04 February 2011

Drug Law Enforcement metrics

The Australian Institute of Criminology has released 'Measuring the effectiveness of drug law enforcement' (Trends & issues in crime and criminal justice no.406, 2011) by Katie Willis, Jessica Anderson & Peter Homel.

The authors comment that -
Seizing drugs and arresting those who import, manufacture, grow and/or distribute these drugs is often viewed as the most important purpose of drug law enforcement. This view is certainly strong in popular media depictions of organised drug criminals. Unfortunately, the reality is perhaps far less entertaining or straightforward, although just as, if not more, important. While there is no doubt that a key role of drug law enforcement is to remove drugs and high-risk offenders from the community, the most critical factor is what this actually achieves in the longer term. That is, a community that is less burdened by the impact of drugs, such as crime, illness, injury and death.

Increasingly, there is both internal and external pressure on drug law enforcement to demonstrate not just how much work they do (the seizures and arrests), but how well they do it (the community impacts)—something that has so far proven very difficult. This paper outlines the nature of these challenges and summarises findings from a national project that shows a practical and effective way forward in measuring the impacts of drug law enforcement.
The paper
summarises key findings, both conceptual and practical, from the second stage of a major national project that sought to test the feasibility of a model performance measurement framework for Australian DLE agencies and to provide advice on its national implementation (Willis, Homel & Anderson 2010). As such, it does not provide an overview of the effectiveness of DLE in Australia. The first project stage involved development and preliminary testing of the initial performance measurement framework. Trends & Issues no. 332 (Homel & Willis 2006) includes a summary of the project’s rationale and development and so this is not repeated in this paper in detail. Both project stages were undertaken by the Australian Institute of Criminology (AIC) on behalf of the National Drug Law Enforcement Research Fund.

The rationale behind the use of the framework as a DLE performance measurement tool is that the framework’s measures address a combination of supply and demand market issues. The framework’s premise is that DLE impacts on both of these. In theory, illicit drug supply is reduced through action such as controls on drug production and distribution, seizures and the arrest (and ultimately incarceration) of those involved in the importation, production and distribution of illicit drugs (for a detailed summary of supply-side controls see Willis, Homel & Gray 2006). In essence, the aim of supply-side DLE is to disrupt the supply or availability of illicit drugs, thereby increasing the costs and risks associated with drug importation and distribution. The aim of demand-side DLE is to reduce the level of demand for illicit drugs within the general community. Demand-side DLE is primarily directed at the drug user. The rationale behind demand-side DLE is that, even if DLE agencies are unable to increase the financial cost of illicit drug use or restrict its availability, they can increase the non-monetary costs associated with its use. So, as the level of inconvenience, time, risk or cost of trying to find a drug seller increases, more drug purchasers are tempted to leave the illicit drug market (for example by entering treatment) while those who remain tend to use illicit drugs less frequently (Weatherburn et al. 2000). This then has clear flow-on effects in terms of reducing public harms.

Deep-frozen wetware

After a night reading the superb God-Fearing and Free: A Spiritual History of America's Cold War (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 2010) by Jason Stevens I sought light relief, in the style of Waugh's The Loved One, by reading Alcor's quarterly magazine [PDF].

Stevens offers an incisive exploration of the reception of the Niebuhrs, Norman Brown, Flannery O'Connor and other figures, along with analysis of works such as Inherit The Wind and The Night of the Hunter. Strongly commended.

The magazine from Alcor, the business that specialises in freezing your head (attached to your body or otherwise) with the expectation that you'll eventually be 'revived' without ill-effects, is a hoot.

It features advice by Ralph Merkle on "Signing Up Your Relatives", ie persuading people that they too should get the big chill (a process that is, of course, not free). Merkle helpfully suggests that -
Well, you’ve tried all the soft sell approaches. You’ve used all the rational arguments. You’ve pointed out all the simple, easy, straightforward reasons why Pat should choose cryonics. They haven’t worked. It’s time to try something with a bit more punch: “How would you feel if I put a shotgun in my mouth and blew out my brains?”

“What?” Pat might well try to evade answering the question. The obvious counter to any attempt at evasion is to simply repeat the question (possibly in shortened form or possibly after acknowledging Pat’s attempted counter but then saying that doesn’t answer the question): “How would you feel if I put a shotgun in my mouth and blew out my brains?” It seems unlikely that Pat would feel at all good in response to your hypothetical action, so we can reasonably assume that Pat eventually provides some variant of the following answer: “Terrible!” At which point you can say: “That’s how I feel about what you’re doing. Look, it’s easy for you to say you don’t want cryonics. You won’t have to grieve over your own death – but I will. Remember when died? Remember how you felt? Well, that’s how I’m going to feel if you aren’t cryopreserved. And I’m going to keep grieving for you for the rest of my life. Is that what you want to leave me, a lifetime of grief?”

If Pat has conceded that cryonics has some chance of working you can make an even stronger argument: "Even worse, think about what happens if cryonics is successful and I’m revived and rejuvenated: the rest of my life could be thousands of years or even longer. I’m scared I’ll never stop thinking about you and wishing you were with me, going over this conversation we’re having right now again and again in my mind, and blaming myself for not being more persuasive, for not trying harder, and for eventually giving up."

The primary purpose of the opening question and the essentially forced response is to snap Pat out of the “this is my decision and nobody else has a say in it” mind set. Pat’s decision influences more people than just Pat (if Pat cares about anyone else who supports cryonics, mention them as well). It’s also appealing to an implicit notion of fairness. If there’s some important reason Pat should be buried or cremated rather than cryopreserved, now is the time for Pat to explain it – otherwise Pat is just hurting people for a whim, and most people most of the time try to avoid hurting others, even if it means they can’t do exactly what they want.

