The media release states
Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs will be banned from wearing their colours in public anywhere in Queensland under the Palaszczuk Government’s tough new package of laws to better tackle serious organised crime.
The move will extend the current prohibition on wearing colours in licenced venues into all public places across the State.
Premier Annastacia Palaszczuk said Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs have been a very visible and intimidating part of organised crime.
“The days of brazen, menacing rides through our streets and cities in daunting gang colours are over,” Ms Palaszczuk said.
“Under Campbell Newman’s laws, gang colours were still permitted on our streets. Under my laws, they won’t be."
“The gangs can expect no let-up from police and prosecutors. I want more convictions not less, something we haven’t seen under the LNP laws."
“My Government’s new laws will give the police and our courts workable, enforceable laws to convict those involved in all forms of serious crime,” the Premier said.
Attorney-General and Minister for Justice Yvette D’Ath said the extension of the ban will target outlaw motorcycle gangs, without impacting legitimate, law-abiding motorcycle riders and clubs.
“The Taskforce Report on Organised Crime Legislation recommended the Government retain the provisions in the Liquor Act that ban the wearing of prohibited items such as OMCG colours in licenced venues,” Mrs D’Ath said.
“The Government is adopting that recommendation but taking it further, because we recognise the fear and intimidation caused by colours, wherever they are worn."
“They can also intimidate victims or witnesses to crimes, who may fear the consequences if they come forward."
“That intimidation goes directly to the behaviour of OMCGs that is rightfully a concern to the Queensland public and Queensland Police."
“We want to ensure the safety of our community, and are committed to giving law enforcement agencies the tools they need to make that happen.”
It is intended the offence will carry escalating penalties including imprisonment, and police will be empowered to confiscate banned items on the spot.
The Palaszczuk Government’s commitment to tackling organised crime in all its forms means the provisions that will prevent outlaw motorcycle gang clubhouses reopening can also be used to shut down premises such as call centres being used for boiler room fraud rackets.
Police Minister Bill Byrne said the new laws will also retain additional mandatory penalties as an inducement for offenders to cooperate with police.
“Our crackdown on serious organised crime will be all-encompassing,” Mr Byrne said.
“That’s why police have been involved through the development of this new regime."
“Key stakeholders have had also had input into the Commission of Inquiry into the Criminal Organisations Act and the Taskforce on Organised Crime Legislation.”
The new package will be introduced to Parliament in the next fortnight to allow consultation on the specific provisions of the draft legislation. The Government will work toward the passage of the laws through the Parliament by the end of this year.The Victorian Law Reform Commission's report on Regulatory Regimes Preventing the Infiltration of Organised Crime into Lawful Occupations and Industries at the beginning of this year states
On 29 October 2014, the then Attorney-General, the Hon. Robert Clark, MP, asked the Victorian Law Reform Commission to review and report on the use of regulatory regimes to help prevent organised crime and criminal organisations entering into or operating through lawful occupations and industries. In the terms of reference, and in this report, the term ‘infiltration’ means both entering into and operating through lawful occupations and industries by organised crime.
There is a growing recognition—both in Australia and internationally—that the infiltration of lawful occupations and industries is an important strategy of organised crime groups. Alongside this, there is a growing interest in the use of regulatory regimes to deter and detect that infiltration. Under the terms of reference, the concept of infiltration involves both the entry of organised crime groups into an occupation or industry (for example, through owning or operating a business), and the operation of organised crime groups through an occupation or industry. ‘Operating through’ an occupation or industry includes the use of professional facilitators and specialist service providers.
The terms of reference do not ask the Commission to make recommendations for law reform. Instead, the Commission is asked to establish a framework of principles for assessing the risks of organised crime infiltration of occupations and industries, and for developing suitable regulatory responses to those risks.
The Commission’s report therefore contains guidance of a general nature that can be applied to any lawful occupation or industry that may be at risk of organised crime infiltration. Given the diversity of occupations/industries that may be vulnerable to infiltration, and the different forms that infiltration may take, it would not be possible— or advisable—to attempt to present a ‘one size fits all’ regulatory response that could be applied to all lawful occupations/industries at risk of organised crime infiltration. Any changes to the regulatory regime of an occupation or industry to address a risk of infiltration must be proportionate to that risk and the harm likely to be caused by infiltration, and take into account the other policy goals of the regulatory regime. The Commission’s consultations made clear that a regulatory response to infiltration will only be effective and proportionate if it is specific to the at-risk occupation/industry and the particular vulnerabilities and opportunities that organised crime groups may seek to exploit within it.
