14 March 2024

Regulation

In Medical Board of Australia v Chu (Review and Regulation) [2024] VCAT 89 the Tribunal states 

With the agreement of the respondent, the Tribunal finds as follows: Between 20 January 2018 and 18 October 2018, contrary to section 82(1) of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) (‘Crimes Act’), the respondent obtained financial advantage by deception by billing private health insurers in the amount of $24,005.75. Between on or about June 2016 and February 2018, the respondent improperly accessed, stored and used clinical records of patients at the Jesse McPherson Hospital without any therapeutic purpose and for the purpose of gaining financial advantage by deception. On or about 15 July 2019, the respondent responded untruthfully to the allegations raised by Monash Health concerning his billing of insurers for providing assistant surgery services which occurred from on or about 8 June 2016 and 4 February 2018. Between on or about 18 May 2020 and 25 May 2020, contrary to section 130(1) of the Health Practitioner National Law (Victoria) Act 2009 (Vic), the respondent failed to notify the applicant of a relevant event within seven (7) days, namely that he had been charged with an offence punishable by 12 months imprisonment or more. The conduct described in findings 1 to 4, when considered together, was professional misconduct within the meaning of the definition of professional misconduct in paragraphs (a) and (c) of section 5 of the Health Practitioner National Law (Victoria) Act 2009.

The consequent Orders are  

Pursuant to the Health Practitioner National Law (Victoria) Act 2009 (‘National Law’), the Tribunal orders: Under section 196(2)(a) of the National Law, Dr Alex Po Tsun Chu is reprimanded. Under section 196(2)(d) of the National Law, Dr Alex Po Tsun Chu’s registration as a medical practitioner is suspended for a period of six months from the date of this order. Under section 196(2)(b) of the National Law, conditions be imposed on Dr Alex Po Tsun Chu’s registration as follows: Undertake education 

(a) The Practitioner must undertake and successfully complete a program of education, approved by the Medical Board of Australia (Board) and including a reflective practice report, in relation: (1) the principles of ethical professional conduct, including in relation to: (A) billing practices with respect to third party providers including the Victorian Workcover Authority, the Transport Accident Commission and Medicare; and (B) the requirement for professional behaviour as required by s 8 of the Good Medical Practice: A Code of Conduct for Doctors in Australia, including the requirement to be honest and not misleading in preparing documentation as required by sub-s 8.8; (2) the consequences of unethical professional conduct, including in relation to unethical billing practices and the adverse impact on the reputation of the medical profession and patient trust. (a) The education must consist of a minimum number of six (6) hours completed over a six (6) month period. 

(b) The Practitioner must complete the education within six (6) months of the notice of the Board’s approval of the education. 

(c) Within 14 days of the notice of the imposition of these conditions, the Practitioner must, on the approved form (HPN11): (1) nominate a person(s) to be approved by the Board to act as educator; and (2) provide acknowledgement that Ahpra will obtain a report from the approved educator at the conclusion of the education. 

(e) The Practitioner must ensure that the nomination of an educator is accompanied by acknowledgement, on the approved form (HPNA11), from the nominated educator and by an education plan outlining the form the education will take and how the topics of the education will be addressed. 

(f) Within 30 days of the completion of the education, the Practitioner is to provide: (1) Evidence of successful completion of the education. (2) A report demonstrating, to the satisfaction of the Board, that the Practitioner has reflected on the issues that gave rise to this condition requiring they undertake education and how the Practitioner has incorporated the lessons learnt in the education into the Practitioner’s practice.

13 March 2024

Hotpot

In Zhang v The First Org Ltd (Strike Out) [2024] NZHRRT 11 the NZ Human Rights Review Tribunal has considered a claim of indirect marital status discrimination in relation to the serving of hotpot. 

The Tribunal states 

[1] Red Hill Restaurant (Red Hill) serves hotpot. On its menu Red Hill specifies that a minimum of two diners are required to order this dish. Mr Zhang alleges that this requirement or policy amounts to indirect marital status discrimination as it is less likely that a single person would be dining with another person who is prepared to share the cost of a hotpot meal. 

