21 December 2014

Unions Royal Commission

The two volume interim report by the Royal Commission into Trade Union Governance and Corruption states that it is structured as follows -
Part 2: The legal landscape
69. Part 2 sets the legal landscape by providing an overview in respect of the duties of officers of registered organisations, the use of union resources in elections, and financial reporting obligations on registered organisations.
Part 3: Generic slush funds
70. Part 3 considers funds with variety of purposes. The most notorious fund, the Australian Workers’ Union – Workplace Reform Association, is considered in Chapter 3.2.
71. Funds of this kind pose significant governance issues. The officials who operate those funds owe statutory and general duties to the union. On the other hand, the officials deploy their energy and sometimes their employer’s resources for the benefit of the fund. This gives rise to actual or potential conflicts of interest. Often these funds have no or no adequate record keeping. Management decisions are made informally or without due process. Directors’ or shareholders’ meetings are not held. If they are held, minutes are not kept. Transactions are often effected by cash. When records are maintained, they are often maintained in a haphazard fashion.
72. The Australian Workers’ Union – Workplace Reform Association case study concerned allegations of fraudulent and other misconduct by Bruce Wilson and Ralph Blewitt, former officials of the AWU. A recommendation is made that this Interim Report be referred to the relevant prosecuting authorities in Western Australia and Victoria to consider whether Bruce Wilson and Ralph Blewitt may have committed criminal offences. Findings are made that Julia Gillard did not commit any crime and was not aware of any criminality on the part of these union officials.
73. Industry 2020 is another generic fund. It was associated with Cesar Melhem, the former State Secretary of the Victorian branch of the Australian Workers’ Union (AWU). Industry 2020 organised lucrative fundraisers by using the name, influence and resources of the AWU. The AWU or its members received no recompense or benefit from Industry 2020’s activities. The funds raised were deployed to support political causes associated with Mr Melhem, including members of the Labour Unity faction of the Australian Labor Party (to which Mr Melhem belonged) and the Asmar campaign for the HSU.
74. Other generic funds examined in Part 3 are Building Industry 2000, IR 21 and TLATA. The issues arising for consideration in relation to these funds include the fiduciary duties of union officials, conflicts of interest and corporate governance.
Part 4: Fighting funds
75. These are the most common type of relevant fund considered by the Commission so far. Commonly an election fund is maintained by a union through amounts deducted automatically from the salaries of members and paid into a designated bank account. On its face there is nothing objectionable about such a fund. A member who decides voluntarily to contribute to an election fund is free to do so.
76. However, a number of problems with such funds in practice have emerged. Often there is no or insufficient disclosure to contributors or union members as to the activities of the fund. Record keeping is commonly very limited. The voluntariness of members’ decisions to contribute to a number of funds is questionable. A fund may give rise to a lopsided election or no election at all. An incumbent may have a disproportionate benefit if he or she has significant resources which are not available to his or her opponent. Candidates for election can close their eyes to the sources, propriety and legality of funding received for their campaigns and disclaim responsibility for that funding on the basis of ignorance.
Part 5: Income protection and redundancy funds
77. Funds of this kind are significant sources of union revenue. The two funds considered in Part 5, the BERT Fund (Chapter 5.2) and the Protect scheme (Chapter 5.3), both illustrate the problems that arise when unions are too closely connected with the governance of important income protection and redundancy funds.
Part 6: Superannuation
78. The two case studies considered by the Commission in this Part vividly illustrate the difficulties which employees face in light of the current lack of choice of superannuation fund available to workers under an enterprise agreement.
79. Chapter 6.2 concerns Paul Bracegirdle’s Herculean attempts to choose his own superannuation fund, rather than having his superannuation contributions made to TWUSUPER. TWUSUPER is a fund associated with the Transport Workers’ Union (TWU): approximately $2 million has flowed from TWUSUPER to the TWU over the last two financial years.
80. Chapter 6.3 concerns Katherine Cole’s similar struggle. She was required to join the Labour Union Co-operative Retirement Fund (LUCRF), an industry superannuation fund associated with the National Union of Workers (NUW). Her attempts to get out of the fund were rebuffed. Ultimately, Katherine Cole she took the drastic step of resigning her position, rather than continuing in LUCRF.
Part 7: Training funds
81. The only fund examined in this Part of the report is TEACHO, a fund associated with the TWU. Issues arising in connection with other funds, such as METL, a fund associated with the Maritime Union of Australia, will be considered in more detail next year.
82. As with many of the other funds already mentioned, the relevant arrangements in respect of TEACHO came into existence as part of the enterprise agreement bargaining process. In part the problem with TEACHO derives from a lack of clarity as to the appropriateness or efficacy of its functions. Another problem involves the fact that Toll agreed in a side deal, negotiated at the same time as its EBA with the TWU, to make payments to TEACHO provided that the TWU in return supplied reports to Toll concerning the activities of competitors. The information required for the purposes of the reports would be obtained by the TWU in pursuit of its statutory functions as a trade union. Toll sought to keep this information suppressed at the hearings of the Commission, an application which was refused. In his evidence Damian Sloan of Toll, a very impressive witness, accepted that Toll had agreed to provisions in the EBA relating to TEACHO in order to achieve industrial peace.
Part 8: CFMEU
83. Part 8 is the largest part of the Interim Report. It contains a number of case studies associated with the CFMEU. Together they raise fundamental issues about the regulation of the building and construction industry, and the culture of wilful defiance of the law which appears to lie at the core of the CFMEU.
84. Chapter 8.2 concerns Boral Ltd. Boral is a multinational company listed on the ASX. It was the victim of a ‘black ban’ imposed by the CFMEU. The evidence of the conduct of the CFMEU and its officers towards Boral and its customers has led to findings that blackmail and contraventions of the Competition and Consumer Act may have been committed.
85. Chapter 8.3 concerns Cbus, which manages employees’ superannuation. Senior executives at Cbus, namely Ms Butera and Ms Zanatta, covertly provided contact information for Cbus members employed by the Lis-Con companies to Mr Brian Parker, the NSW State Secretary of the CFMEU. This was done at the request of Mr Parker, who wanted the information to cause employees of Lis-Con to be personally contacted to make trouble with their employer.
86. Chapter 8.4 deals with the question of whether, on 27 March 2013, Mr Darren Greenfield, a CFMEU official, made a death threat to Brian Fitzpatrick, another CFMEU official. The finding is that the conversation was as Mr Fitzpatrick described in his evidence.
87. Chapter 8.5 deals with the unsavoury views held and expressed by Mr Parker about another member of the Branch Committee of Management who had been compelled to give evidence to the Commission and who, when called, gave truthful evidence.
88. Chapter 8.6 addresses two case studies relating to the unacceptable way in which the CFMEU has dealt with its records, including those which may have been relevant to the Terms of Reference.
89. Chapter 8.7 is devoted to the Universal Cranes case study. It raises similar issues to those in respect of Boral, and thus involves issues of extortion, unlawful threats and breaches of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth). Officials at the CFMEU in Queensland embarked on a campaign against it by banning it from sites, and threatening to continue the ban unless Universal Cranes signed the CFMEU’s form of enterprise bargaining agreement.
90. The Hindmarsh case study is dealt with briefly in Chapter 8.8. There are two reasons for brevity at this stage. The first concerns the fact that there are Federal Circuit Court proceedings due to be heard shortly which raise some of the issues raised in the Commission hearings. The second is that, in relation to the remaining discrete issues, it is desirable to afford the CFMEU and its officers a further opportunity to provide submissions which they have so far chosen not to provide.
91. Chapter 8.9 concerns the treatment of FWBC Inspectors by CFMEU officers. There was evidence of intimidating, abusive and verbally violent treatment towards FWBC inspectors by members of the CFMEU. In one case the verbal violence was captured on video. It involved a CFMEU official standing in close proximity to an FWBC inspector and screaming abuse of a particularly insulting and violent kind. Other evidence, equally insulting although not captured on video, related to the treatment of FWBC inspectors at the Barangaroo site.
92. Chapter 8.10 concerns the Pentridge Prison site and activity by the Victorian branch of the CFMEU. The activity in question included the making of abusive and threatening calls by union officials, and the application of improper pressure on subcontractors to sign the CFMEU’s form of enterprise bargaining agreement and on workers to become CFMEU members.
