Turing and a Fourth Law of Robotics

'Halting, Intuition, Heuristics, and Action: Alan Turing and the Theoretical Constraints on AI-Lawyering' by Jeffrey M. Lipshaw in Savannah Law Review (Forthcoming) comments

This is a reflection on the relationship of lawyering and artificial intelligence. Its goal is a better understanding of the theoretical constraints of the latter. The first part is an assessment of one particular and crucially important aspect in the theory of machine thinking – determining if the program being run will reach a conclusion. This is known as the “Halting Problem.” One question at the far reaches of AI capability is whether any physical machine presently conceivable could always, on its own, for every possible program, determine whether the program will ultimately generate an answer. The essence of the Halting Problem is that the answer to that specific question is “no.” Hence, unless a human programs the machine to decide it short of a final answer being generated, the machine won’t itself be able to decide whether it had thought enough and it was time to fish or cut bait. The second part is a philosophical reflection on what it means to decide something as opposed merely to think about it. Humans don’t have a Halting Problem. Even if they think as logically and formally as a machine, they also act. The thesis is that humans seem always in the case of every problem to be able to stop thinking and start doing, even if they don’t know whether the thinking is or will ever be complete. The third part is an assessment of what a law school of the future ought to look like, given this moderate view of the interaction between thinking machines and deciding humans.

'Toward a Fourth Law of Robotics: Preserving Attribution, Responsibility, and Explainability in an Algorithmic Society' by Frank A. Pasquale in (2017) 78 Ohio State Law Journal comments 

Jack Balkin makes several important contributions to legal theory and ethics in his lecture, “The Three Laws of Robotics in the Age of Big Data.” He proposes “laws of robotics” for an “algorithmic society” characterized by “social and economic decision making by algorithms, robots, and AI agents.” These laws both elegantly encapsulate, and add new principles to, a growing movement for accountable design and deployment of algorithms. My comment aims to 1) contextualize his proposal as a kind of “regulation of regulation,” familiar from the perspective of administrative law, 2) expand the range of methodological perspectives capable of identifying “algorithmic nuisance,” a key concept in Balkin’s lecture, and 3) propose a fourth law of robotics to ensure the viability of Balkin’s three laws.

Ordoliberalism

'Authoritarian Liberalism: From Schmitt via Ordoliberalism to the Euro' by Werner Bonefeld in (2017) 43(4-5) Critical Sociology 747 examines

the market liberal veracity of Hayek’s view that a dictatorship may be more liberal in its policies than an unlimited democratic assembly. Hayek’s warning about the potentially illiberal character of democratic government is key to the German ordoliberal thinking that emerged in the context of the crisis of the Weimar Republic. The ordoliberal thinkers were keenly aware of Schmitt’s political theology and argued with him that the state is the predominant power in the relationship between market and state, conceiving of this relationship as free economy and strong state. They maintained that the establishment of social order is the precondition of free economy; law does not apply to disorder and does not create order. The liberal state is the ‘concentrated force’ of that order. The contribution argues that ordoliberalism is best characterized as an authoritarian liberalism and assesses its contemporary veracity in relation to the European Union.

Bonefeld states

The program of liberalism ... summed up in a single word, should read ‘property’, that is, private property in the means of production ... All other demands of liberalism derive from this basic demand. (Von Mises, 1985: 137) It cannot be denied that Fascism and similar movements aiming at the establishment of dictatorships are full of the best intentions and that their intervention has, for the moment, saved European civilization. (Von Mises, 1985: 51) ...

The term ‘authoritarian liberalism’ was coined by the German Jurist Hermann Heller in a 1933 publication about the rightist Von Papen government of 1932. His account explored Carl Schmitt’s ‘Strong State and Sound Economy’ (1998) as the theoretical manifestation of the authoritarian turn of liberal thought. Heller characterized the turn towards authoritarianism as a demotion of democratic government ‘in favour of the dictatorial authority of the state’ (Heller, 2015: 296).  Schmitt’s stance was by and large shared by the founding thinkers of German ordoliberalism. They too identified the democratic character of the Weimar Republic as the root cause of the crisis of Weimar, arguing that mass democracy is tyrannical in its consequences.

