The rapid transition to clean energy is fraught with potential inequities. As clean energy policies ramp up in scale and ambition, they confront challenging new questions: Who should pay for the transition? Who should live next to the industrial-scale wind and solar farms these policies promote? Will the new “green” economy be a fairer one, with more widespread opportunity, than the fossil fuel economy it is replacing? Who gets to decide what kinds of resources power our decarbonized world? In this article, we assert that it is useful to understand these challenges collectively, as part of an emerging agenda of “clean energy justice.” Mapping this agenda highlights the equity challenges that will attend the transition to clean energy, and allows for more comprehensive, creative approaches to legal and policy solutions.
A cleaner energy economy does not ineluctably translate into a more just economy. We identify four considerations that will be critical to ensure that clean energy does not entrench widening inequalities in wealth and power: (1) how to fund the transition; (2) who benefits from the upsides of the new clean energy economy, including green jobs and new technologies like rooftop solar panels; (3) who participates in decisions about the shape of the new clean energy economy; and (4) how and where new clean energy infrastructure is sited. Drawing from available data, we describe why there are real risks that the gains of clean energy might be unequally distributed, while the costs fall on rural communities and non-adopters of new technologies, thus exacerbating inequality while greening the grid. And through original empirical research, we highlight the challenges of full and equal participation in the esoteric, technocratic procedures of energy law.
The present moment is a critical one for bringing these diverse considerations together into this overarching agenda. The U.S. energy system is in the early days of a long transition away from fossil fuels towards clean energy. It is time for energy lawmakers and energy law scholars to better anticipate the distributive and procedural justice concerns that will attend this transition, and to forge new ways to address them.''Sacrifice Zones' in the Green Energy Economy: Toward an Environmental Justice Framework' by Dayna Nadine Scott and Adrian Smith in (2018) 62(3) McGill Law Journal 861 comments
The environmental justice movement validates the grassroots struggles of residents of places which Steve Lerner refers to as “sacrifice zones”: low-income and racialized communities shouldering more than their fair share of environmental harms related to pollution, contamination, toxic waste, and heavy industry. On this account, disparities in wealth and power, often inscribed and re-inscribed through social processes of racialization, are understood to produce disparities in environmental burdens. Here, we attempt to understand how these dynamics are shifting in the green energy economy under settler colonial capitalism. We consider the possibility that the political economy of green energy contains its own sacrifice zones. Drawing on preliminary empirical research undertaken in southwestern Ontario in 2015, we document local resistance to renewable energy projects. Residents mounted campaigns against wind turbines based on suspected health effects and against solar farms based on arable land and food justice concerns, and in both cases, grounded their resistance in a generalized claim, which might be termed a “right to landscape”. We conclude that this resistance, contrary to typical framings which dismiss it as NIMBYism, has resonances with broader claims about environmental justice and may signal larger structural shifts worth devoting scholarly attention to. In the end, however, we do not wholly accept the sacrifice zone characterization of this resistance either, as our analysis reveals it to be far more complex and ambiguous than such a framing allows. But we maintain that taking this resistance seriously, rather than treating it as merely obstructionist to a transition away from fossil capitalism, reveals a counter-hegemonic potential at its core. There are seeds in this resistance with the power to push back on the deepening of capitalist relations.The ACT Legislative Assembly - vaguely aware, it seems, of disquiet about land deals in the Territory - has released the report of the Select Committee on Independent Integrity Commission.
The recommendations of that committee are
R 1 2.7 The Committee recommends that the ACT Government table a bill based on the Integrity Commission Bill 2018 Exposure Draft, incorporating amendments recommended in this report, and that the Assembly debate that bill.
R2 2.8 The Committee recommends that the Assembly not proceed with the Anti-corruption and Integrity Commission Bill 2018.
R3 2.11 The Committee recommends the following process could enable the passage of the legislation within the current sitting pattern:
The ACT Government respond to this report by instructing the Parliamentary Counsel Office to amend the Exposure Draft to give effect to any recommendations in this report with which the ACT Government agrees, creating a draft bill.
The ACT Government further instruct the Parliamentary Counsel Office to prepare, but not incorporate into the draft bill, draft amendments to give effect to any recommendations in this report with which the ACT Government does not agree.
Both the draft bill and draft amendments be made available to all members, and the legal adviser of the Standing Committee on Justice and Community Safety (Legislative Scrutiny role), by close of business 16 November 2018.
During the week beginning 19 November 2018 members representing each party, their advisers, parliamentary drafters and any other officials that may be of assistance meet to discuss and refine the draft bill.
On 27 November 2018 the Government table a draft bill, incorporating any amendments agreed during meetings the proceeding week.
The Assembly suspend Standing Orders in order to debate the bill during that week.
R4 2.16 The Committee recommends that commencement of the legislation be staggered to allow for the appointment of a Commissioner and Commission prior to the receipt of complaints.