93. Chapter 8.11, which is extremely brief, relates to allegations made by Andrew Zaf. As those allegations remain under investigation, no findings are made at this stage.
94. The final chapter in Part 8 is Chapter 8.12. It concerns relations between the Lis-Con companies and the CFMEU in Queensland.
Part 9: HSU
95. The only issue relating to the HSU considered in this Interim Report concerns the activities of the HSU Victorian No 1 Branch (now named the Health Workers’ Union). A number of officials at this branch have alleged that their Right Entry Permit tests were undertaken by others on their behalf. This issue is considered and resolved in Chapter 9. As noted above, other issues concerning the HSU which have also been the subject of evidence before the Commission to date will be addressed in a future report.
Part 10: TWU
96. A number of funds associated with the TWU or its officials – namely the McLean Forum, the New Transport Workers’ Team, TWUSUPER and TEACHO – are dealt with in the Parts summarised above.
97. This Part also considers questions relating to the NSW Branch of the TWU’s electoral roll. For a number of years the NSW Branch of the TWU provided documents to the ALP which overstated the number of members of the NSW Branch eligible to vote in a ballot for an office in the union. The significance of this matter is that the TWU was exercising voting rights at ALP conferences based on an inflated number of members.
Part 11: SDA
98. This case study involves the then Secretary-Treasurer of the Queensland Branch of the Shop, Distributive, Allied and Employees’ Association terminating the employment of an organiser because – on the evidence, although this was not the stated reason – the organiser had decided to run against him at a forthcoming election. Confidential Report
99. There is a recommendation that one volume of this Interim Report be kept confidential. On 12 December 2014 an order was made directing that any information in the Confidential Report that might enable a person named in that report who has given evidence before the Commission to be identified not be published. That recommendation and that order were made because the confidential volume deals with threats to witnesses. It is necessary for that volume to be confidential in order to protect the physical well-being of those witnesses and their families. This is unfortunate, because the confidential volume reveals grave threats to the power and authority of the Australian state.
Recommendations for referral
100. It is recommended that this Interim Report and any other relevant materials be referred, pursuant to s 6P of the Royal Commissions Act 1902 (Cth) and every other enabling power, to the:
(a) Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions in order that consideration may be given to whether:
(i) the CFMEU should be charged with and prosecuted for cartel conduct contrary to ss 44ZZRF and 44ZZRG of the Competition Policy Reform (Victoria) Act 1995 (Vic) (Chapter 8.2); (ii) Darren Greenfield should be charged with and prosecuted for using a carriage service to make a threat and/or to menace, harass or cause offence contrary to ss 474.15 and 474.17 of the Criminal Code (Cth) (Chapter 8.4); and (iii) each of John Perkovic, Luke Collier, Rob Kera, Brian Parker and Michael Greenfield should be charged with and prosecuted for obstruction of a Commonwealth public official contrary to s 149.1 of the Criminal Code (Cth) (Chapter 8.9); (iv) each of Diana Asmar, David Eden, Darryn Rowe, Nick Katsis, Saso Trajcevski-Uzunov and Lee Atkinson should be charged with and prosecuted for making a false statement in an application or recklessly making a false statement contrary to ss 136 and 137 of the Criminal Code (Cth) (Chapter 9); and (v) Kimberly Kitching should be charged with and prosecuted for aiding and abetting the contraventions of each of Diana Asmar, David Eden, Darryn Rowe, Nick Katsis, Saso Trajcevski-Uzunov and Lee Atkinson (Chapter 9);
(b) Australian Securities and Investments Commission in order that consideration may be given to whether:
(i) Michael Ravbar should be charged with and prosecuted for breaches of his duty as an officer contrary to s 184 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), and whether a civil penalty proceeding should be commenced and carried on against Michael Ravbar for contraventions of ss 180, 181 and 182 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (Chapter 5.2); and (ii) the exemptions granted to employee redundancy funds by ASIC Class Order CO 02/314 remain appropriate (Chapter 5.2);
(c) Fair Work Building Inspectorate in order that consideration may be given to whether proceedings should be commenced and carried on against:
(i) each of Michael Ravbar and Peter Close for coercion to the existence, exercise or refusal to exercise a workplace right contrary to s 343 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (Chapter 8.7); (ii) each of Michael Ravbar, Peter Close and Andrew Sutherland for taking adverse action against another person as a result of the existence, exercise or refusal to exercise a workplace right contrary to s 340 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (Chapter 8.7); (iii) each of Anton Sucic and Ivan Dadic for taking adverse action against a person because they were not a member of an industrial association contrary to s 346 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (Chapter 8.10); and (iv) each of John Setka and Gerard Benstead for coercion by allocating duties to a particular person contrary to s 355 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (Chapter 8.10);
(d) Australian Competition and Consumer Commission in order that consideration may be given to whether proceedings should be commenced and carried on against:
(i) the CFMEU for conspiring with others to contravene s 45E of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) contrary to ss 45E and 76(1)(e) of that Act (Chapter 8.7); and (ii) each of Michael Ravbar, Peter Close, Andrew Sutherland, Ben Loakes and the CFMEU for a secondary boycott for the purpose of causing substantial loss or damage contrary to s 45D of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) (Chapter 8.7);
(e) General Manager of the Fair Work Commission, or a delegate of the General Manager, in order that consideration may be given to whether a proceeding should be commenced and carried on against the TWU for a pecuniary penalty order for failing to hold records for 7 years contrary to s 231 of the Fair Work (Registered Organisations) Act 2009 (Cth) (Chapter 10.2);
(f) Australian Information Commissioner in order that consideration may be given to whether the Queensland Branch of the Shop, Distributive, Allied and Employees’ Association contravened National Privacy Principle 10.1 or any provision of the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) (Chapter 12);
(g) New South Wales Director of Public Prosecutions in order that consideration may be given to whether Darren Greenfield should be charged with and prosecuted for common assault contrary to s 61 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) (Chapter 8.4);
(h) South Australian Director of Public Prosecutions in order that consideration may be given to whether:
(i) John Perkovic should be charged with and prosecuted for assault contrary to s 20(1) of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) (Chapter 8.9); (ii) John Perkovic should be charged with and prosecuted for accosting or impeding another in a threatening manner contrary to s 20(1)(e) of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) (Chapter 8.9); and (iii) John Perkovic should be charged with and prosecuted for the common law offence of assault (Chapter 8.9);
(i) Queensland Director of Public Prosecutions in order that consideration may be given to whether:
(i) each of Michael Ravbar and Peter Close be charged with and prosecuted for extortion contrary to s 415 of the Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) (Chapter 8.7); and (ii) each of Michael Ravbar and Peter Close be charged with and prosecuted for threats to cause detriment to another person contrary to s 359 of the Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) (Chapter 8.7);
(j) Victorian Director of Public Prosecutions in order that consideration may be given to whether:
(i) each of Ralph Blewitt and Bruce Wilson should be charged with and prosecuted for obtaining financial advantage by deception and conspiracy to commit an offence contrary to ss 82 and 321 of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) (Chapter 3.2); (ii) John Setka and Shaun Reardon should be charged with and prosecuted for blackmail contrary to s 87 of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) (Chapter 8.2); and (iii) Shaun Reardon should be charged with and prosecuted for being an accessory to blackmail contrary to s 323 of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) (Chapter 8.2);
(k) Western Australian Director of Public Prosecutions in order that consideration may be given to whether each of Ralph Blewitt and Bruce Wilson should be charged with and prosecuted for:
(i) fraudulent conduct contrary to s 409(1) of the Criminal Code (WA); and (ii) conspiracy to commit an indictable offence contrary to s 558 of the Criminal Code (WA) (Chapter 3.2); and
(l) Divisional Branch Management Committee of the New South Wales branch of the Construction and General Division of the CFMEU in order that consideration may be given to whether any action should be taken against Brian Parker under r 51 of the Rules for the Construction and General Division of the CFMEU to investigate whether Mr Parker:
(i) has engaged in gross misbehaviour; (ii) has grossly neglected his duty; (iii) has conversed in an abusive or derogatory manner towards any person; (iv) has made statements which impugn the character and integrity of fellow officials; or (v) should be removed from office (Chapter 8.4 and 8.5).

