07 January 2017

Mediation

Last month the NSW Law Reform Commission released its Consultation Paper 18 - Dispute resolution: Model provisions. The paper reflects 2013 Terms of Reference aimed at improving legislative provisions dealing with alternative dispute resolution, in particular recommendations regarding 'a consistent model or models for dispute resolution in statutory contexts, including court ordered mediation and alternative dispute resolution'(excluding dispute resolution under the Commercial Arbitration Act 2010 (NSW) or Industrial Relations Act 1996 (NSW).)

The Commission comments
Alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”) is generally regarded as providing many benefits for disputing parties, especially in reducing costs and delays as compared with litigation. Our terms of reference require us to consider improving or updating the legislative provisions dealing with ADR and to consider the possibility of recommending a consistent model or models for ADR. ... 
In undertaking this review the Commission should have regard to:
  • the desirability of just, quick and cheap resolution of disputes through use of mediation and other forms of dispute resolution in appropriate contexts 
  • issues of referral powers (including timing of referrals), confidentiality, status of agreements reached, and proper protections required for the parties, mediators, and others involved in dispute resolution 
  •  the proper role for legislation, contract and other legal frameworks in establishing frameworks for dispute resolution  
  • any related matters the Commission considers appropriate. ...
ADR can provide many benefits for disputing parties. It can reduce the costs and delays associated with litigation and facilitate flexible outcomes. In the context of litigation, ADR can keep disputes private (instead of being exposed in public hearings) and can ensure cases are managed effectively, for example, by narrowing the issues in dispute. It can also assist the parties in preserving, repairing or improving ongoing relationships. 
[We] sought submissions on a variety of ADR processes in NSW statutes. Mediation emerged from this as the focal point of stakeholder discussion. Mediation and quasi-mediation processes in NSW statutes vary in detail and coverage and are often inconsistent. This patchwork contributes to uncertainty among users. In particular, it is sometimes unclear exactly what types of dispute resolution are available and what safeguards apply in particular statutory contexts. Further, there are currently no provisions that protect parties during commercial/consensual mediation outside a judicial or statutory context. 
Despite the patchwork nature of the statutory provisions in NSW, we are not persuaded that there would be significant benefit in attempting to rationalise these provisions into one or a small number of models. Rather we see a benefit in developing model provisions that would apply to mediations taking place outside any statutory or judicial context, unless their application was excluded.
The Commission accordingly recommends model provisions, that in summary are -
Model provision 1: Definitions of accredited mediator and mediation (page 5) 
“Accredited mediator” means a person who is accredited by a Recognised Mediator Accreditation Body in accordance with the National Mediator Accreditation System. “Mediation” means a process in which the parties to a dispute, with the assistance of a third party dispute resolution practitioner (the mediator), come together in an endeavour to resolve their dispute. It includes a process that fits this description even when such a process is described as “conciliation” or “neutral evaluation”. 
Model Provision 2: Confidentiality and admissibility of mediation communications in evidence 
(1) Definitions “Mediation communication” means (a) anything said or done (b) any document prepared, or (c) any information provided, for the purposes of mediation, in the course of mediation, or to follow up mediation including any invitation to mediate or any mediation agreement. “Tribunal” means a tribunal established under statute and includes both administrative and arbitral tribunals. 
(2) Confidentiality of mediation communications
(a) A person must not disclose a mediation communication except as provided for by Model Provision 2(2)(b) or (2)(c). 
(b) A person may disclose a mediation communication if: (i) all the parties to the mediation consent and, if the information relates to the mediator, the mediator agrees to the disclosure (ii) the disclosed information is publicly available, but is not information that is only in the public domain due to an unauthorised disclosure by that person (iii) the disclosure is made for the purpose of seeking legal advice (iv) the disclosure is required for the purposes of carrying out or enforcing a settlement agreement (v) the disclosure is required to bring a claim for mediator misconduct or to respond to such a claim (vi) the disclosure is made for research, evaluation, or educational purposes and is made without revealing, or being likely to reveal, whether directly or indirectly, the identity of any party, mediator, or other person involved in the conduct of the mediation (vii) the disclosure is required by law, or  (viii)the disclosure is required to protect the health or safety of any person. 
(c) A person may disclose a mediation communication with leave of the court or tribunal under Model Provision 2(4). 
(3) Admissibility of mediation communications in evidence A court or tribunal may admit a mediation communication in evidence in any proceedings (including judicial, arbitral, administrative or disciplinary proceedings) only by leave under Model Provision 2(4). 
(4) Leave for disclosure or admission of evidence
(a) A court or tribunal may, on application by any person, grant leave for a mediation communication to be disclosed under Model Provision 2(2)(c) or admitted in evidence under Model Provision 2(3). 
(b) For the purposes of Model Provision 2(4)(a), the court or tribunal must take into account the following matters in deciding whether to grant leave: (i) whether the mediation communication may be or has been disclosed under Model Provision 2(2)(b) (ii) whether it is in the public interest or the interests of justice for the mediation communication to be disclosed or to be admitted in evidence, notwithstanding the general public interest in favour of preserving the confidentiality of mediation communications, and (iii) any other circumstances or matters that the court or tribunal considers relevant. 
(c) Where a person seeks disclosure of admission of the mediation communication in evidence: (i) before a court, the application must be made to the court before which the proceedings are heard (ii) before a tribunal, the application must be made to the tribunal before which proceedings are heard, and (iii) in any other case, the application must be made to NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal. 
Model Provision 3: Mediator’s immunity (page 10) 
(1) No matter or thing done or omitted to be done by a mediator subjects the mediator to any personal action, liability, claim or demand if the matter or thing was done for the purposes of a mediation session under this Act. 
(2) Model Provision 3(1) does not apply if the claimant can show an absence of good faith on the mediator’s part. (3) This section is not intended to alter the operation of s 33 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) or cl 2 of sch 1 of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Regulation 2013 (NSW). 
Model Provision 4: Termination of mediation (page 12) 
(1) Where the question of whether a mediation has been terminated arises in any proceedings, the court or tribunal must determine whether the mediation has been terminated. 
(2) Unless evidence to the contrary is adduced, the court or tribunal must presume a mediation has terminated if: (a) the mediator purports to terminate a mediation (b) a party purports to terminate a mediation (c) a time limit for the mediation (and any extensions) agreed by the parties expires, or (d) litigation commences or recommences. 
