10 July 2012

Whistles and Wispelaere

What to do about whistleblowing and about people such as Jean-Philippe Wispelaere in the 'age of WikiLeaks' (or WikiMyths) and anxieties about cyberwar and government accountability?

'Free Speech Aboard the Leaky Ship of State: Calibrating First Amendment Protection for Leakers of Classified Information' by Heidi Kitrosser in (2012) 6(2) Journal of National Security Law & Policy  notes that
The Obama Administration has initiated six prosecutions of government employees for leaking classified information. This is double the number of prosecutions brought by all previous administrations combined. The rise in prosecutions, coupled with other developments – most notably a series of disclosures from the website wikileaks – has brought a renewed focus to the first amendment status of classified information and those who disseminate it. Most of the attention and concern, however, has centered on the protections due non-governmental third parties who publish information that is leaked to them. When their attention turns to leakers, commentators most often argue or assume that leakers can be prosecuted with little or no constitutional difficulty, given their special positions of trust with respect to classified information. 
This Article challenges that conventional view. It argues that government insiders who leak classified information merit robust, albeit certainly not unlimited, constitutional protections from prosecution. It also explains that the government should have greater constitutional leeway to punish leakers through administrative sanctions tied to leakers’ insider status – for example, through dismissal from employment or security clearance removal – than through criminal penalties. The Article defends these points on grounds of constitutional text, structure, and principle in their own right and as applied to the realities of the classification system. It also analyzes judicial doctrine, explaining that while aspects of it bode poorly for leaker protections from prosecution, the overall doctrinal picture is far less bleak for leakers than is often assumed.
There is an upbeat view in 'Protecting Rights from Within? Inspectors General and National Security Oversight' by Shirin Sinnar in Stanford Law Review which comments
Courts and Congress are often reluctant to constrain the executive branch when it limits individual rights in the pursuit of national security. Many scholars have argued that mechanisms within the executive branch can supply an alternative constraint on executive power – whether as a preferred alternative due to the comparative advantages of such institutions or as a second-best option necessitated by congressional and judicial abdication. Despite this interest in the “internal separation of powers,” there is very little attention to what such internal mechanisms are actually doing to protect individual rights.
Sinnar argues that
Inspectors General (IGs), little noticed oversight institutions in federal agencies, are now playing a significant role in monitoring national security practices curtailing individual rights. IGs have investigated the post-9/11 detentions of immigrants, the use of National Security Letters to obtain personal records, coercive interrogations of terrorist suspects, extraordinary rendition, military monitoring of political protests, and many other controversial counterterrorism practices.
Analyzing five reviews at the Departments of Justice, Homeland Security, and Defense, and the Central Intelligence Agency, I argue that these investigations varied significantly in independence and rigor. At their strongest, IG reviews provided remarkable transparency on national security practices, identified violations of the law that had escaped judicial review, and even challenged government conduct where existing law was ambiguous or undeveloped. Such reviews protected rights where courts had failed and significantly reinforced other forms of oversight. At the same time, even stronger reviews largely did not result in remedies for most victims, repercussions for high-level executive officials, or significant rights-protective constraints on agency discretion.&
These case studies illuminate the potential strengths and limitations of IG rights oversight: IGs are well-suited to increase transparency, evaluate the propriety of national security conduct, and reform internal procedures; on the other hand, their independence can be undermined, they may avoid constitutional questions, and they rely on political actors to implement reforms. IGs can help protect individual rights against national security abuses and should be modestly strengthened, but do not displace the need for robust external oversight of the national security executive.
Obama's performance is critiqued in the 86 page 'Whistleblowers and the Obama Presidency: The National Security Dilemma' by Richard Moberly in (2012) 16 Employee Rights and Employment Policy Journal, which comments -
As a candidate for President, Barack Obama promised to protect whistleblowers because they are, in his words, “watchdogs of wrongdoing and partners in performance.” Three years into his Presidency, Obama’s record often demonstrates strong support for employees who disclose government misconduct. He appointed whistleblower-rights supporters to key administrative posts and fought to include robust whistleblower protections in his key legislative accomplishments, such as the economic stimulus package, health care reform and the financial reform bill.
However, the Obama Administration’s treatment of national security whistleblowers has been decidedly less emphatic and more nuanced. His Administration aggressively prosecuted unauthorized disclosures related to national security and objected to reporters claiming a privilege not to reveal their sources. Moreover, a substantial legislative reform of federal employee whistleblower protections remained in limbo for much of Obama’s Presidency in part because of his Administration’s concern that the proposed law would provide too many rights to national security whistleblowers. 
This Article examines and critiques this apparent contradiction in President Obama’s whistleblower agenda and also explores ways in which the Obama Administration might satisfy its national security policy objectives without undermining whistleblower protection.
Perspectives on Wispelaere, secrecy and whistleblowing are provided in Rod Tiffen's 'Why Political Plumbers Fail – Hypocrisy and Hyperbole in Leak Control' [PDF], Andrew Wilkie's self-regarding Axis of Deceit: The Extraordinary Story of an Australian Whistleblower (Black Inc., 2004) and the 2010 Australian Law Reform Commission report on Secrecy Laws and Open Government in Australia (ALRC Report 112).