The emotional argument being made is quite simple and is based on few assumptions. Stated explicitly, it is: “Pat, if you are buried or cremated your loved ones (at least those of us who think cryonics is a good idea) will suffer and grieve for decades, if not a lot longer. If you’re cryopreserved, we won’t. Is being buried or cremated really so important to you that you are willing to put us through that kind of pain? For what reason?”

This emotional argument is valid regardless of Pat’s skepticism or doubts about cryonics – because it’s your belief in cryonics that makes it work, not Pat’s doubts.
Mike Perry, in a review of The Sociopath Next Door, warns that -
The cryonics movement is small and vulnerable. We need to be concerned about people who could do us harm and may impress us initially with their intelligence, competence, and apparent eagerness to help. One such personality type is the sociopath, a person with no conscience, the subject of the book here reviewed.
Oh dear, sociopaths threatening the "movement" founded on the belief that when the wetware gets thawed the person will still be there (ie the brain will be functioning rather than what one of my more irreverent medical friends describes as a defrosted meat-flavoured icicle).

Lest I be too cruel about "the movement" - where would we be without pasty-faced nerds in true believer mode - I'll quote an explanation from the magazine.
The Alcor Life Extension Foundation is a nonprofit tax-exempt scientific and educational organization dedicated to advancing the science of cryopreservation and promoting cryonics as a rational option. Being an Alcor member means knowing that — should the worst happen — Alcor’s Emergency Response Team is ready to respond for you, 24 hours a day, 365 days a year.
The "worst" is presumably a meeting with the grim reaper, an eventuality that from my perspective is strictly a matter of when rather than if.

The same magazine states that -
Cryonics is an attempt to preserve and protect human life, not reverse death. It is the practice of using extreme cold to attempt to preserve the life of a person who can no longer be supported by today’s medicine. Will future medicine, including mature nanotechnology, have the ability to heal at the cellular and molecular levels? Can cryonics successfully carry the cryopreserved person forward through time, for however many decades or centuries might be necessary, until the cryopreservation process can be reversed and the person restored to full health? While cryonics may sound like science fiction, there is a basis for it in real science. The complete scientific story of cryonics is seldom told in media reports, leaving cryonics widely misunderstood. We invite you to reach your own conclusions.
People who find the prospect of freezing and defrosting passe can presumably savour the writing of transhumanist Charles Tandy, founder of (and apparently sole academic at) RIA University. That no doubt very fine institution is apparently somewhat less substantial than Laszlo's recurrently-hyped-&-rebadged GlobalShift University (aka Giordano Bruno University aka Giordano Bruno GlobalShift University), albeit like the Laszlo institution does not appear to have any students.

Tandy very modestly claims to be "a pioneer in time travel and suspended animation", complete with a Laszlo-style theory about "the omniverse". His 'Entropy & Immortality' in 14(1) Journal of Futures Studies (2009) burbles that -
Work beginning in the 20th century has laid the foundation for eventual realization of the onto-resurrection imperative. Developments have already taken us to the threshold of what has been called "practical time travel" – or what, loosely speaking, we may call "time travel". Once time travel becomes feasible in the 21st century, then we can proceed to more fully implement our common task of resurrecting all persons no longer alive, rather than merely resurrecting some persons via current techniques such as CPR. The first steps (beyond CPR) occurred in the 20th century on several fronts, including steps in the direction of suspended-animation, superfast-rocketry, and seg-communities. ...

But the onto-resurrection imperative demands more than immortality for those currently alive. In extraterrestrial space we can experiment (e.g. via Einsteinian or Gödelian past-directed time travel-viewing) with immortality for all persons no longer alive. Seg-communities (Self-sufficient Extra-terrestrial Green-habitats, or O'Neill communities – e.g., see O'Neill, 2000) can assist us with our ordinary and terrestrial problems as well as assist us in completion of the onto-resurrection project. Indeed, in Al Gore's account of the global warming of our water planet, his parable of the frog is a central metaphor. Because the frog in the pot of water experiences only a gradual warming, the frog does not jump out. I add: Jumping off the water planet is now historically imperative. Indeed, it seems unwise to put all of our eggs (futures) into one basket (biosphere).

I close with these words from Jacques Choron: "Only pleasant and personal immortality provides what still appears to many as the only effective defense against ... death. But it is able to accomplish much more. It appeases the sorrow following the death of a loved one by opening up the possibility of a joyful reunion... It satisfies the sense of justice outraged by the premature deaths of people of great promise and talent, because only this kind of immortality offers the hope of fulfillment in another life. Finally, it offers an answer to the question of the ultimate meaning of life, particularly when death prompts the agonizing query [of Tolstoy], 'What is the purpose of this strife and struggle if, in the end, I shall disappear like a soap bubble?' "

Above it was shown that mental-reality and all-reality are dimensions of reality which are not altogether reducible to any strictly physical-scientific paradigm. A more believable (general-ontological) paradigm was presented. Within this framework, the issue of personal immortality was considered. It was concluded that the immortality project, as a physical-scientific common-task to resurrect all dead persons, is ethically imperative. The imperative includes as first steps the development of suspended-animation, superfast-rocketry, and seg-communities.
Shame that there's no mention of hovercars, jetpacks and proton pills!

