Game Archives

The report of a Survey of the Video Game Reissue Market in the United States (conducted for the Video Game History Foundation and the Software Preservation Network, in collaboration with the University of Washington Information School GAME Research Group) by Phil Salvador comments 

Video games are part of our cultural history. The video game industry and cultural heritage institutions agree that video games should be preserved for both entertainment and study. As part of that effort, a growing market has emerged for reissuing historical games, popularly called retro games or classic games. 

Despite this, the availability of historical games is generally understood to be limited. This is due to a variety of factors, including technical constraints, complicated rights issues, rightsholder disinterest, and the long-term volatility of digital distribution platforms. The scale of this problem is troubling for anyone hoping to access games, but it is particularly critical for the cultural heritage field, which depends on the ability to access historical video games for research and must otherwise rely on unauthorized means to access them. 

Although the game industry agrees with the cultural heritage field that preservation is important, they disagree about how severe this problem is and how to address it. Industry lobbyists in the United States have opposed new copyright exemptions for game preservation on the grounds that there is already a thriving reissue market. While a healthy market for certain game reissues does exist, it is overshadowed by the volume of games that remain unavailable. 

To better inform discussions of these complex issues, we gathered empirical evidence about the state of the video game reissue market in the United States and what portion of historical games are actually still in commercial distribution. We believe this is the first major study to analyze the availability rates for a broad sample of historical games in this manner. 

What We Studied 

This study analyzed a dataset representing over 4,000 historical video games released in the United States before 2010 to determine whether they have been reissued or are otherwise still available through their rightsholders. The survey examined four sample groups, each representing a different segment of the diverse population of video games:

● A sample of all historical games released before 2010. 

● Games for the Commodore 64, a platform that represents an abandoned ecosystem with the lowest level of commercial interest. 

● Games for the Game Boy platform family, a neglected ecosystem with demonstrable commercial interest but declining availability. 

● Games for the PlayStation 2, an active ecosystem with high recommercialization activity from multiple parties.  

Historical video game availability is dire. Only 13 percent of classic video games published in the United States are currently in release. This figure is comparable to the commercial availability of pre-World War II audio recordings (10 percent or less) or the survival rate of American silent-era films (14 percent), two other mediums at risk. 

These levels are consistent across platform ecosystems and time periods. All three platform libraries examined for this study have poor reissue rates, regardless of commercial interest (see table 1). Despite vastly different levels of platform-owner activity, the Commodore 64 and the Game Boy family ecosystems are both effectively abandoned, while our example of a commercially active  ecosystem, the PlayStation 2 ecosystem, only reaches a reissue rate of 12 percent. Across all platforms, no five-year period from 1960–2009 rises above 20 percent availability (see figure 1).   

Historically significant games with low commercial value are especially unlikely to be reissued. The reissue rate falls below 3 percent for all games released prior 1985, a period with high historical importance to the early game industry but minimal commercial activity. The Commodore 64—an important platform for the 1980s computer game industry—showed both the lowest availability rate and the lowest diversity of reissue sources out of any ecosystem we examined. This is evidence that the interests of the marketplace do not align with the needs of video game researchers. Digital marketplace volatility threatens the availability of game reissues. While games do get reissued, the long-term instability of digital game distribution platforms means they often lapse out of release, especially in ecosystems where there is a low diversity of reissue sources. 6.5 percent of the Game Boy library was previously available only through Nintendo’s Virtual Console storefronts for the Wii U and 3DS platforms, but since those services shuttered in March 2023, those games are no longer available in any form. Other legacy digital stores that are still running, such as the PlayStation 3 and PlayStation Vita stores, have experienced such a degradation in service quality that users are effectively unable to purchase titles that are technically still in commerce. 

Takeaways 

This is a systemic problem. Historical game availability issues are widespread across all platform ecosystems and time periods. No single company or platform owner is responsible for this reality. This is a crisis for the entire medium of video games. 

While the reissue market is active, it’s not enough. Publishers do reissue historical video games through a variety of formats, services, and products, but their collective effort has amounted to recommercializing or otherwise making available less than one- fifth of all historical games. As a result, nearly 90 percent of the game industry’s historical output is inaccessible without acquiring vintage games and hardware from the expensive second-hand market, visiting library collections in person due to restrictions imposed by Digital Millennium Copyright Act, or resorting to piracy. 

The game industry must acknowledge this problem—and that libraries and archives can help solve it. While it may seem hard to reconcile the interests of the commercial marketplace with the needs of researchers, the first step is to agree on the facts and recognize the significant gaps that exist in the reissue market. Cultural heritage institutions can help close that gap by providing access to the overwhelming majority of games that remain unavailable. 

Constitutions far, far away

'How Liberty Dies in a Galaxy Far, Far Away: Star Wars, Democratic Decay, and Weak Executives' by Conor Casey and David Kenny in (2023) 35(2) Law and Literature comments 

In this article we argue that the story of Star Wars has much to tell us about perennial questions of constitutional design. The series offers a rich cinematic exploration of some of the most pressing real-life issues of politics and constitutionalism and is, we suggest, a fruitful source of insight for issues of constitutional design and regulation. This article proceeds in three parts. In Part I, we sketch the political context which grounds our analysis, outlining the key constitutional institutions of the Galactic Republic, and their rapid decline and fall as documented across the prequel trilogy. In Part II, we outline the existing contributions commentators have made in respect of Star Wars and its lessons for constitutional design and regulation—the problem with the concentration of government power in one person and the risks posed to political systems by excessive delegation of authority to the executive branch. We then introduce three more nuanced lessons that we think the films offer: the ‘Publius paradox’; the hollowness of legalism; and the dangers of confusion at the apex of power. In Part III, with detailed analysis of the films, we show how the Star Wars saga clearly illustrates these lessons: that a constitutionally weak executive, rather than a strong one, can be a cause of democratic decay and autocracy, as it proves incapable of meeting the demands of governance; that commitment to and obsession with law is not per se any bulwark against autocracy; and that unclear lines of constitutional authority pose a huge risk at times of strain and crisis. We argue that the constitutional problem Star Wars illustrates is more subtle and more important than the dominant accounts suggest: that under concentration of power creates the risk of overconcentration of power. If we fear the decay of democracy into autocracy and wish to respond to it, we must be careful not to excessively limit or diffuse power. If we do, and begin to see constitutionalism as solely or primarily a means of restraining government, we may limit government so much that we cause the very problem we seek to prevent.

