15 June 2017

Theory Fade

'Working Themselves Impure: A Life Cycle Theory of Legal Theories' by Jeremy K. Kessler and David Pozen in (2016) 83 University of Chicago Law Review 1819-1892 comments
 Prescriptive legal theories have a tendency to cannibalize themselves. As they develop into schools of thought, they become not only increasingly complicated but also increasingly compromised, by their own normative lights. Maturation breeds adulteration. The theories work themselves impure. 
This Article identifies and diagnoses this evolutionary phenomenon. We develop a stylized model to explain the life cycle of certain particularly influential legal theories. We illustrate this life cycle through case studies of originalism, textualism, popular constitutionalism, and cost-benefit analysis, as well as a comparison with leading accounts of organizational and theoretical change in politics and science. And we argue that an appreciation of the life cycle counsels a reorientation of legal advocacy and critique. The most significant threats posed by a new legal theory do not come from its neglect of significant first-order values -- the usual focus of criticism -- for those values are apt to be incorporated into the theory. Rather, the deeper threats lie in the second- and third-order social, political, and ideological effects that the adulterated theory’s persistence may foster down the line.
'Working for the Weekend: A Response to Kessler & and Pozen' (Virginia Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper No. 2017-33) by Charles L. Barzun comments
In Working Themselves Impure: A Life Cycle Theory of Legal Theories, Professors Jeremy Kessler and David Pozen argue that prescriptive legal theories tend to cannibalize themselves over time. Drawing on four case studies (originalism, textualism, popular constitutionalism, and cost-benefit analysis), the authors show how these theories tend to gain popularity and momentum only at the cost of abandoning the theoretical and normative motivations that originally inspired them. This brief Response does not take issue - at least not directly - with the authors’ characterizations of the theories they examine. It instead focuses on the last few pages of their article, where the authors discuss what they take to be their study’s methodological implications. I focus on these methodological suggestions because they deal most directly with a question their study as a whole naturally invites: Is the life-cycle theory likely to be helpful to the lawyer, judge, or legal scholar interested in assessing these theories? I offer some reasons for skepticism on this score.
Barzun concludes
The authors are hardly the first to succumb to the temptation of conceptualizing methodological debates in law around a dichotomy between internal and external points of view.  The distinction tempts the legal metatheorist because it promises to yield insights free of controversial moral or metaphysical commitments. Maybe that is why the distinction is now endemic to legal theory. But in my view, the distinction is an intellectual crutch that ought to be kicked away for good. It no longer serves any useful purpose, and it blocks clear and creative ways of thinking about law. ... 
Is there a better alternative? I am not sure, but if so, I think it begins with the recognition that two things are simultaneously true: (1) all human endeavors to organize immediate human experience into systems or patterns of thought are imperfect and so contain anomalies and contradictions, and (2) we cannot live or think other than by relentlessly engaging in such organizing and generalizing endeavors, sometimes consciously and often not. Accepting (1) means that we should not be surprised by the authors’ observations about legal theories because, as their own illuminating discussion shows, the adulteration process they identify is pervasive in intellectual life. Accepting (2) means that there is no escaping the difficulties recognized by (1). So the authors are right that no decision procedure can free judges from the need to make controversial evaluative judgments when deciding cases. But nor can any “perspective” be reached that will free legal theorists (or metatheorists) from the need to make controversial conceptual, causal, or evaluative judgments when analyzing theories for the sake of practical decision-making of any sort. If there is no exit from this predicament, then the best the metatheorist can hope for is that she be- comes marginally more aware of the “interests and ideals” driving her own judgments and perhaps someday even learns to distinguish between the two. In the meantime, all she can do is keep on trying to get it right, get it right.
There's a lighter perspective in Application of Adrian Ashley of the House of Cooper [2017] NSWSC 533, a 'sovereign citizen' case with catchwords featuring
applicant arrested on warrant after failing to appear on charge of possession of cannabis – applicant alleging plants supplied by God – whether the criminal law can prohibit conduct approved by God – whether applicant bound by the laws and usages of this State – where applicant claiming to be a self-governed man who believes the King James Version Bible 1611 is the supreme law. 
The judgment states
The application was brought on behalf of a man described as “Adrian Ashley of the House of Cooper”. He was purportedly represented by a man who describes himself as “Keith Charles of the House of Haffey” as “petitioner”. The petitioner objected when I addressed him as “Mr Charles”, asserting that “Mister” is a military title and that he is not in the military. Without acceding to the correctness of that contention, I will refer to him (as a matter of respect) as the petitioner. The petitioner indicated that Adrian Ashley also objects to the title “Mister” on the same basis. I will refer to Adrian Ashley as the applicant.
Further
The petitioner presented a number of witness statements and other documents to the Court. He also addressed the Court orally and provided additional information in response to questions asked by me. As best I was able to ascertain from the information provided, the application was based on a number of grounds. I will address those grounds in the order I consider logical rather than the order in which they were presented in the material relied upon by the petitioner.
