Professions

In Fletcher v Heaft [2020] SASC 75 the SA Supreme Court has found that a penalty of good behaviour bond for three years against a woman who pleaded guilty to 66 offences under section 116(1)(c) of Schedule 2 to the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law (South Australia) Act 2010 (SA) in claiming to be a registered nurse after deregistration was manifestly inadequate.

The Australian Health Practitioner Regulation Agency (AHPRA) appealed the sentence imposed on Heaft by a Magistrate, complaining on appeal that the Magistrate: (1) imposed a penalty which was manifestly inadequate; (2) misapplied section 120 of the Sentencing Act 2017 (SA); (3) erred in determining that community service was inappropriate; and (4) took into account an erroneous factual consideration. AHPRA successfully sought orders that the Magistrate’s sentence be set aside and the respondent be resentenced.

 A fresh bond was substituted, with a condition of performing 80 hours of community service within one year and six months.

Heaft's true status was brought to the attention of authorities when her employer went to update the registration details and found that she was suspended.

Medical Device Printing

'A clarion call for understanding regulatory processes for additive manufacturing in the health sector' by Antonia Horst, Fiona McDonald and Dietmar W. Hutmacher in (2019) 16(5) Expert Review of Medical Devices 405-412 comments

As Additive Manufacturing (AM) in the health sector evolves to the point where products can be translated into the clinic, these manufactured goods need to be assessed by regulators in order for such products to be manufactured, sold, and used in accordance with the law. In this article, the authors argue that if AM products in the health sector are to be regulated in the near future, stakeholders involved in translational research need to understand the challenges faced by both regulators and industry. We portray different points of possible dissonance for AM medical products with existing regulatory frameworks. Hence, we advocate for stakeholders to proactively provide solutions for regulatory processes for products emerging from AM in the health sector.

The authors argue

The regulation of medical products emerging from additive manufacturing (AM) – the term associated with 3D printing in an industry context – in the health sector is an important milestone in the maturation process of the industry. Yet, new technologies often pose challenges for regulators who must determine whether a product is both safe and appropriate for use, as products that emerge from a new technology may (or may not) create different types of harms, risks, and areas of concern. These differences may also illustrate that existing regulatory regimes need to be modernized. 

AM in the health sector is widely reported on in academic, as well as in industry or public media outlets, with manifold (potential) applications. Different applications of AM in the health sector are at different stages on their way to clinical translation: Products containing biological materials, such as cells or growths factors, are mostly at the research stage. On the other hand, some products manufactured through AM that do not contain biological materials are starting to be used in a clinical context and others are seeking regulatory approval. Such products include, for example, surgical equipment, prosthetics, hip and knee prostheses, implants, and other medical devices. These products show variety in their risk and complexity, ranging from low-risk devices, such as surgical planning models, to high-risk devices, such as biodegradable scaffolds (see Figure 1). AM is used to create standard sized (Figure 1), as well as personalized products (Figure3). Nonetheless, only a small number of these types of products are used routinely in clinical practice and have FDA approval and/or CE-Mark at the moment. 

So far, a uniform vocabulary and clear terms have not yet been established to describe different product categories stemming from AM in the health sector. Nevertheless, a clear distinction between different kinds of products is essential when interfacing with regulatory structures, as different product categories may evoke different regulatory pathways. 

While there is an ongoing discussion in the literature about terminology describing different categories of AM in the health and biomedical sector, so far no nomenclature has arisen that is universally accepted by the wider research community. We identify the use of different terms, or the use of the same terms with different underlying meanings, as a potential hindrance when interfacing with regulators. So far, unfortunately, there is a tendency in the literature to discuss ‘3D printing regulation’ or ‘Bioprinting regulation’ without a distinction to what is meant by these terms and which products they shall encompass. We, therefore, use the follow- ing descriptions to categorize the products that are intended for use in the health sector on the basis of the materials used in the manufacturing process: ‘AM in the health sector’ or ‘AM products’. These are used as broad terms, encompassing all aforementioned product categories. To allow for a more detailed discussion, we distinguish between AM containing biological matter in the manufacturing process, in other words, tissue engineered products manufactured using layer by layer techniques, and AM without the use of biological matter but for use in the health sector. This distinction is orientated by the regulatory separation of biological medical products, pharmaceuticals and medical devices, which will be discussed in more detail below. For clarity and simplicity, this article does not consider pharmaceuticals (see Figure 2). 

Although the first AM products, such as biodegradable scaffolds (Figure 1), have been used for more then 10 years in a clinical context, they are only now being translated into routine clinical applications. One identified barrier to this translational stage is uncertainty about how the regulatory frameworks will respond to these new technologies. In academic and research-centered contexts, product regulation is generally not considered, as non-translational research folows different, more lenient sets of rules. Therefore, consumer safety laws, such as medical product regulations, are neither known of nor followed. Although start-up companies and industry are starting to engage with regulators and regulatory processes to understand what the industry could do to assist unobstructed regulatory processes, these considerations remain limited. While the need to interface with regulatory processes is becoming more pressing as industry interest in such products is rising and AM in the health sector matures, there is still uncertainty about when and whether some aspects of AM containing biological matter will get to the stage that they require regulation and even if they will at all.Opinions range from doubting whole organs will ever result from AM processes, predicting ‘printed organs‘ within the next few decades, to describing AM technologies for printing materials containing biological matter as if they were ready for commercialization and routine application in hospitals. This broad range of published viewpoints may result from overly optimistic and sometimes not evidence based reporting by researchers. This conclusion is drawn from the relative abun- dance of appraisals for these applications in the academic literature and wider media, compared with the lack of scientific evidence of such outcomes. Regarding AM products that do not contain biological matter, opinions around the feasibility of this technology to be upscaled as well as what the actual benefits of using this technology may mean in regard to patient recovery, health-care savings, and product development, differ significantly. These uncertainties create further challenges for an industry that needs to urgently prepare for regulation. 

In this article, the authors argue that if AM products in the health sector are to be regulated in the near future, those involved in translational research and the manufacturing process need to understand the challenges faced by regulators, such as the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) or the Australian Therapeutic Goods Administration (TGA) when dealing with new technologies. The academic and industry stakeholders involved in this area also need to understand the risk profile of the product class or products and their status as being mass produced or customized/personalized. The terminology must be used consistently and standards need to be designed with regulatory processes in mind so that they can function as a logical extension of regulatory processes. We advocate for the wider industry anticipating and being ready with solutions for regulators when they need to adapt regulatory processes to regulate products emerging from AM in the health sector.