The authors argue 

 Despite their massive impact across the culture, and being subject to sustained analysis in fields such as philosophy and even other aspects of law,  the Star Wars films have not been subject to sustained analysis by constitutional scholars. An exception to this is Sunstein, in his popular book on The World According to Star Wars, who highlights the politics of the saga: Star Wars isn’t a political tract, but it has a political message… That’s one of the reasons for the universal appeal of the saga. Whatever your political convictions, and wherever you live, you’re likely to see an Emperor of some kind, and you’re likely to have some sympathy for the rebels. 

The saga, Sunstein says, criticizes ‘central authority, and its rebel heart lies with those who try to resist it.’ The prequels, he notes, deal with ‘the rise of tyranny and the collapse of democracies’, offering ‘a warning about the need for citizen vigilance against the countless would-be emperors who try to accumulate power at the expense of the public.’ 

Star Wars’ grasp of the nuances of politics is somewhat thin, which is forgivable for a series of science fiction action films. The films initially read as naïvely anti-political, believing that politics as practiced in the real world—as a series of pragmatic compromises—is equivalent to corruption, and that political ambition is fundamentally suspect.  It harkens back to a time—which is always mythologised, in civilisations past or in a galaxy far away—where politicians were truly civil, listening, reasoning and debating, acting for a pure people rather than a corrupt elite. Sunstein is, perhaps for this reason, sceptical of the depth of Star Wars’ insights into constitutionalism. Though he notes Star Wars is ‘obsessed with the separation of powers’ it does not ‘have all that much to say about constitutions, at least not directly’. Sunstein maintains, ‘if you’re looking to learn about constitutional design, Star Wars probably isn’t your best bet.’ We respectfully disagree. We think that, in spite of its lack of political sophistication, the story of Star Wars has much to tell us about perennial questions of constitutional design, and it is much more interesting than its basic anti-politics. The series offers a rich cinematic exploration of some of the most pressing real-life issues of politics and constitutionalism and is, we suggest, a fruitful source of insight for issues of constitutional design and regulation. 

This article proceeds in three parts. In Part I, we sketch the political context which grounds our analysis, tracing the form and structure of the constitutional institutions of the Galactic Republic; the political culture of this polity; the challenges facing the Republic; and its rapid decline and fall as documented across the prequel trilogy. In Part II, we first outline the existing contributions commentators have made in respect of Star Wars and its lessons for constitutional design and regulation—that the films’ commentary on constitutionalism is as a story of the ‘problem with the concentration of government power in one person’ and the risks posed to political systems by excessive delegation of authority to the executive branch. We then introduce three more nuanced lessons that we think the films offer: the ‘Publius paradox’, the hollowness of legalism, and the dangers of confusion at the apex of power. In Part III, with detailed analysis of the films, we show how the Star Wars saga illustrates very effectively these lessons: that a constitutionally weak executive, rather than a strong one, can be a cause of democratic decay and autocracy, as it proves incapable of meeting the demands of governance; that commitment to and obsession with law is not per se any bulwark against autocracy; and that unclear lines of constitutional authority pose a huge risk at times of strain and crisis. We argue that the constitutional problem Star Wars illustrates is more subtle and more important than the dominant accounts suggest: that under concentration of power creates the risk of overconcentration of power. If we fear the decay of democracy into autocracy and wish to respond to it, we must be careful not to excessively limit or diffuse power.  If we do, and begin to see constitutionalism as solely or primarily a means of restraining government, we may limit government so much that we cause the very problem we seek to prevent.

NFTs

'When a Series’ Main Protagonist Gets Stolen and Sold – A Study of NFTs and Their Approaches to Copyright Licensing' by Susan Bischoff in (2023) GRUR International comments 

Over the past two years non-fungible tokens (NFTs) have become a highly popular, though extremely volatile trade asset. As mere data sets on the blockchain, NFTs are challenging the law to define the legal positions they entail. This article examines NFTs from the angle of copyright licensing, looking at it from a European perspective with the main focus on German law. Based on the technical specifics of NFTs, the paper evaluates the relevant legal position required for a permitted use of tokenized copyrighted content and how such a position may be obtained in the context of NFT trading. A review of the copyright schemes of 21 of the most sought-after NFT collections sets out the current state of licensing and identifies the prevailing legal uncertainties. The fact that these are not merely theoretical is then shown by the turbulent case of a ‘stolen’ ape avatar, tokenized by an NFT, that was set to star in a live-action animated series. ... 

Imagine the leading actor of a TV show being abducted. Sensational headlines and immense media coverage would surely follow. In addition to concerns for the actor’s health and well-being, the show’s ongoing production would face an unexpected and precarious hiatus. Now turn your attention to a real case, where pre-production for a series centring ‘Bored Ape #8398’ had to be stopped, because an ape had been reported ‘stolen’ from the producer, actor Seth Green. Though the reports of a missing main protagonist sounded spectacular, it was always clear that no actress, actor or animal had actually been harmed, because this drama all happened in the digital world. The planned show ‘White Horse Tavern’ is no remake of ‘Planet of the Apes’ or a reboot of the long-running German TV classic ‘Unser Charly’, which involved a dressed chimpanzee – a scenario that tells you more than you need to know about German television in the 1990s and 2000s. In fact, Bored Ape #8398 is not a living being at all, but a two-dimensional profile picture of a cartoon ape, tokenized by an NFT, which had been stolen from Green. The reason for the production delay was therefore not an involuntary physical absence of a cast member, but rather the notion that with the NFT gone, using an animated version of the cartoon ape Fred Simian as a bartender in a live-action animated series would no longer be permitted under copyright law. 

The case of the lost Bored Ape is symbolic of the multitude of legal and practical uncertainties in the realms of NFTs that condense at the interfaces of rights of use and the notion of ownership, and the incident suggests the need for an analysis of the legal situation and current market practice. This paper first outlines the factual characteristics and thus technical foundations of NFTs, including what it means when one gets ‘stolen’ (II.). It then assesses the relevant legal position required for making lawful use of artwork underlying an NFT such as the missing Bored Ape (III.). That is followed by an evaluation of the relation between the factual disposition over an NFT and the rights to use the tokenized work, taking the current licensing practice of individual and smaller NFT offerings into account (IV.). A market survey of the current approaches to copyright, if any, of the 21 most relevant and economically valuable NFT collections outlines the status quo of copyright licensing and its unresolved issues (V.). Against these findings, the case of the abducted Bored Ape #8398 is conclusively evaluated (VI.). As a recent phenomenon in the digital space with significant commercial interest, the NFT ecosystem is subject to fast-paced developments. This paper, which was completed on 15 January 2023, can therefore only provide a snapshot of the current situation in terms of market values, relevant players, legal approaches, and initial litigation between stakeholders. The relevant copyright issues, however, are general in nature overall and therefore likely to outlast short- and medium-term developments in the field. 