First, it was suggested that the applicant was arrested for conduct which is incapable of amounting to an offence. The petitioner explained that the applicant was charged after being found in possession of cannabis. The petitioner contended that all plants were given to man by God, citing Genesis 1:29 of the King James Version Bible 1611, which states: And God said, Behold, I have given you every herb bearing seed, which is upon the face of all the earth, and every tree, in the which is the fruit of a tree yielding seed; to you it shall be for meat.
The point might have been made in response to the petitioner’s submission that, according to those words, if it is God who supplies cannabis to man, it is for nutritional rather than recreational purposes. In any event, I took the view that the matters contended for by the petitioner would not afford a defence to an offence against ss 10 or 23(1)(c) of the Drug Misuse and Trafficking Act 1985 (NSW), which prohibits the possession of cannabis in a number of forms, regardless of its origin.
The second basis for the application revealed by the material put before the Court by the petitioner was that the manner of the applicant’s arrest was unlawful. The petitioner presented a witness statement by a person described as “Izabella-marie, a living soul (woman) of majority in age”. She stated that the applicant answered a knock on the door one morning. She heard him calling for help and went to the front patio where she saw “two casually dressed strangers assaulting Adrian” (they were later identified to be police officers). The applicant asked her to call the petitioner in his capacity as “Occupant of the Office of Special Executor for the Cooper, Adrian Ashley, Estate”, which she did.
At the petitioner’s suggestion, she asked the strangers why they were arresting the applicant. The strangers said they were arresting him “for not appearing at a court hearing”. According to the statement, the applicant was arrested forcefully and assaulted by police.
The petitioner also provided his own statement, headed “Testimony to the facts”. As noted in the statement of Izabella-marie, the petitioner was not present at the premises when the applicant was arrested but spoke to her and to police by telephone throughout the incident. In order to make sense of the petitioner’s statement, it is necessary to understand that he adopts the curious practice of referring to himself variously in the third person singular, as “One”, and in the first person plural, as “We”. He stated:
(12) Throughout the time we were communicating it was also made known that One is the Occupant of the office of Commonwealth public official (Crimes Act 1914 – Section 13), common law notary public and Special Executor of the Cooper, Adrian Ashley, Estate, and that they had not followed due process of law and were assaulting Adrian without warrant and had made a false arrest and if they were to now take him from the property it could be seen as abduction and kidnap and as they were armed with guns, armed kidnap in company, and they were reminded at one point that ignorance of the law is no excuse.
(13) Despite being made aware of these above facts, they forcefully removed Adrian against his will, and took him to Newtown Police Station, which to our knowledge of the law is false imprisonment. As the men stepped out of their alleged office when they first laid hands on Adrian without following due process of law to which Adrian is fully entitled, along with his unalienable freedoms/liberties and rights. ...
The Court states
The letter asserted, in effect, that the applicant is beyond the reach of the criminal law:
Adrian-ashley is a national of the Commonwealth of Australia and not an Australian citizen, therefore the statute/legislation that is being forced upon him does not apply as he is a self-governing man who does not consent to be governed, and has only complied to police demands under duress so as to remain neutral and not be construed as belligerent.
The letter concluded by expressing the hope that the attached documents “make clear to all those concerned the position Adrian-ashley holds as a loyal subject of The Queen and his belief that the King James Version Bible 1611 as the supreme law” [sic].
The documents attached with the letter included an “Affirmation of Truth” and “Testament to Will by Proclamation” each signed by the applicant. Those documents were evidently calculated to achieve or record the applicant’s status as a self-governing person who is not bound by the law of any Sovereign State. An aspect of the position adopted by the applicant is that he expressly does not accept “any benefits or privileges of any Sovereign State”. It was not explained how, consistently with that position, he can invoke the jurisdiction of this Court. 
I did not think it was reasonably arguable that the applicant’s affirmation and proclamation were effective to relieve him of the constraints imposed upon him by the law. Unsurprisingly, the petitioner concluded his submissions by citing Magna Carta (version not identified).
After hearing from the applicant at length, I formed the view that no reasonable basis for a writ of habeas corpus was disclosed and, indeed, that the application was manifestly hopeless. In that circumstance, I did not consider it appropriate to grant the relief sought or to make orders for any further step to be taken in the proceedings.
I wish to record that, during the hearing, I informed the petitioner on a number of occasions that it remains open to the applicant to make a release application under the Bail Act 2013 (NSW). The petitioner appeared to reject that proposition, evidently taking the view that a release application is only appropriate in circumstances of lawful detention, whereas he contends the applicant’s detention is unlawful. The petitioner’s view is misconceived in that respect and he potentially does the applicant a disservice in adhering to it. It is to be hoped that the applicant is aware of his entitlement (notwithstanding his stated position of eschewing the benefits and privileges conferred upon him by the State) to bring a release application under the Bail Act. Any such application is likely to be better received without the embellishment of insistence upon medieval modes of address or ill-informed incantation of God’s law and Magna Carta.