The Commission recommends that the report be read in conjunction with the Victorian Guide to Regulation and used by policy makers in assessing the risks of organised crime infiltration of lawful occupations and industries, and in developing regulatory responses to those risks.
The following key messages emerge from the Commission’s report.
The nature of organised crime
Organised crime comprises an increasingly broad range of activities. An effective regulatory response to organised crime infiltration requires an understanding of the breadth of activities that may benefit from (or require) the infiltration of lawful occupations and industries, and the particular forms of conduct that organised crime groups may engage in once infiltration has occurred. While infiltration may enable the conduct of ‘traditional’ organised crime activities such as the trafficking of illicit commodities and money laundering, it may equally enable conduct such as fraud (including investment, taxation or identity fraud), unlawful practices that are specific to an occupation or industry (such as illegal commercial fishing or waste management practices), or labour exploitation or trafficking.
Regulators should have an understanding of contemporary forms of organised crime activity, and remain abreast of changes to such activity as organised crime groups seek out new markets and means of profit-making. This understanding is necessary not only for the identification of risk factors for infiltration and the choice of regulatory strategies but also for the implementation of the regulatory response. In tackling organised crime, it is becoming more common to take a multi-disciplinary approach to enforcement and consider the enforcement actions available to several government agencies. This requires an understanding of the numerous types of activity in which organised crime groups may be engaged in a particular occupation or industry, such as taxation fraud, employment law contraventions, or migration law contraventions.
Identifying risk factors for infiltration
Existing analyses of common risk factors for organised crime infiltration are at an early stage of development, and are relatively few. Drawing on the existing analyses and its own consultations, the Commission has identified a series of high-level risk factors that can assist policy makers in identifying a risk of infiltration of a particular occupation or industry. However, as the Commission’s consultations made clear, a more detailed, specific risk assessment of a particular occupation or industry should also be conducted to determine the precise vulnerabilities that organised crime groups may exploit and the appropriate regulatory strategies to reduce those vulnerabilities.
Collaboration and information sharing
An effective regulatory response to organised crime infiltration will require some degree of collaboration among regulatory, law enforcement and other government agencies. No one agency will hold all the necessary information, or be equipped with all the necessary powers and skills, to address organised crime infiltration.
Information sharing among government agencies is key to any collaborative work. The Commission has suggested that improved information sharing requires addressing any legislative barriers to information sharing, instituting appropriate governance arrangements for the sharing of sensitive information, and creating some form of centralised information-sharing mechanism, whether this comprises a multi-agency network through which information can be requested and circulated, or a centralised agency that can source and evaluate information from multiple agencies where a regulator has concerns about a particular licence applicant or other regulatory matter.
Collaboration between government agencies and industry is also key. Regulators will need to engage with industry in identifying risks of infiltration, developing a regulatory response, and implementing that response (including utilising industry members as a source of information about organised crime infiltration).
Strategies to reduce the risk of infiltration: licensing and beyond
The report sets out four main strategies for reducing the risk of organised crime infiltration of a lawful occupation or industry: • assessing the existing regulatory regime • restricting entry into an occupation or industry through a licensing scheme • regulating post-entry behaviour in an occupation or industry • addressing the use of professional facilitators.
Restrictions on entry
Where no regulatory regime currently operates, or the existing regime is deficient, it may be appropriate to restrict entry to the occupation or industry through a licensing scheme. However, licensing should not be a default response to a risk of organised crime infiltration. The report sets out a range of factors that should be considered in deciding whether licensing is appropriate, including whether the form of infiltration is of a type that could be addressed through licensing measures, whether the regulator would be willing and able to conduct a rigorous examination of licence applicants, whether the regulator (or possibly Victoria Police) would have the powers and resources to prevent unlicensed operation, and the potential anti-competitive effects of licensing on the occupation/industry.
