In Schneider v Colhoun, 2022 SKQB 163 the Saskatchewan Court states
[1] The plaintiff has brought an application for judgment against the defendants, his former residential landlords. He claims he is entitled to judgment of $1,024,743.00. He says he is entitled to this because the defendants failed to respond, but not to his statement of claim – they filed a defence and counterclaim, to which the plaintiff has actually replied – but to some arcane quasi‑litigation process of his own apparent devising.
[2] The grounds for the plaintiff’s application are impossible to decipher. It is as if “ludicrous” and “risible” had a child. In chambers the plaintiff attempted to explain same but the water he was swimming in just became murkier. The plaintiff has fully bought into the bamboozle, and he does not appear able to extricate himself from same notwithstanding that the bamboozle is demonstrably incorrect and devoid of legal foundation and merit. …
[15] You might think with this classic and linear pleadings history, this matter would be following the classic litigation path.
[16] You would be wrong.
[17] The plaintiff has established an alternate litigation path, one unknown to our procedures in this Court be those in statute or the rules or the common law. To explain this alternate path (perhaps alternate reality) will take some time.
[18] The plaintiff’s current notice of application came before me in Regina chambers on June 7, 2022. It was filed May 20, 2022 – before the defendants’ defence was due and indeed before it was filed. While not easy to discern, the application sought judgment of $1,024,743.00 from the defendants as a result of their “default”. “Default”, of course, is a term of art in The Queen’s Bench Rules. It means the defendants had failed to serve and file a statement of defence in a timely way. That is not the case here, since as at May 20th the defendants still had time to file a defence even if I assume the claim was served on them on May 4th, the date it was issued. Also, in the case at bar, the defendants have not been noted for default of defence pertaining to the statement of claim.
[19] So. The plaintiff’s present notice of application seeks the following remedies:
1. Remedies related to Default of Defence section 3‑21 Norm and Laura Colhoun in the amount of $1,024,743 dollars as the Defendants did not respond to the attached “Notice of Demand”, “Notary Certificate Notice of NON_RESPONSE”, or the Notarial Certificate of Dishonour.
2. 3‑24 Claim for debt or liquidated demand and pecuniary damages or detention of goods by Norm and Laura Colhoun in the amount of $1,024,743 dollars.
[20] Thus the plaintiff’s application is a curious blend of a (mis)application of The Queen’s Bench Rules and processes of the plaintiff’s devising or adoption, the provenance of the latter not being entirely clear. Let me explain.
[21] The plaintiff’s supporting material states that the plaintiff, “a living soul”, sent two registered letters to the defendants containing some documents: - December 17, 2021. The plaintiff sent a “Notice of Demand” to the defendants. He says he received no response to same. - January 20, 2022. The plaintiff sent a “Notice of NON‑RESPONSE” to the defendants, to which he also says he received no response.
[22] The plaintiff purports to put this information before the Court in his document entitled “VERIFIED DECLARATION IN THE NATURE OF AN AFFIDAVIT”. It is not an affidavit. It is not affirmed or sworn, nor does it comply with The Queen’s Bench Rules pertaining to affidavits. Nevertheless I have considered this document.
[23] After asserting the two mailings (above) the plaintiff goes on to say this: In light of the dishonors and failure to provide a defence as noted above, I hereby request your services as a notary public for the Province of Saskatchewan, to evidence the dishonor and failure to provide a defence as outlined above by re‑presenting my Notary Notice of Dishonour and Default Further, Affiant sayeth naught.
[24] The Notice and Demand of December 17, 2021 is attached to this fiat as Appendix “A”. The Notice of Non‑Response of January 20, 2022 is attached to this fiat as Appendix “B”. These documents speak for themselves. I will not attempt to explain them. I am not sure I could.
[25] There’s more. The plaintiff filed an undated, untitled document which begins “Information in support of the Statement of Claim”. It purports to be just that, but it is not in sworn form and is not actual evidence before this Court on this application. It includes a list of items for which specific sums are claimed, running the gamut from killing his cat to moving expenses to expensive liquor to sexual aids. ...
