Unwell

Another 'stolen honour' incident, withy the ABC reporting that Troy Daniel Barnes has been fined $2,500 Parramatta Local Court and placed on a three-year good behaviour bond after pleading guilty to six charges regarding impersonation of an ADF member. 

Barnes resigned as a NSW POlice senior constable last year after colleagues became suspicious of dramatic war stories he told over nine months, including claims he had beemn awarded service medals, had met warlords, witnessed a woman and child being killed, and jumped from a helicopter during tours of duty in Afghanistan and Iraq. 

The Court heard he took "props" to work, including a knife and a telescope, to substantiate the claims and showed colleagues photographs in which he had photoshopped his face onto images of two decorated veterans. 

 Barnes was initially charged with 29 offences (facing a maximum penalty of six months' jail and $3,300 fine for each charge). He sought to have them dismissed on mental health grounds, with his lawyer arguing that suffered post-traumatic stress disorder after a decade in the police force where movement to a desk job resulted in a "loss of identity". She commented "I'd describe it as locker room talk to his colleagues to perhaps make himself seem more appealing".

Judgment

Singh v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCA 755 is one of those quotable judgments re the AAT, with Perram J stating

[19] I should briefly mention the reasons of the Federal Circuit Court. These were at [59]-[60] and [63]:

Mr Karp’s reference to the evidence of the particular witnesses in paragraph (a) did not identify any material or significant evidence that was not the subject of genuine intellectual consideration by the Tribunal. The Tribunal expressly referred in paragraph 6 of its reasons to the evidence of witnesses and further referred to the evidence of witnesses in its reasons, as summarised above. There is no basis to find that the Tribunal did not take into account the evidence of the witnesses, notwithstanding Mr Karp’s submissions to the contrary. There was no material or significant evidence identified by the witnesses that the Tribunal was required to further expressly engage with in the circumstances of the findings made by the Tribunal in this case. 

The Tribunal does not have to refer to every item of evidence before the Tribunal and is not required to specifically discuss and evaluate every piece of evidence. The Tribunal did refer to the witnesses, and the fifth witness’s evidence was summarised at paragraph 28 of the Tribunal’s reasons. The Tribunal, however, was not bound to accept the witnesses’ opinions. It is apparent that the Tribunal took into account the applicant’s mother’s views as to there being a marriage between the sponsor and the applicant and it also expressly referred to the applicant’s mother’s evidence about having lived with the parties. 

... The Tribunal also made express reference to the number of witnesses advanced in the submissions as having indicated there was a genuine relationship. There is no basis to infer that the Tribunal overlooked this submission or the evidence. The Court does not accept that there was any material or significant evidence that required further express consideration by the Tribunal in respect of the persons identified by the particulars to particular (a). The Tribunal reasons as summarised above evidence that the Tribunal had a genuine intellectual engagement with evidence and submissions advanced by the applicant. No jurisdictional error is made out by particular (a).

[20] For the reasons I have given, this is entirely erroneous. It reflects a complete lack of intellectual engagement with the argument which was being put and is indicative of a judicial method in which meaningless phrases are unthinkingly gathered from the authorities like twigs and patched together in some kind of forensic bird’s nest. Judgments like this are a blot on the judicial department of government. The appeal must be allowed with costs. Mr Karp also raised a similar argument in relation to the evidence of Mr Manjinder Singh and a psychologist, Mr Gachon. It is not necessary to deal with these in circumstances where the decision of the Tribunal is to be set aside. 