Where a licensing scheme is used, a host of factors will need to be considered in order to detect any links to organised crime when assessing a licence applicant’s probity and suitability. This includes enquiring into the professional competency of the licence applicant, the beneficial owners of corporate applicants, any history of prior unlawful behaviour (whether criminal or non-criminal) and adverse administrative decisions, and the financial capacity of the applicant to conduct the licensed business. Although criminal intelligence may be heavily relied on in some licensing decisions, it is particularly important that regulators consider a broad range of information in assessing probity and suitability, so as not to place an unreasonable burden on law enforcement agencies, and to establish the most complete picture possible of the applicant’s probity and suitability.
Post-entry regulation
The post-entry regulation of an occupation or industry is just as important as any restrictions on entry.
Any licensing scheme will need to be supplemented with the ongoing regulation of an occupation or industry in order to detect organised crime groups that evaded detection during the licensing process, or which have corrupted existing occupation/industry members.
Post-entry regulation is also a potential alternative to restrictions on entry. It may be that the particular vulnerabilities of an occupation/industry are best addressed through a targeted, post-entry measure, such as record-keeping requirements or restrictions on cash-based transactions.
Post-entry regulation also provides an opportunity to ‘widen the regulatory gaze’ and harness the capacity of third parties—such as occupation and industry members, customers, and employees/workers—to participate in regulation. In some industries, for example, legitimate businesses may play a key role in deterring and detecting organised crime infiltration by conducting supplier or customer due diligence.
The report outlines five forms of post-entry regulation that should be considered in order to reduce the risk of organised crime infiltration:
• ongoing monitoring of probity and suitability
• customer and supplier due diligence measures
• record-keeping requirements
• restrictions on cash-based transactions
• controls on coercive conduct.
Professional facilitators
The use of service providers and ‘professional facilitators’ by organised crime groups is one potential form of infiltration. Professional facilitators may include lawyers, accountants, financial advisers and real estate agents, who wittingly or unwittingly assist with money laundering or other unlawful conduct. Insofar as professional facilitators may be key enablers of such activity, there may be significant disruptive value in addressing their use by organised crime groups.
Any regulatory strategies that seek to address the use of professionals should have regard to the continuum of facilitating conduct by professionals, which ranges from unwitting assistance through to wilful blindness and, at its highest, voluntary and deliberate facilitation of unlawful activity. With this in mind, consideration should be given to three key regulatory strategies that may help to prevent the use of professional facilitators by organised crime groups:
• professional ethics education and support measures
• customer due diligence measures
• accessorial liability provisions.
The Commission notes that one key issue concerning professional facilitators is the current scope of the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006 (Cth), which at the time of delivery of this report was under review by the Commonwealth government in relation to its proposed extension to lawyers, accountants and real estate agents. Being Commonwealth legislation, the Commission has not commented on this proposed reform, and has confined its attention to strategies that may be used under Victorian regulatory regimes.
A comprehensive regulatory response
By aligning this report with the Victorian Guide to Regulation, the Commission seeks to emphasise that any regulatory response to organised crime infiltration must be comprehensive; that is, it should begin by clearly identifying the particular vulnerabilities of an occupation or industry to infiltration, identify regulatory strategies that directly address those vulnerabilities, and ensure that the regulatory response is able to be effectively implemented.
The third step—implementation—requires a consideration of:
• which agency—or agencies—are most appropriate to administer the regulatory regime
• the need to foster information gathering from a broad range of sources
• which investigative powers are required • the necessity of a robust enforcement response.
In this respect, it is especially important that policy makers first consider the utility of any existing regulatory regime before developing new regulatory strategies. An existing regime may be sufficient ‘on paper’, but its effectiveness may be hampered by inadequate regulatory skill sets, insufficient collaboration and information sharing among relevant government agencies, or a limited and risk-averse enforcement response. Any such issues should be identified and redressed before new regulatory measures are considered.
The NSW Ombudsman report on a three year review of the state's consorting regime comments
The Crimes Amendment (Consorting and Organised Crime) Bill 2012 (the Bill) was introduced in February 2012 against a background of increased public concern about drive-by shootings and their suspected connection to criminal gangs. The Bill contained a suite of amendments, including a new consorting law, that were aimed at tackling organised crime and criminal gangs.
Consorting is not a new offence. It has existed in New South Wales (NSW) since the 1920’s when it was enacted in response to concern about the ‘razor gangs’ in East Sydney. Over time, it fell into disuse and was the subject of criticism.