Privacy

Stuart P. Green (Rutgers Law School) has posted 'To See and Be Seen: Reconstructing the Law of Voyeurism and Exhibitionism' by Stuart P. Green in (2017) 54 American Criminal Law Review comments
 Although the incidence of voyeurism and indecent exposure is relatively low compared to other sexual offenses, both crimes raise fundamental questions about the proper scope of the criminal law in a liberal society. The two offenses mark out, and mutually reinforce, the borders of the ever-changing and culturally variable understanding of what is public and what is private. In voyeurism, the offender violates the victim's right to exclude others from her private domain. In indecent exposure, the offender violates the victim's right not to be included in the private domain of others. The interests and rights at stake in the two offenses are in a sense complementary. But they also reflect significant asymmetries. The wrongs of voyeurism seem relatively clear and uncontested, and this is true even across otherwise wide cultural divides. The law of public indecency, by contrast, will prove to be messier, more sensitive to cultural variations, and more attuned to the specific circumstances in which such exposure occurs. We will see this, for example, when we consider cases in which a person exposes himself in contexts as varied as Mardi Gras parades, political protests, performance art, nude beaches, and fraternity pranks. We will also consider the ways in which the emergence of new technologies and new social practices have simultaneously lowered the threshold of what society regards as private, while increasing the potential for resulting harm to victims.

