26 March 2015

Data Sales

Who gets the data when things go wrong? In the US retailer RadioShack is reportedly trying to auction its customer data - a mere 117 million customers - as part of its court-supervised bankruptcy. The data supposedly includes "consumer names, phone numbers, mailing addresses, e-mail addresses, and, where allowed, activity data".

Minor problem: RadioShack  has recurrently stated that it "will not sell or rent your personally identifiable information to anyone at any time".

RadioShack has made undertakings to its in-store and online customers that personal identifying information would not be sold, with signage for example indicating
The information you give us is treated with discretion and respect. We pride ourselves on not selling our private mailing list. From time to time, we may send you information from our company or from select, responsible companies that may join with RadioShack to bring you special offers
The  Tennessee and Texas governments, along with telco AT&T (for which RadioShack was a mobile phone service agent) have objected to the sale, variously arguing that the data isn't RadioShack's to sell or that it's grossly undervalued.

The proposed sale is reminiscent of dot com sales more than a decade ago, which resulted in tighter protection for information about minors (for example gathered through online toy sales) but not adults.

TPPA and Health

'Explaining China's Tripartite Strategy Towards the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Agreement' by Ming Du in (2015) 18(2) Journal of International Economic Law argues that
The emergence of mega-regional trade agreements like the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) threatens to fragment global trade governance in fundamental ways. An important question, yet so far under-explored, is how the rising powers currently being excluded from the mega- regionals, such as China, view this new development in global economic governance. This article intends to fill this gap in literature from a Chinese perspective. Specifically, this article addresses the following questions: why has China changed its initial suspicious attitude to a more neutral stance towards the TPP recently? What are the short-term and long-term effects of the TPP on China’s economic growth and geo-political influence? How will China deal with a myriad of challenges posed by the TPP going forward, be it in or outside the TPP? After the analysis of a range of relevant political, economic and legal factors, I submit that the Chinese government has adopted what I call a ‘tripartite strategy’ towards the TPP. What remains to be seen is whether this tripartite strategy provides the best roadmap for China’s further integration into the global economy.
'Trade Policy and Public Health' by Sharon Friel, Libby Hattersley and Ruth Townsend in (2015) 36 Annual Review of Public Health 325-344 comments 
Twenty-first-century trade policy is complex and affects society and population health in direct and indirect ways. Without doubt, trade policy influences the distribution of power, money, and resources between and within countries, which in turn affects the natural environment; people's daily living conditions; and the local availability, quality, affordability, and desirability of products (e.g., food, tobacco, alcohol, and health care); it also affects individuals' enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health. In this article, we provide an overview of the modern global trade environment, illustrate the pathways between trade and health, and explore the emerging twenty-first-century trade policy landscape and its implications for health and health equity. We conclude with a call for more interdisciplinary research that embraces complexity theory and systems science as well as the political economy of health and that includes monitoring and evaluation of the impact of trade agreements on health.

Speech

'Corporate Speech and the First Amendment: History, Data, and Implications' by John C. Coates IV draws
on empirical analysis, history, and economic theory to show that corporations have begun to displace individuals as direct beneficiaries of the First Amendment and to outline an argument that the shift reflects economically harmful rent seeking. The history of corporations, regulation of commercial speech, and First Amendment case law is retold, with an emphasis on the role of constitutional entrepreneur Justice Lewis Powell, who prompted the Supreme Court to invent corporate and commercial speech rights. The chronology shows that First Amendment doctrine long post-dated both pervasive regulation of commercial speech and the rise of the U.S. as the world’s leading economic power – a chronology with implications for originalists, and for policy. Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals decisions are analyzed to quantify the degree to which corporations have displaced individuals as direct beneficiaries of First Amendment rights, and to show that they have done so recently, but with growing speed since Virginia Pharmacy, Bellotti, and Central Hudson. Nearly half of First Amendment challenges now benefit business corporations and trade groups, rather than other kinds of organizations or individuals, and the trend-line is up. Such cases commonly constitute a form of corruption: the use of litigation by managers to entrench reregulation in their personal interests at the expense of shareholders, consumers, and employees. In aggregate, they degrade the rule of law, rendering it less predictable, general and clear. This corruption risks significant economic harms in addition to the loss of a republican form of government.

23 March 2015

Personal Property Securities

The report on the Review of the Personal Property Securities Act 2009 (Cth) deals with legislation aimed at establishing "a single, national set of rules for secured credit using personal property".

The intention is that the rules would "provide greater certainty for Australian businesses, credit providers and consumers", reducing the cost of secured finance and to making it easier for businesses and consumers to use their assets as security.

