Showing posts with label Intellectual Property. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Intellectual Property. Show all posts

15 October 2026

IP Administration

The Explanatory Statement for the Regulatory Reform Omnibus Bill 2026 (Cth) - now passed - states 

Schedule 1: Amendments to simplify business regulation 

The amendments in Schedule 1 make regulatory improvements for businesses by simplifying business reporting obligations, adding targeted safeguards for businesses that rely on intellectual property (IP) processes and easing administrative processes for plant breeders and importers. These amendments reflect that regulation affects every business operating in Australia, and that well-targeted regulation creates productive environments to encourage business investment while maintaining important safeguards for the community. 

Part 1 amends the Trade Marks Act 1995 to broaden the regulation-making power for the awarding of costs in contested proceedings before the Registrar of Trade Marks. This will enable the regulations to provide for costs to be awarded outside of the standard scale in limited circumstances, such as where a party is acting unreasonably or obstructively in a way that increases costs of another party. This is intended to deter such behaviour and ensure proceedings run efficiently and effectively. 

Part 2 amends the Trade Marks Act 1995 and the Patents Act 1990 to provide a regulation making power to close the re-registration loophole for patent and trade marks attorneys. The amendments will enable complaints and disciplinary processes in relation to an attorney's conduct while registered to continue even if the attorney becomes unregistered. The amendments also enable regulations to prescribe different re-registration requirements for different classes of individuals and companies, for example by imposing more stringent requirements for those who are or were the subject of disciplinary proceedings. 

Part 3 amends the Plant Breeder's Rights Act 1994 to provide a grace period for payment of renewal fees for Plant Breeder's Rights (PBR). The amendments simplify when the renewal fee must be paid and the consequences of non-payment. Part 3 also provides a simplified mechanism for handling an offer by the holder to surrender the PBR. The amendments will improve the PBR renewal and surrender process and more closely align processes with other IP rights. 

Part 4 amends the Trade Marks Act 1995 so that references in the Act and its regulations to the Madrid Protocol are as in force for Australia from time to time. Part 4 also inserts a regulation-making power to apply, adopt or incorporate a matter from the Regulations under the Madrid Protocol as in force from time to time. This reduces the need for frequent amendments to the Trade Marks Regulations 1995 to keep them consistent with the Madrid system, and provides greater certainty for users of the system. 

Part 4 also amends the Trade Marks Act 1995 so that the classes of goods and services for trade mark registration are the classes in the Classification established under the Nice Agreement, as in force for Australia from time to time. This change avoids the need to periodically update regulations when the Classification is updated. It also supports Australia's continued alignment with the international classification system used for trade marks.

GRATK

The Australian Parliament's Joint Committee on Treaties in its latest report addresses the WIPO Treaty on Intellectual Property, Genetic Resources and Associated Traditional Knowledge (aka GRATK) as follows 

The WIPO Treaty on Intellectual Property, Genetic Resources and Associated Traditional Knowledge (GRATK Treaty) was referred to the Committee on 13 May 2026. 
 
The Committee received 13 submissions and held two public hearings in Canberra on 29 June 2026 and 6 July 2026. A list of submissions can be found in Appendix A and the details of the hearings and witnesses can be found in Appendix B. The transcripts of evidence from the public hearings can be accessed through the Committee’s website. 
 
Overview and background 
 
The GRATK Treaty creates an international framework for the introduction of a disclosure of source requirement into patent systems. The GRATK Treaty was created by the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), the United Nations agency responsible for setting international norms for intellectual property (IP). The GRATK Treaty was adopted at WIPO in Geneva on 24 May 2024 and was open to WIPO Member States for signatures for one year following its adoption.Australia signed the GRATK Treaty on 12 December 2024. 
 
The disclosure of source requirement will require applicants of patent protection to disclose the source of knowledge for inventions based on any: Genetic Resource (GR): any material of plant, animal, microbial or other origin containing functional units of heredity (not including human genetic resources) Associated Traditional Knowledge (ATK): knowledge of Indigenous Peoples of local communities associated with a GR. The above requirements are intended to increase transparency in patents systems to promote recognition and respect for Indigenous Peoples’ culture and knowledge. The GRATK Treaty is the first WIPO treaty to include specific provisions for Indigenous Peoples and local communities.
 
Justification 
 
As a biodiverse country with many GRs and Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples with deep knowledge of GRs, the GRATK Treaty aligns strongly with Australia’s interests. 
 
Australia has considered the introduction of a disclosure of source requirement for several years, particularly considering concerns raised about Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander knowledge appearing in the IP system. Introducing a disclosure of source requirement allows the Government to actively demonstrate its commitment to elevating Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander knowledge systems. Furthermore, the entry into force of the GRATK Treaty contributes to the Australian Government’s policy of advancing economic empowerment and lasting economic security for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples. 
 
A disclosure of source requirement for patents based on GRs and ATK will provide greater visibility of source information, which is not always clear. The provision and visibility of more information will allow for greater understanding of what GRs or ATK is being used as a basis for innovation and commercialisation in the patent system. The additional information will also support IP Australia’s examination of patents, which may further prevent the granting of erroneous patents. 
 
Australia played an active role in the WIPO negotiations to conclude and adopt the GRATK Treaty. The entry into force of the GRATK Treaty will provide increased recognition for the traditional knowledge of Indigenous Peoples and local communities and support a patent system with diverse innovation. The ratification of the GRATK Treaty would cement Australia’s role in leading IP approaches that foster economic opportunities for a diversity of actors. 
 
Through the ratification of the GRATK Treaty, Australia would become a Contracting Party to the GRATK Treaty. This means that Australia would be able to influence the future of the GRATK Treaty through participation in the Assembly.  Australia would also be able to maintain its ability to influence other ongoing international discussions relating to enabling Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples to protect and economically benefit from traditional knowledge and culture.
 
Furthermore, the GRATK Treaty provides an international standard for the implementation of disclosure of source requirements in patent processes. Consistency across jurisdictions through international standards assists patent applicants by minimising the navigation of disparate rules. 
 
Obligations 
 
Article 1 of the GRATK Treaty establishes its objectives: enhancing the efficacy, transparency and quality of the patent system regarding GR and ATK; and preventing patents from being wrongly granted for inventions that are not novel with regard to GR and ATK.Article 2 contains definitions for key terms used in the GRATK Treaty. This includes the definition of ‘based on’ meaning that the GR and/or ATK must have been necessary for the invention in a patent and that the claimed invention must depend on the specific properties of that GR and/or ATK. Article 2 also provides a term for signatories of the GRATK Treaty, Contracting Parties. This term includes countries and intergovernmental organisations. 
 