Telco Facilities and Immunities

The national government is conducting a Consultation on possible amendments to telecommunications carrier powers and immunities, centred on facilities.

The paper states
Telecommunications services play an important and expanding role in how people, businesses and governments go about their daily lives. The Australian Government is committed to Australians having ready access to high-quality, reliable and affordable telecommunications services. 
To help provide Australians with better telecommunications services more quickly and cost effectively, telecommunications carriers have powers and immunities under Schedule 3 of the Telecommunications Act 1997 (the Act). These powers and immunities help them install and maintain telecommunications network facilities. 
So they can better meet consumer’s needs faster and at lower cost, telecommunications carriers have asked the Australian Government to consider making changes to carrier powers and immunities. This would include changes to the Telecommunications (Low-impact Facilities) Determination 1997 (LIFD), the Telecommunications Code of Practice 1997 (Tel Code) and potentially Schedule 3 to the Act itself. The telecommunications industry has indicated that the changes could lead to significant time and cost savings and improved services to the community. It will also reduce burden on government and other agencies to administer these regulations. Generally, the proposed changes would:
  • clarify the operation of existing powers and immunities (e.g. heritage overlays), 
  • allow some increases in the size of existing facilities (e.g. solar cells), 
  • allow some new type of facilities (e.g. lens antennas) , 
  • allow some types of facilities in new areas (e.g. omnidirectional antennas), 
  • alter some land owner and occupier notification and objection timeframes and processes in the Tel Code, and 
  • potentially, enable temporary or replacement towers or extensions to be installed in some limited circumstances
The paper states Carrier powers and immunities give telecommunications carriers the ability to enter land and install and maintain some types of telecommunications network facilities. They are critical to the efficient construction and maintenance of telecommunications networks. They minimise the regulatory burden on carriers so that they can quickly and cost-effectively meet the community’s need for access to affordable, fast and reliable telecommunications services. 
Most aspects of carrier powers and immunities have been in place since 1997. Since then, communications technologies have evolved rapidly, and demand for services and data has increased dramatically. For example, in 1997, Wi-Fi was a new technology and not widespread, mobile phones did not connect to the internet, and only 25 per cent of Australians had a mobile phone subscription . 
Telecommunications carriers have proposed that powers and immunities should be amended to reflect new technologies, enhanced work practices, and reduce the regulatory cost and burden. Where carrier powers and immunities do not apply, carriers are typically required to seek planning approval for their activities under differing state and territory planning laws. These approval processes can significantly increase the time and costs for carriers to install facilities that are important for improving telecommunications services to the community and businesses. These costs flow through to consumer prices. Giving carriers uniform, streamlined powers and immunities under Commonwealth law helps them meet consumer demand for services while reducing the administrative burden on carriers and state, territory and local governments. 
Carriers have estimated that if the proposed changes proceed, they could result in over $100 million per year in regulatory cost savings to industry and government and over $50 million per year in economic and social productivity benefits to consumers. ... 
Carrier powers and immunities are set out in Schedule 3 to the Act. Schedule 3 provides carriers with powers to enter land (including public areas of buildings) for inspection, and to install and maintain certain types of facilities. It also provides certain immunities, including from a range of State and Territory laws when carrying out those activities, such as those laws relating to land use, planning, design, construction, siting, tenancy, environmental assessments and protection. These are collectively referred to as ‘planning laws’ in this paper. 
Most importantly, Schedule 3 covers the installation of ‘low impact facilities’, which are specified in the LIFD and discussed further below. When using carrier powers and immunities, the Act requires carriers to notify affected land owners and occupiers of their intended activities, and give them the opportunity to object. The Act also imposes a range of conditions on carriers engaging in authorised activities, including a requirement to comply with the conditions in the Tel Code which are discussed below. It requires carriers to do as little damage as practicable and restore land to a condition that is similar to before the activity began. They must act in accordance with good engineering practice, protect the safety of people and property, interfere with other users of the land as little as practicable, and protect the environment. Compliance with the requirements under Schedule 3 to the Act is a carrier licence condition. 
If Schedule 3 to the Act does not cover a particular telecommunications facility, carriers need to comply with applicable State and Territory planning laws and obtain landowner consent. For example, Schedule 3 does not permit new free standing telecommunications towers to be specified as low impact facilities. These facilities must be authorised through relevant state and territory planning laws, which typically require a development application.