In the context of Weimar, the authoritarian reassertion of the state was thus not only meant to overcome the ‘lamentable weakness’ (Friedrich, 1955: 512) of the liberal state. It was also meant to reorder the socio-economic relations to achieve free economy. Authoritarian liberalism conceives of the state as ‘market police’ (Rüstow, 1942). According to Heller (2015) it posits the state in its pure liberal form as the organized force and concentrated power of the system of liberty, enforcing market freedom and sustaining depoliticized socio-economic relations. Depoliticization is an eminently political practice. To Schmitt and the ordoliberals ‘the Leviathan was and had to be there first’ (Streek, 2015: 363); and rightly so: by its own logic, and as Adam Smith had already argued, free economy descends into ‘bloodshed and disorder’ (Smith, 1976: 340) unless the state civilizes its conduct by means of law, police, and fabrication of the moral sentiments of the system of private property. The freedom to compete presupposes ‘market police with strong state authority’ (Rüstow, 1942: 289) to sustain it. The strength of the state as market police depends on its independence from society. Its capacity to neutralize democracy and civilize the conduct of a free labour economy depends on the state as the independent and concentrated power of society.

In the late 1920s/early 1930s, the critique of mass democracy was part of the rightist reaction to the Weimar Republic. In the 1950s, it became part of the ‘anti-totalitarian’ idea that mass democ- racy leads to unfreedom, and that for the sake of an open society democracy needed to be fettered. As Willgerodt and Peacock (1989: 6) put it, ‘those who rely on the rules for liberal decisions, irrespective of the results of these decisions, must answer the question: how can it be guaranteed that these decisions will not destroy the liberal rules?’. In this perspective, freedom needs to be protected against the enemies of freedom even if they move formally within the legal bounds of a free society and secure parliamentary majorities by free elections. That is, ‘trust in freedom must be accompanied by a distrust of forces that abolish freedom or interfere with it’ (Lenel, 1989: 21). Surveillance is the condition of trust. Recognition of the enemies of freedom depends on the certainty of indivisible socio-economic values and political norms that recognize free economy as a ‘universal form of existence’ (Eucken, 2004: 321).

There can be no doubt. Relativism has no values to defend. It succumbs, they say, to ‘trouble makers’ (Röpke, 2009: 50). In this remarkable manner, the rightist denunciation of Weimar democracy established itself as a militant defence of post-war democracy. ‘Militant democracy’ rejects liberality as an open invitation to the enemy within. Instead it demands the curtailment of democracy ostensibly in order to protect it against attack and communist overthrow.

In the 1970s the authoritarian liberal critique of democracy came to the fore again in the context of the then economic crisis. The debate focused by and large on Britain. It argued that the crisis had been brought about by an excess of democracy that had let to an overloaded interventionist state, which had stifled the economy with crisis-ridden consequences. Its crisis-diagnosis entailed the prescription for resolving the crisis. The economy had to be set free by rolling back the state and by curtailing the democratic excess. Its stance formed the theoretical foundation of the incoming Thatcher government in 1979.

However, in Europe, the most sustained effort in neutralizing mass democracy occurred in the form of European monetary union, which created the world’s only state-less currency. The government of the Euro is to all intents and purposes entirely removed from the territorially regimented democratic sovereigns. It sets in place a market liberal framework for the conduct of policy in the federated and democratically constituted member states. The paper lays out the argument that capitalist political economy entails the liberal state as market police. This conception of the state excludes the idea of mass democracy as the constitutive basis of the liberal rule of law. The next section introduces Schmitt’s authoritarian stance and examines the ordoliberal critique of mass democracy. The following section presents the neoliberal account of a crisis of democracy in the 1970s. The conclusion summarizes the argument with reference to the elements of authoritarian liberalism in the governance of the Euro. I hold that the European monetary union amounts to a system of imposed liberty, which strengthens the liberal character of the member states. It also tends to nationalize the critique of ‘liberty’ in the form of powerful neo-fascist political movements and parties, including populist nationalist rejection fed by impotent rage and pitiful delusions about ‘land and sea’, as in the case of Brexit.

