13 December 2014

Homeless

'A Homeless Bill of Rights (Revolution)' by Sara Rankin in (2015) Seton Hall Law Review (Forthcoming) examines
an emerging movement so far unexplored by legal scholarship: the proposal and, in some states, the enactment of a Homeless Bill of Rights. This article presents these new laws as a lens to re-examine storied debates over positive and social welfare rights. Homeless bills of rights also present a compelling opportunity to re-examine rights-based theories in the context of social movement scholarship. Specifically, could these laws be understood as part of a new "rights revolution"? What conditions might influence the impact of these new laws on the individual rights of the homeless or the housed? On American rights culture and consciousness?
The article surveys current efforts to advance homeless bills of rights across nine states and the U.S. territory of Puerto Rico and evaluates these case studies from a social movement perspective. Ultimately, the article predicts that these new laws are more likely to have an incremental social and normative impact than an immediate legal impact. Even so, homeless bills of rights are a critical, if slight, step to advance the rights of one of the most vulnerable segments of contemporary society. Perhaps as significantly, these new laws present an opportunity for housed Americans to confront our collective, deeply-rooted biases against the homeless.
Rankin comments -
A new movement is afoot: in June 2012, Rhode Island passed the mainland’s first Homeless Bill of Rights. State legislatures in California, Hawaii, Illinois, Connecticut, Oregon, Vermont, Missouri, and Massachusetts quickly followed suit, introducing their own bills. So far, Connecticut and Illinois have already joined Rhode Island with freshly enacted homeless bills of rights. Other states are actively evaluating the prospects for such legislation.
Homeless bills of rights articulate a vibrant range of rights and remedies. For example, some provide the right to shelter, sustenance, or health care, while others incorporate rights against employment discrimination or police harassment. Some provide civil remedies for those whose statutory rights have been violated; at least one vests the creation, implementation, and enforcement of rights in an administrative entity. Although these new laws illustrate varying substantive provisions and strategic compromises, they share the overarching goal of improving the lives of homeless Americans.
The emergence of this new legislative tool raises compelling questions. What exactly is a homeless bill of rights? What is its purpose? What are the differences and similarities across jurisdictions? What types of rights are or should be covered? How, if at all, are these rights different than those afforded to housed individuals? Do these laws announce any new rights? Or are they merely statutory reiterations of constitutional or civil rights already afforded to the homeless—or for that matter, to housed individuals? If homeless bills of rights are only statutory reiterations of already existing rights, how might these laws meaningfully improve the lives of homeless people?
On the other hand, if homeless bills of rights actually purport to create new rights for homeless people—such as positive social welfare rights—should advocates fight for judicial enforcement provisions? If a right is not judicially enforceable, is it really a right at all? Many legal scholars and homeless advocates contend that judicial enforceability is the sine qua non of a right. Indeed, virtually all homeless bill of rights so far advanced on the mainland United States explicitly provide for civil remedies. But others dispute the necessity of judicial enforceability to the realization of a right, instead emphasizing the realization of rights through agency implementation. After all, judicial rulings do not necessarily translate to agency implementation; to the contrary, judicial enforcement may be ineffectual or even provoke legislative repeal of a law. Accordingly, should homeless advocates expend significant resources to ensure homeless bills of rights contain civil remedies provisions? What approach best ensures the implementation and realization of rights for homeless Americans?
By their very nature, homeless bills of rights invite such robust rights-based inquiries. Ultimately, the value of a homeless bill of rights must be measured by its potential contribution to the lives of homeless Americans. Of course, any ideal outcome would significantly revise how American society perceives, values, and incorporates homeless people—the law would be part of a social movement that transforms relationships between the housed and homeless from exclusive to inclusive. In this respect, homeless bills of rights might be understood as part of an effort to naturalize a normative vision. Social movement theory can help to explain how such a normative vision might become a reality.
This Article is the first to identify and analyze the new, growing phenomenon of homeless bills of rights in the United States. The Article is enriched with feedback and insights of homeless advocates nationwide, the result of dozens of interviews with advocates inside and outside of active jurisdictions. Part I introduces the specific context of homeless advocacy, spotlighting key issues with homelessness in the United States. Part II surveys case studies of current efforts to enact homeless bills of rights in nine states and Puerto Rico. This section briefly describes the history, content, and status of these bills, and draws substantive and strategic comparisons among these case studies. Part III introduces a rights revolution framework. Specifically, this section surveys rights-based theories and their application to social movement “rights revolutions.” It applies a rights revolution framework to these case studies and analyzes the potential challenges and benefits of this new legislative tool, both from a practical and theoretical perspective. The Article concludes that homeless bills of rights are more likely to have an incremental social and normative impact than an immediate legal impact. Even so, these new laws are an important step toward a long-overdue rights revolution for one of America’s most vulnerable populations. Perhaps as significantly, these new laws present an opportunity for housed Americans to confront our persistent, deeply-rooted biases against the homeless.