In the second reading speech introducing the Bill to Parliament, the Hon. David Clarke (the Parliamentary Secretary speaking on behalf of the Minister for Police) said the Bill ‘modernises the offence of consorting, as well as extending and clarifying its application’.
The second reading speech acknowledged that the existing consorting offence had ‘been criticised for its potential application to everyday, innocent relationships which should not be the subject of prosecution’. With specific reference to the intention of the consorting law, the Parliamentary Secretary stated that ‘the goal of the offence is not to criminalise individual relationships, but to deter people from associating with a criminal milieu’.
The new consorting law was framed widely. It retained the broad definition of ‘convicted offender’ contained in the preceding version of the offence. The meaning of ‘consorting’ had been previously considered by the High Court, which established there is no need for an occasion of ‘consorting’ to have any unlawful purpose or be linked to ongoing or recent criminal activity. The result, acknowledged in a more recent decision, is that the ‘primary practical constraint upon its application is the discretion afforded to police officers’. The extent of the police discretion in determining the operation of the new consorting law was recognised by Parliament. The second reading speech noted that the consorting law requires police to ‘make a judgment about whether observed behaviour reaches the level sought to be addressed by the bill, that is, behaviour which forms or reinforces criminal ties.’ This brings with it a risk that the law will not be properly applied, as acknowledged by other Government speakers in the Parliamentary debates
When enacting the new consorting law, Parliament required the NSW Ombudsman to ‘prepare a report on the operation’ of the new law to be provided to the Attorney General and to the Commissioner of Police. The importance of this review was noted in the second reading speech: The old [consorting] provision has fallen into disuse and has been criticised in the past. This Report will provide an opportunity... to review the use of the new provision and to consider any further amendments or repeal of the provisions as necessary.
This is the Ombudsman’s report on the operation of the new consorting law as required. This report covers the three year period from the date the law commenced on 9 April 2012 to 8 April 2015. We provide this report to the Attorney General and Commissioner of Police, in accordance with our obligations under Part 29, schedule 11 of the Crimes Act 1900.
The new consorting law
The consorting law is located in Part 3A, Division 7 of the Crimes Act. Section 93X provides that it is an offence to habitually consort with at least two ‘convicted offenders’ on at least two occasions, after receiving an official consorting warning from police in relation to each offender. Any person, except children under the age of criminal responsibility, can be warned or charged with habitually consorting.
The new consorting law includes a number of significant changes: • consorting is extended from face-to-face associations to include consorting by electronic means such as communicating by phone, text or social media • the maximum penalty is increased to three years imprisonment and/or a $16,500 fine, from a maximum of six months and/or a fine of $400 • the offence is changed from a summary offence to an indictable offence, with the result that the statutory time limit applying to summary offences is removed • consorting with at least two different ‘convicted offenders’ is required • official police warnings are required to be given to a person in relation to each ‘convicted offender’guidance regarding the meaning of ‘habitual’ is provided so that ‘habitual consorting’ involves a minimum of two associations with each offender, and • six possible defences to a charge of consorting are included.
In chapter 4 we outline the different elements of the new consorting law. Key terms such as ‘habitually’ and more precise meanings of terms contained in the defences, such as ‘family members’, were not tested in court proceedings during the review period.
Public concerns about the operation of the consorting law
Consorting is a controversial offence as it involves the criminalisation of social interactions between people, who may be otherwise unconnected from criminal activity. The object of the offence is to allow police to intervene and attempt to prevent future offending. We received 34 submissions from organisations and individuals in response to our issues paper. Nearly all of these expressed serious concern about the consorting law, with the majority of submissions also calling for it to be repealed.
The central concern is that the consorting law curtails the freedom of association and communication between people to whom the law is applied in circumstances where there is no requirement for police to suspect any link between the consorting and planning or undertaking criminal activity or ‘building criminal networks’.
The validity of the new consorting law was subject to a constitutional challenge that was finalised in October 2014. The High Court, by majority, held the law to be valid. The grounds of challenge submitted that the impact of the consorting law contravened the implied constitutional freedom of political communication and freedom of association of people. The High Court noted that it was not its role in the proceedings to assess the merits or fairness of the consorting law. In a joint judgment, three of the High Court Justices noted that ‘[t]he desirability of consorting provisions such as this is not relevant to the task before the Court’. The High Court’s assessment of the new consorting law was limited to determining whether it was valid in light of the implied rights protected by the Constitution. In the submissions we received, human rights concerns relating to the consorting law were generally discussed in the context of Australia’s human rights obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). While there may be no constitutional foundation for a right to freedom of association in Australian law (as decided by the High Court), the infringement of this freedom remained a concern to many people and organisations that provided submissions to us during the review period.