Patent disclosure of source requirements 
 
Article 3 contains the main obligations about the disclosure of source requirements. To fulfil the GRATK Treaty’s disclosure of source requirements, Contracting Parties must require patent applicants to disclose: the country of origin (or, where not known, the source) if the claimed invention is based on a GR the Indigenous Peoples or local community who provided any traditional knowledge for claimed inventions based on ATK.The GRATK Treaty provides examples of sources of GRs and ATK in Article 2. Applicants must also declare that the content of their disclosure is true and correct to the best knowledge of the applicant. If an applicant is unaware of this information they must disclose where they obtained the GR or ATK. Article 3.4 obliges Contracting Parties to provide guidance to applicants on how to meet and comply with disclosure requirements. It also requires Contracting Parties to provide applicants with an opportunity to rectify a failure to meet the disclosure requirements or correct an erroneous disclosure. However, the GRATK Treaty also allows for Contracting Parties to exclude applicants from this opportunity where fraudulent conduct or intent is present. Article 3.5 states that the responsible IP Office within a Contracting Party (IP Australia in Australia) shall not be obliged to verify the authenticity of any disclosures provided. This reflects that applicants have more available information regarding their claimed invention than an IP Office. In the event of failures to meet the disclosure requirements, appropriate, effective and proportionate measures must exist to address them. 
 
The GRATK Treaty allows for flexibility in the measures Contracting Parties use. Sanctions or remedies cannot be applied before an applicant has an opportunity to address a failure to disclose. Furthermore, under Article 5.3, Contracting Parties must not revoke, invalidate, or refuse to enforce patent rights solely due to an applicant’s failure to meet disclosure of source requirements. Article 5.4 does allow for Contracting Parties to apply sanctions post-grant of patent rights in cases of fraudulent intent by applicants. The obligations in Article 5 reflect the serious impact loss of patent rights can have on invention-based income and benefit sharing. Under Article 4, Contracting Parties shall not impose the obligations of the GRATK Treaty retrospectively. This means that any patent applications filed prior to the entry into force of the GRATK Treaty are not subject to the disclosure of source requirements set out in the GRATK Treaty. This aligns with Australia’s typical approach to the application of regulatory requirements. 
 
Information sharing and related systems 
 
Article 3.6 states that Contracting Parties shall make the information provided in source disclosures available in accordance with patent procedures. In Australia, patent procedures are determined by the Patents Act 1990, Patent Regulations 1991 and IP Australia’s Patent Manual of Practice and Procedure. 
 
The GRATK Treaty allows for Contracting Parties to establish information systems of known GR and ATK. This is not mandatory under the GRATK Treaty, however, Article 6.1 states that if established, it should be done in consultation with Indigenous Peoples and local communities where applicable. Contracting Parties should also ensure appropriate safeguards are developed for these databases. The information systems should be made available to the IP Offices for the purposes of examining patents. 
 
The Assembly 
 
Article 10 establishes an Assembly comprised of one delegate from each Contracting Party. The Assembly shall deal with all matters concerning the maintenance and development of the GRATK Treaty and its application and operation. However, any administrative tasks concerning the GRATK Treaty, including the provision of a secretariat for the Assembly, will be performed by the International Bureau of WIPO. Aside from Contracting Party delegates and WIPO staff, participation with Assembly business may be extended to representatives from Indigenous Peoples and local communities. Under, Article 10.1(c), the Assembly shall encourage Indigenous Peoples and local communities to effectively participate as accredited observers. 
 
Relationship with other international agreements 
 
Article 7 requires that the GRATK Treaty is implemented in a mutually supportive manner with other relevant international agreements. The GRATK Treaty specifically notes the Patent Cooperation Treaty (1970). Australia is a signatory to the Patent Cooperation Treaty (1970), and several other patent-related international agreements. Ensuring the implementation of the GRATK Treaty is consistent with Australia’s other relevant patent-related agreements would be part of progressing Australia’s patent system. 
 
Consultation 
 
Consultation on IP with regard to Indigenous Knowledge 
 
The topic of IP and Indigenous Knowledge was brought to WIPO for consideration in 2001. Discussions related to the GRATK Treaty began at WIPO in 2019. In 2018–19 and 2021 IP Australia commenced large-scale public consultation on Indigenous Knowledge issues with a range of stakeholders, prioritising Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander engagement. 
 
These consultations heard support for disclosure of source requirements, noting they would not address all concerns regarding the use of Indigenous Knowledge. The following points were also widely noted during the consultations: the onus for indicating source information should be on the patent applicants disclosure of sources should capture secondary sources used measures to ensure disclosure requirements are met are very important disclosure should be part of further measures to support consent agreements and benefit sharing arrangements for the use of Indigenous Knowledge to ensure research and innovators are not burdened by requirements. Ahead of the final treaty negotiations IP Australia hosted roundtables to discuss the GRATK Treaty’s content with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander experts. 
 
Intellectual property was also a frequently raised topic during the Australia’s Ambassador for First Nations People engagement with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people across Australia. Several Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander observers were present for the conclusion of the GRATK Treaty at the WIPO May 2024 Diplomatic Conference. 
 
Industry engagement 
 
IP Australia regularly engages with IP stakeholders and professionals through consultation meetings. Updates on the GRATK Treaty were provided through these forums. IP Australia also engaged with IP attorney professionals and other industry stakeholders regarding the GRATK Treaty. IP Australia staff have attended various professional industry events and have spoken about or presented on the GRATK Treaty. 
 
IP Australia and the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade also met with industry representatives ahead of the adoption of the GRATK Treaty, including from medicines and biotechnology sectors. Concerns were noted from some representatives about ensuring changes did not impact the legal certainty of the patent system. These concerns were also raised in negotiations at WIPO, resulting in the intention to create a disclosure of source requirement that maintains certainty and confidence in the patent system. 
 
State and Territory engagement 
 
The GRATK Treaty does not place obligations on State or Territory jurisdictions. States and Territories were briefed on the GRATK Treaty on 20 November 2024 at the Senior Officials Trade and Investment Group. They were also notified of the GRATK Treaty on 22 October 2025 through the Interjurisdictional Working Group. 
 
Implementation 
 
Article 9 sets out general principles on implementation; they allow for some flexibility in how Contracting Parties give effect to the GRATK Treaty’s obligations. The flexibility allows for Contracting Parties to determine the specific legal, administrative and policy measures needed to fulfill their obligations under the GRATK Treaty. 
 
Australia’s patent and IP systems are exclusively regulated by the Commonwealth. IP Australia is the Commonwealth entity responsible for administering patents. Implementation of the GRATK Treaty’s obligations in Australia would require amendments to the Patents Act 1990 and Patents Regulations 1991. Updates would also need to be made to administrative practice and procedure. 
 
Termination 
 
Under Article 19 any Contracting Party may denounce the GRATK Treaty by notification to the Director General of WIPO. Denunciation shall take effect one year following the Director General of WIPO receiving notification. Denunciation shall not affect the application of the GRATK Treaty to any pending patent applications and any patent in force at the time of a Contracting Party’s denunciation taking effect. 
 