Elder Abuse

The Australian Law Reform Commission's Elder Abuse report - which quotes Associate Professor Dr Wendy Bonython and myself - features the following recommendations
3. A National Plan to Combat Elder Abuse 
Recommendation 3–1 The Australian Government, in cooperation with state and territory governments, should develop a National Plan to combat elder abuse. The Plan should: (a) establish a national policy framework; (b) outline strategies and actions by government and the community; (c) set priorities for the implementation of agreed actions; and (d) provide for further research and evaluation. 
Recommendation 3–2 The National Plan to combat elder abuse should be led by a steering committee under the imprimatur of the Law, Crime and Community Safety Council of the Council of Australian Governments. 
Recommendation 3–3 The National Plan to combat elder abuse should identify goals, including: (a) promoting the autonomy and agency of older people; (b) addressing ageism and promoting community understanding of elder abuse; (c) achieving national consistency; (d) safeguarding at-risk adults and improving responses; and (e) building the evidence base. 
Recommendation 3–4 The National Plan should take into account the different experiences and needs of older persons with respect to: (a) gender; (b) sexual orientation; (c) disability; and (d) cultural and linguistic diversity. The Plan should also take into account the experiences and needs of: (a) older Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people; and (b) older people living in rural and remote communities. Recommendation 3–5 There should be a national prevalence study of elder abuse to build the evidence base to inform policy responses. 
4. Aged Care 
Recommendation 4–1 Aged care legislation should provide for a new serious incident response scheme for aged care. The scheme should require approved providers to notify to an independent oversight body: (a) an allegation or a suspicion on reasonable grounds of a serious incident; and (b) the outcome of an investigation into a serious incident, including findings and action taken. This scheme should replace the current responsibilities in relation to reportable assaults in s 63-1AA of the Aged Care Act 1997 (Cth). 
Recommendation 4–2 The independent oversight body should monitor and oversee the approved provider’s investigation of, and response to, serious incidents, and be empowered to conduct investigations of such incidents. 
Recommendation 4–3 In residential care, a ‘serious incident’ should mean, when committed against a care recipient: (a) physical, sexual or financial abuse; (b) seriously inappropriate, improper, inhumane or cruel treatment; (c) unexplained serious injury; (d) neglect; unless committed by another care recipient, in which case it should mean: (e) sexual abuse; (f) physical abuse causing serious injury; or (g) an incident that is part of a pattern of abuse. 
Recommendation 4–4 In home care or flexible care, ‘serious incident’ should mean physical, sexual or financial abuse committed by a staff member against a care recipient. 
Recommendation 4–5 An act or omission that, in all the circumstances, causes harm that is trivial or negligible should not be considered a ‘serious incident’. 
Recommendation 4–6 The serious incident response scheme should: (a) define ‘staff member’ consistently with the definition in s 63-1AA(9) of the Aged Care Act 1997 (Cth); (b) require the approved provider to take reasonable measures to require staff members to report serious incidents; (c) require the approved provider to ensure staff members are not victimised; (d) protect informants’ identities; (e) not exempt serious incidents committed by a care recipient with a pre-diagnosed cognitive impairment against another care recipient; and (f) authorise disclosure of personal information to police. 
Recommendation 4–7 The Department of Health (Cth) should commission an independent evaluation of research on optimal staffing models and levels in aged care. The results of this evaluation should be made public and used to assess the adequacy of staffing in residential aged care against legislative standards. 
Recommendation 4–8 Unregistered aged care workers who provide direct care should be subject to the planned National Code of Conduct for Health Care Workers. 
Recommendation 4–9 There should be a national employment screening process for Commonwealth-regulated aged care. The screening process should determine whether a clearance should be granted to a person to work in aged care, based on an assessment of: (a) a person’s criminal history; (b) relevant incidents under the recommended serious incident response scheme; and (c) relevant disciplinary proceedings or complaints. 
Recommendation 4–10 Aged care legislation should regulate the use of restrictive practices in residential aged care. Any restrictive practice should be the least restrictive and used only: (a) as a last resort, after alternative strategies have been considered, to prevent serious physical harm; (b) to the extent necessary and proportionate to the risk of harm; (c) with the approval of a person authorised by statute to make this decision; (d) as prescribed by a person’s behaviour support plan; and (e) when subject to regular review. 
Recommendation 4–11 The Australian Government should consider further safeguards in relation to the use of restrictive practices in residential aged care, including: (a) establishing an independent Senior Practitioner for aged care, to provide expert leadership on and oversight of the use of restrictive practices; (b) requiring aged care providers to record and report the use of restrictive practices in residential aged care; and (c) consistently regulating the use of restrictive practices in aged care and the National Disability Insurance Scheme. 
Recommendation 4–12 The Australian Government should further consider Recommendation 6–2 of ALRC Report No 124 Equality, Capacity and Disability in Commonwealth Laws, that aged care laws and legal frameworks should be amended consistently with the National Decision-Making Principles set out in that Report. 
Recommendation 4–13 Aged care legislation should provide that agreements entered into between an approved provider and a care recipient cannot require that the care recipient has appointed a decision maker for lifestyle, personal or financial matters. 
Recommendation 4–14 The Department of Health (Cth) should develop national guidelines for the community visitors scheme. The guidelines should include policies and procedures for visitors to follow if they have concerns about abuse or neglect of care recipients. 
5. Enduring Appointments 
Recommendation 5–1 Safeguards against the misuse of an enduring document in state and territory legislation should: (a) recognise the ability of the principal to create enduring documents that give full powers, powers that are limited or restricted, and powers that are subject to conditions or circumstances; (b) require the appointed decision maker to support and represent the will, preferences and rights of the principal; (c) enhance witnessing requirements; (d) restrict conflict transactions; (e) restrict who may be an attorney; (f) set out in simple terms the types of decisions that are outside the power of a person acting under an enduring document; and (g) mandate basic requirements for record keeping. 
Recommendation 5–2 State and territory civil and administrative tribunals should have: (a) jurisdiction in relation to any cause of action, or claim for equitable relief, that is available against a substitute decision maker in the Supreme Court for abuse, or misuse of power, or failure to perform their duties; and (b) the power to order any remedy available to the Supreme Court. 
Recommendation 5–3 A national online register of enduring documents, and court and tribunal appointments of guardians and financial administrators, should be established after: (a) agreement on nationally consistent laws governing: (i) enduring powers of attorney (including financial, medical and personal); (ii) enduring guardianship; and (iii) other personally appointed substitute decision makers; and (b) the development of a national model enduring document. 