R5 2.17 The Committee recommends that s2(2) of the Exposure Draft be reviewed to confirm whether delayed commencement provisions should be linked to s6.
R6 2.20 The Committee recommends that all definitions be included in the legislation, not defined in regulation.
R7 3.8 The Committee recommends that the criteria for eligibility for Commissioner and Inspector allow for the appointment to the role of a former judge, as listed in s26(1) of the Exposure Draft, or an Australian legal practitioner of not less than 10 years standing.
R8 3.9 The majority of the Committee recommends that the criteria for eligibility for Commissioner prohibit the appointment of a former member of the Legislative Assembly to the role.
R9 3.12 The Committee recommends that the terms of appointment for a Commissioner and CEO of the Commission be of different lengths to ensure continuity of operations.
R10 3.15 The Committee recommends that the provisions relating to the Commissioner’s conflicts of interest in s29 of the Exposure Draft be reviewed to consider improved drafting, including drawing on s102 of the Bill.
R11 3.20 The Committee recommends that the maximum term of appointment of an acting Commissioner be defined in the legislation as six months and that any reappointment to a further six month term be subject to consultation with the relevant Assembly committee.
R12 3.21 The Committee recommends that the legislation be amended to include the explanatory note to s97 of the Bill regarding acting appointments.
R11 3.24 The Committee recommends that bankruptcy and insolvency be grounds to suspend a Commissioner.
R14 3.27 The Committee recommends that the ACT Government consider whether failure by the Commissioner to disclose conflict of interest matters would be considered “misbehaviour” under s33 of the Exposure Draft, as that term is generally understood, or whether the more specific provisions on this matter in s105 of the Bill should be adopted.
R12 3.30 The Committee recommends that the ACT Government consider the question of how a CEO of the Commission could be suspended and, if necessary, insert suspension provisions in the legislation.
R13 3.37 The majority of the Committee recommends that the legislation require that staff of the Commission not have been an ACT public servant in the last 5 years.
R14 3.38 The Committee recommends that the legislation require the Commission to develop and publish guidelines for personal interest disclosures requested under s48 of the Exposure Draft.
R15 3.41 The Committee recommends that the legislation authorise the Speaker to seek administrative support and advice in discharging the Speaker’s statutory role under the legislation, in a similar way as s37B of the Auditor-General’s Act 1996 and s37A of the Ombudsman Act 1989.
R16 3.42 The Committee recommends that the Standing Committee on Administration and Procedure examine the level and manner of support to the Speaker in performing her statutory roles under Officer of the Assembly legislation.
R17 4.11 The Committee recommends that the legislation be examined to ensure that it incorporates the full extent of the NSW definition of corrupt conduct, as reflected in the Bill, but maintain the focus on “serious corrupt conduct” and “systemic corrupt conduct”.
R18 4.15 The Committee recommends that the ACT Government consider whether the legislation should explicitly state that the Commission has no jurisdiction prior to 1989.
R19 4.25 The Committee recommends that the legislation be amended to make previous investigation by another body a consideration in the Commissioner’s determination if an investigation is in the public interest and not a bar to investigation by the Commission.
R20 4.28 The Committee recommends that the ACT Government consider whether the definition of public authority in the legislation should be amended to cover persons that do not have a contractual relationship with government but are licenced by government to provide certain services.
R21 4.37 The majority of the Committee recommends that the definition of public official include members of the judiciary and judicial officers.
R22 4.51 The Committee recommends that the legislation be amended so that Senior Executive Service officers are included in mandatory corruption notification provisions in s60 of the Exposure Draft.
R23 4.52 The Committee recommends that provisions on mandatory corruption notifications be amended to make it clear that the following individuals are not subject to those provisions in performance of their duties but are subject to those provisions regarding possible serious or systemic corrupt conduct within their own organisations: The Auditor-General; The Ombudsman; The Electoral Commissioner; The Human Rights Commissioner; and The Clerk of the Legislative Assembly.
R24 4.53 The Committee recommends that the Speaker not be exempt from mandatory corruption notification provisions.
R25 4.54 The Committee recommends that provisions on mandatory corruption notifications be amended to remove reference to a member of staff of an MLA.
R26 4.60 The Committee recommends that the legislation include an offence of failing to make a mandatory corruption notification
R27 4.61 The Committee recommends that the Commission provide comprehensive training and education material to anyone subject to mandatory corruption notification requirements.
R28 4.68 The Committee recommends that s56(1) of the Exposure Draft be redrafted by removing “and” between the items on the list of ways in which a corruption complaint may be made.
R29 4.73 The Committee recommends that the legislation be amended so that a complainant loses their absolute privilege from defamation should they publicly disclose the contents of a complaint prior to the Commission making it public.
