In R v Struhs [2025] QSC 10 the Supreme Court has found that numerous defendants are guilty of manslaughter of a child as part of the expression of their faith, which included expectations that the child would undergo resurrection.
The judgment states
After the Crown opening at the commencement of the trial, I invited all accused to make an opening statement. Only one accused spoke, although he purported to speak on behalf of all. That was Brendan Stevens, the spiritual leader of a small, home-based Church of which each other accused was a member at the time of Elizabeth’s death. He asserted, amongst other things, that the trial was “just a religious persecution”, that the accused did not “have any particular care” amongst themselves how they were judged by the court and that they did not “come to fight the charge”. Despite that, most accused progressively engaged in one way or another with the trial process and, by its conclusion, all 14 accused stood to address the court. Their addresses occupied a whole sitting day on the last day of trial and most accused advanced submissions to the effect that he or she should be acquitted of any wrongdoing. ...
Until her death, Elizabeth Rose Struhs was a vibrant, happy child with, of course, her whole life ahead of her. She left a lasting impression on many with whom she came into contact on the outside, whether through her schooling or during the treatment and control of a medical condition she was first diagnosed with in 2019 – Type 1 diabetes. It cannot be doubted that she was lovingly cared for in almost every way by her parents, Jason and Kerrie Struhs , or that she was adored by every member of the Church including all other accused. However, due to a singular belief in the healing power of God which, to the minds of her parents and the other members of the Church left no room for recourse to any form of medical care or treatment, she was deprived of the one thing that would most definitely have kept her alive – insulin. Her death was inevitable once the administration of that drug was abandoned and when, encouraged and supported by the other accused, her parents refused to seek any medical assistance in the days and nights which followed until her death. ...
The Crown case against all accused was premised on the duty owed under the law by Jason and Kerrie Struhs to provide Elizabeth with such medical care and treatment as was necessary for the preservation of her life. Each had been previously dealt with by the courts for failing to do so. Each, the Crown contended, failed to do so again with the inevitable consequence that Elizabeth died.
[22] All accused, except for Jason Struhs , held to a fervent belief in the healing power of God of the kind already mentioned, that is to say, a belief that left no room for recourse to any form of medical care or treatment. This was a core belief of the Church, and no suggestion was made by the Crown that it was not genuinely held by its members. However, the Crown alleged that, when Jason Struhs joined the Church after 17 years of staunch opposition, he was persuaded by all other accused to adopt, and then act on, that core belief with the consequence that he ceased the administration of insulin to Elizabeth and, further, that they aided him through encouragement and support not to resume insulin or to seek any other form of medical care or treatment for her in the intervening days and nights before she died.
[23] In the cases against Jason Struhs and Brendan Stevens, the Crown maintained that, not only was each criminally responsible for Elizabeth’s death, but they acted in circumstances where they were recklessly indifferent to human life. This was because, it was alleged, both knew that, by ceasing insulin and shunning any other form of medical intervention, Elizabeth would probably die. Each was accordingly said to be guilty of murder because they acted (or omitted to act) with reckless indifference to Elizabeth’s life.
[24] The case against Kerrie Struhs for manslaughter was based on her refusal to fulfill the duty owed by her to provide Elizabeth with such medical care and treatment as was necessary for the preservation of her life.
[25] All other accused were said to be criminally responsible for Elizabeth’s death because, by their words and actions of encouragement and support, they both counselled and aided the unlawful killing of Elizabeth by intentionally encouraging Jason Struhs to cease providing insulin as well as medical care and treatment to Elizabeth, and by intentionally supporting his choice to continue to do so. This, it was said, amounted to manslaughter. ...
Reference has already been made to the opening statement delivered by Brendan Stevens. He emphasised that all accused were within their “rights to believe in the Word of God completely” and that they had chosen to “follow God”, echoing remarks made by Kerrie Struhs in her closing address to the jury at her trial in 2021. Mr Stevens asserted that the prosecution against all accused was a prosecution for believing in God.
