Registration Fakes

AHPRA reports a woman has been convicted for the second time for holding herself out as a registered nurse to her employer, staff and patients, becoming the first Australian sent to jail for pretending to be a registered health practitioner. 

Alison Mibus, who has never been registered as a nurse, pleaded guilty to six charges relating to claiming to be a registered nurse. She was sentenced under the National Law to four months and 28 days imprisonment, to be suspended after serving one month. The ABC separately reports Mibus had also previously stolen $136, 290 from another workplace.

Mibus faced five charges of holding herself out as a registered nurse, and one charge of claiming to be qualified to practise as a nurse, in breach of section 116 of the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law 2009. 

In January 2019 Mibus applied for a job at as practice manager at a South Australian medical clinic. In her application she falsely claimed to be a registered nurse with years of nursing experience. The position did not require the registration but the claim appears to have given her an advantage over other applicants.

During employment from March 2020 to September 2020 Mibus represented herself as a registered nurse in multiple emails to a range of recipients, including SA Health. One apparently misled colleague allowed Mibus to administer vaccinations to his parents and himself. AHPRA states that Mibus lied to colleagues that she was undertaking clinical nursing shifts at another medical centre so that she could ‘maintain [my] registration'. 

 During an additional internal job application Mibus again falsely claimed to have nursing registration and qualifications. The  deception was discovered after she resigned.

Mibus had previously been prosecuted by AHPRA for claiming to be a registered nurse, being sentenced in February 2020 on three counts of holding herself out to be a registered nurse by administering vaccines and treating patients while employed as a practice manager at a different medical centre during 2017. She was fined $10,500 for that offending. At the time the maximum penalty was a $30,000 fine. AHPRA notes that Australian jurisdictions apart from WA have increased the maximum penalty to a fine of $60,000, three years imprisonment, or both. 

In 2016 the ABC  reported anotherAdelaide woman had passed herself off as a registered nurse for five years. 

 Jennifer Anne Reed  pleaded guilty to seven counts of deception by using the identity of a registered nurse to work at several aged care homes in South Australia between 2009 and 2014. Reed reportedly continued her offending in New South Wales until December 2014. 

She had worked as the director of nursing for Moonta Health and Aged Care in 2014 and was responsible for administering "drugs of dependence" at Trevu House. She received wages of almost $350,000 over the five years. 

 Prosecutors said Reed's deception involved producing fake documents to secure work, including a false CV and references. 

 Reed was sentenced to four years for deception offences and given a non-parole term of 14 months. She also was ordered to pay almost $30,000 to the ATO for undeclared earnings.

Prescribing

"Prescribing Algorithmic Discrimination' by Jennifer D Oliva and Elizabeth Pendo comments 

In response to America’s escalating drug poisoning crisis, the federal government has funded, incentivized, and mandated that states adopt and implement prescription drug monitoring programs (PDMPs) to electronically surveil controlled substances and other “drugs of concern.” State PDMPs utilize proprietary, predictive software platforms that deploy algorithms to determine whether a patient is at risk for drug misuse, drug diversion, doctor shopping, or substance use disorder. PDMPs have never been validated by a federal agency or peer review, yet states have mandated their use throughout the health care delivery system. 

 

Research demonstrates that clinical overreliance on the risk scores generated by PDMP algorithms motivates clinicians to refuse to treat—or to inappropriately treat—marginalized and stigmatized patient populations, including individuals with or perceived of suffering from substance use disorder and patients with chronic, complex disabilities. This article provides a framework for challenging such PDMP algorithmic discrimination as disability discrimination. It contends that Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and Section 1557 of the Accountable Care Act can be engaged to protect vulnerable patients from PDMP-related algorithmic discrimination and provides recommendations to strengthen the 2022 Section 1557 proposed rule concerned with clinical-decision algorithmic discrimination, to harmonize new and existing antidiscrimination protections, and to improve implementation and enforcement efforts in this context.