Model Provision 5: Enforcement of mediated settlement agreements (page 14) 
(1) “Mediated settlement agreement” means an agreement by some or all of the parties to mediation settling the whole, or part, of their dispute. 
(2) If a party to a mediated settlement agreement fails to comply with its terms, another party wishing to enforce the agreement may, on notice to all other parties who signed the agreement, apply to the Court for orders to give effect to the agreement if:
(a) the agreement is reduced to writing and signed by the parties, and 
(b) the mediation was conducted by an accredited mediator, and 
(c) a party against whom the applicant seeks to enforce the settlement agreement has explicitly consented to such enforcement, whether by the terms of the agreement or other means. 
(3) The mediator must draw the attention of the parties to the effect of Model Provision 5(2) before the mediated settlement agreement is signed. 
(4) The Court may refuse to give orders under Model Provision 5(2) only:
(a) at the request of the party against whom it is invoked, if that party furnishes to the Court proof that the agreement is void or voidable on grounds of incapacity, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake or other invalidating cause, including that the agreement is void or voidable after a court has found it is unjust in the circumstances relating to the contract at the time it was made under the Contracts Review Act 1980 (NSW), or 
(b) if the Court finds that: (i) any of the terms of the agreement cannot be enforced as an order of the Court, or (ii) making the order would be contrary to public policy, or (iii) the mediator failed to draw the parties’ attention to the binding nature of the agreement before it was signed. 
(5) Any undertaking by one or more of the parties to a mediated settlement agreement to pay the fees and expenses of the mediator is enforceable if: (a) the amount of such fees, or (b) the means for their calculation, is specified in the agreement. 
As proposal 1 (Removal of statutory defamation privilege) the Commission recommends'
Provisions establishing a defence of absolute privilege to defamation proceedings arising from the conduct of mediations should be repealed.
Under  Implementation options the paper states
Option 1: Application to mediation under an agreement (page 19) 
This Act applies to any mediation conducted under an agreement to mediate entered into after the commencement of this Act if the mediator is an accredited mediator and: (a) the mediation is wholly or partly conducted in NSW, or (b) the agreement to mediate provides that the law of NSW is to apply to the mediation, unless the parties exclude or have excluded the operation of the Act or any provision of the Act, by agreement. 
Option 2: Application in existing and future statutes (page 20) 
The model provisions should be: (a) inserted in terms or by reference into each of the statutes that in our view would benefit from the provisions listed in Appendix A, and (b) used as a template for future legislation providing for mediation, unless the circumstances otherwise require. 
In discussing confidentiality the Commission comments
2.9 Submissions support a uniform approach to confidentiality and admissibility of mediation information in evidence. This approach should apply unless the context dictates otherwise. A strong regime in this area is essential to allay parties’ concerns that information disclosed during mediation might be used in subsequent litigation or disclosed to the public if the mediation proves unsuccessful. Although the common law provides some degree of protection, a legislative regime would provide additional certainty, allowing courts to protect information appropriately and quickly. For example, in accordance with the Mediation Ordinance 2012 (Hong Kong), the High Court of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region struck out a defence and passages of affidavits that were based on information obtained in mediation. 
The model provisions draw upon aspects of the Mediation Bill 2016 (Singapore), the Mediation Ordinance 2012 (Hong Kong) and the Commercial Mediation Act 2010 (Ontario). Submissions identified these as appropriate models. The provisions also align with provisions in the UNCITRAL Model Law, and with the exceptions to confidentiality and inadmissibility recently expounded by the UK Supreme Court. NADRAC has recommended a similar general rule about confidentiality and privilege subject to specified exceptions. 
We propose that confidentiality and admissibility be dealt with together, with courts and the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal (“NCAT”) placed in a supervisory role under Model Provision 2(4). This reduces procedural complexity and clarifies the relationship between confidentiality and “without prejudice” privilege by integrating both protections into the one regime. The provisions encourage regularity by imposing a default position against admissibility, subject to the aggrieved party being able to justify why the default position should not apply under Model Provision 2(4)(a). 
The factors in Model Provision 2(4)(b) that the courts or NCAT must consider are broadly similar to those imposed by s 138 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) with respect to the admission of illegally or improperly obtained evidence. A number of submissions supported introducing a provision like Model Provision 2(4)(b)(ii), which relates to the public interest. An example of the other circumstances or matters referred to in Model Provision 2(4)(b)(iii) is where there is no concluded settlement but one party to the negotiations has made a clear statement, intending the other party to act on it and the other party has in fact acted, giving rise to an estoppel. 
The exceptions to confidentiality in the recommended provision are broadly consistent with those provided by s 131 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) that exclude evidence of settlement negotiations. Section 131 prevents evidence from being introduced if it concerns communications between disputing parties. This applies in the context of legal proceedings and is not likely to operate where formal legal proceedings have not yet been instituted. The model provisions would expressly extend this protection beyond the litigation context. This supports the role of mediation as a dispute resolution option in its own right.
Comments on the removal of the defamation privilege are
A defence of absolute privilege to defamation proceedings arising from mediations was first introduced by the Community Justice Centres pilot project in 1980. The co-ordinating committee thought it likely that mediations might involve “a heated exchange of views, accusations and abuse” and considered it desirable to protect the parties to a mediation from possible suits for defamation. Along with subsequent provisions based upon it,, this privilege has never been tested. Similarly, there is no known evidence to support the claim made when justifying its insertion into the Land and Environment Court Act 1979 (NSW) in 2007 that “without the protection afforded by [defamation privilege], parties involved in a [mediation] might be less frank and less willing to make concessions to settle a dispute”. 
However, given that mediation communications are inadmissible, purportedly defamatory statements made in the course of mediation will be inadmissible in any attempt to prosecute a defamation claim, unless one of the proposed exceptions applies. Likewise, as mediation communications are confidential and thus cannot “leave the room”, the risk of damage from any purportedly defamatory statement is limited. The good faith immunity provided to mediators also protects them against liability for defamation. 
An express statutory privilege against defamation is, therefore, superfluous. The absence of defamation privilege in any international mediation legislation supports this conclusion. We therefore propose that NSW repeal provisions that establish a defence of absolute privilege to defamation claims. Such a privilege should not be included in any generally applicable statute on mediation.

