01 June 2021

Genealogy

'Traditional Laws Meet Emerging Biotechnologies: The Impact of Genetic Genealogy on Indigenous Land Title in Australia' by Elizabeth Watt, Emma Kowal, and Carmen Cummings in (2020) 79(2) Human Organization comments 

The increasing popularity and availability of genetic testing has the potential to play into debates surrounding forms of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander land ownership known as “native title.” This paper draws on research with applied anthropologists working in native title, and a review of descriptions of native title holders in existing determinations, to address three key questions: Are native title holders and claimants interested in using genetic genealogy for claiming native title or resolving membership disputes? If so, can this biotechnology offer them the kind of information they seek? And finally, does the legal framework allow or support its use for these purposes? Our findings highlight the importance of disseminating current information about genetic genealogy among Indigenous Australians and having frank conversations about the opportunities and limits of genetic technologies in this context. 

 The authors state 

On November 8, 2017, the second author of this paper received an unexpected email. It was sent by a lawyer representing three Indigenous citizens of the Australian state of Queensland. They had been dismissed from their roles as cultural officers in the Barada Barna Indigenous Corporation (BBIC) a year earlier. All three were members of one family, who’d been active in the Barada Barna people’s campaign to claim their ancestral lands under the Native Title Act, 1993 (Cth). Shortly after the claim succeeded in 2016, the board of BBIC, the Registered Native Title Body Corporate (RNTBC) set up to hold and manage the group’s native title, suspended their family’s membership — claiming they’d failed to provide evidence of their biological connection to the Barada Barna people. Because group membership was an “inherent requirement” of the cultural officer role, the three were also dismissed from their positions (Roos v. Winnaa Pty Ltd, FWC 3568 [2018]). 

The key questions in the Fair Work Commission case that followed revolved around the origins of the aggrieved family’s ancestor, Kitchener Brown. Authorities had removed Kitchener from Barada Barna land in 1908, along with Barada Barna children that he referred to as his “brothers.” A century later, the descendants of these brothers oversaw the return of Kitchener’s remains to Barada Barna land (Hamilton 2008). However, following the successful native title claim, these presumed relatives changed their position—arguing that Kitchener was in fact an adopted, rather than biological, broth- er. This means Kitchener’s ancestors did not meet the strict RNTBC membership rules, based on the group’s description in their native title determination. To prove otherwise, the Board members had called on Kitchener’s descendants to take DNA tests. They refused, stating the request was “offensive and culturally inappropriate” (personal communication). 

This is where the second author, a medical and cultural anthropologist who has researched the use of genetics in Aboriginal communities since 2007, came in. She was asked to provide an expert testimony about the cultural basis of this re- fusal and whether it was theoretically possible to demonstrate a biological connection between Kitchener’s descendants and their presumed Barada Barna relatives through DNA testing. Ultimately, the testimony was not decisive in the case. The Commissioners found in favor of Kitchener’s family, arguing that the RNTBC did not truly believe they were not rightful members at the time of their dismissal, as their membership had been suspended but not cancelled (Fair Work Commission v. Winnaa Pty Ltd, FWC 3568, C2017/371 [2018]). But the request for expert testimony itself raises broader questions. While there have been informal calls by Aboriginal people to “prove” their identity through DNA tests (Bevilacqua 2002; Noble 2015; Wood 2002), this is the first time (to our knowledge) that such a request has been recorded in a legal case. Is this a sign of things to come? Will the increased availability of genetic ancestry testing in Australia affect Aboriginal people’s access to native title rights in the future? 

In this paper, we address these two broad questions through three smaller ones: Are native title holders and claimants interested in using genetic genealogy for claiming native title or resolving membership disputes? If so, can this biotechnology offer them the kind of information they seek? And does the legal framework allow or support its use for these purposes? To answer these social, scientific, and legal questions, we draw on two primary data sources: a survey of forty anthropologists working in native title and a review of descriptions of native title holders—descriptions that provide the basis for RNTBC membership rules—in 213 of the existing 347 native title determinations. 

Combining and supplementing these two datasets, we offer some insight into the future use of genetics in Aboriginal land claims. Our research suggests that, while there is some interest in using genealogical DNA tests to prove native title, the hopes upon which this interest is built are generally mis- guided. It is highly unlikely that genealogical genetics will offer proof of descent from the original owners for specific regions, and such evidence is not in fact required by courts. But there is a greater—and growing—interest in using these tests to resolve membership disputes, and the scientific and legal scope for this application is potentially much greater. Genetic kinship tests are able to establish biological relation- ships between living people with increasing precision, and the descriptions of native title holders in Federal Court determinations increasingly contain lists of “apical ancestors” (similar to the “base roles” of Native American tribes).