The author is expressly aware that the value of actively traded NFTs has taken a massive hit due to the declining interest following the initial hype from 2021 into 2022, and to the recent crash(es) of cryptocurrencies. It is further acknowledged that NFTs have sparked a wide range of criticism and warnings. While being especially critical of irresponsible business models based on pressure tactics towards consumers and the intolerable environmental impact of most blockchain-based applications, the author recognizes the reality of NFTs as trade assets that have already opened up new exploitation possibilities for creators and artists, brands, and museums, and that might gain further importance in the looming Metaverse. Lastly, the topic is considered worth examining as a paradigm for the interplay between copyright law, which for the most part still carries an analogous view of the world that at most reflects the state of digitalization of the early 2000s, and the progressing emergence of digital-only use and distribution of copyrighted content.

Regulation

'The Digital Services Act and the EU as the Global Regulator of the Internet' by Ioanna Tourkochoriti in (2023) 24(1) Chicago Journal of International Law discusses 

the Digital Services Act (DSA), the new regulation enacted by the EU to combat hate speech and misinformation online, focusing on the major challenges its application will entail. However sophisticated the DSA might be, major technological challenges to detecting hate speech and misinformation online necessitate further research in implementing the DSA. This Essay also discusses potential conflicts with U.S. law that may arise in the application of the DSA. The gap in regulating the platforms in the U.S. has meant that the platforms adapt to the most stringent standards of regulation existing elsewhere. In 2016, the EU agreed with Facebook, Microsoft, Twitter, and YouTube on a code of conduct countering hate speech online. As part of this code, the platforms agreed to rules or Community Guidelines and to practice content moderation in conformity with them. The DSA builds on the content moderation system by enhancing the internal complaint-handling systems the platforms maintain. In the meantime, some states in the U.S., namely Texas and Florida, enacted legislation prohibiting the platforms from engaging in viewpoint discrimination. Two federal courts of appeals that have examined the constitutionality of these statutes under the First Amendment are split in their rulings. This Essay discusses the implications for the platforms’ content moderation practices depending on which ruling will be upheld. ... 

Tourkochoriti argues

Extreme speech has become a major source of mass unrest throughout the world. Social media platforms magnify the conflicts that lie latent within many societies, which are often further fueled by powerful political actors. Similarly, widespread misinformation during the COVID-19 pandemic and the perceptions of these platforms’ inadequate responses led the European Union (EU) to pass the 2022 Digital Services Act (DSA) to combat misinformation and extremist speech.1 The EU also strengthened its Code of Practice on Disinformation. Although these are important developments toward regulating hate speech online, the legislation will be difficult to implement. There are major technological challenges in monitoring online hate speech that necessitate further research. Furthermore, depending on legal developments in the United States (U.S.), the EU’s new legal regime might lead to a conflict with U.S. law, which will complicate platforms’ content moderation processes. 

The DSA responds to concerns expressed about the shortcomings of the system of content moderation currently applied by major social media platforms. Although it offers a sophisticated regulatory model to combat hate speech and misinformation, further research is required in several areas related to detecting such content. The state of the relevant detection technologies raises several concerns, which relate to the difficulties in the current artificial intelligence (AI) models that have been developed to detect hate speech and misinformation. Research is also needed to determine the impact of exposure to hate speech online. 

The U.S. offers extended protection for freedom of speech. In many European states, however, it is legitimate for the government to limit abuse of the same freedom to protect citizens from harm caused by hate speech. It is also legitimate to limit fake news. In the U.S., the sparse regulation of speech at the federal level has left a gap to be filled by states and civil society actors. Florida and Texas enacted legislation to limit online platforms’ discretion to refuse to host others’ speech. More frequently, contractual terms limit speech rights in several private institutions in the U.S. The major U.S.-based social media companies (Facebook and Twitter) have created deontology committees to limit hate speech in the U.S. under pressure from the EU. Questions emerged recently among academics and political actors in the EU on whether these platforms are limiting too much speech as private actors. The concern emerged that the platforms may be limiting even more speech than what is acceptable in Europe, where limits to hate speech by the government are acceptable. 

Courts have the last word in Europe about whether social media users’ freedoms will be adequately protected. Citizens can bring claims before courts alleging violations of their constitutional rights by the platforms. The doctrine of horizontal effect of constitutional rights, dominant in European states, enables them to do so. According to this doctrine, the Constitution applies not only to the vertical relationship between the state and its citizens, but also to the horizontal relationship between private parties within society. The constitutionally protected right to freedom of expression justifies government intervention to ensure its protection against civil society actors too. In several EU member states, the DSA will supersede existing national legislation regulating hate speech and fake news online. France has enacted such legislation, the constitutionality of which was examined by the Constitutional Council. Germany has also enacted legislation generating significant case law in this area. The DSA will trump even U.S. free speech law insofar as the major companies are transnational and must therefore follow European rules as well as American law. However, depending on future court decisions, a conflict may emerge between U.S. law and the DSA. Should this conflict emerge, content moderation may become challenging for the platforms, as they will need to maintain different moderation standards in the U.S. and in the EU. 

Social media companies are required to modify their operational practices to abide by the EU’s Code of Conduct Countering Illegal Hate Speech Online. Specifically, platforms are required to offer enhanced internal complaint-handling mechanisms. They must also meet several procedural requirements in investigating complaints. They must issue prior warnings before removing users. 

The DSA applies to providers of intermediary services irrespective of their place of establishment or residence “in so far as they provide services in the Union, as evidenced by a substantial connection to the Union.” Social media companies modify their behavior to meet the most stringent legal regimes in order to be able to offer their services everywhere. So, by engaging in regional regulation of online speech, the EU is becoming a global regulator of the internet. 

Part II of this Essay discusses the role platforms play in defining the public sphere today and the implications of that role for government regulation. Part III presents how the DSA complements existing codes of practice in countering illegal hate speech. Part IV investigates the challenges that regulating online extreme speech and misinformation pose for governments and platforms. These challenges relate to the state of the relevant detection technologies. Part V focuses on transnational enforcement of the Act and discusses possible areas of conflict with U.S. law. Further research is needed to establish guidelines for establishing what counts as hateful, violent, dangerous, offensive, or defamatory expression, insofar as these forms of expression are subject to DSA regulation.

Scams

The Qld Office of Fair Trading - with a media release titled 'Not so ‘helpful hands’ lands fake charity in court' - reports that it froze the bank accounts of a man found guilty of illegally collecting donations 

A New South Wales man has pleaded guilty to two counts of breaching the Collections Act 1966 after an investigation by the Queensland Office of Fair Trading (OFT). 

David Oneeglio from Pottsville, New South Wales, has been prosecuted and fined $750 in the Brisbane Magistrates Court (12 June 2023) after requesting donations without approval. He was also charged with failing to produce requested information and records to account properly for money and equipment received. 

