19 November 2009

Marriage

Two perspectives this afternoon on marriage and death.

The UK Independent reports ('Till death us do not part: French woman marries dead fiancé') that Magali Jaskiewicz has married her dead fiancé.

The dead man, father of her two daughters, was killed in a road accident two days after the couple informed the town hall that they planned to become man and wife. That was almost a year ago. Under article 171 of the French civil code it is possible for a bride or groom to marry a dead fiancé, with permission from the French President after providing clear evidence that the people planned to marry and were interrupted by the grim reaper.

The Article dates from December 1959, after De Gaulle was inspired to change the law to enable Irène Jodard to marry deceased fiancée André Capra, a victim of the Malpasset dam disaster. It specifies that -
The President of the Republic may, for grave reasons [no pun in the original], authorise the celebration of the marriage where one of the future spouses is dead after the completion of the official formalities indicating unequivocally his or her consent.

In this case, the effects of the marriage date back to the day preceding that of the death of the spouse.

However, this marriage may not involve any right of intestate succession to the benefit of the survivor and no matrimonial regime is considered to have existed between the spouses.
I haven't yet checked for an exegesis of the Article, which presumably gives the surviving partner some consolation and confers the father's name on the offspring.

The Independent delivers the expected bathos -
The bride wore white but, as the mayor sadly pointed out, she was a widow before she left the town hall. ...

"She left the town hall a widow but she had taken her loved one's name," Mr Caput said. ... "It is a real love story. When the gendarmes brought her the decree signed by the President, she came straight to see me. She said, 'These are my first tears of joy since Jonathan died'."

[Jaskiewicz] dressed all in white, married Jonathan and became his official widow. During the ceremony, a large colour portrait of Jonathan was placed beside her on a wooden stand. ... The bride, relatives and friends and the couple's daughters, Doriane, three, and Kassandra, 18 months, then went to place flowers on the bride-groom's grave.
Supposedly there are around 20 such posthumous marriages in France each year, which on consideration are less bizarre than the retrospective conversion of dead ancestors practiced by devotees of the Church of Latter-Day Saints.

The last major media coverage appears to have been reporting of a 'provocation' by US performance artist Shishaldin, otherwise known for selling her DNA on eBay and running the New York City marathon dressed in salami, so much more original (for anyone who can't remember the Italian Futurists) than dressed as a salami.

'Lautréamont and the Haunting of Surrealism' by Shane McCorristine in 5 Studies across Disciplines in the Humanities and Social Sciences (2009) 31-49 reports that in 2004 Shishaldin
released a report to the media and appeared on British television claiming that she was attempting to marry the Isidor Ducasse aka the Comte de Lautréamont [author of Les Chants de Maldoror and interred since 1870] by invoking an obscure article of the French Civil Code which allows for the marriage between a living citizen and a dead fiancée. Shishaldin wrote a letter to President Jacques Chirac requesting that he authorise this posthumous engagement: En tant qu’artiste, je me sens compulsif pour faire un stand 'bold' à la défense du mariage en tant qu'une union qui ne peut pas être définie, une union des âmes et des spirites, la sorte d'union célébrée par fait d'art et de littérature ..., un mariage d’art et littérature.
Chirac was apparently not amused.

Coincidentally there has been a reference in the New York Times to the 1964 'von Linde' case, a posthumous dissolution of a US marriage that illustrates conceptualisation of marriage as something concerned with heterosexual activity.

In Estelle F Sophian v. Manfred Graf von Linde (10/27/64) the NY Supreme Court Appellate Division First Division upheld the lower court's decision in favour of Ms Sophian, who had sought posthumous annulment of a marriage between her niece and Mr von Linde. The husband, who died in 1968, is otherwise famous as a plastic surgeon who worked on Montgomery Clift's face and as a supporter of gay liberation prior to Stonewall.