Additional concerns expressed to us included the ability of the law to further marginalise disadvantaged and vulnerable people, to breach convicted offenders’ privacy, and to impede efforts by community organisations and government agencies to rehabilitate and reintegrate people into the community following imprisonment or detention.
In chapter 5 of this report we outline the primary concerns expressed to us about the law. The impact of the High Court proceedings on the implementation of the consorting law by police is described in section 6.7.1 of chapter 6, and section 7.2.1 of chapter 7.
Use of the consorting law
This report examines the use of the new consorting law by the NSW Police Force during its first three years of operation. We have not been able to quantify the extent to which the consorting law has been used by police officers to target people suspected of involvement in serious and organised crime or criminal gangs. However, we have quantified use of the consorting law by specialist squads in the Organised Crime Directorate and Serious Crime Directorates of the NSW Police Force. These specialist squads have operational remits that restrict their focus to serious crime, organised crime and criminal gangs. This provides insight into the extent of the use of the consorting law in relation to criminal activity within these categories.
To prepare this report, we analysed police consorting data, consulted extensively and published an issues paper seeking views regarding emerging issues in relation to the operation of the consorting law. Our methodology is outlined in chapter 2 and a statistical overview of the operation of the consorting law is provided in chapter 6. A discussion of the different types of use of the consorting law is located in chapters 7 and 8. At the outset, the NSW Police Force made a policy decision not to limit use of the new consorting law to organised crime and/or criminal gangs. This broad implementation resulted in the law being used across NSW to target a variety of local policing issues.
We found more than 3,300 people were subject to use of the consorting law as a result of being issued with a consorting warning or having others warned about consorting with them. The law was used on approximately 1,800 different occasions. More than 9,100 consorting warnings were issued, with 42 people charged with 46 offences of habitually consorting.
Officers attached to specialist squads tasked with policing serious and organised crime and criminal gangs were responsible for half of all the consorting warnings issued during the review period. The other half of the warnings were issued by general duties police attached to Local Area Commands (LACs).
Despite the even split in the number of warnings issued by specialist squads compared to general duties police, three quarters of all people subject to use of the consorting law were affected only as a result of an interaction with general duties police. This can be explained by the different way the Gangs Squad used the consorting law, for example, they targeted individuals on more than one occasion. The different characteristics of use by squads and general duties police are outlined in chapters 6, 7 and 8 of this report.
Use by specialist squads
The biggest single user of the consorting law was the NSW Police Force Gangs Squad. It was responsible for half of all consorting warnings issued and 34 of the 46 charges brought. The Gangs Squad leads the NSW Police Force response to serious and organised gang-related crime, particularly that involving Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs (OMCGs).
Use of the consorting law by the Gangs Squad involved a targeted and intelligence-driven approach. This is discussed in section 7.5 of chapter 7. During consultations with us, officers from the Gangs Squad indicated support for the consorting law and belief in its effectiveness as a tool for policing high-risk OMCGs. Gangs Squad officers used the consorting law to prevent criminal offending and to disrupt the ability of gang members to associate. It was used in addition to traditional criminal investigative strategies. As outlined in section 7.5, the consorting law’s effectiveness in this context lies in the cultural characteristics of OMCGs, and in the multi-layered approach adopted by the Gangs Squad to policing those gangs whose members were considered to be involved in ongoing, serious criminal activities.
The Gangs Squad was of the view that the operational flexibility that arises from the breadth of the consorting law and its restricted defences is crucial to the effectiveness of the consorting law in relation to high-risk OMCGs.
In contrast, other specialist squads also tasked with policing serious and organised crime and criminal gangs, have either significantly reduced their use of the consorting law over time or did not initiate use. The reasons for this are reported in sections 7.6 and 7.7 of chapter 7.
Use by general duties police
Nearly all LACs across NSW used the consorting law on at least one occasion, though sustained use was rare. The majority of use by general duties police attached to LACs was concentrated in Sydney metropolitan areas, with pockets of significant use in western NSW.
