Algorithmic Control

'The Invisible Cage: Workers’ Reactivity to Opaque Algorithmic Evaluations' by Hatim A. Rahman in (2021) 66(4) Administrative Science Quarterly comments 

 Existing research has shown that people experience third-party evaluations as a form of control because they try to align their behavior with evaluations’ criteria to secure more favorable resources, recognition, and opportunities from external audiences. Much of this research has focused on evaluations with transparent criteria, but increasingly, algorithmic evaluation systems are not transparent. Drawing on over three years of interviews, archival data, and observations as a registered user on a labor platform, I studied how freelance workers contend with an opaque third-party evaluation algorithm—and with what consequences. My findings show the platform implemented an opaque evaluation algorithm to meaningfully differentiate between freelancers’ rating scores. Freelancers experienced this evaluation as a form of control but could not align their actions with its criteria because they could not clearly identify those criteria. I found freelancers had divergent responses to this situation: some experimented with ways to improve their rating scores, and others constrained their activity on the platform. Their reactivity differed based not only on their general success on the platform—whether they were high or low performers—but also on how much they depended on the platform for work and whether they experienced setbacks in the form of decreased evaluation scores. These workers experienced what I call an “invisible cage”: a form of control in which the criteria for success and changes to those criteria are unpredictable. For gig workers who rely on labor platforms, this form of control increasingly determines their access to clients and projects while undermining their ability to understand and respond to factors that determine their success. 

Third-party evaluations are a central feature of today’s societal and organizational landscape (Lamont, 2012; Sharkey and Bromley, 2015; Espeland and Sauder, 2016). Studies have shown that third-party rating evaluations of actors such as doctors (RateMDs), professors (RateMyProfessors), hotels (TripAdvisor), restaurants (Yelp), corporations (Forbes), and universities (U.S. News & World Report) provide a sense of transparency and accountability for external audiences (Strathern, 2000; Power, 2010; Orlikowski and Scott, 2014). Audiences also use third-party evaluations to form their perceptions and make decisions about the evaluated actor (Karpik, 2010). As a result, these evaluations influence the resources, recognition, and opportunities actors receive from external audiences (Pope, 2009; Brandtner, 2017). As the prevalence and influence of third-party evaluation systems have increased, researchers have examined how actors subject to such systems react to them (Jin and Leslie, 2003; Espeland and Sauder, 2007; Chatterji and Toffel, 2010). For example, because university admissions, funding, and recognition are influenced by third-party evaluations (e.g., U.S. News & World Report), university administrators and faculty pay close attention to the criteria these evaluations use, such as career placement statistics, and change their behavior to better align with them (Sauder and Espeland, 2009; Espeland and Sauder, 2016). 

Consequently, while prior work has shown that third-party evaluations often provide transparency and accountability for external audiences, it has also suggested that actors subject to third-party evaluations experience them as a form of control (Espeland and Sauder, 2016; Brandtner, 2017; Kornberger, Pflueger, and Mouritsen, 2017). Because third-party evaluations can influence actors’ ability to secure resources and recognition from their primary audiences, actors will likely internalize evaluations’ criteria and change their behavior to conform to those standards (Sauder and Espeland, 2009; Masum and Tovey, 2011). Scholars label the phenomenon of people changing their perceptions and behavior in response to being evaluated as “reactivity” (Espeland and Sauder, 2007). 

Technological advancements have expanded the use of third-party evaluations to new areas of work and organizing, raising new questions in this domain (Fourcade and Healy, 2016; Kuhn and Maleki, 2017; Cameron, 2021). Nowhere is this more evident than in the rise of labor platforms and their use of third-party evaluations to assess workers. While several types of platforms exist (Davis, 2016; Sundararajan, 2016), those most relevant to this study are labor platforms facilitating gig work, such as Upwork, TopCoder, and TaskRabbit. They provide a digital infrastructure to connect clients with freelance job seekers for relatively short-term projects. Labor platforms have attracted increased attention from work and organizational scholars because they differ from intermediaries and exchange systems previously studied (Vallas and Schor, 2020; Rahman and Valentine, 2021; Stark and Pais, 2021), particularly in their use of evaluations (Kornberger, Pflueger, and Mouritsen, 2017). 