The Report thus considers:
  • the effect of the reforms introduced by the Act; 
  • the level of awareness and understanding of the Act; 
  • the incidence and causes of non-compliance with the Act; 
  • opportunities for minimising regulatory and administrative burdens including cost; and  opportunities for further efficiencies. 
  • the scope and definitions of personal property; 
  • the desirability of introducing thresholds; 
  • the interaction of the Act with other legislation; and 
  • other relevant matters. 
The Report includes "extensive recommendations on how to improve the Act, including simplification of the Act and of the register established by the Act".

The Reviewer states
A paradigm shift in our law 
The Personal Property Securities Act 2009 (the Act) revolutionised the law and practice of secured transactions in Australia. It established an entirely new regime for the creation, legal effect and enforcement of security interests in personal property. In doing so, it replaced a number of complex and fragmented sets of rules with a single set of rules that apply to security interests in personal property. The Act did not do this by simply standardising the rules for existing legal structures. Instead, the Act took an entirely new approach to secured transactions laws, based on principles that had been developed and implemented in a number of overseas jurisdictions, most notably in the United States, Canada and New Zealand. This approach largely ignores the form that parties choose for their transaction or even who has title to the property, and instead focuses on the transaction’s commercial substance to determine whether it should be treated as a security interest. This was a radical shift in approach for Australian law. 
Effect of the reforms 
The Replacement Explanatory Memorandum for the Act stated that the purpose of the Act was to provide “more certain, consistent, simpler and cheaper arrangements for personal property securities”. The clear feedback from submissions to the review is that much still needs to be done if the Act is to achieve these goals. The Act has improved consistency in Australia’s secured transactions laws, but submissions emphasised that the Act and the Register are far too complex and that their meaning is often unclear, and that the resultant uncertainty has not allowed the Act to reach its potential. Submissions maintained that much can be done to simplify the content of the Act, and that this would make the Act much more accessible to users and easier to work with. Simplifying the Act will help it to achieve its objectives, as simpler and clearer rules can lead to more predictable outcomes. More predictable outcomes would give financiers greater confidence in the Act and in their ability to take effective security interests under it. That, in turn, would assist borrowers to use their assets as collateral, and enhance their ability to raise cost-effective finance. 
What can be done? 
Much can be done to improve the Act. The Act is significantly longer than the corresponding legislation in other jurisdictions, and while some of that additional length is attributable to constitutional or other machinery provisions, much of it flows from the very prescriptive nature of some of the drafting, and from the inclusion of additional provisions that may be of only marginal benefit. The Act has also adopted a number of concepts and policy choices from overseas models without it being clear as to what extent those concepts and policy choices were appropriate for Australian business conditions. The Act will be much more effective as a piece of Australian legislation if these concepts and policy choices can be tested against Australian operating conditions and expectations, and modified where this is needed. There is no one single step that by itself will produce a major improvement to the Act. Rather, improvement needs to come from the making of many small changes. 
Stakeholder input 
The work of the review has relied very heavily on input from stakeholders. The review sought the views of stakeholders through two rounds of submissions, and four consultation papers. In all, the review received 88 submissions and 83 responses to the consultation papers, from stakeholders such as industry organisations, individual businesses, law firms and law societies, government organisations representing business, consumer and privacy interests, and members of the academic legal community. Their views underpin the recommendations in this report. 
Recommendations for change 
The outcomes of the review as they relate to the Act and the Register are set out in Chapters 4 to 9 of this report. Those Chapters group the many issues by topic. The discussion of each issue consists of an explanation of the issue, consideration of the feedback received from stakeholders, and my recommendations in relation to it. For convenience, all the recommendations are also listed separately at the end of this report, in Annexure E. There was a strong consensus in the views of stakeholders on the great majority of issues. There were a number of issues, however, on which stakeholders were more divided, often because of differing philosophical starting points or competing policy preferences. My recommendations on those issues reflect what I believe, after careful consideration, to be the appropriate balance of the competing perspectives. I was not in a position to make a properly–informed recommendation on a small number of questions, mostly as the result of a lack of information. In those cases, I have instead recommended a path that Government could follow in order to reach an appropriate resolution of the issue. 
Implementation will be critical 
Making major changes to legislation of this complexity is itself a complex task. Care will need to be taken to ensure that the changes do not inadvertently upset existing rights, to ensure that the amended Act is internally consistent, and to ensure that the detail of the drafting is effective to respond to the concerns that it is designed to address. I make some recommendations on these matters in Chapter 10. 
A fresh education campaign 
The reforms introduced by the Act will only realise their objectives if the people that it affects are aware of it, and understand how it affects them. Government went to considerable efforts to raise awareness of the Act around the time that the Act was passed, but general awareness of the Act appears to have remained low, and the complexity and unfamiliarity of the content of the Act have meant that many do not know how to work with it. My anecdotal understanding is that there is now a higher level of awareness of the Act, especially among small businesses, but that more can still be done to ensure that businesses and consumers that are affected by the Act are aware of it. I believe that the recommendations in Chapters 4 to 9 will help to make the Act simpler and clearer, and so much easier to understand and work with. The Act will always be a complex piece of legislation, however, and its implications for businesses and consumers will not always be straight-forward. In addition to increasing public awareness of the existence of the Act, Government should also take steps to increase understanding, among both businesses and the legal community, of the detailed effects of the Act. I make some recommendations on these matters in Chapter 10 as well.