[2] Mr Zhang accepted that a person dining alone can still order hotpot but is required to pay the same price for that dish which is designed to be shared by (at least) two people. However, he says that charging a person eating alone the same price as two people eating hotpot is not justified. He said that previously he had been able to purchase hotpot for one at Red Hill and accepted that charging a bit over half the price for two diners would be justified (and therefore not discriminatory). 

[3] Red Hill denied that its actions were discriminatory. It said that the policy applied to everyone and was not limited to customers with a particular marital status. It admitted that it had previously allowed one paying customer to purchase a single portion of hotpot for less than the price of the menu item. However, in his affidavit supporting the application, Yutian Liu said that due to rising costs it was not economical for Red Hill to prepare a hotpot for one paying customer only. 

[4] Red Hill applied to strike out the claim on the basis that it: [4.1] Disclosed no reasonable cause of action; [4.2] Was frivolous, because the policy was common to many restaurants and because Mr Zhang’s essential complaint was about the quantum of the additional charge paid for those eating alone rather than discrimination per se; [4.3] Was vexatious, because it was brought to annoy or irritate Red Hill after it changed its policy; and [4.4] Was an abuse of process because it was manifestly groundless and without foundation. 

[5] Red Hill further argued that it would not be inappropriate to strike out the proceeding as there was no reasonable prospect of success, and that Mr Zhang’s right of access to the Tribunal was outweighed by the desirability of freeing Red Hill from the burden of defending groundless litigation. 

[6] The application is being dealt with on the papers pursuant to s 104(4A) of the Human Rights Act 1993 (HRA). The parties were given an opportunity to comment on whether it should be dealt with in this way and neither raised any objection. ... 

[14] The prohibition against discrimination in the provision of restaurant services is set out in s 44 of the HRA. 44 Provision of goods and services (1) It shall be unlawful for any person who supplies goods, facilities, or services to the public or to any section of the public— (a) to refuse or fail on demand to provide any other person with those goods, facilities, or services; or (b) to treat any other person less favourably in connection with the provision of those goods, facilities, or services than would otherwise be the case,— 

[15] Given the definition of marital status in s 21(1)(b) of the HRA, we have taken the status of single to be those who are not married, in a civil union or in a de facto relationship. 

[16] Mr Zhang accepts that Red Hill did not decline to provide hotpot to him because he is single. Nor does he claim it directly treated him less favourably for that reason. Rather his claim is its charging policy has the effect of treating him differently and is indirectly discriminatory by virtue of s 65 of the HRA. 

[17] The prohibition against indirect discrimination in s 65 reads: 65 Indirect discrimination Where any conduct, practice, requirement, or condition that is not apparently in contravention of any provision of this Part has the effect of treating a person or group of persons differently on 1 of the prohibited grounds of discrimination in a situation where such treatment would be unlawful under any provision of this Part other than this section, that conduct, practice, condition, or requirement shall be unlawful under that provision unless the person whose conduct or practice is in issue, or who imposes the condition or requirement, establishes good reason for it. 

[18] That section has been described by the Court of Appeal decision in Ngaronoa v Attorney-General in the following terms:  [119] Indirect discrimination under s 65 of the Human Rights Act can arise when a criterion in a law or policy, which is not on its face discriminatory, corresponds to a feature (or lack thereof) of all or part of a group and results in that group being treated differently on a prohibited ground. A Canadian example we will refer to is a policy in a public health system which does not fund the provision of translation services to deaf patients who could otherwise use state care. The provision did not mention deafness, and did not explicitly exclude deaf patients from the benefit of state care, but a failure to provide translation services to deaf patients effectively denied them equal access to important benefits that were available to other persons who were not deaf. … 

[19] The issues the Tribunal needs to consider are: [19.1] Does the indirect discrimination claim disclose a reasonable cause of action? and [19.2] Is the claim frivolous or vexatious? 

[20] We first consider whether the claim is frivolous. 

[21] The right to be free from discrimination is a fundamental human right. To avoid trivialising the non-discrimination right, the disadvantage arising from differential treatment, when viewed in context, must not be theoretical, innocuous or de minimus. 