The court notes that
The marriage took place on March 1, 1962. On March 11 the couple went on their honeymoon in Haiti. On March 14 the wife died there. The action is brought by an aunt of the deceased wife. No question of the capacity of the plaintiff to bring the suit is raised.
The Annulment was sought on the basis of fraudulent misrepresentations inducing von Linde's wife to enter into the marriage.
here were three causes of action, each based on representations of a different character. The first alleged that defendant misrepresented his age, origin and ancestry. The second alleged that he concealed the fact that he was a homosexual. And the third alleged that he misrepresented his intentions to have normal sexual relations with his wife. The [lower]court dismissed the second cause of action for failure of proof and submitted the other two causes of action to the jury. The latter found for the plaintiff on both causes of action.
The appellate court noted that -
As to the first cause of action, it was established beyond doubt that defendant's real name is Robert Dent and that he is a native of Birmingham, Alabama. He married under the name of Manfred Graf Von Linde, a name which he continues to use; and at the trial he claimed the protection of the Fifth Amendment as to all inquiries as to how he came to adopt it.
It commented that -
In this case the status of the parties, the bald-face fraud practiced for an obvious venal purpose on a woman peculiarly susceptible to this kind of allure, provided an issue as to the fairness of defendant's dealing. Its resolution by the jury is not in conflict with our law.

As for the third cause of action, there is, and there could be, no dispute that, if the defendant never intended to have normal sexual relations with his wife and either concealed or misrepresented this state of mind, it would constitute fraud material to the marriage contract. The objection here is as to the proof that defendant had such an intent. Proof of an intent rarely rises to a degree that absolutely precludes a finding to the contrary. The proof here was as to defendant's statements and conduct after the marriage. Here also the fact that the person whose testimony would be expected to shed the most light on the facts, namely, the wife, was dead, made the proof more difficult. But there was proof, and the greater part of defendant's argument is devoted not to its sufficiency but to its credibility. That was a matter for the jury, and we cannot say that their conclusion was against the weight of the evidence. ... The evidence presented in support of the third cause of action that the marriage between Lucille Rogers and the defendant was never consummated was based on the testimony of the Haitian chauffeur employed by the defendant relating to conversations he overheard by Lucille Rogers and the defendant while they were riding as passengers in the back seat of an automobile.
In discussing Dent/von Linde's sexuality, the court was more cautious, commenting that -
it is unnecessary to consider the appeal from the dismissal of the second cause of action. However, a brief statement of our views might be in order in the event that a retrial should ever become necessary. Dismissal was on the ground of failure of proof. The proof consisted of one act of homosexuality committed some 16 years prior to the marriage. There was also proof that the deceased wife had a very marked aversion to sexual deviation. The court concluded, rightly, we believe, that this single act was not proof of defendant's sexual character, nor was the proof of the wife's aversion sufficient to draw the inference that, had she known of this single act long antedating the marriage, she would not have accepted defendant's proposal. However, subsequent to the verdict plaintiff moved on the basis of newly discovered evidence for judgment on the second cause of action. The newly discovered evidence consisted of records of the United States Navy Department showing a long and continuous history of homosexuality. These records had been subpoenaed for the trial but were not made available by the Navy Department until after the verdict was rendered.

One Smell

The 3,105 page judgement by the NSW Supreme Court in Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Rich [2009] NSWSC 1229 (aka the 'One-Tel Case') is a depressing read.

Austin J found in favour of controversial entrepreneur Jodee Rich against ASIC, the national corporations regulator, in litigation that followed the demise of the One.Tel telecommunications group. That demise involved failure of One.Tel Ltd (a large Australian-listed company that had attracted major investment from the Murdoch and Packer families) and its local subsidiaries, accompanied by the collapse or on-sale of overseas subsidiaries. It was depicted in Paul Barry's Rich Kids (Sydney: Bantam 2002), which historian Bridget Griffen-Foley described as a tale of "breathtaking greed, self-aggrandisement, mismanagement, ineptitude and duplicity".

Following the collapse, seen by some as emblematic of the dot-com bubble, ASIC brought civil penalty proceedings for breach of the statutory duty of care of company directors and officers. The proceedings were initially brought by ASIC against three executive directors and the non-executive chairman of One.Tel. Action against joint managing director Bradley Keeling and non-executive Chair John Greaves was settled in 2003, with Keeling agreeing to a ten-year disqualification from acting as a director and liability to pay compensation of $92m and Greaves accepting a disqualification from being a director for four years and liability to pay compensation of $20m.

ASIC alleged that the defendants did not disclose the true financial position of the company to the board, and that they knew or should have known the true position.