Data Breach Compensation

US retailer Target is reported to agreed to establish a US$10m fund for victims of the 2013 data breach, which exposed details of around 40 million customers.

Victims will need to fill out a claim form covering whether they used a credit or debit card at a Target store in the U.S. between 27 November and 18 December 2013 and whether they have reason to believe that their information was compromised as a result of doing so.

The fund gives effect to a settlement in a class-action lawsuit.

The settlement requires Target to -
  • maintain a “written information security program” that it monitors and evaluates with metrics, 
  • establish a process for responding to security risks, and 
  • create a formal program to train Target employees on data security. 
Losses covered by the claim form include -
  • unauthorized/unreimbursed charges, 
  • fees for hiring someone to correct a credit report, 
  • late and declined payment fees, 
  • costs for monitoring accounts or replacing important documents post-breach,
  • up to two hours of “lost time” (billable at $10 per hour). 
In practice the requirement for “reasonable documentation that the claimed losses were actually incurred and more likely than not arose from the Intrusion" will limit the pool of claimants.

The New York Times states
The retailer estimated recently that it had already accrued $252 million in expenses related to the data breach as of the end of January, a figure it said would be partly offset by an expected $90 million in insurance payouts. That estimate was based on the prospect of settling many lawsuits, Target said. 
Target faces further claims from three of the four major credit card companies, and is likely to face action from the fourth, it said in an annual filing on March 13. State and federal agencies, including the state attorneys general, the Federal Trade Commission and the Securities and Exchange Commission, are also investigating the breach, and may seek to impose fines and other penalties, according to Target.

22 March 2015

Editing Embryos

Three calls to restrict the use of genome-editing tools to modify the DNA of human embryos.

In 'Don’t edit the human germ line' Edward Lanphier, Fyodor Urnov, Sarah Ehlen Haecker, Michael Werner and Joanna Smolenski in Nature comment
It is thought that studies involving the use of genome-editing tools to modify the DNA of human embryos will be published shortly.
There are grave concerns regarding the ethical and safety implications of this research. There is also fear of the negative impact it could have on important work involving the use of genome-editing techniques in somatic (non-reproductive) cells.
We are all involved in this latter area of work. One of us (F.U.) helped to develop the first genome-editing technology, zinc-finger nucleases (ZFNs), and is now senior scientist at the company developing them, Sangamo BioSciences of Richmond, California. The Alliance for Regenerative Medicine (ARM; in which E.L., M.W. and S.E.H. are involved), is an international organization that represents more than 200 life-sciences companies, research institutions, non-profit organizations, patient-advocacy groups and investors focused on developing and commercializing therapeutics, including those involving genome editing.
Genome-editing technologies may offer a powerful approach to treat many human diseases, including HIV/AIDS, haemophilia, sickle-cell anaemia and several forms of cancer. All techniques currently in various stages of clinical development focus on modifying the genetic material of somatic cells, such as T cells (a type of white blood cell). These are not designed to affect sperm or eggs.
In our view, genome editing in human embryos using current technologies could have unpredictable effects on future generations. This makes it dangerous and ethically unacceptable. Such research could be exploited for non-therapeutic modifications. We are concerned that a public outcry about such an ethical breach could hinder a promising area of therapeutic development, namely making genetic changes that cannot be inherited.
At this early stage, scientists should agree not to modify the DNA of human reproductive cells. Should a truly compelling case ever arise for the therapeutic benefit of germ­line modification, we encourage an open discussion around the appropriate course of action.
'A prudent path forward for genomic engineering and germline gene modification' by David Baltimore, Paul Berg, Michael Botchan, Dana Carroll, R. Alta Charo, George Church, Jacob E. Corn, George Q. Daley, Jennifer A. Doudna, Marsha Fenner, Henry T. Greely, Martin Jinek, G. Steven Martin,Edward Penhoet,Jennifer Puck,Samuel H. Sternberg,Jonathan S. Weissman, Keith R. Yamamoto, in Science argues that
A framework for open discourse on the use of CRISPR-Cas9 technology to manipulate the human genome is urgently needed.
The authors go on to recommend
  • Strongly discourage clinical application of this technology at this time. 
  • Create forums for education and discussion 
  • Encourage open research to evaluate the utility of CRISPR-Cas9 technology for both human and nonhuman model systems. 
  • Hold an international meeting to consider these issues and possibly make policy recommendation. 
That's consistent with the International Society for Stem Cell Research policy statement on human germline gene editing, which calls for a ban on clinical application of human germline gene editing technology but is less restrictive on laboratory activity.