Unlike previously studied settings, in which third-party evaluation criteria are relatively transparent to those being evaluated, in labor platforms these criteria are often opaque to workers. This opacity makes it easier for platforms and clients to differentiate among workers by using their evaluation scores, because it is more difficult for workers to game and inflate the evaluation system than in traditional settings (Filippas, Horton, and Golden, 2019; Garg and Johari, 2020). Platforms’ use of opacity in worker evaluations raises an underexplored question: how do opaque third-party evaluations influence workers’ reactivity, and what mechanisms contribute to this form of reactivity? While existing organizational research (Proctor, 2008; Briscoe and Murphy, 2012; Burrell, 2016) has broadly suggested that opacity will make it more difficult for workers to understand evaluation criteria, we lack grounded theory examining how workers contend with such opacity—and with what consequences. 

To address this gap, I studied one of the largest labor platforms focused on higher-level project work, such as software engineering, design, and data analytics. The platform implemented an opaque algorithmic rating evaluation to better differentiate which freelancers should be visible to clients and to prevent freelancers from gaming their scores. Freelancers tried but generally failed to understand the evaluation’s inputs, processing, and output, which led them to experience the opaque evaluation as a system of control characterized by unpredictable updates, fluctuating criteria, and lack of opportunities to improve their scores. These experiences were especially frustrating because the opacity contrasted with workers’ expectations of employee-evaluation systems based on previous experiences in traditional organizations, where such systems’ main purpose is to help workers improve (Cappelli and Conyon, 2018). 

I observed that freelancers responded to evaluation opacity with two types of reactivity: they either tested different tactics to increase their scores, such as working on various types of projects and with different contract lengths, or they tried to preserve their scores by limiting their engagement with the platform, such as by working with platform-based clients outside of the platform and not working with new clients. This was the case both for workers with higher and lower scores on the platform. Two mechanisms determined their type of reactivity: the extent to which freelancers depended on the platform for work and income and whether they experienced decreases in their evaluation scores (regardless of whether those scores started out higher or lower). My findings support the argument that opaque third-party evaluations can create an “invisible cage” for workers, because they experience such evaluations as a form of control and yet cannot decipher or learn from the criteria for success and changes to those criteria.

Pseudolaw

A useful discussion in Behr v Behr, 2024 ABKB 288 of some pseudolaw mechanisms 

[8] Mr. Behr is employing two notorious pseudolaw strategies: “Strawman Theory”, and a “Three/Five Letters” process. In Mr. Behr’s case, the strange “i: man: Jason” language indicates he is using pseudolaw concepts taught by a US Sovereign Citizen promoter/guru Carl (Karl) Lentz. That predicts that Mr. Behr plans to initiate proceedings as a “Prosecutor”, against Justice Akgungor, the “Wrongdoer” in a fictitious “the Behr Court”. 

[9] Communicating directly with a Justice of this Court outside litigation processes is inappropriate. Mr. Behr has gone further, and is threatening and intimidating a Justice without legal authority. In fact, the OPCA techniques Mr. Behr is using create a presumption his pseudolaw materials have an abusive ulterior intention and a bad faith purpose. 

[10] This Memorandum of Decision has two purposes. First, this Memorandum of Decision makes it absolutely clear to Mr. Behr that his Notices and other documents have no basis in law. Second, Mr. Behr is required to explain why he should not be subject to a court-administered penalty because of his threatening and intimidating misconduct. 

II. Mr. Behr’s Pseudolaw Materials 

[11] As previously noted, Mr. Behr’s materials implicate a number of pseudolaw concepts. 

A. Strawman Theory 

[12] Strawman Theory (reviewed in Meads at paras 417-446; Pomerleau v Canada (Revenue Agency), 2017 ABQB 123 at paras 67-88; Potvin (Re), 2018 ABQB 652 at paras 83-92; Donald J Netolitzky, “Organized Pseudolegal Commercial Arguments and Magic and Ceremony” (2018) 55:4 Alta L Rev 1045 at 1068-1078 (Netolitzky, “Magic”)) is based on the false concept that individuals have two parts: 

1) A “flesh and blood” physical human component that is identified by mixed case letter names and/or unorthodox naming structures, for example here via “i: man: Jason Dennis of the Behr Family”. Mr. Behr says he is “... a man. (Name in upper and lowercase letters)”. This physical human being aspect of the Strawman duality is purportedly not inherently subject to government or Court authority, but only some other kind of reduced law. 