Costs 
 
Joining the GRATK Treaty will result in no cost to the Australian Government or State and Territory Governments. 
 
As IP Australia operates on a cost recovery basis, the costs of any activities related to the implementation of the GRATK Treaty would be met from within IP Australia’s budget. 
 
The National Interest Analysis (NIA) for the GRATK Treaty raises concerns about potential costs to businesses. It argues that patent applicants already provide detailed information about their inventions under current requirements. The introduction of a new requirement will add another element to the already detailed process. This may potentially incur costs according to how inventions have been developed. 
 
The NIA predicts that this will be most relevant to industries linked to GR and ATK such as biotechnology, food, agriculture, nutraceutical, plant-based cosmetics and medical/pharmaceutical industries. Based on data from 2015-2020 IP Australia estimates that between 3 and 9 per cent of future patent applications filed in Australia may be subject to the disclosure of source requirements. 
 
Guidance may be required from patent attorneys and IP Australia regarding how to fulfill new disclosure of source requirements. 
 
Future treaty action 
 
Amendments to the GRATK Treaty are covered within Articles 8, 10, 14 and 15. 
 
Under Article 8, Contracting Parties commit to a review of the scope and content of the GRATK Treaty four years after its entry into force.This review will address issues like the possible extension of the Article 3 disclosure of source requirements to other areas of IP and issues deriving from new technologies. 
 
Article 10.2 allows the Assembly to adopt amendments to Articles 10 and 11. Adoption requires a three-fourths majority of the votes cast with each Contracting Party entitled to one vote.  Once adopted, these amendments would enter into force for all Contracting Parties one month after three-fourths of the Contracting Parties have notified the Director General of WIPO in writing of acceptance. Any such amendment applies to all Contracting Parties at the time of its entry into force. 
 
Article 14 provides that the GRATK Treaty may only be revised at a Diplomatic Conference in accordance with the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. The Assembly has the power to decide the convocation of the Diplomatic Conference and shall give necessary instructions to the Director General of WIPO for its preparation. 
 
Article 20 provides that no reservations are permitted. 
 
Any amendments to the GRATK Treaty would be subject to Australia’s domestic treaty making requirements, including consideration by the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties. 
 
Ratification status 
 
WIPO currently has 194 Member States. Of these, only 44 Member States have signed or acceded to the GRATK Treaty. A table is included below listing these States by region. 
 
Table 4.1WIPO Member States that have signed the GRATK Treaty as of May 2026, by geographic region 
 
Algeria Bolivia Australia Albania Burkina Faso Brazil Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Bosnia and Herzegovina Cabo Verde Chile Indonesia Switzerland Central African Republic Colombia Iran Congo Dominican Republic Marshall Islands Côte d’Ivoire Ecuador Niue Eswatini Nicaragua Vanuatu Ghana Paraguay Lesotho Peru Madagascar Saint Vincent and the Grenadines Malawi Uruguay Morocco Namibia Nigeria São Tomé and Príncipe Senegal South Africa Tanzania The Gambia Togo Uganda Zambia  
 
The GRATK Treaty will enter into force three months after 15 eligible parties have deposited instruments of ratification or accession. To date two signatories have deposited instruments of ratification, Malawi in December 2024 and Uganda in July 2025. In March 2026, Albania deposited an instrument of accession. Whilst the period of the GRATK Treaty being open for signatures has ended, any Member State of WIPO may become party to the GRATK Treaty through an instrument of accession. 
 
Key Considerations 
 
Indigenous custodianship and control over traditional knowledge 
 
The GRATK Treaty is the first intellectual property treaty to refer to traditional knowledge, Indigenous Peoples and local communities. Aware of the ongoing challenges Australia’s Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples face regarding Indigenous Cultural and Intellectual Property (ICIP), the Committee was interested in First Nations perspectives of the GRATK Treaty. The Committee received several submissions from Indigenous organisations and academic experts. It also heard from representatives of the Indigenous Knowledge Panel to IP Australia (IK Panel), an independent panel that provides advice to IP Australia, and the National Native Title Council (NNTC), the peak body representing the native title sector. 
 
The Committee found these First Nations voices were calling for ratification of the GRATK Treaty. NNTC writes in their submission that the GRATK Treaty ‘…represents a small but positive step towards recognition of Indigenous Peoples Traditional Environmental Knowledge…’ Ms Chrissy Grant from the IK Panel explained: The current IP system has historically enabled the extraction and commercialisation of Indigenous knowledge without attribution, consent or benefit. Joining the GRATK treaty would be part of capturing the truth in the patent record where genetic resources or traditional knowledge have been used. It says this invention came from somewhere and from someone. That is the baseline that Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people have been denied for too long. 
 
The Committee also heard evidence about the potential interactions between the GRATK Treaty and the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP). Adopted in 2007 by the United Nations General Assembly, UNDRIP is the most comprehensive international instrument on the rights of Indigenous Peoples. It establishes a framework of minimum standards for the survival, dignity and well-being of Indigenous Peoples. Australia formally endorsed UNDRIP in 2009.  IK Panel explained the relevancy of UNDRIP to the GRATK Treaty, stating: Under the Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples—UNDRIP—articles 3 and 4 provide for self-determination to freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development, and the right to autonomy and self-government in matters relating to the internal and local affairs. Article 31 states that Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain, control, protect and develop their cultural heritage, traditional knowledge and intellectual property. 
 
NNTC also highlighted the connection between UNDRIP and the GRATK Treaty, outlining how the protection of Indigenous rights to ICIP and traditional knowledge is essential in accomplishing the rights established through UNDRIP: The recognition of Traditional Owner rights to ICIP… [Traditional Environmental Knowledge] and intangible cultural heritage more broadly is essential to give life to UNDRIP. Whilst this is being executed incrementally though various instruments of international law, the incorporation of instruments into jurisdictional legislation and regulation is another point at which they can be strengthened. An example of this would be the way in which the Treaty in implemented in Australia. Evidence to the inquiry highlighted the importance of meaningful consultation with First Nations Australians regarding protection of cultural knowledge under the GRATK Treaty. Ms Grant from the IK Panel emphasised that traditional knowledge may be held by individuals, families, clan groups or a whole Nation, and that there is currently limited accountability for identifying where such knowledge originates. Without clear processes regarding cultural intellectual property First Nations peoples may find it difficult to assert their rights or ensure that traditional knowledge has been used appropriately.  Effective implementation of the GRATK Treaty will require mechanisms to ensure the correct Traditional Owners and knowledge holders are identified and consulted. Ms Grant stated: There needs to be a concerted effort put into informing people about the changes that can, and probably will at some time, impact on them. By them understanding fully exactly what is expected of them, but also what they can expect from the researchers and the government under the framework that is put together, they should have the right and the opportunity to have input into that process. Therefore, it might be a fairly extensive consultation process. 
 