Argument in court centred on whether ASIC had proved its case as to the true financial position in the first quarter of 2001. The judge concluded that -
ASIC has failed to prove its pleaded case against either of the defendants. Therefore judgment should be entered for Mr Rich and Mr Silbermann in the proceedings.
He indicated that -
ASIC's contentions have a superficial appeal, but time and again they were shown to be unpersuasive when the underlying financial detail was investigated. When Mr Carter's evidence was largely excluded, ASIC presented what it described, frequently, as a documentary case. Although there were many categories of documents, three categories were particularly significant, so much so that the defendants described them as the "three pillars" of ASIC's case (T 14952): management accounts, aged creditors reports and collection profile summaries. When those documents were scrutinised in detail, they were found to be, wholly or in part, too unreliable to form the basis for financial findings: the Australian fixed wire/service provider management accounts at 20.3, Australian aged creditors reports at 11.2.5, and collection profile summaries at 4.8.6. The difficulties encountered with those documents might have been overcome, wholly or in substantial part, if ASIC had brought forward witnesses to explain the documents and give evidence as to their status, witnesses such as Mr Holmes or Ms Nassif for the fixed wire/service provider management accounts and Australian aged creditors reports, and Mr Basman for the collection profile summaries. But that evidence was not forthcoming and so the unexplained problems with the documents added up to a serious flaw in ASIC's case. No evidentiary presumptions are needed for the court to get to that conclusion, but some are available as discussed in Ch 3.

To the extent that ASIC's case rested on other documents of less uncertain meaning, and on the evidence of its witnesses such as the UK witnesses, Ms Randall and Ms Ashley, the defendants were able to advance alternative plausible explanations for what had occurred, and ASIC failed to prove its case to the appropriate civil standard, having regard to the presence of those alternative explanations.

An additional problem with ASIC's case has been the extent to which it has strayed outside its pleading. The problem areas are identified in para 2.3.6. I have not expressly correlated the findings made in para 2.3.6 to the substantive discussion of the submissions found in the body of the judgment. However, in cases where I have considered a submission by ASIC in the body of the judgment and rejected it on its merits, and I have also found at 2.3.6 that the submission is impermissibly outside ASIC's pleading, my intention is that the submission is rejected on both the substantive ground and the pleading ground.

This judgment and the verdict to which it leads are the product of civil legal proceedings conducted in accordance with our adversary system. Under that system the issue for determination is whether the plaintiff has proven its pleaded allegations, by the evidence that is before the court. The question for determination is not the larger issue of how it happened that a rising corporate group supported by two well-resourced investors came to fail, in spectacular circumstances. The court has not been asked to determine, at large, who was to blame for the disaster, as amongst the defendants, other executives, non-executive directors, major shareholders and advisers. The proceedings are not a Royal Commission. Notwithstanding the huge amount of effort that has been devoted to these proceedings by the parties and their advisers, and by the court, many questions about the failure of One.Tel are left unanswered. That was inevitable, given the nature of the proceedings and the questions placed before the court for resolution.

One of the unanswered questions is whether One.Tel would have survived if, in May 2001, PBL/CPH and News had maintained their support for the company and implemented their plan to underwrite a deeply discounted rights issue to raise $132 million. The tendered evidence has led me to reject ASIC's figures as to the financial circumstances of One.Tel at the end of February, March and April 2001, and to prefer the figures set out in Chs 11, 13 and 15 respectively. If those figures are right, a fundraising of $132 million accompanied by continuing support by the major shareholders would probably have been enough to address the company's cash requirement until November 2001, by which time, according to the business plans, the company's businesses would have been generating more healthy Group cash flow. The withdrawal of that support, and the abandonment of the rights issue, may well have ensured that the company could not survive.
The judge also commented that -
Throughout my judgment there are criticisms of ASIC's submissions and of aspects of its conduct of this case. Amongst the more serious are my views that:

• the scope of the case, endeavouring to prove the financial circumstances of a large multinational corporate group over each of four months, was far too wide and produced an excessively long and burdensome proceeding;

• in a substantial number of significant ways, ASIC's final submissions were outside its pleaded case;

• ASIC chose not to call any witness to explain certain tendered documents, instead inviting the court to draw inferences from the documents notwithstanding their ambiguities and other grounds for doubting their reliability; and

• ASIC's engagement of Mr Carter to provide expert evidence in the proceedings gave rise to substantial difficulties, in circumstances where Mr Carter had previously prepared a detailed report to assist the Commission to decide what course of action to take, with unfettered access to documents and witnesses, and he was told when his forensic report was at a mature draft stage that he was to exclude information he had obtained from individuals who would not be called to give evidence.
Ian Verrender in The Age today reflected on the judgement, commenting that
The time has come to bite the bullet. Disband the Australian Securities and Investments Commission and start all over again. For if there is one thing that has come of yesterday's mammoth Supreme Court judgment it is this: ASIC, even though it is run by lawyers, seems incapable of putting together a decent case to present to the courts.

