Criminologists In The News

'Newsmaking criminology in the twenty-first century: an analysis of criminologists’ news media engagement in seven countries' by Imogen Richards, Mark A. Wood and Mary Iliadis in (2020) Current Issues in Criminal Justice comments

While newsmaking is regularly debated within criminology, few studies have examined why criminologists make news media appearances and how often they do so. Drawing on a dataset of 1211 survey responses and 27 interviews, our study examines these issues, investigating the frequency, predictors and motivations of newsmaking criminology among scholars in seven countries: the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Ireland and South Africa. Our findings indicate that gender and career stage are key predictors of criminologists appearing at least once in news media, along with the desire to publicise research, demonstrate research impact, generate university publicity and influence policy and legal reform. Our interview data reveal two central logics informing these predictors: an industrial logic responsive to the demands of academic capitalism and a social logic informing scholars’ beliefs on the public role of criminologists and criminological research. On the one hand, our participants’ newsmaking practices were driven by moral-political motivations to dispel ‘crime news’ myths and promote evidence-based criminal justice policies. On the other, they were often also influenced by the imperatives of academic capitalism to promote tertiary education, measure research impact and participate in competitive employment markets.

The authors argue

 Criminologists have long debated the benefits and limitations of what Barak (1988) has termed newsmaking criminology: researchers contributing to news media discourses on crime and justice through op-eds and media appearances (Carrier, 2014; Currie, 2007; Murray, 2017; Rock, 2014; Ruggiero, 2012). However, while newsmaking practices are regularly debated within criminology, few studies have empirically examined who appears in the media, why they make these appearances and how often they do so (Frost and Phillips, 2011; Tewksbury, Miller, and DeMichele, 2006). These issues have key axiological and ethical implications for newsmaking within criminology, particularly in the wake of an increased emphasis on ‘engagement’ within higher education. If newsmaking is patterned along demographic or sub-disciplinary lines, it may serve to exacerbate inequities within and beyond the academy. Within the academy, the question of which criminologists appear in the media has an immediate bearing on the ‘politics of engagement’. Understanding factors that shape whether criminologists appear in the media enables us to work toward a more equitable politics and praxis of engagement that does not inadvertently reproduce broader social harms within the academy. Beyond the academy, addressing this same question helps us understand what forms of criminological knowledge publics access, and by corollary, what functions such knowledge plays in public discourses on crime and criminal justice. Seeking to address these issues, our research examines the personal, professional and structural factors that influence participation in contemporary newsmaking criminology. Our research reveals that newsmaking practices within criminology, though widespread, do not reflect equal access, interest or opportunity. Nor do they simply reflect how ‘newsworthy’ journalists deem a criminologist’s research. While the perceived ‘newsworthiness’ of a criminologist’s research is one factor shaping whether they appear in news media (Carrier, 2014; Iliadis, Richards, and Wood, 2019), this is not the only, or even necessarily the dominant factor influencing criminology’s ‘politics of research impact’ (Chubb and Reed, 2018; Murray, 2017, p. 508). Reflecting the broader political economy of contemporary academia, newsmaking operates within a ‘field of power’, shaped by researchers’ academic rank, self-identified gender, roles within the discipline, socio-cultural background and research interests (Burawoy, 2005; Glenn, 2007). Through this research, we emphasise the need for institutions to acknowledge this field of power and the structural challenges it throws up for many criminologists who wish to engage in newsmaking. 

Drawing on a dataset of 1211 survey responses and 27 interviews, our mixed-methods study addresses frequency, predictors and motivations of newsmaking criminology, examining how and why criminologists in the United Kingdom, United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Ireland and South Africa interact with news media organisations. Our analysis reveals key demographic, attitudinal and motivational predictors of criminologists appearing in news media. As we detail, gender and career stage are significant demographic predictors of these appearances, while motivational predictors of news media engagement include a desire to publicise research, demonstrate research impact, generate publicity for their university and influence policy and legal reform. 

To explain these predictors of criminologists appearing in the media, in the second part of this article we draw upon insights from interview data to explore the multiple ‘logics’ underpinning newsmaking criminology. These co-existing logics notably include an industrial logic responsive to the demands of academic capitalism and a social logic informing scholars’ beliefs on the public role of criminologists and criminological research. Where the former is typically underwritten by a robust ‘audit culture’, and reinforced by material rewards and incentives, the latter is characterised by intrinsic motivations, such as curiosity, commitment and concern (Mendoza and Berger, 2008, p. 3; Slaughter and Leslie, 1997). Our analysis indicates that newsmaking criminology is driven, on the one hand, by a moral-political motivation to inform media audiences, dispel mythology about crime and justice and promote evidence-based policy reform. On the other hand, newsmaking practices arise in response to the imperatives of academic capitalism, audit culture and the ‘entrepreneurial university’ (Slaughter and Leslie, 1997), wherein researchers experience pressure to promote their university, enhance research impact and participate in competitive employment markets. 