Evidence provided by Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander stakeholders highlighted the following key themes: The need for further reform of the patent system in Australia following ratification of the GRATK Treaty. The need for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander presence within the implementation and future action of the GRATK Treaty, developed in accordance with existing Indigenous governance structures. The importance of considering Access and Benefit-Sharing (ABS) frameworks and Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) requirements during implementation. 
 
Innovation, consistency and legal certainty 
 
Australian agriculture accounts for over 50 per cent of domestic land use and 12.4 per cent of Australia’s goods and service exports. 
 
The plant science industry plays an important role in the innovation and advancement of Australia’s agriculture. During the inquiry the Committee sought to understand the potential impacts of the GRATK Treaty on Australia’s plant science industry. The Committee received submissions from two peak industry bodies, CropLife Australia and the Australian Seed Federation (ASF). 
 
CropLife Australia and ASF emphasise the importance of innovation and a pragmatic patent system for the plant science industry. Mr Justin Crosby from CropLife Australia explained ‘…intellectual protection is a really important part of how we get new innovations that help our farmers.’ Both industry bodies raised concerns that implementation of the GRATK Treaty could create additional administrative burden and legal uncertainty. ASF stated that: …the new disclosure requirement should operate solely as a transparency measure and should not create additional access and benefit-sharing compliance obligations, administrative burdens or legal uncertainty for innovators, researchers and plant breeders. 
 
The safeguards and boundaries built into the GRATK Treaty through Articles 3–5 have been designed to maintain certainty and confidence in the patent system. CropLife Australia and ASF’s submissions underlined the importance of these articles. ASF explained that they ‘…welcome the important safeguards in the GRATK Treaty, such as clarifying language on the disclosure trigger and the exclusion of sanctions that could lead to revocation or invalidation of patents.’ CropLife Australia’s submission additionally asserts that successful implementation of the GRATK Treaty in Australia would maintain ‘…a focused, procedural disclosure requirement limited to the clear boundaries of the disclosure requirements agreed by the parties within Article 3 of the Treaty.’ 
 
There is also a need to ensure consistency across procedures and requirements, given that the plant science and biotechnology industry operates within a complex framework of national and international instruments, such as the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture and the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture. ASF explains that ‘…activities in plant breeding and plant biotechnology require navigation of a complex patchwork of biodiversity-related access and benefit sharing requirements.’ 
 
The Committee examined concerns that emerging technologies such as AI could make it harder to identify and disclose the use of traditional knowledge. Evidence suggested AI may weaken the traceability of knowledge sources, while IP Australia noted that the GRATK Treaty includes mechanisms to review and address emerging technologies through future implementation and review processes. 
 
Treaty status and prospects of ratification 
 
For the GRATK Treaty to enter into force, 15 eligible parties need to deposit instruments of ratification or accession. IP Australia discussed their expectation of how quickly other signatories will ratify. They predicted that ‘…a number of the signatories from the African region and from Central and South America would be actively looking at the GRATK Treaty.’ The Committee inquired into the level of interest shown by Australia’s neighbours in the Asia Pacific region. IP Australia reported that Indonesia and Pacific Island countries were active participants in the negotiation of the GRATK Treaty with Indonesia, Vanuatu and the Marshall Islands becoming signatories. IP Australia also identified Switzerland as a signatory that is like-minded to Australia regarding the patent system. 
 
When asked about the role Australia can play in the GRATK Treaty’s entry into force IP Australia identified an opportunity for Australia to take a leading role. They explained: Our benefit, in joining the treaty, is being able to demonstrate how this treaty could be implemented in a sophisticated patent system in a sensible and pragmatic way. We would also have the opportunity to influence future developments around the protection and management of traditional knowledge and cultural expressions. 
 
IP Australia further explained that if Australia were to ratify and implement the GRATK Treaty pragmatically there could be a positive flow-on effect for other nations. They stated that ratifying: … could also help influence the approach of other countries, which would support consistency, allow engagement in sharing mutual understanding and maximise transparency around when genetic resources and traditional knowledge are used across the world. 
 
A submission received by Mr Antony Taubman, a former Director of the WIPO Traditional Knowledge Division, reinforced this claim, stating: Ratification and implementation of the Treaty at a relatively early stage would secure first-mover advantage, influence general implementation of this emerging standard, and ensure a seat, from the outset, in the Assembly and in the Article 8 review. 
 
A number of submissions highlighted ratification as an opportunity for Australia to continue its active engagement with the GRATK Treaty. Professor Wendland explained that ‘Australia’s ratification would be fitting given Australia’s significant contribution over many years to the initiation of work by WIPO on these issues in the late 1990s to the adoption of the GRATK Treaty in May 2024.’ 
 
The Committee sought to understand possible impacts of a delayed entry into force. Professor Matthew Storey from the NNTC argued that without the legislative changes enabled by the GRATK Treaty, traditional knowledge and genetic resources could continue to be used under existing intellectual property laws without requiring benefit-sharing arrangements with Traditional Owners. This sentiment was also echoed by the IK Panel, who stated that Australia’s current IP system ‘…still treats Indigenous knowledge as if it is ownerless.’
 
Committee Comment 
 
The Committee recognises the ongoing struggle with misappropriation of ICIP and welcomes the acknowledgement of Traditional Knowledge within a multilateral treaty, noting the GRATK Treaty supports the rights of Indigenous Peoples to maintain, control, protect and develop their traditional knowledge, cultural heritage and intellectual property, consistent with Article 31 of the UNDRIP. 
 
Australia has demonstrated leadership throughout the GRATK Treaty negotiations and there is an opportunity for Australia to continue a global leadership role through ratification and effective domestic implementation. 
 
Plant science industry is vital to Australian agricultural productivity, innovation and export performance. The Committee supports implementation of the GRATK Treaty that maintains the safeguards agreed during negotiations and provides clarity and certainty for innovators, researchers and industry participants. 
 
The Committee notes that the successful implementation of the GRATK Treaty will depend on early, comprehensive and culturally appropriate engagement with Australian First Nations peoples. Consultation will be critical to ensuring that implementation measures reflect the diversity of First Nations communities, supports informed consent processes, and provides effective protections for traditional knowledge and cultural interests. 
 
Recommendation 3 
 
The Committee recommends the Australian Government consult relevant First Nations, the plant science industry and other relevant industry stakeholders during implementation of the WIPO Treaty on Intellectual Property, Genetic Resources and Associated Traditional Knowledge. 
 
Recommendation 4 
 
The Committee supports the WIPO Treaty on Intellectual Property, Genetic Resources and Associated Traditional Knowledge and recommends that binding treaty action be taken.