6. Family Agreements 
Recommendation 6–1 State and territory tribunals should have jurisdiction to resolve family disputes involving residential property under an ‘assets for care’ arrangement. 
Recommendation 6–2 The Social Security Act 1991 (Cth) should be amended to require that a ‘granny flat interest’ is expressed in writing for the purposes of calculating entitlement to the Age Pension. 
7. Superannuation 
Recommendation 7–1 The structure and drafting of the provisions relating to death benefit nominations in ss 58 and 59 of the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth) and reg 6.17A of the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Regulations 1994 (Cth) should be reviewed. The review should consider: (a) witnessing requirements for making, amending and revoking nominations; (b) the authority of a person who holds an enduring power of attorney in relation to the making, alteration and revocation of a nomination; (c) whether a procedure for the approval of a nomination on behalf of a member should be introduced; and (d) the extent to which other aspects of wills law may be relevant. 
Recommendation 7–2 The Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth) should be amended to include ‘replaceable rules’ for self-managed superannuation funds which provide a mechanism for an enduring attorney to become a trustee/director where this was provided for in the enduring document and notwithstanding the terms of the trust deed and constitution of the corporate trustee or the actions of the other trustees/directors. 
Recommendation 7–3 The relevant operating standards for self-managed superannuation funds in cl 4.09 of the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Regulations 1994 (Cth), should be amended to add an additional standard that would require the trustee to consider the suitability of the investment plan where an individual trustee or director of the corporate trustee becomes ‘under a legal disability’. 
Recommendation 7–4 Section 104A of the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth) and the accompanying Australian Taxation Office Trustee Declaration form should be amended to require an individual to notify the Australian Taxation Office when they become a trustee (or director of a company which acts as trustee) of a self-managed superannuation fund as a consequence of being an attorney under an enduring document.   
8. Wills 
Recommendation 8–1 The Law Council of Australia, together with state and territory law societies, should develop national best practice guidelines for legal practitioners in relation to the preparation and execution of wills and other advance planning documents to ensure they provide thorough coverage of matters such as: (a) elder abuse in probate matters; (b) common risk factors associated with undue influence; (c) the importance of taking detailed instructions from the person alone; (d) the need to keep detailed file notes and make inquiries regarding previous wills and advance planning documents; and (e) the importance of ensuring that the person has ‘testamentary capacity’—understanding the nature of the document and knowing and approving of its contents, particularly in circumstances where an unrelated person benefits. 
9. Banking 
Recommendation 9–1 The Code of Banking Practice should provide that banks will take reasonable steps to prevent the financial abuse of vulnerable customers, in accordance with the industry guideline, Protecting Vulnerable Customers from Potential Financial Abuse. The guideline should set out examples of such reasonable steps, including in relation to: (a) training staff to detect and appropriately respond to abuse; (b) using software and other means to identify suspicious transactions; (c) reporting abuse to the relevant authorities, when appropriate; (d) guaranteeing mortgages and other loans; and (e) measures to check that ‘Authority to Operate’ forms are not obtained fraudulently and that customers understand the risks of these arrangements. 
10. Guardianship and Financial Administration 
Recommendation 10–1 Newly-appointed private guardians and private financial administrators should be required to sign an undertaking with respect to their responsibilities and obligations. 
Recommendation 10–2 The Australian Guardianship and Administration Council should develop best practice guidelines on how state and territory tribunals can support a person who is the subject of an application for guardianship or financial administration to participate in the determination process as far as possible. 
12. Social Security 
Recommendation 12–1 The Department of Human Services (Cth) should develop an elder abuse strategy. 
Recommendation 12–2 Payments to nominees should be held separately from the nominee’s own funds in a dedicated account nominated and maintained by the nominee. 
Recommendation 12–3 Centrelink staff should speak directly with persons of Age Pension age who are entering into arrangements with others that concern social security payments. 
14. Safeguarding Adults at Risk 
Recommendation 14–1 Adult safeguarding laws should be enacted in each state and territory. These laws should give adult safeguarding agencies the role of safeguarding and supporting ‘at-risk adults’. 
Recommendation 14–2 Adult safeguarding agencies should have a statutory duty to make inquiries where they have reasonable grounds to suspect that a person is an ‘at-risk adult’. The first step of an inquiry should be to contact the at-risk adult. 
Recommendation 14–3 Adult safeguarding laws should define ‘at-risk adults’ to mean people aged 18 years and over who: (a) have care and support needs; (b) are being abused or neglected, or are at risk of abuse or neglect; and (c) are unable to protect themselves from abuse or neglect because of their care and support needs. 
Recommendation 14–4 Adult safeguarding laws should provide that the consent of an at-risk adult must be secured before safeguarding agencies investigate, or take any other action, in relation to the abuse or neglect of the adult. However, consent should not be required: (a) in serious cases of physical abuse, sexual abuse, or neglect; or (b) if the safeguarding agency cannot contact the adult, despite extensive efforts to do so; or (c) if the adult lacks the legal capacity to give consent, in the circumstances. 
Recommendation 14–5 Adult safeguarding laws should provide that, where a safeguarding agency has reasonable grounds to conclude that a person is an at-risk adult, the agency may take the following actions, with the adult’s consent: (a) coordinate legal, medical and other services for the adult; (b) meet with relevant government agencies and other bodies and professionals to prepare a plan to stop the abuse and support the adult; (c) report the abuse to the police; (d) apply for a court order in relation to the person thought to be committing the abuse (for example, a violence intervention order); or (e) decide to take no further action. 
Recommendation 14–6 Adult safeguarding laws should provide adult safeguarding agencies with necessary coercive information-gathering powers, such as the power to require a person to answer questions and produce documents. Agencies should only be able to exercise such powers where they have reasonable grounds to suspect that there is ‘serious abuse’ of an at-risk adult, and only to the extent that it is necessary to safeguard and support the at-risk adult. 
Recommendation 14–7 Adult safeguarding laws should provide that any person who, in good faith, reports abuse to an adult safeguarding agency should not, as a consequence of their report, be: (a) liable civilly, criminally or under an administrative process; (b) found to have departed from standards of professional conduct; (c) dismissed or threatened in the course of their employment; or (d) discriminated against with respect to employment or membership in a profession or trade union. 
Recommendation 14–8 Adult safeguarding agencies should work with relevant professional bodies to develop protocols for when prescribed professionals, such as medical practitioners, should refer the abuse of at-risk adults to adult safeguarding agencies.