The remainder of our article proceeds in eight sections. The first section features an overview of newsmaking criminology, including an appraisal of existing research, while the second provides an account of our methodology. Section 3 summarises our survey findings, focusing on the key predictors of criminologists appearing in news media. Having provided an overview of these predictors, Section 4 examines our finding of a gender gap in criminologists’ media appearances and details the implications of this disparity for equity within the academy. Sections 5 and 6 then unpack the two central logics driving newsmaking criminology, exploring firstly the social logic informing criminologists’ moral-political views on newsmaking, and secondly, the industrial logic compelling criminologists to respond to the demands of academic capitalism. Finally, in Sections 7 and 8, we outline firstly the limitations, and secondly, the key conclusions of our study.

Transatlantic Privacy

‘Towards a Transatlantic Concept of Data Privacy’ by Erdem Büyüksagis in (2019) 30(1) Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law Journal comments

Due to ever-growing big data and the ease with which information can be transmitted over the Internet, it has become more complicated for individuals to enjoy their rights to access, to rectify and erase personal information, and for the judiciary to apply conventional privacy law rules, such as consent, transparency, and purpose limitation. On both sides of the Atlantic, this phenomenon has motivated legislatures and courts to extend protective measures in data privacy. Nevertheless, data protection standards in the United States and the European Union (‘EU’) appear to many observers to be radically different and even mutually incompatible. The European Court of Justice’s ruling in Google Spain led many to assume that EU law gives more importance to data protection than does US law. 

In this Article, I argue that the United States and the EU do in fact give similar levels of legal and regulatory protection to private data. Despite the Google Spain decision, the absence of an explicit reference to privacy or data protection in the US Constitution, and cultural differences regarding the value placed on privacy between these jurisdictions, critics have not offered any convincing arguments to show that either the perception of privacy or the consequences of its violation are radically different in the United States and in Europe. First, when assessing whether private data gathered by governments agencies or private businesses ought to be made available to the general public, courts in both jurisdictions take into account the nature of the information in question, its sensitivity for the data subject’s privacy, the data subject’s identity, the reasons behind the storage and disclosure of the information, and the public’s interest in the information. My point is illustrated by the fact that courts in the United States and the EU rely upon similar tests to deal with potential data breaches. Second, particularly since the adoption of the General Data Protection Regulation, data protection is on the agenda of a number of state legislatures in the United States. The adoption of the California Consumer Privacy Act constitutes a non-negligible shift in the nation’s data privacy regime, since its effective territorial reach will not be limited to California, but will involve all the states given as the headquarters of hundreds of high technology companies that are based in the region commonly known as ‘Silicon Valley’. 

My analysis leads me to the conclusion that the regulatory and case law developments on both sides of the Atlantic hint at a harmonization process of data protection standards because of the ever-growing recognition of the need for specific data protection laws and their substantive convergence.

Exits

'Exit Strategy' (Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper #542) by Mark A. Lemley and Andrew McCreary comments

 In Silicon Valley, the most important thing to think about when starting a company is how you’re going to end it. The venture capital funding model that dominates the tech industry is focused on the “exit strategy” — the ways funders and founders can cash out their investment. While in common lore the exit strategy is an initial public offering (IPO), in practice IPOs are increasingly rare. Most companies that succeed instead exit the market by merging with an existing firm. And for a variety of reasons, innovative startups are especially likely to be acquired by the dominant firm in the market, particularly when they are venture funded. 

In this paper, we argue that this focus on exit, particularly exit by acquisition, is pathological. It leads to concentration in the tech industry, reinforcing the power of dominant firms. It short-circuits the development of truly disruptive new technologies that have historically displaced incumbents in innovative industries. And because incumbents often buy startups only to shut them down, intentionally or not, it means that the public loses access to many of the most promising new technologies Silicon Valley has developed. 

There has to be a better way. We suggest a number of ways to break the cycle of acquisition by incumbents, including changing the incentives that favor acquisition over continued operation, finding other ways to fund startups or to allow venture capital firms to cash out without an acquisition, and changing the antitrust laws to focus on who is acquiring startups. These solutions won’t fix the problem of today’s entrenched tech monopolies. But they will allow the next generation of companies that might displace the tech giants to make it to market.