Tandy is a Director of the Lifeboat Foundation, concerned with responses to "existential threats" (bug-eyed extraterrestrials and so forth). It has an interest in immortality by - kid you not - 'broadcasting' us into outer space, in the pious hope that artificial intelligence (AI) or benign extraterrestrials will reconstruct us using that information. Oh dear.
A personality could be uploaded or migrated to a computer as well as being broadcast to the universe so a future ET could reinstantiate them in case an existential risk occurs. Instead of an ET, if one is willing to entertain either faster-than-light travel or non-Euclidean-space travel (e.g. wormholes), it may even be possible that our far-future descendants pick up our broadcasts and reconstruct us.
One link points to CyBeRev (Personal CyberConsciousness by Terasem Movement Inc).
CyBeRev means cybernetic beingness revival. The purpose of the CyBeRev project is to prevent death by preserving sufficient digital information about a person so that recovery remains possible by foreseeable technology. Terasem Movement believes that future technology will be able to recover full functionality for CyBeRev people.

The first step toward achieving that goal, and the purpose of this website, is for participants to store digital reflections of their mannerisms, personality, recollections, feelings, beliefs, attitudes and values with as great a fidelity as is possible.

Participants can store digital reflections in a variety of formats, including:
Photos
Videos
Text documents
Audio recordings
Favorites
Personality tests
Participants can then choose to share some or all of their information with others through the Visit Reflections feature of the project.
If you are enthused you can read the following associated statement from "Terasem Movement Transreligion Inc", explained as -
A social movement devoted to diversity, unity and joyful immortality achieved through exponential growth of geo-ethical nanotechnology. Immortality is accomplished by creating consciousness in self-replicating machines that can be distributed throughout the cosmos. The machines use their exponentially growing knowledge and ethical nanotechnology to convert universal random mass and energy into ubiquitous intelligent mass and energy that, networked together, will be a force capable of controlling cosmic physics. Diversity, unity and joy are ensured through machine consciousness and universal adherence to the principles of Terasem. As the collective consciousness becomes increasingly omnipresent, omniscient and omnipotent it will realize the age-old vision of a benevolent God. Until the time of cosmic dispersion, Terasem functions as a trans-religion by educating the public on the practicality and necessity of diversity, unity and joyful immortality.

01 February 2011

Over-simplification

High office might induce people to recognise that the answers to some questions are not simple and indeed that sometimes we don't ask the right questions.

Last year I pointed to Anthony Fisher's crude simplification - crying out for derision - that atheism resulted in the horrors of last century. (Presumably demonic possession or other excuses got sundry religious organisations off the hook for their misbehaviour during that period and sundry wars of religion were attributable to bad weather, bad parenting or reading too much Martin Luther and Irenaeus).

Alas, Fisher The Simplifier - aka the Most Rev Anthony Fisher OP, DD, BA (Hons), LLB, BTheol (Hons), DPhil - is at it again. During his sermon at St Mary's Cathedral yesterday he explained that "Bad laws are mostly made by bad people and in turn make people bad".

Unabashed by sharing that insight (albeit apparently without suggesting that we should remove the "bad people"), he warned that "state-sanctioned killing" undermined the legitimacy of the state and its criminal law. Oops, let's not talk to the armed forces during times of war (or the blessing of those forces by the righteous).

Bishop Fisher noted that Pope John Paul II went so far as to deem such laws "lacking authentic juridical validity" and requiring lawyers and health professionals to refuse conscientiously to follow them. How things have changed.

There's a more nuanced and fruitful analysis in 'Kelsen's Reception in Australasia' by Iain Stewart, an account of the Kelsen Stone dispute at pages 311-352 of Hans Kelsen Anderswo/Hans Kelsen Abroad (2010) edited by Robert Walter et al.

Stewart's chapter, founded on his 2006 conference paper regarding that dispute -
Reviews the reception of Hans Kelsen's Pure Theory of Law in Australasia, with particular reference to: Kelsen's dispute with Julius Stone over the "Grundnorm" concept; use (or misuse) of that concept in legal argument during the constitutional crisis in Fiji, 2000-2009; applicability of the "Grundnorm" concept to Australia; and the author's own work in facilitating access to, and departing from, the Pure Theory.
He comments that -
difficulty with the idea of a basic norm prevents him from getting further with that of dynamic legal order. A pity, since the distinction between static and dynamic ordering of norms is today central to Kelsen’s legacy, while that between static and dynamic approaches in the study of law has passed away along with its functionalist social-scientific counterparts.

The difficulty was never overcome. Kelsen and Stone pursued their courses like ships in the night, of which one speaks the other with basic miscomprehension. The position remained that set by Kelsen on the final page of Professor Stone and the Pure Theory of Law. According to Stone, Kelsen had written, with reference to the American legal realists: "Sociological jurisprudence presupposes normative jurisprudence, since until the latter has determined what are legal norms sociological jurisprudence has no defined province". Kelsen does say "sociological jurisprudence presupposes normative jurisprudence", but not the rest – although the rest is a reasonable summary of what he also says. Stone then remarks: “Yet the truth may be exactly the reverse"; "it would be truer to say that Kelsen’s normative jurisprudence presupposes 'sociological jurisprudence'". Kelsen contents himself with remarking: "But Professor Stone does not prove it".
Stewart later indicates that -
I would like to take a break now and a nice place for a holiday is Fiji. The country is also known to journalists as "coup-coup land": since independence from Britain in 1970, it has had no less than five military coups – two in 1987 and one each in 2000, 2006 and 2009. It has had three constitutions – in 1970, 1990 and 1997 – and today none of them is in operation. This instability makes it difficult to apply the Pure Theory of Law without simple fictionality, yet it has been tried.
I do wonder what Kelsen, of for that matter Dr Fisher, would make of the Greeting Card For The Year of the Rabbit animation on the LRB site.