[21] For completeness, it should be noted that the next hearing in the Tribunal will be the fourth time it will have attempted to determine the Appellant’s review application according to law. The first decision, made on 2 July 2015, was set aside by consent when the parties agreed in the Federal Circuit Court that the Tribunal had failed to consider the mandatory matters in reg 1.15A(3) of the Regulations, which include the very same question involved in this appeal: ie the social aspects of the relationship. The second Tribunal decision made on 2 November 2016 was set aside when it came to light that the second Tribunal had extensively plagiarised the first Tribunal’s reasons. The third Tribunal’s decision made on 22 November 2019 will now be set aside because it failed to consider evidence which was favourable to the Appellant under reg 1.15A(3). The Appellant’s initial application for review of the delegate’s decision was filed with the Tribunal as long ago as 12 December 2013 and the Tribunal has now been considering this entirely straightforward matter for nearly 8 long years. It is to be hoped that the Appellant, who is still a relatively young man, lives a long enough life to see the Tribunal deal with his review application according to law. It is by no means too much to expect that the Tribunal takes into account the matters which by law it is required to take into account, that it does not unwisely plagiarise earlier decisions which have been set aside and that it remembers to consider not only the evidence which is unfavourable to the Appellant but also that which is in his favour. Public confidence in the Tribunal resides in its reputation for competence. The conduct of the present review application is apt to undermine that confidence.

Strawmen

In Landry (Re), 2021 ABQB 390 Associate Chief Justice J.D. Rooke in the Alberta Court of Queen's Bench deals with pseudolegal claims, stating

  [2] Ms. Landry is currently subject to court access restrictions as a consequence of Ms. Landry employing Organized Pseudolegal Commercial Argument [OPCA] (Meads v Meads, 2012 ABQB 571 [Meads]) strategies to evade debts in three Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench actions: Scotia Mortgage Corporation v Landry, 2018 ABQB 856, court access restrictions imposed 2018 ABQB 951 [Landry #2]. ...

[4] As I understand Ms. Landry, her proposed litigation activities involve two separate family dispute scenarios: 1. Ms. Landry has four children with two fathers. The fathers currently have custody of the four children. Ms. Landry seeks access to those children, and that the children reside with her, at least in part. Ms. Landry makes many allegations of misconduct by one of the two fathers, GJ, who is the father of three children with Ms. Landry. The relationship Ms. Landry has described between herself and GJ is high conflict. 2. Ms. Landry is currently living with, and in a relationship with, BS. BS has two children from a former relationship with CH. Ms. Landry indicates there are currently legal proceedings ongoing between BS and CH, and “[m]y name has been brought into” that proceeding: Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench Docket FL10 08018. 

[5] What complicates this matter is that the package received from Ms. Landry includes statements, concepts, and documents that are clearly OPCA in character. OPCA strategies and ideas are legally incorrect and abusive strategies marketed to gullible, ill-informed, and often criminal anti-government activists: Meads. OPCA schemes are typically applied to evade income tax, as a “get out of jail free card”, to attack government and institutional actors, or as a way to purportedly nullify debts and get free money: Unrau v National Dental Examining Board, 2019 ABQB 283 at para 178 [Unrau #2]. Employing pseudolaw is always an abuse of court processes, and warrants immediate court response: Unrau #2 at paras 180, 670-671. 

[6] Ms. Landry in her materials states that she has been educating herself about OPCA misconceptions, and recognizes these ideas abuse and misuse court processes. She agrees that steps such as court access restrictions “... are necessary in some cases ... for the greater good and I see that. ...”. Ms. Landry indicates she has reviewed Meads and academic literature written about pseudolaw. She says in 2018 she did not understand the implications of her actions, and: ... It was not until recently that I had the realization of the importance of the Court system clamping down on people who employ abusive Organized Pseudolegal Commercial Arguments. She states she has “... developed respect and knowledge of the Court system ...” as a result of her being subject to the Landry #2 court access restrictions, and her educating herself about pseudolaw. 

[7] A person who is subject to court access restrictions is presumed to engage in illegitimate litigation, unless the Court is satisfied otherwise: Re Thompson, 2018 ABQB 87 at para 19, leave to appeal denied 2018 ABCA 111, leave to appeal to SCC refused, 38204 (14 February 2019) [Re Thompson]. However, the threshold for a valid leave to file application is low. As Nielsen ACJ stated in Re Thompson at paras 25-26: ... to initiate a court proceeding in the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench [the applicant] is required to “demonstrate” that the proceeding is “not an abuse of process” and “there are reasonable grounds” for his proposed litigation. ... The applicant must establish “reasonable grounds” for its litigation, and “[depose] fully and completely to the facts and circumstances surrounding the proposed claim or proceeding”. This standard is not onerous, since it is no more than mustering the evidence that a litigant would, in any case, require for their intended litigation. ... That information is critical to a reviewing judge being able to say whether or not a proposed action or application is an abuse of process. Provision of that evidentiary foundation falls to the person who applies for leave. ... 