Injury

'Liability for Workplace Psychiatric Injury in Australia: New Coherence and Unresolved Tensions' by Kylie Burns in (2023) 45(2) Sydney Law Review 157 comments 

Workplace psychiatric injury is a significant health, economic and social problem. Multiple recent inquiries and reports have drawn attention to the failure of Australian law, including workplace health and safety (‘WHS’) regulation and compensation laws, to adequately respond to workplace psychiatric injury. This article considers how Australian negligence law has responded to workplace psychiatric injury since the High Court took a restrictive approach in 2005 in Koehler v Cerebos (Australia) Ltd. It considers the role of workplace psychosocial hazards in psychiatric injury and the changing Australian WHS landscape, including the evolution of Australian principles of negligence following Koehler. The 2022 High Court decision in Kozarov v Victoria which concerned injury from vicarious trauma is analysed and the tensions and unresolved issues post Kozarov are considered. The article argues that while Australian negligence law has experienced some change of direction post Kozarov, the failure of the High Court to overrule Koehler means it may remain difficult for some injured employees to recover for their workplace psychiatric injuries. Further development of negligence law is required in a way which promotes coherence with the Australian legislative regulatory landscape, and which adequately recognises the nature of workplace psychosocial hazards. 

Workplace psychiatric injury is a significant health, economic and social problem. The cost to the Australian economy of poor psychosocial workplace climates is approximately $6 billion per annum. A 2014 study by Beyond Blue found that only about half of Australian employees considered their workplace was mentally healthy. On average, there are around 10,000 accepted workers compensation claims for psychiatric injury or illness each year, the majority of which involve extended periods of absence from the workplace. While the number and overall cost of all ‘serious injury’ workers compensation claims4 have fallen over the past decade, the number and costs of mental injury claims have grown exponentially. Serious mental health–related claims rose 73% between 2000 and 2020. Median time lost in working weeks for mental health conditions ‘rose 175%, from 11.2 working weeks in 2000–01 to 30.8 weeks in 2019–20’. Median compensation for mental health conditions rose 288% from $14,300 in 2000–01 to $55,300 in 2019– 20. Mental stress claims had the highest median compensation amount of all injuries — ‘more than three times the median compensation amount for all serious claims’. 

Many people who suffer psychiatric injury in the workplace remain uncompensated. Psychiatric injury claims are treated differently from physical injury claims. State and territory workers compensation schemes reject 24–60% of psychiatric injury claims, compared to 6–10% of physical injury and disease claims. Workplace psychiatric injury is suffered at a disproportionately higher rate by women, particularly in sub-categories of mental stress such as work-related harassment, workplace violence, bullying and work pressure where women suffer injuries at more than twice the rate of men. Rates of workplace psychiatric injury and claims differ widely between different industries. The average overall incident rates of serious accepted claims over five years for injuries caused by mental stress are highest in public administration and safety services (including police, fire fighters, emergency services personnel, corrections officers, border control officers); health care and social assistance professionals; and education and training professionals. Occupations with very high rates of work-related harassment and bullying include clerical and administrative workers; defence force members, police and fire fighters; and labourers. 

There is increasing awareness that workplace psychiatric injury in Australia requires an urgent response. The risk of psychiatric injury in the workplace due to employer-controlled psychosocial hazards has been known for many years. However, multiple recent government inquiries and reports have drawn attention to the failure of Australian law, including workplace health and safety (‘WHS’) regulation and compensation laws, to adequately recognise, respond to and compensate workplace psychiatric injury. These include the 2019 report by the Senate Education and Employment References Committee on the mental health and suicides of first responders;  the 2020 report by the Productivity Commission on mental health; the 2021 report of the Royal Commission into Victoria’s Mental Health System; the 2018 review of the model WHS laws (‘Boland Review’); the 2020 report of the Australian Human Rights Commission (‘AHRC’) on the inquiry into sexual harassment in Australian workplaces (‘Respect@Work’);  the 2022 AHRC report on the independent review into Commonwealth parliamentary workplaces; and the 2022 Western Australian Legislative Assembly Report on sexual harassment in the fly-in fly-out mining industry. 

This article considers how Australian negligence law has responded to workplace psychiatric injury since the High Court took a restrictive approach to liability in 2005 in Koehler v Cerebos (Australia) Ltd. Part II considers, as background, the role of workplace psychosocial hazards in psychiatric injury and the changing WHS regulatory landscape in Australia. Part III discusses the principles of negligence following Koehler. It suggests that the restriction of employer liability for injury by courts has been problematic. Factors contributing to the restriction of liability have included: the construction of workplace psychiatric injury as predominantly caused by individual employee factors rather than workplace psychosocial hazards; the principle of the coherence of negligence law with other areas of law, particularly contract; and legal policy factors including privacy and individual autonomy. Part IV analyses the 2022 High Court decision in Kozarov v Victoria concerning vicarious trauma — that is, trauma suffered by exposure to the trauma and suffering of others. Part V considers tensions and unresolved issues in negligence law post Kozarov. The article argues that while Australian negligence law has changed direction post Kozarov, the failure of the High Court to overrule Koehler means it may remain difficult for some injured employees to recover for their workplace psychiatric injuries. Further development of negligence law in a way which promotes coherence with the Australian legislative regulatory landscape, and which adequately recognises the nature of workplace psychosocial hazards, is required.