In March and April 2022 Mr Oneeglio made numerous daily public statements asking for donations to be made via websites www.aussiehelpers.live and www.aussiehelpinghands.com to assist flood affected communities in northern New South Wales. 

Pleas for donations were made across a variety of social media platforms and websites. 

As a result of investigations, the OFT took swift action and froze three separate bank accounts containing donations. 

The Office comments 

 Queenslanders are urged to make sure the charity is registered by checking on the Queensland Government’s “check a charity” website and the Australian Charities and Not-For-Profits Commission website before they donate.

In the US the federal Attorney's Office, Eastern District of New York in a media release states 

 A 13-count indictment was unsealed today in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York charging George Anthony Devolder Santos, better known as “George Santos,” a United States Congressman representing the Third District of New York, with seven counts of wire fraud, three counts of money laundering, one count of theft of public funds, and two counts of making materially false statements to the House of Representatives. ... 

“This indictment seeks to hold Santos accountable for various alleged fraudulent schemes and brazen misrepresentations,” stated United States Attorney Peace. “Taken together, the allegations in the indictment charge Santos with relying on repeated dishonesty and deception to ascend to the halls of Congress and enrich himself. He used political contributions to line his pockets, unlawfully applied for unemployment benefits that should have gone to New Yorkers who had lost their jobs due to the pandemic, and lied to the House of Representatives. My Office and our law enforcement partners will continue to aggressively root out corruption and self-dealing from our community’s public institutions and hold public officials accountable to the constituents who elected them.” 

“The Criminal Division’s Public Integrity Section is committed to rooting out fraud and corruption, especially when committed by our elected officials,” said Assistant Attorney General Kenneth A. Polite, Jr. of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division. “As alleged, Santos engaged in criminal conduct intended to deceive and defraud the American public. As this indictment reflects, the Department of Justice will hold accountable anyone who engages in such criminality.” 

“As today's enforcement action demonstrates, the FBI remains committed to holding all equally accountable under the law. As we allege, Congressman Santos committed federal crimes, and he will now be forced to face the consequences of his actions. I would like to commend the diligent efforts of the investigative and prosecutorial teams in this matter,” stated FBI Assistant Director-in-Charge Driscoll. 

“At the height of the pandemic in 2020, George Santos allegedly applied for and received unemployment benefits while he was employed and running for Congress,” stated District Attorney Donnelly. “As charged in the indictment, the defendant’s alleged behavior continued during his second run for Congress when he pocketed campaign contributions and used that money to pay down personal debts and buy designer clothing. This indictment is the result of a lengthy collaboration between law enforcement agencies, and I thank our partners at the U.S. Attorney’s Office, the Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation for their dedication to rooting out public corruption.” 

Mr. Peace also thanked the U.S. Department of Labor, Office of Inspector General, the New York State Department of Labor (NYS DOL), and the Queens County District Attorney’s Office for their assistance. 

As alleged in the indictment, Santos, who was elected to Congress last November and sworn in as the U.S. Representative for New York’s Third Congressional District on January 7, 2023, engaged in multiple fraudulent schemes. 

Fraudulent Political Contribution Solicitation Scheme 

Beginning in September 2022, during his successful campaign for Congress, Santos operated a limited liability company (Company #1) through which he allegedly defrauded prospective political supporters. Santos enlisted a Queens-based political consultant (Person #1) to communicate with prospective donors on Santos’s behalf. Santos allegedly directed Person #1 to falsely tell donors that, among other things, their money would be used to help elect Santos to the House, including by purchasing television advertisements. In reliance on these false statements, two donors (Contributor #1 and Contributor #2) each transferred $25,000 to Company #1’s bank account, which Santos controlled. 

As alleged in the indictment, shortly after the funds were received into Company #1’s bank account, the money was transferred into Santos’s personal bank accounts—in one instance laundered through two of Santos’s personal accounts. Santos allegedly then used much of that money for personal expenses. Among other things, Santos allegedly used the funds to make personal purchases (including of designer clothing), to withdraw cash, to discharge personal debts, and to transfer money to his associates. 

Unemployment Insurance Fraud Scheme 

Beginning in approximately February 2020, Santos was employed as a Regional Director of a Florida-based investment firm (Investment Firm #1), where he earned an annual salary of approximately $120,000. By late-March 2020, in response to the outbreak of COVID-19 in the United States, new legislation was signed into law that provided additional federal funding to assist out-of-work Americans during the pandemic. 

In mid-June 2020, although he was employed and was not eligible for unemployment benefits, Santos applied for government assistance through the New York State Department of Labor, allegedly claiming falsely to have been unemployed since March 2020. From that point until April 2021—when Santos was working and receiving a salary on a near-continuous basis and during his unsuccessful run for Congress—he falsely affirmed each week that he was eligible for unemployment benefits when he was not. As a result, Santos allegedly fraudulently received more than $24,000 in unemployment insurance benefits. 

False Statements to the House of Representatives 

Finally, the indictment describes Santos’s alleged efforts to mislead the House of Representatives and the public about his financial condition in connection with each of his two Congressional campaigns. 

Santos, like all candidates for the House, had a legal duty to file with the Clerk of the House of Representatives a Financial Disclosure Statement (House Disclosures) before each election. In each of his House Disclosures, Santos was personally required to give a full and complete accounting of his assets, income, and liabilities, among other things. He certified that his House Disclosures were true, complete, and correct. 

In May 2020, in connection with his first campaign for election to the House, Santos filed two House Disclosures in which he allegedly falsely certified that, during the reporting period, his only earned income consisted of salary, commission, and bonuses totaling $55,000 from another company (Company #2), and that the only compensation exceeding $5,000 he received from a single source was an unspecified commission bonus from Company #2. In actuality, Santos allegedly overstated the income he received from Company #2 and altogether failed to disclose the salary he received from Investment Firm #1. 

In September 2022, in connection with his second campaign for election to the House, Santos filed another House Disclosure, in which he allegedly overstated his income and assets. In this House Disclosure, he falsely certified that during the reporting period: He had earned $750,000 in salary from the Devolder Organization LLC, a Florida‑based entity of which Santos was the sole beneficial owner; He had received between $1,000,001 and $5,000,000 in dividends from the Devolder Organization LLC; He had a checking account with deposits of between $100,001 and $250,000; and He had a savings account with deposits of between $1,000,001 and $5,000,000. 

As alleged in the indictment, these assertions were false: Santos had not received from the Devolder Organization LLC the reported amounts of salary or dividends and did not maintain checking or savings accounts with deposits in the reported amounts. Further, Santos allegedly failed to disclose that, in 2021, he received approximately $28,000 in income from Investment Firm #1 and more than $20,000 in unemployment insurance benefits from the NYS DOL.