Abstraction and Recreational Genomics

'The Indignity Of Abstraction: Datamining and Autonomy in the Age of Direct to Consumer Genomics' by myself and Wendy Bonython in (2019) 7(2) Griffith Journal of Law and Human Dignity 139-160 comments

 Direct To Consumer Genomics services such as 23AndMe and Ancestry.com promise to foster medical research and deepen personal connection through sharing information about the human genome. This article contextualises those promises by asking questions about dignity. The services and the legal frameworks in which they operate are predicated on abstracting people as sets of genetic data. The commonality of that data among biological relatives means that individuals who gift a service with data about themselves are disregarding the autonomy of relatives who might not want to be genetically datamined. Law about such genomics should acknowledge Kant’s wariness about abstracting people as a means to an end.

Machine IP

'Who Holds the Right to Exclude for Machine Work Products?' by Garry Gabison comments

This article investigates whether the inventions and works created by Artificial Intelligence should be patent-able and copyright-able and if so, who should be assigned these rights. This article uses US case law and incentive economics to answer these questions. This article discusses who of the machine, its creators, owners, or operators should be assigned the rights to exclude others if policymakers want to promote the progress of science and useful arts. All four candidates raise legal problems. Based on current law, the users may be able to patent their invention but other works would fall into the public domain. Assigning exclusion rights to any party distorts the incentives of the other parties. The Intellectual Property system is maladapted to deal with these intelligent machines. Instead, these inventions and works should fall into the public domain. The four candidates can use alternative business models to profit from the machine’s creations.

US Drone Identification

In the US the Federal Aviation Authority has released a proposed Rule regarding mandatory  remote identification of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), otherwise known as drones. It is of interest regarding identification of items on the Internet of Things, for potential enforcement of privacy rights (the potential removal of anonymity from eyes in the sky) and for an example of regulatory processes.

The FAA states

The remote identification of unmanned aircraft systems in the airspace of the United States would address safety, national security, and law enforcement concerns regarding the further integration of these aircraft into the airspace of the United States while also enabling greater operational capabilities.

A. Introduction and Overview 

This proposed rule would establish requirements for the remote identification of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS)  operated in the airspace of the United States. Remote identification (or Remote ID) is the ability of an unmanned aircraft in flight to provide certain identification and location information that people on the ground and other airspace users can receive. This is an important building block in the unmanned traffic management ecosystem. For example, the ability to identify and locate UAS operating in the airspace of the United States provides additional situational awareness to manned and unmanned aircraft. This will become even more important as the number of UAS operations in all classes of airspace increases. In addition, the ability to identify and locate UAS provides critical information to law enforcement and other officials charged with ensuring public safety. While remote identification alone will not enable routine expanded operations such as operations over people or beyond visual line of sight, it is a critical element for building unmanned traffic management capabilities. The FAA envisions that the remote identification network will form the foundation for the development of other technologies that can enable expanded operations.

Full implementation of remote identification relies on three interdependent parts that are being developed concurrently. The first is this proposed rule, which establishes operating requirements for UAS operators and performance-based design and production standards for producers of UAS. The second is a network of Remote ID UAS Service Suppliers (Remote ID USS) that would collect the identification and location in real-time from in-flight UAS. The Remote ID USS would perform this service under contract with the FAA, based on the same model the FAA currently uses for the Low Altitude Authorization and Notification Capability (LAANC).[2] The third part of the remote identification ecosystem is the collection of technical requirements that standards-setting organizations will develop to meet the performance-based design and production requirements in this proposed rule.

All UAS operating in the airspace of the United States, with very few exceptions, would be subject to the requirements of this rule. All UAS operators would be required to comply regardless of whether they conduct recreational or commercial operations, except those flying UAS that are not otherwise required to be registered under the FAA's existing rules. All UAS produced for operation in the airspace of the United States would have to comply with the design and production requirements established in this proposal with exceptions for amateur-built UAS, UAS of the United States government, and unmanned aircraft that weigh less than 0.55 pounds.