01 August 2025

Espionage Costs

The AIC Costs of Espionage report (in partnership with the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation) claims

 Espionage has become one of the most significant national security threats to Australia, impacting government, businesses and the university sector. The highly secretive nature of espionage makes it extremely difficult to measure. In this study we estimated, for the first time, the actual and prevented costs of espionage. Building on the Australian Institute of Criminology’s method for measuring the costs of serious and organised crime, we estimated the mitigation and response costs and the direct costs of espionage impacting Australia. We also estimated the preventable costs associated with a number of possible scenarios. The numbers are conservative and an underestimate of the true cost, given the challenges in identifying and measuring espionage activity and its consequences. 
 
In 2023–24, espionage cost Australia at least $12.5 billion. This includes the direct costs of the consequences of known or probable espionage activity – primarily losses due to state or state-sponsored cyber attacks, insider threats and intellectual property theft – as well as the public and private sector response, remediation and mitigation costs. There are also tens of billions in additional costs that Australia may have prevented by countering potential espionage. For example, in just one week, a single incident of espionage-enabled sabotage from a large-scale cyber attack could cost the Australian economy nearly $6 billion. These prevented costs are significant, and highlight the importance and benefit of investing in efforts to reduce the threat of espionage and minimise the harm in high-risk settings.

The report states 

The threat of espionage – the state or state-sponsored theft of Australian information or capabilities – is now at extreme levels, posing an enormous risk to Australia’s national security. This threat is expected to worsen in future. Understanding the real and potential harm from espionage to the government, private and university sectors, and to the wider community is an important step in ensuring that appropriate action is taken to build our resilience to the threat posed by state and state-sponsored actors. We relied on a review of known cases, published and unpublished research, and data on espionage and espionage-related harms, along with input from subject matter experts, to estimate the mitigation and response costs, direct costs of espionage, and the prevented costs of espionage. We limited our analysis of direct, mitigation and response costs to the 2023–24 financial year. Some calculations of espionage-related expenditure were based on sensitive and classified data, and therefore these costings are not itemised in this report. 

It is important to note at the outset that these numbers, while significant, underestimate the true cost of espionage in Australia. Espionage, by definition, is difficult to detect, and many of its most serious impacts cannot be assigned a dollar value. We have chosen to be conservative in our calculations. 

This is an important first attempt to measure the range of costs from known and suspected incidents of espionage, using a methodology that has been applied to other areas of national security. While this report highlights the importance of taking action to prevent espionage to protect Australia’s national interests, it also draws attention to the need for further work to help us better understand the impact that espionage has on government, businesses, universities and the wider community. 

Actual costs from espionage Our estimate of the actual costs from espionage includes both the direct costs of known or suspected espionage activity, and the mitigation and response costs to government, businesses and universities. 

Direct costs of known or suspected espionage activity 

We estimated the actual cost of state or state-sponsored cyber espionage, insider threats and intellectual property (IP) theft through a range of methods including:

„ Cyber security incidents impacting Australian medium and large businesses were estimated to cost up to $1,193.8 million. 

„ Cyber security incidents impacting Australian public universities were estimated to cost up to $14.5 million. 

„ Insider threats involving state or state-sponsored actors impacting Australian businesses were estimated to cost up to $324.8 million. 

„ Cyber security incidents involving state or state-sponsored actors impacting federal government agencies (not itemised here). 

„ Insider threats involving state or state-sponsored actors impacting Australian public universities were estimated to cost up to $25.0 million. 

„ Cyber-enabled theft of IP and trade secrets from businesses was estimated to cost up to $1,901.0 million. 

„ IP theft from government, the not-for-profit sector and universities was estimated to cost up to $628.0 million in 2023–24. 

These costs were incurred in a single financial year (2023–24). These represent a significant underestimate of the true cost of espionage, given the challenges in identifying, quantifying and valuing some of the consequences. 

Mitigation and response costs 

Significant resources are invested in the public and private sectors to mitigate and respond to espionage. These include the cost to federal government agencies entities related to the identification, investigation, disruption and prosecution of espionage incidents in Australia, as well as the development and enactment of policy and legislation regarding espionage in Australia. Other costs of mitigation include those associated with implementing and maintaining security measures, community outreach, and education and awareness raising. Many of these mitigation measures (particularly legislation) have been introduced in response to previous incidents of espionage or foreign interference, and thus can be considered long-term costs of espionage in Australia. We used a combination of top-down and bottom-up approaches to estimate these costs, relying on data on the operating expenditure of each agency and expert input from senior representatives from these agencies and other stakeholders. 

We also estimated the cost of cyber security to state, territory and local government agencies, businesses and universities. We determined the operating expenditure of each sector and relied on industry estimates of the proportion of total expenditure that is spent on information and communications technology (ICT) and, of that, the proportion spent on cyber security. We then estimated the proportion of these cyber security costs associated with espionage. There are also costs to businesses associated with personnel security and vetting, as well as the costs associated with applying for commercial foreign investments to the Foreign Investment Review Board (which assesses, among other things, risks to national security). 

Critical infrastructure is a major target for foreign actors seeking to undermine Australia’s national security and, in addition to the costs to the Australian Government, there have been costs to industry associated with several major reforms to the regulation of critical infrastructure to reduce the risk of espionage. Universities also incur costs associated with due diligence activity, including vetting of international students and assessing the risks associated with partnerships with foreign institutions. We used a range of methods and data sources to estimate these costs. These mitigation and response costs have not been itemised, and the full detail regarding our costing methodology has not been provided because it relies on sensitive and classified data. The mitigation and response costs are included in the total cost estimate. Several additional costs are incurred as a consequence of the action taken by government, businesses and the university sector to mitigate the risk of espionage. 

Among these are:

„ the costs of having to use more expensive technology, or technology that is less than optimal, rather than technology that may be available from a foreign adversary 

„ the costs incurred by government suppliers in certain high-risk sectors in order to meet security requirements 

„ declines in potential foreign investment due to our current national security posture „ missed opportunities for international research collaborations with leading academics and organisations. 

Although these costs are likely to be significant, they have not been estimated in the current research due to a lack of sufficient data. 

Prevented costs from espionage 

We estimate the counter-espionage efforts of governments, businesses and universities may have prevented tens of billions of dollars of additional costs to the Australian economy. While there have been many examples of espionage impacting Australia and our international partners, other harms have been avoided. 

We modelled a range of scenarios to estimate the potential costs that may have – to the best of our knowledge – been prevented, but which would be incurred in the future if efforts to prevent espionage were not successful.

„ Sabotage of critical infrastructure enabled by espionage could cost up to $1,161.2 million per incident. 

„ An economy-wide, week-long disruption to digital technology-intensive industries, enabled by sabotage, could cost the Australian economy $5,930.4 million. 