We found that different LACs employed the consorting law to attempt to address a range of local policing issues. While there was evidence of use by general duties police to target people suspected of very serious criminal activity, the law was also used to target people in public seating areas and public walkways, and at public transport hubs. Generally, the impetus for this use came as a result of nuisance offending in these areas or complaints from local businesses about ‘undesirable’ people disrupting retail or hospitality enterprises. In the months prior to the end of the review period, the Police Transport Command began using the consorting law on public transport such as trains and at train stations.
Some LACs advised they thought the consorting law was an effective disruption and crime prevention tool, while other LACs discontinued their use of the consorting law because they found few tangible benefits resulted.
We provide analysis and discussion of use of the new consorting law by general duties police officers in chapters 6, 7 and 8.
Who was targeted by police?
We analysed the demographic and criminal conviction histories of people subject to use of the consorting law during the review period. A statistical overview of this analysis is provided in section 6.8 of chapter 6.
With little use of electronic consorting, the operation of the consorting law relied on police observations of people spending time together in places open to the public. As a result, there was an increased potential for people who spent a lot of time in areas open to the public to be subject to use of the consorting law to a greater degree than others. In addition to being more visible to police, some groups have a proportionally higher number of people with previous convictions for indictable offences when compared to the general population. This brought these groups, and the people they spent time with, more readily within the ambit of the consorting law.
In chapter 8 we outline use of the consorting law in relation to disadvantaged and vulnerable people. In particular, we report use in relation to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples, people experiencing homelessness, and children and young people.
Demographic analysis of the consorting data revealed high use of the consorting law in relation to Aboriginal people, with significant variation between police regions. These variations are represented in figures 6 and 9 in chapters 6 and 8 respectively.
The proportion of Aboriginal people and the incidence of children and young people were far higher among those targeted by general duties police when compared with those targeted by specialist squads. Overall, 44% of people targeted by general duties officers were Aboriginal, compared to 13% of those targeted by specialist squads. Only a handful of people aged less than 18 years were subject to use of the consorting law by the specialist squads.
The proportion of women, children and young people subject to use of the consorting law who were Aboriginal was especially high, with half of adult women, and 60% of children and young people, identified as Aboriginal. During police consultations we found that the list of six defences available to a person charged with consorting had a significant influence on police officers’ exercise of their discretion to issue consorting warnings. If an officer considered a person may be able to rely on a recognised defence contained in section 93Y of the Crimes Act, the officer was unlikely to issue a consorting warning in the circumstances. Consorting with ‘family members’ is one of the six defences available, though ‘family’ is undefined. We found an inconsistent application of ‘family’ in the context of policing of Aboriginal people, with some officers failing to recognise concepts of kinship consistent with Aboriginal cultural practice when considering if the people consorting were ‘family members’.
We also identified clusters of use by general duties police officers in relation to people experiencing homelessness. This is reported in section 8.2.4 of chapter 8. In one Sydney metropolitan area we were advised by a community service provider that people were no longer attending their support services for fear of being further targeted for consorting.
An issue raised with us throughout the review is the lack of any defence to a charge of consorting for a person seeking to access supports and services such as those required by people experiencing homelessness. This is discussed in section 8.2.5 of chapter 8. Particular concern arose about use of the consorting law in relation to children and young people. Significantly, almost 80% of children and young people who had their associates warned about consorting with them were mistakenly identified as ‘convicted offenders’ by police. This resulted in nearly 200 invalid warnings and represents a significant waste of policing resources as well as an unknown impact on those directly affected. The exceptionally high error rate with respect to children and young people, including the remedial actions taken by the NSW Police Force in response to our findings, is reported in section 8.3.4 of chapter 8.
In order to gain insight into the children and young people represented in the consorting data, we analysed police and Family and Community Services records in relation to a random sample of half of the cohort. This revealed multiple indicators of disadvantage for nearly every child and young person. In a number of recent reports and submissions prepared by this office we have argued the need for human services agencies to take an ‘intelligence-driven’ approach to the early identification of vulnerable children and young people who are ‘at-risk’, for the purpose of undertaking integrated case management aimed at supporting them and their families.13 Experts in the area of juvenile offending by at-risk children and young people advised that the consorting law is likely to be ineffective in relation to this cohort.