This proposal establishes design and production requirements for two categories of remote identification: Standard remote identification UAS and limited remote identification UAS. Standard remote identification UAS would be required to broadcast identification and location information directly from the unmanned aircraft and simultaneously transmit that same information to a Remote ID USS through an internet connection. Limited remote identification UAS would be required to transmit information through the internet only, with no broadcast requirements; however, the unmanned aircraft would be designed to operate no more than 400 feet from the control station. Under this proposal, the vast majority of UAS would be required to comply with one of these two categories of remote identification. For those limited exceptions, which include certain amateur-built UAS and UAS manufactured prior to the compliance date, operators flying UAS without remote identification capabilities would be permitted to fly only at certain specific geographic areas established under this rule specifically to accommodate them.

This proposal envisions that within three years of the effective date of this rule, all UAS operating in the airspace of the United States will be compliant with the remote identification requirements. No UAS could be produced for operation in the United States after two years and no UAS could be operated after three years except in accordance with the requirements of this proposal. Details on the requirements and their applicability are in the sections that follow.

B. Purpose of the Regulatory Action

The FAA is integrating unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) operations into the airspace of the United States through a phased, incremental, and risk-based approach.

On June 28, 2016, the FAA achieved a major step towards UAS integration when it published the final rule for Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems. This was one of multiple UAS-related regulatory actions taken by the FAA to enable the safe integration of UAS into the airspace of the United States. As technology progresses and the utility of UAS increases, the FAA anticipates a need for further rulemaking to continue to foster the safe, secure, and efficient use of the airspace of the United States. The FAA believes that the next step in the regulatory process is to develop regulatory requirements that enable the remote identification of UAS operating in the airspace of the United States.

The remote identification of UAS is necessary to ensure public safety and the safety and efficiency of the airspace of the United States. The remote identification framework would provide UAS-specific data, which could be used in tandem with new technologies and infrastructure to facilitate future, more advanced operational capabilities (such as detect-and-avoid and aircraft-to-aircraft communications that support beyond visual line of sight operations) and to develop the necessary elements for comprehensive UAS traffic management (UTM). Furthermore, remote identification of UAS would provide airspace awareness to the FAA, national security agencies, and law enforcement entities. This information could be used to distinguish compliant airspace users from those potentially posing a safety or security risk.

Current rules for registration and marking of unmanned aircraft facilitate the identification of the owners of unmanned aircraft, but normally only upon physical examination of the aircraft. Existing electronic surveillance technologies like transponders and Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B), in addition to radio communications with air traffic control (ATC), were all considered as potential solutions for the remote identification of UAS but were determined to be unsuitable due to the lack of infrastructure for these technologies at lower altitudes and the potential saturation of available radio frequency spectrum. The FAA proposes to address the identification issues associated with UAS by requiring the use of new services and technology to enable the remote identification of UAS.

The proposed remote identification requirements are consistent with the FAA's safety mission of overseeing and promoting safety in air commerce and national security as well as promoting the safe and efficient use of the navigable airspace. The newly-available information would serve the public interest of enhancing safety, efficiency, and security in air commerce by creating situational awareness of all UAS flying in the airspace of the United States, which would allow additional and more complex UAS operations to take place. Remote identification would also strengthen the FAA's oversight of UAS operations and support efforts of law enforcement and national security agencies to address and mitigate disruptive behavior and hazards, which may threaten the safety and security of the airspace of the United States, other UAS, manned aviation, and persons and property on the ground. Remote identification information provided in near real-time would also assist Federal security partners in threat discrimination—allowing them to identify an operator and make an informed decision regarding the need to take actions to mitigate a perceived security or safety risk. The proposed rule would enhance the FAA's ability to monitor compliance with applicable regulations; would contribute to the FAA's ability to undertake compliance, enforcement, and educational actions required to mitigate safety risks; and would advance the safe integration of UAS into the airspace of the United States.

C. Summary of the Proposed Rule

This proposed rule provides a framework for remote identification of all UAS operating in the airspace of the United States. The rule would facilitate the collection and storage of certain data such as identity, location, and altitude regarding an unmanned aircraft and its control station.

The FAA is proposing to tie the remote identification requirements to the registration of unmanned aircraft because the FAA and law enforcement agencies have a need to correlate remote identification and registration data. The proposed rule would therefore impose operating requirements on persons operating unmanned aircraft registered or required to be registered under title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), part 47 or part 48, and on persons operating foreign civil unmanned aircraft in the United States. The proposed rule would also impose requirements on persons applying for and using FAA-recognized identification areas (areas specifically recognized by the FAA where UAS without remote identification equipment could operate) and requirements for persons developing means of compliance (e.g., standards) that describe how a UAS would be designed and produced to meet the performance requirements proposed in this rule. Finally, the proposed rule would require persons designing and producing UAS with remote identification for operations in the United States to produce them using an FAA-accepted means of compliance.