Given it already has a less than impressive record when it comes to the investigation of corporate malfeasance and white collar crime in general, this embarrassing episode should hammer home the final nail in its coffin.

Yesterday's 3000 page judgment by Justice Robert Austin is a damning indictment on the ability of our corporate regulator.

The case against the One.Tel founders was ill conceived, poorly conducted and riddled with errors at almost every step. ASIC's arguments to the court were embellished and exaggerated, its evidence and analysis of the company's financial situation deeply flawed and it failed comprehensively to convince the judge of the fundamental basis of its case - that the defendants misled the board and the market.
ASIC has responded to the judgement, indicating that -
ASIC Chairman, Mr Tony D'Aloisio said the case should provide important guidance to executives and directors on the exchange of information between the board and management.

Additionally, the case has shed light on several important legal issues, notably the additional responsibilities of the chairman of a public company, particularly one with a finance/accounting background and considerable experience on public boards. It also identified the right of defendants in civil penalty proceedings not to give discovery or file witness statements until the conclusion of evidence by ASIC's witnesses.

'The case has also provided important guidance to ASIC on how to run similar matters in the future'

18 November 2009

First Nations

I've belatedly caught up with Paul Chartrand's 30pp 'Reconciling Indigenous peoples' sovereignty and state sovereignty' [PDF], published by the Australian Institute of Aboriginal & Torres Strait Islander Studies in September this year.

Chartrand examines the concept of 'shared sovereignty' as
a contribution to the debate on reconciliation with Indigenous peoples in Canada and Australia. The discussion includes some commentary on some common features of the reconciliation debate in both countries. The main focus is on the views of a minority of justices in a Supreme Court of Canada case and their comparison with the analysis of Canada’s 1996 Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples.
His conclusion notes that
The concept of 'shared sovereignties' is presented as an idea that may influence the way citizens think about the indigenous peoples, and their aspirations to live harmoniously with others in circumstances of peace and justice in each country. I have not pretended to determine for indigenous peoples what their aspirations might be, and my contribution is intended to be supportive of aspirations for reconciliation.

An assumption behind the discussion in this paper is that concepts or ideas are useful and practical. It is interesting that politicians in each country have run roughshod over this simple proposition. To illustrate, they have used rhetoric which pretends to assert a preference for 'practical' strategies over such things as 'abstract discussions about rights ...'. The better view would seem to be that ideas or concepts are useful and practical guides for action. In this view, ideas play not only an important but an essential role because they inform actions designed to reach a particular policy objective. Ideas or concepts inform the development of legal rules and build a coherent doctrine governing a particular sphere of law. Furthermore, extremist views, whether advanced by politicians or ivory-tower ideologues, can not, by their very nature, contribute much to reconciliation.

Shared sovereignties as an idea moves collective thinking in a country that has jettisoned the idea of terra nullius, and which now accepts that the existence and presence of indigenous peoples on their lands matters, to the more fully equitable notion that not only the existence but also the political action of indigenous peoples matters in the creation of practices, precepts and laws that reflect a consensual view of the fundamental values that guide a vision of the just society and of the constitutional order that ought to sustain it. Indigenous peoples have a right to aspire to live according to their own visions of the good society, inspired by their own concepts about the universe and the values that ought to inform the way that good relations are to be established and maintained within families, communities, and the Nation-State. This is my understanding of the essence of the right of self-determination.

... The goal of creating harmonious relations can only be achieved, in the long run, by creating and maintaining good relations between representatives of the indigenous peoples and representatives of the State's governments. The agents and representatives of States, that is, the democratically elected government politicians, decide what is the nature and scope of the 'public interest' of all citizens. That includes all Aboriginal persons. Aboriginal persons are entitled to the enjoyment of all the rights of citizens, and are also subject to the obligations of citizenship. So the government represents the public interest of the entire population of the State, and its government members make decisions in the public interest. At the same time, under the concept of 'shared sovereignty', those who speak for the Aboriginal peoples have the authority and power to make decisions in the 'public interest' of each Aboriginal people that has a right of self-determination.