„ Theft of trade secrets from a large, publicly listed Australian company could result in share market losses of up to $887.2 million per incident. 

„ Cyber espionage attacks targeting a large, publicly listed Australian company could result in share market losses of up to $439.6 million per incident. 

„ Diminishing trust in government security due to espionage activity could result in an annual decrease in foreign direct investment inflows of up to $10,291.2 million. 

„ The potential annual losses from a decline in international student revenue because of a need to tighten controls following major espionage activity could be up to $890.7 million. 

„ A 10% decrease in annual US funding for research following espionage activity impacting Australian and US relationships could lead to potential same-year economic losses of up to $376.7 million. 

Many of these costs relate to, or would result from, single incidents of espionage. The cost from multiple repeated attacks targeting government, businesses and university sectors would be significantly higher. As such, the total prevented costs depend on the nature and scale of future espionage activity impacting Australia but are estimated to be tens of billions of dollars. 

Total actual and prevented costs from espionage 

When we combine the mitigation and response costs and the direct costs of espionage that could be measured, the total known cost to government, businesses, universities and the broader community in 2023–24 is estimated to be at least $12.5 billion. We estimate that tens of billions further in espionage costs may have been prevented through effective mitigation and counter-espionage activity. These costs are preventable – but only if appropriate action is taken to address the threat from those who seek to harm Australia’s national interests. 

Total actual costs: $12.5B Direct costs of known or suspected espionage Public and private sector mitigation and response costs 

Prevented costs: Tens of billions of dollars

24 November 2024

AI, Trade and the WTO

The WTO 'Trading with intelligence: How AI shapes and is shaped by international trade' report comments

The widespread and transformative impact that artificial intelligence (AI) is currently having on society is being felt in all areas, from work, production and trade to health, arts and leisure activities. New applications of AI are expected to create unprecedented new economic and societal opportunities and benefits. However, significant ethical and societal risks are also associated with the development and application of AI. These risks have implications for all these areas too, including trade. AI is a global issue, and as governments increasingly move to regulate AI, global cooperation is more important than ever. 

Against this backdrop, the present report examines the intersection of AI and international trade. It begins with a discussion of why AI is a trade issue, before delving into the ways in which AI may shape the future of international trade. It discusses key trade-related policy considerations raised by this technology and provides an overview of government initiatives taken both to promote and to regulate AI. The report also highlights the looming risk of regulatory fragmentation and its impact, in particular on trade opportunities for micro, small and medium- sized businesses. Finally, the report discusses the critical role of the WTO in facilitating AI-related trade, ensuring trustworthy AI and addressing emerging trade tensions. 

Why is AI a trade issue? 

AI is distinct from other digital technologies in several key ways, and it has the potential to affect international trade significantly. It is a general-purpose technology, capable of adapting to a wide range of domains and tasks with unprecedented flexibility and efficiency. It relies on large datasets to learn and improve its performance and accuracy. AI's functions and efficiency can evolve rapidly, leading to dynamic shifts in its capabilities and autonomy. Finally, its inherent complexity and opacity, as well as its potential failures and biases, raise significant concerns related to matters such as how to understand the reasons for and basis of AI decisions and recommendations, or regarding ethics and broader societal implications. AI can be leveraged to overcome trade costs associated with trade logistics, supply chain management and regulatory compliance. By enhancing trade logistics, overcoming language barriers, and minimizing search and match costs, AI can make trade more efficient. It can help to automate and streamline customs clearance processes and border controls, navigate complex trade regulations and compliance requirements, and predict risks. AI-based tools can be used in trade finance, and can significantly enhance supply chain visibility by providing real-time data analytics, predictive insights and automated decision-making processes. All of this could lower trade costs and, as a result, level the playing field for developing economies and small businesses, helping them to overcome trade barriers, enter global markets and participate in international trade. 

AI can transform patterns of trade in services, particularly digitally delivered services. It can enhance productivity, especially in services sectors that rely on manual processes, by enabling low-skilled workers to leverage best practices of more high-skilled workers more effectively. For example, generative AI can amplify the performance of business consultants by up to 40 per cent compared to those not using it. Greater productivity gain is also observed for lower-skilled workers (Dell’Acqua et al., 2023). Research also shows that access to generative AI increases the productivity of call centre workers by an average of 14 per cent, and by 34 per cent specifically for novice and low-skilled workers (Brynjolfsson et al., 2023). AI can also foster the development of innovative services and increase demand for them. However, while AI can enhance trade in digitally delivered services significantly, it has contributed to reducing the demand for certain traditional services. AI-enabled automation can also reduce the necessity to outsource certain services. 

AI can increase demand and trade in technology-related products. Because AI systems often rely on real-time data streams and seamless connectivity, the adoption of AI is spurring demand for complementary goods related to information and communications technology (ICT) infrastructure and information technology (IT) equipment. These include computer and telecommunications services, specialized development tools and software libraries. For example, the global market for AI chips was valued at US$ 61.5 billion in 2023 and it has been projected that it could reach US$ 621 billion by 2032 (S&S Insider, 2024). As many of these goods and services are often supplied by a small number of economies, international trade serves as a major channel to foster AI development worldwide. Further upstream in the value chain, trade in the extraction and processing of critical metals and minerals, as well as trade in energy, are also likely to gain in importance. In addition, AI has substantially heightened the demand for data, fundamentally reshaping the landscape of data usage and trade. 

By affecting productivity, and through shifts in production dynamics, AI may reshape economies' comparative advantages. AI is expected to enhance productivity across all economic sectors in both developed and developing economies, and to change the composition of inputs required for production, placing greater emphasis on capital investment, rather than on labour inputs. This shift in production dynamics could reshape trade patterns. Conversely, new sources of comparative advantage may emerge from factors like educated labour, digital connectivity and favourable regulations. Because AI is energy-intensive, economies with abundant renewable energy may also gain comparative advantages. However, although AI can potentially benefit all economies, the development and control of AI technology are likely to remain concentrated in large economies and companies with advanced AI capabilities, resulting in industrial concentration. The adoption of AI can drive productivity increases across various sectors and reduce trade costs, leading to global gains in trade and GDP. Simulations using the WTO global trade model show that, under an optimistic scenario of universal AI adoption and high productivity growth up until 2040, global real trade growth could increase by almost 14 percentage points. In contrast, a cautious scenario, with uneven AI adoption and low productivity growth, projects trade growth of just under 7 percentage points. The simulation further shows that, while high-income economies are expected to see the largest productivity gains, lower-income economies have better potential to reduce trade costs. 