09 July 2012

Beyond the binary

The ACT Law Reform Advisory Council (the Territory's counterpart of the ALRC and NSWLRC) has released its Beyond The Binary: legal recognition of sex and gender diversity in the ACT gender diversity report [PDF].

The Council had been asked to advise on the legal recognition of transgender and intersex people in the ACT, specifically -
to inquire into and report on steps necessary to provide for legal recognition of transgender and intersex people in the Territory, and to ensure that any such provision is compliant with the Human Rights Act 2004, with particular regard to: 
a. the existing provisions of the Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1997
b. the potential implications of legal recognition of transgender and intersex people in the Territory for public functions or documentation under Territory and Commonwealth law, and
c. the potential implications of legal recognition of transgender and intersex people in the Territory for mutual recognition of a persons’ sex by and among the States, Territories, and Commonwealth.
It features some 35 recommendations ...

In ACT legislation generally:
1. reference should consistently be made to ‘sex and gender diversity’, ‘sex and gender diverse people’, and ‘people in sex and gender diverse communities’. 
2. when necessary, specific reference should be made to ‘transgender’, a ‘transgender person’, and ‘transgender people’ to refer to people who, having been born as physiologically either male or female, have changed or are changing their identity from one sex and gender to another. 
3. when necessary, specific reference should be made to ‘intersex’, an ‘intersex person’, and ‘intersex people’ to refer to people who, because of their physiological characteristics at birth, do not identify only as female or only as male. The term intersex should not be used to refer to or include people who have changed or are changing their identity from one sex and gender to another. 
4. it is not necessary or appropriate to define ‘female’ or ‘male’. Those terms do have an ordinary binary meaning and legislation is not necessary to confirm that. It is, however, appropriate to define terms of sex and gender diversity that are outside these binary terms, so that diverse sex and gender identity is given recognition as a part of a process of its being normalised. 
5. the 2003 ACT Report audit of ACT laws which require a person to identify their sex and gender should be updated and extended to laws and practices, and that the need for those requirements should be reviewed with the intention of removing whenever possible a requirement that a person identify their sex and gender. 
In the Legislation Act 2001:
6. the definition of ‘transgender’ is appropriate and sufficient. 
7. in the definition of ‘intersex’, reference to a ‘a genetic condition’ as the reason for a person’s intersex status is inappropriate, and it is sufficient to refer to the fact that an intersex person’s reproductive organs or sex chromosomes that are not exclusively male or female. 
In the Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1997 and Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Regulation 1998:
8. the sex of a child born in the ACT should continue to be recorded by the Registrar-General, subject to recommendations for changes to the timing for notification and registration, and to the available categories of sex. 
9. to give legal recognition to sex and gender diverse people who are not defined by the female/male binary, wherever the BDMR Act and BDMR Regulation refer to two sexes, male and female, they should be amended to recognise three sex and gender identities: female, male and intersex. 
10. having regard to 1-3 above, the BDMR Act should be amended to replace the term ‘transsexual’ with reference to sex and gender diverse people, and to sex and gender diversity, unless it is necessary to refer specifically to transgender people. 
11. the sex of a child when it is notified (s5 BDMR Act; s4(1) BDMR Regulation) should be any of female, male, intersex, to be advised, or indeterminate. 
12. the option ‘indeterminate’ should be used only in circumstances anticipated by s9(2)(b) BDMR Act when it is not possible to determine the sex of a premature still-born child; it should not be used to when a child is or could be intersex, in which case one of the other four categories should be used. 
13. at the time that the sex of a child is notified as ‘intersex’ or ‘to be advised’, the parents and any health practitioners involved in caring for the child should be provided with printed information, advice and resources, developed in consultation with representatives of the intersex community and expert health practitioners, which explain intersex and set out considerations for decisions that can be made about the child’s sex and gender identity. 
14. the current 60 days allowed for the registration of the sex of any child (ss9 and 11 BDMR Act; s5 BDMR Regulation) should be extended to 180 days. 
15. to give legal recognition to intersex people, the available categories for the registration of a person’s sex should be any of female, male, intersex and indeterminate. 
16. the Registrar-General should be empowered to issue a birth certificate which shows a person’s sex as ‘unspecified’, in circumstances where a person is in the process of changing their identity from one sex and gender to another (‘transitioning’), or does not identify as having a sex. 
17. the requirement in the ACT for a person to undergo sexual reassignment surgery to change the record of their sex should be abolished. 
18. the requirement for a person to register a change in their sex and gender identity should not be more onerous than it is in the policy of the Passport Office. 