13 June 2017

VR Trespass

'Virtual Reality Intrusion' by Gilad Yadin in (2016) 53(1) Willamette Law Review
ventures into the unchartered waters of virtual reality criminal law, presenting both a novel multidisciplinary insight into a technological medium that many believe will shape future human society and an unexpected challenge to an inherently flawed cyber intrusion legal doctrine. 
Thirty years ago, lawmakers in countries all over the world enacted new and specialized computer misuse legislation, acting on the notion that existing criminal law is insufficient to the task of prosecuting and resolving computer intrusion cases. Unfortunately, the resulting unauthorized access regime has created significant problems. One is the potential criminalization of everyday technological behavior, brought about by an overly extensive normative scope; another is chronic under-enforcement; and yet another is a wider chilling effect on creativity and digital freedoms. 
Lately, interest in virtual reality, a fairly old concept, has reawakened. Unlike other information technologies, virtual reality is built to deliver a psychological effect believably simulating the physical world; it possesses three-dimensional spatial characteristics, infuses users with real legal expectations, and mirrors human social institutions and values. Many actions within virtual reality, lawful and criminal, are subjectively and conceptually closer to physical acts than to user actions in cyberspace. Subsequently, considering some forms of virtual reality intrusion may warrant reverting back to the ancient common law doctrines of burglary and trespass as an alternative to the severely flawed modern computer misuse laws governing unauthorized access to computers and data.

Educational Liability

'Liability of Educational Providers to Victims of Abuse: A Comparison and Critique' by Anthony Gray  in (2017) 39 Sydney Law Review 167 comments
 The principle of vicarious liability is, to some extent, incoherent. It is indisputable that the case law has moved well beyond the original confines of the doctrine — the basis of its imposition having, to some extent, undercut by development elsewhere in tort law, and its rationale continuing to be subject to conjecture and disagreement. This article seeks to improve the situation by suggesting that the law of vicarious liability should be reconceptualised as having its basis in the law of agency. It does so in the context of the liability of educational providers to victims of abuse.
Gray argues
The Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse (‘Royal Commission’) continues to hold hearings into alleged abuse within institutions, primarily educational institutions. The scale of the alleged abuse is staggering. The Royal Commission’s Redress and Civil Litigation Report estimates a possible 60 000 survivors of institutional sexual abuse thus far. The Commission’s hearings and findings will have flow-on effects on many facets of the legal system. It is expected that there may be an increase in civil claims against educational providers for alleged abuse, as well as substantial reform to relevant legislation. 
Several cases have recently considered the civil liability of educational providers for abuse, committed by their employees, of victims under their care (usually children), including the recent High Court of Australia decision Prince Alfred College Inc v ADC.  This sad situation raises many important and difficult legal issues, primarily: the question of the extent to which the educational provider is vicariously liable for the abuser’s actions; the extent to which the educational provider may be deemed directly negligent for what has occurred; and, in some cases, questions of limitation periods, given that the survivor of the abuse may not seek legal redress until long after the events. It goes without saying that, quite apart from any legal issues, survivors of sexual abuse require society’s deepest compassion and caring for what they have suffered, the symptoms and consequences of which may endure through their lives. As a society, we must do what we can to assist in the healing process, and it is recognised that the legal system can play its part in this, as part of a much broader response. However, in and of itself, the fact a person has suffered abuse does not (and should not) automatically translate to an actionable legal claim against the institution who engaged the abuser. 
The extent to which an educational provider may be vicariously liable for the actions of their employee is part of a bigger issue of the future of the principle of vicarious liability in the law. Courts in the modern era continue to struggle to articulate a rational basis for the doctrine, tests of liability remain very difficult to apply in particular cases, and fine distinctions are made that may not reflect the realities of current employment settings. The likely increase in the number of claims in this area will place in the spotlight the appropriateness of current legal principle. 
This article surveys recent major developments in the law on vicarious liability. The main focus of the discussion will be the question of the liability of educational providers for abuse. However, these questions cannot be answered in isolation from the more general principles of vicarious liability and other liability issues, including limitation periods. Thus, some cases that do not directly involve questions of educational institutions and abuse will be discussed. Part II of this article summarises the existing law in three jurisdictions: Canada, the United Kingdom (‘UK’) and Australia, including the recent High Court of Australia decision in Prince Alfred College. A comparison among these jurisdictions is appropriate given the common law tradition they share, and because superior courts of each jurisdiction regularly refer to, and often adopt, principles developed from the others in this area of law. Part III critiques existing theories of vicarious liability. 
Part IV explores the potential of agency principles to rationalise principle in this area. This is important because, while historically vicarious liability had an agency basis, modern case law tends not to use this concept. The thesis of this article is that vicarious liability is best sourced in principles of agency, and the law should return to it, and its limits. Concededly, the High Court in Prince Alfred College did not utilise agency principles. However, over the long term, the basis of vicarious liability has changed greatly. Furthermore, in tort law more broadly, concepts have undergone rapid transformation and refinement, for example strict liability and liability of public authorities for non-feasance. In this light, it is not too late for reconceptualisation of the law of vicarious liability. In saying this, it is acknowledged that the legal principle of vicarious liability is just one of the legal principles affecting the question of financial compensation for survivors of institutional sexual abuse. Other legal rules, for instance statutes of limitation and the so-called ‘Ellis defence’, have made it difficult in practice for survivors of sexual abuse to obtain legal redress. There has been both successful  and unsuccessful legislative reform in this area. An outcome of the Royal Commission may well be further legal reforms, in substantive and procedural law, to facilitate compensation claims by survivors of institutional sexual abuse. Further, the full force of negligence principles should be applied directly against institutions that do not take proper care in the selection or supervision of staff members. While in the past, institutions may have argued ignorance about possible child sexual abuse, or difficulty in obtaining information about a person’s past record, no one today can claim to be unaware of the risk of abuse, or legitimately complain of difficulties in researching an individual’s past. 
In other words, there have been legitimate arguments in the past that vicarious liability must be robustly applied to institutions because otherwise survivors of such abuse may be left without a remedy. However, given robust application of negligence principles, developments in accessibility of information, past recent reforms and possible future reform due to the Royal Commission’s work, these concerns may be lessened. The article will now briefly consider the history and rationale of vicarious liability, examine the authorities, and critique existing rationales, before suggesting a reconception of this area of law on the basis of agency principles. It will be argued that given changes in the law of negligence, the rationale for imposing vicarious liability has (largely) evaporated, even if this is little recognised in the cases.