Ethics

'Malleable Morality: Re-Shaping Moral Judgments in Health Policymaking' by Shelly Simana in (2023) 51(2) Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 344 comments 

In contrast to the increasing skepticism and distrust of experts by a significant portion of the public, experts are generally well-trusted by governments to act in the public’s interests. Governments hold that relying on a group of experts with the appropriate expertise and knowledge is necessary to make policy decisions. They consider expertise a trustworthy source of credibility that is “synonymous with truth.” 

In this article, I focus on a particular type of experts — “moral experts.” Such experts have specialized knowledge and understanding of moral philosophy and ethics (e.g., public health ethics, clinical ethics, and research ethics), and are frequently called upon to advise governments on health-related moral dilemmas. The involvement of moral experts in health policymaking can take many forms: these include, inter alia, holding positions in public service, participating in advisory committees, organizing policy forums, and publishing reports with the goal of influencing policy in a particular health domain. 

It should be stressed that the article’s arguments are not confined to moral experts; rather, they could also apply to other experts whose decisions involve making moral judgments. Consider the design of machine learning-based solutions for health services as an example. When creating and building AI systems, designers and developers implement a set of moral values that act as decision guides. As a result, they make moral judgments in the course of their work. 

This article questions the apparent causality of reasoning in national and international health policymaking, addressing the gap between how moral experts ought to make and how they do in fact make moral judgments on moral dilemmas related to health, health care, and public health. By “moral judgments,” I mean judgments that involve normative assertions (e.g., “mask mandates are justified”), as opposed to descriptive or factual assertions (e.g., “The R0 of Covid-19 is between 5-7”). For this purpose, I employ two observations from the Social Intuitionist Model (SIM) of moral reasoning, which was developed by the social psychologist Jonathan Haidt. These observations shed new light on the role of moral experts in health policymaking, particularly in areas that raise complex moral issues. I argue that these two observations suggest that it should not be up to moral experts alone to address moral issues of this nature and that cooperation at both the national and international levels is essential. 

In this article, I focus on a particular type of experts — “moral experts.” Such experts have specialized knowledge and understanding of ethics (e.g., public health ethics, clinical ethics, and research ethics) and moral philosophy and are frequently called upon to advise governments on health-related moral dilemmas. The involvement of moral experts in health policymaking can take many forms: these include, inter alia, holding positions in public service, participating in advisory committees, organizing policy forums, and publishing reports with the goal of influencing policy in a particular health domain. 

The first observation relates to the process by which individuals form moral judgments. According to Haidt, moral reasoning is a “post hoc invention meant to rationalize spontaneous moral intuitions.” Meaning, intuitions come first, followed by strategic reasoning. When individuals engage in moral reasoning, it is usually after an instinctive process led them to a particular judgment. Interestingly, individuals may not even be aware of the moral intuitions that guide them and may be even less aware of their origin. Haidt further suggests that one of the only reasons for engaging in moral reasoning is to better prepare for social situations in which individuals may be required to justify their judgments to others. 

This observation can be placed within a vast body of philosophy and moral psychology literature that emphasizes the importance of emotions and intuitions. This literature first appeared in Adam Smith’s and David Hume’s writings and was then stressed by psychologists like Freud who assumed that judgments are “driven by unconscious motives and feelings, which are then rationalized with publicly acceptable reasons.” 

Haidt’s first observation implies, I argue, that even expertise in ethics and moral philosophy — which is the kind of expertise we expect moral experts will bring to the table — does not necessarily guarantee moral judgments that are largely based on reason and less on moral intuitions. This observation suggests that experts’ moral judgment may be subjective and devoid of deliberate reasoning and reflection; it may ultimately reflect experts’ personal moral intuitions and be guided by an intuitive response. For this reason, I believe that we should start questioning the status of moral experts as reasoned “consultants” and ensure that health policy remains accountable to the interests and needs of the public. 