Animal Citizenship and Theriocide

'Do Animals Need Citizenship?' (Georgia State University College of Law, Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2014-36) by William A. Edmundson comments that
 An ambitious proposal by Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka seeks to break out of an impasse that animal-rights advocacy seems to have reached. They divide the animal kingdom into three categories and distribute rights accordingly. Domesticated animals are to be treated as citizens enjoying the same rights and duties as human citizens (adjusting for relative differences in ability, just as we do for children and the severely cognitively handicapped). Wild animal species are to be treated as sovereign nations having rights to their territories. Liminal animals are to be treated as resident aliens. This article is a critique of this "Citizenship Theory" of animal rights. One theme of the critique questions whether citizenship and sovereignty are in fact doing the normative work that Citizenship Theory represents them as doing. Another theme questions whether rights of citizenship and sovereignty can be of use to the animals Citizenship Theory would bestow them on.
Edmundson argues
Animals need rights. The value a right has, for the one holding it, derives mostly from the set of duties it imposes on others. But the value of a right is not exhausted by that set. A set of “indirect” duties can protect a variety of animal interests, but it cannot coherently protect an interest in maintaining dignity. Someone to whom a duty is owed, i.e., is directed, occupies a higher plane than one who is the mere object of an impersonal duty. Rights, and their correlative directed duties, respect the dignity of the right holder in a special way. Rights are also more amenable to enforcement by proxies than indirect duties are. A proxy speaks for someone, and not merely for something. Rights, in contrast to mere collections of directed duties, serve a generative function. The set of duties correlative to a right is open-ended; and sensitivity to another’s rights means recognition of a host of directed duties that might otherwise go unnoticed. Finally, rights serve a fallback function, which comes into play when sympathy and affection are attenuated or absent.
But do animals need the rights associated with citizenship? Do they need the right to exercise sovereignty over a territory? Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka have argued that these distinctively political rights can not only be held by animals but can also be distinctively beneficial to them. Moreover, these rights can be forensically effective instruments for animal-welfare activism (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011, 2013; Kymlicka and Donaldson 2014).
Donaldson and Kymlicka ruefully observe that advocacy of universal animal rights on the model of universal human rights has gotten traction only among certain activists and academics. It has “virtually no resonance amongst the general public” and remains “a political non-starter” (2011, 5,6), even though electorates have increasingly shown a degree of worry about the treatment of animals. Apart from scattered, incremental reforms, the picture is depressing: an “Eternal Treblinka” (2011, 2) whose moral and political superstructure remains largely unquestioned.
Why the impasse? Selfishness (both individual and corporate), selective blindness, and cultural tradition are contributing factors, but Donaldson and Kymlicka argue that the way animal rights theory, or “ART”—their acronymic designation for a certain typical development of animal rights theory—has been framed is itself an important obstacle. The “classical model of ART” recognizes “only one acceptable relationship to animals: treating them ethically means leaving them alone, not interfering with their negative right to life and liberty” (2011, 9). Typical negative rights are the right not to be murdered, not to be raped, not to be experimented on, while a typical positive duty would be to render aid to someone who is in distress, and a typical relational duty would be a duty to support one’s family and to stick up for one’s friends. The nearly exclusive theoretical concentration on universal negative rights for animals contrasts to the human context, in which, they claim, “the vast bulk of reasoning and moral theorizing concerns not [the] universal negative rights but rather the positive and relational obligations we have to other groups of humans” (2011, 6). Many of the rights and duties humans owe each other arise out of relationships: parent and child, teacher and student, master and apprentice, and the typically asymmetrical dependency of latter on the former gives normative content to the positive duties—and correlative positive rights—that arise. So, they have urged, let’s talk about positive and relational 3 rights for animals.
The Relational Turn
At first, citizenship rights for animals seems to be an odd prescription. If a short list of negative rights for animals is a hard sell, one would expect that enlarging the list to include positive rights would be harder still. But what Donaldson and Kymlicka propose is not a wholesale enlargement. (In effect, as I point out below, the position they advocate contracts the scope of both positive and negative rights that wild animals might enjoy.) Rather, the relational turn begins by articulating certain underlying joints in the moral landscape. The first step is to extract three salient, morally relevant categories from the manifold variety of human-animal interactions. There are domesticated animals, that we have bred to be dependent upon us and live amongst us, such as household pets. There are wild animals, who wish to, and are capable of, living apart from us, and with whom we have little interaction unless we are animal ethologists, zoologists, or zookeepers. Finally, there are liminal animals, such as pigeons, raccoons, squirrels, and feral cats, that live amongst us but do not normally affiliate with or depend upon particular humans, although they are dependent upon access to human settlements and the food waste they produce and the niche habitats they provide. Donaldson and Kymlicka propose to rescue ART by structuring it around these three categories.
The rescue is completed by making a second turn, from the relational to the political philosophical. Because domesticated animals live among us and must for the most part continue to do so, they are to be treated as citizens, enjoying the same rights and duties as human citizens — adjusting of course for relevant differences in ability, just as we do for children and the severely cognitively handicapped. Wild animals species are to be treated as sovereign nations having rights to their territories. Liminal animals are to be treated as resident aliens. All three categories are protected by certain universal negative rights; but integrated with these are “differentiated positive rights” (2011, 11) that largely track the three categories. This, in a nutshell, is the “expanded citizenship-based ART” (2011, 15), or “the citizenship approach” (2011, 16) Donaldson and Kymlicka propose. I will refer to it as Citizenship Theory.
The Citizenship Theory crucially depends on the “citizenship logic” (2011, 15) that analogizes a threefold division of domesticated, liminal, and wild animals to categories based on sovereignty and citizenship. To get a clearer sense of what citizenship logic is intended to do, it helps to first review what Donaldson and Kymlicka see as ART’s weaknesses. Classical ART gravitates toward two particularly extreme and therefore vulnerable positions. The first is an “abolitionist” position on domesticated animals. Interaction between humans and the animals they domesticate is inevitably exploitative and unjust, according to ART. But domesticated animals are, by definition, dependent upon human interaction for their continued existence. Therefore, the abolitionist wing of ART calls for the (humane) extinction of all species of domesticated animals. That puts an end to unjust exploitation, but it also puts an end to all dogs, cats, horses, pigs, chickens and other domesticated animals that cannot be returned to a viable wild state. Donaldson and Kymlicka argue that the abolitionist position not only alienates many of ART’s strongest allies, it heedlessly overlooks the possibility of citizenship for domesticated animals.
ART’s second unsatisfactory position is a “let them be” injunction with respect to wild animals. This position may resonate with a popular “laissez faire intuition” about animals of species that typically avoid human contact with humans. But it does not allow for positive duties toward wild animals; nor could it, except in an ad hoc way, provide limits on any such positive duties. ART thus gets caught in a “‘too little—too much’ dilemma” (2011, 11): either stick with a narrow negative-rights conception of the universal right to life, and turn a blind eye to habitat destruction and ecological spillovers that do not injure identifiable individual creatures. Or broaden the right to life in wholesale fashion, and license massive wholesale intervention and management of wild species, going even as far as to try to prevent or extinguish predatory behavior. Citizenship Theory unravels the dilemma: it supports positive rights but embeds them in a principled structure that defines sensible conditions and limits.
