22 April 2023

OPCA and Contempt

In R. v. Hardy 2023 BCPC 65 the Supreme Court of British Columbia states 

[1] On September 1, 2022, day one of a scheduled one-and-a-half day trial, I found 46-year-old Cameron Hardy guilty of in facie contempt of court, otherwise known as contempt in the face of the court. 

[2] He is a disciple of "Organized Pseudo-legal Commercial Arguments" (OPCA) theory. As explained by him, he is a freeman. He proclaims that he was created by the creative source. He claims to be a man of mankind, being something other than a human being. Simply put, he says that he is a man, a mankind, not some legal identity on a piece of paper that was created by man and owned by man. Accordingly, in his mind, he is not a person or an individual, and therefore the courts of British Columbia hold no jurisdiction over him. He rejects the name, Cameron Hardy. Instead, he self- identifies by various names, including “A Man Known As Cameron Hardy” and “A Man Commonly Called Cameron Hardy.” For my decision, I will refer to him simply as Hardy. 

[3] Even if I am wrong about Hardy’s legal name or his status as the defendant on the substantive matter, today, I am sentencing the person who was standing in front of the court on September 1, 2022, who committed contempt in the face of the court. 

I. INTRODUCTION 

[4] The courts of British Columbia are legitimate, or they are not. There is no middle ground. There are no shades of grey. Unfortunately for Hardy, the courts of British Columbia, including the Provincial Court of British Columbia, are legitimate. 

[5] British Columbia and Canadian laws apply to Hardy, no matter how he identifies, what words he uses to describe himself, or his political orientation. The criminal law, and the procedures that govern its implementation, are part of the law of British Columbia and Canada and apply to all. Opting out is not an option. 

[6] As a result of his refusal to recognize the legitimacy of the court, heed court orders and directions, and participate in the trial process, Hardy finds himself before the court for sentencing for contempt of court. 

[7] The superior courts and s. 9 of the Criminal Code recognize the authority of a Provincial Court judge to forego the formal trappings of a criminal trial and summarily punish for in facie contempt of court. 

[8] One leading in facie contempt of court case is R. v. B.K., 1995 CanLII 45 (SCC). As set out by Justice Major (in dissent) in B.K., xx 26 I agree with the caution expressed by Lord Denning in Balogh that the power of summary punishment is a great but necessary one that is to be used with scrupulous care. 

[9] In the present case, because of Hardy’s behaviour and flagrant disregard for the directions and order of the court, there existed an urgent and imperative need to utilize the summary contempt procedure on day one of his substantive trial. Specifically, Hardy’s refusal to follow the court's directions and order was deliberate and premeditated, as evidenced by the written script he had in his possession and read to the court. He undertook a calculated and intentional course of action, as he had on previous court occasions, specifically to thwart the court from proceeding with his trial. He maintained his behaviour despite being encouraged to engage legal counsel and being told of his actions' potential consequences. His conduct was contemptuous of the court and the administration of justice. 

II. OPCA ARGUMENTS 

[10] As stated on page 764 in 'Enjoy The Silence: Pseudolaw At The Supreme Court of Canada': Because pseudolaw has no actual validity, OPCA litigants by definition abuse court processes when they advance these ideas. Furthermore, Canadian case law on this subject is now highly developed. Post-Meads, an OPCA litigant is unlikely to enter court, let alone an appeal court, unaware that the ideas he or she intends to argue have been the target of strong court criticism. Nevertheless, some OPCA litigants’ belief in pseudolaw is apparently sincere...Social scientists who have investigated these populations confirm there are true believers in this community who are driven by a combination of conspiratorial and political beliefs, reinforced in a kind of social echo chamber. 

When viewed exclusively from a government and court perspective, pseudolaw is nothing but a waste of state and institutional resources. That perspective misses something important. Pseudolaw leads to self-inflicted injury by those who advance these toxic ideas, including increased litigation damages and costs, criminal sanctions, psychiatric detention, foreclosed homes, and broken families. In a very real sense, OPCA litigants are the victims of the conman gurus who sell supposed secrets to the real but concealed law. Worse, OPCA theories authorize unorthodox and illegal actions against government, police, and court workers, including violence. xx Pseudolaw is a form of legal quackery or snake oil. Much as doctors and scientists are the most effective critics of pseudomedical and pseudoscience frauds, courts are the expert bodies logically and functionally positioned to refute OPCA misconceptions with clear, substantive, and responsive court decisions. 