Mandatory Reporting and Health Complaints

The COAG Health Ministers meeting of 4 August resulted in a communique with the following items

Strengthened penalties and prohibition orders under the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law

Health Ministers agreed to proceed with amendments to the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law (the National Law) to strengthen penalties for offences committed by people who hold themselves out to be a registered health practitioner, including those who use reserved professional titles or carry out restricted practices when not registered. Ministers also agreed to proceed with an amendment to introduce a custodial sentence with a maximum term of up to three years for these offences. These important reforms will be fast tracked to strengthen public protection under the National Law. Preparation will now commence on a draft amendment bill to be brought forward to Ministers for approval, with a view to this being introduced to the Queensland Parliament in 2018. The Western Australian Parliament is also expected to consider legislative changes to the Western Australian National Law.

Amendment to mandatory reporting provisions for treating health practitioner

Health Ministers agree that protecting the public from harm is of paramount importance as is supporting practitioners to seek health and in particular mental health treatment as soon as possible.

Health Ministers agreed that doctors should be able to seek treatment for health issues with confidentiality whilst also preserving the requirement for patient safety.

A nationally consistent approach to mandatory reporting provisions will provide confidence to health practitioners that they can feel able to seek treatment for their own health conditions anywhere in Australia.

Agree for AHMAC to recommend a nationally consistent approach to mandatory reporting, following discussion paper and consultation with consumer and practitioner groups, with a proposal to be considered by COAG Health Council at their November 2017 meeting, to allow the amendment to be progressed as part of Tranche 1A package of amendments and related guidelines.

National human biomonitoring program

Health Ministers noted that human biomonitoring data can play a key role in identifying chemicals which potentially cause adverse health effects and action that may need to be taken to protect public health. Health Ministers agreed that a National Human Biomonitoring Program could be beneficial in assisting with the understanding of chemical exposures in the Australian population.

Accordingly, Ministers agreed that the Australian Health Ministers’ Advisory Council will explore this matter in more detail by undertaking a feasibility assessment of a National Human Biomonitoring Program.

The Senate Standing Committees on Community Affairs report earlier this year on Complaints mechanism administered under the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law had the following terms of reference: 

•  the implementation of the current complaints system under the National Law, including the role of the Australian Health Practitioner Regulation Agency (AHPRA) and the National Boards; 
• whether the existing regulatory framework, established by the National Law, contains adequate provision for addressing medical complaints; 
• the roles of AHPRA, the National Boards and professional organisations, such as the various Colleges, in addressing concerns within the medical profession with the complaints process; 
• the adequacy of the relationships between those bodies responsible for handling complaints; 
• whether amendments to the National Law, in relation to the complaints handling process, are required; and 
• other improvements that could assist in a fairer, quicker and more effective medical complaints process. 

The Committee's recommendations are - 

R 1   that AHPRA review and amend the way it engages with notifiers throughout the process to ensure that all notifiers are aware of their rights and responsibilities and are informed about the progress and status of the notification. 

R 2  that AHPRA and the national boards develop and publish a framework for identifying and dealing with vexatious complaints. 

R 3  that the COAG Health Council consider whether recourse and compensation processes should be made available to health practitioners subjected to vexatious claims. 

R 4  that AHPRA and the national boards institute mechanisms to ensure appropriate clinical peer advice is obtained at the earliest possible opportunity in the management of a notification. 

R 5 that AHPRA immediately strengthen its conflicts of interest policy for members of boards and that the Chair of the board should make active inquiries of the other decision makers about actual or potential conflicts of interest prior to consideration of a notification. 

R 6 that AHPRA develop a transparent independent method of determining when external advice is obtained and who provides that advice. 

R 7  that AHPRA consider providing greater remuneration to practitioners called upon to provide clinical peer advice. 

R 8 that AHPRA formally induct and educate board members on the way the regulatory powers of the board can be used to achieve results that both manages risk to the public and educates practitioners. 

R 9 that AHPRA conduct additional training with staff to ensure an appropriately broad understanding of the policies it administers and provide staff with ongoing professional development related to the undertaking of investigations. 

R 10  that the COAG Health Council consider amending the National Law to reflect the Psychology Board of Australia's policy on single expert witness psychologists acting in family law proceedings. 