'Theriocide: Naming Animal Killing' by Piers Beirne in (2014) 3(2) International Journal for Crime, Justice and Social Democracy 49-66 comments
In this essay I recommend ‘theriocide’ as the name for those diverse human actions that cause the deaths of animals. Like the killing of one human by another, theriocide may be socially acceptable or unacceptable, legal or illegal. It may be intentional or unintentional and may involve active maltreatment or passive neglect. Theriocide may occur one-on-one, in small groups or in large-scale social institutions. The numerous and sometimes intersecting sites of theriocide include intensive rearing regimes; hunting and fishing; trafficking; vivisection; militarism; pollution; and human-induced climate change. If the killing of animals by humans is as harmful to them as homicide is to humans, then the proper naming of such deaths offers a remedy, however small, to the extensive privileging of human lives over those of other animals. Inevitably, the essay leads to a shocking question: Is theriocide murder?. 
... The variety of ways that we kill animals seems without limit. Animals can be boiled, cooked, crushed, electrocuted, ensnared, exterminated, harpooned, hooked, hunted, injected with chemicals, netted, poached, poisoned, run over, shot, slit, speared, strangled, stuck, suffocated, trapped and vivisected. However, operating in tandem with the strategic invisibility of animals in slaughterhouses is the increasing elusiveness of their deaths in various discourses of lethality. Euphemisms rule here. Varying according to such factors as the social class of the hunters and the species of the hunted, many hunting discourses, for example, describe the dead bodies of ‘game’ as the ‘catch’, ‘bag’, ‘yield’, ‘take’ and ‘harvest’. Specialty hunting often requires specialty language. Among the euphemisms for the killing of foxes, for example, hunters refer to the imminent killing or the moment of killing of their quarry as ‘to account for’, ‘bowl over’, ‘break up’, ‘bring to book’, ‘chop’, ‘deal with’, ‘punish’, ‘crush’ and ‘roll over’. Heads of killed foxes are named ‘masks’, their paws ‘pads’ and their tails ‘brushes’. Animals dissected and killed during ‘scientific experimentation’ and ‘vivisection’ become ‘sacrifices’, ‘subjects’, ‘objects’ and ‘products’. Animals killed by the military are referred to as ‘collateral damage’. Animals are ‘humanely’ killed and ‘put to sleep’ and ‘euthanised’ in ‘shelters’ under the guise of ‘pest control’ and ‘nuisance avoidance’. 
Some killing euphemisms do duty in different discourses. Among these are ‘cull’, ‘catch’, ‘crop’ – both ‘live’ and ‘dressed’ – ‘harvest’ and ‘sacrifice’. ‘Cull’, for example, is used by ecologically‐ minded hunters to refer to the killing and ‘removal’ of weaker animals in a herd or to police and ‘eliminate’ undesirable predators which threaten more desirable species. In this capacity ‘cull’ competes with ‘animal population control’, ‘artificial selection’, ‘nuisance wildlife management’, ‘selective breeding’ and ‘game management’. Sometimes, as well, culling or ‘putting down’ is used as Orwellian‐speak for the killing of cattle infected with Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy. A harvest also refers to the killing of fish or to the number of animals killed, as does a ‘strike’. When the harvest is coupled with or intersects self‐stated ecological practices, the killing of animals is termed ‘sound’ or ‘responsible’ or ‘ethical’ or ‘sustainable’. When human intervention practices lead to the killing of an entire species, such as happened with mammoths and passenger pigeons, animals become ‘extinct’, though ‘speciescide’ or, even, ‘genocide’ might be a better term here. 
 The recitation of these euphemisms here is not a prelude to some immediate moralizing on the wrongfulness of animal killing. Rather, it is intended as a step on the path towards greater honesty in how we talk about our killing of animals. My present aim, therefore, is to name the diverse sites of animal killing as theriocide. This I begin by juxtaposing how we presently talk about humans killing humans, on the one hand, with how we describe humans killing animals, on the other. 
Further definition of theriocide 
Theriocide refers to those diverse human actions that cause the deaths of animals. As with the killing of one human by another (for example, homicide, infanticide and femicide3), a theriocide may be socially acceptable or unacceptable, legal or illegal. It may be intentional or unintentional. It may involve active maltreatment or passive neglect. Theriocides may occur one‐on‐one, in small groups or in large‐scale social institutions. The numerous sites of theriocide include intensive rearing regimes; hunting and fishing; trafficking; vivisection; militarism; pollution; and human‐induced climate change. 
Etymology 
Theriocide is the killing of an animal by a human. It combines the ancient Greek ... (an animal other than a human) and the Latin cædere. ..., first, is a prosaic variant of θηρ, which seems originally to have meant a beast of prey. Later, ... was extended to other animals, probably including wild and domesticated animals and metaphorical monsters. ‘Cædere’ denotes the action of cutting or felling or killing. It is the source of the French word abattoir, where the felling of trees is used as a euphemism for both the rendering of animals to a horizontal position and also the site of their slaughter. 
It is impossible to know with certainty when and where any given word originated. As a word, theriocide has been used at least four times previously (Beirne 2007: 63, 2009: 17, 182; Nihan 2007: 407‐08, 413 n.76; Schwartz 1996: 7, 31). 
In my own case, in 2007, it was inserted, vaguely and with little thought, into a critical assessment of evidence on the progression thesis: namely, the claim that there is a link of escalation or graduation between animal cruelty and violence between humans. My argument, which still stands, was meant not only to welcome the scholarly and activist interest in individualized cruelty to animals but also to problematize a widespread reluctance for investigation of those institutionalized cruelties where theriocide is committed on a much greater scale. 
Quite coincidentally, later in the same year, the rabbinical scholar Christophe Nihan used ‘theriocide’ as his translation of the Hebrew phrase for ‘wrongful animal killing’ (2007: 408; and see Schwartz 1996: 7). Nihan’s choice of theriocide stemmed from his interpretation of the strictures in Genesis 9: 4‐6 and Leviticus 17: 3‐4 against the shedding of human and nonhuman blood. These rules entailed, on the one hand, that any wrongful killing of humans was condemned as homicide and subject to divine sanction by the Hebrew god Yahweh. On the other, the judgment of an animal’s death as wrongful killing – that is, as theriocide – was limited to the profane sacrifice of three species of domestic quadrupeds: namely, oxen, sheep and goats (Nihan 2007: 407‐08 and 413 n.76; and see Milgrom 2008: 1456‐1457). (Interestingly, it is unclear in both Genesis and Leviticus and also in Nihan’s and Schwartz’s accounts whether or not the unlawful killing of animals was intended to be regarded as a lesser and lower‐key derivation of homicide laws.) 
Etymologically speaking, at least two sorts of objection may be made to the employment of theriocide in lethality discourse. Purists might object, for example, that theriocide is a hybrid and therefore inferior to constructions with simpler pedigrees. But stuffiness towards hybrids has been waning of late. None of us shudders very often or, at least, not for that reason, when we use words like television or criminology. Moreover, two other constructions can also be mentioned: ‘zoocide’ and ‘animalicide’. Against zoocide, first: on the one hand, though the ancient Greek 'zoon' means a living being, including an animal – as opposed to a plant, phyton – the verb with which it is cognate (zao) is also used for human life. In other words, zoocide locks us into a Wittgensteinian vicious circle that ironically privileges humans. On the other, though it has the apparent advantage of being very popular as the name of a site where animals are used as objects of spectacle and entertainment, ‘zoo’ is overloaded with cultural baggage. The would‐be ‘animalicide’, second, entails one of the same problems as zoocide: namely, that it refers both to humans and to animals other than humans. Worse still, animalicide would be an anthropocentric derivation from the Sanskrit origin of the word ‘animal’: namely, ‘that which is to be feared’. 
Scope 
The number of other animals we humans kill seems limited only by technology and our own ingenuity. Among the major sites of theriocide are intensive rearing regimes; hunting and fishing; trafficking; vivisection; militarism; pollution; and climate change.