[22] In this case, while Red Hill’s menu states that the hotpot for the specified price is for a minimum of two people, the plain inference is that when hotpot is ordered the diner will receive sufficient food for two people in return for the price payable. If anyone wants to order that quantity of hotpot for that price, there is no prohibition preventing any diner from doing so. Had Red Hill simply set out the price for hotpot, no exception could be taken. Any discrimination alleged is therefore merely theoretical and does not give rise to material disadvantage. 

[23] As a person dining alone, Mr Zhang objects to paying the full price for a serving of hotpot. He claims that he should be able to order a single portion of hotpot in return for which he agrees it is reasonable to pay more than half the price of the minimum two- person portion on offer. Given Mr Zhang accepted it would be appropriate to charge some additional amount for an individual serving size of hotpot, Red Hill argued that Mr Zhang’s principal complaint is about the amount he is required to pay, rather than about discrimination per se and is frivolous for this reason. 

[24] We agree that the essence of this claim is about the minimum charge for a serving of hotpot and how large that serving should be. For Mr Zhang to claim that the non- discrimination right is engaged by this question trivialises the right’s importance. 

[25] The claim’s overreach is demonstrated by the fact that, if successful, it would permit members of other groups such as Pacific people and Māori who are more likely to be on a lower income than the national average,  or women who are more likely to be on a  lower income than men, to also allege that restaurants which fail to serve them smaller portions of food at lower prices amounts to discrimination.   Further, while any commercial justification put forward by the restaurant would likely prevail, restaurant owners would still face the burden of responding to such claims (as would the Tribunal). 

[26] Mr Zhang’s claim lacks the seriousness necessary for it to proceed to trial. Having reached that decision, we consider the claim should be struck out on the ground that it is frivolous. 

27] Having struck the claim out on this basis, it is unnecessary to consider whether the claim is also vexatious because it was designed to annoy or irritate Red Hill after it changed its policy. 

[28] For completeness, however, we consider whether the claim should be struck out on the basis that it fails to disclose a reasonable cause of action. 

[31] Mr Zhang’s claim contains no particulars to support his contention that Red Hill’s policy regarding the two-person minimum price for a hotpot disproportionately affects those who are single or that it imposes a material disadvantage on single diners. Instead, the claim proceeds on the assumption that this is the case. We do not consider this is an appropriate matter over which to take judicial notice.

Weeds

In Redland City Council v Kozik [2024] HCA 7 Gageler CJ and Jagot J. state   

 1 In the Preface to the second edition of Mason and Carter's Restitution Law in Australia, the authors referred metaphorically to the "restitution common of the law" being "tended by judges". They encouraged preparedness on the part of judges to "tear out weeds, however ancient". In the factual circumstances giving rise to the present case, Redland City Council ("the Council") tore out actual weeds from part of the actual common – in the form of waterways – within its local government area. The Council also dredged and removed silt, rubbish, and debris from the waterways, repaired revetment walls protecting the banks of the waterways from erosion and preventing subsidence, and improved the quality of the water in the waterways ("the works"). 

2 The Council was required to undertake the works in the discharge of its statutory functions as a local government authority under the Local Government Act 2009 (Qld) ("the Local Government Act") and the Coastal Protection and Management Act 1995 (Qld) ("the Coastal Protection and Management Act"). The Council also had a statutory entitlement to fund the works by levying "special charges" under the Local Government Act on land in its local government area which specially benefited from the works. 

3 The Council in fact funded part of the overall cost of the works by purporting to levy special charges on land which adjoined the land on and waters in which the works were carried out. The Council funded the balance of the costs of the works from its general revenue. 

4 After the Council had completed the works, it discovered that it had failed to comply with a condition of the prescribed process for the levying of special charges under the Local Government Act, as a consequence of which its levying of the special charges was invalid. The Council refunded to landowners so much of the total amount invalidly levied on and paid by them as remained unspent, but it refused to refund so much as it had spent on the works. 