UAS owners, UAS operators (including pilots, remote pilots, recreational flyers, and other persons manipulating the flight controls of UAS), UAS designers and producers, developers of remote identification means of compliance, and Remote Identification UAS Service Suppliers (Remote ID USS) would have important roles in the remote identification of UAS. The subsections that follow describe the roles and responsibilities of each of these groups within the scope of the proposed rule.

1. UAS OWNERS

The FAA proposes to revise the registration requirements to require all owners of unmanned aircraft to register each unmanned aircraft individually when registering under part 48. Furthermore, the owners of standard or limited remote identification unmanned aircraft would have to provide the serial number of all unmanned aircraft registered under part 47 or part 48, on or before the 36th month after the effective date of the final rule. The serial number would establish the unique identity of the unmanned aircraft. The serial number provided during registration or re-registration would have to be issued by the producer of the unmanned aircraft and comply with the ANSI/CTA-2063-A serial number standard.

Owners of unmanned aircraft used exclusively for limited recreational operations who currently register multiple aircraft under a single registration number would be required to register each aircraft, individually by manufacturer, model, and, if the unmanned aircraft is a standard or limited remote identification unmanned aircraft, the aircraft's serial number, on or before the 36th month after the effective date of the final rule. The owners of small unmanned aircraft registered after the effective date of the final rule would have to comply with the new registration requirements prior to the operation of the unmanned aircraft.

2. UAS OPERATORS

I. REMOTE IDENTIFICATION OPERATING REQUIREMENTS

Under the proposed rule, a person operating a UAS in the airspace of the United States would have to meet the remote identification requirements in one of three ways, depending upon the capabilities of the UAS, on or before the 36th month after the effective date of the final rule.

A. STANDARD REMOTE IDENTIFICATION UAS

For purposes of this proposed rule, a “standard remote identification UAS” is a UAS with remote identification equipment capable of both: (1) Connecting to the internet and transmitting through that internet connection to a Remote ID USS; and (2) broadcasting directly from the unmanned aircraft. Standard remote identification UAS are discussed further in section X.A.1 of this preamble. 

Any person operating a standard remote identification UAS would be required to ensure: The UAS was designed and produced to meet the minimum performance requirements of the rule using an FAA-accepted means of compliance for standard remote identification UAS. Persons would be able to meet this obligation by ensuring that the serial number of the standard remote identification UAS is listed on an FAA-accepted declaration of compliance. 

A person operating a UAS would be able to read the label on the aircraft indicating whether the UAS is a standard or limited remote identification UAS. Additionally, a person could determine whether the UAS is listed on an FAA-accepted declaration of compliance by verifying the status on the FAA's website. 

The standard remote identification UAS broadcasts the remote identification message elements directly from the unmanned aircraft from takeoff to landing. When the internet is available at takeoff, the standard remote identification UAS connects to the internet and transmits the required message elements through that internet connection to a Remote ID USS. 

The required message elements include, among others, a UAS Identification to establish the unique identity of the UAS. 

Operators would have to choose whether to use the serial number of the unmanned aircraft or a session ID (e.g., a randomly-generated alphanumeric code assigned by a Remote ID USS on a per-flight basis designed to provide additional privacy to the operator) as the UAS Identification. 

The required message elements are discussed in section XII.C of this preamble. A person could operate a standard remote identification UAS only if: (1) It has a serial number that is listed on an FAA-accepted declaration of compliance; (2) its remote identification equipment is functional and complies with the requirements of the proposed rule from takeoff to landing; and (3) its remote identification equipment and functionality have not been disabled.

B. LIMITED REMOTE IDENTIFICATION UAS

For purposes of this proposed rule, a “limited remote identification UAS” is a UAS that: (1) Is designed and produced to restrict operation to no more than 400 feet from its control station; (2) is capable of connecting to the internet and transmitting the remote identification message elements through that internet connection to a Remote ID USS; and (3) cannot broadcast remote identification message elements. Limited remote identification UAS are discussed further in section X.A.2 of this preamble. Persons operating a limited remote identification UAS would be required to operate within visual line of sight and ensure that: The UAS was designed and produced to meet the minimum performance requirements of the rule using an FAA-accepted means of compliance for a limited remote identification UAS. Persons would be able to meet this obligation by ensuring that the serial number of the limited remote identification UAS is listed on an FAA-accepted declaration of compliance. Additionally, a person could determine whether the UAS is listed on an FAA-accepted declaration of compliance by verifying the status on the FAA's website. From takeoff to landing, the limited remote identification UAS connects to the internet and transmits the required remote identification message elements through that internet connection to a Remote ID USS.