19. when an intersex person seeks a change to the record of the sex on register, whether to female, male or intersex, the person need only rely on medical confirmation of their intersex status. 
20. the requirement for a person to register a change in their sex and gender identity is a matter of policy for the government to decide, from among suitable and available options which range from self-identification to self-identification accompanied by corroboration by various classes of people. 
21. it is not appropriate at this stage to prohibit, more broadly than the Discrimination Act already does, requests for disclosure of gender identity without a demonstrated legitimate need. 
22. in light of the practice of the Registrar-General to issue a change of name certificate which does not show the person’s sex or former name, no changes to current law and practice under the Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act need to be made to ensure protection of the privacy of a person who has changed their sex and gender identity.  
23. the current restrictions – in the BDMR Regulation and Office of Regulatory Services Policy – on access to a record of a person’s sex in the register are adequate, but information provided by the Territory from its register to another State or Territory, and access to the register provided by the Territory to another State or Territory, should be subject to the same restrictions on access as are set out in the BDMR Regulation and Office of Regulatory Services Policy. 
24. the BDMR Act s29 should accept an Australian passport or Document of Identity, in addition to an ‘interstate recognition certificate’, as evidence that the person mentioned is of the sex as stated in it. Further, reference in s29(3) to an ‘interstate recognition certificate’ should not be limited to a certificate ‘in relation to a person who has undergone sexual reassignment surgery’. 
25. a Certificate of Particulars is a desirable mechanism to ensure equal access for ACT residents to reforms that are designed to guarantee legal recognition of sex and gender diverse people without reliance on inhumane eligibility requirements. 
In the Discrimination Act 1991:
26. having regard to 1-3 above, where the Discrimination Act refers to the attribute of ‘gender identity’, it should be amended to refer instead to sex and gender diversity. 
27. protected attributes should include:
i. a person’s identifying as intersex, as a sex other than their registered sex, as having no sex, and as being in transition for one sex to another 
ii. the record of a person’s sex having been altered under the BDMR Act or equivalent law or practice, and 
iii. a person’s physical presentation (including physical features, manner of speech, and dress) when it is not consistent with the person’s recorded birth sex or with the conventional physical presentation of a person of a particular sex.
In the ACT public sector:
28. when an ACT public authority identifies and/or records a person’s sex:
i. the person is entitled to inspect the record, and to have their sex identified and/or recorded (and if necessary amended) in accordance with their sex as registered under the BDMR Act) 
ii. no liability should attach to a person who, on behalf of an ACT public authority, incorrectly records a person’s sex in good faith. 
29. if, as recommended, the available categories for the registration of a person’s sex under the BDMR Act are to be any of female, male, or intersex, then at least those three categories should be used in all ACT government activity. 
30. when it is relevant for an ACT public authority to require a person to identify their sex – other than for notifying and registering a birth and for changing the birth record of their sex – the person should be asked their ‘sex and gender identity’, and should be given the option of identifying as any of:
a) female 
b) male 
c) intersex 
d) none of the above. 
31. the proposed changes to law and practice to give legal recognition to sex and gender diverse people will need to be accompanied by investment in public authorities for: i. programs of education and training about sex and gender diversity ii. the conversion of systems and documents to reflect the formal recognition of sex and gender diversity iii. funding to ensure that the legislative changes are part of a broader program of social inclusion. 
In the ACT:
32. to monitor and report on progress towards legal recognition for sex and gender diverse people in the ACT, the ACT Human Rights Commission must be sufficiently resourced to address the underreporting of discrimination against transgender and intersex people, and to support employers and service providers with information about their legal obligations under the Discrimination Act 1991 and the Human Rights Act 2004. 
33. to address issues of unemployment, discrimination, poor physical and mental health outcomes, and low rates of social inclusion and participation among sex and gender diverse people:
i. support and advisory services should be provided to sex and gender diverse people and their families 
ii. recurrent education and training programs should be provided to service providers, employers, workplaces and educational institutions.
 Nationally:
34. while the ACT is acting to remove legal obstacles for sex and gender diverse people across all its legislation, cooperation with the Commonwealth and with other State and Territory governments will be important in developing a national approach that addresses both the legal and social recognition difficulties faced by the gender diverse community.
35. it is desirable for the governments of the States, Territories and Commonwealth to audit their laws and practices for provisions which require a person to identify their sex and gender, and to review the need for those requirements with the intention of removing whenever possible a requirement that a person identify their sex and gender. 