[11] Whether Hardy is a “true believer” or simply an “opportunist” using OPCA to delay and disrupt the court process, his reliance on the discredited OPCA theory clearly contributed to his contemptuous behaviour on September 1, 2022. And even though no OPCA defence has been successful on its merits – see R. v. Hardy, 2007 BCCA 523 and R. v. Hardy, 2007 BCSC 125, for examples of how an OPCA defendant was successful on appeal because the Crown did not prove identity beyond a reasonable doubt at the trial court stage – the courts are still having to deal on a regular and on- going basis with civil court litigants and criminal defendants who embrace OPCA theory. So, in light of the zero percent chance of success on the merits in the courts, why do people still espouse OPCA theory? 

[12] In 'Overcoming Knowledge Resistance: A Systematic Review of Experimental Studies', the authors state: A well-known fact is that people surprisingly often believe in things that are simply not true. For example, the public stance on climate change in the US has become increasingly contentious (Leshner, 2015; van der Linden, 2015), and many believe that vaccination has negative health effects (Larson et al., 2016). Such unfounded beliefs predict a range of maladaptive perceptions and behaviors, including poor health choices, climate change denial, and decreased civic virtue (Grebe & Narrrass, 2012; Jolley & Douglas, 20l4). 

An obvious question then is why people, in this era of information abundance, hold beliefs that contradict reason and rigorous observation. While there is little doubt that humans are capable of rational thinking, research has made clear that we often don't form our beliefs by a rational weighing of evidence and data. Rather, research shows that our perceptions, interpretations, and beliefs about the world are strongly influenced by our previous beliefs, feelings, and personal motives to view the world in one way rather than the other. Thus, people selectively attend to information consistent with their interests or previous beliefs, interpret neutral information or evidence that counter their attitudes in a belief confirming manner, and distort or selectively remember objective facts in a way that support their attitudes and decisions. Hence our reasoning is often motivated by desires to view the world as we expect or want it to be (for an overview, see Kunda, 1999). While modern people thus in principle have access to more knowledge than ever before, our inherent mode of thinking continues to make us susceptible to erroneous conclusions and false beliefs. This type of motivated reasoning is an important factor behind misconceptions that helps explain knowledge resistance. 

[13] I may never understand the true reason Hardy has acted in the manner he has. Nonetheless, he has relied upon OPCA theory misinformation to delay and disrupt his court proceedings. He relied upon and spread his OPCA disinformation intending to harm or deceive the court and the administration of justice. 

[14] As with the defendant in R. v. Kuleba, 2021 ONSC 1016, Hardy’s stubbornly wrong reliance on the OPCA theory he advanced caused him to reject opportunities provided to him by the court. 

[15] Concerning OPCA theory, I repeat what I said in paragraph 1 of Ruling Re: Organized Pseudo-legal Commercial Arguments, in R. v. Hardy, 2022 BCPC 189, ...I also had the opportunity to reflect upon what has become known in Canada -- and other parts of the world, too -- as pseudo-legal arguments. And one of the interesting things about pseudo-legal arguments, regardless of whether one is of the detaxer or freeman of the land or sovereign citizen ideology/philosophy, is that there has not been a single case in Canada supporting this particular theory. Judges are, by precedent, allowed to look at previous decisions of the court and decisions of a superior court are binding on me. What that means is that superior courts have said that I may and should summarily dismiss these kind of arguments, and by summarily dismiss, that means not waste the taxpayers’ money, the court's time, your time, the prosecutor's time, the court clerk's time, or anyone else’s time, with an argument that has zero chance of success. 