2) A non-corporeal legal doppelganger component that is identified by all capital letters names, such as “JASON BEHR”. This component of the duality has many names, for example: the Strawman, a “person”, or an “estate”. In this case, it appears Mr. Behr says his Strawman is “a corporation with a ‘cusip’ number”, which is distinct and different from “i: man: Jason”, since he is not “A LEGAL PERSON (NAME IN ALL CAPITAL LETTERS)”. The non-corporeal Strawman half is created by birth documentation - here the birth certificate that created a “LEGAL PERSONA (Corporation)” - which is a concealed contract. Then the Strawman is bound to the physical person by that contract. According to Strawman Theory, legislation, government authority, police authority, and (sometimes) Court jurisdiction only exist because these entities chain their authority to the Strawman, and then onward through to the flesh and blood physical human.

[13] In short, Strawman Theory promises that eliminating the Strawman, claiming authority over the Strawman, or breaking the Strawman to human “contact” creates extraordinary immunities and authority. Strawman Theory describes the birth contract scheme as a kind of dirty trick, where unwitting parents enslave their newborns by completing apparently innocent birth documentation. 

[14] Obviously, none of that is true. However, that has not discouraged OPCA litigants and gurus from creating many variations on Strawman Theory. Sometimes these versions of Strawman Theory use terminology derived from actual Court and legal processes, but some Strawman Theory variations are framed in a very unorthodox, even ceremonial manner: Docken v Anderson, 2023 ABKB 313 at para 6; Netolitzky, “Magic” at 1070-1075. 

[15] In Mr. Behr’s case he demands proof that he, personally, is bound by a “wet signature” contract that he has entered into with the “... crown service corporation[s] such as ALBERTA, CANADA or EDMONTON ...”, or with Justice Akgungor personally: i require the obligation (contract[s]) with my wet signature on it proving i gave you permission to move my property, given you jurisdiction over i a man, and to use my property (my name my parents gifted to me when i was born not birthed) in a totally different capacity of that of a LEGAL PERSON? ... You claim to have a contract on the private side that i Jason Dennis of the Behr family to be your property? (sic) 

[16] Similarly, in the Notices, Mr. Behr rejected judicial and government authority: ... As a Man i have rights and those rights are far superior to your inferior duties & Obligations and not to mention a Man and a Woman’s rights are unalienable. (sic) 

[17] Thus, there is no question that Mr. Behr is employing Strawman Theory concepts. Mr. Behr deploying Strawman Theory concepts in relation to him (purported) escaping conventional legal authorities and somehow retaining possession of the lands now set for sale has serious negative implications for Mr. Behr. Strawman Theory is so notoriously false that anyone who employs Strawman Theory is presumed in law to do so in bad faith, and for abusive, ulterior purposes: Fiander v Mills, 2015 NLCA 31 at paras 37-40; Rothweiler v Payette, 2018 ABQB 288 at paras 6-21; Unrau #2 at para 180. That presumption applies to Mr. Behr’s irregular and threatening correspondence to Justice Akgungor, which prima facie establishes bad and illegitimate intention by Mr. Behr. 

B. Three/Five Letters 

[18] The sequence of Notices sent by Mr. Behr are clearly a “Three/Five Letters” scheme. Each document in a Three/Five Letters process is a foisted unilateral agreement, a document which purports to unilaterally place obligations on the recipient: Meads at paras 447-528. Silence or a failure to meet the criteria set in a foisted unilateral agreement is said to be “tacit acquiescence”, “tacit admission”, “tacit agreement”, “tacit assent”, “tacit consent”, or “tacit procuration”. 

[19] Most documents in a Three/Five Letters process set a deadline for a response. In the case of Mr. Behr, he claims that if he says something in a document, and Justice Akgungor does not refute that within 36 hours, then “he wins”. Thus, documents in a Three/Five Letters process reverse the onus of proof used in common law jurisdictions. Mr. Behr alleges, and unless his allegation is disproven, “he wins”. For example, his Notices include these passages that “foists” numerous allegations on Justice Akgungor: Who gave you jurisdiction over i a man? Who was moving this court against i a man? Who gave you the right to move my property? Who gave you the right to steal my identity? ... You claim i Jason Dennis of the Behr family to be your property? You claim to have a contract on the private side that i Jason Dennis of the Behr family to be your property? You claim that the service corporation you work for has a contract that i Jason Dennis of the Behr family to be their property? (sic) 

[20] Mr. Behr then demands “... the obligation (constract[s]) with my wet signature ...”, the person injured by Mr. Behr with a “... verifiable claim against i a man ...”, and “... the document that states LEGAL applies to any man or woman as well as the document that states CIVIL PROCEDURE applies to any man or woman ...”. Silence then means agreement, and “i: man: Jason” wins: If you fail to respond [acquiesce] with the required evidence, it is on public record a contract was not produced. A tacit agreement will be established... and no jurisdiction or court exists ... (sic) 

[21] As was comprehensively reviewed in Meads at paras 447-528, silence does not mean agreement in Canadian law. Thus Mr. Behr’s Notices have no legal effect, they are “... an irrelevant monologue shouted at a brick wall.”: Re Boisjoli, 2015 ABQB 629 at para 49. 