Haidt’s second observation concerns the malleability of one’s moral intuitions, and hence moral judgments. He explains that moral reasoning is not always self-constructed and is mostly received from the outside. In other words, moral reasoning occurs in a social setting, where individuals can challenge each other’s moral judgments and generate new intuitions. Haidt maintains that these new intuitions are more likely to result in nuanced and multi-faceted moral judgments because venturing outside of one’s own “moral matrix” helps to develop moral humility and overcome one’s sense of self-righteousness. 

I claim that the second observation uniquely demonstrates the value of public engagement and participation and paves the way for a more democratic approach to health policymaking. Specifically, this observation implies that experts’ moral judgment is malleable and may be more reasoned if experts discussed the mitigating factors involved in moral dilemmas with multiple stakeholders, such as individuals representing different backgrounds, cultures, and fields of study. Since it may be challenging — if not impossible — to deny experts’ initial moral intuitions, vigorous public engagement with experts’ moral judgments has the potential to provide a basis for both a well-functioning health system and a just society. 

Public engagement and participation promise to restore rationalism in health policymaking by upsetting experts’ initial moral judgments, introducing them to new moral intuitions, and using their reasoning capability to adjudicate conflicts between competing intuitive moral judgments. With a refined moral judgment, moral experts would be able to provide more reasoned recommendations. Moreover, public engagement performs a democratic function by lending legitimacy to health policy decisions that may otherwise be based solely on the normative judgments of experts and other non-elected officials and agencies. 

To summarize, in this article, I suggest that experts’ moral judgments may be intuitive, and that the reasons they offer to justify those judgments are likely to be post hoc rationalizations. Consequently, moral experts may make suboptimal decisions from the public’s perspective. Moreover, I contend that health policy should not be developed exclusively based on the moral judgments of a selected group of experts because these judgments may not always be reasoned. Moral experts can benefit from having their moral judgments questioned through open discussion and debate with members of the public and other stakeholders who may have different moral intuitions and judgments. Ultimately, by opening experts’ moral judgments for evaluation, it would be possible to engage with and consider the judgments of non-experts, promoting more democratic decision-making processes. Overall, I call for a broad public dialogue over health-related moral issues, challenging the prevailing notion that moral reasoning is “beyond the competence of untrained minds” and stressing the importance of not conducting moral deliberations “by expert bodies behind closed doors, with little or no accountability to wider audiences.” 

The article is constructed as follows. In Part I, I discuss the role of moral experts in health policymaking. I show that experts have been given a dominant role in health policymaking processes, and that the policy recommendations they provide are often not contested. I also address challenges that arise from placing a greater reliance on the moral judgments of experts. 

In Part II, I discuss how SIM can be used in the context of moral experts. I begin by explaining that moral experts, like everyone else, may be motivated by their moral intuitions. Upon receiving a request for policy recommendation, moral experts may develop moral judgment instinctively, and their moral intuition would guide this judgment. I then explain the malleability of experts’ morality. Drawing from SIM, I argue that experts’ moral intuitions can be open to influence from a wide range of stimuli emanating from the social milieu in which they are embedded. This suggests that experts’ moral intuitions and, by extension, their moral judgments on moral issues might shift if they were exposed to individuals from various backgrounds and points of view. Overall, I propose a different lens through which we could challenge rationalism when it comes to moral dilemmas related to health and advance an argument for public engagement in health policymaking. 

In Part III, I demonstrate that international cooperation on issues that have global effects is vital. I use a case study on the governance of gene-editing technologies to highlight SIM’s practical implications. I argue that the governance of these technologies is currently dominated by experts and propose other governance alternatives that are both more democratic and just.

Criticism

'To What Extent Should Academic Freedom Allow Academics To Criticise Their Universities' by Nina Levine and Haydn Rigby in (2022) 48(1) Monash University Law Review comments 

The recent case of Schröder-Turk v Murdoch University has thrown up questions in relation to the extent to which an academic is allowed to criticise the university at which they are employed. What freedom, if any, does an academic have to criticise the practices of their Australian university? Are there any limits to this freedom? Are these limits appropriate? These questions in turn raise questions as to the existence and nature of any right that an academic has to exercise academic freedom in Australia and the extent to which this right may provide an academic with more protection to criticise their university employer than they may have otherwise had and whether this may have unintended, detrimental consequences. Does this right to academic freedom allow academics to criticise their institution whether or not they have a reasonable basis for doing so and if so, should this be the case? This article explores these questions with particular reference to the effect of the Model Code for the Protection of Free Speech and Academic Freedom recommended by former High Court of Australia Chief Justice Robert French and proposes some amendments to this Code. 