18 December 2014

SNS Terms of Service

'Terms of Service on Social Media Sites' by Corinne Hui Yun Tan in (2014) 19(2) Media and Arts Law Review 195-220 considers
 the provisions within the terms of service (‘TOS’) of the social media behemoths of today — Facebook, YouTube, Twitter and the Wikimedia Foundation. In particular, it examines the main provisions that purport to regulate, from a copyright perspective, generative activities on social media sites. This empirical work is undertaken so that the article can shed light on the relationship between the contractual and copyright regimes. To do so, the article identifies the instances where the contractual regime is to some extent aligned with the copyright regime, and further, where there are potential incompatibilities between the two regimes. It also refers to the legal position in the United States, as a result of the nationality of the companies operating the social media sites examined. Additionally, this article makes references to the legal positions in the United Kingdom and Australia, to draw attention to the potential implications of the TOS on social media site users in other jurisdictions. The discussions in the early part of the article lead readers to its conclusion on the appropriate role for TOS, vis-à-vis the copyright regime, in regulating generative activities on social media sites. Its concern is a real one and can serve as a platform for future scholarly contributions to the field, given the worldwide usage of social media sites.

14 December 2014

Indigenous Expenditure

The Productivity Commission has released its 2014 Indigenous Expenditure Report, providing estimates of Australian, State and Territory government expenditure on services provided to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Australians.

Highlights are
  • Total direct expenditure on services for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Australians in 2012-13 was estimated to be $30.3 billion, accounting for 6.1 per cent of total direct general government expenditure. Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Australians made up 3.0 per cent of the population in 2013. 
  • Indigenous expenditure increased in real terms by $5.0 billion (19.9 per cent) from 2008-09 to 2012-13, while non-Indigenous expenditure increased by 9.0 per cent. Expenditure per Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander person increased by 10.3 per cent, and expenditure per non Indigenous person increased by 2.2 per cent. 
  • Estimated expenditure per person in 2012-13 was $43 449 for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Australians, compared with $20 900 for other Australians (a ratio of 2.08 to 1 - an increase from a ratio of 1.93 to 1 in 2008-09). The $22 550 per person difference in 2012-13 reflected the combined effects of: greater intensity of service use ($15 438 or 68.5 per cent) - because of greater need, and because of the younger age profile of the population higher cost of providing services ($7112 or 31.5 per cent) - for example, because of location, or because targeted services are provided in addition to mainstream services (for example, Indigenous liaison officers in hospitals). 
  • Total direct expenditure on services for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Australians in 2012-13 was made up of: $24.7 billion (or $35 313 per person) on services where expenditure is directly related to service use (a proxy for 'on the ground' services) $5.7 billion (or $8137 per person) on services where expenditure is attributed on the basis of their share of the population (expenditure in areas such as defence, foreign affairs and industry assistance, which benefits all Australians equally). 
  • The Australian Government accounted for $14.1 billion (46.6 per cent) of direct Indigenous expenditure in 2012-13 (an increase of $2.4 billion (20.3 per cent) in real terms from 2008-09) with the remaining $16.2 billion (53.4 per cent) provided by State and Territory governments (an increase of $2.6 billion (19.5 per cent) in real terms from 2008-09). 
  • Mainstream services accounted for $24.7 billion (81.4 per cent) of direct Indigenous expenditure in 2012-13 (a real increase of $5.1 billion (26.0 per cent) from 2008-09) with the remaining $5.6 billion (18.6 per cent) provided through Indigenous specific (targeted) services (a real decrease of $0.1 billion (1.2 per cent) from 2008-09).