Corporate and other disclosure

'Too Big to Disclose: Firm Size and Materiality Blindspots in Securities Regulation' by George  Georgiev in (2017) 64 UCLA Law Review comments
This Article argues that the securities disclosure regime contains previously unexamined structural deficiencies, which pertain to the information provided by the largest public companies. These deficiencies arise from the operation of the materiality standard, a core element of the disclosure regime that is used in a number of disclosure rules. The materiality standard is designed to limit firms’ disclosure to information that would be of importance to investors, and to prevent the overproduction of information. I argue, however, that in the case of large firms the materiality standard can also lead to the underproduction of information — or to “materiality blindspots.” Since the threshold for what is material increases as firms get bigger, at the very largest firms even matters that are significant or sizeable in absolute terms may be deemed immaterial and remain undisclosed. Such firms are “too big to disclose” and, in a perfectly legal manner, take advantage of the materiality standard to avoid disclosure. 
I illustrate the materiality blindspots phenomenon by analyzing the disclosure rules in three key areas (material contracts, material legal proceedings, and material business spending) and presenting original case studies of the disclosure practices of large firms. After revisiting accepted theory on disclosure regulation through the prism of firm size and analyzing examples from the case studies, I identify two sets of potential harms. First, materiality blindspots may undermine investor protection and corporate governance, including by diminishing stock price accuracy and making inside and outside monitoring for fraud, waste, or suboptimal management practices more difficult. Second, the materiality standard may give systematic advantages to large firms and lead to market distortions, in effect serving as a regulatory subsidy for bigness. I suggest that certain disclosure requirements that currently rely only on the materiality standard should be supplemented with targeted rules employing quantitative thresholds. This could provide a safety net against materiality blindspots by requiring large firms to disclose additional information that is not caught by the existing materiality standard, but that is significant or sizeable in absolute terms. 
'Case Note: ASG v Hayne - A Case iof Publish and Not Be Damned' by Jeremy Finn in [2016] New Zealand Criminal Law Review 86 comments
The decision in ASG v Hayne has significant implications for persons seeking permanent name suppression. This appears to have been the first time the Court of Appeal has been called upon to consider the meaning of “publication” under section 200 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2011. Unfortunately the decision raises at least as many questions as it answers. Some of these difficulties may reflect the fact that the case came before the Court of Appeal on appeal from the Employment Court, rather than from a criminal proceeding. 
ASG was employed by the University of Otago as a security officer. He pleaded guilty to charges of wilful damage and assaulting a female in relation to an incident unconnected with his work. The District Court Judge discharged him without conviction on both charges, on the basis that the fact of conviction would imperil his employment and such a consequence was out of all proportion to the seriousness of the offence. The judge further ordered permanent name suppression and suppression of other details under s 200 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2011. The Court of Appeal thought it probable that the order was made so that the identity of ASG would not be disclosed to his employer and no adverse consequences could ensue. 
However, the persons present at the court hearing included an employee of the University who had been informed that ASG was to be sentenced for offending. That employee made notes of the matter and then made enquiries as to whether he could disclose the details of the offending and outcome to the University authorities. He obtained legal advice from the University's lawyer, who advised him that the suppression order would not prevent communication of the information as to the charges and guilty pleas to the University as an employer and therefore to a person with a legitimate interest in knowing that an employee had pleaded guilty to conduct of the kind he was supposed to prevent. Following that advice, disclosure was made to the appropriate University personnel and the University conducted an internal investigation which led to first the appellant's suspension from his duties and later to a final written warning. 
The matter then went before the Employment Relations Authority and then, on appeal, to the Employment Court. ASG contended that the communication of information as to the hearing to the University was in breach of the suppression order and therefore the University was not entitled to have regard to it. When the matter came before the Employment Court, the court held that communication of the information did not breach the suppression order, relying principally on the High Court decision in Solicitor-General v Smith on the predecessor legislation which had held that communication of information to persons with a legitimate interest did not breach a statutory prohibition on publishing a report of court proceedings involving a young person.
Finn notes that on appeal the Court held that
the University, as employer, was a person with a genuine interest and therefore the communication to it of information had not breached the suppression order. That decision was telegraphed earlier in the judgement when the Court commenced its discussion of its own views of the matter by emphasising that an employee had a duty to disclose relevant material to her or his employer and that ASG was in breach of that duty. It may be thought that this conclusion, something at least arguably irrelevant to the meaning of “publication”, coloured the rest of the judgement.