Nonsense

In Kelly v Fiander [2023] WASC 187 the Supreme Court considered an appeal by a pseudolaw adherent convicted of four offences: 

(1) driving a motor vehicle with an imitation number plate, contrary to s 36(2)(e) of the Road Traffic (Administration) Act 2008 (WA); (2) using an unlicensed vehicle on a road contrary to s 4(2) of the Road Traffic (Vehicles) Act 2012 (WA); (3) driving a vehicle on a road while being disqualified from holding a motor vehicle licence contrary to s 49(1)(a) and s 49(3)(ca) of the Road Traffic Act 1974 (WA); and (4) failing to comply with a direction by a police officer to stop a motor vehicle contrary to s 44 of the Road Traffic (Administration) Act 2008 (WA). 

The Court states 

[10] Before describing what occurred in the Magistrates Court it is necessary to say something about the appellant. It is apparent from the record of the proceedings in the Magistrates Court, the various documents that the appellant has filed in this court, and the proceedings that were conducted before me, that the appellant is an adherent of what has come to be known as 'pseudolaw'. It is also clear that she is an enthusiastic proponent of a theory espoused by pseudolaw devotees that some call the 'strawman duality'. 

[11] The strawman duality theory is based on the fundamentally misguided notion that there exists a physical human being and, at the same time, a separate non-physical person (a 'doppelganger'). Under this theory, it is said that while governments can exercise power over both the physical and the non-physical person, the capacity to exercise power over the physical person only exists because there is a 'contract' that links the physical person with the non-physical person. This 'contract' is evidenced by documents such a birth and marriage certificates. 

[12] The non-physical person is often identified by pseudolaw exponents using an upper-case letter name because, it is said, government and legal documentation such as birth and marriage certificates use capital letters when recording names. 

[13] A critical component of this strawman theory is the idea that government authority over the physical person can be negated by removing the doppelganger. In very simple terms, this is said to be achieved by revoking or denying the legitimacy of the contract. This then has the effect of removing any government authority over the physical person.

The appeal in Branch v Town of Victoria Park [2023] WASC 231 was similarly unsuccessful. 

In Burles v Lakhani, 2023 ABKB 409 the Court states 

 [1] On May 5, 2023, a person who self-identifies as “Lord Grace, Grant Nelson Burles, Apostle Prophet, Cup-bearer – office of the CHAPEL GRANT MISSION EMBASSY” filed with the Court of King’s Bench of Alberta an Originating Application (Application) and a 43-page Affidavit sworn on May 5, 2023. These documents appear to name the Lt. Governor of Alberta, Salma Lakhani (“Crown-Holder of the Great Seal, Her Honour, The Honourable, Salma Lakhani AOC B.Sc, LLD(HON.) office of the Lieutenant Governor of Alberta”) as the Respondent. In this Memorandum of Decision, I will refer to the Applicant as “Mr. Burles”, though, as will become apparent, Mr. Burles characterizes himself in a very different manner. Mr. Burles paid a $250 filing fee. 

[2] Mr. Burles’ Application cannot be adequately summarized, and so I reproduce the body of that document:

BASIC CLAIM: 

1. Reclaim my noble status, from the diminished status of the commoner class. In order, to hold my surname office of divine service, as, Apostle, Prophet, or Cup-bearer of the monastic Chapel Grant Mission, at 416 Gleichen St. Gleichen, Alberta, legal description; plan Gleichen 7 -10 - 9 - 752N, an embassy for the redemption of mans soul for their domicile of the city of New Jerusalem of a ancient Israelite temple site on Alberta/ Montana border that marks a land claim of the Milk River watershed. The ancient Israelite temple site land claim will be filed this summer 2023 in a separate application. 

2. This status change will redeem my noble title right to Grant N. Burles trust estate lands, tenements, and hereditament for the servient tenement of Chapel Grant Mission charitable use or needs. 

3. Status change allows for exemption and immunity from, Wheatland County property tax and utilities services, and utility services of Epcor, Telus, as well as bank services, and exemption from the status of an artificial person or common class of society. 

REMEDY SOUGHT 

1. Change or remove my reduced surname status of the dead legal artificial person, as I did not die intestate. The Registry rolls, Vital Statistics, Land Titles, and Wheatland County tax roll, must change my status to a freeman or nobility, so to redeem my birthright for the surname of Christ for the Cestuy que personal or customary usage in service at Chapel Grant Mission. 

2. Redeem lost funds, from taxation and estate assets used as collateral in service contracts over the course of my life with government agency's for the benefit of the Chapel Grant Mission. ... 

APPLICABLE ACTS AND REGULATIONS 

1. ACTS: Pre-ordination; evidence of divine appointment with the registration of a live birth, 

2. Attestation; baptism certificate, 

3. Ratification; Confirmation of consecration to appointed ordination in Christ name certificate, 

4. Consecration of the Chapel Grant Mission certificate. 

5. REGULATIONS: Bible; rules or orders prescribed by God and or King Jesus the anointed one. Customary or established modes and arrangements of Yahova/ Christ divine law as prescribed in the Bible, such as, my apostolic mandate for souls of The City of New Jerusalem of N. America. (Sic, emphasis in original.)

[3] The corresponding Affidavit is also unorthodox. Again, reproducing parts of the Affidavit is helpful to appreciate and accurately reflect Mr. Burles’ claims and the information he has placed before the Court. 

In a court of equity (extraordinary), As a man of God, I claim equitable title right to the trust estate of Grant N. Burles with evidence of monastic spirituality, such as, deeds, documents, instruments, heraldry, and pedigrees (exhibit 25 to 34 are extracts from book two: evidence of birthright claim part 1, of a three volume book set called; Lord of the Holy Grail) which vitiates the un-voluntary deed grant (exhibit 35 to 37 extracts from book two - evidence of birthright claim part 2) that alienates my living person's free-born status of noble (freemen) title to birthrights of perpetuities in my propriety of personal and real property. As a man of God's law, I claim equitable title as beneficiary for the private use and charitable use as the Apostle, Prophet, or Cup-bearer, Grant N. Burles surname of Christ for the Chapel Grant Mission embassy at 416 Gleichen, Gleichen, Alberta. The main function of the mission is to redeem souls for Christ's New Jerusalem. I provide extracts (exhibit 38) from volume three of the book set - evidence of the deed tablet of green jasper for the ancient Israelite temple site land claim of parts of Alberta and the entire Milk River watershed. 