13 December 2014

Media

'Enhancing Press Freedom through Greater Privacy Law: A UK Perspective on an Australian Privacy Tort' by Paul Wragg in (2014) 36(4) Sydney Law Review comments 
In light of previous inquiries identifying areas of concern in Australia’s privacy law provisions, the Australian Law Reform Commission (‘ALRC’) recently devised a new tort that, if implemented, would better protect individuals from serious invasions of privacy. Although the tort was designed principally with new technologies in mind, there has been vociferous concern that such a tort might unduly inhibit press freedom. This response is familiar to United Kingdom (‘UK’) commentators who have seen the press, in particular, react similarly to common law developments in privacy law. Yet that experience has not been entirely unfavourable to the UK press; indeed, the jurisprudence discloses a generous treatment of the term ‘public interest’, which has kept interference with press activity to a minimum. In light of the reference to press freedom within the ALRC’s proposed tort, and given the absence of an express constitutional provision protecting Australian press speech, this article argues that the UK experience shows how, counterintuitively, the ALRC’s proposed tort could actually enhance, rather than diminish, press freedom protection in Australia.

NSA

'Nothing to Fear or Nowhere to Hide: Competing Visions of the NSA's 215 Program' by Susan Freiwald in (2014) 12(2) Journal of Telecommunications and High Technology Law comments 
Despite Intelligence Community leaders’ assurances, the detailed knowledge of the NSA metadata program (the 215 program) that flowed from the Snowden revelations did not assuage concerns about the program. Three groups, the American Civil Liberties Union, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, and the Electronic Privacy Information Center, brought immediate legal challenges with mixed results in the lower courts. The conflict, in the courts, Congress, and the press, has revealed that the proponents and opponents of Section 215 view the program in diametrically opposed ways. Program proponents see a vital intelligence program operating within legal limits, which has suffered a few compliance issues that were remedied by a well-functioning oversight regime. Program opponents see the same program as unauthorized and unconstitutional, yielding minimal benefits, and subject to significant abuses and insufficient oversight. Part of the disjunction reflects differing interpretations of the law, but much of it stems from a deep-seated lack of trust. For example, surveillance proponents tend to view civil libertarian activists as motivated by ideology and not amenable to persuasion by facts or reason. They find frustrating the lack of credit they get for their own efforts to protect civil liberties. Civil libertarian activists regard secret surveillance as a request that they merely “trust the government.” They cite current and historical abuses of the surveillance power in this country and elsewhere as reason to refuse to do so. This paper discusses how each side’s lack of trust leads it to use the same words to mean entirely different things.
This essay proceeds in the following manner. Part I provides a brief overview of the 215 program. Part II compares the proponents’ cost-versus-benefit calculations to opponents’ calculations. Part III considers how differently each group assesses the legality of the 215 program, considering both statutory authorization and the relevant constitutional provisions. Part IV compares each side’s understanding of what it means to abuse the surveillance power, which depends crucially on the issues raised in the prior Parts. Because program opponents view it as ineffective and illegal, its very operation abuses civil liberties. Program proponents perceive no abuses when agents engage in legally authorized and justified surveillance. This essay concludes that whatever happens to the 215 program will not likely resolve the manner in which the program’s proponents and opponents talk past each other. Yet use of a common language could increase understanding, and even trust, and it would surely enhance opportunities for constructive engagement among the parties themselves and the greater public.

Negligence

'High Court Negligence Cases 2000–10' by Pam Stewart and Anita Stuhmcke in (2014) 36(4) Sydney Law Review reports a study of High Court negligence decisions from 2000 to 2010.
The research establishes that the common law of negligence has been evolving toward the imposition of greater personal responsibility on plaintiffs in most circumstances, but especially in recreational activity cases. Further, the study reveals a substantial level of protection for public authority defendants at common law, challenging the assumptions that underpinned the significant statutory protections that were enacted in Australian jurisdictions from 2002 onwards. The data analysis therefore corroborates previous work of Australian tort law scholars and contradicts the claims made by policymakers at the start of the 21st century about the urgent need for tort law reform. Given that there has not been an empirical study of 21st century High Court negligence decisions to date, the study provides a foundation for future assessment of the effect of Australian tort law reform legislation.  

Constitutions, Confusion and Vexation

'Written Constitutions and the Politics of Recognition: Symbolism and Substance' by Dylan Lino comments
Written constitutions are a major site of contestation in the political struggles by marginalised groups to have their identities respected within public institutions – the ‘politics of recognition’, in Charles Taylor’s influential coinage. I argue in this paper that, in struggles over recognition, two dimensions of written constitutions are pertinent. The first – the constitutional dimension, which is the primary role of written constitutions – is to distribute and limit the most fundamental aspects of public power within the state. Accordingly, written constitutions may be amended to redistribute public power in a way that better respects a given group’s identity. A second element of written constitutions – a non-constitutional, symbolic dimension – is their status as cultural symbols of the polities to which they are attached. Constitutional amendments recognising identity groups may thus seek to render these symbols more inclusive and representative of the polity overall.
The politics of constitutional recognition have played out in recent years in Australia in relation to the nation’s Indigenous peoples, the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples. Though many proposals for constitutionally recognising Indigenous peoples have been controversial, one sort of reform has garnered significant mainstream political support. This kind of reform entails the insertion of explicit but legally ineffectual mentions of Indigenous peoples within either a preamble or discrete section of the constitutional text. Several amendments along these lines have already been made to constitutions at the State level, and there will likely be a similar proposal put forward at the national level within the next few years.
Though these reforms take place within written constitutions, there is nothing particularly constitutional about them. Having no effect on the distribution of public power within the Australian legal order, such reforms focus entirely on the non-constitutional symbolic function of written constitutions. In this paper, I argue that attending to the expressive dimension of written constitutions should not be discarded from the politics of recognition: symbolic recognition in written constitutions can have salutary effects for those being recognised. However, as the Australian example shows, constitutional recognition that is purely symbolic can be deficient in two major ways. First, denying such forms of recognition any substantive constitutional function can have negative symbolic effects in itself. Second, the pursuit of wholly symbolic recognition in written constitutions often neglects valid grievances about how power is wielded by the state over the group in question. For both problems, the solution is pursuing substantive forms of constitutional recognition.