The global trade and GDP impact of AI varies significantly across economies and sectors, depending on choices made concerning innovation and policies. While trade growth in high-income economies remains relatively stable across projected scenarios, low-income economies could experience much higher trade growth under the scenarios of universal AI adoption and high productivity growth (18.1 percentage points) compared to those of uneven AI adoption and low productivity growth (6.5 percentage points). The simulation results suggest that if developing economies improve their AI readiness by strengthening digital infrastructure, enhancing skills and boosting innovation and regulatory capacity, they will be in a better position to adopt AI effectively. 

These simulations show that digitally delivered services1 are expected to experience the highest trade growth. In an optimistic scenario of universal AI adoption, digitally delivered services are projected to see cumulative growth of nearly 18 percentage points relative to the baseline scenario, the largest increase across all sectors. The expected impact of AI on real trade growth also differs within sectors. Potentially digitally delivered services such as education, human healthcare, and recreational and financial services, as well as manufacturing sectors such as processed food, are projected to experience significant trade growth, largely driven by trade cost reductions. Meanwhile, sectors related to natural resource extraction and manufacturing sectors such as textiles are expected to see limited growth. 

The policies of AI and trade 

The discussion on how AI might reshape international trade raises important policy questions. The risk of a growing divide resulting from applications of AI is significant, as are data governance challenges and the need to ensure that AI is trustworthy and to clarify how it relates to intellectual property (IP) rights. The implementation of AI at the domestic, regional and international levels entails both benefits and risks, and a lack of coordination could cause increasing regulatory fragmentation with regard to AI. Addressing the risk of a growing AI divide is essential to leverage the opportunities offered by this technology. Currently, the capacity to develop AI technology is concentrated in a few large economies, and this is creating a significant divide between economies that are leading research and development (R&D) in AI – in particular China and the United States – and the rest of the world. This imbalance could be further exacerbated by the use of government subsidies to develop AI. The risk of industry concentration within a few large firms could also intensify the divide between firms. These features, combined with the opacity of AI algorithms and the possibility of tacit collusion among competitor firms to maintain higher prices, present challenges for competition authorities. 

The rise of AI is raising important data governance issues that will need to be addressed to prevent further digital trade barriers. Cross-border data flows are essential to AI, as vast amounts of data are needed to train AI models, as well as minimize possible biases. Thus, restrictions on data flows can slow AI innovation and development, increase costs for firms, and negatively impact trade in AI-enabled products. A recent study (OECD and WTO, 2024) found that if all economies fully restricted their data flows, this could result in a 5 per cent reduction in global GDP and a 10 per cent decrease in exports. However, the large datasets required by AI models raise significant privacy concerns. Therefore, a reasonable trade-off between accessing large amounts of data to train AI models and protecting individual privacy must be found. 

Ensuring that AI is trustworthy without hindering trade can be challenging. “AI trustworthiness” means that it meets expectations in terms of reliability, security, privacy, safety, accountability and quality in a verifiable way. However, given the behaviour and opaque nature of AI systems, as well as the potential dual-use of some AI products (i.e., for both civilian and military applications), striking a balance between ensuring that AI is trustworthy and enabling trade to flow as smoothly as possible may prove especially challenging. The evolutionary nature of AI makes regulation a perennial moving target. “Traditional" regulations and standards for goods, which normally focus on tangible, visible and static product requirements, may not be fully capable of addressing all of the different types of potential risks, including the ethical and societal questions that may result from the integration of AI into goods and services. Regulating to address questions of public morals, human dignity and other fundamental rights, such as discrimination or fairness, is not only challenging, but is also prone to causing regulatory fragmentation because the meaning and relative importance of such values may vary across societies. 

AI also poses new conceptual challenges for the traditional, “human-centric” approach to IP rights. Issues that deserve particular attention include the protection of AI algorithms and of copyrighted material for training AI, and the protection and ownership of AI generated outputs. These questions may call for a re-evaluation of existing IP legal frameworks. 

The immense potential of AI has prompted governments around the globe to take action to promote its development and use while mitigating its potential risks. At the domestic level, more and more jurisdictions are putting in place AI strategies and policies to enhance their AI capabilities. The number of economies having implemented AI strategies increased from three in 2017 to 75 in 2023. According to Stanford University's 2024 "AI Index", 25 AI-related regulatory measures were adopted in the United States in 2023, compared to just one in 2016, while the European Union has passed almost 130 AI-related regulatory measures since 2017. However, most domestic AI policy initiatives are being implemented by developed economies, which could further deepen the existing AI divide between developed and developing economies: while around 30 per cent of developing economies have put AI policy measures in place, only one least-developed country (LDC) – Uganda – has done so according to data from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) AI Policy Observatory. Also high on governments’ policy agendas are domestic initiatives to promote access to data through open data and data-sharing initiatives, with a view to fostering domestic innovation and competition, protecting privacy and controlling the flow of data across borders. What is emerging is a landscape of fragmented measures and heterogeneous domestic initiatives, which may lead to regulatory fragmentation. 

This fragmentation extends beyond AI-specific regulations to include sector-specific legislation, such as IP and data regulations, which also impact AI. In addition, the design of some border measures imposed on the hardware components and raw materials crucial to AI systems can affect competitors in other economies, leading to trade- distorting effects and further exacerbating fragmentation. The economic costs of regulatory fragmentation, in particular for small businesses, highlight the importance of mitigating regulatory heterogeneity; according to OECD and WTO (2024), the economic costs of the fragmentation of data flow regimes along geo-economic blocks amount to a loss of more than 1 per cent of real GDP. The increasing number of bilateral and regional cooperation initiatives on AI governance, many focusing on different priorities, add to the risk of creating a multitude of fragmented approaches. 

For example, while some bilateral cooperation initiatives focus primarily on aligning AI-related terminology and taxonomy, and on monitoring and measuring AI risks, others prioritize collaboration to promote alignment in general terms or focus primarily on AI safety and governance. Likewise, some regional initiatives prioritize human rights and ethics, while others focus on economic development and growth. 

Regional trade agreements (RTAs) and digital economy agreements are important vehicles to promote and regulate AI. AI-specific provisions have started to be incorporated into such agreements, but they mainly take the form of “soft” – i.e., non-binding – provisions focusing on the importance of collaboration to promote trusted, safe and responsible use of AI. Several AI-specific provisions explicitly refer to trade. Digital trade provisions included in RTAs, such as provisions on data flows, data localization, protection of personal information, access to government data, source code,2 competition in digital markets, and customs duties on electronic transmissions, are also important for AI development and use. The number of RTAs with digital trade provisions has been growing steadily since the early 2000s, and by the end of 2022, 116 RTAs – representing 33 per cent of all existing RTAs – had incorporated provisions related to digital trade (López-González et al., 2023). However, the depth of digital trade provisions included in RTAs varies significantly, reflecting diverging approaches. Few developing economies and LDCs have negotiated digital trade provisions. Disciplines on trade in services in RTAs are also an important channel through which governments' trade policies and trade obligations can affect the policy environment for AI, but the level of commitments undertaken differs significantly across economies. 