[22] The Three/Five Letters process includes a succession of these foisted unilateral agreements. The first makes the alleged claim, and then a number of documents follow that provide additional opportunities for the target to make a response, allege acquiescence, tacit agreement, “default” which proves guilt and/or liability, and usually a fictitious judgment of some kind, sometimes where a notary is a (purported) super-judge: reviewed in Bank of Montreal v Rogozinsky, 2014 ABQB 771 at paras 55-73; Rothweiler v Payette, 2018 ABQB 288 at paras 6-21 (Rothweiler); Donald J Netolitzky, “Humdrum Becomes a Headache: Lawyers Notarizing Organized Pseudolegal Commercial Argument Documents” (2019) 49:3 Advocates’ Quarterly 279 (Netolitzky, “Humdrum”). 

[23] In Rothweiler, Associate Chief Justice Rooke identified numerous Canadian judgments that investigated, and consistently rejected and denounced the Three/Five Letters scheme, and concluded the appearance of a Three/Five Letters strategy creates a negative presumption: ... may presume that deployment of the Three/Five Letters argument is proof that the person using these concepts is engaged in a vexatious, abusive argument, and does so for an improper and ulterior purpose. That reverses the onus of proof, so that it is up to the OPCA litigant who has advanced the Three/Five Letters to prove their action, complaint, or defence is not vexatious and an abuse of court processes. 

[24] That presumption clearly applies to Mr. Behr’s Notices and other documents sent to Justice Ackgungor. 

C. Lentzian Litigation 

[25] As previously noted, Mr. Behr appears to be using pseudolaw concepts advanced by US Sovereign Citizen guru Carl Lentz. Rooke ACJ in Anderson v Ossowski, 2021 ABQB 382 at paras 18-30 reviewed the stereotypic motifs and processes applied by Lentz and his customers, including the unique fingerprint naming structure used to designate the “flesh and blood” half the the Lentzian Strawman Theory duality, the “i: man: Jason” motif where “i” is always lower case. At the moment Mr. Behr is relatively early on in his Lentzian (pseudo)litigation. He is still completing his Three/Five Letters claim to establish Justice Akgungor is a “wrongdoer” who then can be sued “in private” by Mr. Behr, the “Prosecutor”, in “the Behr Court”, where Justice Akgungor presumptively is guilty/liable. 

[26] Lentz’s theories do not work for himself (Anderson v Ossowsky at para 22), leading to Lentz’s litigation being thrown out, including a lawsuit in which Lentz sued for $440 million when he stole “brown liquid, also known as coffee”. Lentz’s followers in Canada also have been uniformly unsuccessful, including when Lentz himself personally appeared as representative and expert: Anderson v Ossowsky at para 24/ 

[27] Recently, a British Columbia lawyer, Naomi Arbabi (Ms. Arbabi), attempted to employ Lentz’s concepts while suing a neighbor for $1,000 a day, because Ms. Arbabi’s view from her condominium was partially obstructed by an opaque barrier. That was a “trespass” of her “property”. Like Mr. Behr, Ms. Arbabi used a Three/Five Letters scheme in “the private” to establish the injury to sue under her own personal Court Rules. The result was the Arbabi lawsuit was struck out and special costs were awarded: Arbabi v McLelland, 2024 BCSC 91. Ms. Arbabi was suspended on an interim basis as a lawyer certified to practice law in British Columbia (Arbabi (Re), 2024 LSBC 13), after which Ms. Arbabi resigned from the Law Society of British Columbia. 

[28] Thus, not only is Mr. Behr’s pseudolaw documentation generally rejected as false and abusive by Canadian courts, so is the specific scheme he is currently attempting to impose which targets Justice Akgungor.