In Markan v Bar Association of Queensland (No 3) [2014] QSC 225 the Supreme Court has engaged with a vexatious litigant. The Court states 

 This is the third action Mr Markan has brought against the Bar Association of Queensland. He has also, out of those proceedings, brought three appeals to the Court of Appeal and two applications to the High Court for special leave to appeal. He has also brought proceedings against the Crime and Misconduct Commission (as it was formerly named) and the Queensland Police Service. In the CMC action he also, again, brought an appeal in the Court of Appeal. 

BAQ says all these proceedings involve unmeritorious, fanciful or ridiculous claims which, despite dismissal by judges at first instance and in appeal courts, are maintained by Mr Markan – to the point, BAQ argues, that he should be made the subject of a vexatious proceedings order under the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2005 (Qld). If an order under the VPA is not made then BAQ seeks, in the alternative, an order striking out his claim and statement of claim in this action. 

Mr Markan cross-applies. He seeks orders that BAQ should be declared the vexatious person, and that BAQ’s application to strike out his claim and statement of claim should, itself, be struck out. He also cross-applies for an order that the Court reject BAQ’s application for the vexatious order against him; and, for the selection of a “...neutral, independent and impartial arbitrator to preside over the Court hearing”. (Unless otherwise indicated, words and phrases in italics are taken from Mr Markan’s court documents and submissions.) 

Where it began: Mr Markan is, in his view, wrongly convicted of a criminal offence 

n late 2008 Mr Markan was convicted by a jury in the District Court of one count of grievous bodily harm and sentenced to four years’ imprisonment, with a parole date fixed after two years. He was alleged to have assaulted a fellow employee at a resort where they both worked on South Stradbroke Island, breaking his left arm. 

Mr Markan represented himself at trial. He did not give or call evidence. His case, which he put to the complainant in cross-examination, was that the complainant was the aggressor and that Mr Markan had not caused him any physical injury except to his hands and arms. Although Mr Markan had told investigating police that he had acted in self defence, and although the judge presiding at his trial had warned Mr Markan that unless he gave evidence there would be no evidence before the jury on that issue, he nevertheless chose not to give evidence himself. 

After the trial Mr Markan retained solicitors who engaged Mr Tim Carmody SC (as the present Chief Justice then was) and Mr Douglas Wilson of counsel to advise in relation to, and represent him in, an appeal. An appeal against conviction only was commenced. It was heard on 27 March 2009 and dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 1 May 2009. 

Mr Markan then retained different solicitors who engaged Mr Paul Smith of counsel (as his Honour then was) to advise in relation to a special leave application which was filed, but dismissed by the High Court on 4 November 2012. 

The application for special leave contained six grounds of appeal. The first was that there was an irregularity in the selection of the trial judge who had previously been the Director of Public Prosecutions. The High Court, after noting that the Court of Appeal had not been asked to address that question, observed that “... no claim of bias could succeed unless it were demonstrated that the trial judge had been personally involved in the decision to proceed against the applicant. This has not been demonstrated”. 

The second ground alleged procedural unfairness at the trial – that the trial judge had refused to have the complainant recalled so that a medical witness could examine him. Again, the High Court noted, the matter did not appear to have been taken up in the Court of Appeal but, in any event, Mr Markan had not demonstrated error in the trial judge’s discretionary decision on the point. 

The third ground involved a complaint by Mr Markan that he was wrongly prevented from asking an investigating police officer why the officer did not ask the complainant about a supposed discrepancy between the complainant’s claim that he had been hit many times on the head, and the lack of any signs of this during medical examination. Mr Markan also complained that the trial judge had wrongly refused to allow a question as to why the police officer had concluded that Mr Markan was not acting in self-defence. Again, the High Court observed that Mr Markan had not demonstrated error in the Court of Appeal’s failure to uphold those complaints – the first question was a matter for medical evidence, and the second involved an attempt to seek an opinion on the matter not the subject of expert evidence. 

The fourth ground related to the trial judge’s summing up, and errors alleged to have occurred in it. Mr Markan complained that the Court of Appeal had not dealt with the matter but, as the High Court observed, it did not appear that it had been asked to do so. In any event, as the High Court went on to observe, the complaints (which focused upon an alleged absence of medical evidence about the complainant having head injuries) were pointless; there was clear evidence that the complainant suffered a broken arm at the hands of Mr Markan, and that was sufficient so as to establish grievous bodily harm; and, Mr Markan did not himself give evidence to contradict the complainant’s evidence about being hit on the head. 

The fifth ground related to a reference by the complainant, while testifying, to Mr Markan adventuring into cyber-crime. There was some focus, in the course of the trial, on whether this was a reference to a prior criminal conviction of Mr Markan. Later, in the presence of the jury, the witness withdrew any suggestion of any previous conviction of Mr Markan for cyber-crime. 

The sixth ground involved a submission that the conviction was based on fabricated evidence – in particular, the complainant’s claim to have been hit on the head and the leg. Mr Markan complained that the Court of Appeal had not dealt with those points but, again, the High Court was not dissuaded that it had been asked to do so, and said: “What the jury made of the evidence and the complainant’s credibility was a matter for them”. 

It is compelling, from a reading of the decisions of the Court of Appeal and the High Court, that Mr Markan made a number of wide-ranging complaints to both about his criminal trial but that in each instance the appeal court concluded that they were immaterial, were not the product of any error by the presiding trial judge, and, insofar as the trial could be said to have been conducted in a way disadvantageous to Mr Markan, that was the sole product of decisions he made himself – in particular, the decision not to give evidence – in circumstances where he had been fully and fairly informed of his choices, and the consequences of them, by the trial judge. 