10 December 2014

Financial Systems Inquiry Final Report

The Financial Systems Inquiry (aka Murray Inquiry) has released its final report on how "to best position Australia’s financial system to meet Australia’s evolving needs and support economic growth". The report claims to offer "a blueprint for an efficient and resilient financial system over the next 10 to 20 years, characterised by the fair treatment of users" and reflecting "public interest: the interests of individuals, businesses, the economy, taxpayers and Government".

The report features 44 recommendations, reflecting an assessment that
Australia’s financial system has performed well since the Wallis Inquiry and has many strong characteristics. It also has a number of weaknesses: taxation and regulatory settings distort the flow of funding to the real economy; it remains susceptible to financial shocks; superannuation is not delivering retirement incomes efficiently; unfair consumer outcomes remain prevalent; and policy settings do not focus on the benefits of competition and innovation. As a result, the system is prone to calls for more regulation. To put these issues in context, the Overview first deals with the characteristics of Australia’s economy. It then describes the characteristics of and prerequisites for a well-functioning financial system and the Inquiry’s philosophy of financial regulation.
The report accordingly  focuses on seven themes-
The Overview deals with the general themes of funding the Australian economy and competition. The Inquiry has also made recommendations on five specific themes, which comprise the next chapters of this report:
•Strengthen the economy by making the financial system more resilient.
•Lift the value of the superannuation system and retirement incomes.
•Drive economic growth and productivity through settings that promote innovation.
•Enhance confidence and trust by creating an environment in which financial firms treat customers fairly.
•Enhance regulator independence and accountability, and minimise the need for future regulation.
These recommendations seek to improve efficiency, resilience and fair treatment in the Australian financial system, allowing it to achieve its potential in supporting economic growth and enhancing standards of living for current and future generations.
Its assumption is that
The financial sector plays a vital role in supporting a vibrant, growing economy that improves the standard of living for all Australians. The system’s ultimate purpose is to facilitate sustainable growth in the economy by meeting the financial needs of its users.
The Inquiry believes the financial system will achieve this goal if it operates in a manner that is:
•Efficient: An efficient system allocates Australia’s scarce financial and other resources for the greatest possible benefit to our economy, supporting growth, productivity and prosperity.
•Resilient: The financial system should adjust to changing circumstances while continuing to provide its core economic functions, even during severe shocks. Institutions in distress should be resolvable with minimal costs to depositors, policy holders, taxpayers and the real economy.
•Fair: Fair treatment occurs where participants act with integrity, honesty, transparency and non-discrimination. A market economy operates more effectively where participants enter into transactions with confidence they will be treated fairly. Confidence and trust in the system are essential ingredients in building an efficient, resilient and fair financial system that facilitates economic growth and meets the financial needs of Australians. The Inquiry considers that all financial system participants have roles and responsibilities in engendering that confidence and trust. ....
Central to the Inquiry’s philosophy is the principle that the financial system should be subject and responsive to market forces, including competition. However, competitive markets need to operate within a strong and effective legal and policy framework provided by Government. This includes predictable rule of law with strong property rights; a freely convertible floating currency and free flow of trade, investment and capital across borders; a strong fiscal position; a sound and independent monetary policy framework; and an effective, accountable and transparent government.
The Inquiry’s approach to policy intervention is guided by the public interest. Given the inevitable trade-offs involved, deciding how and when policy makers should intervene in the financial system requires considerable judgement. Intervention should seek to balance efficiency, resilience and fairness in a way that builds participants’ confidence and trust. Intervention should only occur where its benefits to the economy as a whole outweigh its costs, and should always seek to be proportionate and cost sensitive.
The report summarises the Inquiry's recommendations as follows
Resilience (pages 33–88)
1 Capital levels -- Set capital standards such that Australian authorised deposit-taking institution capital ratios are unquestionably strong.
2 Narrow mortgage risk weight differences -- Raise the average internal ratings-based (IRB) mortgage risk weight to narrow the difference between average mortgage risk weights for authorised deposit-taking institutions using IRB risk-weight models and those using standardised risk weights.
3 Loss absorbing and recapitalisation capacity -- Implement a framework for minimum loss absorbing and recapitalisation capacity in line with emerging international practice, sufficient to facilitate the orderly resolution of Australian authorised deposit-taking institutions and minimise taxpayer support.
4 Transparent reporting -- Develop a reporting template for Australian authorised deposit-taking institution capital ratios that is transparent against the minimum Basel capital framework.
5 Crisis management toolkit -- Complete the existing processes for strengthening crisis management powers that have been on hold pending the outcome of the Inquiry.
6 Financial Claims Scheme -- Maintain the ex post funding structure of the Financial Claims Scheme for authorised deposit-taking institutions.
7 Leverage ratio -- Introduce a leverage ratio that acts as a backstop to authorised deposit-taking institutions’ risk-weighted capital positions.
8 Direct borrowing by superannuation funds -- Remove the exception to the general prohibition on direct borrowing for limited recourse borrowing arrangements by superannuation funds.
Superannuation and retirement incomes (pages 89–142)
9 Objectives of the superannuation system -- Seek broad political agreement for, and enshrine in legislation, the objectives of the superannuation system and report publicly on how policy proposals are consistent with achieving these objectives over the long term.
10 Improving efficiency during accumulation -- Introduce a formal competitive process to allocate new default fund members to MySuper products, unless a review by 2020 concludes that the Stronger Super reforms have been effective in significantly improving competition and efficiency in the superannuation system.
11 The retirement phase of superannuation -- Require superannuation trustees to pre-select a comprehensive income product for members’ retirement. The product would commence on the member’s instruction, or the member may choose to take their benefits in another way. Impediments to product development should be removed.
12 Choice of fund -- Provide all employees with the ability to choose the fund into which their Superannuation Guarantee contributions are paid.
13 Governance of superannuation funds -- Mandate a majority of independent directors on the board of corporate trustees of public offer superannuation funds, including an independent chair; align the director penalty regime with managed investment schemes; and strengthen the conflict of interest requirements.
Innovation (pages 143–192)
14 Collaboration to enable innovation -- Establish a permanent public–private sector collaborative committee, the ‘Innovation Collaboration’, to facilitate financial system innovation and enable timely and coordinated policy and regulatory responses.
15 Digital identity --  Develop a national strategy for a federated-style model of trusted digital identities.
16 Clearer graduated payments regulation -- Enhance graduation of retail payments regulation by clarifying thresholds for regulation by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission and the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority. Strengthen consumer protection by mandating the ePayments Code. Introduce a separate prudential regime with two tiers for purchased payment facilities.
17 Interchange fees and customer surcharging --  Improve interchange fee regulation by clarifying thresholds for when they apply, broadening the range of fees and payments they apply to, and lowering interchange fees. Improve surcharging regulation by expanding its application and ensuring customers using lower-cost payment methods cannot be over-surcharged by allowing more prescriptive limits on surcharging.
18 Crowdfunding -- Graduate fundraising regulation to facilitate crowdfunding for both debt and equity and, over time, other forms of financing.
19 Data access and use -- Review the costs and benefits of increasing access to and improving the use of data, taking into account community concerns about appropriate privacy protections.
20 Comprehensive credit reporting -- Support industry efforts to expand credit data sharing under the new voluntary comprehensive credit reporting regime. If, over time, participation is inadequate, Government should consider legislating mandatory participation.
Consumer outcomes (pages 193–232)
21 Strengthen product issuer and distributor accountability -- Introduce a targeted and principles-based product design and distribution obligation.
22 Introduce product intervention power -- Introduce a proactive product intervention power that would enhance the regulatory toolkit available where there is risk of significant consumer detriment.
23 Facilitate innovative disclosure -- Remove regulatory impediments to innovative product disclosure and communication with consumers, and improve the way risk and fees are communicated to consumers.
24 Align the interests of financial firms and consumers -- Better align the interests of financial firms with those of consumers by raising industry standards, enhancing the power to ban individuals from management and ensuring remuneration structures in life insurance and stockbroking do not affect the quality of financial advice.
25 Raise the competency of advisers -- Raise the competency of financial advice providers and introduce an enhanced register of advisers.
26 Improve guidance and disclosure in general insurance -- Improve guidance (including tools and calculators) and disclosure for general insurance, especially in relation to home insurance.
Regulatory system (pages 233–260)
27 Regulator accountability --  Create a new Financial Regulator Assessment Board to advise Government annually on how financial regulators have implemented their mandates. Provide clearer guidance to regulators in Statements of Expectation and increase the use of performance indicators for regulator performance.
28 Execution of mandate -- Provide regulators with more stable funding by adopting a three-year funding model based on periodic funding reviews, increase their capacity to pay competitive remuneration, boost flexibility in respect of staffing and funding, and require them to undertake periodic capability reviews.
29 Strengthening the Australian Securities and Investments Commission’s funding and powers -- Introduce an industry funding model for the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) and provide ASIC with stronger regulatory tools.
30 Strengthening the focus on competition in the financial system -- Review the state of competition in the sector every three years, improve reporting of how regulators balance competition against their core objectives, identify barriers to cross-border provision of financial services and include consideration of competition in the Australian Securities and Investments Commission’s mandate.
31 Compliance costs and policy processes -- Increase the time available for industry to implement complex regulatory change. Conduct post-implementation reviews of major regulatory changes more frequently.
Significant matters (pages 261–276)
32 Impact investment -- Explore ways to facilitate development of the impact investment market and encourage innovation in funding social service delivery. Provide guidance to superannuation trustees on the appropriateness of impact investment. Support law reform to classify a private ancillary fund as a ‘sophisticated’ or ‘professional’ investor, where the founder of the fund meets those definitions.
33 Retail corporate bond market -- Reduce disclosure requirements for large listed corporates issuing ‘simple’ bonds and encourage industry to develop standard terms for ‘simple’ bonds.
34 Unfair contract term provisions -- Support Government’s process to extend unfair contract term protections to small businesses. Encourage industry to develop standards on the use of non-monetary default covenants.
35 Finance companies --  Clearly differentiate the investment products that finance companies and similar entities offer retail consumers from authorised deposit-taking institution deposits.
36 Corporate administration and bankruptcy -- Consult on possible amendments to the external administration regime to provide additional flexibility for businesses in financial difficulty.
37 Superannuation member engagement -- Publish retirement income projections on member statements from defined contribution superannuation schemes using Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) regulatory guidance. Facilitate access to consolidated superannuation information from the Australian Taxation Office to use with ASIC’s and superannuation funds’ retirement income projection calculators.
38 Cyber security -- Update the 2009 Cyber Security Strategy to reflect changes in the threat environment, improve cohesion in policy implementation, and progress public–private sector and cross-industry collaboration. Establish a formal framework for cyber security information sharing and response to cyber threats.
39 Technology neutrality --  Identify, in consultation with the financial sector, and amend priority areas of regulation to be technology neutral. Embed consideration of the principle of technology neutrality into development processes for future regulation. Ensure regulation allows individuals to select alternative methods to access services to maintain fair treatment for all consumer segments.
40 Provision of financial advice and mortgage broking -- Rename ‘general advice’ and require advisers and mortgage brokers to disclose ownership structures.
41 Unclaimed monies --  Define bank accounts and life insurance policies as unclaimed monies only if they are inactive for seven years.
42 Managed investment scheme regulation -- Support Government’s review of the Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee’s recommendations on managed investment schemes, giving priority to matters relating to: •Consumer detriment, including illiquid schemes and freezing of funds. •Regulatory architecture impeding cross-border transactions and mutual recognition arrangements.
43 Legacy products --  Introduce a mechanism to facilitate the rationalisation of legacy products in the life insurance and managed investments sectors.
44 Corporations Act 2001 ownership restrictions -- Remove market ownership restrictions from the Corporations Act 2001 once the current reforms to cross-border regulation of financial market infrastructure are complete.