This ancient Abrahamic temple site land claim will be brought to court this summer of 2023, using my book of evidence with, maps, photos, diagrams, and measurements demonstrating who the maker of the temple site was, astronomical obelisks alignments of divine nature dating the land claim, one alignment at 33 degrees, a Hebrew altar, linier mounds, burials, and a naturally inscribed stone, inscribed with the likeness of God's name as a tetragram YH-VA in italicize cursive Hebrew, and the symbol of Christ (XX at 33 degrees inlayed in the stone). This is a deed tablet cornerstone of green jasper, the first foundation stone for Christ's New Jerusalem kingdom on earth as prescribed in the Bible. 

I claim my domicile is of the spiritual jurisdiction of New Jerusalem kingdom of Christ on earth. My residence is at the embassy Chapel Grant Mission, as a spiritual emissary of Christ for His kingdom's transactions with the temporal jurisdiction who holds my temporals for my estate principal, as second party agent, factor, or trustee. More evidence in volume one: Bill of Equity - statement of birthright claim. I must see and speak in person with my agents, factor or trustee. 

As beneficiary, the Burles status change to nobility must vitiate the false deed grant the man or executor of my trust estate unknowingly volunteered to accord to, as the deed was established without my knowledge, intent or wont as a child. Nullification for fraud or mistake redeems my nobility from the diminished status of a yeomen class or commoner (vulgar) gentile dead artificial person; which must be changed by Alberta registry, vital statistic, land titles, Municipality of Wheatland County (tax and utilities), Epcor, Telus, and Alberta Treasury Branch, as well as, other government agencies regarding my estate prerogatives. 

Moreover they're transferring my property rights to secure loans with collateral without my consent from my trust estate assets by operation of law and rules against perpetuities, as I apparently died intestate with a fraudulently created surname dead legal artificial person. As of March 1, 2023 I am paying property tax and utilities of 416 Gleichen Street, Gleichen, Alberta, by assignment to transfer the collateral to the creditor as payment, as we both have an interest in the funds. However these assignments were rejected by Wheatland County and Epcor. Canada Revenue Agency (federal court) will need to be notified by the Crown, or me if need be, about my surname status change and relief regarding transactions in money of account using my noble family name or distinct appellation as a basics of exchangeable value for the dignity of my distinguished station in Christ name Grant N. Burles for the Chapel Grant Mission. 

This status change must be performed by these government agencies for the benefits, easements, appurtenances, perquisites and fees for private use in services at the monastic regular Chapel Grant Mission, an embassy for the City of New Jerusalem of North America. ... 

I must have all deeds, instrument, terms and definitions of the Crown's claim over my person, and or noble title birthrights for my viewing and inspection, it is possible the Crown agents made a mistake. It is not needed for me to know the exact mechanism by which my birthrights are taken by my secular trustee, Just that they are taken without my intent or knowledge as a child. It would be un-equitable for me as a peer to not know my second party executor or trustee and his/her fiduciary duties that I must trust with my trust. I must meet my trustee(s).

ACCC Data Brokers Inquiry

The ACCC has released Digital Platform Services Inquiry – March 2024 report on data brokers Issues Paper which states 

The purpose of this Issues Paper is to invite written submissions from interested parties to assist the ACCC in understanding the nature of the data broker industry in Australia and any related competition and consumer issues that may arise. 

The role of data brokers 

As we continue to spend more of our time online, Australians are generating an ever- increasing amount of data. As noted by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), ‘the digital transformation is changing economies and societies, powered partly by the collection and use of ever-growing quantities of consumer data.’ According to a 2019 McKinsey Global Survey, 47% of respondents said that data and analytics have significantly or fundamentally changed the nature of competition in their industries over the previous 3 years. In many markets, access to large volumes of high- quality personal data is essential for businesses to compete. Where businesses have unique access to such data, this can provide them with a significant competitive advantage. Conversely, not having access to such data can be a significant barrier to entry and expansion. For example, McKinsey’s 2019 research found that businesses reporting the greatest growth in revenue and earnings received a significant proportion of that boost from data and analytics, with high-performing organisations 3 times more likely than others to say their data and analytics initiatives had contributed at least 20% to earnings before interest and taxes over the previous 3 years. 

What is a data broker? 

Data brokers are a key part of the data supply chain that fuels a range of online and offline products and services. The Direction for the Inquiry defines a data broker as ‘a supplier who collects personal or other information on persons, and sells this information to, or shares this information with, others.’6 Hence, for the purposes of the Report, we will focus on data brokers that collect, process and analyse ‘personal or other information on persons.’ ... 

By combining information acquired from a range of sources, data brokers are able to develop and monetise new proprietary data products and services. These data products and services include tools and reports prepared for a variety of purposes such as customer profiling, marketing, risk management, consumer credit reports or scores, and fraud or crime prevention. The Final Report of the ACCC’s Digital Platforms Inquiry (the DPI Report), discussed the role of data brokers, observing that they ‘have a central role in exchanging and combining personal information and data across a wide variety of sectors in Australia.’ 

Despite the central role that data brokers play in providing data products and services to a range of businesses, as well as the wide variety and volume of information that they collect, analyse and process, there is currently little transparency, awareness and understanding of how data brokers operate in Australia. 

Many consumers are not aware that businesses such as data brokers collect their information, nor have an understanding about how or when such information is collected, or what is being done with this information. In addition, many consumers appear to be uncomfortable with the kinds of data-handling practices used by businesses such as data brokers. A recent survey by the Consumer Policy Research Centre found that 74% of Australians were not comfortable with companies sharing or selling their personal information, and less than 10% were comfortable with targeted advertising based on the tracking of online behaviour or personal characteristics without express permission. Despite these consumer sentiments, current trends in data collection and analysis suggest that the role of data brokers is likely to increase. 

Overseas jurisdictions, including the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada, have previously examined the role of data brokers and identified concerns with their practices. The ACCC will draw on relevant literature and reports both in Australia and overseas for the purpose of this Report. 

Proposed focus 

Data brokers can be broadly split into two categories:

▪ businesses that collect data on their own consumers and sell or share that data with others (first-party data brokers), and 

▪ businesses that collect data about consumers from a range of third-party sources and sell or share that data with others (third-party data brokers). 

The ACCC has previously examined how digital platforms use the first-party data they collect from their users in providing digital platform services. We have also looked at some examples of businesses that share or sell first-party data to others. However, we have not yet examined the data collection, storage, supply, processing and analysis services supplied by businesses who sell or share information that is predominately collected from a variety of other sources, (i.e. third-party data brokers). Third-party data brokers typically add value to the data they collect by applying sophisticated and proprietary analysis to it, which is then used to develop data products and services sold or licensed to businesses that might not otherwise have the in-house capacity or resources to undertake this themselves. 