The last few years have witnessed a wave of international initiatives related to AI. While there are elements of complementarity among such initiatives and alignment on core principles, different initiatives prioritize different aspects of AI governance. A number of initiatives also contain various common elements that have important trade and WTO angles, such as the recognition of the role of regulations and standards, the need to avoid regulatory fragmentation, the importance of IP rights, the importance of privacy, personal data protection and data governance, and the importance of international cooperation, coordination and dialogue. Several of these initiatives also address the environmental impacts of AI. 

However, there is still no global alignment on AI terminology. Differing priorities, the overlap between initiatives, and lack of global agreement on key terminology could pose challenges at the implementation stage, limiting efforts to prevent fragmentation and to put in place a coherent global AI governance framework. Nevertheless, beyond initiatives to govern AI, an increasing number of international organizations, such as the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) and the World Bank, are developing courses on AI and integrating AI in their technical assistance activities, some of which have a trade component. The WTO, as the only rules-based global body dealing with trade policy, can contribute to promoting the benefits of AI and limiting its potential risks. It can play an important role in limiting regulatory fragmentation, promoting the development of trustworthy AI and access to it, and facilitating trade in AI-related goods and services, thereby enabling the growth of AI and promoting innovation through IP. 

What role for the WTO? 

WTO rules and processes promote global convergence. The WTO is a forum that promotes transparency, non-discrimination, discussion, the exchange of good practices, regulatory harmonization, non-mandatory policy guidance, and global alignment through the negotiation of new binding trade rules on trade. Transparency provisions included in WTO agreements allow WTO members, as well as economic operators and consumers, to be kept abreast of latest regulatory developments. One example is the enhanced transparency provisions in the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Agreement. By requiring early notification of regulatory measures and allowing opportunities to provide comments on these measures at a draft stage, the TBT Agreement can help to prevent obstacles to trade, as well as promote and accelerate global convergence. WTO members are increasingly notifying a wide range of regulations on digital technologies to the TBT Committee. For instance, more than 160 notifications have been made on regulations addressing cybersecurity and the Internet of Things (IoT)/robotics, both of which are relevant for AI. More recently, the TBT Committee has started receiving notifications of AI-specific regulations. Another example is the WTO Trade Policy Review Mechanism, which contributes to transparency in members’ trade policies. Finally, in terms of possible new substantive rules, various issues negotiated under the Joint Statement Initiative on E-commerce, which currently brings together 91 WTO members, may matter for AI. 

The WTO also provides a global forum for constructive dialogue, the exchange of good practices, and cooperation. This enables discussion among members of how best to design nuanced, flexible and adaptable regulatory solutions to address the goods, services and IP-related aspects of AI in a coordinated manner. In some areas, the WTO also promotes regulatory harmonization and coherence by encouraging the use of international standards, mutual recognition and equivalence, and through various "soft law" instruments, such as voluntary committee guidelines. 

The WTO is the cornerstone of global efforts to facilitate trade in services and goods that enable or are enabled by AI. Various aspects of the WTO rulebook can contribute to promoting the development of and access to AI. For example, the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) plays an important role in shaping a policy environment that facilitates the development and uptake of AI. A majority of WTO members (out of 141 schedules of commitments, 84, or 60 per cent, contain commitments on computer services) have made specific commitments on market access and national treatment related to ICT services, which play a fundamental role in enabling and promoting AI. However, commitments in other sectors remain limited, and barriers to services trade remain high in overall terms. When it comes to goods, the Information Technology Agreement (ITA) aims to increase worldwide access to high-technology goods essential to AI by eliminating tariffs on the ICT products it covers. Meanwhile, the TBT Agreement can help to ensure that, when governments adopt AI standards and regulations, these are, to the extent possible, not trade-restrictive, and are optimal for attaining policy objectives. The Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement aims to foster a balanced IP system that incentivizes innovation through the enforcement and protection of IP rights, while promoting dissemination of and access to technology, to the mutual benefit of both producers and users of technological knowledge. Various WTO agreements also include provisions to promote the transfer of technology, and this can play an important role in the development of AI. Finally, the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA) 2012 promotes access to internationally available new AI technologies. Various principles, provisions and guidelines in the WTO rulebook can support trade in AI systems and AI-enabled products by minimizing international negative spillovers. Examples include the non-discrimination principle and the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS), which recognizes that certain investment measures can restrict and distort trade and states that members may not apply investment measures that discriminate against foreign products or lead to quantitative restrictions. When it comes to technical regulations, standards and certification procedures, the TBT Agreement provides that regulatory intervention shall not be discriminatory nor any more trade-restrictive than necessary to achieve the intended policy objectives, and that it should, when justified, be subject to periodic reviews. And the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) can play a crucial role in navigating the dual aspects of AI development, by promoting technological innovation while preventing negative spillovers in international trade from government financial support. 

The WTO can help to prevent and settle trade tensions and frictions. The practice of raising "specific trade concerns" (STCs) allows WTO committees to serve as a venue for defusing potential trade tensions with regulatory measures in a cooperative, pragmatic and non-litigious way. In the TBT Committee, for instance, members have already been using this practice to discuss and address concerns with regulations involving a wide range of digital technologies and issues, including IoT, autonomous vehicles, 5G in robotics, industrial automation, cybersecurity, and more recently AI. The WTO also serves as a global forum to settle trade-related disputes. While there has been no dispute on AI so far, the WTO Dispute Settlement System has dealt with resolving disputes related to various aspects of the digital economy. 

The WTO promotes inclusiveness through special and differential treatment and technical assistance for developing economies. WTO agreements recognize the constraints faced by developing economies and, for this reason, include various special and differential (S&D) treatment provisions to help them to implement WTO rules and participate more effectively in international trade. Technical assistance and capacity-building are key pillars of the WTO’s work and play a fundamental role in furthering understanding of the WTO rules and agreements, as well as of other topics relevant to trade. Multi-stakeholder programmes, such as Aid for Trade and the Enhanced Integrated Framework, could, however, be leveraged further to help developing economies seize the benefits of AI for trade. 

As a forum for negotiation, discussion and rule-making, the WTO provides a multilateral framework that can help address the trade-related aspects of AI governance. Nevertheless, AI may have implications for international trade rules. Although it is a new technology, AI is developing rapidly, and is certainly already advanced enough to be a subject of discussions at the WTO. Its cross-cutting nature requires a cross-cutting policymaking approach to promote policy coherence. 

While AI governance extends beyond trade, trade remains a crucial element within AI governance. The WTO can contribute significantly to developing a robust AI governance framework. This report is a first attempt to explore some key implications of AI for trade and trade rules. As AI continues to evolve, governments should continue to discuss the intersection of AI and trade and its possible implications for the WTO rulebook.