ALRC Freedoms Inquiry

The Australian Law Reform Commission has released the 130 page issues paper regarding its inquiry into traditional rights and freedoms.

The iquiry is independent of the freedoms inquiry being undertaken by 'Freedoms Commissioner' Tim Wilson under AHRC auspices.

The ALRC has asked the following questions in its paper -
Freedom of Speech
Q2–1 What general principles or criteria should be applied to help determine whether a law that interferes with freedom of speech is justified?
Q2–2 Which Commonwealth laws unjustifiably interfere with freedom of speech, and why are these laws unjustified?
Freedom of Religion
Q3–1 What general principles or criteria should be applied to help determine whether a law that interferes with freedom of religion is justified?
Q3–2 Which Commonwealth laws unjustifiably interfere with freedom of religion, and why are these laws unjustified?
Freedom of Association
Q4–1 What general principles or criteria should be applied to help determine whether a law that interferes with freedom of association is justified?
Q4–2 Which Commonwealth laws unjustifiably interfere with freedom of association, and why are these laws unjustified?
Freedom of Movement
Q5–1 What general principles or criteria should be applied to help determine whether a law that interferes with freedom of movement is justified?
Q5–2 Which Commonwealth laws unjustifiably interfere with freedom of movement, and why are these laws unjustified?
Property Rights
Q6–1 What general principles or criteria should be applied to help determine whether a law that interferes with vested property rights is justified?
Q6–2 Which Commonwealth laws unjustifiably interfere with vested property rights, and why are these laws unjustified?
Retrospective Laws
Q7–1 What general principles or criteria should be applied to help determine whether a law that retrospectively changes legal rights and obligations is justified?
Q7–2 Which Commonwealth laws retrospectively change legal rights and obligations without justification? Why are these laws unjustified?
Fair Trial Question
Q8–1 What general principles or criteria should be applied to help determine whether a law that limits the right to a fair trial is justified?
Q8–2 Which Commonwealth laws unjustifiably limit the right to a fair trial, and why are these laws unjustified?
Burden of Proof
Q9–1 What general principles or criteria should be applied to help determine whether a law that reverses or shifts the burden of proof is justified?
Q9–2 Which Commonwealth laws unjustifiably reverse or shift the burden of proof, and why are these laws unjustified?
The Privilege against Self-incrimination
Q10–1 What general principles or criteria should be applied to help determine whether a law that excludes the privilege against self-incrimination is justified?
Q10–2 Which Commonwealth laws unjustifiably exclude the privilege against self-incrimination, and why are these laws unjustified? 
Client Legal Privilege
Q11–1 What general principles or criteria should be applied to help determine whether a law that abrogates client legal privilege is justified?
Q11–2 Which Commonwealth laws unjustifiably abrogate client legal privilege, and why are these laws unjustified?
Strict and Absolute Liability
Q12–1 What general principles or criteria should be applied to help determine whether a law that imposes strict or absolute liability for a criminal offence is justified?
Q12–2 Which Commonwealth laws unjustifiably imposes strict or absolute liability for a criminal offence, and why are these laws unjustified?
Appeal from Acquittal
Q13–1 What general principles or criteria should be applied to help determine whether a law that allows an appeal from an acquittal is justified?
Q13–2 Which Commonwealth laws unjustifiably allow an appeal from an acquittal, and why are these laws unjustified?
Procedural Fairness
Q14–1 What general principles or criteria should be applied to help determine whether a law that denies procedural fairness is justified?
Q14–2 Which Commonwealth laws unjustifiably deny procedural fairness, and why are these laws unjustified?
Delegating Legislative Power
Q15–1 What general principles or criteria should be applied to help determine whether a law that delegates legislative power to the executive is justified?
Q15–2 Which Commonwealth laws unjustifiably delegate legislative power to the executive, and why are these laws unjustified?
Authorising what would otherwise be a Tort
Q16–1 What general principles or criteria should be applied to help determine whether a law that authorises what would otherwise be a tort is justified?
Q16–2 Which Commonwealth laws unjustifiably authorise what would otherwise be a tort, and why are these laws unjustified?
Executive Immunities
Q17–1 What general principles or criteria should be applied to help determine whether a law that gives executive immunities a wide application is justified?
Question 17–2 Which Commonwealth laws unjustifiably give executive immunities a wide application, and why are these immunities unjustified?
Judicial Review
Q18–1 What general principles or criteria should be applied to help determine whether a law that restricts access to judicial review is justified?
Q18–2 Which Commonwealth laws unjustifiably restrict access to judicial review, and why are these laws unjustified?
Others Rights, Freedoms and Privilege
Q19–1 Which Commonwealth laws unjustifiably encroach on other common law rights, freedoms and privileges, and why are these laws unjustified?