[8] From my review of Ms. Landry’s materials, I believe she is attempting to satisfy that standard. She has, for example, in her Affidavits indicated specific alleged facts, and provides an explanation of why certain outcomes should occur. She has provided documents and recordings that she says validates her claims. 

[9] The problem, as I have observed above, is that Ms. Landry’s applications and materials still include OPCA strategies. An application for leave to file may be rejected where the submissions exhibit indicia of abusive litigation: ET v Calgary Catholic School District No 1, 2017 ABCA 349, leave to appeal to SCC refused, 38081 (8 November 2018); Alberta Treasury Branches v Hok, 2018 ABQB 316; Thompson v Alberta Labour Relations Board, 2018 ABQB 220; Re Botar, 2018 ABQB 193; Trinity Place Foundation of Alberta v Templanza, 2019 ABQB 45; Onischuk (Re), 2019 ABQB 229; Fletcher v Davidson & Williams LLP, 2019 ABQB 396; Ubah v Canadian Natural Resources Limited, 2021 ABQB 208; Knutson (Re), 2021 ABQB 367. The OPCA component of Ms. Landry’s materials is a clear basis to reject Ms. Landry’s filings: Unrau #2 at paras 180, 670-671. 

[10] I am mindful of my obligations, pursuant to Pintea v Johns, 2017 SCC 23, to self-represented litigants, such as Ms. Landry. I therefore will take several steps: 1. Ms. Landry’s leave to file application is rejected as an attempt to abuse the Court’s processes via OPCA concepts. 2. Paragraph 38, subparagraph 6 of Landry #2, states: “An application that is dismissed may not be made again, directly or indirectly.” That provision does not apply to Ms. Landry’s April 30, 2021 leave to file application. She is permitted to make a further leave to file application, if she chooses, subject to the guidelines detailed below. 3. The remainder of this decision will review Ms. Landry’s April 30, 2021 materials and provide information as to a number of issues, so that, if Ms. Landry wishes to make a valid, non-OPCA, leave to file application, she will be better positioned to do so. 

[11] In short, Ms. Landry says she wants to participate in Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench proceedings in relation to certain family disputes, and to do so in a valid, lawful manner. This decision is intended to assist her in doing that. 

II. Family Dispute #2: BS and CH 

[12] The facts, as I understand them, are that BS and CH are separated parents of two children. There are presently family proceedings initiated by CH before the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench, Docket No. FL10 08018. Ms. Landry lives with BS. Ms. Landry does not indicate that she has any legal rights in relation to the children of BS and CH. For example, she is not a guardian of the children. 

[13] If that is correct, then Ms. Landry has no standing to initiate litigation involving the children. She is a third-party to that dispute. Her Application #2 at paras 5-8, 18-19, 21-22 purports to involve or relate to CH and the children of BS and CH. It appears Application #2 is a “parenting order”, as defined in the Family Law Act, SA 2003, c F-4.5, ss 32-34. Applications for parenting orders may be made by one or more guardians: Family Law Act, s 32(1). Ms. Landry, therefore, appears to have no status to make an application of this kind. 

[14] That role falls to BS. Since BS is not apparently subject to court access restrictions, he does not require leave to file an application relating to his children in the FL10 08018 action. Ms. Landry may provide evidence in that matter, for example by affidavit, but legislation does not permit Ms. Landry a larger role than that. This is BS’s family, not hers. 

[15] My review of Ms. Landry’s materials indicates that BS also subscribes to pseudolaw. The six-page typewritten letter includes this passage: I am unsure as to whether or not [BS] can enter public courts as he is not in possession of the original security and has returned the birth certificate (reg # [XXXX-XX-XXXXXX]) to the Office of the Minister of Finance of Canada, indorsed and exempt from levy. (RN 517 496 450 CA) I am with the understanding that it may not be in [BS’s] best interest to ever mention RN numbers or securities in public courts. [BS] is with the understanding that he is not within her Majesty the Queen Et al organization (Canada), is in Canada but not “Of” Canada and that International Laws apply. 