It is better to live with 'shared sovereignty' than with 'contested sovereignty'. The latter is the enemy of democracy and the companion of repression, subjugation and civil strife. It is better to legitimize the de facto governance of States such as Australia and Canada over the indigenous peoples by welcoming the participation of indigenous citizens in all decision-making that affects the general public interest as well as the public interest of each of the 'nations' or 'peoples' entitled to self-determination.

Wherever decisions are made that affect the interests of indigenous peoples there they must have a voice. The concept of 'shared sovereignty' stands for the idea that legitimate political participation today can cure an unconscionable beginning. If a just vision for our common future in our country must be built upon a common truth about the past, then perhaps 'shared sovereignty' also stands for the idea that as a country we can have a just vision of our society that is built upon an illusion about our ancestors so long as the illusion is commonly held. This should not be surprising if it is accepted that countries or societies seem to build a collective self-identity upon idealized histories.
It is a worthy study but to me far less persuasive than David Ritter's lapidary and insightful 250pp Contesting Native Title: From Controversy to Consensus in the Struggle for Indigenous Land Rights (Crows Nest: Allen & Unwin 2009).

Ritter was an Associate to Justice Robert French (now Chief Justice of the High Court) when the latter was President of the National Native Title Tribunal. Ritter subsequently served as Principal Legal Officer of a native title representative body and wrote the provocative 88pp The Native Title Market (Crawley: University of Western Australia Press 2009).

Contesting Native Title will discomfort some readers but is of major value for people interested in Indigenous land rights in Australia, in law's treatment of Indigenous people and in justice as a process rather than an outcome.

Enchanted Palaces and magic candles

I'm reading Mark Mazower's 236pp No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations (Princeton University Press, 2009), Beth Simmons' 451pp Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics (Cambridge University Press, 2009) and Eric Posner's 266pp The Perils of Global Legalism (University of Chicago Press, 2009).

The Mazower is simply a delight: lucid, respectful, realistic, full of insights. It is founded on an awareness of history, appreciation of legal principles and recognition of how states/individuals actually behave. I recommend it strongly. The Posner strikes me as clever - very Chicago School - but overall unpersuasive because centred on a view of law as something that can ultimately be reduced to a cost/benefit analysis without any fuss about transcendent principles.

On the subject of magic the excellent Christine Corcos points to a US incident in which a Florida psychic was arrested after attempting to extract $1,000 from a customer.

The aggrieved customer was reportedly approached by Tiffany Evans at the Smith Haven Mall (so much more convenient than in a moonlit conventicle in the dark dark woods or in a smelly gypsy caravan) on 7 September. She agreed to have her fortune read for $25. During the reading - no specifics on whether it was just a quick squint at the palm or whether animals and other critters (newts, rats, chickens) were harmerd in the process - the victim was informed that for another $100 she could have a more detailed reading. She coughed up. On meeting Evans - again at the mall - on 9 September she was told that she had a curse. Never fear: hand over another $1,250 for a stone (where would we be without a magic stone, even if it isn't the stone extracted from the forehead of a toad) and a body wash and the curse would then be lifted.

Later in September the victim handed over $600 as the down-payment for lifting the curse. She received a small stone and a plastic bag containing an unknown liquid. When she next meet the psychic, watched by undercover police officers, Evans pretended to read the victim's fortune (checking whether the curse was half-lifted?) and attempted to sell her candles for $550. The candles would supposedly remove negative energy. The media report concludes with the lapidary phrase: "Officers arrested Evans at 4:51 pm."

17 November 2009

Necrosis is the new black

One of the fascinating aspects of the sociology of knowledge (if I was being cruel I'd say the anthropology of academia, given that members of the PhD tribe have as many shibboleths and fetishes as the latest undiscovered people in the Amazonian rainforest or New Guinea Highlands) is watching the way that new disciplines create and propagate language to reinforce their exclusiveness, assert authority or simply have fun.

'Necro' it seems is 'in' among the cultural studies people. Necro is the new black or the circlet of pig tusks and human incisors around the young warrior's neck.