Histories

‘Australian Historians and Historiography in the Courtroom’ by Tanya Josev in (2020) 43(3) Melbourne University Law Review comments

This article examines the fascinating, yet often controversial, use of historians’ work and research in the courtroom. In recent times, there has been what might be described as a healthy scepticism from some Australian lawyers and historians as to the respective efficacy and value of their counterparts’ disciplinary practices in fact-finding. This article examines some of the similarities and differences in those disciplinary practices in the context of the courts’ engagement with both historians (as expert witnesses) and historiography (as works capable of citation in support of historical facts). The article begins by examining, on a statistical basis, the recent judicial treatment of historians as expert witnesses in the federal courts. It then moves to an examination of the High Court’s treatment of general works of Australian history in aid of the Court making observations about the past. The article argues that the judicial citation of historical works has taken on heightened significance in the post-Mabo and ‘history wars’ eras. It concludes that lasting changes to public and political discourse in Australia in the last 30 years — namely, the effect of the political stratagems that form the ‘culture wars’ — have arguably led to the citation of generalist Australian historiography being stymied in the apex court. 

 Josev states

The role of ‘history’ in the courtroom, and the role of historians in the process of tendering evidence to the court of that history, is an area of study well-trodden by academic lawyers and historians. It is probably safe to say that there is a healthy scepticism from some lawyers and historians as to the respective efficacy and value of their counterparts’ disciplinary practices in fact-finding. ‘To enter the courtroom is to do many things, but it is not to do history’, observed medical historian David Rothman. ‘The essential attributes that [historians] treasure most about historical inquiry have to be left outside the door. The scope of analysis is narrowed’. Meanwhile, on the bench, it appears that some judges take the view that, outside of the tendering of archival (and preferably documentary) primary evidence, there is little an historian can do in the courtroom that judges could not do for themselves: ‘I’m not entirely sure what the professional skills of historians bring to [the fact-finding] process, that a lawyer or judge himself or herself wouldn’t be able to bring’, an Australian Federal Court judge remarked under the cloak of anonymity in 2008. That view appeared to be not uncommon amongst some Australian jurisdiction. The (then puisne) High Court Justice Sir Owen Dixon himself saw the need for recourse to historical expertise in certain questions of fact, remarking in Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth that courts ‘may use the general facts of history as ascertained or ascertainable from the accepted writings of serious historians’ and ‘for verification refer to standard works of literature and the like’. Despite this directive, explicit reference to general historical works, or to the expert evidence of historians, has only taken on a greater prominence in constitutional litigation since the decision in Cole v Whitfield in 1988, and in native title disputes since Mabo v Queensland [No 2] in 1992. This, of course, should be contrasted against the use of what I loosely call doctrinal historiography, which has enjoyed a long and perhaps almost uncritical adoption in the Australian courtroom — this will be briefly dealt with later in this article. The modest expansion in the use of ‘history’ in the Australian courtroom has brought with it some difficulties for both judge and historian — most particularly, how to treat the testimony of an historian as a fact-finder and interpreter of evidence, when those very tasks will inevitably be revisited by the judge as the ultimate fact-finder? If so, what special expertise does an historian offer? 

This article does not concern itself with the specific debates in constitutional democracies (including Australia) about the ‘dead hand’ of the law versus a ‘living tree’ perspective and the attendant questions about how history might be applied in both approaches. Instead, it focuses on the broader issue of how history at large is being used or cited in the Australian federal courts at present. It first examines the manner in which the federal judiciary treats the evidence of historians as expert witnesses (that is, experts that offer to the court, in Dixon’s terms, the ‘facts of history’), particularly in light of the flurry of critical attention given to judicial practices following the Cubillo v Commonwealth [No 2] decision in 2000. The article then moves to evaluate how the High Court in particular treats general Australian historiography. In recent times, there has been increased public scrutiny of generalist Australian works of history, particularly in light of the ‘history wars’, a set of partisan stratagems that have been employed and re-employed regularly in public discourse since the late 1990s. I conclude here that lasting changes to public and political discourse in Australia in the last 30 years have taken their toll on the public perception of the courts and the practice of history, and that, as a result, early (but incomplete) evidence shows that the High Court displays great caution in citing general works of Australian history.

Identities

Given my ongoing interest in CV padding and identity crime I note the latest questions about claims by Sapan Desai of Surgisphere.

The Guardian today comments

 Claims made by Desai about his qualifications gained since his medical degree have been called into doubt, including his claims to hold two PhDs, a master’s, and affiliations with major universities and colleges. Some of these affiliations have now been removed from his website and online profiles. ... According to online profiles, Desai, who is now 41, has had an extraordinary and varied career. In 2010 the online encyclopedia Wikipedia flagged his page for deletion after editors raised queries about his accomplishments. 

“If half of the claims in this article are true, this is indeed an exceptional young man,” one website editor wrote of Desai, who at the time was 31. “However, exceptional does not necessarily equal notable. Most claims are unsourced or sourced to the subject’s own websites. Many claims are over the top.” 

As well as holding at least one PhD, a medical degree and working as a vascular surgeon, Desai has also founded several companies including Surgisphere and a charity. His claims (on the deleted Wikipedia page) of having a second PhD and a Juris Doctor, or law degree, could not be independently verified by the Guardian and Desai did not respond to questions about this. 

His biography also says he completed his master’s of business administration in healthcare management at Western Governors University. The university did not respond to requests for confirmation of this MBA. But according to the university archive he gave a speech to a graduation of university students in 2012, telling them: “Nothing that is easy is worthwhile. Because at the end of the struggle is a fountain that never stops, a fountain that showers us with the twin gifts of knowledge and wisdom.” 

In a video he made for a crowdfunding campaign to support a product he designed, described as a “wearable neural induction device”, Desai said he also held a PhD in neuroscience. The device, which Desai boasted could increase brain function and creativity, never came to fruition. The Guardian could find no other record of his having neuroscience qualifications and Desai did not respond to questions about this.

Closer to home a media release from the WA Department of Mines, Industry Regulation & Safety  last month states

Mental health consumers warned about man masquerading as a psychologist (Tyson John Vacher / John Vacher Psychology) 

Consumers seeking mental health services are being warned about a North Fremantle man who is masquerading as a psychologist. 

Tyson John Vacher, aka Dr John Vacher and trading as John Vacher Psychology, has been making false or misleading statements on his website jvpsychology (dot) com regarding his experience and qualifications. 

Mr Vacher has stated on his website jvpsychology dot com that he is a member of the Australian Counsellors’ Association and has 10 years’ experience, neither of which is true. 

Listings on other websites also claimed Mr Vacher has a PhD and a qualification from the University of Southern Queensland, which are not true. 

Commissioner for Consumer Protection Lanie Chopping expressed concern that vulnerable people suffering from mental health issues may be duped and not get the expert treatment they need. 