The commentator notes that Beijing recently moved against that animation, in which a group of oppressed rabbits overthrow an abusive government of tigers.
The cartoon claims to be 'meant as an adult fairy tale', with 'no connection to real life', but most of the events it depicts will be familiar to a Chinese audience. It begins with baby rabbits being fed bottled milk: 'Little rabbit, be good, open your mouth, open it up quickly, and drink up your happy future'. They turn green, their eyes pop out and their heads explode. In 2008, six infants died and more than 300,000 fell ill after drinking contaminated formula.

When one of the rabbits tries to protest at a political meeting, he is beaten by the tigers. 'Build a Harmonious Forest', the tigers' banner says, echoing the government's talk of 'Building a Harmonious Society'. Then the tigers bulldoze the rabbits; houses.
And on it goes, in a less than aesopian rendition of human rights abuses that are unsurprising to people who have for example looked at blog posts here and here.

29 January 2011

Flabby

From Peter Hartcher's column in today's Melbourne Age -
the receding floods have left Julia Gillard and Labor newly exposed. A government has much greater freedom of action than an opposition. Gillard's first choice was to decide whether to respond boldly as a national leader or incrementally as a manager.

Bold leadership would have seized the floods as an opportunity to achieve big things, above and beyond the immediate contingency.

For example, Gillard might have declared that the floods across all the eastern states was not just a problem of recovery but an opportunity to rebuild better than ever.

She might have declared it as the moment for a new national productivity drive, a national economic rejuvenation. Drawing on examples such as the Great Chicago Fire of 1871 that allowed the creation of a thrusting modern metropolis and the invention of the skyscraper, she could have turned adversity into opportunity. But Gillard became Labor leader as the embodiment of the party's panicked retreat from ambition. Rudd, Gillard and Swan lost their nerve over emissions trading, immigration and the mining tax, and shrank Labor to present a smaller political target.

The Gillard government has now demonstrated that it is the same creature in the face of unexpected calamity as it was in the face of an election campaign. The flood response confirms that the Gillard government is cautious, timorous, and managerialist. This isn't necessarily bad, just small.
Small and disappointing

Fetishism and Flags on fire

Now that we're over Australia Day - the annual festival of beer, sunburn, burnouts and cheap nationalism - I'm reading 'A Fetishised Gift: The Legal Status of Flags' by Graeme Orr in (2010) 19(3) Griffith Law Review 504-526. Orr's lucid The Law of Politics: Elections, Parties and Money in Australia (Federation Press, 2010) is commended.

Orr comments that -
bridge the gap between cultural studiesʼ insight into nationalism and its symbolics, and the flagʼs legal status, to better understand the unique position occupied by national flags. In doing so it draws particularly on United States, Australian and New Zealand law and practice.

Flag ʻwavingʼ has become more prevalent in many liberal democracies. In such societies, flags occupy not a religious role, but a quiet and quotidian place in what Billig terms ʻbanal nationalismʼ. As a cipher for the whole, a particular flagʼs design is relatively unimportant; what lends it power is a mix of the gravity bestowed by its official designation and the easy commodification lent by a flagʼs easy reproducibility and portability. Unlike other state symbols such as the currency, coat of arms and honorifics, the state does not seek to monopolise the flagʼs use, let alone define its meaning.

Analysis of laws governing flag designation, observance and ʻdesecrationʼ reveals that the law accords the flag distinct status yet only equivocal protection. While the state may crave its citizensʼ fealty, a flag is not a symbol of some distant governmentality. Rather, it is gifted to ʻthe peopleʼ and relies for its relevance on its organic proliferation. As both object and image, people attribute a power to the flag - a power they recognise over themselves and others with whom they share a body politic. A key source of this fetishisation is its official, legal designation. Though it embodies no particular values, a flag is valued, even fetishised, by flag-wavers and flag-burners alike.
He goes on to argue that -
The legal act of designating an official flag – unlike the law governing other national symbols and currencies – is intended to encourage its proliferation, rather than create a monopoly. A flag is not an official symbol in the sense of representing a formal, even distant, governmentality. A flag is inevitably a cipher, and hence a site for contested values. As a result, although the state desires to encourage honour and respect for the flag, and hence the state’s symbolic self, the law is equivocal about punishing flagdestruction, let alone constraining flag use.

Ultimately, if the flag is to maintain its place as something gifted to a people, it relies for its relevance on its reproducibility and organic proliferation. It needs to be valued, indeed fetishised, by flag-wavers and flag-burners alike. Like most fetishes, flag fetishism bestows an arational power upon a common object. An otherwise empty, geodesic design on a piece of fabric is invested not just with the ability to symbolise, even bind, otherwise disparate people within a fractious liberal legal order: it comes to possess such emotional power that its mere sight inspires some to tears and others to jeers.
The article features a nuanced discussion of regulation and flag burning in Australia and New Zealand. I am reminded of Coleman v Kinbacher and Anor (Qld Police) [2003] QCA 575, one of the salient Australian flag burning judgments.