[27] Next, as Appendix “D” I have attached the document the plaintiff calls his “Affidavit of Facts, Decree Under Claim of Right and Fee Schedule”. To be fair, this is a comprehensive document. It begins “The Creator created the universe, the earth and life” and ends with the extensive claims the plaintiff makes against these defendants. These documents draw distinctions as to the nature of the plaintiff: his corporeal self, his private self (to which no laws apply), his sole shareholder/beneficiary self in his name, his agency self. The claims advanced by these various personages are themselves varied. For example there are numerous human rights offences alleged, for each the plaintiff says he is entitled to 50 grams of gold. It’s sort of like catching a leprechaun apparently.
[28] I am not going to go through each of these documents in detail. Suffice it to say that they are complex, convoluted, labyrinthine and – alas – unknown to law.
[29] The plaintiff has also filed a partially completed Form 3‑22, affidavit for default judgment on a debt or liquidated demand.
[30] These are the documents that the plaintiff relies upon for the present application. These constitute his alternate claim mechanism which, nevertheless, he attempts to incorporate into the standard system of civil litigation in this Court. I do not pretend to understand why he must use our Rules if these other processes bestow such wide rights upon him. …
[32] I commence my analysis by noting that at the chambers hearing I recognized that the plaintiff was entitled to represent himself in these proceedings, but strongly urged the plaintiff to obtain legal advice, if not legal representation. It is fair to say he did not embrace my suggestion.
[33] The obvious starting point in this analysis is to reference Meads v Meads, 2012 ABQB 571, [2013] 3 WWR 419. Mr. Justice Rooke crafted this masterful review of the tactics of “Organized Pseudolegal Commercial Argument (OPCA) Litigants” over a decade ago. It withstands the test of time and has been widely adopted in Canada. He succinctly described the nature of OPCA Litigants at para. 4 of his decision:
[4] OPCA litigants do not express any stereotypic beliefs other than a general rejection of court and state authority; nor do they fall into any common social or professional association. Arguments and claims of this nature emerge in all kinds of legal proceedings and all levels of Courts and tribunals. This group is unified by: 1. a characteristic set of strategies (somewhat different by group) that they employ, 2. specific but irrelevant formalities and language which they appear to believe are (or portray as) significant, and 3. the commercial sources from which their ideas and materials originate. This category of litigant shares one other critical characteristic: they will only honour state, regulatory, contract, family, fiduciary, equitable, and criminal obligations if they feel like it. And typically, they don’t.
[34] Having regard to the rest of the judgment in Meads and the material and arguments presented to me on this application, I have absolutely no hesitation in finding that Mr. Schneider falls within the OPCA category. His arguments fall within several of the categories set out by Justice Rooke in Part VI of Meads. I will point out five of the most salient of these.
[35] First, the plaintiff asserts that he is not subject to the authority of statute, rules, this Court or the rule of law generally. In Meads this is dealt with beginning at para. 267. The case at bar is an interesting hybrid. While the plaintiff discounts this Court’s ability to set and govern its own process as a court of inherent jurisdiction, and while he sets forth and relies upon his own set of “laws” and “rules”, he nonetheless adheres roughly to this Court’s process by bringing a statement of claim and a notice of application for judgment. One wonders why, if his Notice of Dishonour system has legitimacy and efficacy, he needs to engage at all with this Court’s process.
[36] In chambers the plaintiff asserted that this “system” of rights enforcement was widely known and recognized. I asked him where I could find the basis for this system. His reply was “It’s the notary process”, expressed in a tone of frustration that I would not know that process and embrace same. His view is that notaries are the real judges.
[37] In particular the plaintiff repeatedly asserted that the “Uniform Commercial Code” applied, that it had been adopted in Canada, and that he was entitled to use it and I was bound to enforce it. Again, this is markedly similar to Meads. At paras. 26 and 27 Justice Rooke noted as follows:
[26] Mr. Meads stated that his birth certificate has an associated bond with large amounts of money that could easily discharge in full the claims advanced by Ms. Meads. He said this Court could order that payment. He then attempted to provide me with an envelope, presumably containing documents. Mr. Meads said the contents of the envelope had been “filed internationally”: a UCC filing, a Canadian filing, a commercial security agreement, an identity bond, “actual and constructive notices”, hold harmless and identity agreements, non‑negotiable security agreements, an affidavit of his status, a copyright and trade‑mark of his name contract, and definitions of the words used in those documents. “UCC” means the “Uniform Commercial Code”, which is U.S. commercial legislation.