5 Representatives of a group of landowners who had paid the invalidly levied special charges ("the Landowners") brought a proceeding in the Supreme Court of Queensland against the Council for recovery of the unrefunded portion of the amount of the special charges each had paid. Their claim was put on alternative bases. First, it was put as a claim to a statutory debt due by way of refund under regulations made under the Local Government Act providing for the return of "special rates or charges incorrectly levied". Second, it was put as a common law claim in restitution for moneys paid under a mistake of law. 

6 By way of defence (and counterclaim for a negative declaration), the Council pleaded that the claim was defeated by each Landowner having received a "direct and comparable benefit" from the Council in connection with the payment of the special charges because of the Council undertaking the works. 

7 The parties agreed on stating common questions for determination in the proceeding. The primary judge (Bradley J) made orders which answered each of those questions. The effect of the primary judge's answers was that the Landowners succeeded in their claim to a statutory debt but failed in their claim in restitution at common law. 

8 On appeal and cross appeal, the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Queensland (McMurdo JA and Bodice J, Callaghan J dissenting in part) substituted different answers. The effect of the answers as substituted was that the Landowners failed in their claim to a statutory debt but succeeded in their claim in restitution at common law. 

9 In answering the common questions, the primary judge made three important findings. These findings were not disturbed on appeal to the Court of Appeal and were not sought to be disturbed in this Court. The first finding was that each Landowner paid the special charges in the mistaken belief that the Landowner had a legal obligation to do so. The second finding was that the land of each Landowner specially benefited from the undertaking of the works. One benefit was both quantifiable and quantified: an increase in the value of the land (or a prevented diminution of value) of at least one to two per cent, an amount which greatly exceeded the amount mistakenly paid by the Landowner as special charges. Another benefit was unquantified even if quantifiable: an increase in visual amenity. The third important finding was that the special benefit to each Landowner resulting from the works was sufficient to render each Landowner's land "susceptible" to the levy of special charges under the Local Government Act. 

10 The Council appeals by special leave from so much of the orders of the Court of Appeal as substituted answers to the effect that the Landowners succeeded in their claim in restitution at common law. For their part, the Landowners seek special leave to cross appeal from so much of those orders as substituted answers to the effect that the Landowners failed in their claim to a statutory debt. 

11 The proposed cross appeal depends on discrete issues of statutory construction which would render the appeal moot if resolved in the Landowners' favour. For that reason, it is appropriate for special leave to cross appeal to be granted and for the cross appeal to be considered in advance of the appeal. Adopting that course, we would dismiss the Landowners' cross appeal and allow the Council's appeal. 

12 We consider that the answers substituted by the Court of Appeal to the effect that the Landowners failed in their claim to a statutory debt were right. On the proper construction of the regulations made under the Local Government Act, providing for the return of special charges incorrectly levied, the Landowners are not entitled to a refund. 

13 We consider that the answers substituted by the Court of Appeal to the effect that the Landowners succeeded in their claim in restitution at common law were wrong. The Council had a statutory entitlement to fund the works by the levy of special charges payable by the Landowners. The Landowners cannot recover from the Council so much of the moneys as they paid and as the Council spent undertaking the works because, to that extent, the Council was not unjustly enriched at the expense of the Landowners. 

14 The Council's statutory entitlement to fund the works by the levy of special charges payable by the Landowners, and its levy and expenditure in good faith of the special charges on undertaking the works (that is, the Council honestly believing that it had complied with the statutory requirements enabling it to levy and spend the special charges on those works), is an answer to the Landowners' prima facie entitlement to recover moneys paid by them under an operative mistake of law. These circumstances would also answer any prima facie entitlement of the Landowners to recover under the principle formulated in Woolwich Equitable Building Society v Inland Revenue Commissioners – that "money paid by a citizen to a public authority in the form of taxes or other levies paid pursuant to an ultra vires demand by the authority is prima facie recoverable by the citizen as of right" – if that principle were to be imported into the common law of Australia. Whether the Woolwich principle should be imported into the common law of Australia is raised by the Landowners' notice of contention and was the subject of submissions by the Attorney General of the Commonwealth and the Attorney General of Queensland but, given that the circumstances described would answer any such prima facie entitlement to restitution, that question need not be determined.