Goldie Osuri's 'Media Necropower: Australian media reception and the somatechnics of Mamdouh Habib' in 5(1) Borderlands (2006) - the journal where the UnDead such as Foucault and Derrida haunt the landscape (please, someone, please show them the way back to Pere Lachaise or unleash Jane Austen the Fearless Zombie Killer!) - discusses how Mamdouh Habib -
was discursively positioned within Australian media reception. Specifically, I argue that Habib's body was made culturally intelligible within what I call media necropower or contemporary media practices which reconfigure the politics of race and assimilability within the somatechnics of racialised bodies. Reading at least two televisual interviews on Sixty Minutes (2005), and Dateline (2005), as well as newspaper articles and a number of public responses to Mamdouh Habib's interviews, this paper will explore how the materiality of Habib's body was produced within a speculative, judgmental regime, media necropower.
Hmmm, can't beat necropower and judgmental somatechnics. The latter is -
a newly coined term used to highlight the inextricability of soma and techne of the body (as a culturally intelligible construct), and the techniques in and through which bodies are formed and transformed' (2005). With reference to Derrida's work, Joseph Pugliese discusses somatechnics as a way of addressing how 'techne', understood as 'writing, signifying systems and hard technology', is not applied to the body. In fact, the body and techne are indissociable since 'techne in fact constitutes a type of "arche trace" that constitutes the very conditions of possibility for the cultural intelligibility of the body' (Pugliese, 2005). In this sense, 'the body comes into being only through techne' (Pugliese, 2005). Or, to put in another way, the technologies of thinking, seeing, hearing, signifying, visualizing, and positioning produce bodies as culturally intelligible.
And necropower, you ask? No, it's not a green form of electricity generated by attaching a set of jumper leads (ouch, no alligator clips on the nipples) to the phosphorescent cadaver of a philosopher who hs reached his use-by date but is still getting the tonsil-hockey treatment from the disciples.

Necropower is associated with necropolitics.
Post 9/11, these technologies are intensified through the practice of necropower. The practices of necropower by the U.S. and its allies have been represented as necessary to the very identity of democracy and freedom. This necessity of the practices of necropower marks a discursive shift in post 9/11 national and international politics and mediascapes. In making visible how the 'war against terrorism' enables the reinvention and practice of necropower, which constituted the difference of colonial rule, on populations within colonial centres, I make the claim that contemporary western governmentalities (through state and other forms of governmentalities such as media governmentality and the exercise of consumer citizenship) demand new forms of racialised assimilable bodies and subjectivities which will comply with, consent to, and even demand overt practices of necropower while maintaining the identity of the 'west' as 'civilized,' democratic, and free. These new forms of racialised assimilable bodies and subjectivities are always already situated within the shifting historical hierarchies of racial formations in different locations. ... But the practices of necropower point to the intensification and reconfiguration of race and assimilability through the somatechnics of racialised bodies.

In order to understand what racialised assimilable bodies and subjectivities these post 9/11 forms of governmentality require, it is necessary to trace the theorization of necropolitics and the practice of necropower as outlined by Achille Mbembe.
Damn, until today I had missed out on Mbembe.
Positing biopower in Foucault's terms as 'that domain of life over which power has taken control', Mbembe outlines a series of ways in which the concept of biopower does not account for the place of 'life, death, and the human body (in particular the wounded or slain body)' in the context of politics as a form of war. Mbembe's articulates necropower specifically as the type of power exercised in Palestine reconfiguring the relationship between suicide, resistance, sacrifice and terror. So if necropolitics is the 'subjugation of life to the power of death' (2003: 39), freedom itself (for the figure of the suicide-bomber, for example) may be a vision of that which is to come through death, which is itself 'a release from terror and bondage' (2003: 39). In this context, the concept of necropower accounts for the ways in which 'in our contemporary world, weapons are deployed in the interest of the maximum destruction of persons and the creation of death-worlds, new and unique forms of social existence in which vast populations are subjected to conditions of life conferring upon them the status of the living dead' (Mbembe, 2003: 40).
No, he's apparently not describing the Shoah ... or what happened in the Ukraine under Mr Stalin or Comrade Pol Pot.
In Mbembe's thesis, necropower operates in the space of the late modern colony where the sovereignty of the colonial power is based on the violence of occupation. ... In the historical moment that we're living in, the practices of necropower are constitutive of the discourses of security and freedom of populations located in western nation-states through forms of governmentality not simply aligned with the state. The invocation of security and freedom shifts dominant discourses on the acceptability of torture or other 'state of exception' practices as now fundamental to the freedom, sovereignty and security of western nation-states and its citizens.
Subhabrata Bobby Banerjee, writing on 'Live and Let Die: Colonial Sovereignties and the Death Worlds of Necrocapitalism' in the same issue of Borderlands, generously develops -
the concept of necrocapitalism by discussing contemporary forms of organizational accumulation that involve dispossession and the subjugation of life to the power of death. Drawing on the works of Agamben (1998, 2005) and Mbembe (2003) I discuss how some contemporary capitalist practices contribute to this subjugation of life. I discuss some ideological formations of necrocapitalist practices and examine what kind of social relations are disrupted and destroyed as a result of these practices. I discuss the organization and management of global violence and explore the rise of the privatized military and its use in the so-called war on terror.