While we have quantified use of the consorting law in relation to Aboriginal people and children and young people, and have identified pockets of use with respect to people experiencing homelessness, our analysis does not establish whether any measurable crime prevention benefit has been achieved by this use, or whether the people targeted have merely become caught up in the consorting law net through their otherwise innocent use of public space.
The use of the consorting law in relation to certain disadvantaged and vulnerable groups demonstrates the breadth of circumstances to which the consorting law may be applied, and illustrates some of the negative consequences that may arise from its operation. In particular, our discussion in chapter 8 highlights the importance of a carefully defined framework within which the consorting law should be appropriately applied. Our proposed framework is discussed in chapter 11.
Our recommendations
This report makes 20 recommendations designed to increase the fairness of the operation of the consorting law for those directly affected and to reduce the risk of negative consequences that may arise from lawful but inappropriate use. These recommendations are contained in chapters 8 to 11. A summary of recommendations follows. Some of the adjustments to the consorting law we recommend are the responsibility of the Attorney General and Parliament, and others are within the responsibility of the NSW Police Force.
Our recommendations seek to balance the operational advantage of the law’s flexibility that is important to the Gangs Squad’s use, against the risk of negative or unintended impacts associated with its broad implementation.
There are clear advantages to reducing inappropriate use of the consorting law in relation to people not involved in any criminal activity or who are involved in only minor offending, including people belonging to disadvantaged and vulnerable groups. The focus should instead be on use of the law in prevention of serious crime.
We recommend that this be achieved by amending NSW Police Force policy so that the operation of the consorting law is: • focused on serious offending • closely linked to crime prevention, and • prohibited from being used to address minor or nuisance offending.
We also recommend the Attorney General introduce, for the consideration of Parliament, an objects or purpose clause to the consorting law to clarify that the intent of the consorting law is for the prevention of serious crime.
In chapter 8 we recommend the removal of children and young people from the application of the consorting law. The reasons for this are both practical and based on concerns regarding a lack of effectiveness of the consorting law in relation to children and young people, and its incompatibility with other relevant policy and legislation.
In chapter 10 we discuss issues relating to the defences in section 93Y of the Crimes Act available to a person charged with consorting. We recommend that additional defences be inserted into section 93Y and that broad definitions of ‘family members’ and ‘health service’ are adopted. Specifically, we recommend section 93Y include a defence for people complying with the directions of Corrective Services NSW or the State Parole Authority, for people accessing emergency or transitional accommodation, and for people accessing welfare and support services. Also in this chapter, we recommend ‘family members’ be defined to ensure recognition of Aboriginal kinship relations, and ‘health service’ is defined to include beneficial services such as counselling services, rehabilitation services, and accessing social workers.
The recommendations in relation to the section 93Y defences are expected to influence the exercise of discretion by police officers and to provide access to appropriate legal defences for disadvantaged and vulnerable people.
Other recommendations aimed at increasing the fairness of the operation of the consorting law are discussed in chapter 9. These relate to the provision of accurate information to people subject to the use of the consorting law, minimising the required breach of privacy of ‘convicted offenders’ when warnings are issued about them, removing the ambiguity from the suggested statutory format of consorting warnings, and creating a policy regarding the time frame following an incident of consorting within which a retrospective warning may be issued. We also recommend the introduction of clear time limits governing the validity of warnings.
Over the course of the review we have identified errors made by police in relation to the ‘convicted offender’ status of people identified in a consorting warning, and identified significant issues in relation to the accuracy of police record keeping. This is reported in chapter 9 in sections 9.2 and 9.3. The NSW Police Force has taken numerous steps to address these errors; however, there remains a need for further training of officers and a specific quality assurance process for the ongoing use of the consorting law.
Finally, criminological research and law enforcement experience indicates that organised crime groups are adaptable and are likely to respond to successful law enforcement strategies by altering their methods. It follows that members and associates of high-risk OMCGs, for example, may change the way they associate or communicate with each other in response to the Gangs Squad’s use of the consorting law. In acknowledging this adaptability, as well as the potential risks associated with inappropriate but lawful use identified in this report and the lack of quantitative evidence to enable the evaluation of crime prevention outcomes linked to use of the consorting law, we recommend a further independent review of the operation of the consorting law be conducted in the future. This should occur when normal use of the law has been established and implementation of any of the recommendations made in this report has occurred.