PTAs

'Navigating State Interventions: The Pivotal Role of PTAs in Modern Trade Conflicts' by Andrew D. Mitchell in (2024) 25(1) Chicago Journal of International Law 195-218 comments 

In international trade, State interventions often challenge the efficacy of traditional anti-dumping and countervailing measures under the World Trade Organization (WTO) framework. This article examines the limitations of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement) in addressing State interventions, such as export taxes, export bans on raw materials, and non-commercial activities by State-owned enterprises. These interventions pose significant legal and economic challenges in global trade. The article advocates for the potential of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) as practical tools to address these challenges, surpassing traditional legal pathways under the Anti-Dumping Agreement. An analysis of recent WTO disputes demonstrates how PTAs provide targeted disciplines against State interventions that cause market distortions and unfair trade practices. PTAs offer a more rational and equitable approach to managing trade conflicts, avoiding conventional trade remedies’ economic irrationalities and protectionist tendencies. The article proposes a strategic shift towards PTAs to fill gaps left by traditional WTO agreements. It highlights the need for a dynamic, adaptable legal framework in international trade that responds to sophisticated State interventions in the global economy. 

AI Democratic Deficit

'Artificial intelligence, the common good, and the democratic deficit in AI governance' by Mark Coeckelbergh in (2024) AI and Ethics comments 

There is a broad consensus that artificial intelligence should contribute to the common good, but it is not clear what is meant by that. This paper discusses this issue and uses it as a lens for analysing what it calls the “democracy deficit” in current AI governance, which includes a tendency to deny the inherently political character of the issue and to take a technocratic shortcut. It indicates what we may agree on and what is and should be up to (further) deliberation when it comes to AI ethics and AI governance. Inspired by the republican tradition in political theory, it also argues for a more active role of citizens and (end-)users: not only as participants in deliberation but also in ensuring, creatively and communicatively, that AI contributes to the common good. 

Currently there is much discussion about artificial intelligence (AI) and its potential risks and benefits to society. The version of AI that is usually talked about is machine learning, which enables statistical analysis of (big) data and thereby automation and prediction. AI is increasingly used across all sectors, and more recently applications of large language models (LLMs) have raised much public concern, for example about replacement of jobs and about manipulation. 

In discussions about AI ethics and AI policy it is often said that AI should contribute to the common good. For example, the recently installed UN AI advisory body ‘aims to harness AI for the common good’, major AI companies such as Open AI claim that they develop AI for the common good, and already in 2018 The House of Lords Artificial Intelligence Committee’s report said that AI should be developed for the common good and benefit of humanity. 

It is easy to imagine that AI can contribute to the common good. Consider for instance medicine and healthcare: one could argue that AI-powered diagnosis tools benefit society at large, for instance when they enable early diagnosis of cancer, help research into factors that contribute to Alzheimer disease, and improve accessibility of care. This benefits particular societies and ultimately humanity. At the same time, some people may benefit more from AI than others. And when AI risks to make some workers and perhaps even professions obsolete, including knowledge workers and creative professions, the claim that AI contributes to the common good becomes at least more controversial. 

But what, exactly, is the common good, how do we know it, and who defines it? What is the collective implied in “common”: a local community, a nation, humanity? And who is included in that collective? The concept has a long history in political philosophy, which is usually neglected in AI ethics discussions (an exception is Berendt. Moreover, the question who defines the common good leads to the important question regarding the democratic character of AI governance; there are currently many worries about AI’s impact on democracy and the power asymmetries it creates. 

In this paper I connect political-philosophical discussions about the common good to questions concerning the governance of AI. In particular, after sketching a conceptual framework based on relevant political philosophy literature concerning the common good (and outlining my position in that discussion), I discuss AI and the common good to more precisely identify the democratic deficit or gap in current AI governance. While it is often said that this governance could be more democratic, this paper helps to specify what, exactly, is problematic if we view it through the lens of the discussion about common good. It also indicates what we may agree on and what remains– and probably should remain– the subject of political discussion and contestation. Furthermore, in sympathy with the republican tradition in political philosophy (broadly construed), the paper points to the active role citizens can play in making sure that AI contributes to the common good. Going beyond Mouffe’s emphasis on giving voice and allowing political struggle, it calls attention to the creative and communicative aspects of active republican citizenship, and to the related need for civic education that prepares people accordingly.