... rather than reduce death to distinctions between labor whether in a colonial or a metropolitan context, it is necessary to understand necrocapitalism as a practice that operates through the establishment of colonial sovereignty, and the manner in which this sovereignty is established in the current political economy where the business of death can take place through states of exception. In this sense, it is necessary to read the manner in which colonial sovereignty operates to create states of exception conducive to the operation of necrocapitalist practices.
You can't have too much necro - the academic equivalent of the black eyeliner used by seriously emo Goth kids (essential for members of the little tribe but underwhelming grizzled wrinklies such as myself who wonder whether the insights are all that exciting or original once the academic mantras are translated into ordinary English). Banerjee notes that -
Situating necropolitics in the context of economy, Montag (2005: 11) argues that if necropolitics is interested in the production of death or subjugating life to the power of death then it is possible to speak of a necroeconomics - a space of 'letting die or exposing to death'.
What about necrogastronomy - the endless wait for service that is a feature of life "in the historical moment that we're living in" followed by food that sees you parked interminably, twixt life and death (or just smells and feels that way), in the smallest room in the house. Or necrocallcentre, situated in the offshore limbo land staffed by resentful subalterns you'd much rather be home reading Gayatri Spivak than keeping you on hold for two hours.

Regulation of Legal Costs

The release of proposals for a National Legal Services Ombudsman, highlighted in the preceding post of this blog, has been accompanied by the National Legal Profession Reform Taskforce's discussion paper on regulation of legal costs.

The paper envisages that the following principles would be embodied in national legislation and more detailed guidelines under the supervision of the National Legal Services Board -
Objectives of the scheme

The scheme would provide for law practices to make disclosures to clients regarding legal costs; regulate making of costs agreements regarding legal services, including conditional costs agreements (eg 'no win, no fee' agreements); regulate billing of costs for legal services; provide a mechanism for assessment of legal costs and for setting aside of certain costs agreements.

Costs disclosure

Before, or as soon as practicable after, giving instructions to act clients will receive sufficient written information about the estimated costs of their matter, and the method for calculating that estimate, to reasonably allow them to make informed decisions about the conduct of the matter. That will include disclosure in relation to costs where a law practice intends to retain another law practice or expert on behalf of the client.

Any significant change to a matter previously disclosed must be notified to the client as soon as reasonably possible after the law practice becomes aware of the change. Costs disclosure should be presented in a concise, clear and accessible format.

Legal practitioners should take reasonable steps to ensure that clients understand the information disclosed. Consumers from "culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds" should not be disadvantaged.

Clients must be informed about their right to negotiate a costs agreement and to challenge legal costs.

Costs agreements are enforceable as a contract between the parties. (Any assessment will by reference to the costs agreement if it is a valid agreement complying with the legislation). If a law practice fails to disclose anything required by the legislation, the client will not be required to pay legal costs until they have been assessed. The law practice must not commence or maintain proceedings to recover fees until after the assessment. Sophisticated clients may contract out of the mandatory costs disclosure and assessment regimes.

Reasonableness

Legal practitioners and law practices may only charge fair and reasonable costs. A costs agreement is prima facie evidence of what are fair and reasonable costs. Legal costs should be proportionate to the complexity or importance of the issues and amount in dispute. Law practices and their clients may agree to a variety of methods for calculating legal costs. Courts/tribunals may set aside costs agreements that are not fair or reasonable. Legal practitioners and law practices must make reasonable endeavours to act promptly and to minimise delay and must not work in a way that unnecessarily increases costs in a matter.