31 May 2021

US Personality Rights

'Endorsing After Death' by Andrew Gilden in (2022) 63 William and Mary Law Review comments 

An endorsement is an act of giving one’s public support to a person, product, service, or cause; accordingly, it might seem impossible for someone to make an endorsement after they have died. Nevertheless, posthumous endorsements have become commonplace in social media marketing and increasingly have been embraced by trademark and unfair competition laws. Entities representing Marilyn Monroe, for example, have successfully brought trademark claims for the unauthorized use of Marilyn’s name, have successfully brought false endorsement claims under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, and regularly have promoted products through the Instagram-verified ‘@marilynmonroe’ page. Marilyn Monroe survives today as a highly-paid celebrity endorser even though she died almost 60 years and her ‘Estate’ is controlled by individuals with zero personal connection to her. 

 This paper closely examines the growing body of posthumous endorsement law and sets forth a new framework that better respects both the agency of the deceased as well as the continuing bonds between the deceased, their fans, and their families. Intellectual property scholars have critiqued other forms of postmortem IP, such as copyright and publicity rights, but this article shows that posthumous endorsement rights pose unique and largely unaddressed concerns. First, these rights frequently pose a continuity problem: courts have allowed endorsement rights to shift from the decedent to their heirs to unrelated third parties without acknowledging just how differently situated each of these entities is with respect to the communicated endorsement. Second, these rights pose discursive problems: they allow rightsholders to speak in the ‘official’ voice of the decedent, leveraging the individual’s continuing cultural influence into commercial and political endeavors that emerge long after their death. Third, these rights pose dignitary concerns: individuals are often symbolically brought back from the dead without their consent and forced to speak on behalf of entities that have purchased their goodwill on the open market …

Lex Informatica

'From Lex Informatica to the Control Revolution' by Julie Cohen in (2021) 35 Berkeley Technology Law Journal comments 

Legal scholarship on the encounter between networked digital technologies and law has focused principally on how legal and policy processes should respond to new technological developments and has spent much less time considering what that encounter might signify for the shape of legal institutions themselves. This essay focuses on the latter question. Within fields like technology studies, labor history, and economic sociology, there is a well-developed tradition of studying the ways that new information technologies and the ‘control revolution’ they enabled – in brief, a quantum leap in the capacity for highly granular oversight and management – have elicited long-term, enduring changes in the structure and operation of economic organizations. I begin by considering some lessons of work in that tradition for law understood as a set of organizations constituted for the purpose of governance. Next, I turn the lens inward, offering some observations about techlaw scholarship that are essentially therapeutic. The disruptions of organizational change have affected scholars who teach, think, and write about techlaw in ways more profound than are commonly acknowledged and discussed. It seems fitting, in a symposium dedicated to Joel Reidenberg’s life and work, to use the process of grief as a device for exploring the arc of techlaw scholarship over its first quarter century. The fit is surprisingly good and the takeaways relatively clear: If, as I intend to suggest, the organizational forms that underpin our familiar legal institutions have been in the process of evolving out from under us, we still have choices to make about how legal institutions optimized for the information economy will be constituted. Finally, I identify two sets of important considerations that should inform the processes of organizational and institutional redesign.

TRIPS

'TRIPS Through A Military Looking Glass' by Peter Drahos comments 

 The paper draws on an argument from Hanns Ullrich that the Agreement on the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) suffers for a legitimacy gap. This gap takes the form of an external conditioning of states’ sovereignty over innovation in markets. The paper argues there is a less-discussed and somewhat darker legitimacy gap of TRIPS. This gap relates to the US national security state (NSS) and its use of intellectual property to regulate globally innovation in weapons systems. The paper traces the links between the NSS, intellectual property and weapons innovation from World War II to the present day. TRIPS has lost legitimacy in the eyes of the NSS because it has failed to hold back China’s innovation in defense-sensitive areas such as 5G technology. Drawing on the work of Carl Schmitt, the paper offers a phenomenological reading of the NSS’ view of legitimacy. The paper finishes with an examination of the implications of Schmitt’s friend-enemy distinction for the future of intellectual property and the US-China relationship.