Mr Markan complains about his lawyers 

Mr Markan complained to the Legal Services Commission about the conduct of his solicitors and counsel in both appeals. The Commissioner referred his complaints about the barristers to BAQ for investigation, report and recommendation. In April 2012 BAQ delivered two reports to the Commissioner in which it concluded that neither Mr Carmody SC and Mr Wilson in the Court of Appeal, nor Mr Smith in the High Court, were guilty of any misconduct. Mr Markan’s principal complaint had been that his barristers did not run points which he considered to be important. Some of them were, in fact, advanced on his special leave application and found not to have merit. In respect of all the others, BAQ’s report concluded that any failure by the barristers to follow Mr Markan’s instructions was the legitimate product of their own forensic judgment, consistent with applicable rules of conduct and their overriding duty to the court. 

Mr Markan did not sue his solicitors or barristers. Rather, he commenced the various actions against BAQ, and the Police Commissioner and the CMC, which are now said to be vexatious. Mr Markan’s first action (BS928/13) and the appeals in it. 

In his first proceeding, begun in February 2013, Mr Markan pleads that arising out of the actions of the Legal Services Commissioner and BAQ in investigating his complaints about his barristers (of which he had notice) and his acceptance of that procedure, there was a contract between him and BAQ which the Association breached by failing to find in his favour – i.e., by not making findings of misconduct by the barristers. 

Mr Markan sued BAQ for $10,000,000.13, alleging that it is an “... arrogant mafia organisation operating to subvert the Government and community institutions”, and has been involved in a “... fragrant contempt of laws in this country”, which involved “... unlawful act [sic] indicating gross malice and ill will ... affecting the whole society, eroding public confidence in the operation of justice system [sic]”. 

The damages are calculated under six heads – compensatory, consequential, aggregated, exemplary, parasistic [sic] and restitution damages – with an amount of $1,666,666.683333 for each head. 

BAQ applied to have the statement of claim struck out. After a hearing before Dalton J on 5 March 2013, Mr Markan filed an amended claim and statement of claim. It was, arguably, more extreme and less coherent. In it, he: “...demands that the Defendant makes the public apology for the harm and distress caused utilizing all major public media available in a clear and highly visible manner”; alleges BAQ has been involved in criminal conduct; and, demands that “... people associated with the Bar Association of Queensland ... be sent to re-education facilities where they will be subjected to hard physical labour to instill [sic] in them the respect to other people in the community”. 

In the statement of claim there is an apparent attempt to improve the pleading relating to the alleged breach, with an allegation that BAQ failed to provide “... the service of ‘INVESTIGATION’ in honest, fair and reasonable manner according to law”. 

The new claim also seeks a declaration that BAQ is a “... criminal organisation and to order its dissolution”. 

Mr Markan also applied, separately, for orders that a “... neutral independent and impartial arbiter ... preside over the court hearing this case”. Atkinson J heard that application on 17 April 2013. Mr Markan asked her Honour to disqualify herself. She refused. A week later, on 24 April 2013, she heard BAQ’s renewed application to strike out the proceedings, and Mr Markan’s oral application for a stay of her decision not to disqualify herself. On 7 June 2013 she made orders striking out the claim and statement of claim. In her reasons Atkinson J concluded that there was no basis in fact or law for the plaintiff’s claims sufficient to maintain his case. She observed that “... portions of the claim and statement of claim and amended statement of claim merely make scandalous accusations of criminal or other serious misconduct without pleading any material facts which could be said to support such allegations”; and, “... to allow such pleadings to continue would be an abuse of process of the court”; and, that the claims made by Mr Markan contained “... numerous baseless and scandalous allegations of dishonest conduct”. 

Between the first and second hearings before Atkinson J Mr Markan had appealed to the Court of Appeal, and sought a stay pending the determination of that appeal. He also appealed the decision striking out his claim and statement of claim. Both appeals were heard together on 8 October 2013. Both were dismissed on 13 December 2013. 

The Court, in a joint judgment, concluded that the pleadings, even after amendment, did not disclose any reasonable cause of action. 

Mr Markan filed two applications for special leave to appeal against both orders made by the Court of Appeal. In them he described the conduct of Atkinson J, and the Court of Appeal judges, as “... like mafia dons protecting their friends and to pervert or obstruct Justice and the Rule of Law”. The applications were dismissed on 13 May 2014, Bell and Gageler JJ observing that there was no error in the decision of Atkinson J not to recuse herself, and that her assessment that the amended statement of claim disclosed no reasonable cause of action was unimpeachable. 

Mr Markan’s second action (BS6041/13) and the appeals in it 

Mr Markan had commenced the first action in February 2013. In early June 2013 he sent BAQ what purported to be an invoice for $11,000,000.13 “... for the service provided by Peter Markan concerning the redemption of Bar Association of Qld”. It purports to be a detailed invoice with particulars – e.g., Mr Markan purports to “charge” BAQ $2,000 per minute for 1,500 minutes for work associated with an attendance in court before Atkinson J on 24 April 2013, for a total cost of $3,000,000. 

Less than a month later he began a new action claiming, again, that BAQ make a public apology for public distress caused to him; that anyone associated with BAQ be sent to re-education facilities and subjected to hard labour; and that he be paid $11,000,000.13 for services by which Mr Markan had provided BAQ with “... the service of ‘public ridicule’ and ‘public humiliation’”. 

The statement of claim is couched in quite conversational terms – e.g., “... queensland [sic] barristers enjoy being abused, cursed and swore at because they get sexual satisfaction from it. Although it sounded to me weird, kinky and depraved I kept it to myself because you do not say such things to clients”. 

The prayer in the statement of claim seeks payment of the invoice for $11,000,000.13 “exactly and approximately”. As to interest it alleges that Mr Markan is “ ... in the process of creating the algorithm for the calculation of the interest on the money due. However initial calculation, looking at the array of the derivative of the variance between parameters and arguments of the difference between queensland barristers [sic] stupidity and their arrogance, shows values unbelievably huge and requires further testing”. 

BAQ applied to strike out the claimant’s statement of claim. Mr Markan cross-applied for the selection of a “... neutral, independent and impartial arbiter to preside over the court hearing this case”; to strike out BAQ’s application; and, for a grant of “... LEGAL IMMUNITY for anything done or said in court by the plaintiff”. 

The applications were heard by Fryberg J on 25 and 26 July 2013. Again, Mr Markan asked the judge to recuse himself. That was refused. Mr Markan then sought to “... exercise common law rights and human rights” and informed the Court that he was “refusing to participate in this proceeding”. In his absence Fryberg J determined all the applications and, as BAQ requested, struck out the action. He observed that the statement of claim “... contains no cause of action known to law. The document is, in short, fanciful. The claim is unsustainable and consequently should not be allowed to proceed”. 