R 11 that the COAG Health Council consider making a caution an appellable decision. 

R 12 that the COAG Health Council consider whether notifiers should be permitted to appeal board decisions to the relevant tribunal. 

R 13 that AHPRA take all necessary steps to improve the timeliness of the complaints process and calls on the Australian Government to consider avenues for ensuring AHPRA has the necessary additional resources to ensure this occurs. 

R 14  that AHPRA institute a practice of providing monthly updates to complainants and medical professionals whom are the subject of complaints.

Driverless Vehicles

The National Transport Commission (NTC) last year released a paper on Regulatory reforms for automated road vehicles.

The Commission has recently released a discussion paper on Regulatory options to assure automated vehicle safety in Australia, outlining four regulatory options to govern the safety of driverless cars and other autonomous vehicles in Australia:

• Continuing the current approach
• Self-certification
• Pre-market approval
• Accreditation.

The paper states

Automated vehicles that do not require human driver input into the driving task for at least part of the journey are expected to arrive on our roads from around 2020. Currently there is no explicit regulation covering these automated driving functions. Manufacturers are aiming to ensure automated driving functionality improves road safety, but this technology may also create safety risks for road users. The purpose of this paper is to seek feedback on:

• whether there is a need for explicit regulation of automated driving functions, above existing transport and consumer law 

• if there is a need for regulation, what form this should take.

We are seeking feedback from governments, road safety experts, automated vehicle manufacturers, technology providers, insurers and other stakeholders on these questions. This paper examines:

• how safety of automated vehicle functions should be assessed 

• the options for a safety assurance system 

• the criteria that should be used to decide among those options

•  institutional arrangements, road access and compliance.

Based on the feedback we receive, we will make recommendations to transport ministers in November 2017 on the preferred approach and the next steps to implement any required changes to legislation.

Australian governments have started work to remove legislative barriers to increasingly automated road vehicles. These barriers relate primarily to road traffic laws that implicitly require a human driver. Without further action, once these barriers have been removed, governments would have no regulatory mechanism to proactively ensure automated driving technologies are safe.

Automated driving technologies are progressively undertaking more of the driving task, and it is likely this technology will improve road safety, mobility, productivity and environmental outcomes. However, the technology is highly innovative and diverse and requires further testing and evaluation. From a regulatory perspective, there are four key issues:

• Should governments have a role assuring the safety of automated vehicles? 

• What are our measures of safety, and what is the level of safety required? 

• How does a safety assurance system balance safety outcomes with innovation, certainty and regulatory efficiency?

• Where does a safety assurance system fit within the existing regulatory framework for road transport, and how does it interact with existing laws?

In November 2016 the Transport and Infrastructure Council directed the National Transport Commission (NTC) to develop a national performance-based assurance regime designed to ensure the safe operation of automated vehicles. This will form a key component of an end-to-end regulatory framework to support the safe commercial operation of automated vehicles. Based on the feedback to this discussion paper, the NTC will recommend a preferred approach to ministers in November 2017, along with the next steps on regulatory reforms to support this approach.

In the absence of agreed Australian or international standards specific to automated vehicle technologies, governments need to consider the uncertain safety outcomes associated with different applications of automated driving, and whether the safety risk justifies additional government oversight and regulatory intervention. In Australia this type of oversight would be in addition to existing general consumer and product liability laws as well as extensive regulation covering vehicle standards and vehicle operation.

As the performance of the vehicle technology becomes increasingly safety-critical, new regulatory approaches may be needed to ensure initial and ongoing safety. Such approaches will need to cover all potential technology providers, from traditional automotive manufacturers to companies and individuals developing after-market devices to modify existing vehicles.

There is a risk that, without a national and coordinated response to automated vehicle reform, Australia’s complex regulatory framework will result in inconsistent regulation or over-regulation of automated vehicles across states and territories.

Regulatory options for safety assurance of automated vehicle functions

The NTC has developed four regulatory options for consultation for the safety assurance of automated vehicle functions. These are based on our assessment of the current regulatory framework and a review of safety literature and international developments. The four options are:

1. Continue current approach – no additional regulatory oversight, with an emphasis on existing safeguards in Australian Consumer Law and road transport laws. 