R30 4.79 The Committee recommends that the Standing Committee on Administration and Procedure develop amendments to continuing resolution 5AA to permit the Legislative Assembly Commissioner for Standards to refer matters to the Commission and to receive and act on referrals from the Commission.
R31 4.80 The Committee recommends that the legislation be amended by deleting s57(4)(d) to remove the Legislative Assembly Commissioner for Standards from the list.
R32 4.81 The Committee recommends that the legislation be amended by adding the Legislative Assembly Commissioner for Standards, the Speaker and Deputy Speaker to the list of entities in s104(2) from which the Commissioner may not ask for written reports
R33 4.84 The Committee recommends that the legislation be reviewed to ensure that s103(1)(a) of the Exposure Draft, which prevents the Commission from referring a corruption report that it does not have the power to investigate, does not obstruct effective cooperation between integrity bodies.
R34 5.6 The Committee recommends that the legislation state that where a matter of parliamentary privilege arises in the course of the exercise of the Commission’s powers, it shall be dealt with by the Assembly.
R35 5.7 The Committee recommends that the ACT Government obtain and publish a legal analysis on the impact s270(a)(iv) of the Exposure Draft, and similar provisions in the Public Interest Disclosure Act 2012, has on the Assembly’s rights as regards s24(3) of the Australian Capital Territory (Self Government) Act 1988.
R36 5.10 The Committee recommends that the ACT Government explore whether specific provision needs to be made in the legislation to permit the Commissioner to make use of Members’ declarations of interest.
R37 5.16 The Committee recommends that the Standing Committee on Administration and Procedure consider the arrangements necessary for an independent process to advise on claims of parliamentary privilege that arise during Commission investigations and present a proposal to the Assembly.
R38 6.15 The Committee recommends that the legislation require the Commissioner to issue guidelines about the Commission’s policies and procedures, and that the ACT Government consider whether the guidelines should be a notifiable instrument.
R39 6.20 The majority of the Committee recommends that the legislation prohibit the use of summons in preliminary inquiries.
40 6.27 The Committee recommends that the ACT Government re-examine the timeframes in the legislation under which persons arrested under an arrest warrant must be bought before the Commission to ensure consistency with the language and timeframes used in other relevant pieces of ACT legislation.
41 6.28 The Committee recommends that s156(3)(e) of the Exposure Draft be redrafted by deleting the phrase “if the magistrate has contacted the person” and making s156(3)(e)(i) and s156(3)(e)(ii) into s156(3)(f) and s156(3)(g) respectively.
42 6.36 The Committee recommends that s186 of the Exposure Draft be amended to give the Commission the discretion to withhold a proposed investigation report from a relevant entity if there are reasonable grounds to believe that the sharing of the proposed investigation report could prejudice a prosecutorial or serious disciplinary action.
43 6.49 The Committee recommends that the legislation be amended to include a general offence of obstructing the Commissioner, Inspector, their staff and witnesses, similar to Part 9 of New South Wales Independent Commission Against Corruption Act 1988.
44 7.5 The Committee recommends that the ACT Government amend the Exposure Draft to contain a clear statement of the Inspector’s powers in a similar manner as s57 of New South Wales’ Independent Commission Against Corruption Act 1988.
45 7.8 The Committee recommends that the ACT Government remove any provisions from the legislation that require automatic reporting of the Commission’s use of its powers to the Inspector, including sections 79, 87, 139, 144, 155, 158, 166 and 192.
R46 7.13 The Committee recommends that the legislation omit reference to any requirement that inspectorate staff be employed by the Territory or under Territory law to enable a Commonwealth agency to be appointed as Inspector if so chosen.
R47 7.14 The Committee recommends that the legislation be amended so that any exercise by the Speaker of the power under s236(2) to make arrangements for another person to exercise the functions of the Inspector be subject to the consultation and Assembly resolution requirements of s222(2)(a) and s222(3)(b).
R48 7.17 The Committee recommends that the legislation be amended by deleting s260 of the Exposure Draft, removing the power of the Inspector to recommend that an acting Commissioner be appointed.
R49 7.20 The Committee recommends that the Commissioner be required to maintain a register of conflicts of interest and any steps taken to manage them within the Commission and that the register be available to the Inspector.
R50 7.21 The Committee recommends that the Inspector report to the relevant Assembly committee on the extent to which the Commission is managing conflicts of interest.
R51 7.25 The Committee recommends that the Assembly establish a dedicated committee with oversight of the Commission.
R52 7.26 The Committee recommends that the legislation be amended to replace references to the “presiding member of the relevant Assembly committee” with “the relevant Assembly committee”.
R53 8.5 The Committee recommends that the legislation be amended to remove reference in s23(1)(f) to the Commission providing leadership to the Legislative Assembly.
R54 8.15 The Committee recommends that the ACT Government establish a comprehensive review of the Public Interest Disclosure Act 2012 as soon as is possible with the aim of having changes implemented by 2020.