“It’s alarming to me that someone with no qualifications or experience as a practising psychologist should be offering professional help to people who may be suffering from depression, anxiety, sexual abuse trauma or other mental health issues,” Ms Chopping said. 

“Our investigation into Mr Vacher has confirmed that he does not hold the formal qualifications in psychology that he claims and his assertion of having ten years’ experience is ridiculous considering he is only 23 years old.”

In 2021 Vacher received a community corrections order after pleading guilty to two health-related fraud offences and three charges related to the forging of a Bachelor of Laws testamur from the University of Southern Queensland. He'd used the forged law qualification for applications to enrol in three different tertiary institutions. His lawyer is reported as stating that Vacher is "remorseful", is now pursuing his professional ambitions "in the correct way" and has been accepted into a Masters of Counselling degree.

Pleading

Lytras v The Queen [2020] VSCA 150 is of interest to law students studying pleadings and professional competence.

The Court states

[21] The plea conducted on the applicant’s behalf by his then counsel was, to put it mildly, not a shining example of the advocate’s art. 

[22] After pointing out that the applicant had supporters in court, and telling the judge that he had a number of references for the judge to look at, counsel for the applicant commenced his submissions by making the somewhat remarkable submission that he was instructed to seek ‘four with a two, and then with a cocktail of a CCO, which is based on Boulton’s case’. In other words, counsel was seeking a sentence of four years’ imprisonment, with a non-parole period of two years, to be combined with a community correction order (‘CCO’) of 18 months’ duration, the CCO being justified by Boulton.  When the judge pointed out, first, that he was limited to a sentence of 12 months’ imprisonment combined with a CCO; and, secondly, that the quantity of drugs was such that ‘you’re not within cooee of a cocktail’ (that is, a long way from a combined sentence of imprisonment and a CCO), counsel made the equally remarkable submission: ‘I accept that, Your Honour. I mean, I’m going on instructions’. 

[23] Counsel competently presenting a plea in mitigation would not have suggested to the judge the length of any sentence of imprisonment deemed to be ‘within the range’, and certainly would not have stated that a head sentence of four years’ imprisonment could be combined with a CCO. Further, in a competently conducted plea counsel would not have suggested that it was possible to fix a non- parole period with a CCO. Plainly, it was no answer to these shortcomings for counsel to offer the excuse that he was ‘going on instructions’. Counsel had a duty to be familiar with the applicable legislative provisions and sentencing principles, so as not only to be in a position adequately to assist the court, but so as to ensure that error was avoided. It was a breach of the duty that counsel owed to the court to advance sentencing submissions that plainly were wrong — based on clearly erroneous instructions — to the sentencing judge. 

[24] After that less than promising start, counsel tendered a bundle of character references (Exhibit 2), and a bundle of certificates showing the courses that the applicant had completed whilst in custody (Exhibit 3). Counsel told the judge that the applicant had been a ‘pioneer’ within the prison community, ‘to support prisoners in need’. Having informed the judge that the applicant had written out his life history in ‘very legible handwriting’, counsel tendered the document (Exhibit 4) — some 16 pages — and asked the judge to take it into chambers and read it with the references. Counsel made no attempt, however, to take the judge through the salient aspects of the applicant’s history, let alone highlight those matters revealed in the document that went in mitigation of penalty. 

[25] The judge then asked counsel a series of questions in an obvious effort to be apprised of the applicant’s antecedents, but got little information in response. When the judge then sought information from counsel about the applicant’s prior convictions, counsel said: ‘Well, his priors, yes, they speak for themselves, Your Honour’. Counsel then told the judge that businesses that the applicant ran with his partner had become ‘lost’, and, since the applicant had been in custody for two years, his life ‘was really in ruins’. 

[26] After then tendering a number of urine testing certificates, showing that the applicant had abstained from drugs in custody (Exhibit 6), counsel submitted that the applicant’s ‘prospects of rehabilitation are, at the moment, excellent’, and that he has ‘that ongoing family support, and together with the fact he wants to have a more meaningful relationship with those of his children that he’ll be able to be reunited with when he’s outside’. Counsel told the judge that the applicant wanted to be a drug counsellor when released. 

[27] Towards the end of counsel’s plea — such as it was — the judge remarked: All I can tell you is, it’s clearly serious behaviour, and I haven’t yet determined the appropriate sentence. I’ve got to read all the material, and take into account the mitigating factors, of which there seem to be primarily two. One his plea, for what it’s worth, the utilitarian value. And secondly the steps he’s taken to further his rehabilitation in custody.

In considering grounds of appeal the Court states

Ground 2: Incompetence of counsel 

[35] It is convenient to turn first to ground 2, which complains that ‘the sentencing discretion miscarried as a consequence of the applicant’s representation at the plea hearing being incompetent, such that the applicant was materially and unfairly disadvantaged’. It cannot be gainsaid that aspects of the plea by the applicant’s counsel were incompetent. His failure to have a basic grasp of elementary facets of relevant sentencing law was inexcusable. This Court’s intervention — assuming leave to appeal is granted — is only warranted, however, if ‘there is an error in the sentence first imposed’ and ‘a different sentence should be imposed’.

[36] In this Court, counsel for the applicant submitted that counsel who presented the plea did not address ‘what appeared to be a history of potentially serious mental health concerns’ set out in the applicant’s handwritten history. Further, despite this history, counsel on the plea accepted the sentencing judge’s summary that there were only two matters in mitigation, being the applicant’s ‘plea of guilty, for what it’s worth, the utilitarian value’; and prospects of rehabilitation, including the steps taken towards rehabilitation in custody, coupled with ongoing family support.

[37] Counsel for the respondent submitted that appellate intervention is not justified. In written submissions it was contended that the applicant’s handwritten material comprehensively set out his personal history, including his abuse of drugs and alcohol. And though in oral submissions counsel for the respondent said that it ‘must be acknowledged that the conduct of the plea was unsatisfactory’, he nonetheless argued that nothing in the sentencing remarks suggests that counsel’s incompetence led to any error in the sentence imposed. 

[38] Recognising that there may be cases in which it might be concluded that the failure to put relevant material in mitigation before a sentencing court on a plea leads to there being ‘an error in the sentence first imposed’, this case is not an appropriate vehicle in which to consider circumstances where the incompetent conduct of a plea by counsel might lead an appellate court to determine that there was an error in the sentence imposed as a result of that incompetence. Although in the exercise of his duties to his client, and to the court, counsel should have done a great deal more to present even a barely adequate plea, the judge had before him in written form some material going in mitigation of penalty, which, no doubt, he read and considered.