06 December 2014

Nudging

Cass Sunstein in 'The Ethics of Nudging' comments -
This essay defends the following propositions. (1) It is pointless to object to choice architecture or nudging as such. Choice architecture cannot be avoided. Nature itself nudges; so does the weather; so do spontaneous orders and invisible hands. The private sector inevitably nudges, as does the government. It is reasonable to object to particular nudges, but not to nudging in general. (2) In this context, ethical abstractions (for example, about autonomy, dignity, and manipulation) can create serious confusion. To make progress, those abstractions must be brought into contact with concrete practices. Nudging and choice architecture take diverse forms, and the force of an ethical objection depends on the specific form. (3) If welfare is our guide, much nudging is actually required on ethical grounds. (4) If autonomy is our guide, much nudging is also required on ethical grounds. (5) Choice architecture should not, and need not, compromise either dignity or self-government, though imaginable forms could do both. (6) Some nudges are objectionable because the choice architect has illicit ends. When the ends are legitimate, and when nudges are fully transparent and subject to public scrutiny, a convincing ethical objection is less likely to be available. (7) There is, however, room for ethical objections in the case of well-motivated but manipulative interventions, certainly if people have not consented to them; such nudges can undermine autonomy and dignity. It follows that both the concept and the practice of manipulation deserve careful attention. The concept of manipulation has a core and a periphery; some interventions fit within the core, others within the periphery, and others outside of both.

Human Capital

'The New Cognitive Property: Human Capital Law and the Reach of Intellectual Property' by Orly Lobel in (2015) Texas Law Review (Forthcoming) comments -
 Contemporary law has become grounded in the conviction that not only the outputs of innovation – artistic expressions, scientific methods, and technological advances – but also the inputs of innovation – skills, experience, know-how, professional relationships, creativity and entrepreneurial energies – are subject to control and propertization. In other words, we now face a reality of not only the expansion of intellectual property but also cognitive property. The new cognitive property has emerged under the radar, commodifying intellectual intangibles which have traditionally been kept outside of the scope of intellectual property law. Regulatory and contractual controls on human capital – post-employment restrictions including non-competition contracts, non-solicitation, non-poaching, and anti-dealing agreements; collusive do-not-hire talent cartels; pre-invention assignment agreements of patents, copyright, as well as non-patentable and non-copyrightable ideas; and non-disclosure agreements, expansion of trade secret laws, and economic espionage prosecution against former insiders – are among the fastest growing frontiers of market battles. This article introduces the growing field of human capital law, at the intersections of IP, contract and employment law, and antitrust law, and cautions against the devastating effects of the growing enclosure of cognitive capacities in contemporary markets.

03 December 2014

Reputation, Privacy and Injury

'Data Protection and the Right to Reputation: Filling the 'Gaps' after the Defamation Act 2013' by David Erdos in (2014) 73(3) Cambridge Law Journal 536-569 argues
Defamation law has historically occupied a position of overwhelming dominance in the vindication of the traditional right to reputation. Nevertheless, liberalisation of this legal framework including through the Defamation Act 2013 has led to a concern that, when analysed from a fundamental rights perspective, “gaps” in the protection provided for natural persons may have emerged. In this new context, there has been a renewed focus on whether data protection may fill the potential lacunae. Data protection law contains a number of important limitations and exceptions and its jurisprudence has been both limited and sometimes confused. Nevertheless, this article argues that its broad purpose and complex structure ensure it will play a significantly augmented role in the future, especially in actions against website operators facilitating the dissemination of information posted by a third party, the publication of opinion, or where either injunctive relief or the correction of inaccurate information is sought (in particular in cases of continuing online disclosure).
In Pedavoli v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd [2014] NSWSC 1674 the Supreme Court of New South Wales has awarded $350,000 to a high school teacher wrongly identified by a newspaper as the teacher involved in the allegations of unlawful sexual misconduct with a number of boys in St Aloysius College.

