The Productivity Commission's paper on University Education in
5 Year Productivity Review [
PDF] considers 'Consumer rights
and restitution for inadequate
educational quality'.
The paper states
- Universities are essential to Australia’s continued prosperity. Their
research helps to raise
productivity and living standards, while the knowledge and skills they teach to students
develops
human capital
for
better lifetime prospects, wages and productivity. However, there are tensions between
universities’
research and
teaching
functions.
Many
university
staff are
more interested in, and rewarded for,
conducting
research (due to
established cultures and the importance
international research rankings). Teaching
therefore plays second fiddle to research, with consequences for student satisfaction,
teaching quality,
and
graduate outcomes. Realigning university incentives (both financial and institutional) closer towards the interests
of students
and taxpayers
would help
restore balance.
- As the exact scale of any issues in teaching quality or student outcomes are difficult to
determine, a
first step would be improving their
measurement,
which would itself
encourage
universities to focus more on
their teaching function.
- The appropriateness of Australia’s existing consumer law
provisions and their application
to the higher education sector could also be reviewed
to determine whether they provide
sufficient restitution for inadequate teaching quality.
- Financial incentives, such as through
performance-contingent funding
(as proposed in the
2017-18 Budget)
are
also a step in the right direction,
although there are a range of
challenges with making this approach fair and effective. There is limited evidence that teaching quality is improved
by
universities jointly undertaking
research and teaching (the ‘teaching-research nexus’),
which undermines
the
rationale for
the Australian Government’s
restriction
that all
universities
must
do
both. The teaching-research nexus is also used
to justify
cross-subsidies from
teaching to
research.
This can create labour market distortions, as it
encourages
universities to
increase the number of students
undertaking high-margin courses
and minimise
the number
doing low-margin courses,
to increase
research funds.
- Making payments to universities for
Commonwealth-supported places more
cost-reflective
would be an option to address the problem. However, it
would have
undesirable flow-on effects
to
university research
capacity
unless offset by other funding
initiatives.
It cannot be recommended without a reassessment of research funding
arrangements for universities, or indeed their overall operation. Structural challenges in the
Higher Education Loan Program (HELP)
debt system
can also
result in
unproductive skills formation.
Increased
costs for taxpayers associated with this
may encourage
short-term savings that have unintended consequences (such as limiting
access and efficiency) or
that
undermine the principles of the system. As a solution, the Government has proposed
decreasing
the
initial
HELP repayment
threshold.
More debtors
would make
repayments, reducing the cost of the system.
- This is
unlikely to address many long-term structural challenges and could
result in
reduced labour supply and workforce participation through higher effective marginal tax
rates. It could also undermine
the
historical
‘guaranteed returns’
principle
of HELP
(although
it is
subject to debate whether this remains a valid rationale).
−
A less distortionary method of reducing doubtful HELP debts would be to collect
outstanding amounts from deceased estates (with adequate protections for
hardship).
In discussing consumer protection the paper comments
Competitive
markets for normal goods (such as consumer electronics) are generally
covered by an implied warranty under the Australian Consumer Law (ACL)
for faulty or
inadequate products. These kind of
warranties reinforce the rights of consumers to expect
decent quality products and create strong incentives for the provider to
ensure high-quality
provision.
Equally, providers that make misleading or false claims about the nature
and
quality of their products would also be liable under the ACL, as this
would constitute
misleading conduct.
Although the nature of the products provided by the higher education sector (both
universities and non-university providers) is different to those in other markets, the
basic
principle of protecting consumer (student) rights in a competitive market and enabling
them to seek restitution for inadequate product quality is sound.
The main barrier to the use of the ACL for educational services has historically been
whether, for a Commonwealth-supported student, universities passed the test of being
engaged in ‘trade or commerce’
—
a necessary prerequisite for action under the statute.
That barrier appears to have weakened with the adoption of a demand-driven system,
which more
clearly recasts universities as commercial agencies engaged in trade or
commerce
(Corones
2012; Fletcher and Coyne
2016; Nguyen and Oliver
2013). That has
not only opened up the possibility of legal action for misleading conduct
(for example, a
university
that marketed a course as led by an internationally renowned academic when it
was not), but also for provision of inadequate services.