[39] In those circumstances, we would not grant leave to appeal on the first ground. Obviously enough, however, this should not be taken as any form of acceptance, tacit or otherwise, on our part, of the manner in which this plea was conducted.

Fakes

R v Evelyn [2020] QSC 097 offers an illustration of identity crime. It deals with a drug trafficker  found in possession of a large amount of fake drivers licences and fraudulent credit cards in the names of dozens of victims.

Evelyn was sentenced with 12 years and 5 months' imprisonment over 97 offences, including 10 offences relating to possessing tainted property, dealing with another entity's identity and fraud.

The judgment states

[2] In all, there are 97 offences for which sentences were imposed. The period of offending began on a date between 11 May 2016 and 12 June 2016 and ended on 12 December 2018. The range of offences is extensive, but can be described as falling into two categories. First, there are 37 drug offences, the most serious of which are two trafficking offences for a period of slightly in excess five weeks and approximately 8 months later for a period just under four weeks. The maximum penalty for the trafficking offences is 25 years’ imprisonment 

[3] Second, there are 51 offences of fraud or dishonesty, of which the most serious is an offence of fraud by dishonestly gaining a benefit or advantage to a value of over $30,000 over a period of slightly in excess of ten months. The maximum penalty for fraud by dishonestly gaining a benefit or advantage to a value of over $30,000 is 14 years’ imprisonment.

Under a search warrant Police on 25 November during a search of Evelyn's unit located 'a cache of identity documents that the defendant had received being ID cards and bank cards that had been stolen from 18 different victims'. A search on 13 December disclosed more drugs and 'a quantity of documentation in the name of other persons consisting of personal bank records, traffic infringement notices and registration renewals for vehicles'.

In dealing with the identity crime the judgment states

[14] On 13 January 2017, the defendant used one Martin Drennan’s identification information to send an online submission to open a bank account with the ANZ bank. 

[15] Between 17 January 2017 and 9 March 2017, the defendant received the driver’s licence of one Simon Goodburn, which was stolen. 

[16] On 27 January 2017, the defendant entered into a rental agreement with Budget Rent-a- Car, Surfers Paradise. The defendant rented a car and agreed to return it on 11 February 2017 but did not do so. [17] Between 18 February 2017 and 9 March 2017, the defendant received a driver’s licence of one Jordan Keras, which was stolen. 

[18] Between 18 February 2017 and 9 March 2017, the defendant received a driver’s licence of one Hideaki Takayama, which was stolen. 

[19] On 28 February 2017, police attended the basement carpark of the defendant’s address and located the car which had stolen registration plates affixed to it. 

[20] On 8 March 2017, the defendant received tainted property being a Medicare card in the name of Martin Drennan. ... 

Where did the value go?

[25] On 15 July 2017, the defendant entered Europcar vehicle rentals at Brisbane Airport, presented a driver’s licence in the name of Ivor Hodgson and signed a rental agreement in Hodgson’s name to hire a Mercedes Benz. The defendant paid $510.83 with an American Express card in Hodgson’s name (“Hodgson Amex card”). 

[26] On 15 July 2017, the defendant attended at the DFO Eagle Farm and Coles Express Brisbane Airport and made purchases using the Hodgson Amex card being $30.97 at Coles Express, $69.95 at Country Road and $253.63 at Calvin Klein. 

[27] On 18 July 2017, the defendant attended Coles supermarket at Ann Street, Gatton and made purchases using the Hodgson Amex card in the amounts of $51.75 and $28.50.  

[28] On 19 July 2017, the defendant attended Coles Express Brisbane Airport and made a purchase of $48.80 using the Hodgson Amex card. 

[29] On 18 August 2017, the defendant attended Woolworths supermarket Surfer’s Paradise and made a purchase of $9.55 using the Hodgson Amex card. 

[30] On 19 August 2017, the defendant attended Officeworks and 7-Eleven in Morayfield and made purchases of $59.00 at Officeworks and $23.27 at 7-Eleven using the Hodgson Amex card. 

[31] On 19 August 2017, the defendant attended Woolworths supermarket Carindale and made two purchases in amounts of $23.85 and $60.79 using the Hodgson Amex card 

[32] On 19 August 2017, the defendant attended the Coles Express Nudgee and made a purchase of $26.74 using the Hodgson Amex card. 

The judgment continues -

[33] On various dates between 5 November 2016 and 11 October 2017, the defendant obtained and used driver’s licence data and other personal information relating to 123 different complainants for the purpose of making fraudulent applications to finance companies, banks and telecommunication companies in order to secure finance, credit cards or phones in their names. 

[34] Also, on various days between 1 January 2017 and 11 October 2017, the defendant used the identities of 29 complainants and made online applications to finance companies, banks and telecommunication companies in order to secure finance, credit cards or phones in their names. 67 of the applications were successful. 77 of the applications previously referred to were rejected. 

[35] The value of the successful applications was $58,820.13 

[36] Further, during this period, the defendant forged a number of documents in the name of one Clive Thompson, including a Queensland driver’s licence, an RACV credit application, an Energy Australia account statement, a Westpac Banking Corporation (“Westpac”) statement and a Queensland Transport driver’s licence change of address application. 

[37] On 4 August 2017, the defendant lodged the forged RACV credit application in the name of Clive Thompson with a credit provider. On that day, the defendant obtained an Audi sedan purchased in the name of Clive Thompson from the Audi Centre on the Gold Coast using the forged RACV credit application. The value of the Audi was $42,660.95. 

[38] On 4 August 2017, the defendant thereby broke a condition of a bail undertaking he entered into on 20 March 2017 by going to the Gold Coast City Council area other than for the purpose of visiting his solicitors or to attend court. 

[39] On 8 August 2017, the defendant similarly breached that bail condition. 

[40] On a date between 1 April 2017 and 11 October 2017, the defendant obtained a gold chain from Shiels Jewellers dishonestly. The value of the gold chain was $5,000. 

[41] On 1 September 2017, the defendant made four fraudulent withdrawals from the Commonwealth Bank account of one Mandy Turner in the total amount of $702. 

[42] On 25 July, 17 August, and 25 September 2017, the defendant made three fraudulent withdrawals from the Westpac bank account of Wiston Smitt in the amount of $1,476. 

[43] On 10 October 2018, the defendant obtained and used Wayne John Ward’s identification information to obtain a Visa card from St. George bank in that name, and to hire and book a room at the Oaks Hotel in Brisbane City. 

[44] Between 5 November 2018 and 12 December 2018, the defendant removed an electronic monitoring device which was fitted to his leg on 14 July 2018, thereby damaging it. 

[45] On 7 November 2018, upon or after removal of the device, the defendant was unlawfully at large. 