2. Self-certification – manufacturers make a statement of compliance against high-level safety criteria developed by government. This could be supported by a primary safety duty to provide safe automated vehicles. 

3. Pre-market approval – automated driving systems are certified by a government agency as meeting minimum prescribed technical standards prior to market entry. 

4. Accreditation – accreditation agency accredits an automated driving system entity. The accredited party demonstrates it has identified and managed safety risks to a legal standard of care.

We are seeking feedback on these regulatory options, recognising that the regulatory solution may draw upon elements across these options. Stakeholders are also welcome to propose new regulatory options. ... 

In many ways, the regulatory options reflect the risk appetite of the community and how the optimum role of government is perceived and understood by the community. In broad terms, the greater the risk appetite, the less we need explicit regulation, or a proactive role for governments to ensure automated vehicle safety.

In line with developments in other countries, the NTC proposes that the safety risks are sufficiently high or unknown to warrant some level of regulatory oversight and government involvement in the safety assurance system. ...

We have proposed eight assessment criteria against which the regulatory options for the safety assurance system have been evaluated. ... 

Proposed assessment criteria for the design of the safety assurance system

1. Safety 

• The model should support automated vehicle safety, including the ongoing safety over the full lifespan of the vehicle. 

• The model should provide certainty about who is responsible for testing, validating and managing safety risks. 

2. Innovation, flexibility and responsiveness 

• The model should be technology-neutral and allow innovative solutions 

• The model should allow government to respond and adapt to the changing market and evolving technology.  

3. Accountability and probity 

• The model should ensure the decision-making process is transparent, accountable and, where appropriate, appealable. 

• There should always be an entity (whether an individual or a corporation) that is legally accountable for the automated driving system.

4. Regulatory efficiency 

• The assurance process should be as efficient as possible and result in the least cost for industry and government, proportionate to the risk. 

• The process of assurance should minimise structural, organisational and regulatory change necessary to implement the model. 

5. International and domestic consistency 

• The model should support a single national approach, or state-based approaches that are nationally consistent. 

• The model should be adaptable if and when there is international consistency. International approval processes and standards should be recognisable. 

6. Safe operational design domain 

• The model should be able to take into consideration the operational design domain of an automated driving system. 

7. Other policy objectives 

• The model should be able to support non-safety policy objectives including cybersecurity, traffic management, environmental protection and the provision of data for enforcement or insurance purposes. 

8. Timeliness  

• The model should be able to be implemented and operational when the technology is ready.

Our initial assessment of the regulatory options suggests there are significant disadvantages associated with not developing a safety assurance system and continuing with the current approach (see Table 2). This is primarily because the ADRs do not have regard to automated driving technologies. Furthermore, existing safeguards, including vehicle recall powers, are focused on the technical integrity of the vehicle and do not consider environmental or human performance safety factors. This may lead to road safety risks, particularly in relation to vehicle modifications and after-market fitment.

Self-certification is a light-touch approach that, like the ‘continue current approach’ option, relies on existing safeguards but could introduce voluntary or mandatory compliance with automated vehicle safety principles and criteria. Showing compliance with these criteria would allow automated driving system entities to demonstrate to government that their vehicles are safe and therefore suitable to be registered under state and territory laws. Self-certification could be supported by a legislated primary safety duty for manufacturers, suppliers and automated driving system entities to provide safe automated vehicles.

Pre-market approval possibly provides the highest certainty for government and consumers that automated vehicles will be safe. However, this option is also regulation- and resource intensive and could stifle safety-related innovation if testing standards and procedures do not keep pace with technology changes.

Accreditation provides a comprehensive, risk-based and proven framework within which safety can be regulated. It focuses on outcomes, risk management and continuing improvements to safety. The accreditation model has demonstrated safety benefits in other high-risk industries including mining, rail and aviation. However, accreditation would involve a major reform of road safety, includes substantial set up costs and is not an approach that other countries are known to be exploring. ...

The paper comments

Implementation issues

A number of key issues need to be considered in implementing an approach to the safety assurance of automated vehicle functions, in particular:

• how to evaluate and validate safety

•  institutional arrangements to support the approach 

• how to manage access to the road network 

• how to ensure compliance with the requirements of the approach selected.