The Court stated
The defamation greatly damaged Ms Pedavoli's impeccable reputation and caused her immense hurt. She is entitled to a large award of damages and to have the court declare to all the world the falsity of that which has been imputed to her by the newspaper.
The NSWSC rejected the newspaper's defence of offering to make amends for its mistake, because the newspaper failed to include in its apology the versions of the article posted in social media and in a syndicated news group. The Court stated
The only defence relied upon by the defendants is the statutory defence created by s 18 of the Defamation Act 2005 of failure to accept an offer to make amends.
The defence under s 18 is relatively new and has received little judicial consideration. Its operation must be considered in the context of the objects stated in s 3 of the Defamation Act, which are:
"(a) to enact provisions to promote uniform laws of defamation in Australia, and
(b) to ensure that the law of defamation does not place unreasonable limits on freedom of expression and, in particular, on the publication and discussion of matters of public interest and importance, and
(c) to provide effective and fair remedies for persons whose reputations are harmed by the publication of defamatory matter, and
(d) to promote speedy and non-litigious methods of resolving disputes about the publication of defamatory matter."
The defence under s 18 serves those objects (particularly the object of promoting speedy and non-litigious methods of resolving disputes) by creating a powerful incentive for defendants to make amends rather than to fight the cause. The making of a reasonable offer has the potential, one way or the other, to stymy the litigious path to vindication of reputation. If the offer is accepted, the plaintiff cannot pursue proceedings in court: s 17. If the offer is rejected then, provided the requirements of s 18 are satisfied, there is a complete defence, notwithstanding the establishment of an otherwise actionable defamation. Whereas a defendant can apologise, in aid of the defence, with impunity (see s 13(4) and s 20 of the Act), a plaintiff who fails to accept a reasonable offer to make amends risks everything.
In the face of that draconian sanction for failure to accept an offer, it is unsurprising that the Act is quite prescriptive as to its content. Section 15 of the Act provides:
"15 Content of offer to make amends
(1) An offer to make amends:
(a) must be in writing, and
(b) must be readily identifiable as an offer to make amends under this Division, and
(c) if the offer is limited to any particular defamatory imputations-must state that the offer is so limited and particularise the imputations to which the offer is limited, and
(d) must include an offer to publish, or join in publishing, a reasonable correction of the matter in question or, if the offer is limited to any particular defamatory imputations, the imputations to which the offer is limited, and
(e) if material containing the matter has been given to someone else by the publisher or with the publisher's knowledge-must include an offer to take, or join in taking, reasonable steps to tell the other person that the matter is or may be defamatory of the aggrieved person, and
(f) must include an offer to pay the expenses reasonably incurred by the aggrieved person before the offer was made and the expenses reasonably incurred by the aggrieved person in considering the offer, and
(g) may include any other kind of offer, or particulars of any other action taken by the publisher, to redress the harm sustained by the aggrieved person because of the matter in question, including (but not limited to): (i) an offer to publish, or join in publishing, an apology in relation to the matter in question or, if the offer is limited to any particular defamatory imputations, the imputations to which the offer is limited, or (ii) an offer to pay compensation for any economic or non-economic loss of the aggrieved person, or (iii) the particulars of any correction or apology made, or action taken, before the date of the offer.
(2) Without limiting subsection (1)(g)(ii), an offer to pay compensation may comprise or include any one or more of the following:
(a) an offer to pay a stated amount,
(b) an offer to pay an amount to be agreed between the publisher and the aggrieved person,
(c) an offer to pay an amount determined by an arbitrator appointed, or agreed on, by the publisher and the aggrieved person,
(d) an offer to pay an amount determined by a court."
The Court went on to conclude -
In accordance with s 18(1) of the Act, the elements of the defence of failure to accept an offer of amends are:
(a) that the publisher made the offer as soon as practicable after becoming aware that the matter was defamatory, and
(b) that, at any time before the trial the publisher was ready and willing, on acceptance of the offer by the plaintiff, to carry out the terms of the offer, and
(c) that in all the circumstances the offer was reasonable.
The third element presents a challenge for the philosophy of space and time. On its face, s 18(1) appears to require proof that the offer was reasonable in all the circumstances as they existed at the time when the offer was made. However, subs (2) provides a list of considerations (some mandatory, some permissible) for determining whether the offer "is" reasonable. The temporal glitch within the section is apparently not accidental. One of the mandatory considerations is "any correction or apology published before any trial". In terms, that provision would require the court, in determining the reasonableness of an offer, to have regard to a correction or apology published after the plea of failure to accept a reasonable offer had been put on. The section thus entails an element of paradox, requiring the court to make a determination as to circumstances at a fixed point in time with mandatory reference to later events.
It was suggested in the plaintiff's written submissions that the offer was not made as soon as practicable in the present case. However, the evidence established that, during part of the relevant period, the defendants were awaiting a response from the plaintiff's solicitor to correspondence in respect of the offer. Whilst I accept that a defendant must act promptly in making an offer of amends, I do not think the period that passed between publication of the matters complained of and the making of the offer detracted from its reasonableness in the present case.
Ms Pedavoli does not dispute that the defendants were ready and willing, upon acceptance of the offer, to carry out its terms.
Whether the offer was reasonable
The real contest is as to whether, in all the circumstances, the offer was reasonable.
Mr Blackburn addressed that issue by asking, rhetorically, how is the defendants' offer unreasonable?
At the risk of boxing at semantic shadows, I think it is preferable to address the question in the terms posed by the statute, which requires the defendants to prove that in all the circumstances the offer was reasonable.
As already noted, s 18(2) guides the determination of that issue. It is appropriate to set out the full text of the subsection:
"(2) In determining whether an offer to make amends is reasonable, a court:
(a) must have regard to any correction or apology published before any trial arising out of the matter in question, including the extent to which the correction or apology is brought to the attention of the audience of the matter in question taking into account: (i) the prominence given to the correction or apology as published in comparison to the prominence given to the matter in question as published, and (ii) the period that elapses between publication of the matter in question and publication of the correction or apology, and
(b) may have regard to: (i) whether the aggrieved person refused to accept an offer that was limited to any particular defamatory imputations because the aggrieved person did not agree with the publisher about the imputations that the matter in question carried, and (ii) any other matter that the court considers relevant."
The starting point is to consider that for which amends are to be made. The reasonableness of an offer will be critically informed by its capacity to address the hurt and harm done by the publication in question, both as to its seriousness and its extent. The extent to which the defendants' apology was brought to the attention of the audience of the matter complained of is a mandatory consideration which must take into account the prominence given to the apology as published in comparison to the prominence given to the matter complained of: s 18(2)(a)(i).
The reach and prominence of the apology
An important consideration in assessing that issue in the present case is that the matter complained of did not name Ms Pedavoli. Rather, it identified her by the inclusion of a wrong description of the teacher concerned. It follows that her reputation was harmed only among those who read the matter complained of and understood it to refer to her. That undoubtedly complicated the task of making amends. On the one hand, a reasonable correction only had to be brought to the attention of a smaller audience than the whole audience to whom the matter complained of was published. However, in order to be reasonable, the correction had to be calculated in some way to attract the attention of that smaller audience.
Newspaper editors understand as well as anyone the capacity of a headline to draw the attention of the reader. Each of the matters complained of was published under a headline likely to attract the attention of a large number of readers, including many who knew Ms Pedavoli ("female teacher quits top Catholic school after claim of sex with boys"; "Sex with students claims: female teacher quits top Catholic boys school"). The correction was less gripping. It was published under the headline "apology". The headline contained no words to indicate the subject matter of the apology, such as "apology to female teacher at Catholic school" or "correction of article on sex with boys".
Further, the prominence given to the apology was unequal to the prominence given to the matter complained of. It was, in my view, highly unlikely to draw the attention of anything like the audience of the matter complained of. The first matter complained of (as it appeared in the print newspaper) stretched over pages 2 and 3 of the Sydney Morning Herald, on a Friday. In addition to the compelling headline, it was visually stark, appearing under a large photograph (illustrating a different story).