[46] On 7 November 2018 the defendant breached a condition of a bail undertaking entered into by him on 2 July 2018 requiring him to reside at an address approved by the Director of Public Prosecutions. 

[47] On 26 November 2018, the defendant was required to attend the Southport Magistrates Court and failed to appear. 

[48] On 7 November 2018, the defendant was required to attend the Supreme Court at Brisbane and failed to appear. 

[49] On 6 December 2018, the defendant impersonated one Dominic Nastasi and used a falsified driver’s licence as proof of his identification as that person to hire a car from Thrifty Car and Truck Rentals. 

[50] On 6 December 2018, the defendant used a Bank of Melbourne Visa card he fraudulently obtained in the name of Dominic Nastasi (“Nasatasi Visa card”) to pay a fee of $1,836 for the hire car from Thrift Car and Truck Rental. 

[51] On 12 December 2018, police executed a search warrant at a room occupied by the defendant at Peppers Resort Broadbeach. They located 8 clip seal bags containing 13.628 grams of methylamphetamine by pure weight and 0.852 grams of MDMA by pure weight. 

[52] They also located two bottles containing remnants of liquid tested as 1, 4-Butanediol. 

[53] On 12 December 2018, the defendant was occupying the room at Peppers Resort Broadbeach booked under the name of Dominic Nastasi for which he had paid a $200 deposit using the Nastasi visa card.

In Jerrim v Smith [2020] TASMC 6 Smith had been charged under Police Service Act 2003 (Tas) s 78 with impersonating a police officer: 'You are charged with on 7 May 2016 at Pontville in Tasmania, not being a police officer and you did without lawful excuse, have in your possession a badge that resembled a police badge namely, you had a police badge wired into your wallet, resembling a police issue warrant card.'

The judgment states

 At the beginning of the hearing in March 2020 Mr Cangelosi, counsel for the defendant, sought to have the complaint struck out on the basis that it did not contain a valid charge in that the complaint omitted an essential element of the offence. Prosecution gave notice to seek to amend the complaint. Both counsel agreed that the time in which a valid complaint of impersonating a police officer in May 2000 could be laid had now expired. 

The relevant section of the Police Service Act 2003 which creates the offence of impersonation of a police officer states:-

78. Impersonation 

A person who is not a police officer must not do any of the following without lawful excuse or the approval of the Commissioner: 

(a) ...; 

(b) wear or have in possession any uniform or badge that resembles, or is likely to be perceived as, a police uniform or badge; ....

That section provides two limbs to the charge of impersonation each of which must be satisfied in order to constitute the offence. They are that the person not a police officer does any of the matters listed: a) without lawful excuse; and b) without the approval of the Commissioner. 

In order to succeed in any prosecution, on this charge, the prosecution must prove both elements of the charge, that is, both a lack of lawful excuse and a lack of approval by the Commissioner. The burden of proof is upon the prosecution to prove both elements of the charge, beyond reasonable doubt, and the failure to do so will result in an acquittal. 

If the police did not prove that the defendant did not have the Commissioner's permission to have in his possession the police badge the charge of impersonation of a police officer would fail. There is no evidential onus upon the defendant adduce evidence that he had the Commissioner's permission. 

The central issue to be determined by the Court is whether or not the complaint as drafted is defective because it discloses no offence because it did not include words similar to "or the approval of the Commissioner" so that the complaint read something similar to: “You are charged with on 7 May 2016 at Pontville in Tasmania, not being a police officer and you did without lawful excuse or the approval of the Commissioner have in your possession a badge that resembled a police badge.....”.

Regulatory Incapacity

'Mortgage Broking, Regulatory Failure and Statutory Design' by Jeannie Marie Paterson and Elise Bant in (2020) 31(1) Journal of Banking and Finance Law and Practice comments

 The Royal Commission into Misconduct in the Banking, Insurance and Financial Services Industry and the Productivity Commission Report into Banking raised questions about the quality of the service provided by mortgage brokers to consumers and recommended far-reaching changes to the way in which the mortgage broking industry is regulated. In response, the Commonwealth Government has recently introduced a “best interests” duty and tighter regulation of commissions. This new regime has potentially far-reaching significance, as the broking industry itself is at the threshold of considerable technological change prompted by the introduction of the Open Banking’s initiative. This article assesses the reforms in terms of: (1) efficacy in improving the quality of the service provided by mortgage brokers; (2) fit with the existing regime, including insights from fiduciary law; and (3) flexibility in adapting to technological innovation. It aims to highlight the importance of good legislative design in responding to concerns about the effective functioning of a regulated market. 

The same issue features 'Trust, Social Licence and Regulation: Lessons from the Hayne Royal Commission' by Anne Matthew, offering

 a critical approach to examining key findings of the Hayne Royal Commission, using institutional theory as a lens. Institutional theory positions the social contract within its understanding of laws, rules and norms. It is argued that the Royal Commission’s recommendations calling for a stronger regulatory response and simplification of the law are supported by institutional theory. Enforcement and simplification can provide clarity that the law is in fact a rule of the game and ensure that the institutional rules are in a strong position to influence behaviour. The role of the regulator in this process is pivotal.

'Product Intervention Power: An Extra Layer of Protection to Consumers' by Marina Nehme, comments

 In April 2019, the Australian Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC) was provided with the power to issue product intervention orders – that is, where a financial services/credit product available to retail clients/consumers has caused, will cause or is likely to cause a significant consumer detriment, ASIC may “regulate, or if necessary, ban” that product. The Treasury Laws Amendment (Design and Distribution Obligations and Product Intervention Powers) Act 2019 (Cth) also empowers ASIC with design and distribution powers for financial services/credit products; this power will come into effect in April 2021. These powers have been on the horizon since the Financial System Inquiry in 2014, which hoped that product intervention powers (PIPs) might help to “build consumer confidence and trust in the financial system”. This aim remains urgent, particularly following well-publicised findings by the Royal Commission into Misconduct in the Banking, Superannuation and Financial Services Industry of poor and even illegal practices in the financial industry. This article analyses these reforms with the aim of understanding the extent to which PIPs might enhance the regulatory regime and promote consumer trust.

Victoria Stace's  'Consumer Lending by New Zealand Banks After the Royal Commission – Business as Usual or More Responsibility Required?' comments

This article looks at the question of whether banks in New Zealand – which are for the most part wholly owned subsidiaries of Australian banks – would be acting in breach of New Zealand’s responsible lending laws if they engage in certain conduct that was found by the Australian Royal Commission into Misconduct in the Banking, Superannuation and Financial Services Industry to be in breach of the Australian responsible lending laws. This involves considering the differences between the responsible lending laws in each jurisdiction, and assessing whether the conduct identified by the Royal Commission to be in breach of Australian laws would contravene New Zealand’s equivalent laws. The article focuses on the lender’s obligation to assess whether the proposed credit will cause the borrower substantial hardship, as this was a particular focus of the Royal Commission.