How to evaluate and validate safety

Evaluation and validation of automated vehicle safety is a foundation issue for the development of the safety assurance system. The proportionate and appropriate role of a government agency to test the safety claims made by a manufacturer or technology provider will largely depend on the regulatory model adopted in Australia.

We are seeking feedback on whether safety should be defined and measured according to the rate of technical failure and incidents that result in harm to people, or be based on an agreed metric of safety such as crash rates.

The NTC is proposing that the onus be placed on the automated driving system entity to demonstrate the methods they have adopted to identify and manage safety risks.

Institutional arrangements to support the approach

If there is a role for government in safety assurance for automated vehicle functions? Which government body will have that role? Responsibility for motor vehicle safety regulation is currently shared between the Commonwealth and the states and territories. The current mix of regulatory responsibilities adds complexity to the development of a safety assurance system and the potential institutional arrangements to oversee the safety assurance system. We are seeking feedback on institutional arrangements, including the types of government entities that could support a safety assurance system.

Institutional arrangements are heavily dependent on the safety assurance option chosen, therefore the NTC is proposing that institutional models are further developed after a regulatory option has been agreed.

How to manage access to the road network

For the foreseeable future, automated vehicle functionality will be limited to parts of the road network (for example, only sealed roads). This raises the question of the role of registration authorities and road managers (including local governments) in managing access to the road as part of the safety assurance system. We are seeking feedback on the role of road managers and whether registration authorities and road managers should authorise automated vehicle access to their road network in addition to safety assurance processes.

The NTC is proposing that a national approach should be adopted that incorporates automated vehicle registration and network access into the safety assurance process. However, access issues should be further explored once a regulatory model has been agreed.

How to ensure compliance

How do governments ensure compliance with any safety assurance system? We are seeking feedback on how to ensure compliance – including what regulation (if any) is needed to ensure automated driving system entities and other parties comply with safety obligations.

We suggest that compliance could be ensured through a primary safety duty for parties to provide safe automated vehicles with associated penalties and/or specific sanctions and penalties for the automated driving system entity.

The best way to ensure compliance will depend significantly on the regulatory model agreed. Sanctions and penalties in road traffic laws could also cover automated driving system entities through the NTC reforms to driver legislation.

Consultation questions

1. Should government have a role in assessing the safety of automated vehicles or can industry and the existing regulatory framework manage this? What do you think the role of government should be in the safety assurance of automated vehicles? 

2. Should governments be aiming for a safety outcome that is as safe as, or significantly safer than, conventional vehicles and drivers? If so, what metrics or approach should be used? 

3. Should the onus be placed on the automated driving system entity to demonstrate the methods they have adopted to identify and mitigate safety risks? 

4. Are the proposed assessment criteria sufficient to decide on the best safety assurance option? If not, what other assessment criteria should be used for the design of the safety assurance system? 

5. Should governments adopt a transitional approach to the development of a safety assurance system? If so, how would this work? 

6. Is continuing the current approach to regulating vehicle safety the best option for the safety assurance of automated vehicle functions? If so, why? 

7. Is self-certification the best approach to regulating automated vehicle safety? If so, should this approach be voluntary or mandatory? Should self-certification be supported by a primary safety duty to ensure automated vehicle safety? 

8. Is pre-market approval the best approach to regulating automated vehicle safety? If so, what regulatory option would be the most effective to support pre-market approval? 

9. Is accreditation the best approach to regulating automated vehicle safety? If so, why? 

10. Based on the option for safety assurance of automated vehicle functions, what institutional arrangements should support this option? Why? 

11. How should governments manage access to the road network by automated vehicles? Do you agree with a national approach that does not require additional approval by a registration authority or road manager? 

12. How should governments ensure compliance with the safety assurance system?

Equality and Divine Authority

The Victorian Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission has released its Equitable Briefing Initiative: Aggregate data report - Jul 2017.