[16] As a Provincial Court judge, I am bound by precedent. I also pay heed to persuasive case law from outside of British Columbia. Cases such as R. v. Trifunski, 2022 BCSC 609, Parhar v. British Columbia (Attorney General), 2021 BCSC 700, R. v. Merrill, 2021 BCSC 1017, R. v. August-Sjodin, 2020 BCSC 826, R. v. Ciciarelli, 2019 ONSC 6719, R. v. Penner, 2018 MBQB 200, R. v. Jacobi, 2017 BCSC 1106, R. v. Petrie, 2012 BCSC 2110, and R. v. Lindsay, 2011 BCCA 99, have considered the issues already. OPCA litigants cannot succeed when relying upon their OPCA theory as legally sound in Canadian courts. The case law makes it clear that the arguments and philosophies being advanced by Hardy have no legal authority and are nonsensical. Accordingly, I refused to re-litigate OPCA claims and engage with Hardy concerning OPCA contentions. 

[17] In the leading case of Meads v. Meads, 2012 ABQB 571, Associate Chief Justice Rooke of the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench said the following about courts’ responses to OPCA cases:

  [586] Canadian courts have adopted a variety and range of responses to OPCA litigants and litigation. Any judge who faces OPCA litigation should consider deployment of all tools in this arsenal, and others that may be developed for this difficult litigant category. 

[18] I am aware of the debate over whether OPCA-type defendants and litigants are delusional and suffering from a type of mental illness versus being anti-government ideologists, expressing their political philosophies in an unorthodox manner. The temptation is to lean towards believing some OPCA-type defendants and litigants have a form of mental illness when one observes how people like Hardy, confronted with the reality that their position cannot win, still carry on with their OPCA-type contentions and behaviour. 

[19] On pages 1174-5 in 'After The Hammer: Six Years of Meads v. Meads', Donald J. Netolitzky, author and legal researcher, addresses the issue head-on: The Meads OPCA indicia serve another useful role not suggested in that decision. Psychiatric investigation of Freemen and Sovereign Citizens has concluded adherence to pseudolaw conspiracies is an expression of extreme political beliefs, reinforced in small introspective social communities. However, the peculiar formulaic expression of these ideas mimics delusion. That has resulted in misdiagnosis of these persons as mentally ill. OPCA ideas such as the “Strawman” duality have been misidentified as a mental health issue, rather than pseudolaw. Court- ordered psychiatric examinations and detentions may result. The Meads OPCA indicia are therefore a helpful resource to distinguish between persons who litigate because of mental illness versus anti-government ideology expressed in an unorthodox manner. 

[20] I have not ordered a psychiatric assessment for Hardy, finding him intelligent, albeit an anti-government ideologist. He understands the difference between right and wrong. He has merely selected wrong over right. 

[21] Having rejected mental health issues playing a role in Hardy’s disruptive behaviour and reliance on OPCA theory, I next consider how misinformation has contributed to Hardy’s contempt of court. 

[22] OPCA theory falls into the category of misinformation, defined on page 13 in 'The psychological drivers of misinformation belief and its resistance to correction', as “any information that turns out to be false.” Scholarly articles such as 'After The Hammer: Six Years of Meads v. Meads, The psychological drivers of misinformation belief and its resistance to correction and Beyond Misinformation: Understanding and Coping with the “Post-Truth" Era' provide context to the reality that individuals, despite all evidence to the contrary, continue to rely upon misinformation, leading to poor judgement and decision-making. It is the way for OPCA theory proponents. 

[23] It seems that phraseology such as “post-truth" and “fake news" has become increasingly prevalent in public discourse. As a court system, we need to recognize how the growing abundance of misinformation influences people in the political, technological, and societal context, including the courtroom. Regarding OPCA theory proponents, we need to develop a concrete methodology to deal with them once rationale thought and societal norms have been rejected by the OPCA theory proponent. After all, if left unchecked, OPCA theory can and will harm the court system, as evidenced by Hardy’s success at turning what should have been a one to two-day trial into a costly and time-consuming exercise that has morphed into two separate files: the substantive trial file and the contempt of court file. 