Steve Kourabas's 'Prudential Regulation in Australia and the Banking Royal Commission: A Missed Opportunity for Reform?' argues

The global financial crisis (GFC) revealed fundamental regulatory weaknesses in many of the world’s leading financial jurisdictions. In particular, there was a lack of attention to risks of a systemic nature. Post-GFC regulatory reforms in many of the world’s leading financial jurisdictions have sought to address this problem through the introduction of regulation that emphasises the systemic nature of financial risk as well as changes to regulatory structures. However, Australian policy-makers and regulators have tended to focus more on market conduct and consumer protection matters as evidenced during the recent Royal Commission into Misconduct in the Banking, Superannuation and Financial Services Industry. This article argues that the secondary status of systemic financial stability as a regulatory concern in Australia following the GFC undermines the centrality of systemic financial stability as a regulatory goal. The article proposes a number of reforms that have been introduced in jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom to give effect to global best practice following the GFC and that have as their key aim the maintenance of systemic financial stability.

'Role and Effectiveness of ASIC Compared with the SEC: Shedding Light on Regulation and Enforcement in the United States and Australia' by Zehra G Kavame Eroglu and KE Powell  comments

The Australian Securities and Investments Commission’s (ASIC) regulatory oversight of securities and financial markets has increased considerably over time. However, the wisdom of this model has recently been challenged by the Hayne Royal Commission as ASIC’s enforcement activities were found to be relatively toothless. Accordingly, many criticised the agency and called for further ASIC reform. After the Global Financial Crisis, the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) faced similar criticisms of regulatory failure. As such, this article analyses the SEC regulatory structure, enforcement activities and governmental resources, and compares certain indicators of effectiveness with those of ASIC over the past quarter-century. By comparing ASIC with the world’s biggest capital market regulator this article analyses the viability of further reform of ASIC and argues that ASIC is woefully under-resourced to engage in increased enforcement action. 

Secession and the Beast

Noting media reports - alas without much detail - dealing with the supposed secession bid in Western Australia last week by the New Westralia group, breathlessly characterised in one item as 'the sovereign nation that attempted to overthrow the state government 24 hours ago'.

The New Westies appear to be greatly worried by the mark of the beast, a Jesuit conspiracy and other nonsense. They supposedly  'declare themselves against foreign incursion, domestic insurgency, mercenary, treachery, sedition and treasonous behaviour', with member Wade Guerin  alerting people on Facebook - but of course - that 'Under diplomatic immunity we are all protected by international criminal court'. The WA Police disagree.

Guerin and three associates broke into the old York courthouse on Friday, claimng to serve notice on the WA government through decrees posted on the courthouse wall. Gone are the days where Luther nailed his tract to the front door.

The New Westies declared the building theirs, reportedly demanding keys and security codes within 72 hours and declaring  null and void all current lease agreements and management orders on the basis that New Westralia is the 'legitimate sovereign authority acting in the interests of the people native of the Dependencies of Western Australia'. The Police arrived, arrests followed, the world was unpersuaded by the message

we are under siege at the current moment in York, Australia and staying strong in our court ... please do your research as much as possible, good people ... I can only show you the way, we must all attempt our own escape and everything is in play to do so, trust me

or by the prayers of the revolutionaries.

Prayer is relevant, given their characterisation of the Australian flag as satanic, denunciation of The Bishop of Rome and reference to New Westralia as 'a Christian nation' that 'strives to be a world class destination for spiritual vitality, enlightenment, meditation, wonder and expression, on the great adventure of life'. In case you were in doubt, the New Westies claim to be 'a constituted body for true allegiance, protection, prosperity, care and maintenance of peaceful society, and the depository for the proper administrative governance for the people native of the Dependencies of Western Australia'.

The people have been charged with criminal damage, trespass, and obstructing police.

The Friends of New Westralia site states

New Westralia (trust) is a constituted body (Executive Council) for true allegiance, protection, prosperity, care and maintenance of peaceful society, and the depository for the proper administrative governance for the people native of the Dependencies of Western Australia. 

New Westralia body politic (Executive Council) is based on a model of co-operative association of peers, one share – one vote, representative governance from local council upwards. 

New Westralia attests to be the legitimate sovereign authority acting in the interests of the people native of the Dependencies of Western Australia, their heirs and successors, And, Defender of the Imperial Realm proper in the name of Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth the Second, the Protestant Supreme Governor of the Church of England in her absentia by capture, retardation, disinterest, or uncaring of Her loyal subjects current plight, as it may be. 

New Westralia attests to be the proper Governing body of law for the Dependencies of Western Australia, and other Territories inclusive, taking the usufruct in safe hands for the benefit of the people of the Dependencies of Western Australia. 

New Westralia stands against foreign incursion, domestic (terrorism) insurgency, mercenary, treachery, sedition and treasonous behaviour against the Imperial Crown proper or injurious to the people of Western Australia, or our other Australian friends. 

New Westralia pledges reciprocal loyalty and true allegiance, to govern in good faith and return confidence to the institutions and structures of a Just Society, with Certainty of Future paramount to the interest of harmony, peace and security. 

New Westralia offers, advocacy, investigation and protection from unwanted intrusion, servitude, commercial predation, alienation of rights and property among other things.

The Mission Statement is a hoot, complete with the usual sovereign citizen mumbo jumbo about all caps names

Hierarchical order and system malfunction  

The spiritual War 

Christian/ spiritual (Universal) faith - Enlightenment v Dark forces satanic cult control matrix (Protestant Church of England v Roman Vatican cult/ Global UN NWO/ Elite 1%) 

The Governor in trust 

Supreme Governor of the Protestant Church of England – Queen Elizabeth the Second, Defender of (Universal) Faith. 

The free men 

The free men/ People – Subjects of Her Gracious Majesty (free- will/ choice)

 The Constitution

Commonwealth of Australia Constitution (1901)

The inherent design flaw within 

S51 allows Parliament discretion to make laws/ treaty and many other things. (Deliberate subterfuge to maintain control/ the inherent design flaw within).   

The COMPANY  

AUSTRALIA corp (Jesuit control/ “The COMPANY”).  

The CITIZEN 

PERSONS= Legal Personality/ CITIZEN (OF ROME),with Numerical Legal Entity Identifier (LEI). 

The Number of the beast.  

Workers/ contractors/ mercenary service, bound by the terms of the contract/ Bondsmen. 