Mr Markan filed a notice of appeal in early August 2013, relying on grounds almost identical to those put forward in his earlier appeal against the orders of Atkinson J. The appeal came on for hearing on 18 February 2014. Mr Markan asked each of the judges (McMurdo P, Muir JA and Mullins J) to recuse themselves. They refused. Their decision was handed down on 28 February 2014.[16] Mr Markan’s claims for payment of his invoice were variously described as “patently ridiculous” (McMurdo P), “frivolous, vexatious and scandalous” (Muir JA) and “misguided” (Mullins J). 

Mr Markan has sought special leave in the High Court to appeal against those orders. His application alleges that the decision is “deeply offensive” and makes an unparticularised allegation that one of the appeal court judges was “... receiving financial benefit from the other party before the court”. The Queensland Supreme Court is described as “... the hub of racism”. The application is yet to be determined. Mr Markan’s third action (BS2980/14) 

This third action, in which his and BAQ’s applications are now being considered, also followed a purported “invoice” from Mr Markan to BAQ. On its face it has two components. The first is described as the “non creative” component for $500,000 which, it is said, has been “graciously waved [sic]”. The second is described as the “creative component” for the “promotion of Bar Association of Queensland ... as the most effective Mafia organisation in the world”. The amount, which is not broken down, is $10,000,000.13. The statement of claim alleges the parties have reached an agreement, under which this sum is payable by BAQ to Mr Markan, “... by virtue of their conduct”. 

The judgment notes Markan's claims regarding the overall invalidity of law 

It is alleged in the statement of claim that BAQ has been a “very successful criminal organisation” which has gained its “greatest benefit ... by obtaining the monopoly for the staffing the position of ‘judges’ in courts”; and that “...mafia appointed ‘judges’ ... corruptly obtained position of so called ‘authority’ within legitimate legal system”. Amongst Mr Markan’s prayers for relief he seeks a declaration that s 59 of the Queensland Constitution is invalid (because it breaches the Statute of Monopolies 1623 and “human/civil rights legislation”), and an associated declaration that “any member of the community has the right to become a judge (as unalienable human/civil right [sic]), as such job does not require any specific qualifications or competence”. 

Again, the pleading includes claims that BAQ is a criminal organisation, and that persons associated with it should be sent to re-education facilities and subjected to hard physical labour. ... 

Mr Markan’s other litigation: Crime and Misconduct Commission, Qld Police Service and Legal Services Commission 

It is not only BAQ which has been the subject of proceedings of this kind, brought by Mr Markan. He sued the Crime and Misconduct Commission (as it then was) in proceedings commenced in May 2013. He also sued the CMC for $10,000,000.13 for damages, sought a public apology from it and, also, asked the court to recommend that people associated with that organisation be sent to re-education facilities where they would be subjected to hard physical labour. 

As the decision of the Court of Appeal in Markan v Crime and Misconduct Commission [2014] QCA 60 shows, Mr Markan had earlier instituted proceedings against the Legal Services Commission in the nature of an application for judicial review of the Commission’s handling of his original complaint. A judge of the Supreme Court determined there was no basis for a review. 

Then, he lodged a formal complaint with the CMC about the conduct of the Legal Services Commission and BAQ alleging – again and in particular – that the Commission was “involved in mafia style protection of lawyers who are abusing the system”. When the CMC did not take any action in respect of that complaint he bought proceedings in which he alleged the CMC was a “commercial organisation”, contracted “to provide services to the people of Queensland” but had failed to act in an “honest, fair and reasonable manner ..., but rather was guilty of unconscionable conduct and dishonesty” and had therefore failed in its duties. 

The Trial Division judge who heard the matter determined there was no basis for judicial review. 

The same themes emerged in Mr Markan’s claim and statement of claim in the CMC proceedings and in his written and oral submission to the Court of Appeal as in his three actions against BAQ. At paragraph [17] of his reasons in the Court of Appeal, Morrison JA (with whom McMurdo P and Gotterson JA agreed) noted that Mr Markan’s written and oral submissions to the court consisted of a repetition of what had occurred before the primary judge, and went on to make demands that Mr Markan’s human rights be acknowledged and respected, and attacked the primary judge on the basis of his lack of competency, and made “scandalous assertions going to the judge’s character and confidence” – without, again, any evidence or persuasive arguments to support any of these allegations. 

At paragraph [18] Morrison JA observed that the central theme of Mr Markan’s outline was that for a variety of reasons, some of them bizarre, the learned primary judge was not qualified to hear the application because of his appointment under an illegitimate and corrupt legal system. At [20] he observed that Mr Markan’s “abuse of the Court, and of the opportunity to address the issues in the appeal, reached the level where he asserted that none of the members of this Court were recognised by him as legitimate judicial officers, able to hear and determine the issues in the appeal, describing this Court as a ‘Kangaroo Court’”. The appeal was dismissed, with costs. 

Mr Markan then sent correspondence to the Commissioner of Police calling for the “arrest, investigation and prosecution” of the three judges who determined the CMC matter in the Court of Appeal. When that did not happen he brought proceedings against the Qld Police Service. He, again, sought damages of $10,000,000.13 on the basis that QPS had breached its “SOCIAL CONTRACT” to protect him as a member of the Queensland community. 

In his statement of claim he says that at the Court of Appeal hearing he asked all three presiding judges to provide evidence of their competence; that they failed to do so; and, therefore, in the absence of that evidence there could, in effect, be no disagreement with his categorisation of the court as a “kangaroo court”, nor any legal challenge to that conclusion. He recites, in the statement of claim, that he is treating those appeal court judges “... just as the public gallery and they are welcome to listen to my issues I have with ‘Crime and Misconduct Commission’ and then I presented my case in legitimate court without illegitimate judges”. 

The prayer for relief seeks orders, again, for a public apology; for a declaration that the QPS be declared a “CRIMINAL ORGANISATION”; and that persons associated with the QPS be sent to re-education facilities and subjected to hard labour. 

Mr Markan brought an application that a Trial Division judge, sitting in applications, make orders freezing QPS’s bank accounts and all available assets and, indeed selling the QPS including its assets if the amount “... in bank accounts is not sufficient to cover my legal Claim”; and, in any event, for the payment to him of $10,000,000.13. 

Do any of Mr Markan’s claims have substance? 