The Commission states

 In 2014 the Commercial Bar Association of Victoria, the judiciary and the Victorian Equal Opportunity and Human Rights Commission began work together to understand and address equity issues for female barristers at the commercial bar. Of specific concern was the notion that women practising at the Victorian Bar in commercial law were briefed less frequently than their male counterparts and received briefs of less value.

The Equitable Briefing Initiative was developed to analyse the briefing practices of law firms and government entities who volunteered to be a part of the initiative by submitting data over a three-year period from 2016–19 on their briefing practices, and to focus on reducing any gender bias apparent in briefing practices.

This report analyses results from the first stage of the Equitable Briefing Initiative. It aims to identify any bias in briefing practices and considers whether the number of briefs to female barristers are proportionate at each level of seniority, and whether the average value of briefs to men and women are equivalent at each level of seniority.

The Commission comments

Overall, the data from this first reporting period allow us to make some interesting conclusions while leaving a number of questions open. There is most evidence of bias in relation to briefing of SC/QCs. Women at that level of seniority tended to receive fewer briefs than men over the reporting period, and there is some suggestion (though not enough evidence to come to any firm conclusion yet) that those briefs to women tended to be lower in value than the briefs that men received. Additional data will help us to determine the extent of any bias experienced by women at the SC/QC level.

Results were more encouraging at the non-SC/QC levels of seniority. Based on CommBar membership numbers, there was evidence that men received more briefs than women, but the discrepancy was not particularly large (the difference between the proportion of women CommBar members and the proportion of briefs they received was only 2.4 per cent); in addition, there was no evidence that the value of briefs to women was lower at either the Junior or Senior level. As previously mentioned, we will be able to make firmer, more precise conclusions as more data are received over subsequent reporting periods.

In Tasmania the Meander Valley Council  has disagreed with the Beerepoot family's claim that land is owned - if that's the word - by God and accordingly the family is not liable to pay rates. A block of the Beerepoot land has accordingly been sold on behalf of the Council for around $120,000 in order to pay $3,500 rates accumulated over seven years. The Council expects to transfer most of the proceeds (less legal costs and the recovered rates) to  the family.

The Beerepoot's reportedly advised the Council that  the land belonged to the "Heavenly Father", with rates being a matter "between council and God". Payment would be "asking us to bow down to a false God which is something we cannot do".

The family had unpaid rates of $9,332 regarding three properties, with an "anonymous source" paying  the rates for two properties in Chudleigh.

Fiduciaries

'Parenthood Is a Fiduciary Relationship' by Lionel Smith comments 

Canadian courts have held that parents stand in a fiduciary relationship with their children. Some commentators take the view that this is an inappropriate and unwarranted extension of a set of concepts that were originally elaborated in the context of the management of property rights and other pecuniary interests. This goal of this paper is to assess the characterization of parents as fiduciaries, in the light of recent scholarship on fiduciary law. I argue that while there are significant differences between the parent-child context and more traditional fiduciary categories, nonetheless the characterization of the parent as a fiduciary towards his or child captures a central, indeed a defining, element of the parent-child relationship, which is also a defining element of more traditional fiduciary relationships: namely, the possession of legal powers that are held in a managerial or other-regarding capacity, for the benefit of another person.

Econometrics

'The Data-Driven Future of International Economic Law' by Joost Pauwelyn and Wolfgang Alschner in (2017) 20 Journal of International Economic Law 217-231 comments 

The availability of more data and new ways of analyzing it is changing the way we do empirical legal research. With the help of modern technology we can study adjudicators, awards and agreements in greater numbers, less time and more detail opening the doors for new research questions, theory building and legal technology applications for scholars and practitioners. This introduction to the Journal of International Economic Law Special Issue on new frontiers in empirical legal research provides a first take on this data-driven future. It distinguishes data-driven research from more traditional methods by pointing to (1) its “data first” attitude, (2) its ambition to look at all the available data rather than subsamples thereof and (3) and its focus on computing rather than reading or counting. Data-driven research comes with new promises, but also challenges and limitations. While it allows researchers to uncover latent structures, debunk past myths and even forecast the future, it also requires new skills and competencies including an ability to tell patterns from noise in inductive data analysis. We argue that the time is ripe to overcome these challenges and to seize the opportunities of the new data-driven frontier in empirical legal scholarship.