The ISSCR
calls for a moratorium on attempts at clinical application of nuclear genome editing of the human germ line to enable more extensive scientific analysis of the potential risks of genome editing and broader public discussion of the societal and ethical implications.

21 March 2015

Passwords and Devices at NZ Borders

The New Zealand Customs Service has released a discussion paper [PDF] regarding a review of the Customs and Excise Act 1996.

The paper proposes an amendment of the Act to give Customs personnel the power to require people to disclose passwords to their electronic devices when entering New Zealand, with failure to do so in the absence of a reasonable excuse would be an offence punishable with three months imprisonment. The rationale is that the power would be useful in 'helping detect objectionable material' and 'evidence of other offending, such as drugs offences'. It would also allow officials to verify an individual's travel plans, given that tickets and booking details are often held on computers and smartphones.

Officials would also be authorised to compel people to empty their pockets, currently not permitted unless those officials have "reasonable cause". The discussion paper indicates that it is rare for people to refuse to empty their pockets when asked, but "even a small proportion of people refusing to do so can present a significant threat to New Zealand".

Interestingly, enterprises would be permitted to hold their business records overseas with prior approval by Customs, something that would make it easier for "trusted businesses" to take advantage of overseas cloud computing services.

The paper states
When Customs does examine a person’s electronic device, the owner is not legally obliged to provide us with a password or encryption key to access the device. We have found that it is relatively uncommon for someone to refuse to provide this, but if they do refuse it can mean we have no way of uncovering evidence of criminal offending even when we know the device does hold this evidence.
If a person refuses to provide access, it is likely that Customs will seize the device for forensic examination and not return it immediately to the owner (unless there is nothing to suggest the device contains prohibited material). However, some devices cannot be accessed and examined by our Electronic Forensics Unit without password or encryption access. If Customs cannot require access to an electronic device, it is not possible to treat the device in the same way that we treat the examination of accompanying baggage. This undermines the purpose of examining electronic devices and is a barrier to us effectively investigating and prosecuting criminal offending.
The Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism Act 2009 empowers us to require a person to provide access (such as passwords, codes and encryption keys) to an electronic device in relation to the movement of cash in breach of that Act. The Search and Surveillance Act also imposes this obligation on owners of devices where a search is performed under that Act; however, searches under that Act usually take place only if criminal offending is suspected.
The paper goes on to discuss options -
Our preferred solutions
Examining electronic devices: Explicitly include electronic devices in the scope of routine baggage searches This option would include an explicit reference to electronic devices in the new Act. Customs officers would continue to be able to examine electronic devices as part of a routine baggage search (if required), but there would be greater transparency for the public. This option would continue the practice of performing an initial examination on electronic devices without a threshold having to be met. This would confirm that Customs treats electronic devices and their content in the same way as physical goods accompanying a person across the border. In our view, this would allow us to adapt to changing technology and new methods of concealing prohibited material, such as objectionable material.
This option would also continue the practice of only performing full forensic examinations of electronic devices and copying the material when evidence of prohibited material or illegal activities is discovered on the device. The search is then escalated to a full forensic search of the device (see the diagram on page 133 for the current escalation process). This aligns with our personal search powers, where there may be an escalation from a routine baggage search to a personal search.
Customs does not examine the content of electronic devices outside of a routine baggage or personal search, and this would not change under this option.
This option is consistent with similar powers available to customs agencies in Australia, Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom. However, developing law in other countries is beginning to place greater weight on the privacy implications associated with information contained on electronic devices, including at the border.
Passwords and encryption: Require a person to provide a password or encryption key on request
Under this option, a new power would be included in the new Act to authorise Customs officers to require access to an electronic device in order to examine that device effectively. Access is likely to be in the form of a password, encryption key, or identification access.
A new offence and penalty would be included for failing to provide the relevant access when required to do so.
This option is consistent with the powers that Customs has under the Search and Surveillance Act 2012, and also the Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism Act 2009, to require people to provide access to an electronic device. It also aligns with comparable countries, such as Australia, the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom.
Other solutions we are considering