[24] In trying to understand Hardy’s rationale for his contempt of court, I appreciate the warning given on pages 13 and 14 in 'The psychological drivers of misinformation belief and its resistance to correction':

The psychology and history of misinformation cannot be fully grasped without taking into account contemporary technology. Misinformation helped bring Roman emperors to power, who used messages on coins as a form of mass communication, and Nazi propaganda heavily relied on the printed press, radio and cinema. Today, misinformation campaigns can leverage digital infrastructure that is unparalleled in its reach. The internet reaches billions of individuals and enables senders to tailor persuasive messages to the specific psychological profiles of individual users. Moreover, social media users’ exposure to information that challenges their worldviews can be limited when communication environments foster confirmation of previous beliefs — so-called echo chambers. Although there is some controversy about echo chambers and their impact on people’s beliefs and behaviours, the internet is an ideal medium for the fast spread of falsehoods at the expense of accurate information. However, the prevalence of misinformation cannot be attributed only to technology: conventional efforts to combat misinformation have also not been as successful as hoped — these include educational efforts that focus on merely conveying factual knowledge and corrective efforts that merely retract misinformation. 

For decades, science communication has relied on an information deficit model when responding to misinformation, focusing on people’s misunderstanding of, or lack of access to, facts. Thus, a thorough and accessible explanation of facts should overcome the impact of misinformation. However, the information deficit model ignores the cognitive, social and affective drivers of attitude formation and truth judgements. For example, some individuals deny the existence of climate change or reject vaccinations despite being aware of a scientific consensus to the contrary. This rejection of science is not the result of mere ignorance but is driven by factors such as conspiratorial mentality, fears, identity expression and motivated reasoning — reasoning driven more by personal or moral values than objective evidence. Thus, to understand the psychology of misinformation and how it might be countered, it is essential to consider the cognitive architecture and social context of individual decision makers. ..... 

Different types of misinformation exist — for example, misinformation that goes against scientific consensus or misinformation that contradicts simple, objectively true facts. Moreover, the term disinformation is often specifically used for the subset of misinformation that is spread intentionally. More research is needed on the extent to which different types of misinformation might be associated with differential psychological impacts and barriers for revision, and to establish the extent to which people infer intentionality and how this might affect their processing of the false information. 

[25] The observations of Justice Graesser in A.V.I. v. M.H.V.B., 2020 ABQB 790, a recent case dealing with a defendant named Robinson who espoused OPCA and "Magna Carta Lawful Rebellion" (MCLR) theory, hold in Hardy’s case:

52 The consequences of contempt are not trivial. In Fearn v Canada Customs, 2014 ABQB 114, and in particular paragraphs 215-256, the Court concluded that gurus who promote OPCA schemes that purportedly defeat legitimate court authority are engaged in criminal contempt of court. 

53 This may appear to be the use of a sledgehammer to crush an ant. I would instead use the analogy of an inoculation to stop a virus. OPCA and MCLR gurus harm people. Ms. Robinson has already harmed MHVB and her family. These gurus teach illusions that will predictably fail. They promise much, but their clientele gets less than nothing. 

54 These schemes are nothing more than cons, led by people who rely and feed on the oft-quoted statement attributed to P.T. Barnum (of circus fame): a sucker is born every minute. That is as true now as it was when spoken more than 150 years ago. The Courts are not suckers. And the Courts will not be intimidated.

[26] Despite having been ordered not to do so, Hardy’s use and reliance upon OPCA theory – combined with his refusal to recognize the court's legitimacy, heed court orders and directions, and participate in the trial process – resulted in Hardy finding himself before the court for sentencing for contempt of court. 

[27] The procedural steps customarily required by natural justice would not have been of any benefit in the situation faced by the court in the present case, as evidenced by Hardy’s refusal to speak to a lawyer or have a lawyer represent him, combined with his reliance on OPCA theory and his disruptive behaviour before, during and after the finding of contempt, until his removal by the sheriffs from the courtroom. With Lord Denning’s warning in mind, the court decided that Hardy’s behaviour on September 1, 2022, demanded immediate action from the court. The court could not allow it to continue. ...