Hohfeld

 'Hohfeldian Analysis and the Separation of Rights and Powers' by John Goldberg and Benjamin Zipursky in Shyam Balganesh, Ted Sichelman and Henry Smith (eds), The Legacy of Wesley Hohfeld: Edited Major Works, Select Personal Papers, and Original Commentaries (Cambridge University Press, forthcoming 2018) comments
At the time he wrote, Wesley Hohfeld seemed to be of the view that longstanding conceptual confusions that had blocked progress in legal thought — particularly confusions about legal rights — would soon be put to rest. If so, rights have proved a tougher nut to crack than he expected. Indeed, the difficulty of providing an adequate account of rights has led many scholars, including scholars who share Hohfeld’s aptitude and aspirations for analytic philosophy, to lose sight of a distinction central to Hohfeld’s project, namely, the distinction between a right (or claim right) and a power. Or so we argue in Part I. Worse, confusions over rights and powers, when combined with a particular understanding of what constitutes clear-eyed analysis of legal issues, has contributed to the now-widely shared but mistaken supposition that common law reasoning must (or should) take the form of instrumental reasoning. We outline this claim in Parts II and III. 
Ultimately, we suggest that Hohfeld’s juristic legacy contains two profound ironies. His entirely sound insistence on the analytic separation of legal rights and legal powers has helped to obscure their deep substantive connection in certain bodies of law, especially tort and contract law. And his implicit acceptance of the idea that a commitment to conceptual clarity goes hand in hand with instrumentalism in legal analysis has indirectly led prominent courts — including most famously the California Supreme Court in landmark decisions such as Rowland v Christian — to mangle how rights, duties, and powers are linked within private law. ... 
Legal Realists and Critical Legal Studies scholars have rightly praised Hohfeld for untangling confused concepts and thereby allowing lawyers, judges, and jurists to spot substantive normative commitments concealed as definitions. As progressive scholars have learned the hard way, however, one should not suppose that the identification of a normative commitment within a legal concept or construct will suffice to undermine it. At least since the 1980s, an increasing number of commentators and courts have embraced concepts and constructs associated with libertarianism with their eyes wide open. Exposing false claims of definitional connection can only serve as a prelude to evaluating the substantive principles that, for better or worse, are doing the normative work. 
As we see it, the connection between claim rights and legal powers in a body of law such as tort law is a happier illustration of the same point. Claim rights and legal powers, even though conceptually distinct, are substantively connected in tort law and in other branches of private law. It is a laudable and basic moral commitment of our system that a person whose legal rights against being wrongfully injured have been violated is entitled to demand redress from the violator for the violation. As tort law’s longstanding linkage of rights and powers attests, the right-remedy principle is and has long been a core substantive commitment of our legal system. We would go badly astray if a proper Hohfeldian insistence on the analytic separation of claim rights and powers caused us to lose sight of this commitment.
The same volume features 'Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld: On the Difficulty of Becoming a Law Professor' by John Henry Schlegel.

Schlegel  comments 
Wesley Hohfeld (1879 - 1918) is well known to legal philosophers and to property teachers for his table of fundamental conceptions, a terminological framework for understanding legal doctrine and reasoning. This work was also substantively important for some members of the American Legal Realist movement and Critical Legal Studies. More personally he was part of the generation of law teachers who had to figure out how to become a professional academic in the years after completion of the job of reordering of the corpus juris in the wake of the demise of the writ system. A Harvard Law School educated westerner who ambivalently wanted to move east from his post at the then decidedly non-elite Stanford Law School, Hohfeld eventually made it to the then decidedly non-elite Yale Law School. His relatively brief career sheds light on both how in the years before World War I legal academics built a professional identity and how they navigated the nascent law school network. It also raises a question of how an analytical legal scholar might have responded to later developments in jurisprudence. ...
Anyone who spends a large amount of time with newly appointed, untenured colleagues, presumably because one’s older colleagues are just not all that interesting any more, will recognize that acquiring a professional identity, in the sense of being comfortable putting pants on, tying a tie and keeping shoes shined, is both a matter of imitating the behavior of others and of fitting that behavior into an existing self. Part of that job is social and part is intellectual. However, for someone starting out in law teaching in the earliest years of the Twentieth Century, as did Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, acquiring an identity was more difficult than it is today. Academic lawyers then were still busy creating such an identity out of the social and intellectual positions in which they found themselves and from which they, as existing selves, could only limitedly escape. Understanding Hohfeld’s academic life requires that one understand the complexities of this world as it, and he too, was forming an academic identity.
Schlegel concludes
It is always sad when a good scholar, finally at the point of being able to put it all together, fades and dies, the project unfinished. This seems to be especially true of Hohfeld, however much that his project misunderstands the practice of law, an activity that thrives, indeed depends, on the ambiguity of its concepts and relations, not in the clarity he sought to bring to it. Still, one wonders whether Hohfeld just might have died happier than he would have had he lived longer. He was not a person naturally comfortable in the world. Indeed, given Corbin’s description of Hohfeld’s behavior and his expressed grounds for resisting a move to Yale, he might well be understood to be at the very high functioning end of Asperger’s Spectrum Disorder. And the fun he made of the work of Bingham’s scholarship suggests that Hohfeld would have been mighty unhappy if such a hypothetical future had unfolded pretty much as it did.
After all, analytic jurisprudence assumed that judicial decision-making was mostly founded in doctrine and that what both judges and lawyers needed to know was how to regularize the judicial action of applying doctrine, how to avoid the misuse of the fundamental legal conceptions. This is precisely the task that Cook undertook in the years around the time of Hohfeld’s death, and a large portion of what he did for the rest of his life when writing on the conflict of laws. But the Realist project that conventionally is taken to have started with Holmes’ “Path of the Law” did not assume that judicial decision-making was mostly founded in doctrine and so spoke less to judges and more toward lawyers trying to understand all of the various factors that played a part in judicial, as well as their own, decision-making. For Realist scholars such as Cook, Corbin and Llewellyn, Hohfeld’s categories identified some of the ways that the doctrinal system worked, but mostly they isolated occasions for puzzling out why judges made the decisions that they did.  Hohfeld probably understood the need for such work -- after all he made a place for it in his “Vital School of Law and Jurisprudence” as “functional or dynamic jurisprudence” -- but he surely would have been unhappy when a co-equal branch of jurisprudence began to take over the law school world to the detriment of his analytical enterprise, especially when the results of that takeover combined a weak version of analytics that goes by the name of critique, a weak version of Realism’s emphasis on social context, and a weak version of normative argument and called the mess legal scholarship.