Billing

A law practice may not seek to recover its fees unless it has provided a properly prepared bill to the client. A law practice may not charge for the preparation of bills and clients may request an itemised bill (at no additional cost). Bills must include a notice about a client’s right to challenge legal costs or to have a costs agreement set aside.Liability of principals for overcharging. Principals of law practices are responsible for the reasonableness of bills rendered to clients, and will be personally liable in the event of the charging of excessive legal costs in matters in which they have acted or which they have supervised. A law practice may be liable for the charging of excessive legal costs by one of its principals or one of its employees.

Cost assessment

Costs assessments must be conducted in accordance with National Rules. Determinations of costs assessors are admissible in disciplinary proceedings as evidence as to the reasonableness of legal costs.

Regulatory Guidelines

The Board will issue National Rules detailing actions that practitioners are required to take to comply with and give effect to the legislative principles. A breach of the National Rules will be conduct capable of constituting unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct. In the case of law practices, a breach without reasonable excuse may constitute an offence.

Legal Ombudsman

The federal Attorney-General, the Hon Robert McClelland, has announced release by the National Legal Profession Reform Taskforce of two discussion papers.

The Taskforce has "been charged with developing uniform legislation to regulate the legal profession across Australia". It is due to report to the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) in April 2010. Its activity broadly reflects the recent Access To Justice Strategy announced by the national government.

The Papers

The Taskforce's first paper sets out a proposal for a new National Legal Services Ombudsman.

The 18 page paper outlines functions for the proposed Ombudsman including -
* receiving and investigating complaints;
* making determinations in relation to complaints and unsatisfactory professional conduct;
* conducting internal reviews of certain decisions; and
* educating the public and the legal profession on ethical issues and the complaints process.
The Taskforce's second paper articulates "proposals to constrain overcharging and the exploitation of vulnerable legal services consumers".

Those proposals include -
* providing for law practices to make disclosures to clients regarding legal costs;
* regulating the making of costs agreements in respect of legal services;
* regulating the billing of costs for legal services; and
* providing a mechanism for the "assessment of legal costs and the setting aside of certain costs agreements".
The Attorney-General commented that -
In these papers the Taskforce has tackled complaints and legal costs, two critical areas in need of regulatory reform. We need to ensure that consumers of legal services across Australia are afforded consistent protection and remedies, and they can obtain all necessary information to make informed decisions about the conduct of a matter, and that legal costs are fair and reasonable.
The Ombudsman

The expectation is that the Ombudsman would provide consumers of legal services with a "single, easily accessible avenue for making complaints about legal practitioners".

If substantiated, those complaints could result in findings of unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct against a legal practitioner. The Ombudsman "would have powers to deal with complaints of a more 'consumer' nature, being complaints about the provision of legal services", being able to make a determination if reasonably satisfied that conduct by the service provider was not fair and reasonable in all the circumstances.

The Ombudsman's functions regarding complaints against legal practitioners and law practices would include
• receiving complaints;
• investigating complaints;
• making determinations in relation to complaints of a consumer nature, and certain cases of unsatisfactory professional conduct, and making appropriate orders;
• prosecuting matters involving unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct in the appropriate disciplinary tribunal;
• conducting internal reviews of certain decisions;
• being involved in reviews by the disciplinary tribunal, and appeals to the Supreme Court in relation to disciplinary matters; and
• providing education to the public and legal profession about ethical issues, producing educational information about the complaints process and advising members of the public about the complaints process.
An office of the National Legal Services Ombudsman (NLSO) would be established to oversee the national scheme. In practice, the NLSO would handle relatively few complaints itself at first instance (for example, only where a complaint is particularly sensitive or may lead to a legal precedent). In most cases, the NLSO would delegate its complaint handling functions to state/territory bodies, which would investigate and resolve complaints, and prosecute disciplinary matters on its behalf.

Those bodies would continue to be separate state/territory entities but would operate "under the name and auspices" of the NLSO (eg as NLSO state/territory offices).

The discussion paper envisages that legal services consumers could automatically access the NLSO via a single telephone number, which could divert them to the relevant State or Territory body.