The required message elements would include, among others, a UAS Identification to establish the unique identity of the UAS. Operators would have to choose whether to use the unmanned aircraft's serial number or a session ID assigned by a Remote ID USS as the UAS Identification. The required message elements are discussed in section XII.C of this preamble.

A person could operate a limited remote identification UAS only if: (1) it has a serial number that is listed on an FAA-accepted declaration of compliance; (2) its remote identification equipment is functional and complies with the requirements of the proposed rule from takeoff to landing; and (3) its remote identification equipment and functionality have not been disabled. Examples of the use of limited remoted identification UAS are further discussed in section X.G of this preamble.

C. UAS WITHOUT REMOTE IDENTIFICATION EQUIPMENT

Under the proposed rule, the vast majority of UAS would be required to have remote identification capability, however as discussed in section X. A. 3, a limited number of UAS would continue to not have remote identification. The FAA envisions that upon full implementation of this rule, no unmanned aircraft weighing more than 0.55 pounds will be commercially available that is not either a standard remote identification UAS or a limited remote identification UAS. However, there will be certain UAS including amateur built aircraft and previously manufactured UAS that might not have remote identification capability. A person operating a UAS without remote identification equipment would always be required to operate within visual line of sight [6] and within an FAA-recognized identification area. Under the proposed rule, an FAA-recognized identification area is a defined geographic area where UAS without remote identification can operate. An area would be eligible for establishment as an FAA-recognized identification area if it is a flying site that has been established within the programming of a community based organization recognized by the Administrator. The FAA would maintain a list of FAA-recognized identification areas at https://www.faa.gov. FAA-recognized identification areas are discussed further in section XV of this preamble.

II. PROHIBITION AGAINST THE USE OF ADS-B OUT AND TRANSPONDERS

The proposed rule also prohibits use of ADS-B Out and transponders for UAS operations under 14 CFR part 107 and part 91 unless otherwise authorized by the FAA. The FAA is concerned that the potential proliferation of ADS-B Out transmitters on UAS may negatively affect the safe operation of manned aircraft in the airspace of the United States. The projected numbers of UAS operations have the potential to saturate available ADS-B frequencies, affecting ADS-B capabilities for manned aircraft and potentially blinding ADS-B ground receivers. The FAA is therefore proposing that UAS operators, with limited exceptions, be prohibited from using ADS-B Out or transponders. The prohibition against the use of ADS-B Out and transponders is discussed in Section XVI of this preamble.

3. UAS DESIGNERS AND PRODUCERS

For each UAS designed or produced for operation in the United States, the person responsible for the design or production of the unmanned aircraft system (with limited exceptions included in the proposal) would be required to design or produce the UAS in accordance with the performance requirements for a standard remote identification UAS or limited remote identification UAS using an FAA-accepted means of compliance for remote identification on or before the 24th month after the effective date of the final rule.

A person responsible for the production of UAS (with limited exceptions) would be required to: Issue each unmanned aircraft a serial number that complies with the ANSI/CTA-2063-A serial number standard. Label the unmanned aircraft to indicate that it is remote identification compliant and indicate whether the UAS is standard remote identification or limited remote identification. Submit a declaration of compliance for acceptance by the FAA, declaring that the UAS complies with the requirements of the proposed rule.

The FAA could ask the person responsible for the production of the UAS to submit additional information or documentation, as needed, to supplement a declaration of compliance. The FAA would notify the submitter of its acceptance of a declaration of compliance. The FAA would also provide a list of accepted declarations of compliance at https://www.faa.gov.

A person that submits a declaration of compliance would be required to retain certain data for as long as the UAS listed on that declaration of compliance is produced plus an additional 24 calendar months. If the FAA rescinds its acceptance of a declaration of compliance, the submitter of the FAA-accepted declaration of compliance or any person adversely affected by the rescission of the Administrator's acceptance of the declaration of compliance may petition the FAA to reconsider the rescission by submitting a request for reconsideration to the FAA within 60 calendar days of publication in the Federal Register of a notice of rescission.