Examining electronic devices: Allow for the examination of electronic devices but with a threshold
This option would include an explicit reference to electronic devices in the new Act, as with our preferred option for examining electronic devices. But it would only allow Customs officers to examine electronic devices once a threshold has been met (rather than as part of a routine baggage search).
It is likely that this threshold would be similar to that currently provided for invoking our personal search powers, which is a reasonable suspicion that a person is hiding certain material on or about their person. In this case the threshold could instead be reasonable suspicion that an electronic device holds certain material. We believe that having a threshold that must be met before we can examine an electronic device does not allow us to meet the changing risks that electronic goods pose at the border. Under this option, electronic devices would not be treated in the same way as physical goods accompanying a person across the border; instead they would be treated in the same way as people suspected of hiding prohibited goods on their person.
A more practical alternative may be to limit a threshold to escalated searches. For example, a preliminary or cursory search of a device could be conducted as part of a routine baggage search, but any further search, such as cloning, forensic analysis, and copying of the content on the device, could be subject to a threshold. This threshold would probably be based on what material is found on the device during the preliminary examination.
Passwords and encryption: Apply the Search and Surveillance Act to Customs’ powers to examine electronic devices
This option would extend the scope of section 130 of the Search and Surveillance Act 2012 to apply to Customs’ examinations of electronic devices at the border. That particular section places a duty on a person to assist with access to an electronic device when required to do so by an officer exercising a search power that relates to data held on the device. This section does not currently apply to Customs’ examination of goods powers.
This option would extend section 130 to cover whichever option is adopted for the examination of electronic devices. This would enable Customs to require a person to provide the relevant access to the electronic device without the need for a separate provision in the Customs and Excise Act.
The offence for failing to comply with this obligation without reasonable excuse would also apply, and, if convicted, the person would be liable to a maximum prison term of three months.
Reporting requirements also accompany the search powers in the Search and Surveillance Act: any person who exercises a warrantless search power (such as searching an electronic device) must report in writing on the search as soon as practicable. Customs’ chief executive would also be required by that Act to report on the exercise of these powers in every annual report to Parliament under this option.
However, these reporting requirements would create unrealistic obligations for Customs, as there could potentially be electronic device examinations a number of times each day. When the Search and Surveillance Act was passed, Parliament deliberately did not extend that Act to all of Customs’ powers because the border environment is unique. If this option is adopted it may be possible to exclude the reporting requirements from Customs’ use of this power.
Status quo
Retaining the status quo would mean that Customs would be hampered in responding to changing risks related to technology. Because the Customs and Excise Act does not explicitly refer to electronic devices, it can be difficult for the public to identify when Customs can search these devices.
This option would not restrict Customs from continuing to examine electronic devices as part of routine baggage searches at the border. But we would not have the power to require a person to provide access to that device, and there could be a lack of transparency for the public.
Currently, there are costs and other impacts associated with us not being able to require access to electronic devices, both for Customs and for the device’s owner. These include: prolonged questioning by Customs officers; devices being seized for extended periods; and Customs being unable to examine the devices efficiently to identify evidence of criminal offending. In some cases, searches may be escalated unnecessarily because a person has refused to provide a password.
Who would be affected by change
The issue of access to electronic devices mainly affects international air passengers.
Most people voluntarily give Customs access to their electronic device when requested, and options involving legislative change would target the handful of people who refuse to provide access. However, the number who refuse may increase as technology continues to develop.
Customs recognises that accessing a person’s smartphone or laptop can be a sensitive and personal matter, as many people will have personal items such as family photos or emails on their devices. The options we have identified raise issues of individual privacy and the need for protection against unreasonable search, and those considerations need to be balanced against the need to protect the community from harm.
Whichever option is adopted, the power to examine electronic devices will continue to be constrained by the protection in the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 against unreasonable search. The collection or use of any personal information will also continue to be governed by the Privacy Act 1993. Specifically, personal information collected from electronic devices will be used only for the purposes for which it was collected. This is achieved by limiting any initial examination to a cursory screening, rather than a full forensic analysis.