Boiler-rooms

What's striking about the new Australian Institute of Criminology and Australian Crime Commission report [PDF] on Serious and Organised Investment Fraud - apart from the document's superficiality - is the small scale of that fraud relative to the depredations of corporate criminals such as Alan Bond.

The 40 page report is thin, very thin ...  something that might be expected after reading previous ACC documents (eg noted here, here and here) that are distinguished by problematical analogies, woolly statistics, emotive language and a decided absence of legal analysis.

The authors explain that -
In 2011, Task Force Galilee was established to broaden the understanding of Serious and Organised Investment Fraud and to develop a national response. As at April 2012, the Task Force estimated that Australians’ losses to this type of fraud since January 2007 were in excess of A$113 million, with this figure likely to be conservative. During this period more than 2,600 Australians were victims of Serious and Organised Investment Fraud. These figures have largely been established as a result of intelligence analysis, and do not reflect the actual level of reporting by victims, which remains low. 
This report has been prepared to provide an insight into the nature and extent of this type of fraud as it currently affects Australia. Since the Task Force’s establishment, knowledge and understanding of Serious and Organised Investment Fraud has grown exponentially, and continues to do so. The information in this report is a compilation of the key characteristics identified via available literature and relevant Task Force member findings. The research and assistance of the Australian Institute of Criminology (AIC) is also acknowledged. 
This report uses the definition of Serious and Organised Investment Fraud which has been adopted by Task Force Galilee. This Task Force defines it as: 
a) any unsolicited contact, by telephone or internet, of persons in Australia (potential investors) by persons (callers) usually located overseas, where such callers engage in conduct that is fraudulent, false, misleading or deceptive with the purpose of inducing potential investors to buy, sell, or retain securities or other investments and where such callers do not have the license or authority to engage in a securities business, or investment advice business in Australia; and
b) may include superannuation and investment fraud.
The report indicates that -
Serious and Organised Investment Fraud (or ‘boiler room frauds’ as they are referred to in some jurisdictions) use sophisticated techniques to solicit investment in non-existent or essentially worthless shares and other securities. The frauds are well organised and convincing, with constantly evolving modus operandi. They generally operate from an overseas location; however recent investigations have identified operations based in Australia. Combined, these factors contribute to their ability to evade detection. These characteristics also reflect those of frauds in general, and can be attributed to offenders adapting their methods once the investment is recognised as a fraud and/or is not generating the same return as it has in the past. Serious and Organised Investment Fraud tactics are considered sophisticated, complex and very effective. They are difficult to identify - even for experienced investors - and are usually initiated by cold-calling potential victims using persuasive techniques that are fraudulent, misleading and deceptive for the purposes of inducing victims to purchase investments. Some Serious and Organised Investment Fraud operators have also been identified operating ‘recovery rooms.’ Once investors have realised they have invested in fraudulent or worthless shares a second arm of the operation ‘the recovery room’ makes contact with victims and attempts to convince them that for a ‘fee’ they can assist recovery of some of the investment. Recovery is, of course, futile. ... 
The effort and time invested in the planning and conduct of Serious and Organised Investment fraud activities indicate it is principally a well-planned and organised criminal activity. In addition, offenders typically dedicate a great deal of effort to convince an investor of their legitimacy with some strategies in place prior to placing the cold call. This includes:
• producing and using bogus prospectuses (hardcopies, internet-based, etc) 
• falsifying company details 
• sending paperwork to the investor 
• coordinating with complicit accountants and lawyers to launder the proceeds of the fraud, conceal the nature of the fraud and sometimes promote the fraud 
• contacting ‘shareholders’ to advise against other suspect companies, isolating themselves from any pending investigations and blaming regulators/law enforcement for ‘victimising’ their company 
• having country-specific scripts for cold callers 
• paying a dividend to convince the investor of the legitimacy of the organisation, and to often lure the investor to reinvest 
• remaining in constant contact with the victim, and trying to build a relationship 
• providing links to fraudulent international regulatory sites 
• engaging in misleading use of a complex series of websites to promote stocks 
• creation of professional looking but false websites 
• monitor and manipulate search engine results moving negative feedback down the list of results 
• circumvent the prevention messaging and on-line feedback that has previously alerted potential victims that they are being scammed, and 
• issuing account statements to reassure investors that their investments are safe.
A 2012 Task Force Galilee assessment found that the average amount transferred by victims of Serious and Organised Investment Fraud was A$18,174 (with a range in value between A$9 and A$1,293,390). In 2002, ASIC found that the median (not average, but middle of the distribution of known fraudulent transfers) amount lost was A$17,000 (with a range in value between A$3,900 and A$500,000). Most of the monies sent to Serious and Organised Investment Fraud operations from the Australian victims surveyed by Task Force Galilee in 2011 were funded by their superannuation (n=20, 37%) and investment funds (n= 34; 63%). Analysis of serious and organised investment fraud in the United Kingdom showed most victims typically lost £20,000 each, with one loss totalling £1.2 million.