4. DEVELOPERS OF REMOTE IDENTIFICATION MEANS OF COMPLIANCE

Means of compliance, as discussed in section XII of this preamble, are developed by persons or organizations to describe methods by which a person designing or producing a UAS with remote identification may comply with the performance requirements of this proposed rule. Under the proposed rule, a means of compliance would have to be accepted by the FAA before it could be used for the design and production of UAS with remote identification. A person or entity seeking acceptance by the FAA of a means of compliance for UAS with remote identification equipment would be required to submit the means of compliance to the FAA. The FAA would review the means of compliance to determine if it meets the minimum performance requirements, and testing and validation procedures of the proposed rule. Specifically, the person or entity would have to submit a detailed description of the means of compliance, a justification for how the means of compliance meets the minimum performance requirements of the proposed rule, and any substantiating material the person or entity wishes the FAA to consider as part of the application. The minimum performance requirements, and testing and validation procedures, are discussed in sections XII.D and XII.F of this preamble. A person or entity who submits a means of compliance that is accepted by the FAA would have to retain certain data for as long as the means of compliance is accepted plus an additional 24 calendar months.

The FAA would indicate acceptance of a means of compliance by notifying the submitter of the acceptance of the proposed means of compliance. The FAA also expects to notify the public that it has accepted the means of compliance by including it on a list of accepted means of compliance at https://www.faa.gov. The FAA would not disclose commercially valuable information in this document.

5. REMOTE ID USS

The proposed rule would require persons operating UAS with remote identification to transmit the remote identification message elements to a Remote ID USS over the internet. A Remote ID USS would be a service provider qualified by the Administrator to provide remote identification services to UAS. Each Remote ID USS would be required to establish a contractual relationship with the FAA through a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) entered into under the FAA's “other transaction authority” under 49 U.S.C. 106(l) and (m), and to comply with a series of terms, conditions, limitations, and technical requirements that outline how the Remote ID USS must interpret and provide data to external users, as well as store and protect such data. The Remote ID USS would also be contractually required to meet quality-of- service metrics that would establish the minimum requirements for providing remote identification services, including availability of the service and what happens when various failures occur. To implement remote identification, the FAA anticipates establishing a cooperative data exchange mechanism between the FAA and Remote ID USS, as discussed in section XIV of this preamble.

Remote ID USS would be required to demonstrate four primary capabilities: (1) The ability to share the remote identification message elements in near real-time with the FAA upon request; (2) the ability to maintain remote identification information securely and to limit access to such information; (3) the ability to meet contractually-established technical parameters; and (4) the ability to inform the FAA when their services are active and inactive. Another capability of a Remote ID USS may be to generate and provide UAS operators with a UAS Identification known as a session ID. A session ID would be a randomly-generated alphanumeric code that is used only for one flight. UAS operators would have the option to use a Session ID to identify the UAS instead of the serial number, to provide a greater level of privacy. This capability would be defined in the technical requirements agreed to in the MOA.

To become an FAA-qualified Remote ID USS, a prospective Remote ID USS would enter into an MOA with the FAA, demonstrate it meets the technical requirements, and successfully test the end-to-end system and connections. Prospective Remote ID USS would also be reviewed for consistency with national security and cybersecurity requirements and export administration regulations. FAA-qualified Remote ID USS would be subject to ongoing FAA review to ensure compliance and quality-of-service.

6. TABLE OF MAJOR PROVISIONS

Table 1 provides a summary of the major provisions of this proposed rule. ...

D. Summary of Costs and Benefits

This proposed rule would provide remote identification of UAS in the airspace of the United States to address safety, security, and law enforcement concerns regarding the further integration of these aircraft into the airspace of the United States while also enabling greater operational capabilities. This proposal would promote public safety and the safety and efficiency of the airspace of the United States. The remote identification framework would provide UAS-specific data, which may be used in tandem with new technologies and infrastructure to facilitate more advanced operational capabilities (such as detect-and-avoid and aircraft-to-aircraft communications that support beyond visual line of sight operations) and to develop the necessary elements for comprehensive UAS traffic management (UTM). Furthermore, remote identification of UAS provides airspace awareness to the FAA, national security agencies, and law enforcement entities. This information could be used to distinguish compliant airspace users from those potentially posing a safety or security risk fulfilling a key requirement for law enforcement and national security agencies charged with protecting public safety.

This proposed rule would result in additional costs for persons responsible for the production of UAS, owners and operators of registered unmanned aircraft, community based organizations, Remote ID USS, and the FAA. This proposal would provide cost savings for the FAA and law enforcement resulting from a reduction in hours and associated costs expended investigating UAS incidents. Additionally, part 107 allows individuals to request waivers from certain provisions, including those prohibiting operations at night and over people. This proposed rule, in concert with the FAA's proposed rule for operations over people would create cost savings for the FAA and part 107 operators by avoiding the time expended processing waivers for these activities.