In May 2019, Associate Professor Gerd Schröder-Turk, an academic staff member at Murdoch University and a staff representative on the Senate at the University, made statements on the Australian Broadcasting Corporation’s Four Corners program in which he expressed concern about the policies of Murdoch University (and those of other Australian universities) in relation to international students. In particular, he expressed his discomfort with Murdoch University’s waiving of English proficiency requirements in order to increase international student enrolments. Murdoch subsequently removed Associate Professor Schröder-Turk from its Senate body which resulted in his bringing an action against the University in which he made two claims against it. First, Associate Professor Schröder-Turk claimed that Murdoch University had breached s 340 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (‘FW Act’) in taking adverse action against him because he exercised his workplace rights including his right to academic freedom. Secondly, he alleged that the University had contravened the Public Interest Disclosure Act 2003 (WA) (‘WA PID Act’) by taking detrimental action against him because of his disclosure of public interest information or ‘whistleblowing’. Murdoch University’s response was to bring a cross-claim against the Associate Professor, alleging that he had breached his fiduciary duty to the university by his disclosure to journalists and claiming that as a result of this unfavourable media coverage, the university had suffered revenue loss from a reduction of international student enrolments and reputational damage to the university. The university’s response was met with disbelief by the academic community (and beyond) as it appeared to fly in the face of academic freedom with the university being petitioned to drop its cross-claim. The university subsequently did withdraw its cross-claim, a fact that did not escape media attention, and at the time of writing, it has resolved the remaining legal issues with the Associate Professor out of court, bringing the litigation to an end. 

Associate Professor Schröder-Turk’s case is not the first of its kind in Australia. Indeed, there have been similar cases where academic staff have made accusations of wrongdoing occurring within their university. A notable example is that of Professor Ted Steele who was dismissed from, and then subsequently reinstated to, the University of Wollongong after he made allegations against it of ‘soft marking’ practices in favour of international full-fee paying students. Another example is that of sessional lecturer Ian Firns who in 2003 raised concerns about the Graduate School of Business at the University of Newcastle in relation to their handling of plagiarism by overseas students. These concerns were ultimately investigated by the Independent Commission Against Corruption (‘ICAC’) with two members of the University’s staff being found to have engaged in corrupt conduct. 

These cases all throw up questions in relation to the extent to which an academic is allowed to criticise the university at which they are employed, and to whom they can disclose such criticism. What freedom, if any, does an academic have to criticise the practices of their Australian university? Are there any limits to this freedom? Are these limits appropriate? These questions in turn raise questions as to the existence and nature of any right that an academic has to exercise academic freedom in Australia and the extent to which this may provide an academic with more protection to criticise their university employers than they may have otherwise had, and whether this may have any detrimental consequences. Does this right to academic freedom allow academics to criticise their institution whether or not they have a reasonable basis for doing so and if so, should this be the case? This article explores these questions. In doing so, it makes particular reference to the recent Report of the Independent Review of Freedom of Speech in Australian Higher Education Providers(‘Review’) led by the Hon Robert S French AC, former Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia, and its recommended ‘Model Code for the Protection of Free Speech and Academic Freedom’, together with the subsequent amendments to it, being those amendments adopted by the University Chancellors Council (‘UCC’) (the ‘Model Code’). Given the current pressure being placed on universities to adopt the Model Code, with its definition of academic freedom as explained further below, it is likely that the Model Code will be of primary relevance in the Australian higher education sector in the coming years. However, an understanding of the freedom that academic staff would otherwise have to criticise the universities at which they are employed is necessary to fully appreciate the effect of the Model Code on this right. 

As academic freedom is central to this article, the article begins by considering its meaning for Australian universities. It reflects on the reluctance of those involved in the establishment of the first universities in Australia to provide for any defined right of academic freedom or any demarcated limits on its expression by academic staff. It discusses the consequences of this reluctance as shown in Australian university history before examining the definition of academic freedom proposed by French in the Review and the Model Code. It then considers the extent to which an academic today would have the freedom at common law and under statute to criticise the practices of their universities independently of any right to academic freedom. Following this, it draws on the extensive examination of university legislation, enterprise agreements (‘EAs’) and policies conducted for the purposes of the Review in considering whether academic staff at Australian universities had any express or implied right to academic freedom prior to the Model Code and the extent to which any such right of academic freedom allowed an academic to criticise their university. Finally, it considers the extent to which the Model Code may provide an academic with more freedom to criticise their universities than they would have otherwise had and whether this may have any unintended, detrimental consequences. It makes recommendations as to how the Model Code could be amended to avoid any such consequences. 