[16] Further, the Personal Property Registry Verification Statement states there are eight “Debtors”, who are Ms. Landry, BS, BS’s two children, and Ms. Landry’s four children. The “Collateral: General” for each “Debtor” is defined in this manner: Any and all credit and/or debt derived from the original Security Reg# [number in the format XXXX-XX-XXXXXX] up to and including but not limited to $500,000,000.00 The numbers in these collateral descriptions conform with Alberta birth certificate numbers. 

[17] The “Secured Party” for the Personal Property Registry Verification Statement is “2323676 Alberta Ltd.”, which has the same telephone number as BS, uses the same mailing address as where Ms. Landry is living with BS, and has an email address that resembles BS’s name. 

[18] The Court is well aware of what the references to an “original security” and “birth certificate” mean, as well as the claims that BS is “not within her Majesty the Queen Et al organization (Canada) ... and that International Laws apply.” This indicates BS subscribes to “Strawman Theory”, a completely fabricated set of claims that birth certificates are a kind of contract that creates government authority over “flesh and blood” human beings through a conduit called a “legal person” or “Strawman”. The Strawman is also purportedly associated with a secret bank account, that holds vast sums of money, which is why the Personal Property Registry Verification Statement indicates that there an “original Security Reg#” that is the same as the birth certificate numbers. 

[19] The fact that BS has sent his birth certificate to government officials is meaningless. Nothing has happened because of that. A birth certificate is not a “security”. It is an identification document - nothing else. BS is still subject to Canadian law, and not “International Laws”, whatever those might be. Putting Canada Post registration number stickers on documents has no legal effect. That has no more legal relevance than putting a gold star or a banana sticker on a document. These practices are pseudolegal nonsense. 

[20] The good news for BS is he may enter Canadian courts just like any other person. I stress: BS is a person in law, and he always will be a person in law. In fact, if BS were somehow to find a way to eliminate his person in law status, then, under the English common law, BS would be property, a slave: Pomerleau v Canada (Revenue Agency), 2017 ABQB 123 at paras 89-95 [Pomerleau]. Fortunately enough for BS and Ms. Landry, that is impossible in Canada. 

[21] While I commend Ms. Landry for her educating herself concerning the differences between law and pseudolaw, she and BS need to understand that references to or attempts to implement Strawman Theory have serious consequences. She should read Meads at paras 417-466, Pomerleau at paras 67-88, Potvin (Re), 2018 ABQB 652 at paras 83-92, and Donald J Netolitzky, “Organized Pseudolegal Commercial Arguments and Magic and Ceremony” (2018) 55:4 Alta L Rev 1045 to better understand why Strawman Theory is nothing but a myth. Further, Ms. Landry and BS should know that simply attempting to use Strawman Theory creates the presumption that the person who advances these ideas does so in bad faith, and for an abusive and ulterior purpose: Fiander v Mills, 2015 NLCA 31 at paras 37-40. 

[22] I stress this point because the Personal Property Registry Verification Statement appears to be an attempt to access fictional secret Strawman “birth bond” bank accounts, and obtain special extralegal status. While BS and Ms. Landry name themselves as “debtors”, and apparently are behind this document, BS and Ms. Landry have also included their children in this pseudolegal scheme. 

[23] Attempting to implicate children in pseudolaw processes is a very negative indicator of parental fitness. Canadian courts have ruled that exhibiting OPCA beliefs is a serious reason to conclude that a person is not a fit parent. Espousing OPCA beliefs means that a person is not a suitable to be a child’s guardian or have custody of and access to the child: H v GJ, 2013 BCPC 242 at paras 136-166; MDC v TC, 2012 NBQB 376 at paras 19-20; Droit de la famille - 123381, 2012 QCCS 6120 at paras 6-8, 12, 111, 227, aff’d 2013 QCCA 725; CP (Re), 2019 ABQB 310 at para 35; CP (Re), 2019 ABQB 388 at para 34-43; and AVI v MHVB, 2020 ABQB 489 at paras 124-128. 