The analysis of this proposed rule is based on the fleet forecast for small unmanned aircraft as published in the FAA Aerospace Forecast. The forecast includes base, low, and high scenarios. This analysis provides a range of net impacts from low to high based on these forecast scenarios. The FAA considers the primary estimate of net impacts of the proposed rule to be the base scenario. For the primary estimate, over a 10-year period of analysis this proposed rule would result in net present value costs of about $582 million at a three percent discount rate with annualized net costs of about $68 million. At a seven percent discount rate, the net present value costs are about $474 million with annualized net costs of $67 million

GINA

'Genetic discrimination: emerging ethical challenges in the context of advancing technology' by Carolyn Riley Chapman, Kripa Sanjay Mehta, Brendan Parent and Arthur L. Caplan in (2019)  Journal of Law and the Biosciences 1–23 comments

Genetic testing is becoming more widespread, and its capabilities and pre- dictive power are growing. In this paper, we evaluate the ethical justifi- cations for and strength of the US legal framework that aims to protect patients, research participants, and consumers from genetic discrimination in employment and health insurance settings in the context of advanc- ing genetic technology. The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) and other laws prohibit genetic and other health-related discrim ination in the United States, but these laws have significant limitations, and some provisions are under threat. If accuracy and predictive power increase, specific instances of use of genetic information by employers may indeed become ethically justifiable; however, any changes to laws would need to be adopted cautiously, if at all, given that people have consented to genetic testing with the expectation that there would be no genetic discrimination in employment or health insurance settings. However, if our society values access to healthcare for both the healthy and the sick, we should uphold strict and broad prohibitions against genetic and health-related discrimination in the context of health insurance, including employer-based health insurance. This is an extremely important but often overlooked consideration in the current US debate on healthcare.

The authors argue

The international focus on and investment in genetic research will undoubtedly increase the ability to use genetic testing to predict many different individual characteristics and phenotypes, including the propensity for disease. According to the US National Institutes of Health (NIH), precision medicine is ‘an emerging approach for disease treatment and prevention that takes into account individual variability in genes, environment, and lifestyle for each person’. Many rare diseases are caused by a single gene defect. More common diseases such as diabetes and heart disease are polygenic and complex in nature, but scientists are identifying genetic factors that predict the risks of these diseases with greater precision and accuracy. Other genetic research is aimed at strengthening the predictive power of genome-wide polygenic scores for specific measures of intelligence (and/or educational attainment) and athleticism. Although the accuracy and predictive power of polygenic risk scores still need improvement, it’s clear that many scientists are working to address this challenge. Regardless of whether selecting embryos for higher IQ is in the realm of possibility, genetic testing is enabling increasingly accurate predictions about human characteristics. 

The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) was enacted in 2008. In large part, the law was intended to allow patients to take advantage of genetic testing in clinical and research settings without fearing genetic discrimination. With knowledge about genotype/phenotype associations continuing to grow, it is worth reexamining the ethical justifications for prohibitions against genetic discrimination in employment and health insurance settings. Are our laws and policies sufficient, or will they need to evolve? With increasing accuracy of genetic testing, would it ever be appropriate to use genetic information to discriminate against or classify individuals in employment or health insurance settings? Our analysis must acknowledge that GINA has created an ethical obligation in its own right: Consumers, patients, and research participants have consented to genetic testing with the expectation that the results cannot be used in employment or health insurance settings. 

We divide this paper into three parts. In Part I, we analyze ethical issues related to the use of genetic information by employers and health insurers. We also discuss how these two spheres overlap since many employers provide health insurance for employees. In Part II, we outline the central policies that collectively prohibit discrimination based on genetic information in the United States in employment and insurance settings and discuss the limitations of these protections. We discuss how laws that prohibit employ- ment and health insurance discrimination based on health status are also important in the context of genetic conditions, when and if genetic disease becomes symptomatic. In Part III, we consider current and future challenges to the legal framework that prohibits genetic discrimination in employment and health insurance settings and make recommendations based on our ethical analysis. In the future, employers might justifiably argue that genetic information is relevant in specific employment decisions, and carveouts to GINA may indeed be warranted in narrow circumstances. However, if our society values equal access to healthcare, we must preserve broad and strict prohibitions against genetic and other health status discrimination in health insurance settings. The US health insurance system, which relies on for-profit insurers as well as employers, may become increasingly ethically problematic over time, if our predictive capabilities increase and insurance providers push back against protections in GINA and the Affordable Care Act (ACA).