[27] By the end of the trial, all accused continued to maintain the position that they were entitled to their particular belief in the healing power of God, even if that conflicted with the laws of the world. However, in addition, many accused submitted they played no role in the decision Jason Struhs made to cease the administration of insulin to Elizabeth. Similarly, it was submitted they played no role in Mr Struhs ’ choice not to resume insulin or seek any other form of medical care or treatment. All they had done, it was submitted, was to encourage Mr Struhs to believe in God. To the point, they submitted they had done nothing to persuade, encourage or support Mr Struhs in the decision and choice he made. Any influence in those respects, it was said, must have come from God, and Mr Struhs agreed with that proposition in his closing address.
1.5 Overview of the Verdicts
[28] Regardless of whether the other essential elements of the offence of murder were proved by the Crown, unless I was satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that, at some point between the time when the decision was made by Jason Struhs to cease the administration of insulin to Elizabeth (Monday, 3 January 2022) and the time when she died (Friday, 7 January 2022), he knew his failure to provide her with insulin and/or medical care and treatment would probably cause her death, Mr Struhs could not be guilty of murder. In this respect, it must be proved beyond reasonable doubt Mr Struhs knew of the probability, as opposed to the possibility, of death. Nothing less than a full realisation on his part that Elizabeth would probably die as a consequence of his failure to act would be sufficient to establish murder in this way, that is, murder by reckless indifference to her life.
[29] Whether this element of the offence was proved to the requisite standard depended on an assessment of the subjective state of mind of Mr Struhs , and not on what a reasonable person might or would have foreseen as a probable consequence of his omission. As such, the test is not objective, and it does not matter that a reasonable person in Mr Struhs ’ position would have known Elizabeth would probably die.
[30] For the reasons set out in Part 7.3, after a consideration of the whole of the evidence admissible against Mr Struhs , there remained a reasonable possibility that, in the cloistered atmosphere of the Church which enveloped Mr Struhs , and which only intensified once he made the decision to cease the administration of insulin, he was so consumed by the particular belief in the healing power of God promoted by its members that he never came to the full realisation Elizabeth would probably die, believing instead that God would not allow that to happen.
[31] I was therefore not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of proof of this essential element and, because all elements of the alleged offence must be proved before a guilty verdict may be returned, Mr Struhs must be acquitted of murder. I was, however, satisfied that Jason Struhs was guilty of manslaughter, for the reasons set out in Part 7.3.
[32] Similar considerations applied in the case against Brendan Stevens for murder. Again, in his case, I could not be satisfied after a consideration of the whole of the evidence admissible against him that Mr Stevens was possessed of the requisite state of mind at any point between the time when the decision was made by Jason Struhs to cease the administration of insulin to Elizabeth and the time when she died. In that regard, proof was required that, at some point over the period under consideration, Mr Stevens knew that Mr Struhs knew that the failure to provide insulin and/or medical care and treatment would probably cause her death. As with Mr Struhs , whether this element of the offence was proved to the requisite standard depended on an assessment of the subjective state of mind of Mr Stevens, and not on what a reasonable person might have known about Mr Struhs ’ state of mind. My reasons for coming to that conclusion are set out in Part 7.4. The Crown not having proved that element of the offence of murder, Mr Stevens must be acquitted of that charge. I was, however, satisfied that Mr Stevens was guilty of manslaughter, again, for the reasons set out in Part 7.4. ...
[106] Unsurprisingly, the duty owed by a parent to provide any child in his or her care with the necessaries of life is one of long-standing and, although there have been different formulations of the duty over time, the meaning has always been plain.