From a privacy and data protection perspective the most interesting comments are those relating to the scammers' identification of targets -
Financial lists are treated as a valuable commodity among those involved in Serious and Organised Investment Fraud activities. Cases have been identified where individual telemarketers (cold callers) have stolen market lead lists from their employers to initiate ‘rip and tear’ rooms (where the telemarketer/cold caller operates the scam on their own) or to sell to competing fraud operations. Analysis of the modus operandi of Serious and Organised Investment Fraud operations and the literature has identified a range of techniques used by operators to identify and contact potential victims. ... These strategies include:
• Internal company telephone lists: these can be stolen from employers. 
• Accessing the member lists of financial/credit ratings agencies.
• A ‘snowball’ scenario. In this situation a victim refers the fraudulent ‘opportunity’ onto family and friends, or the victim passes on their details to offenders. This scenario results in a pool of investors being generated through word of mouth. It is possibly for this reason that Serious and Organised Investment Fraud offenders frequently pay dividends to victims as a means to both feign legitimacy and encourage investors to share this opportunity with friends and family. This method of accessing potential victims highlights the need for individuals not to rely solely on the advice and recommendations of family and friends but to conduct their own checks of potential investment opportunities through authorised regulatory agencies.
• ‘Free lunch’ investment seminars
• Public lists. These include names and details extracted from public telephone directories and shareholder lists, trade journals, professional directories and newspapers. 
• Buying lists from legitimate companies in the leads brokerage industry: ACC intelligence indicates that Serious and Organised Investment Fraud operators have also utilised the services of legitimate leads brokerage companies. An example of this is illustrated in Case Study 3. 
• Buying lists from illegitimate leads brokers: Also known as ‘sucker lists,’ Serious and Organised Investment Fraud operations can purchase leads lists from other illicit operations and criminal leads list brokers. This includes selling victim bank account and credit card information, and contact details (phone number, addresses etc). It has also been observed that Serious and Organised Investment Fraud operators have utilised social networking sites to trade lists of victims as well as recruit accomplices.
The authors conclude that
Analysis of Australia’s response and the response by international agencies to Serious and Organised Investment Fraud indicate that this type of fraud is widely recognised, and reports of Serious and Organised Investment Fraud in Australia are increasing. This could be due to many factors including greater awareness of the crime, improved reporting rates or a general increase in Serious and Organised Investment Fraud operations. As the report demonstrates, Serious and Organised Investment Fraud is not an opportunistic crime, but in fact is a calculated, sophisticated, organised criminal event. These factors also highlight why law enforcement agencies and regulatory agencies globally face difficulties with Serious and Organised Investment Fraud prevention, detection, disruption and prosecution. As Serious and Organised Investment fraudsters are continually evolving their modus operandi, the responses to this crime need to be flexible and responsive. Therefore, it is unlikely that there is one strategy that is a panacea to the crime, particularly as Serious and Organised Investment Fraud involves many different elements. One of the main challenges in developing responses to Serious and Organised Investment Fraud is the overall lack of available, proven good practice examples in Serious and Organised Investment Fraud disruption. 
Raising awareness and education campaigns has been a common strategy for Australian and international agencies to prevent Serious and Organised Investment Fraud. These campaigns are largely directed at potential victims, alerting them to this fraud type, characteristics of the fraud and explanation of what to do if a person suspects an investment fraud operation is active. 
Information sharing and collaboration is also considered an essential part of responding to investment and Serious and Organised Investment fraud. This is a key characteristic of Australia’s response and is a central focus to Task Force Galilee’s prevention and intervention strategy development. 
As a prevention measure, law enforcement and regulatory agencies both nationally and internationally highlight it is essential prior to investing to check numerous sources to ensure the legitimacy of the investment. Investors are also encouraged not to become complacent. Due diligence is required even if an investor has a financial advisor because they may also be unaware of the fraud. It has been suggested that investment and Serious and Organised Investment frauds (e.g. Bernie Madoff fraud) could have been prevented with ‘due diligence’ and verifying information by either investors or hedge fund managers.
Well, you don't say!