As stated in the Review, ‘[o]ne aspect of academic freedom which has not received great prominence in the Australian debate, is the freedom of academic staff to publicly criticise the policies or performance of the institution’s administration and governors’. It is hoped that this article will help to provide this aspect with greater prominence.

Blood and Procedure

Another pseudolaw claim, with the Court in National Australia Bank Limited v Mellander [2023] NSWSC 1171 noting 

 The defendant is the registered proprietor of the property at ... Street, Wentworthville NSW 2145 (the property). The defendant borrowed money from Citibank Pty Limited (Citibank). The loan was secured by a mortgage over the property. Subsequently, Citibank, on the plaintiff’s case, transferred its rights with respect to the loan and the mortgage to the plaintiff. The defendant defaulted on the loan, leading the plaintiff to take action in this Court by way of statement of claim. The defendant says he sent a response to the Court. Nothing was actually filed in the proceedings. As a result of the apparent absence of any response to the plaintiff's claim, the plaintiff obtained default judgment and then subsequently obtained a writ of possession with respect to the property. On 5 September 2023, some 48 hours before he was to be evicted, the defendant filed a notice of motion seeking a stay of the writ of possession. That motion is the subject of this judgment. ... 

The defendant contends that his evidence establishes the default judgment and writ of possession were not properly obtained and, further, that he has a good defence to the claim. 

The plaintiff relied on: (1) the notice of motion seeking default judgment, together with the supporting affidavit of Dean Adams of 6 June 2023 (Exhibit 1); (2) the notice of motion seeking the writ of possession, together with the supporting affidavit of Mr Adams of 18 July 2023 (Exhibit 2); and (3) an affidavit on Sera Erikozu of 19 September 2023 (Exhibit 3). 

The plaintiff also provided written submissions to the Court. On the plaintiff’s case, the above evidence establishes the default judgment and writ of possession were regularly obtained. The plaintiff further submits that the defendant’s contentions are baseless. 

By statement of claim filed 6 March 2023, the plaintiff sought possession of the property, leave to issue a writ for possession, judgment in the amount owing under the loan (approximately $254,000), together with the plaintiff's fees and charges in accordance with the loan and mortgage and the costs of the proceedings. 

An affidavit of a licensed process server of 13 March 2023, annexed to the affidavit in support of the motion for default judgment, establishes that the statement of claim was served on the defendant on 9 March 2023. The affidavit states that three copies of the statement of claim, the notice to occupier, and the possession of land coversheet were served on the defendant by placing them in a sealed envelope and affixing the envelope to the fence at the property. It appears service was affected in this way as, according to the affidavit, the property was surrounded by a fence with a sign indicating “LEGAL NOTICE, NO TRESPASSING - ADMITTANCE BY INVITATION ONLY”. The affidavit annexed a copy of the notice to occupier. 

A further affidavit of service, prepared by a licensed commercial agent on 27 March 2023, was annexed to the affidavit in support of the motion for default judgment. This related to a further service of the statement of claim and possession of land coversheet on 21 March 2023. While the documents did not include a notice to occupier, I am satisfied this document had been properly served on 9 March 2023: Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) (“UCPR”) r 6.9(2). The commercial agent deposed that he attended the property and described the only access to the property to be a “chainmesh gate which was padlocked closed”. He deposed that there were “signs attached to the gate advising that ‘all mail and all correspondence’ would not be accepted, and that uninvited admittance to the property by police, government, process servers etc would be an act of trespass”. The deponent said he waited at the property and, at approximately the 5:30 pm, he had a conversation with a man he believed to be the defendant. He described the man as “aged in his sixties”. He said the man arrived at the property on a bicycle and opened the padlock on the gate. When asked, the person denied that he was the defendant. The deponent said that the man turned away when he appeared to observe the documents in the deponent's hand. The deponent said “I think you are Peter Mellander . I have some legal documents to deliver to you”. The deponent said the person responded, “you have no liability” and further said “you have no liability under the fourth law” and walked away. The deponent states that he then said “as you will not accept the documents, I am making you aware that I will leave them here for you. Take this as notice that you have been served”. The deponent said that he then rolled-up the documents and placed them in the chain mesh gate. The deponent stated that he took a photograph of the person he spoke to. He said he showed that photograph to a neighbour at ... Street who informed him that the person in the photograph was known to him as “Peter Mellander ”. Photographs of the fence, signage, and the person spoken to were annexed to the affidavit.