Unlike first-party data brokers, third-party data brokers do not have a direct relationship with the consumers on whom they collect, process and analyse information. This raises unique consumer protection issues, since consumers are less likely to: ▪ be aware of these practices ▪ have explicitly consented to the collection and use of their data, and ▪ be able to challenge or opt out of the collection and use of their data. 

The ACCC proposes to focus predominantly on third-party data brokers for the purposes of the Report. 

Market dynamics 

The ACCC’s preliminary analysis has identified a number of data products and services supplied by third-party data brokers operating in Australia, including: • Customer and audience profiling and tracking products and services, including marketing and advertising campaign measurement, audience profiling and tracking, media planning, and marketing optimisation. • Property data analytics products and services, including housing affordability reports, construction reports, sales and auction result data and valuation models. • Retail data analysis products and services, including consumer purchasing data, which can be used for pricing, marketing, inventory and optimisation strategies. • Risk and fraud management products and services, including for use in insurance and tenancy applications. • Data validation, cleansing and enriching services. • Identity verification services. 

Another key category of data products and services supplied by third-party data brokers in Australia is consumer and commercial credit reporting products and services, including the supply of credit reports and scores. While the provision of these products and services may raise similar competition or consumer issues to the other products and services supplied by third-party data brokers, we do not propose to focus on these specific offerings as they are regulated separately under the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth). 

We understand that the types of products and services identified above are provided by a range of entities that collect information, including the following third-party data brokers in Australia:

• CoreLogic: is a property data and analytics company that produces a range of products including housing affordability reports, construction reports, sales and auction result data and valuation models. Customers include businesses involved in commercial and residential real estate, banking and finance, and construction, as well as the public sector. CoreLogic operates in 9 locations across Australia, New Zealand, the United States and the United Kingdom, and reportedly has data on over 14 million properties across Australia and New Zealand.  Its annual Australian revenue in the year ending 31 December 2020 was $169.5 million. 

• Equifax: provides ‘insights’ and sells ‘products’ and ‘solutions’ on a range of issues to small businesses and business and enterprise customers. It operates in 24 countries worldwide, providing insights on over 820 million consumers and 91 million businesses. It moved into Australia when it acquired Veda in 2016. In 2021, Equifax Australia Holdings generated revenue of $435 million in Australia. To the extent that Equifax is also a credit reporting body in Australia, we are not proposing to inquire into its credit reporting activities, which are regulated under Australian privacy law. 

• Experian: provides a range of ‘business solutions’ and ‘insights’ services to business users, including a range of data and analytics tools to serve a range of purposes, including marketing, risk management and data validation. It is a global company, operating across 30 countries.  Experian Australia Holdings generated $74.6 million in revenue in Australia in 2021. 

• Illion: provides data and analysis products and services, including risk management and marketing solutions and access to varied ‘data registries.’ Illion is a part of the Dun & Bradstreet Worldwide Network. In 2015, its Australian and New Zealand operations were sold to Archer Capital for $220 million, which was rebranded as illion in 2018. 

• LiveRamp: operates across the globe from 13 offices and has over 900 business customers. LiveRamp provides data tools and analysis to support customer and audience profiling and tracking, as well as marketing and advertising campaign measurement.  LiveRamp was acquired by Acxiom, then a data broker, in 2014. In 2018, Acxiom sold its marketing business (now known as Acxiom Marketing Solutions) and rebranded its data broking business as LiveRamp. 

• Nielsen: is a market research, data and analytics company that offers audience measurement, media planning, marketing optimisation and content metadata services in Australia. Nielsen operates in more than 55 countries. It earned US$3.5 billion (approximately AU$5.27 billion) in global revenue over the year to December 2021. In 2022, its Australian revenue reached $42 million. 

• Oracle: is a provider of cloud applications and cloud infrastructure services. It also operates a third-party data marketplace, which offers ‘actionable audience data' on over 300 million consumers, as well as an ‘ID Graph’ service, which allows advertisers to combine data on individuals across multiple devices.  Oracle’s annual Australian revenue in the year ending 31 May 2021 was $116.2 million. 

• PropTrack: is owned by REA Group and offers ‘data and insights powered by REA Group’ in relation to banking and lending, collateral risk, and real estate. PropTrack is headquartered in Australia and operates in 7 other countries. The REA Group also includes consumer-facing services such as realestate.com.au, flatmates.com.au and Mortgage Choice. The REA Group reported $1.17 billion in revenue over the 2021/22 financial year, including $97 million in the ‘media, data and other’ category. 

• Quantium: offers a range of data science services, including data cleansing, curation and monetisation. It also offers the ‘Q.Checkout’ platform, with insights into an estimated 10 million Australian consumers via Woolworths data, while its CommBank iQ service, a joint venture with Commonwealth Bank, offers access to ‘Australia’s largest aggregated and de-identified transaction banking dataset.’ Quantium was founded in 2002 and now operates across 11 offices worldwide. Woolworths Group acquired a majority stake in Quantium in 2021. In December 2022, Quantium and Telstra announced a new data and AI joint venture.

The ACCC acknowledges that these businesses offer a wide range of products and services, including some offerings that may not directly involve the use of personal or other information on persons. The ACCC has previously engaged some of these businesses in the course of our work. The ACCC is interested in the level of competition between third-party data brokers and other businesses in Australia, and invites submissions on this issue. In particular, we invite any general observations on the level of competition, including what factors drive competition, as well as identification of any specific barriers to effective competition in the provision of data products and services. 

Questions 

1) Who are the databrokers operating in Australia that predominantly collect informationf rom other sources (i.e., not directly from consumers)? 

2) How do data brokers compete? What factors do data brokers differentiate themselves on (e.g., price, range of data, specific types of data, analysis undertaken, additional services offered)? 

3) How difficult is it for new data brokers to enter the Australian market? What are their entry strategies (e.g., expansion of overseas data brokers into Australia, expansion of other businesses into data broking, new entrants)? Does this differ depending on the types of data products or services provided? 

4) What are the benefits of data brokers? Who do they benefit? Does this vary by data broker? If so, how? 

Questions for customers of data brokers 

5) What factors do you consider when choosing which data broker to acquire products or services from? 

Data collection and sources 

The ACCC understands that third-party data brokers collect information from a range of sources, including: • digital platforms, including social media services • web pages (through web scraping) • the use of website cookies • app developers, including through the use of software development kits (SDKs)  • other businesses (such as banks, retailers and telecommunications companies) • open data projects • government sources (such as the electoral roll, ASIC databases, and land titles offices) • customer loyalty schemes • other data brokers. 

From these sources, data brokers collect a range of information. For example, this could include an individual’s name, home and work address, date of birth, marital or family status, education level, income, purchasing history, search and browsing habits, location data, and financial information. 