08 July 2012

Petsicles

With announcement that the Cryonics Institute plans to open a 400-cadaver facility in Australia I have been grazing that organisation's site. It is a hoot, just like the cryonics magazine noted some time ago.

Apart from fervent advice about how to preserve the family pet when Fido or Spot 'deanimates' (the Cryonics people - just like spiritualists - are so very uncomfortable with the word 'death') before the guys with the freezer arrive to make petsicles there is a fun paragraph about DNA preservation -
If your cryopreservation and reanimation proceeds without any problems, a DNA sample should be of little use. If you want your remains preserved under any circumstances and you are killed under circumstances that makes your remains hard to identify, a DNA sample could be useful to verify that the remains to be cryopreserved are really yours. Or you may simply want someone to be able to identify your remains so that there is no ambiguity or question about your identity when you are buried or cremated. Or if your body or the body of a loved-one is lost completely and you like the idea of a clone someday being constructed, the DNA could help. You may even want to save the DNA of your pet for possible future cloning. In some far-future scenarios it will be possible to reconstruct people from artifacts, such as the memories of you that are found in other people who have been reanimated and the physical records of your life, with DNA augmenting the process - although this is extreme science-fiction.
Presumably the latter idea is a hit with devotees of quantum mysticism, homeopathy, astrology, 'matrix energetics', dowsing or 'psionic medicine', with their faith in water having a 'memory', coffee cups and rocks having a cosmic consciousness, ghosts (the dead, it seems, are still with us but "not in a familiar form", unsurprising if the cadaver's been cremated), reincarnation and similar mumbo-jumbo that has gained traction in parts of academia.

UK Private Investigators

More fallout from the News of the World hacking scandal, with release by the UK House of Commons Home Affairs Committee of a report on private investigators.

The report considers the risks of private investigator involvement in the justice system and law enforcement, in particular the threat of corruption associated with that involvement (eg private investigators and police sharing the same bed).