Equally, the requirement under the ACL for suppliers to exercise ‘due skill and care’
could, in principle, relate to set
ting admission standards, curriculum design, course
delivery, support for students, supervision quality and ‘fitness for purpose’ of a
qualification
(Corones
2012, pp.
11–12). The development of standards monitored by
the
Tertiary Education Quality and Standards Agency (TEQSA)
would provide a possible
benchmark for legal action by students. The addition of the unfair contracts regime into the
ACL may also expand the scope for student legal action
(Goldacre
2013).
There nevertheless remains uncertainty about whether a student could, under the existing
legislation and associated instruments, successfully pursue a case against a university for a
low quality course
(Cohen
2016 versus Fletcher and Coyne
2016). Although universities
appear to be covered by the existing ACL provisions, there seems to be no successfully
prosecuted case in Australia, nor a flood of claims yet to be decided.
Part of the difficulty under the existing provisions may arise because a party making a
complaint would need to show how the university had provided a sub-standard service.
A
poor labour market outcome would not (in isolation) trigger any restitution unless the
university had provided a guarantee that successful completion of a qualification would
lead to good job outcomes.
Although a lack of successful cases has also been present in the United Kingdom and the
United States, recent developments suggest that the global landscape for litigation may
similarly be changing (box
3.2).
A legal commentator has recently concluded that: ‘In
Australia, a successful claim by a
student for compensation for careless or incompetent teaching practices may well be just a
matter of time’
(Cohen
2016). With virtually no jurisprudence, it is impossible to
determine the likely number of future claims, let alone their possible effects on university
conduct. However, it is notable that law firms are warning universities to undertake
strategies to avoid liability, such as having good quality control procedures in place for
staff, random supervision of lectures and solicitation of student feedback.
Box 3.2
International
changes
—
making
consumer law great again?
• In March 2017, a US federal judge approved an agreement under which President Trump will
pay US$25
million to settle three class-action lawsuits relating to alleged problems in the quality
of particular educational programs at Trump University (Eder and Medina
2017). Settlements
have no precedent value because a party may decide to settle even if they expect to win in
court (a point
emphasised by President Trump). Regardless, the mere existence of settlements
provides an avenue for claims by students. Settlements usually occur where is at least some
prospect of success by the plaintiffs, whatever the particular merits of a given case.
• In the United Kingdom, the Competition and Markets Authority (the UK equivalent to the
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission) has clarified that the newly enacted
Consumer Rights Act 2015
applies fully to higher education providers (CMA
2015).
The result is
that, among other things, universities must provide services with ‘reasonable skill and care’,
must not include unfair contract terms, and must not misrepresent the nature of their courses. A
new feature of the Act is that a student would have a ‘right to require repeat performance’ (s.
55)
—
a right to return
—
if the university’s performance was below that implicit in its contract. That
might arise because of the poor quality, organisation or supervision
—
all of which would breach
the requirement for reasonable skill and care. The right to return may only relate to a part of the
course. A student could alternatively seek damages or a refund.
Policy options in Australia
The Australian Government has a range of different approaches open
to it, given domestic
and international legal developments:
- do nothing further, letting parties and courts determine the extent to which the current
ACL provides remedies for students who have been given poor quality educational
services
- change the ACL to include some of the features of the UK
Consumer Rights Act 2015
(particularly some provision that emulates section
55)
- develop
complementary
approaches to provide restitution outside the ACL, such as
through alternative dispute resolution
arrangements activated by a formal complaints
mechanism.
Given the relevance of the existing ACL provisions and an apparent lack of pressing need
for change,
the most prudent short-term option would be to allow the current law to
stand and for the courts
to develop legal precedents over time.
However, continued monitoring of the outcomes of the UK experience
should also be
undertaken.
If,
after several years, the new UK arrangements have had significant
positive effects on universities’ conduct, it would then be worth considering adoption
of
similar provisions in Australia. In
particular, this would involve
making it clear
that the ACL
does
relate to higher education and giving the student the right to a
refund, other compensation or the ‘right to a repeat
performance’
in the event of
unacceptable teaching quality.