05 January 2017

Bits and Things

'Big Data, Open Data, Privacy Regulations, Intellectual Property and Competition Law in an Internet of Things World' by Bjorn Lundqvist comments
 The interface between the legal systems triggered by the creation, distribution and consumption of Data is difficult to grasp, and this paper therefore tries to dissect this interface by following information, i.e. ‘the data’ from its sources, to users and re-users and ultimately to its consumers in an ‘Internet of Things’, or Industrial Internet, setting. The paper starts with the attempt to identify what legal systems are applicable this process, with special focus on when competition law may be useful for accessing data. The paper conclude that general competition law may not be readily available for accessing generic (personal or non-personal) Data, except for the situation where the Data set is indispensable to access an industry or a relevant market; while sector specific regulations seem to emerge as a tool for accessing Data held by competitors and third parties. However, the main issue under general competition law in the Data industry, at its current stage of development, is to create a levelled playing field by trying to facilitate the implementation of Internet of Things.
'A Critical Axiology for Big Data Studies' by Saif Shahin in (2016) 19(4) Palabra Clave 972-996 comments
Big Data is having a huge impact on journalism and communication studies. At the same time, it has raised a plethora of social concerns ranging from mass surveillance to the legitimization of prejudices such as racism. This article develops an agenda for critical Big Data research. It discusses what the purpose of such research should be, what pitfalls it should guard against, and the possibility of adapting Big Data methods to conduct empirical research from a critical standpoint. Such a research program will not only enable critical scholarship to meaningfully challenge Big Data as a hegemonic tool, but will also make it possible for scholars to draw upon Big Data resources to address a range of social issues in previously impossible ways. Te article calls for methodological innovation in combining emerging Big Data techniques with critical/qualitative methods of research, such as ethnography and discourse analysis, in ways that allow them to complement each other. 
The techno-euphoria spurred by the advent of Big Data (e.g. Anderson, 2008) is slowly giving way to uneasiness about the social effects of enormous datasets and the algorithms used to compile and analyze them (boyd & Crawford, 2012; Crawford, Miltner, and Gray, 2014; Mahrt and Scharkow, 2013; Manovich, 2012; Shahin, 2016a). Reports of malpractices by major Big Data-enabled enterprises such as Facebook and Google that compromise user privacy (Dwyer, 2011; Rubenstein and Good, 2012), along with Edward Snowden’s revelation that the U.S. government was running surveillance programs on a global scale in collusion with technology companies (Bauman et al., 2014; Lyon, 2014), have made it plain that Big Data is not the panacea for all human problems that it is sometimes made out to be. Instead, Big Data may be reinforcing social divides and exacerbating a variety of social concerns. 
A ProPublica investigation revealed that a criminal risk assessment algorithm developed by a commercial enterprise, widely used by courts and law enforcement officials across the United States, “was particularly likely to falsely flag black defendants as future criminals, wrongly labeling them this way at almost twice the rate as white defendants” (Angwin et al., 2016, para. 16). A New York Times article highlighted a series of “mistakes” committed by commonly used Big Data technologies, including Google Photos tagging black people as “gorillas,” Nikon cameras asking Asians – who often have small eyes compared with Caucasians – if they were “blinking” (Crawford, 2016). Meanwhile, reports continue to emerge about social media companies becoming ever more intrusive, collecting increasing amounts of users’ personal data to serve advertisers and even running experiments manipulating user sentiments (Dewey, 2016). 
What do these concerns mean for journalism and communication research, a field in which Big Data is having a huge impact? Scholars in our field quickly took to Big Data studies: partly because much of Big Data is generated by media and communication technologies – mobile telephones, social media, and so on – and partly because Big Data started altering the economic and operational dynamics of established media institutions especially news organizations. The surge of interest in Big Data research, and awareness of its game-changing potential, is evident in the deluge of Big Data articles being published in communication journals; special is-sues on Big Data that several journals of note have come up with, including the Journal of Communication; Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly; Journal of Broadcasting and Electronic Media; International Journal of Communication; and Media, Culture and Society; and the emergence of new journals devoted to Big Data research, such as Big Data and Society and Social Media + Society. 
This article provides an assessment of what Big Data research has come to mean in journalism and communication studies, identifying two expansive categories: research with Big Data and research on Big Data. Ten, drawing on Gitlin’s (1978) well-known critique of Katz and Lazarsfeld’s (1955) two-step flow theory as the “dominant paradigm” in media studies, the article examines the ideological underpinnings of Big Data research – now regarded as a “paradigm” in its own right (Burgess, Bruns, & Hjorth, 2013). Building on this critique, the article charts an agenda for critical Big Data research, discussing what the purpose of such research should be, what pitfalls it should guard against, and the possibility of adapting Big Data methods themselves to conduct critical research. It argues that a critical approach to Big Data is necessary not only because the problems posed by Big Data need to be explicitly examined in line with critical theory and methods, but also because developing such a research agenda can help critical scholarship in journalism and communication studies draw upon Big Data resources to address a broad range of social concerns in previously impossible ways.