The CONTRACT 

Drivers Licence, Passport, Social Security, medicare (ALL CAPS NAME) (The voluntary Contract = Performance / Consent) 

Conditions  

All legal PERSONS operating within “The COMPANY” (AUSTRALIA) are Bound by the terms and conditions imposed upon them in (voluntary)servitude. 

Alteration of contract 

The COMPANY may alter or amend those terms and conditions periodically where continued consent is presumed by acquiescence or performance. 

Personal Representation accepted 

That is to say, if you say nothing(silence) or should you mark the Polls/ Head count (vote, object or protest) thereby clearly accepting the attendant Personal representation/ liability of that Undertaking. 

Impaired Performance 

Where objection, protest or belligerence dishonours or impairs (YOUR) performance to the consensual undertaking (the contract) there is sufficient legal evidence to constrain non- performance obligations, by WHAT EVER FORCE SEEMS REASONABLE, PROPORTIONATE and NECESSARY. 

Protest 

All protest, discontent, belligerence, agitation, threat, violence causing damage, loss or injury (in it’s legal sense) is contained within the Contract THE BELL/ DOME). 

Justification for the use of Force 

Should the COMPANY amend, alter or change the terms of that contract(Legislation amendments) and your consent be provided (in it’s legal sense) and people protest, agitate, threaten (Rebel) against the new rules, force may be Justifiably used to quell any insurrection. 

Visualisation- the Bel/ Pressure Dome 

In a visualisation we could imagine a bell or dome where the top of the bell is the Legislated Rules of the COMPANY we have consensually agreed to abide by, by our acquiescence or performance (accepting the benefit of CITIZENSHIP). 

The shape of the Bell/ Pressure Dome 

The tapered sides of the bell/ dome are the penalties imposed on infraction of the agreed rules, thereby containing the belligerence under its own pressure. 

The Pressure increases 

Should the new rules imposed cause anxiety or trouble the PERSONAS legally employed in occupation, and social unrest will press against the steadily tightening walls of the bell/ dome and without relief something must give as the pressure naturally increases.... 

Reality exposed 

This is the constructive reality we observe today, mandated vaccinations, loss of rights, applied force against insurrection(police state/ martial law), frustrated protest or objection, ever changing political rules, financial limitation, poverty and depression all contained inside the bell where relief is completely and utterly dependant upon the whim of the COMPANY. 

Our Naivety 

If you would be so naive to think that the mob has the necessary might or organisation to overwhelm or remove the COMPANY you would be grievously mistaken. 

Know Who You Are 

To remove yourself form the occupation(the COMPANY) you may have mistakenly undertaken allegiance, pledging obedience to the foreign occupier you must know who you are, and behave with dignity and restraint. 

Find Godliness and peace 

Find god or/ and the mystery/ mastery of your self. 

The Remedy 

There you have your peaceful remedy.

Analytics

'Re-imagining ‘Learning Analytics’ … a case for starting again?' by Neil Selwyn in (2020) 46 The Internet and Higher Education comments

This brief paper develops a series of provocations against the current forms of Learning Analytics that are beginning to be implemented in higher education contexts. The paper highlights a number of ways in which Learning Analytics can be experienced as discriminatory, oppressive and ultimately disadvantaging across whole student populations, and considers the limitations of current efforts within educational data science to increase awareness of ‘ethics’ and ‘social good’. This culminates in a stark choice: is it possible to substantially improve the field of Learning Analytics as it currently stands, or should we abandon it in favour of new forms of applying data science that are aligned with the experiences of non-conforming ‘learners’ and un-categorizable forms of ‘learning’?

Selwyn argues

Much of this special issue is understandably concerned with thinking the best of Learning Analytics. After all, the idea of Learning Analytics raises a number of seductive promises for all stakeholder groups currently involved in the development and implementation of these technologies in higher education settings. What educational data scientist would not want their work to foster potentially powerful forms of active learning across large student populations? What higher education leader would not want rich, detailed insights into key institutional ‘performance points’ such as student performance, retention and engagement? 

In contrast, then, this brief article deliberately considers the premise of this special issue in a contrary manner. Instead of ‘reading with’ the promises of Learning Analytics, what happens if we choose to ‘read against’ them? What are the fundamental social problems inherent in the ways that Learning Analytics products and practices are being realized in higher education contexts? Who is most likely to be experiencing these issues? How might we ‘think otherwise’ about the application of analytics in higher education – particularly if ‘we’ is taken to include the many interest groups not currently included in the notion of Learning Analytics ‘stakeholders’? As I hope this paper will show, ‘thinking the worst’ can be a useful means of ‘stress testing’ the core premises, principles and politics that the current implementation of learning analytics into education is currently built around. 

Of course, what readers choose ultimately to do with these insights will depend on their own underpinning agendas, values and ideologies. Yet regardless of one’s background, this is a highly appropriate moment to be introducing an element of pessimism into proceedings. People working in the area of learning analytics, education data-mining and other forms of ‘educational data science’ find themselves at a crossroads. On one hand, the vast majority of people working along these lines are clearly very thoughtful and well-intentioned - developing products, protocols and practices that they genuinely hope (if not believe) will considerably improve learning and learners’ experiences of engaging in education. On the other hand, going by the forms of ‘analytics’ that we see being implemented in higher education contexts, there might well be a strong case for radically rethinking how ‘Learning Analytics’ is playing out beyond the confines of LAK, SOLAR and the other academic manifestations of Learning Analytics. 

To be blunt, then, this paper starts from the contention that something is surely amiss if the main aim of academics working in this area is to be “caring and supportive” (Prinsloo, 2019), but significant numbers of people continue to experience Learning Analytics tools and techniques as “data being used against me to screw me” (Essa, 2019). This tension has been highlighted in the recent Twitter-controversies over the propensity of learning analytics tools and systems to be used for purposes of institutional surveillance rather than individual support (e.g. Kovanovic, 2019). As I have argued elsewhere: “All told, there is an emerging suspicion (warranted or not) that students are not the primary beneficiaries of the Learning Analytics technologies they are subjected to during their school or university education” (Selwyn, 2019). 

So, in this brief paper I want to reflect a little further on these tensions – especially the question of what academics working in the area of Learning Analytics consider the political intent of their work to be. If we take the politics of Learning Analytics seriously, then perhaps we need to begin thinking along more radical lines than simply embracing ‘ethics’ and trying to foreground possible ‘social goods’ that educational data science might support. Instead, it might be a useful thought experiment to pursue a more radical logic – what Paul Prinsloo (2019) identifies as “question[ning] the very existence of Learning Analytics” (or, at least, questioning the very existence of the forms of Learning Analytics that are currently being implemented in educational settings around the world).  