The Court was satisfied that Mellander was served with the statement of claim, the notice to occupier, and the possession of land coversheet, noting "the defendant does not suggest the proceedings were not brought to his attention". 

 No response to the statement of claim reached the Court file or, apparently, the plaintiff. On 8 June 2023, the plaintiff filed a notice of motion seeking default judgment. Filed in support of that motion was the affidavit of Mr Adams of 6 June 2023. That affidavit established the transfer of the mortgage from Citibank to the plaintiff, service of the statement of claim and related documents, together with the outstanding debt. There was no requirement to serve the application for default judgment on the defendant: UCPR, r 16.3(1A). The defendant obtained default judgment and possession orders in respect of the property on 15 June 2023. 

By notice of motion filed on 20 July 2023, the plaintiff sought a writ of possession for the property. There was no obligation to serve the application on the defendant: UCPR, r 39.2(2)(b). A writ of possession was obtained on 1 August 2023. 

It was only when faced with eviction from the property that the defendant took any steps in relation to the proceedings, or at least, any step recognised by the Court. On 5 September 2023, the defendant filed a notice of motion by which he sought an order that “the Court provide an immediate stay of proceedings pending full and detailed judicial review”. 

The matter came before Walton J, as Duty Judge, on 13 September 2023. On that date, the defendant's motion was adjourned to 20 September 2023, when it came before me as Duty Judge, to allow the defendant an opportunity to consider the plaintiff’s evidence and put evidence before the Court to provide a basis for the order sought. On 13 September 2013, in accordance with an order made by Walton J, the plaintiff provided the defendant with copies of the motions seeking default judgment and the writ of possession, together with the affidavits in support, the two affidavits of service with respect to the statement of claim referred to above, and the Court’s notice of orders made on 15 June 2023 entering default judgment for the plaintiff. 

The plaintiff served the defendant at court with the affidavit of Ms Erikozou (Exhibit 3) and its written submissions. That material had been filed the previous day in accordance with the orders of Walton J, however, in the absence of any means of electronic service, the defendant was not able to be served until he appeared at the hearing. I adjourned the Court for a period I regarded as sufficient to allow the defendant to read that material. 

The defendant's claim is that there are defects in both the process by which judgment was obtained against him and the substance of the plaintiff's claim. Any stay, as sought by the defendant, is contingent on him having a basis on which to set aside the default judgment. Although no motion to set aside the default judgment has been filed, I will proceed on the basis that this is what the defendant seeks to do. ... 

The process by which default judgment and the writ were obtained 

The steps taken by the plaintiff 

The defendant’s affidavit of 18 September 2023 claims that the default judgment and the subsequent writ were properly obtained. He said that the affidavit of service with respect to the statement of claim was only a photocopy, was not certified as a true copy, had not been “signed by the issuing officer of the Court giving full assurance of liability”, was a “false and fraudulent document” and “has not reached full commercial liability”. Consequently, it was submitted that, among other things, it was void, a constructive fraud, designed to pervert the natural course of justice, and could not be relied upon. The same submission was made in relation to the motion seeking default judgment and the writ of possession. 

There is no obligation on a party to produce original documents. Section 48 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) allows proof of documents by the tender of a document that purports to be a copy of the document and purports to have been produced by a device that reproduces the contents of documents. This allows for the acceptance of a document, which appears to a photocopy of a document. Further, I note the proceedings are interlocutory and s 75 of the Evidence Act provides that the hearsay rule does not apply, provided that the party adducing hearsay evidence adduces evidence of its source. Consequently, and, in the defendant’s favour, on the assumption that it was necessary for the plaintiff to do so, I do not accept the defendant’s submission that the plaintiff has not established the default judgment and writ of possession were properly obtained. 