Regulation Metrics

'Measuring the Temperature and Diversity of the U.S. Regulatory Ecosystem' by Michael James Bommarito II and Daniel Martin Katz comments
Over the last 23 years, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission has required over 34,000 companies to file over 165,000 annual reports. These reports, the so-called “Form 10-Ks,” contain a characterization of a company’s financial performance and its risks, including the regulatory environment in which a company operates. In this paper, we analyze over 4.5 million references to U.S. Federal Acts and Agencies contained within these reports to build a mean-field measurement of temperature and diversity in this regulatory ecosystem. While individuals across the political, economic, and academic world frequently refer to trends in this regulatory ecosystem, there has been far less attention paid to supporting such claims with large-scale, longitudinal data. 
In this paper, we document an increase in the regulatory energy per filing, i.e., a warming “temperature.” We also find that the diversity of the regulatory ecosystem has been increasing over the past two decades, as measured by the dimensionality of the regulatory space and distance between the “regulatory bitstrings” of companies. This measurement framework and its ongoing application contribute an important step towards improving academic and policy discussions around legal complexity and the regulation of large-scale human techno-social systems.
'The Economic Burden of Prescription Opioid Overdose, Abuse, and Dependence in the United States, 2013' by Curtis S Florence, Chao Zhou, Feijung Luo and Likang Xu in (2016) 54(10) Medical Care comments
It is important to understand the magnitude and distribution of the economic burden of prescription opioid overdose, abuse, and dependence to inform clinical practice, research, and other decision makers. Decision makers choosing approaches to address this epidemic need cost information to evaluate the cost effectiveness of their choices.
The authors sought to estimate the economic burden of prescription opioid overdose, abuse, and dependence from a societal perspective. They conclude that total economic burden of fatal overdose and abuse and dependence of prescription opioids is around US$78.5 billion, with over one third of due to increased health care and substance abuse treatment costs (U$28.9 billion) and approximately one quarter of the cost being borne by the public sector in health care, substance abuse treatment, and criminal justice costs.