Chesterman J commented
On 1 October 2002 the applicant was convicted of four offences which arose out of an incident on the previous Australia Day in Townsville. The hearing of the charges occurred over five days in July and August 2002. The charges were: 
‘1.That on the 26th day of January 2002 at Townsville one Patrick John COLEMAN in a public place namely River Side Park behaved in a Disorderly manner. 
2.That on the 26th day of January 2002 at Townsville one Patrick John COLEMAN obstructed a Police Officer namely Andrew KINBACHER in the performance of the Officer’s duties. 
3.That on the 26th day of January 2002 at Townsville one Patrick John COLEMAN assaulted Anthony MARINOV with intent to Resist the lawful Arrest of the said Patrick John COLEMAN. 
4.That on the 26th day of January 2002 at Townsville one Patrick John COLEMAN wilfully and unlawfully destroyed one rear passenger side window and damaged one rear passenger side door the property of the Commissioner of the Police Service.’
[4] The Magistrate appears to have evaluated the evidence quite carefully. He made the following findings of fact: 
‘1.That a large number of people of all ages, including children, toddlers, teenagers, family groups and older people, attended the Australia Day celebrations at Riverside Park on 26th January, 2002. (Estimates given range from 1000 (Ms. McDermott) [sic] couple of thousand (Mr. Moriconi) to five thousand (Mr. Jackson) Ms. McDermott [sic] stated there were about a hundred people in her location, in sight and sound of the defendant. 
2.That the defendant planned for it to be an occasion upon which he would make a dramatic form of protest against the Australian government in relation to its attitude to the persons held in detention centres. 
3.That part of this protest was intended to include a burning of the Australian flag in public. 
4.That the defendant in preparation for this activity, placed a quantity of two-stroke petrol in a bottle, and brought with him a brown bed sheet that had been soaked in water, as a safety measure. 
5.That he also prior to coming to the park conducted a “trial burning” by cutting a small piece of the flag, and putting a light to same, although without the application of any petrol. 
6.That after some preliminary vocal protest directed at Mr. Howard, the Prime Minister, (who was not present) and to some extent at Mr. Mooney, the Mayor, (who was present) the defendant made a statement to the effect that he was going to burn the flag he had with him. 
7.That the defendant placed the flag upon the brown sheet that he had laid out on the ground, and sprinkled it with the petrol he brought with him. 
8.That at the time he did this, a number of members of the public were on and about the park area, in his vicinity, but none in close proximity to him; that the nearest person would have been not closer that [sic] 5 metres from him. 
9.That it was self-evident from the actions, and speech of the defendant, what he intended to do, and why he was in fact doing it. 
10.That his actions were responsible for altering the happy festive mood of some of the persons present, and created a significant feeling of ill-will, if not aggression, and disgust, by some members of the public towards the defendant. 
11.That some persons, at least, one of which was Helen McDermott [sic] felt some degree of concern, and unease as to precisely what the defendant was going to do after he lit the flag, some of that concern being because of the presence of a number of small children in the park that day; that Mrs. Bettenay was frightened and angry by the conduct of the defendant. 
12.That about this time, as it became apparent the defendant was making preparations to carry out his stated intentions, the two police officers approached the defendant; that some of the onlookers became more vocal at this time. 
13.That the defendant when he initially attempted to light the flag with the cigarette lighter, was unsuccessful, in that after a brief show of flame, the flame was extinguished. 
14.That this act caused some mirth and laughter to occur in a section of the onlookers. 
15.That officer Kinbacher spoke briefly to the defendant, and a number of times asking him, in effect, to “Please do not light the flag.” 
16.That the defendant ignored that request, stating it was not illegal to burn a flag, and continued to attempt to light the flag, and, after a number of attempts, was successful in doing so. 
17.That as the flag ignited, and proceeded to burn, small pieces of it dropped to the sheet below, one or more of such drops causing flames to more or less spontaneously occur, when the burning pieces made contact with the sheet; that such flames were extinguished by Officer Marinov, and to some extent by the defendant, by their stamping upon them. 
18.That the precise cause of that secondary fire has not been properly shown or proved to the court, although the presence of the petrol accelerant on either, or both, the flag itself, or upon the ground sheet appears to have been a causative factor. 19.That the brown sheet itself did not itself catch fire or substantially burn, with the possible exception of a small, circular hole, as clearly evident thereon; neither did the surrounding grass or vegetation catch fire. 
20.That as the defendant lit the flag, and as the pieces of the flag dropped to the sheet, causing the secondary fire, Officer Kinbacher placed his hands upon the defendant advising him to the effect: “you are under arrest for disorderly conduct.” 
21.Thereafter the defendant, restated, in effect, that it was not unlawful to burn a flag, and proceeded to resist the actions of Kinbacher and Marinov in a most determined an [sic] violent fashion, as detailed in the evidence presented to the Court.’ 
[5] The Magistrate summarised his views on the evidence and submissions relating to the charge of behaving in a disorderly manner in these terms: 
‘The circumstances existing on that day was a family day of entertainment, with a view to celebrating Australia Day. It was a day on which some persons born outside of Australia were officially accepted as Queensland and Australian citizens, in some form of official ceremony involving the Mayor of Townsville. I have personally examined the flag which has dimensions of approx 130cm x 83cm. and the wooden pole, with pieces end to end measures approx. 240cm. In lighting a cloth item of that size, with the use of petrol accelerant, in an open park area with numerous members of the public in the general vicinity, (if not right next to him) including a number of children, the defendant has taken some risk. The flames that occurred unexpectedly on the sheet are some proof of that. Applying an objective test, I accept and find that conduct to have been provocative, disruptive and disturbing, and, in the manner he went about it, could be described as “a substantial breach of decorum”. I find that behaviour to be disorderly.’ 
[6] Section 7 of the Vagrants, Gaming and Other Offences Act 1931 (Qld) (“VGO”) relevantly provides: ‘7. Obscene, abusive language etc. (1)Any person who, in any public place or so near to any public place that any person who might be therein, and whether any person is therein or not, could view or hear – (e) behaves in a riotous, violent, disorderly, indecent, offensive, threatening, or insulting manner; shall be liable to a penalty...’ 
[7] The applicant was arrested for disorderly conduct by Constable Kinbacher. The applicant’s resistance to his arrest was violent. He struck a police officer in the stomach with some force and struggled strenuously to escape apprehension. When finally overcome, handcuffed and put in a police car he kicked out one of its windows. 
[8] During the course of the trial particulars of the charge of behaving in a disorderly manner were asked for, and given. The particulars were: ‘At about 4.50 pm on 26 January 2002 at Riverside Park it will be alleged that whilst setting alight a flag the ensuring fire spread out of control to a ground sheet and surrounding vegetation causing fear, danger of injury and disruption to members of the public.’ The Magistrate found that there was no satisfactory evidence that any vegetation caught fire. There was evidence that the sheet which the applicant had taken with him to suppress any fire that might result from his intended incineration of the flag, itself caught fire. The Magistrate, however, held that the fact that the blanket caught fire was an accident within the meaning of s 23 of the Criminal Code so that the applicant was not criminally responsible for that act. Nevertheless he thought the applicant’s conduct was disorderly. 