[107] To take one case from England which was decided in 1898, The Queen v Senior, the accused was a member of a sect known as the “Peculiar People”. They were opposed on religious grounds to any recourse to medicines or medical treatment, believing that to do so would “indicate a want of faith in the Lord”. The accused’s child, an infant eight or nine months old, died of pneumonia. The accused, although a “good and kind father in all other respects”, refused to arrange assistance in the form of medicine or medical treatment for his child. The child’s life would have been prolonged, and likely saved, if medical assistance had been provided. The accused was convicted in the Central Criminal Court of manslaughter by criminal negligence. His conviction was based on a breach of a duty under the Prevention of Cruelty to Children Act 1894 which made it an offence to wilfully neglect a child in a person’s care in a manner which, relevantly, resulted in injury to health. On a case stated to the Queen’s Bench Division, the conviction was affirmed. In the course of doing so, the court rejected the notion that a conscientious objection on religious grounds could afford a defence and also emphasised that the standard of care required of a parent will vary as access to medical treatment improves. Lord Russell CJ stated:
Neglect is the want of reasonable care – that is, the omission of such steps as a reasonable parent would take, such as are usually taken in the ordinary experience of mankind – that is, in such a case as the present, provided the parent had such means as would enable him to take the necessary steps. I agree with the statement in the summing-up, that the standard of neglect varies as time went on, and that many things might be legitimately looked upon as evidence of neglect in one generation, which would not have been thought so in a preceding generation, and that regard must be had to the habits and thoughts of the time. At the present day, when medical aid is within the reach of the humblest and poorest members of the community, it cannot reasonably be suggested that the omission to provide medical aid for a dying child does not amount to neglect.
[Counsel] contended that because the prisoner was proved to be an affectionate parent, and was willing to do all things for the benefit of his child, except the one thing which was necessary in the present case, he ought not to be found guilty of the offence of manslaughter, on the ground that he abstained from providing medical aid for his child in consequence of his peculiar views in the matter; but we cannot shut our eyes to the danger which might arise if we were to accede to that argument, for where is the line to be drawn? In the present case the prisoner is shewn to have had an objection to medicine; but other cases might arise, such, for instance, as the case of a child with a broken thigh, where a surgical operation was necessary, which had to be performed with the aid of an anaesthetic; could the father refuse to allow the anaesthetic to be administered? Or take the case of a child that was in danger of suffocation, so that the operation of tracheotomy was necessary in order to save its life, and an anaesthetic was required to be administered.”(Emphasis added).
[108] Grantham J, agreeing with Lord Russell CJ, added:
It may be asked, why should the line be drawn at drugs? A case might arise where it was necessary to apply an instrument where an injury had been suffered. To omit to do that would be wilful neglect. Or take the case of a fever, where quinine was necessary, or ice. Suppose the doctor were to say, ‘I know that if ice is applied the fever will abate’. Could the father refuse to allow the application of ice without being guilty of wilful neglect?” ...
[642] It will be seen from what has already been covered in this Part that the belief held by the accused in the healing power of God went through quite a rapid revision as the circumstances changed around them. On Sunday, 2 January 2022, Jason Struhs declared Elizabeth had been healed as God had promised. His misinterpretation of her blood glucose results the following morning only served to reinforce his belief, and that of the other members of the Church, in that regard. Then, when Elizabeth fell ill the next day (Tuesday, 4 January 2022), and although there was speculation about the cause (some suggesting she was suffering insulin “withdrawal symptoms” and others maintaining they were witnessing “another little trial” by God), all members of the Church were united in the belief that Elizabeth either had been or would be healed, and that is in fact what they prayed for in the days and nights which followed. Then, when Elizabeth died on the morning of Saturday, 7 January 2022, they could of course no longer maintain a belief that Elizabeth would be healed. Instead, in the 36 hours they had available to them for contemplation, all appeared to pivot to a belief that God had “allowed” Elizabeth to die so that He could raise her from the dead and, in that way, show them a miracle to re-affirm their faith. However, by the end of that period, they came to the view that God must have instead intended for Elizabeth’s death and resurrection to have a much larger audience, and, for that reason, it was necessary to bring her death to the attention of the authorities so that they, too, could bear witness to her resurrection. This would, in turn, bring the miracle of Elizabeth’s death and resurrection to the attention of the World which was, many of them contended, in such a state of faithless degeneration. Ever since, the members of the Church have proclaimed Elizabeth will be raised from the dead in their lifetime. ...