The Committee concludes that "it is getting easier for anyone to advertise themselves as a private investigator - with modern communications and cheap surveillance devices - and while the industry remains unregulated, a number of serious risks remain". It recognises the honest contribution made by most private investigators but highlights the involvement of some private investigators in an illegal market in personal data and calls again on the Government to strength the penalties for data offences. The Committee Chair commented that
rogue private investigators are the brokers in a black market in information. They illegally snoop on our data, cash in on our private lives and only get away with a paltry fine. 
The public must be assured that those acting as ‘private investigators’ are subject to stringent checks, act under a code of conduct, and will face tough penalties if they step out of line.
It is also time for the link between private investigators and our police forces to be broken. Officers must be compelled to declare any dealings with private investigators and be subject to a cooling off period before they can move from the police service to the private investigation industry. 
It is time this industry was regulated, so that the honest majority can get on with their work. We expect the Government to act urgently.
Accordingly the report features a range of recommendations -
  • the Government should set up a robust licensing and registration system as soon as possible. 
  • private investigators and their companies should be governed by a new Code of Conduct for Private Investigators. Under this system a criminal record for breach of section 55 should disqualify individual from operating as private investigators. 
  • dealings between police and investigators should be recorded and that there should be a one year cooling off period between serving as a police officer and entering the investigation industry 
  • the Independent Police Complaints Commission should take direct control over investigations in cases alleging police corruption in relation to private investigators.
The report notes that
  • In January 2012, some 2,032 registered data controllers claimed they were operating a business as a private investigator, but industry groups have claimed that as many as 10,000 people are working in the field. No one knows precisely how many private investigators there are in the UK. 
  • As many as 65% of private investigators are former police officers. 
  • Currently, anyone can undertake private investigative activity regardless of skills, experience or criminality as there is no direct regulation of private investigations. 
  • Unscrupulous private investigators are the dealers in an illegal market in personal information, including: bank account details; telephone history; tax information; previous convictions; medical history; and the results of covert surveillance. 
  • Fees charged by investigators are opaque and vary enormously, from a small day fee of £250 for small firms or sole operatives, to several thousands of pounds per day for senior investigators, or difficult tasks. 
  • Sophisticated surveillance equipment is readily available for sale on the Internet, sometimes for less than £100. 
It goes on to comment that -
We were very surprised that the Minister responsible for regulation of the private security industry had not even read the report of the Serious Organised Crime Agency on private investigators. The Government should set out a strategy for mitigating the risks posed by private investigators as soon as the Minister has read and reflected on the report. 
In order to garner "premium" information that commands the highest prices, we heard troubling allegations that private investigators maintain close links with contacts in public service roles, such as the police forces. These links appear to go beyond one-off contacts and therefore to constitute an unacknowledged, but deep-rooted intertwining of a private and unregulated industry with our police forces. The Independent Police Complaints Commission should take a direct control over investigations in cases alleging police corruption. 
Personal privacy would be better protected by closer working between the Information Commissioner, the Chief Surveillance Commissioner and the Interception of Communications Commissioner. We recommend that the Government aim, before the end of the next Parliament, to co-locate the three Commissioners in shared offices and introduce a statutory requirement for them to cooperate on cases where both the Data Protection Act and the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act are relevant. In the longer term, consideration should be given to merging the three offices into a single Office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner.  
Confiscation orders should be sought where a person is convicted of data and privacy offences and has sold the information for profit. 
We recommend that the Home Secretary exercise her power under section 77 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 to strengthen the penalties available for offences relating to the unlawful obtaining, disclosure and selling of personal data under section 55 of the Data Protection Act. The current fine - typically around £100 - is derisory. It is simply not an effective deterrent. ... 
"Private Investigator" should be a protected title - as in the case of "social worker"- so that nobody could use the term to describe themselves without being subject to regulation. 
We recommend the introduction of a two-tier system of licensing of private investigators and private investigation companies and registration of others undertaking investigative work. Full licensing should apply to individuals operating or employed as full-time investigators and to private investigation companies. Registration should apply to in-house investigation work carried out by employees of companies which are already subject to regulation, such as solicitors and insurance companies. Both should be governed by a new Code of Conduct for Private Investigators, which would also apply to sub-contracted and part-time investigators. A criminal record for breach of section 55 should disqualify individuals from operating as private investigators. 
Whereas licensing will impose an additional regulatory burden on the industry, it could also provide the new safeguards necessary to provide some potential benefits. We recommend that the Government analyse the risks and benefits of granting increased access to certain prescribed databases for licensed investigators, in order to facilitate the legitimate pursuit of investigation activities. For example, a licence may confer the right to access the on-line vehicle-keeper database in certain circumstances. It should consider how this would interact with the changes proposed to data protection laws by the European Commission. The United Kingdom has rightly moved to a situation of information management rather than merely looking at data protection. We also recognise that appropriate sharing of data can prevent crime and contribute significantly to other outcomes that are in the public interest. However, any new access should be carefully monitored.
We can look forward to the report of the Leveson inquiry, which will offer another dimension.

I'm with stupid

UK newspapers such as the Daily Mail and civil society groups such as Big Brother Watch are criticising plans by British Airways for an iPad-based “Know Me” initiative that will use Google Images searches to find photos of passengers so that staff can approach them as they arrive at plane or terminal. The initiative will include staff going beyond 'name and seat number' details; they will reportedly search customer complaint and other customer-specific information held by BA.

BA's Head of Customer Analysis is quoted as commenting that
 We’re essentially trying to recreate the feeling of recognition you get in a favourite restaurant when you’re welcomed there, but in our case it will be delivered by thousands of staff to millions of customers. This is just the start — the system has a myriad of possibilities for the future.
Quite so, and not all benign. Is the next stage an integration with biometric data?