Schmitt

‘Rational and Theocratic Authority in the Schmitt-Strauss Exchange’ by John P. McCormick in Poul F. Kjaer and Niklas Olsen (eds) Critical Theories of Crisis in Europe - From Weimar to the Euro (Rowman and Littlefield, 2016)
revisits scholarly investigations, conducted over twenty years ago, of the interwar writings of Carl Schmitt and Leo Strauss; writings in which ‘theology’ played a major role in Schmitt’s and Strauss’s criticisms of Weimar’s liberal democracy, and their respective critiques of Enlightenment politics, more generally. Two decades ago, many progressive scholars, myself included, feared that, in the wake of the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1989, a resurgent radical right in Europe might enlist religion as a crucial component in their authoritarian causes. But we never imagined that these authoritarian threats would themselves become— as they have to a remarkable extent—genuinely and thoroughly theocratic . I mention as just three examples: right-wing Christian movements in the US, politically active Orthodox Judaism in Israel, and radical forms of Islam in Europe and the Middle East. After more than twenty years’ reflection on the Schmitt-Strauss exchange, I believe that I now somewhat better understand the stakes that ‘political theology’ raises for the theocratic challenge to liberal democracy today. In this spirit, this chapter reflects a personal-political enlightenment that I hope is worth sharing with others. 
The conservative, and eventual National Socialist, jurist, Carl Schmitt, famously asserts, in The  Concept of the Political, that all genuine political philosophies are pessimistic concerning human nature. By relying extensively on Thomas Hobbes, a political thinker who strikingly illustrated the violent behaviour of man to man in the absence of authority, Schmitt clearly assumes that he has grounded his state theory on a sufficiently pessimistic conception of human beings. Indeed, what could be more pessimistic than a theory like Schmitt’s ‘friend/enemy thesis’, which insists on the centrality of enmity to political life? 
Yet, in his widely celebrated contemporary commentary on Schmitt’s 1932 book, the young Leo Strauss insists that Hobbes’s notion of man as dangerous but educable — a notion that Schmitt never fully rejects — is not sufficiently pessimistic to justify the kind of political philosophy that both Schmitt and Strauss seek as an alternative to liberalism. I will argue that Strauss, in the 1920s and early 1930s, sought a functional equivalent to traditional theocracy — a Biblical atheism, as it were—that might serve as a foundation of political authority in a simultaneously post-theistic and post-Enlightenment age. 4 Schmitt, as we know, sought an appropriately fascist (if not yet Nazi) solution to what he deemed to be liberal theory’s hopelessly contradictory principles, and liberal practice’s painfully obvious inability to resolve the near civil war circumstances of the late Weimar Republic. 
According to both Schmitt and Strauss, even though Hobbes deems man ‘dangerous’ in circumstances where authority is absent, the Malmesbury philosopher affords the subjects of his Leviathan state significant freedom of thought and action on the assumption that individuals, when governed by a sufficiently strong state, can be prudent, educable, and capable of rational, cost-benefit calculations that may prove conducive to public peace and stability. Schmitt thinks he can correct these flaws in the Hobbesian state by refounding it on collective—rather than individual— grounds. 
Strauss retorts that Schmitt’s reformulation still permits too much freedom of conscience and behaviour for state subjects. In relying on Hobbes, Schmitt may affirm the importance of ‘sovereignty’, but he eschews the necessity of, in Strauss’s word, ‘dominion’. If Schmitt were to understand human evil in terms of ‘moral baseness’ or ‘sinfulness’, then, Strauss suggests, Schmitt would elaborate a more comprehensive notion of ‘ruling’ than Hobbes countenanced or Schmitt himself articulates. Rather than correcting addressable flaws in Hobbes’ system, Schmitt, by not clarifying his own view of human nature, still allows essentially liberal freedoms to persist as dire threats to both the stability of his neo-Leviathan state, and to any substantive notion of the good life. 
Given the sinful, morally base character of human evil, Strauss insists that public order requires an authority more intrusive than the sovereign state—an authority that imposes a substantive vision of the good life that cannot be derived from modern sources, whether they be early-modern notions of natural right, or what he calls elsewhere ‘the execrable principles of 1789’. Strauss suspects that Schmitt, a renowned Roman Catholic critic of liberalism, fundamentally agrees with him; despite what he appears to say to the contrary, Schmitt must believe that human beings are inherently sinful. 
A perspective that understands sinfulness as moral baseness asserts that humans are driven to do wrong not by material deprivation or by the desire to satisfy bodily appetites, as liberals would have us believe. Rather, human beings take fiendish pleasure in doing precisely what they know to be wrong; they take supreme gratification by committing evil, as such. Statutory law associated with the modern Rechtsstaat cannot tame humanity’s inherent sinfulness; nor can it cultivate the natural human intuition of goodness that necessarily accompanies the base human de- sire to violate it. 
This chapter explores the place of educable versus sinful evil in the respective efforts of Schmitt and Strauss to develop genuinely ‘authoritarian’ alternatives to liberal state theory in interwar Germany. Specifically, it addresses several of Strauss’s readings of Schmitt on the moral cum theological status of the political: his assumptions concerning the extent to which Schmitt actually endorses a notion of human evil as sinfulness or moral baseness; his assertion that Schmitt deliberately hides the moral dimensions of the political; and his mischaracterization of what Schmitt deems to be the ultimate danger confronting the political in their age— that is, whether Schmitt fears that the political will disappear altogether or merely that it will be practiced ‘dishonestly’. 
Much more than his disciples claim, Strauss shared deep affinities with Schmitt’s agenda in The Concept of the Political. By affirming ‘the political’, Schmitt celebrated the return of enmity as a harbinger of the reassertion of authority, the prospect that, in the present moment, a new postliberal world order might arise afresh. Only a few years before, in 1929, Strauss had expressed similar exhilaration at the return of sharp distinctions among different groups of neighbours: the demise of the commitment to ‘love thy neighbour’ at the heart of Enlightenment philosophy, spelled, for Strauss, the return of moral affirmation and a revival of quasi-Biblical authority. However, rather than a self-critical, quasi- universal, Biblical tradition affiliated with the Hebrew prophets, Strauss exclaims, somewhat alarmingly, ‘we must ask ourselves seriously whether perhaps the kings were right’. Strauss turns to the Biblical legacy to reaffirm the harsh necessities of warfare and rule, rather than the universal morality philosophically developed by the assimilating liberals of the German-Jewish Enlightenment. 
Schmitt’s endorsement of National Socialism in 1933 makes clear the kind of authoritarianism he sought as a replacement of liberalism — again, a suitable, if not first choice, alternative for the conservative jurist.Strauss’ position, as conveyed by his writings of this era, is more elusive.I will therefore try to sketch out the kind of authoritarian alternative toliberalism, the kind of revived premodern, ‘regime as regimen’, thatStrauss was formulating in his writings before his emigration to the Unit-ed States.