[138] To believe that one is exempt from the law because of how they self-identify and because they espouse OPCA beliefs is not only outrageous but creates great harm to the community as others consider whether a magical “get out of jail free card” exists, and after that stop paying taxes, fail to abide by laws and public health orders, and waste valuable court resources with nonsensical OPCA arguments. ... 

[161] confirm the same principles hold true when sentencing a person for contempt of court related to OPCA misconduct: The words of Justice Tilleman in Fearn v Canada Customs, 2014 ABQB 114, 

[254] The test identified in the appellate case law is that a criminal contempt of court sanction is appropriate when an activity constitutes a "clear and present danger", "real and imminent harm or threat to justice". OPCA gurus sell and promote techniques that damage the court. The judiciary regularly encounters litigants who attempt to apply these techniques. Only a small fraction of those events are documented in reported case law. This is not merely a theoretical issue, but one that is a regular and unwelcome event. 

[255] Thus, though what Mr. Fearn says likely would be preposterous, absurd, and probably offensive to the average Canadian, he is one of a community of like-minded persons. In their eyes Mr. Fearn's "truths" are very real. To permit the business of interfering with court processes to go unchallenged only reinforces this community's misguided, dystopian world perspective. ..... 

[260] Contempt of court is a mechanism to curb OPCA misconduct that is directed to and interferes with court operation and function. This response should be broad and meaningful. That reflects this authority as an expression of the inherent jurisdiction of this Court. That means that while freedom of expression is a value respected and protected both under the common law and the Charter, that right does not extend to speech and communication which is criminal, or is intended to or injures the administration of justice and the rights of justice system participants.

[162] I stress wholeheartedly that Hardy's reliance on OPCA theory was wrong. He attempted to circumvent justice system procedures. His arguments were not merely legally false but often just plain stupid. Hardy’s defence was vexatious and frivolous. He had no hope of success; thus, logically, his only purpose was to frustrate the court and waste government resources.

18 April 2023

Shklar

'Arendt Corrections: Judith Shklar’s Critique of Hannah Arendt' by Hannes Bajohr in (2021) 5 Arendt Studies 87–119 comments

 Judith Shklar wrote about Hannah Arendt throughout her career. However, her nuanced readings are often ignored by schol- ars who prefer to depict both philosophers as stark counter-images. In this paper, I offer a more complex comparison on the basis of all of Shklar’s writings about Arendt. Shklar’s critique is grounded in what she sees as the Romantic strand in Arendt’s thought, which she identifies with a metaphysical, elitist, and aestheticizing stance towards politics, a distaste for modernity, and a nostalgia for Greek antiquity. For Shklar, this position comes to the fore both in what she believes to be Arendt’s purely therapeutic notion of revolution as well as the rejection of her own Jewish identity. Nevertheless, Shklar also admired Arendt’s insights about exile and her appreciation of Kant. Through her sustained critique of Arendt, Shklar developed her own conception of a realist, rights-affirming, and anti-metaphysical liberalism. 

Seyla Benhabib once wrote that Judith Shklar read Hannah Arendt “against the grain on so many issues” that the former’s relationship to the latter warrants its own study. This essay is not such a study, which may require a whole book, but it tries to provide a lay of the land. It is mo- tivated not only by Benhabib’s observation but also by my own impression that most any text dealing with Shklar will inevitably turn to a comparison with Arendt. Yet this is rarely to develop Shklar’s reading of Arendt, but rather to construct both thinkers either as biographical twins or as philosophical counter-images. In this essay, I will first demonstrate this tendency by example of Dana Villa’s pitting Shklar against Arendt in the two philosophers’ assessments of a highest evil. Against what I believe is a reductionist reading, I suggest that Shklar was not simply Arendt’s counter-image, but that similarities persist, and that she made alterations and corrections to some of what appeared to her the more egregious of Arendt’s shortcomings. In the second section, I turn to Shklar’s intellectual socialization in the shadow of one of Arendt’s most important concepts, totalitarianism, which Shklar soon began to reject. I discuss Shklar’s first and already fundamental attack on Arendt in her debut After Utopia, where Arendt is grouped with her teachers Heidegger and Jaspers as belonging to an apolitical, snobbish, and aestheticizing “romanticism of defeat.” That Arendt was not very fussy when it came to historical facts but more interested in heroizing the past, Shklar noted more than once; in the fourth section, I look at her critique of Arendt’s moral taste for classical antiquity, and in the fifth at her incomplete and, in Shklar’s eyes, in the end purely therapeutic, but not political, view of revolution. The sixth section is devoted to Shklar’s strong, and at times excessive, reaction to Eichmann in Jerusalem that saw in it a self-renunciation of Jewish identity. I conclude with a look at the last text Shklar wrote on Arendt, a short but relatively conciliatory review of Arendt’s Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy.