Another BA spokesman is reported as stating that
The most recent advancement of the system enables the British Airways team to search Google images for a photo of specific customers so they can recognise them and proactively approach them. The airline is aiming to send 4,500 personal recognition messages a day by the end of the year.
There is unfortunately no readily identifiable description of the initiative on the BA site.

Nick Pickles of Big Brother Watch aptly commented
Since when has buying a flight ticket meant giving your airline permission to start hunting for information about you on the internet?
If British Airways want more information about us they can ask us for it, rather than ignoring people’s privacy and storing data without us having any idea what data they are storing.
It's hard not to wonder whether BA's marketing and legal staff have simply slept through the latest wave of announcements about notions of consent in EU privacy law. Just because you can do it does not mean something's correct ... and an upbeat statement about the development of an airborne maître d' is unpersuasive.

BA is reported as responding that
We are entirely compliant with the UK Data Protection Act and would never breach that. Know Me is simply another tool to enable us to offer good customer service, similar to the recognition that high street loyalty scheme members expect. 
The Google Images search app helps our customer service team to recognise high profile travellers such as captains of industry who would be using our First Class facilities enabling us to give a more personalised service.
So far there appears to have been no statement from the UK Information Commissioner.

Twitter

A decision in the US highlights questions about evidence, copyright and privacy in relation to Twitter.

The case is People of the State of New York v. Harris, 11-80152, New York Criminal Court (Manhattan).

Judge Matthew A. Sciarrino Jr of the Criminal Court of the City of New York (ie state rather than federal jurisdiction) has ordered that three months of tweets by Occupy Wall Street protestor Malcolm Harris (with the hashtag destructuremal, somewhat less exciting that fleurs du mal) be provided to Manhattan prosecutors. Twitter was also requested to identify any IP addresses associated with the tweets and the email address on Harris’ profile.

Harris had opposed a subpoena seeking access to his tweets in relation to charges of disorderly conduct after arrests on the Brooklyn Bridge. Sciarrino  rejected the argument that access would violate Harris' rights to privacy. The Court held that Harris had wanted the whole world to see his tweets, irrespective of subsequent efforts to delete them. Access to private communications - such as a one to one SMS - was different and would require the traditional search warrant.
There can be no reasonable expectation of privacy in a tweet sent around the world. If you post a tweet, just like if you scream it out the window, there is no reasonable expectation of privacy. There is no proprietary interest in your tweet, which you have now gifted to the world. This is not the same as a private email, a private direct message, a private chat, or any of the other readily available ways to have a private conversation via the internet that now exist
In April Sciarrino held that Harris lacked the standing to oppose the subpoena because under Twitter’s terms & conditions he had granted the company the “worldwide, nonexclusive, royalty-free” right to distribute his messages, which were all publicly available. In the latest decision the Court rejected Twitter's attempt to quash the subpoena [PDF].

Sciarrino commented that
The Constitution gives you the right to post, but as numerous people have learned, there are still consequences for your public posts. What you give to the public belongs to the public. What you keep to yourself belongs only to you.
He went on to note that Harris should have known that online services can retrieve deleted tweets -
Even when a user deletes his or her tweets there are search engines available such as "Untweetable," "Tweleted" and "Politwoops" that hold users accountable for everything they had publicly tweeted and later deleted.
Harris acknowledged that his Twitter account was public and that he wanted his tweets to be widely read but indicated that he was fighting the disclosure on principle.

Twitter responded that -
We are disappointed in the judge's decision and are considering our options. Twitter's Terms of Service have long made it absolutely clear that its users ‘own’ their content. We continue to have a steadfast commitment to our users and their rights.
They would say that, wouldn't they. The no doubt heartfelt commitment is somewhat at odds with announcement by the Library of Congress in 2010 that it had an agreement with Twitter to archive all tweets on that service -
How Tweet It Is!: Library Acquires Entire Twitter Archive
Have you ever sent out a “tweet” on the popular Twitter social media service? Congratulations: Your 140 characters or less will now be housed in the Library of Congress. That’s right. Every public tweet, ever, since Twitter’s inception in March 2006, will be archived digitally at the Library of Congress. That’s a LOT of tweets, by the way: Twitter processes more than 50 million tweets every day, with the total numbering in the billions.
The use of 'own' in the Twitter statement becomes meaningful.

We will see some some interesting debates about responsibility for the preservation of information on social network services and Twitter once litigation is underway or is imminent.

Twitter's Transparency Report is online.