08 June 2017

Cyberinsurance

'Data Breach, Privacy, and Cyber Insurance' by Shauhin Talesh in (2017) Law and Social Inquiry comments 
While data theft and cyber risk are major threats facing organizations, existing research suggests that most organizations do not have sufficient protection to prevent data breaches, deal with notification responsibilities, and comply with privacy laws. This article explores how insurance companies play a critical, yet unrecognized, role in assisting organizations in complying with privacy laws and dealing with cyber theft. My analysis draws from and contributes to two literatures on organizational compliance: new institutional organizational sociology studies of how organizations respond to legal regulation and sociolegal insurance scholars’ research on how institutions govern through risk. Through participant observation at conferences, interviews, and content analysis of insurer manuals and risk management services, my study highlights how insurers act as compliance managers for organizations dealing with cyber security threats. Well beyond pooling and transferring risk, insurance companies offer cyber insurance and unique risk management services that influence the ways organizations comply with privacy laws.
Talesh's fascinating article concludes
This study elaborates the literature on the relationship between organizations and law by blending new institutional organizational sociology studies of how organizations respond to legal regulation and sociolegal insurance scholars’ studies of how institutions govern through risk. In particular, my study bridges these two theoretical frameworks by revealing how in the context of cyber insurance, insurers go well beyond pooling and spreading risk and act as compliance managers for organizations dealing with cyber security threats. Although prior new institutional studies of law and organizations emphasize the way that managerial values influence the nature of law and compliance among organizations, governing through risk provides an alternative framework by showing how risk management services and risk-based logics that are institutionalized by the insurance field influence what organizations are told privacy laws mean and how they are told to respond to data breach. Consistent with prior studies that blend governing through risk and the managerialization of law, concerns over risk and the need for adequate policies and procedures drive the process at every stage. Thus, risk and managerialized values work in tandem.
My multisite, multimethod approach also enhances prior studies of insurance as regulation by revealing how the insurance field governs through risk and uses considerations of risk and insurance services to influence organizational strategy and decision making. Whereas early work celebrates insurance as regulation and focuses on the forms and functions of insurance, more recent studies of directors and officers, employment practices liability, and cyber insurance focus on the conditions 684 under which insurance shapes behavior in positive and negative ways. Given the range of findings from these studies, scholars need to think of the benefits of insurance as regulation on a continuum. Insurance as regulation does not always work, nor does it always fail. Although more research is clearly needed, it appears there are a couple of distinctions between EPLI, directors and officers insurance, and cyber insurance. For example, prior work in the directors and officers context shows how the insurance industry has the ability to engage in loss prevention behavior but does not try to engage in such behavior (Baker and Griffith 2010). In the cyber context, the insurance industry does try to engage in loss pre vention and does so in a manner that is focused on managing and averting the risks associated with data breach. One likely difference is that in the directors and officers context, directors and officers are less eager to be told how to engage in risk-averse behavior. Policyholders in the cyber context, however, are interested in the insurance defense and indemnity coverage, but also the accompanying risk management services that can prevent, detect, and respond to a data breach event. The risk management services that accompany cyber insurance also fill a competency or knowledge gap for the organization. Organizations are willing to use risk management tools that deal with the latest cyber threats that they lack internal tools to defend against. Conversely, directors and officers believe they possess the requisite knowledge and experience to manage a corporation responsibly and are less eager to receive insurance risk management recommendations.
Moreover, whereas prior research shows that EPLI insurers spend considerable time trying to shape the meaning of law for employers tasked with dealing with discrimination laws (Talesh 2015a), here, cyber insurers spend far less time mediating 708 law’s meaning and far more time trying to enhance an organization’s ability to detect and respond when faced with a data breach. Thus, unlike in the EPLI con text, the insurance risk management tools are less about simply avoiding being sued and more about developing processes to prevent or limit any data breach problem from occurring. Therefore, the conditions under which insurance as regulation works depends on a variety of factors. Taken collectively, however, research on directors and officers insurance, EPLI, and the cyber liability insurance context reflect a significant shift in the manner in which insurers actively shape the nature of compliance.
From a policy standpoint, this study raises important questions about the role of insurance in regulating cyber security theft. Although prior research highlights how insurance acts as a form of social control on society (Baker and Simon 2002; Baker and Griffith 2010; Ben-Shahar and Logue 2012; Abraham 2013), important questions remain concerning whether insurers should regulate organizational behavior and if they do regulate behavior, how that authority is exercised. Similar to human resource officials, in-house counsel, and managers (Edelman, Erlanger, and Lande 1993; Edelman, Fuller, and Mara-Drita 2001), my data suggest that the insurance field’s involvement as an intermediary may be mix of benefits and disadvantages.
On the one hand, to the extent organizations remain underprepared for cyber risks and undercompliant with privacy laws, insurance industry intervention in this area is very valuable. The risk management tools offered encourage and, to some extent, force stronger detection and security protocols in organizations and nudge organizations toward greater safety and security. In turn, this makes consumer information less likely to fall into the hands of wrongdoers. Cyber insurance and risk management services such as the audits, hotlines, and online portals of handbook materials provide substantive guidance on privacy law and on organizations’ responsibilities. To the extent that the information provided to organizations is accurate in these settings, these services could be compatible with compliance and could even induce greater compliance. Moreover, the postbreach services allow organizations to turn to one place and address all their concerns. Unlike other financial institutions that also offer risk management services related to data breach, insurance companies are able to package these services with insurance litigation defense and indemnification in the event of an actual breach.
On the other hand, overreliance on cyber risk management systems may allow organizations to avoid more active engagement with the design, content, enforcement, and maintenance of their policies. By encouraging organizations to use insurer-sponsored forensics, information technology, public relations units, and hot lines, the insurance field shifts or decouples responsibility for hard normative judgments to others (such as insurance companies) operating outside the organization (cf. Bisom-Rapp 1996, 1999; Edelman, Fuller, and Mara-Drita 2001). Insurance companies have an obvious financial incentive in seeing more customers purchase cyber insurance and the accompanying risk management services. Insurance industry services that diminish an organization’s individual responsibility to design its 752 cyber security policies and procedures may diminish organizational responsibility for making moral, ethical, and legal choices involved with compliance (cf. Baker and Simon 2002). To the extent organizations can simply delegate their data breach events to the insurers and accompanying risk management vendors, cyber insurers may enhance the possibility that organizations are lethargic in taking ownership of compliance policies and procedures and, consequently, preventing privacy laws from making a greater impact.
Obviously, future research on whether cyber insurance leads to less data theft would help to gauge the value of these insurer-sponsored risk management services. Assuming insurer risk management services reduce the likelihood that data breach events will occur, my data suggest, at least preliminarily, that there is a net benefit. Existing research suggests that organizations are currently unable to keep up with cyber threats. Thus, despite insurers’ financial incentives, insurer-sponsored help is greatly appreciated by organizations and the consumers whose information is potentially exposed.
At a minimum, this study highlights the processes and mechanisms through which insurers act as private risk regulators (Ben-Shahar and Logue 2012). Regulation over privacy and cyber security issues in the United States remains fragmented and incomplete. The insurance industry is stepping in and trying to offer organizations a pathway for dealing with cyber threats and the abundance of privacy laws. Law is typically thought of as top down, coming from public legal institutions such as courts, legislators, and regulatory institutions. However, consistent with new legal realist and the law and society studies, how organizations implement laws and comply with various rules is shaped by intermediary institutions such as insurance companies.
Cyber risk management services do not just reduce risk; they actively construct the meaning of compliance. As shown in the employment and consumer protection contexts (Edelman, Uggen, and Erlanger 1999; Talesh 2009, 2012), these responses are becoming institutionalized and gaining legitimacy. In particular, public legal institutions are deferring to and encouraging organizations to purchase cyber security insurance.
The Department of Homeland Security’s National Protection and Programs Directorate recently convened working sessions and roundtables with the insurance industry to discuss ways to make public and private institutions more cyber secure. While acknowledging that the cyber insurance market is relatively nascent as compared to other lines of insurance, the Department of Homeland Security’s report concluded that cyber insurance is vital: “A robust cybersecurity insurance market could help reduce the number of successful cyberattacks by: (1) promoting the adoption of preventative measures in return for more coverage; and (2) encouraging the implementation of best practices by basing premiums on an insured’s level of self-protection” (Penensky, Traub, and Leff 2015). Moreover, the report devoted extensive attention toward improving risk management within organizations, the very kinds of services cyber insurance companies are offering (Department of Homeland Security 2014). Thus, it appears that insurance institutions are shaping the content and meaning of cyber security compliance.
Moving forward, this article suggests that there is great potential for constructive linkages between studies on risk management and law and organizations. More research on how risk-based logics are mobilized by intermediaries and mediate the way organizations deal with cyber security threats and comply with privacy laws would help strengthen organizational theory and reveal how, in action, the meaning of compliance is often constructed by legal intermediaries