Identity and Lex Sportiva

'Rules of the Game, Gaming The Rules' by Bruce Baer Arnold in Miroslav Imbrišević (ed), Sport, Law and Philosophy: The Jurisprudence of Sport (Routledge, 2023) comments 

 Competitive sport, just like law, is a matter of identity. The centrality of identity results in rules about who gets to compete and therefore who gets rewarded through medals, public recognition, sponsorship and other benefits. As a consequence it results in imperatives for subverting requirements about identity, for example through changing nationality (something encouraged in some national sports policies), through impersonation (‘ring ins’) and use of prohibited substances to illicitly boost performance contrary to notions of fairness. 

That subversion of requirements in turn results in policing, centred on the verification of identity claims regarding nationality, gender, status as an amateur (‘shamateurism’), age or freedom from substances that have not been used by a competitor’s peers. Policing of subversion, and more broadly the administration of sport, is a matter of authority. That authority is the entitlement to do or demand of others certain things by virtue of the role as a referee, sports administrator or government official. Just as competition can be understood as matter of rules about who has the identity that enables participation as a competitor, the governance of sport is intelligible as rules about who gets to make and implement rules regarding sport. Both are analogous to H.L.A Hart’s conceptualisation of primary and secondary rules (Hart 1994). 

This chapter construes professional and quasi professional sport (such as the national football and basketball leagues, the Olympics, America’s Cup and Tour de France) in terms of rules about identity. It suggests that the creation, subversion and policing of identity in sport through the articulation and implementation of rules results in a jurisprudence that offers insights about sports law per se: what has been characterised as the lex sportiva (Kolev 2012; Beloff 2012). That jurisprudence more broadly offers insights about the nature of identity as an artefact in law, something that can be understood through lenses provided by justice theorists such as John Rawls, Alan Gewirth and Martha Nussbaum rather than merely rules theorists such as H.L.A. Hart, Hans Kelsen and contemporary scholars such as Schauer. 

From an identity perspective the lex sportiva provides a lens for considering the nature of rules in legal systems, including questions of authority in the making, day by day enforcement and contestation of rules. Some judicial decisions in the lex sportiva for example deal with disputes about process, including what is acceptable evidence in a claim that an identity has been subverted through doping or that individuals such as Caster Semenya and Billie Jean King have been improperly allowed to compete contrary to rules restricting participation to people with a specific gender. Some are matters of disputed norms regarding bodies and behaviours, where there may be conflicts between sports law as private rules and state law (Di Giandomenico, this volume). 

Such disputes can be understood in terms of Hart’s emphasis on rules of recognition and adjudication, founded on identity rather than morality (Hart 1994; Hart 1958). They can also be understood in terms of expectations regarding the public and private spheres, with public law potentially reshaping private rules to address concerns relating to safety, discrimination and exploitation by oligopolies. 