01 January 2017

Software-enabled consumer products and US copyright

he US Copyright Office last week released a report titled Software-Enabled Consumer Products: a report of the register of copyrights december 2016 responding to a request by Senators Grassley and Leahy that noted
the ubiquity of software and how it plays an ever- increasing role in our lives. ... the expanding presence of software embedded in everyday products requires careful evaluation of copyright's role in shaping interactions with the devices we own.
The report
details how copyright law applies to software-enabled consumer products and enables creative expression and innovation in the software industry. For many innovators, copyright's incentive system is the engine that drives creation and innovation. But the spread of copyrighted software also raises particular concerns about consumers' right to make legitimate use of those works-including resale, repair, and security research. ... 
the Office believes that the proper application of existing copyright doctrines to software embedded in everyday products should allow users to engage in these and other legitimate uses of works, while maintaining the strength and stability of the copyright system. The Office thus is not recommending any legislative changes at this time.
The Executive Summary states
U.S. copyright laws have protected computer software for many years, and today that regime of legal protection supports an industry that is a major engine of economic growth. In the last quarter century, the software industry has added millions of jobs and increased the U.S. gross domestic product by hundreds of billions of dollars. Software has transformed our way of life, paving the way for personal computers, video games, digital photography, the internet, music and movie streaming services, smartphones, the Internet of Things, cryptocurrencies, and self-driving cars. In the near future, software will be behind even more innovations, like artificial intelligence and advanced robotics. In short, as one software entrepreneur famously put it, “software is eating the world.”  One result of the spread of software is that consumers now routinely use software- enabled products for everything from adjusting the thermostats in their homes, to driving to work, to getting a midnight snack from the fridge. This near-ubiquity has led some to question whether current copyright laws provide adequate guidance regarding the sometimes complex copyright issues arising in relation to software embedded in consumer products. These concerns span a wide range of uses, including resale, repair, research, and beyond. For example, to the extent that repairing a software-enabled device requires copying or altering a copyrighted computer program, does the law limit consumers’ right to engage in such activity? How might consumers’ ability to sell or convey such a device be affected if the embedded software is subject to a licensing agreement?
In light of these and other concerns, in October 2015, Chairman Chuck Grassley and Ranking Member Patrick Leahy of the Senate Judiciary Committee (the “Committee”) requested that the Copyright Office provide its expert advice, in “an effort to better understand and evaluate how our copyright laws enable creative expression, foster innovative business models, and allow legitimate uses in this software-enabled environment.” Among other issues, the Committee requested that the Office study and report on:
(1) the provisions of the copyright law that are implicated by the ubiquity of copyrighted software in everyday products; 
(2) the law’s effect on the design, distribution, and legitimate uses of such products, as well as on innovative services related thereto; 
(3) the effects that statutory changes in this area could have on stakeholder interests and business models; and 
(4) the intersection of copyright provisions with other areas of law in this context.
The Committee also asked the Office to make appropriate legislative or other recommendations, if it believed changes were necessary.
The Committee’s request was limited to embedded software in everyday products. The Committee did not ask the Office to review copyright law as applied to software and computer programs generally. Accordingly, a foundational issue in this Report is how to define the specific subset of software that is the subject of this study. As discussed in Part II, the Office found a general consensus that it would be a mistake to statutorily distinguish between software in everyday products and other kinds of software. At the same time, there is no question that the spread of software in everyday products raises unique issues. These products share certain common characteristics, and since the Office’s focus is on products with these shared traits, the Office does not analyze software generally.
The Copyright Office endeavored to examine how existing copyright law doctrines might address the particular issues that arise with respect to these products. In Part III, the Report describes the relevant copyright law doctrines potentially operating in the context of software-enabled consumer products. In addition, the Report briefly identifies some of the complex issues outside of copyright—including privacy and cybersecurity—that have arisen in this context. These issues are being investigated by a number of other components of the federal government, including the Federal Trade Commission, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Department of Commerce. The Copyright Office’s analysis is thus limited to the copyright issues presented by the spread of software-enabled consumer products.
Part IV then addresses how software-enabled consumer products can be resold, repaired or improved, researched for security flaws, or made to interoperate with other products or software. In each case, the Office finds that faithful application of existing copyright law doctrines should provide no barrier to legitimate uses.
In short:
• The Office’s study did not reveal evidence that consumers have been prevented from reselling or otherwise disposing of their software-enabled consumer products. The Office does not see a current need for legislative change relating to resale, so long as courts properly apply the first-sale right embodied in section 109 of the Copyright Act. 
• The Office recognizes the value of allowing the public to freely repair defective consumer products and tinker with products to improve their function. But establishing a new statutory framework explicitly permitting repair and tinkering does not appear to be necessary at this time. Properly understood, existing copyright law doctrines—including the idea/expression dichotomy, fair use, merger, scènes à faire, and section 117—should continue to facilitate these types of activities. 
• Similarly, the Office recognizes the value of allowing the public to engage in good-faith security research of software-enabled consumer products. Again, however, statutory changes (at least outside the context of the anticircumvention provisions in section 1201) do not appear to be necessary at present. Existing copyright law doctrines should protect this legitimate activity. 
• The Office recognizes the significance of preserving the ability to develop products and services that can interoperate with software-enabled consumer products, and the related goal of preserving competition in the marketplace. While a new statutory framework might help reduce some uncertainty in this area, such action does not appear to be necessary at this time. Again, faithful application of existing copyright law doctrines can preserve the twin principles of interoperability and competition.
The Copyright Office also examined the reach and scope of licensing practices for embedded software, an issue that implicates several subsidiary issues, including: the relationship of the Copyright Act to state contract law; whether, and in what circumstances, violations of the terms of software licenses would constitute copyright infringement; and confusion among consumers regarding licensing terms for embedded software. The Office’s study found that, in certain circumstances, such as resale, there is only limited evidence regarding real-world restrictions. Accordingly, the Office believes that the question of ownership versus licensing, while very important, is one that can be resolved with the proper application of existing case law.
The Copyright Office acknowledges that relying on flexible doctrines like merger, scènes à faire, and fair use brings less certainty than bright-line legislative fixes would; in some cases, clarification may only come after litigation. But formal application of copyright law to software-enabled consumer products is still relatively recent. In the context of the technologically driven products at issue in this Report, legislation carries its own risks, including that it might address the technologies of today but may fail to anticipate the different technologies—and distinct concerns—of tomorrow. In that respect, established copyright doctrines benefit from the ability to adapt more deftly to specific situations. As this Report demonstrates, copyright doctrines such as fair use, merger, and scènes à faire have regularly been extended and applied to new technologies as they have developed. And the Office offers this Report as a roadmap of sorts for those seeking to make legitimate use of embedded software.
In sum, the Copyright Office believes that existing copyright law is, at least at this time, well-suited to handle this new age of embedded software, so that innovators can continue to improve our lives and revolutionize our world.