[9] The applicant appealed against his convictions to the District Court which, having heard the submissions to the parties on 16 June 2003, dismissed the appeal on 30 July 2003. 
[10] The applicant’s appeal to the District Court identified fifteen separate grounds of appeal. Many of them are general complaints about the outcome. Some took issue with particular findings of fact which did not appear to be critical. There appear to have been two strands to the attack on the Magistrate’s judgment made in the District Court. The first was that the finding that the burning of the sheet was accidental meant that the charge of disorderly conduct as particularised had not been proved because an essential particular had not been established and/or because the remaining conduct could not be regarded as disorderly. As a consequence, it was said, the police officers present had no right to arrest the applicant because he had not engaged in disorderly conduct. He was therefore entitled to resist arrest and attempt to escape unlawful custody in the police car.  
[11] The second strand was that the applicant’s conduct was a ‘direct and forceful political protest’ which was constitutionally protected. 
[12] The function of particulars in a criminal trial was discussed in a decision of this court, The Queen v Trifyllis (CA No 358 of 1998, delivered 11 December 1998) in which R v Saffron (1989) 17 NSWLR 395 was referred to with approval and it was noticed that ‘the function of particulars is the same in criminal as in civil cases.’ In Saffron Hunt A-JA said (455): ‘The function of particulars in such a case is simply to relieve the other party of the need to investigate the issues of fact not identified by the particulars, or to show what will be put forward as constituting the case which has been pleaded … the relief which is granted to a party at the trial must in the end be founded on the pleadings and not upon any particulars which have been given of the matters alleged in those pleadings …’ Reference was also made to what the High Court has said in Dare v Pulham (1982) 148 CLR 658 at 664: ‘… Where there is no departure during the trial from the pleaded cause of action, a misconformity between the evidence and particulars earlier furnished will not disentitle a party to a verdict based upon the evidence …’ Part of that function is to give the opposing party a sufficiently clear statement of the case to allow him to meet it and to identify the issues for decision and thereby enable the relevance and admissibility of evidence to be determined. See Dare at 664. 
[13] The applicant’s point is that the burning of the ground sheet ‘was an integral part of the particulars’. That part of the case was not proved against him in the sense that he was found not to be criminally responsible for that event. The consequence is, so the applicant contends, that ‘an essential element’ of the offence charged against him was not proved so that he should have been acquitted. 
[14] The argument misunderstands the function of particulars and the nature of the charge brought against the applicant. If the facts proved by the prosecution establish beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of an offence then a conviction must follow even though the Crown may have furnished particulars not all of which were made out. If the facts proved against the applicant were sufficient in law to constitute disorderly conduct and they were within the description of the offence given by the particulars the applicant would have been rightly convicted. It would not matter that not all of the particularised actions were proved to have occurred or were acts for which the applicant was not criminally responsible. 
[15] This was the approach taken by the District Court judge on appeal from the Magistrate. His Honour said: ‘The particulars provided … though brief describe a single episode. … The events complained of would seem to have occurred within the space of seconds rather than minutes. It is transparently obvious that the events commenced with the igniting of the flag to which the contents of a flask of petrol had been previously applied. It may well be that the secondary fire to the ground sheet appeared to observers including the police officers as potentially more serious but the appellant could not have been in any doubt that part of the case against him involved the igniting of the flag itself. … In his own evidence he made reference to the secondary fire being unexpected and unforeseeable making particular reference to the wetness of the ground sheet which would seem to have raised a reasonable doubt in the mind of a Magistrate. In effect he was seeking to compartmentalise the episode to argue that the verdict was not able to be supported by the initial actions concerning which there was common ground. The appellant’s own evidence was that he had come along intending to burn the flag and had provided himself in advance with the wherewithal to do so. 
[16] The Magistrate had said: 
‘As to the above (particulars) it has been established, and (the applicant) admits that he lit the flag, and, I think it can be fairly stated, that it did spread, out of control to the ground sheet. There is no evidence of the fire spreading to any surrounding vegetation. There is some evidence to indicate some concern, fright, and anger, to some of the members of the public, particularly the females. Not, perhaps, because of any out of control fire, but due to what the defendant intended to do, i.e. light a fire. … Clearly then, some of the particulars have not been made out. This causes me some concern. On consideration, I am not satisfied that by itself is sufficient basis to dismiss the charge. … The particulars proved, and the findings made, must be considered, and examined, and a determination made as to whether the manner/behaviour could be considered to be disorderly. If this is found to be the case, then surely the offence would be made out.’ 
[17] This approach cannot be criticised. It is correct. 
[18] The judge understood the applicant to be contending that s 7(1)(e) of the VGO was unconstitutional and he dealt with what he understood to be the submission in support of that contention. He rejected it by reference to the remarks of Brennan CJ in Levy v The State of Victoria and Ors (1996-1997) 189 CLR 579 at 595: 
‘A law which prohibits non-verbal conduct for a legitimate purpose other than the suppressing of its political message is unaffected by the implied freedom if the prohibition is appropriate and adapted to the fulfilment of that purpose. Such a law prohibiting or controlling the non-verbal conduct, if it be reasonable in extent, does not offend the constitutional implication.’ 
The applicant disavows any constitutional challenge to s 7(1)(e). It does not form part of his application for leave to appeal to this court. His point seems rather to be that because he was engaged in what he regarded as a political protest his right to communicate his criticisms of Government migration policy were protected by the Constitution and his conduct could not therefore be disorderly. 
[19] The Magistrate said: 
‘It is really a balancing exercise that has to be performed – the unquestionable right of the defendant to make a peaceful protest, as opposed to the rights of other persons to enjoy a festive, family occasion, in a public park, free from disturbance, or concerns as to health and safety. … The crucial and significant facts … were … the actual decision … to burn the flag of that size, with the aid of an accelerant, at that particular time and place, that he did ignite, and the adverse affect his behaviour appeared to have on some of (the) public present at the time. I still find then, that the manner of the defendant could be fairly classified as disorderly. I consider the defendant has unfortunately made an error of judgment in choosing that time and place to make his particular protest.’ 