The defendant's response to the statement of claim 

There is one complication in relation to the process by which the default judgment and writ of possession were obtained. The defendant claims that he responded to the statement of claim. He says that he mailed, to the Court, a document which forms the bulk of Exhibit 3. That document is titled “Affidavit of Rebuttal” and is date stamped 24 March 2023. It is addressed to the “Supreme Court of New South Wales, Chief Justice” with the Court's address. On the first page, the document sets out the following:

“In support of: NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK LIMITED A.B.N 12 004 044 937 and the SUPREME COURT OF NSW A.B.N. 77 057 165 500 does not have competent jurisdiction over I, The Aggrieved and did deny my lawful rights for peter-james bonded by the blood of the house of mellander Applicant: peter-james bonded by the blood of the house of mellander Defendant 1: The CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER of NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK LIMITED Defendant 2: NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK LIMITED A.B.N. 12 004 044 937 Defendant 3: The CHIEF JUSTICE of the SUPREME COURT OF NSW A.B.N. 77 057 165 500 Defendant 4: The SUPREME COURT OF NSW A.B.N. 77 057 165 500 Defendant 5: The```` STATE of NSW Defendant 6: Attorney-General’s Department A.B.N. 92 661 124 430 Defendant 7: Federal Court of Australia A.B.N. 49 110 847 339 Defendant 8: CITIBANK Pty LIMITED A.C.N. 004 325 080 

General form of affidavit. Affiant: peter-james bonded by the blood of the house of mellander . The CHIEF JUSTICE, I, peter-james bonded by the blood of the house of mellander care of ... Street, Arndell Park, N.S.W. [2148] come with clean hands in equity seeking immediate lawful remedy make asseveration and say as follows: [signed] Deponent [signed] Justice of the Peace Affidavit Registration Number: U.P.U./Australia Post Registered Post Article 341883001778359 Page 1 of 53”

It is not until the second page of the document that reference is made to these proceedings. The document states:

“I refer to 'NOTICE TO OCCUPIER'; NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK LIMITED A.B.N.12 004 044 937 case number 2023/00074608 and 'STATEMENT OF CLAIM; NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK LIMITED A.B.N. 12 004 044 937 v Peter James Mellander ' date March 6, 2023 served on I, The Aggrieved, March 10, 2023 and March 21, 2023.” The 'STATEMENT OF CLAIM' Title of Proceedings lists the defendant as ‘Peter James Mellander ’. 

The SUPREME COURT OF NSW A.B.N. 77 057 165 500 did commit fraud. The Addressee name is a corporate government created name of a corporate dead entity legal fiction construct from the unlawful Birth Certificate by trading company corporation known as NSW REGISTRY OF BIRTHS DEATHS AND MARRIAGES. 

The SUPREME COURT OF NSW A.B.N. 77 057 165 500 did attempt to make trick and deceive and induce and coerce the living breathing flesh and blood man of God being the intended recipient to consent to the fraud. 

The use of the legal name against I, The Aggrieved is offensive and defamatory and embarrassing material. 

There is no contract or obligation by the I, The Aggrieved being the intended recipient to pay or perform to trading company corporation known as SUPREME COURT OF NSW A.B.N. 77 057 165 500. 

The 'STATEMENT OF CLAIM' Attachment Details confirms the Court intends to sit, preside and determine in accordance with UCPR being foreign imposed codification not correctly searching for it's head of power under the Commonwealth Constitution.”

Surveillance

'The Surveillance AI Pipeline' by Pratyusha Ria Kalluri, William Agnew, Myra Cheng, Kentrell Owens, Luca Soldaini and Abeba Birhane comments 

A rapidly growing number of voices have argued that AI research, and computer vision in particular, is closely tied to mass surveillance. Yet the direct path from computer vision research to surveillance has remained obscured and difficult to assess. This study reveals the Surveillance AI pipeline. We obtain three decades of computer vision research papers and downstream patents (more than 20,000 documents) and present a rich qualitative and quantitative analysis. This analysis exposes the nature and extent of the Surveillance AI pipeline, its institutional roots and evolution, and ongoing patterns of obfuscation. We first perform an in-depth content analysis of computer vision papers and downstream patents, identifying and quantifying key features and the many, often subtly expressed, forms of surveillance that appear. On the basis of this analysis, we present a topology of Surveillance AI that characterizes the prevalent targeting of human data, practices of data transferal, and institutional data use. We find stark evidence of close ties between computer vision and surveillance. The majority (68%) of annotated computer vision papers and patents self-report their technology enables data extraction about human bodies and body parts and even more (90%) enable data extraction about humans in general.