Legal Realism

'The Legal Realists on Political Economy' by Dan Priel in (2024) Law and Social Inquiry (forthcoming) comments 

Alongside the well-known jurisprudential ideas associated with legal realism, some scholars have highlighted the realists’ political-economic ideas. Best known among them has been Morton Horwitz, who has argued that the realists launched an “attack on the legitimacy of the market.” Other scholars challenged this view and argued there was no significant connection between legal realism and political economic ideas. I offer a corrective to both views. I first consider the work of five legal realists (Karl Llewellyn, Adolf Berle, William O. Douglas, Jerome Frank, and Thurman Arnold) and show that all held views that were well within the political-economic mainstream of their era, which did not challenge the legitimacy of market capitalism but wanted to see them better regulated. For many of them, there were important connections between their jurisprudential and political-economic ideas. I then turn to some neglected writings of Felix Co-hen, to show that he too saw a direct link between his legal and economic ideas. However, unlike the other legal realists discussed here, he was a radical critic of market capitalism. I use his political-economic writings for a reconsideration of his better known jurisprudential works. 

Identity

Mellor J in COPA v Wright [2024] EWHC 1198 (Ch) comments 

1. Dr Craig Steven Wright (‘Dr Wright’) claims to be Satoshi Nakamoto i.e. he claims to be the person who adopted that pseudonym, who wrote and published the first version of the Bitcoin White Paper on 31 October 2008, who wrote and released the first version of the Bitcoin Source Code and who created the Bitcoin system. Dr Wright also claims to be a person with a unique intellect, with numerous degrees and PhDs in a wide range of subjects, the unique combination of which led him (so it is said) to devise the Bitcoin system. 

2. Thus, Dr Wright presents himself as an extremely clever person. However, in my judgment, he is not nearly as clever as he thinks he is. In both his written evidence and in days of oral evidence under cross-examination, I am entirely satisfied that Dr Wright lied to the Court extensively and repeatedly. Most of his lies related to the documents he had forged which purported to support his claim. All his lies and forged documents were in support of his biggest lie: his claim to be Satoshi Nakamoto. 

3. Many of Dr Wright’s lies contained a grain of truth (which is sometimes said to be the mark of an accomplished liar), but there were many which did not and were outright lies. As soon as one lie was exposed, Dr Wright resorted to further lies and evasions. The final destination frequently turned out to be either Dr Wright blaming some other (often unidentified) person for his predicament or what can only be described as technobabble delivered by him in the witness box. Although as a person with expertise in IT security, Dr Wright must have thought his forgeries would provide convincing evidence to support his claim to be Satoshi or some other point of detail and would go undetected, the evidence shows, as I explain below and in the Appendix, that most of his forgeries turned out to be clumsy. Indeed, certain of Dr Wright’s responses in cross-examination effectively acknowledged that point: from my recollection at least twice he indicated if he had wanted to forge a document, he would have done a much better job. 

4. If Dr Wright’s evidence was true, he would be a uniquely unfortunate individual, the victim of a very large number of unfortunate coincidences, all of which went against him, and/or the victim of a number of conspiracies against him. 

5. The true position is far simpler. It is, however, far from simple because Dr Wright has lied so much over so many years that, on certain points, it can be difficult to pinpoint what actually happened. Those difficulties do not detract from the fact that there is a very considerable body of evidence against Dr Wright being Satoshi. To the extent that it is said there is evidence supporting his claim, it is at best questionable or of very dubious relevance or entirely circumstantial and at worst, it is fabricated and/or based on documents I am satisfied have been forged on a grand scale by Dr Wright. These fabrications and forgeries were exposed in the evidence which I received during the Trial. For that reason, this Judgment contains considerable technical and other detail which is required to expose the true scale of his mendacious campaign to prove he was/is Satoshi Nakamoto. This detail was set out in the extensive Written Closing Submissions prepared by COPA and the Developers and further points drawn out in their oral closing arguments.

Robots

'I, Robot have rights! Haven’t I? Conceptual and Normative Constraints on Holding Legal Positions' ( Lisbon Public Law Working Paper No. 2024-1) by Jorge Silva Sampaio comments 

This paper investigates whether AI robots can hold legal rights, exploring both conceptual and justificatory aspects of the issue. It distinguishes between two types of inquiries: conceptual (whether robots can have rights) and normative (whether they should). It argues that interest theories are more suitable for addressing the latter, while will theories may seem more suitable to the former but are limited in reaching necessary truths about rights. Grounded in the idea that legal positions are constituted by legal norms, the paper examines the relationship between will as intentional action, investigating its implications for determining who can hold legal positions and concludes that intentional action is necessary for legal positions involving action (e.g., duties, powers and liberties), while claim-rights or immunities can be conferred upon entities lacking this capacity. At the normative level, it explores reasons justifying the ascription of rights, focusing on the concept of interest. A suggested approach for the normative analysis required involves comparing robots’ interests with those of humans to justify their attribution of rights.