In working through this prospect, I want to draw on various recent provocations from within the broader data science community – all data science ‘insiders’ who are voicing informed frustrations over the politically uninterested malaise that they see pervading their field of work. These writers are beginning to argue that it is not good enough for data scientists to presume that technology is essentially neutral, that data is objective, and resort to all-absolving claims of ‘I am just an engineer’. In my view, these insider critiques offer some interesting future directions for educational data science to pursue.

'Is Data Dark? Lessons from Borges’s “Funes the Memorius”' by Alfred Essain in (2019) 6(3) Journal of Learning Analytics 35–42 comments

In 'Funes the Memorius' Jorge Luis Borges tells the tale of an Argentinian man who falls off a horse, becomes paralyzed, but with his misfortune acquires the strange gift of infinite memory. Funes remembers everything, which is to say he forgets nothing. l will use Borges' story as the backdrop for my response to Professor Selwyn. 

My commentary is in three parts. First, I begin by stating some core areas of agreement, of which there are many. Second, I examine Selwyn’s use of the word “data”. I argue that it perpetuates a number of common misconceptions about statistics and the scientific method. We cannot understand the importance of learning analytics without first clarifying these misconceptions and moving beyond them. In the course of my argument I challenge Selwyn’s central thesis that “Education is inherently social, inherently contextual, inherently subjective; it means you can’t objectively rate it, measure it, indicate it.” Third, I turn the table on Selwyn. As a critic of learning analytics Selwyn suggests that data “disadvantages large numbers of people”. I argue that the root problem in education is the status quo, which Selwyn unwittingly represents, and not learning analytics. If we care about equity in education, as part of a broader interest in social justice, then learning analytics and the use of educational data can be a powerful instrument for empowering the disadvantaged. 'Is Data Dark? Lessons from Borges’s “Funes the Memorius”' by Alfred Essain in (2019) 6(3) Journal of Learning Analytics 35–42 comments

Citizenship Selling

'Millionaire mobility and the sale of citizenship' by Kristin Surak in (2020) Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies asks

Why do wealthy people purchase citizenship in peripheral countries? This article investigates the demand for citizenship by investment programmes, which enable naturalisation based on a donation or financial investment. Extending research on long-distance naturalisation among the middle class and on residence by investment programmes, I examine the motives of the wealthy using citizenship by investment options. Based on over one hundred interviews with rich naturalisers and intermediaries in the citizenship industry, I find that mobility, both in the present and as a future hedge, is a strong driver, followed by business advantages. Often it is privileges in third countries – not the place granting the citizenship – that are sought. In contrast to middle-class strategic naturalisers, quality of life, education options, and job prospects were not important, though navigating geopolitical barriers and risks were. Many naturalisers were not compensating for the failures of their citizenship at birth, but manoeuvering within a world of state competition. Finally, some individuals inverted the citizenship hierarchy and downgraded from ‘first tier’ memberships when, after years of living abroad, their nationality became a liability. The conclusion elaborates on the duplex structure of intra-state and inter-state inequality that channels demand, and the implications for citizenship more broadly.

Identity

Biometrics as imperialism: age assessments of young asylum seekers in Denmark' by Nanna Dahler in (2020) Race and Class comments

This article explores medical assessments of the age of unaccompanied minors seeking asylum in Denmark, to show how, through the medical and bureaucratic aspects of the process, it serves as an imperialist technology of control, as those judged under 18 have greater protection in the asylum system. Since the biggest group of people who are age-estimated in Denmark are Afghans, the author looks at the relationship between Denmark and Afghanistan and draws on interviews with people who underwent the process. By connecting medical documents with biometric measurement in colonial contexts and the current expansion of biometric surveillance, the author argues that the collection of intrusive physical data from Afghan minors is to be understood as a colonial mapping of the body. The Danish Immigration Service’s age decision-making process articulates a form of administrative rule that works to depoliticise questions of dispossession and death, and is a form of colonial violence enabled by humanitarian discourse and law.

Publics

'Shared Histories: The Feminist and Gay Liberation Movements for Freedom in Public' by Elizabeth Sepper and Deborah Dinner in (2020) 54 University of Richmond Law Review 759 comments

This Symposium on the fiftieth anniversary of the Stonewall Rebellion presents the opportunity to evaluate the regulation and deregulation of gender and sexuality in public space. In 1969, LGBTQ people erupted against policing, harassment, and exclusion in public spaces. That same year, the growing feminist movement also launched protests for women's equality in public accommodations. 

Our essay analyzes two case studies, from New Jersey in the late 1960s and California in the mid-1980s, to show what we might learn by integrating the histories of LGBTQ and feminist public accommodations activism. These case studies offer two lessons. First, the regulation of cisgender women and LGBTQ people stemmed from common sources of both law and custom. Public authorities and private businesses limited the access of unescorted heterosexual women, gay people, and gender nonconformists to public accommodations and surveilled their gathering in public space. For each of these groups, such policing was justified by fears of sexuality perceived to threaten the hetero-patriarchal family. Second, feminist and LGBTQ people's respective fights for equality in public reinforced one another. Before 1969, no city, state, or federal law prohibited sex, sexual orientation, or gender identity discrimination in public accommodations. Beginning in the 1960s, the LGBTQ and feminist movements pursued court battles and legal reforms. They ensured that liquor licensing no longer targeted cisgender women and LGBTQ people. Over the course of the 1970s and ‘80s, virtually all states came to adopt public accommodations laws prohibiting sex discrimination, and cities and states slowly began to explicitly include sexual orientation as well. Feminist and LGBTQ legal victories evolved in an interdependent rather than isolated manner.

Dirigisme

'From Industrial Policy to National Industrial Strategy: An Emerging Global Phenomenon' by Thomas A. Hemphill in (2020) Bulletin of Science, Technology and Society comments

In February 2019, the German federal government announced its new “National Industry Strategy 2030.” Many economies — including the United Kingdom (2017), European Union (2017), and Saudi Arabia (2018) — have announced national industrial strategies addressing the competitive threat of the People’s Republic of China’s 2015 “Made in China 2025” 5-year economic plan to become a global leader in 10 advanced technology manufacturing sectors. The use of the 20th-century term “industrial policy” heralds back to public policy antecedents of what is now evolving globally in the 21st century as national “industrial strategy,” a concept explored in this article. Unlike traditional 20th-century efforts at industrial policy (which focused on public policy efforts to maintain domestic primacy of declining, older industries), national industrial strategy recognizes (and generally accepts) the international global economy as a foundation of competition. Most importantly, national industrial strategy focuses on technologically emerging industries as well as the national government working collaborative in a partnership with these emerging industries to meet future growth challenges and opportunities