the Alberta Associate Chief Justice identified three factors that unify such litigants, being:

(a) a characteristic set of variable strategies that they employ; (b) specific but irrelevant formalities and language which they appear to believe are or portray as significant; (c) the sources from which their ideas and materials originate; and (d) that they will only honour obligations created pursuant to law if they feel like it. 

[11] Through these practises, and the idea of the “dual persona” theory, adherents to the Sovereign Citizen movement attempt to argue that the laws and territorial authority of the Crown do not apply to them. James’ claim falls squarely within the types of claims brought by “Organised Pseudolegal Commercial Argument litigants”. 

[12] I adopt the Court of Appeal’s conclusions in Warahi to the effect that such arguments are untenable and without legal foundation. Acts of Parliament are binding on all persons within the geographical territory of New Zealand, and are upheld by the Courts. It is plainly true that “No person within New Zealand is able to dissociate themselves from their “legal persona” so as to remove themselves from the jurisdiction of the courts”. 

[13] Further, as stated by Ellis J: ...it will inevitably be an abuse of process for a litigant to attempt to employ [Organised Pseudolegal Commercial Argument] concepts in seeking to avoid or defeat any state, regulatory, contract, family or other obligations recognised by law. 

Result 

[14] I am satisfied that James’ claims for an injunction against the Whanganui District Court are based on Organised Pseudolegal Commercial Arguments, and that they have no legal foundation.

04 June 2023

Vulnerability

'Reasoning From the Body: Universal Vulnerability and Social Justice' by Martha Albertson Fineman in Chris Dietz, Michell Travis and Michael Thomson (eds), A Jurisprudence of the Body (Palgrave Macmillan, 2020) states 

This chapter offers a clear roadmap for the application of vulnerability theory. It engages with the ontological body in order to highlight the universality of vulnerability and its implications for law and policy. Embodied vulnerability and the inevitable social dependency it generates provide a clear and unambiguous challenge to [neo]liberal understandings of a legal subjectivity grounded in liberty, autonomy and rationality, as well as rendering incomprehensible models of the restrained state. In the construction of social institutions and relationships, the state is both inherently a primary social actor and the primary instrument of accomplishing social justice. Law and policy represent the ways in which state responsibility is defined and manifested in society. Placing vulnerability and dependency at the center of governance demonstrates the necessity for law and policy that are responsive to the realities of the human condition. Understanding the realities of vulnerability and dependency also reveals the there is an inherent and inevitable inequality of position in many social arrangements to which law must respond. Vulnerability theory helps to formulate the questions that can help us achieve justice through the law and policy that inevitably shapes the contours of these institutions and relationships.