[20] The Magistrate considered this argument by reference to the relevant authorities, O’Connor v Police [1972] NZLR 379, in which Richmond J said ‘… The court has to apply an objective test to the conduct in question and determine as a matter of time, place and circumstances whether it was of a kind likely to cause serious annoyance or disturbance to some person or persons present’, Melser v Police [1967] NZLR 437 in which Napier J remarked ‘I have no doubt that these words ‘disorderly behaviour’ refer to any substantial breach of decorum which tends to disturb or interfere with the comfort of other people who may be in, or in the vicinity of, the street, or public place.’ and Watson v Trenerry (1998) 100 A Crim R 408 in which Angel J quoted the judgment of McCarthy J in Melser: ‘… The right to protest against political decisions, is now accepted as a fundamental human right in any modern society which deserves to be called democratic … the right of protest, in particular, if exercised without restraint, may interfere with other people’s rights of privacy and freedom from molestation. … Freedom of behaviour … is (not) absolute. The purposes of a democratic society are only made practicable by accepting some limitations on absolute individual freedoms. … This … is … elementary.’ 
[21] In particular the Magistrate noted the discussion in Watson concerning the relevance of the fact that the conduct in question which was alleged to be disorderly was, or was part of, a political protest. That clearly is a circumstance relevant to the decision whether the conduct complained of in a prosecution under s 7(1)(e) is disorderly as that term has been explained in the authorities. 
[22] Having referred to the relevant legal principle, and the relevance of the point just mentioned, the Magistrate concluded from his review of the evidence that the charge had been made out. 
[23] The applicant’s contention that his conduct could not have been disorderly because it was an expression of political opinion or participation in a criticism of Government debate cannot be accepted. His motive for his conduct and the characterisation of it as ‘political’ are both irrelevant. Acts which the law makes criminal do not cease to have that character by reason that they are the expression of political opinion. The point is too obvious to need explanation. Where it otherwise the murder of a Prime Minister whose policies one despised would be a constitutionally protected act of political debate. 
[24] The District Court judge took the same approach. Having reviewed the evidence and referred to some particular portions of it his Honour said: ‘I have canvassed some portions of the prosecution evidence concerning the presence of members of the public and children because it was against the backdrop of such evidence that the Magistrate … approached the question of whether the (applicant’s) actions in lighting the flag amounted to disorderly conduct. It was plainly open for the Magistrate to do so on the evidence. Far from being a finding which was unsupported … it seems … to have been quite compelling. I was provided with an extensive summary of the evidence … which … contains reference to a large volume of other evidence to similar effect. The concept of disorderly behaviour is in every case a matter of degree depending upon the relevant time, place and circumstances. The police have made no move to interfere with the (applicant) while he made anti-Government political statements. While the statements may have been unpalatable to some of the patrons of the event there is no suggestion that feelings had become so inflamed as to render likely a breach of the peace. Actually, there seems to have been some merriment at the failure of the (applicant) to light the flag at the first attempt. The objectionable feature of the conduct had very little to do with its political significance. It related to the lighting of a large piece of synthetic material to which petrol had been added in close proximity to larger numbers of people including young children. The circumstances were such as to arouse the apprehension of parents for the safety of their children. The Magistrate described the conduct of the (applicant) as “provocative, disruptive and disturbing, and … as a substantial breach of decorum”. However he went on to describe the crucial and significant facts as being the actual decision by the (applicant) to burn a flag of that size, with the aid of an accelerant at that particular time and place … and the adverse effect his behaviour appeared to have on some of the public present.’ 
[25] The applicant’s submissions as they relate to the conviction of a charge of behaving in a disorderly manner are without substance. They appear to misunderstand the law. It is apparent that the Magistrate paid careful attention to the evidence and applied to it the correct legal principles. In particular the Magistrate took account of the circumstance that the applicant was protesting against a policy of the Commonwealth Government. Having taken that circumstance into account, together with the other relevant circumstances, his Worship was convinced beyond reasonable doubt that the applicant’s behaviour was disorderly. There was no error in his Worship’s approach. The District Court judge reached the same conclusion having reviewed the evidence and having been satisfied that the correct legal principles had been identified and applied. 
[26] The applicant’s complaints that he was arrested unlawfully and was therefore entitled to resist and behaved reasonably in striking Constable Marinov and damaging the police car can be shortly disposed of. 
[27] The point taken here seems to be that: (a)The police officers considered the conduct disorderly only when the secondary fire commenced; (b)The applicant has been found not to be criminally responsible for the second fire; therefore (c)It follows, so the applicant submits, that he has been effectively acquitted of the act which was said to base the criminal liability and authorise the arrest; (d)Therefore, it is submitted by the applicant, that the arrest was unlawful and the applicant’s resistance, was lawful. 
[28] The submissions by the applicant fundamentally misunderstand the law. It is not the law that an arrest is only lawful if ultimately the person arrested is found to be guilty of the alleged offence which was the basis of the arrest. 
[29] Section 198 of the Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld) provides: ‘198 Arrest without warrant (1)It is lawful for a police officer, without warrant, to arrest a person the police officer reasonably suspects has committed or is committing an offence if it is reasonably necessary for 1 or more of the following reasons - (a) to prevent the continuation or repetition of an offence or the commission of another offence; … (g) to preserve the safety or welfare of any person including the person arrested; …’ 
[30] That section: (a)Gives a power to arrest dependent upon a police officer forming the belief prescribed by the section; (b)The existence of the power to arrest is distinct and independent from any ultimate determination of guilt; (c)Provided the police officer holds the requisite belief and the power of arrest therefore arises, the arrest is lawful notwithstanding that there is ultimately an acquittal of the defendant of the offence for which he was arrested and the arrest is lawful even if the police officer’s belief was founded upon some mistake of fact or law. 
[31] The arresting officer Kinbacher had clearly formed the view: (a)That the applicant had committed the offence of disorderly conduct; (b) That he was going to repeat the offence; and that state of mind was reasonably held given the applicant’s conduct up to that point in time. 
[32] On that basis the arrest was lawful. It was not rendered unlawful by the Magistrate ultimately having a reasonable doubt as to the applicant’s criminal liability for the secondary fire. Indeed, even if he was acquitted of the charge of disorderly conduct the arrest was still lawful and he would be guilty of the other charges.  
[33] There is no reason to doubt the correctness of the applicant’s convictions or that the appeal to the District Court was properly dismissed. The application for leave to appeal raises no point of law for determination. I would refuse the application with costs to be assessed. 