It might be argued by Mr Markan, as a non-lawyer and a self-represented litigant, that the various terms used by judges to describe his proceedings and his conduct of them are expressed in lawyerly terms and, in some cases, a form of judicial shorthand, and that no court or judge has ever actually pointed out or explained to him, citing chapter and verse, why all the relief he seeks is without any legal basis and doomed to fail. It is appropriate, then, to consider the basis of his claims and, for the sake of finality, to consider if any have any merit or substance. 

First, there is no basis for his claims alleging contracts with some defendants, and breaches of them. BAQ’s initiation of an investigation, for example, did not bring into existence a contract with Mr Markan for the simple reason the alleged transaction did not occur, is entirely unilateral, and lacks a fundamental prerequisite for the creation of a contract: an offer, and its acceptance. 

Secondly, Mr Markan attempts to rely upon a number of international treaties to support his contention that the judicial selection process, set out in s 59 of the Queensland Constitution, overlooks fundamental human rights; and, therefore, that the judges are biased because they are chosen from a particular portion of society, namely lawyers. 

He relies, for this argument, upon the right to a “fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law” guaranteed by Article 14 of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and a number of other articles concerning equal treatment; but, his contention that the ICCPR is binding law in Queensland by virtue of ss 109 and 117 of the Australian Constitution is incorrect, as it does not bring into play constitutional issues regarding inconsistencies between Commonwealth and State laws, nor laws that discriminate between residents of different States. 

Further, the ICCPR is an international treaty that is not directly enforceable by Australian courts. Mr Markan points to the replication of much of the ICCPR in the human rights legislation in Victoria and the Australian Capital Territory, but these statutes are not applicable in Queensland, and there is no comparable Queensland Act that establishes that the ICCPR is binding in this State. For the same reason, the Supreme Court of Queensland has no jurisdiction to determine alleged breaches of other international treaties, including the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, and the Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg. 

Thirdly, Mr Markan relies on anti-discrimination legislation to further his argument relating to the unfairness of judicial appointments. Mr Markan cannot rely on the Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth), as it invests that Commission with a statutory jurisdiction beyond the scope of this Court. Mr Markan also contends that the suppression of his claim is “direct discrimination” (section 9(a)) and discrimination on the basis of a “political belief or activity” (section 7(j)) under the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld), but he is unable to provide factual evidence demonstrating direct discrimination in the legal sense, namely how he has been treated “less favourably” by the BAQ, on the basis of his political beliefs or the political activities in which he might engage. 

Fourthly, he claims that the judicial selection process in Queensland is inconsistent with principles enunciated by the Magna Carta, the Due Process of Law Act 1368 and the Statute of Monopolies 1623. Although these historical instruments were received as English law by the Australian colonies through a number of Imperial Acts, they are not binding legislation. This is because, like all British statutes, they do not apply to the extent that the Commonwealth or Queensland legislatures have chosen, through exercising their parliamentary sovereignty, to override them. 

Finally, he refers to Mabo (No 2)[26] to suggest that judges of the Supreme Court do not have judicial authority because that case established that “previous pretences that Australia was an empty country or empty place is [sic] not valid” and that ”that law of the land is an Aboriginal law”. Although Mr Markan’s first contention is correct and the High Court did reject the doctrine of terra nullius and recognise common law native title, it did not undermine or supersede Anglo-Australian law per se or impact on the validity of the appointment of judicial officers in this country. 

Should an order be made against Mr Markan under the VPA? 

BAQ’s contention, is, in short, that Mr Markan has serially instituted and pursued vexatious proceedings against BAQ and other parties, and there is an irresistible inference that he will continue to do so. 

Under s 6 of the VPA a “vexatious proceedings order” can be made if the court is satisfied if the person has frequently instituted or conducted vexatious proceedings in Australia. ... The analysis of each of the actions set out earlier, and of the absence of any legal substance in the claims made in any of them, shows a similarity of form and content – fanciful claims, with no basis in law, as to the existence of a contract for the provision of a service which is, itself, plainly fictitious and ridiculous; claims for extraordinarily high damages, the calculation of which has no rational nor sensible basis; the making of unsubstantiated and baseless, but very serious, accusations against each defendant, supplemented by affidavit material and written submissions which repeat or expand upon those statements and, also, extend to include judges in general, and specific members of the judiciary; regular appeals, to the limit of the appeals process, in which the appeal involves nothing more than a rerunning of arguments previously said to be without merit, and hopeless – and, the use of the appeal forum to repeat unjustified, baseless and sometimes scandalous accusations (including personal attacks upon the judge who decided the matter under appeal); and, applications to judges who preside over cases involving Mr Markan to recuse themselves. 

A number of judges have now categorised and described Mr Markan’s proceedings, the claims he makes, the relief he seeks, and the interlocutory applications and appeals he has brought as, variously (but not exhaustively), baseless, scandalous, an abuse of process, outrageous, fanciful, unsustainable, patently ridiculous, frivolous, vexatious, misguided, manifestly without merit, and doomed to fail. 

Despite his many setbacks in the courts, and statements by a number of judges in those terms (and adverse costs orders), he persists. The absence of any legal basis for his actions, combined with his perseverance in the face of these adverse judgments, compels the conclusion that his proceedings are vexatious within the meaning of that term in the VPA. 

There is another aspect of the various proceedings brought by Mr Markan which, in my view, tells strongly against him and cements the conclusion that the actions are vexatious: despite what has now so often been said to him by courts and judges, he has learnt nothing from those decisions and judgments and displays no insight into what they reveal about the manifest shortcomings in his conduct of his litigation. 

A vivid example is that, when applications are brought to strike out his proceedings and he is allowed the opportunity to amend, he does not do so in a way which is responsive, or rational; rather, his amended claims and pleadings are more extravagant, and less coherent, than the documents he initially filed. The rules and practice of proper pleading are not easily learned, but the remedies he seeks have become increasingly disconnected from reality, and bizarre. The zenith (or nadir) might be said to be his attack upon s 59 of the Queensland Constitution and the claims he now makes about sitting judges. ... It is compelling that Mr Markan has brought proceedings which, being without merit or prospects of success, are an abuse of the process of the court. The history of the proceedings he has begun, involving ridiculous and impossible claims, also compels the conclusion that they have been instituted (whether deliberately or otherwise) to harass, annoy, to cause delay or detriment, or for another wrongful purpose; and, that his conduct of the proceedings themselves should also be described in that way. 

... Mr Markan has already taken up a great deal of time and trouble (and public resources) in the Trial Division, the Queensland Court of Appeal, and the High Court. He should be stopped.