The theorists also offer insights about how and why we value ourselves, others and legal frameworks that create/enforce identities. Nussbaum, Rawls and Gewirth offer a jurisprudence that allows us to evaluate rather than merely taxonomise the working of the lex sportiva and the rules of each game (Nussbaum 2006; Nussbaum 2011; Rawls 1971; Rawls 1999; Gewirth 1998). That evaluation emphasises fairness, aspiration and encouragement of flourishing. Their view of justice is antithetical to a ‘winner takes all’ ethic that fosters both the rewards and subversion noted above. The view values participation in sport and achievement of excellence that is not determined by blood substitution, performance enhancement drugs or other mechanisms for cheating. It questions the fairness and thence legitimacy of rule makers that are tainted by corruption or indifferent to harms such as concussion-based injury and sexual abuse by competitors, bringing the rules and the sport into disrepute. It more subtly involves disquiet about rules of a game in which participants in search of rewards accept rules and integrity mechanisms that erode the dignity attributed by liberal democratic states to all humans. 

This chapter begins by characterising identity: a status under a sport’s rules (and more broadly under public law) that is typically signified by identifiers. It then discusses the centrality of identity for sport, including the identity of sportspeople and the identity of the institutions or individuals that make the rules. That discussion is applicable for understanding other fields such as the professions and, more broadly, citizenship as a status that embodies rules regarding reciprocal rights and obligations. It argues that rules regarding identity in professional sport frame the achievement of rewards, including benefits for those who play and those who manage the rules. 

The chapter next examines the subversion of identity and thus subversion of rules regarding identity, for example a competitor gaining an illicit advantage by using a prohibited substance and thereby breaching rules regarding non-use of such substances. Unsurprisingly, where there are rewards and where people may consider that achievement is imperative some people will choose to break such rules and on occasion subvert rules that are meant to detect illicit performance enhancement, for example to defeat substance-detection tests by swapping urine. Legal systems are typically responsive and the administration of rules regarding identity in sport is no exception. The chapter accordingly discusses both rulemaking and practice that seek to detect and deter misrepresentation of identity, for example through testing for performance-enhancing substances. 

The chapter concludes by looking beyond Hart’s concern with rules as a matter of form, arguing that we should further assess sport through reference to a fairness that encompasses dignity and autonomy (Hart 1994; Rawls 1964; Rawls 1971).

Games, IP and AI

'Intellectual Property Law in Gaming and Artificial Intelligence' by Enrico Bonadio and Alina Trapova in Chris Bevan (ed), Handbook on Property Law & Theory (Elgar, forthcoming 2024) comments 

This chapter focuses on copyright and patent aspects of AI in gaming. As is known, copyright law protects original creative expression, while patents safeguard new inventions capable of industrial application. On the copyright side, the central classic question is what video games are in terms of protectable subject matter. This issue of the video games’ legal nature is rather old, but still pertinent topic. By now, it has been widely accepted that video games are complex subject matter from a copyright perspective, comprising not just a software, but also graphic and sound elements that contribute to the unique creative value of the game. That said, different jurisdictions adopt varying approaches to the nature of video games with some classifying them as predominantly computer programs and others dissecting the different elements in the game or treating the game as an audio-visual work as a whole. Patents instead have historically attracted less attention. Nonetheless, these can be extremely important for some hardware, software, development tools and other middleware companies, but as it currently stands the considerable cost tied to patents renders them less utilised in the field. 

Against this background, AI has stepped in to not only disrupt classical IP models, but to also offer a wide range of immersive interactive experiences for gaming; thus, opening new avenues for exploitation. As far as copyright law is concerned, the infusion of an AI element into the game provokes questions of authorship when it comes to in-game creativity. Put differently, who is the author and owner of creative expressions when they are created by players within the context of playing the game where certain interactions are driven (and often dictated) by AI? When it comes to patents and AI in this industry, central issues revolve around whether inventions covering the video games’ mechanics constitute patentable subject matter because they have technical features (and not just an unpatentable set of rules developed to be executed by hardware including a console or computer); and in general, whether patents protecting video games are too broad so as to discourage technological progress in this field. 

This chapter starts with a brief explanation of the influence of AI in gaming (Section 2). It then moves to sketch out the copyright law authorship and in-game creativity challenges (Section 3). Next, it turns to the several patent law conundrums in the field (Section 4). The final part (Section 4) concludes the discussion by arguing that while AI in gaming has been rather recently implemented, the fast pace with which this creative industry develops will certainly quickly transform the experience of video game players, but also the manner in which one understands (intellectual) property in-game.