Naming as claiming

My doctoral dissertation features a brief section on identity construction through law regarding naming, so I was pleased to encounter 'Naming Baby: The Constitutional Dimensions of Parental Naming Rights' (UC Davis Legal Studies Research Paper Series Research Paper No. 241, January 2011) by Carlton Larson.

In discussing European frameworks about what you can call the kid Larson notes that -
Many foreign jurisdictions are significantly more restrictive with respect to naming practices. Portugal, for example, requires parents to select a name from a governmentally approved list. It makes for fascinating reading, a relentless enforcement of 'Portuguese-ishness'. Not surprisingly, "Yuri", "Svetlana', "Johann", "Ethel", and "Andy" all fail to make the cut, but so do "Carmencita", "Catelina", and "Iglesias". In 2007, Venezuelan lawmakers proposed legislation that would limit parents to 100 approved names, perhaps because at least sixty Venezuelans bore the first name "Hitler". Spain specifically prohibits "extravagant" or "improper" names. French law permits officials to reject first names "contrary to the welfare of the child". One such name was "Fleur de Marie", rejected by French courts as too eccentric. Argentina prohibits "names signifying ideological or political tendencies, ridiculous or extravagant names, or those contrary to good morals". It has also rejected certain non-Spanish names, such as "Malcolm". Portugal prohibits names that "raise doubts about the sex of the registrant".
Carlson goes on to note historic and contemporary curiosa in US naming practice -
Another Massachusetts man named his son "Mene Mene Tekel Upharsin". Other names simply defy explanation, such as that of the Boston boy named "Preserved Fish". In 1814, a Connecticut minister named his daughter "Encyclopedia Britannia". Political names of all sorts have been especially popular. In the first half of the nineteenth century, the governor of South Carolina named his son "States Rights". Perhaps proving that some names really are destiny, "States Rights" graduated from Harvard Law School, but was killed in battle as a brigadier general in the Confederate Army. Equally redolent of a Civil-War history exam is the mid-nineteenth-century family who named their sons "Kansas Nebraska", "Lecompton Constitution", and "Emancipation Proclamation", while giving their daughters the apparently more feminine names of “Louisiana Purchase” and "Missouri Compromise". The outhouse was no doubt an important feature of daily life, but one wonders if it was truly necessary to commemorate it, as did one Tennessee family, by naming a girl 'Latrina". Other children were given such gargantuan tongue-twisters as "Trailing Arbutus Vines", "Loyal Lodge No. 296 Knights of Pythias Ponca City Oklahoma Territory", and "John Hodge Opera House Centennial Gargling Oil Samuel J. Tilden".

Resurrections

Last year I noted that Paul Terroni had been refused bail in NSW after faking his own death, seeking the associated insurance and obtaining a false passport (albeit an improvement on the NZ scammer who cashed in on his own 'death' but chose to renew his existing pasport!).

The SMH today reports that Terroni has been sentenced in a NSW District Court to a maximum 23 months in jail (13 months on a fraud charge and 15 months on a passport offence). Although his minimum term reportedly expired two weeks ago, Terroni remains in custody pending sentencing on driving charges that apparently triggered his scam.

He appears to have been charged with driving offences, evading punishment by moving to Ecuador and there ostensibly drowning in a river in 2007. What better day for a faux demise than 1 April. His uncle obtained the death certificate, with Terroni sending that to Australia and snaffling a false passport used for his return to Sydney in 2008. There was an attempt to claim over $283,000 in life insurance, with his mother reportedly alleged to have tried to obtain his superannuation using the bogus death certificate.

Haesler J yesterday sentenced Terroni for for trying to obtaining money by deception and possessing a foreign passport not issued to him, noting that "to fake one's own death in the face of relatively minor criminal charges makes no sense to me". Terroni's barrister argued that his made what "can only be described as a disastrous life choice".