[27] I refused the envelope, and noted that if the envelope was abandoned then I would put those materials in the garbage. I reassured Mr. Meads that I will apply the laws of Alberta and Canada, and that while he is in Court, he will follow the Court’s rules. Mr. Meads’ reply was that was “unacceptable”, and he claimed that the “UCC” is “universal law”.
[38] The troubling nature of this Uniform Commercial Code argument was further dealt with at para. 150 of Meads:
[150] Similarly, Mr. Meads in his documents and arguments references the Uniform Commercial Code [the “UCC”], which is American legislation to harmonize commercial transactions within the United States. That too is not relevant to this proceeding, and will not be applied by this court. That said, as the caselaw survey that follows illustrates, the UCC is also a common motif in material from Canadian OPCA gurus, and forms a significant element in much OPCA mythology. However, why anyone would believe that American commercial legislation would apply in Canada is baffling. Still, OPCA litigants indicate that this legislation has a broad, even extraordinary scope. My office has recently received a document where an OPCA litigant said the UCC applies to governments, “... whether interstellar, intergalactic, international, national, state, provincial, or local ...” [emphasis added].
[39] This finding in Meads has been adopted in other cases. See, for example, Perreal v Knibb, 2014 ABQB 15 at para 8, 581 AR 275.
[40] This Code has no application in Canada or Saskatchewan, despite the plaintiff’s sweeping pronouncements to the contrary. I have not applied it to the application before me. This highlights the first aspect of the plaintiff’s OPCA arguments.
[41] Second, the plaintiff asserts that without his express agreement the law simply does not apply to him. He regards the laws of this nation and this province more as opt‑in provisions than as laws.
[42] One example of this in the within case is from the material filed by the plaintiff. In the material sent to the defendants the plaintiff included the following:
The Creator created the universe, the earth and life. Humans, as a creation of The Creator are inherently equal and have inherent rights. These rights, bestowed by The Creator, cannot be compromised or undone by any other, but The Creator. That being said, the state or government was created by humans and is thereby subservient to humans. The creators of Canada acknowledge these inherent rights cannot be violated and have stated the Charter and Constitution only applies to the government, see Appendix A. I, Geofrey J Schneider, am the living man. As such, I am not, at any time performing on behalf of, or contracting with the government. I am always in the Private unless I issue a statement otherwise. Therefore, all government statutes, acts and codes do not apply to me. As a man of The Creator I follow inherent jurisdiction which states that I am free to do whatever I see fit as long as I DO NO HARM. [Emphasis added]
[43] Through his materials and arguments the plaintiff plainly asserts the legitimate laws of Canada and Saskatchewan simply do not apply to him unless he wishes them to apply. This is another OPCA characteristic.
[44] Third, the plaintiff asserts that this alternate legal process has the force of law and is legitimate. It is not. By way of example and as previously noted, in chambers he asserted quite vociferously that the Uniform Commercial Code is the law of Canada. It is not. He is incorrect. The Uniform Commercial Code is not the law of Canada or Saskatchewan.
[45] Fourth, the plaintiff asserts his person is split into several components. I have already referenced that he is in this legal action as a “private person”. For example his “Notice and Demand” of December 17, 2021 is signed by him at page 4 as “Principal in Fact, and the Only Authorized Representative for GEOFREY J SCHNEIDER including any and all alphabetical or numerical derivations thereof”.
[46] As well, in his “Affidavit of Fact” supporting his alternate process claim he states (page 1), “Let it be understood: the legal entity/person mentioned prior to and following this statement shall not be mistaken for the legal entity on the Birth Certificate created by the Government for the Government.” Later in that same document he states as follows:
If as the sole shareholder/beneficiary I appoint myself, Geofrey J Schneider the sole Executor/Director and Principal Administrator of my Legal Person/Entity, GEOFREY J SCHNEIDER, with full liability, then your role is as follows …
[47] This intrapersonal schism of the plaintiff is a recurring theme flowing through his material and arguments. This is a hallmark of the OPCA litigant.