The estimated readership for the newspaper that day was 769,000. For obvious reasons, it is not possible for the defendants to estimate the portion of the readership that read the matter complained of, but the overwhelming likelihood is that many readers opened the newspaper to read page 2.
The online version of the article was first uploaded onto the Sydney Morning Herald website at approximately 8.57 pm on 30 January 2014. It remained online in its defamatory form until it was amended at approximately 8.42am the following morning in response to Ms Pedavoli's approach to her friend who knew an editor. The defendants do not hold information which enables them to distinguish between the estimated viewing or downloading of the article prior to its amendment. In their answers to interrogatories, the defendants provided an estimated number of unique page views of the article, both in its initial form and as subsequently amended (from 31 January 2014 until it was taken down altogether on 13 February 2014). Based on those estimates, the article was downloaded 18,693 times in New South Wales alone before the incorrect information was removed.
Of course, only a subgroup of each audience (print and online) would have identified Ms Pedavoli but, as already explained, the apology was not well aimed to reach those subgroups.
As published, the apology was barely noticeable. On the website, it was available for download via a link at the very bottom of the homepage headed "apology". In the case of the online apology, the absence of any headline such as to invite the attention of readers who had read the matter complained of is all the more significant. The difference between the interest likely to have been generated by the headlines of the matters complained of and the unobtrusive "apology" could scarcely be more stark. In my view, it did not have sufficient prominence to bring it to the likely attention of roughly the same audience, or even a small percentage of the audience who read the matters complained of and understood them to refer to Ms Pedavoli.
Further, there is no evidence that the apology was published to all of the audience of the matter complained of. Even if the apology published in the printed newspaper and online was of sufficient prominence to reach roughly the same audience as the matter complained of in those two forms of publication (which I do not accept), there was no evidence that it was published to the recipients of the tablet app. Mr Blackburn submitted that it was enough that it was published online. He went so far as to suggest (at T209.41) that the onus was on the plaintiff to prove "that what was published in the iPad was different to what the reader would have seen when one went on the computer". He submitted that the fact that the apology was published online was "the end of that issue". I do not accept that submission. There were 9,129 unique page views of the first matter complained of using the tablet app. There is no evidence whatsoever to establish any prospect of the apology having reached that audience. This is an issue on which the defendants bear the onus of proof.
On my analysis of the issue raised by s 15(1)(e), the defendants did not have to offer to publish the apology to the Twitter followers or in The Age. I would nonetheless regard it to be a relevant and significant consideration, in determining whether the offer was reasonable, to determine whether any steps were taken to tell those persons that the matter complained of was defamatory of Ms Pedavoli. Further, for the purposes of s 18(2)(a) (the mandatory requirement to consider any correction or apology published before any trial), it is relevant to determine whether any apology or correction was in fact published to those persons (accepting that there was no express statutory requirement to offer to do so).
No correction was tweeted to the Twitter followers and no step was taken to tell them that the matter complained of was defamatory of Ms Pedavoli. Whatever the correct analysis of the requirements of s 15(1), I consider the fact that there was no relevant tweet whatsoever to be a significant additional reason for reaching the conclusion that the offer was not reasonable.
As to The Age, the position is complicated by a measure of confusion in the evidence. Mr Blackburn submitted that there is no evidence that the matter complained of was downloaded by any person via The Age website. There was evidence of a search conducted by the solicitor for the plaintiff suggesting that a link to the defamatory version of the article was available on The Age website as at 9.52pm on 30 January 2014 (affidavit of Andrea Rejante sworn 3 October 2014, exhibits W and X). Notwithstanding Mr Blackburn's protestations to the contrary, I am satisfied as to the reliability of that evidence. However, unless I have missed something, I think it is correct to say that there was no direct evidence that the article was in fact downloaded via that link or from The Age website by any reader. A conclusion as to publication (downloading) from The Age could only arise as a matter of inference.
The confusion arises from a document tendered by Mr Blackburn, produced on subpoena by The Age (exhibit 2). The document appears to be a screenshot of the non-defamatory version of the article (that is, the version that remained after the incorrect information had been removed) together with the apology, all on the same page. As I understood the purpose of the tender, it was to prove that the apology was published, even though it was denied that the article was published.
With no witness to explain the precise implications of the document, it is difficult to draw any firm conclusion on that issue. It seems likely that the apology was made available for downloading on The Age website in some form at some time, but there was no evidence as to how one would find it or whether anyone did.
In the result, there is no evidence on the strength of which I could be comfortably satisfied as to either the likely audience of the article or the likely audience of the apology on The Age website. I would observe that the complexity surrounding this issue highlights the need for a plaintiff to be told at an early point the identity of all other persons to whom the matter complained of has been given, which is the clear object of s 15(1)(e).
In any event, even leaving aside the position of Twitter and The Age, in my view the measures taken by the defendants were unlikely to bring the apology to the attention of anything near the audience of the matter complained of (by which I mean those to whom the matter was published who understood it to refer to Ms Pedavoli). That is a factor which strongly militates against a finding that the offer was or is reasonable.
For completeness, I should record a submission put by the plaintiff that the offer was not reasonable because it was subjectively insincere and intended not to correct the damage done but to avoid liability. I do not think a basis has been established for drawing that inference.
Other components of the offer
It is of course necessary to consider all of the elements of the offer taken together. The offer included reliance upon the steps that had already been taken at the request of Ms Pedavoli to correct the online version of the article. I accept that that was a prompt and significant step towards making amends.
Offer to pay damages
The offer also included an offer to pay damages in the sum of $50,000. Having regard to the seriousness of the defamatory imputations conveyed by the article, I consider that a monetary payment was essential to achieve a reasonable offer in the present case, even if the apology had been of equal prominence to the matter complained of and carefully targeted to reach roughly the same audience (which I am not persuaded it was). There may be cases in which the publication of a reasonable correction combined with a contrite apology (entailing acceptance of responsibility for the defamation) might obviate the occasion for payment of damages as well, but this is not such a case. The defendants' submissions implicitly acknowledged that, in order to repair the hurt suffered by Ms Pedavoli, some monetary payment was required.
Mr Blackburn submitted that the adequacy of any monetary offer as part of an offer of amends should not be judged by reference to the range of damages the plaintiff would have received at trial. If what was meant was that a reasonable offer does not have to include an offer to pay an amount within the range of a full assessment of damages as if after a trial, that is undoubtedly correct. Apart from anything else, that would overlook the reparation achieved by the mandatory components of the offer, particularly the requirement to publish a reasonable correction. The reasonableness of any monetary offer is necessarily informed by the reasonableness of the correction, including the extent of its reach. To adopt any different approach would subvert the object of the Act of encouraging the non-litigious resolution of defamation disputes. But the seriousness of the defamation undoubtedly remains a relevant factor in assessing the reasonableness of the monetary component of an offer.
I also accept, as submitted by Mr Blackburn, that the Court must be mindful of the fact that the grounds of aggravation now relied upon by the plaintiff were not known to her at the time the offer was made (and hence had not aggravated her damage). However, even at the time the offer was made, the defendants ought to have appreciated that the defamation was such as to cause extreme hurt and distress to Ms Pedavoli.
The seriousness of the defamation could scarcely be any worse. But for the fact that the plaintiff was not named in the article and the prompt correction of the online edition, this defamation would clearly have fallen within the worst class of case. Accepting that the assessment as to the adequacy of the sum offered must be informed by the other components of the offer and the fact that acceptance of it would have made amends and obviated the need for a trial, I do not think the sum offered was enough to bring the whole of the offer, with all its components, up to the mark of being one which could be characterised as reasonable in all the circumstances. That conclusion is based upon both my assessment as to the inadequacy of the correction and apology and my assessment of the seriousness of the imputations (with the extreme hurt they would inevitably have caused).
For those reasons, I am not satisfied that the defence of failure to accept an offer of amends is established.