The ACCC is interested in understanding more about how data brokers collect information. Stakeholder feedback in response to the below questions will help us better understand industry practices and identify any potential consumer or competition issues. 

6) What information do data brokers collect?  For each type of information, provide details of: a) How this information is collected, including details of any technologies used (e.g., tracking scripts, web-based plug-ins, tracking pixels,  or SDKs in apps). b) Where or from whom this information is collected. c) The terms and conditions under which the data is collected. d) Any prices or fees paid for the information, including details of how these are determined. 

7) Are there any particularly important or must-have sources of information for data brokers to collect? If so, what are they and who supplies these (e.g., digital platforms)? 

Questions for businesses that sell data to data brokers 

8) What information do you sell or provide to databrokers? a) To which databrokers?Do you provide or sell the data to multiple databrokers? Whyor why not? b) Under what terms and conditions (including price) do you sell this data? Is this done via tender, negotiated contracts, take-it-or-leave-it list prices, or other means? c) How do you collect this data? d) Do you know how this data is used? Do you have any control over this? 

9) What other types of businesses (non-data brokers) do you sell or provide data to? 

Data products and services 

The ACCC is particularly interested in the development and supply of data products and services by data brokers to other users. Examples of the types of products and services offered by data brokers include tools and reports developed and used for a range of purposes, including customer profiling, consumer credit scores, marketing, risk management and fraud or crime prevention, as discussed above. The ACCC seeks views from stakeholders on how data brokers use the data they collect. For example, we seek to better understand how data brokers process and analyse data, the specific products and services they offer, who uses these products and services, what they are used for, and the terms and conditions that may apply to their supply and use. 

10)What are the business models used by data brokers? How do they monetise their services? 

11) What types of data products and services are offered by data brokers? a) Who acquires these? b) How and for what purposes are these used? c) What terms and conditions (including restrictions) typically apply to their use? 

Questions for business users of data products and services 

12) What products and services have you acquired from data brokers? a) From which databroker(s)? b) Were these bespoke or ‘off-the-shelf’ products? c) Under what terms and conditions (including price) did you acquire these products and services? Was this done via tender, negotiated contracts, take-it-or-leave-it list prices, or other means? d) What did you use these products and services for? e) What terms and conditions or restrictions govern or governed the use of these products or services? 

13) Are there any ‘must-have’ data products or services that you acquire from data brokers? Are these available from multiple data brokers? If you were unable to acquire these from a data broker, how else could they be acquired? 

14) How important are data brokers for the provision of digital platform services? For example, in addressing data-related barriers to entry. Why? 

15) How do the products and services provided by data brokers affect competition in other markets? For example, in markets where businesses may supply data to data brokers, or in markets where businesses acquire products and services from data brokers in order to provide their own products and services. If the products and services provided by data brokers do affect competition in other markets, how? 

Potential consumer and small business harms 

The ACCC is seeking views on potential consumer and small business harms and benefits associated with the collection, processing and analysis of information by data brokers. The ACCC has previously identified a range of potential harms relating to the collection and use of personal information or data, including harms associated with:

• Direct marketing practices, including customer profiling, personalised pricing or pre-quoting, and potentially harmful targeted advertising.   

• Use of information in ways that discriminate against a consumer, or in ways not anticipated by the consumer.  For example, a consumer’s personal details shared in another context being used to influence their access to rental housing. 

• Incomplete or inaccurate data being used to develop a profile of a consumer. For example, consumers may be unable to complete important transactions, such as opening a bank or mobile phone account, if the data included in a risk mitigation product is incorrect and identifies them as a risk on the basis of the incorrect information.   

• The misuse of personal or other information on persons obtained by malicious actors. For example, products that identify an individual’s home address or place of work may be used to facilitate harassment or stalking, and may expose domestic and family violence victims, law enforcement officers, prosecutors, public officials or other individuals to retaliation or harm.  Personal information could also be misused by malicious actors to perpetuate scams. 

• Misleading terms and conditions or inadequate disclosures about how information is shared with data brokers,  including the use of clickwrap agreements, which use digital prompts that request users to provide their consent to online terms and policies, without requiring them to fully engage. 

As consumers are generally unaware of data brokers and their business practices, we are concerned there may also be a general lack of awareness about the potential harms related to these practices. While the practices of data brokers may also raise privacy-related harms, this Report will not review the operation of Australian privacy laws, which is outside the scope of the Inquiry. 

16) What benefits do data broker products and services provide to consumers and small businesses? 

17) What consumer harms may arise from the collection, processing, analysis or storage of information by data brokers? Which consumers are most likely to be harmed and why? 

18) What consumer harms may arise from the use of data products and services sold or provided by data brokers? Which consumers are most likely to be harmed and why? 

19) What processes and controls do data brokers have in place to protect consumers? This may include efforts around the de-identification and aggregation of data, data verification processes to ensure data is accurate, or measures to protect stored data. a) Are these controls adequate? What more could/should be done? 

20) To what extent are consumers aware that their data is being collected and used by data brokers? How are they are made aware? 

21) What steps can consumers currently take to inspect and/or remove the data that is held about them or to otherwise raise a complaint with data brokers? 

22) What bodies or resources exist to assist and support consumers in their dealings with data brokers? What more could be done to better educate and empower consumers? 

Question for consumers 

23) Have you experienced any harm, including financial loss or differential treatment, as a result of a product or service provided by a data broker? What actions were open to you to try and address the issue, and was it resolved?

LLM Personality?

'Personality Traits in Large Language Models' by Mustafa Safdari, Greg Serapio-García, Clément Crepy, Stephen Fitz, Peter Romero, Luning Sun, Marwa Abdulhai, Aleksandra Faust and Maja Matarić comments 

The advent of large language models (LLMs) has revolutionized natural language processing, enabling the generation of coherent and contextually relevant text. As LLMs increasingly power conversational agents, the synthesized personality embedded in these models by virtue of their training on large amounts of human-generated data draws attention. Since personality is an important factor determining the effectiveness of communication, we present a comprehensive method for administering validated psychometric tests and quantifying, analyzing, and shaping personality traits exhibited in text generated from widely-used LLMs. We find that: 1) personality simulated in the outputs of some LLMs (under specific prompting configurations) is reliable and valid; 2) evidence of reliability and validity of LLM-simulated personality is stronger for larger and instruction fine-tuned models; and 3) personality in LLM outputs can be shaped along desired dimensions to mimic specific personality profiles. We also discuss potential applications and ethical implications of our measurement and shaping framework, especially regarding responsible use of LLMs.

My somewhat dour thought is that cats and cockatoos and puppy dogs often have 'personality' ... personality is not personhood.