[683] I approached the assessment of the honesty and reliability of the versions provided by the accused to investigating police – whether in a recorded conversation or interview or in a police witness statement – with a degree of circumspection. There were a couple of reasons for this.
[684] First, throughout the trial, I encountered several recurring themes in the versions provided by the accused and their closing addresses about significant events in the life of the Church. When asked about these events, several accused related them in a remarkably similar way, almost as though the event had become something of a parable to be revisited and retold as part of their faith as members of the Church. So, for example, the fact Elizabeth emerged from her hospitalisation and treatment in 2019 without some form of permanent disability was held out as the work of God and a miracle. Similarly, the prosecution, conviction and imprisonment of Kerrie Struhs in 2021 was seen as the work of God because it resulted in Jason Struhs joining the Church and being “healed of all his anger”, something that was also recounted as a miracle. Likewise, many accused spoke of Jason Struhs ’ decision to cease the administration of insulin as a “step in faith” and the hope for healing of Elizabeth as a “victory”. The point here is not only that these views were widely held, but they were held and spoken about in the same terms by many of the accused. The result was often a generalised account, easily digested and just as easily recalled. Although what one accused told police was not admissible in evidence against any other accused, this phenomenon of speaking in parables emerged clearly enough from a consideration of evidence admissible against all accused such as the s 93A interview of REK and, it might be added in the case of all accused other than Jason Struhs , the Tripodi evidence. I was therefore careful to ensure as best I could that I was acting on the particular accused’s genuine recall as opposed to something that was merely part of a narrative developed within the Church.
[685] Second, there was a marked commonality in the justifications sought to be advanced by the accused for their conduct. One common justification was that Elizabeth did not want to be on insulin and they were, in that sense, acting in accordance with her wishes. It scarcely needs to be said that the wishes of an eight-year-old child, whatever they may have truly been, were entirely irrelevant to the proof of the charges before the court. Another was the fiction which was advanced to the effect they had done nothing other than encourage Jason Struhs to believe in God or, to like effect, that Jason Struhs was his own man and decided of his own accord to cease the administration of insulin. Those claims were made by several accused and rose to prominence in many of the closing addresses. The other frequent claim was that they were the subject of a religious persecution, despite the whole case being concerned with the refusal on the part of Jason and Kerrie Struhs to fulfil a duty cast on every person in this State who has the care of a child under the age of 16 years. Again, the point is not that many of the accused advanced the same justifications; it is that those justifications might have come from a jointly arrived position and, as such, may not have had a proper foundation in the evidence admissible against the individual accused under consideration. ...
When assessing whether Elizabeth’s death was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the failure to provide insulin and/or medical care and treatment to Elizabeth, I assessed what a reasonable person would have foreseen in the position of Mr Struhs , that is to say, a reasonable person of the same age, experience and knowledge of the same facts or circumstances as Mr Struhs , with ordinary fortitude and strength of mind (excluding attributes of a purely subjective type such as his religious beliefs).
[766] Otherwise, the proven facts speak for themselves. Mr Struhs ’ failure constituted such an egregious departure from the standard of care a reasonable member of the community would observe in the same circumstances as to amount to a crime against the State that is deserving of punishment. Mr Struhs ’ complete abdication of the duty he owed to his child, viewed objectively, involved grave moral guilt and disregard for human life. It constitutes, at the very minimum, criminal negligence. Lastly, for the reasons previously expressed, Mr Struhs ’ failure was unlawful, no defence having been raised on the evidence.
[767] Having already found to the required standard that Elizabeth is dead, I was for these reasons also satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that Mr Struhs caused her death in circumstances where: (1) he had a duty to provide medical care and treatment to her necessary for her life; (2) he breached that duty by failing to provide insulin and/or medical care and treatment to her; (3) her death was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of that failure; and (4) his failure was such as to amount to criminal negligence. Lastly, I was satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that Mr Struhs ’ failure to provide Elizabeth with insulin and/or medical care and treatment was unlawful.
Conclusion [768] Jason Struhs is not guilty of murder but he is guilty of manslaughter.