[48] Fifth, the plaintiff asserts that he can unilaterally make the defendants agree with him, have a contract with him, and be subject to his belief system.
[49] I will refer to a few of the plaintiff’s submissions to illustrate this point. His “Notice and Demand” (Appendix “A” hereto) contains his assertions to this effect. His notice purports to command the defendants’ response within ten days, failing which he is entitled to his claimed remedies. This notice reads in part:
Your failure to respond, within ten (10) days as stipulated, and rebut with particularity everything in this letter with which you disagree, is your lawful, legal and binding agreement with, and admission to the fact, that everything in this letter is true, correct, legal, lawful and binding upon you in any court anywhere in Canada, without your protest or objection or that of those who represent you. As your silence is your acquiescence, notification of legal responsibility is the first essential of due process of law. Silence can only be equated with fraud where there is a legal or moral duty to speak or where an inquiry left unanswered would be intentionally misleading. …
I: Geofrey J Schneider accepts your open and binding offer of contract to form a firm and binding, private, bilateral contract between both parties, in which you agree to pay Geofrey J. Schneider by certified cheque in the amount of $1,024,743 one million, twenty four thousand and seven hundred and forty three dollars …
The foregoing lawful NOTICE AND DEMAND is made in good faith and explicitly without recourse and now constitutes a binding contract and any deviation there from must be and will be treated as a breach of contract, a violation of substantive due process, a breach of public trust and a breach of fiduciary duty.
[50] In the chambers discussion the plaintiff asserted there was nothing untoward about any of this, that this mode of contract formation and enforcement was widely recognized all over the country. Hmmm. Not in my village.
[51] Meads deals with the unilateral formation of agreements commencing at para. 447. A few excerpts illuminate:
[447] OPCA litigants frequently attempt to unilaterally foist obligations on other litigants, peace officers, state actors, or the court and court personnel. These foisted obligations take many forms. None, of course, creates any binding legal obligation. In that sense, these are yet more ‘magic hats’. …
[449] Common examples of these foisted agreements purport to appoint someone a fiduciary, establish a contractual relationship or declare an OPCA person no longer has an obligation, such as to pay income tax. Some purport to unilaterally settle lawsuits or legal claims, without court direction. Others provide a system of predetermined fines.
[450] Sometimes the unilateral agreement says that the recipient has a certain window of time to respond and disagree, otherwise they are held to have agreed to the terms of the unilateral agreement. That may be framed as a requirement that the recipient must rebut or prove themselves exempt from the foisted obligation. However, some foisted unilateral agreements do not even provide that courtesy, and instead allegedly indicate the recipient is bound, whether they like it or not.
[451] Foisted unilateral agreements are almost always expressed in a documentary form. Many foisted unilateral agreements include dramatic language and warnings.
[52] This aspect of this case is, too, a feature of the OPCA litigant and arguments.
[53] In this case the plaintiff is something of a poster boy for OPCA litigants and arguments. His arguments make no sense in numerous respects: grammatically, logically, legally. They are, in a word, nonsense. While the plaintiff presented as truly believing that he could somehow do this, at law he cannot.
[54] There is absolutely not a scintilla of merit in the plaintiff’s present application for judgment. I have not the slightest hesitation in dismissing his application for judgment. …. The plaintiff did not depend entirely on his alternate system, but tried to incorporate same into the legitimate legal system in existence in this province even as he asserted that legitimate process did not apply to him. He should have stuck to the latter. His bifurcation of his claims and arguments have resulted in extra expense to the defendants. …
[60] This is an unfortunate situation. The plaintiff has bought the bamboozle. He cannot now see its true nature. He cannot discern that it is nonsense, that it has absolutely no place in Canadian law. Like a stubborn terrier, he has bitten into the bamboozle so hard that he will not let go, no matter how foul it begins to taste. The bamboozle has captured him and he cannot admit it. The plaintiff has ceded his independent thinking to the charlatans who created this alternate legal theory; I hope he can recover it.