[24] In CP (Re), 2019 ABQB 388, Thomas J concluded, at para 43, that: “... The false, paranoid, and anti-social beliefs that [the OPCA father] now espouses, and his illegal and abusive pseudolegal attempts to defeat Court and legal authority, means he is not a suitable guardian or parent. ...”. That is the potential consequence that faces BS and Ms. Landry if they continue to pursue OPCA concepts in relation to their children. 

[25] I stress once again, any documents and processes purportedly undertaken by BS and Ms. Landry following Strawman Theory, and claims that birth certificates have hidden, secret significance, are a nothing. Ms. Landry and BS obtained no benefit from taking those steps. They will now suffer no negative consequences if they abandon these practices. What they choose to do moving forward is up to them. They now have no excuse to not understand the serious potential consequences of pursuing further ineffective OPCA methods and theories. 

III. Family Dispute #1: Ms. Landry and Her Children 

[26] Ms. Landry’s Application #2 seeks a number of steps concerning her children, their fathers, and Ms. Landry’s sister. I am not going to respond to the proposed litigation, or detail Ms. Landry’s allegations. The substance of those will be evaluated if Ms. Landry submits a second leave to file application following on these reasons. 

[27] That said, I do have several observations. First, Ms. Landry’s current documents appear to indicate there have been family subject court proceedings that involve the custody of Ms. Landry’s children. If correct, then Ms. Landry needs to provide at least a general record of that litigation. Ms. Landry also indicates there are one or more existing parenting arrangements. If Ms. Landry seeks to challenge those, then she needs to provide the Court with those documents as part of her affidavit background, so the reviewing justice knows the status quo. 

[28] Beyond that, Ms. Landry has made a number of pseudolaw references that should be avoided in the future. She, too, says she is “... unsure as to whether or not I can enter public courts as I am not in possession of the original security and I have returned the birth certificate (reg# [XXXX-XX-XXXXXX]) to the Office of the Minister of Finance of Canada, indorsed and exempt from levy. ...” Ms. Landry’s situation is the same as that of BS. What she did with her birth certificate is a nothing. Her status to access courts, and that she is subject to Canadian law, is the same as everyone else who is located in Canada. That has never changed - aside from her ongoing court access restrictions. 

[29] Ms. Landry also wrote: I have learned that a public court venue is not a place to be verbalizing that “I am a woman”, “I have God given rights”, “Canada recognizes the Supremacy of God”, “I am the beneficiary”, “the constitution’ etc etc. The public courts only recognize “persons” and that there is no such thing as an alive “persons” that could possibly be recognized as a man or a woman in a public court venue. I did not know before and maybe that was something that I needed to learn the hard way by witnessing reactions in court venues, being tested and forced to see the beast from the inside. This is Strawman Theory nonsense. Ms. Landry is a person. That is all. There is only her. The same is true for how she signed her handwritten letter, first as “vanessa” and then “by: [signature] - personal representative”. There is only one Vanessa Amy Landry. She is not a “personal representative” of herself. 

[30] Most of the rest of that letter is also nonsense. The claim to “... attach [my] bond to all liabilities, debts, harm, or damages that may be caused to my person ...” means nothing. Judges do not have a “bond”, but, instead, are protected by absolute immunity to legal proceedings based on judicial decision-making: Jordan v Nation, 2013 ABCA 117, leave to appeal to SCC refused, 35405 (19 September 2013), citing Morier v Rivard, 1985 CanLII 26 (SCC), [1985] 2 SCR 716, 23 DLR (4th) 1. What Ms. Landry has written is a threat of litigation on abusive OPCA bases, and I am, unfortunately, very well aware that OPCA litigants carry through on those threats against judges, albeit without any success: e.g. Williams v Payette, 2019 FC 800; Potvin v Rooke, 2019 FCA 285; Rooke v Williams, 2020 FC 1070.