Soundscapes

'Sonic Havens: Towards a Goffmanesque Account of Homely Listening' by Michael James Walsh and Eduardo de la Fuente in (2019) Housing, Theory and Society comments

Drawing upon Goffman’s notion of the interaction order we propose that home and homeliness pertain to the degree to which we can control our auditory involvements with the world and with others. What we term “homely listening” concerns the use of music to make oneself feel at home, in some cases, through seclusion and immersion, and, in others, through either the musical ordering of mundane routines or the use of music to engage in sociality with others. Drawing on 29 in-depth qualitative interviews concerning mundane instances of musical listening, we propose the home is a complex sonic order involving territoriality as well as the aesthetic framing of activity through musical and non-musical sounds. We argue the home represents a negotiated sonic interaction order where individuals skilfully manage involvements with others and activities through their musical and other sound practices.

 The authors note

 This article offers an analysis of a phenomenon we term “homely listening”, and the social and material relations that underpin it, via a framework primarily derived from the microsociology of Erving Goffman. As Manning (1992, 154) observes Goffman’s approach is to transform ethnographies of places, such as the Shetland Islands, hospitals, asylums, and sidewalks into ethnographies of concepts, such as presentation of self, encounters, face-work, territories of the self, etc. As such we aim to contribute to the socio-cultural study of urban sensory ecologies via an ethnography of the phenomenon of homely listening. Our argument is that homely listening may or may not coincide with the strict physical boundaries of the home; and, in any case, the latter gives rise to a range of private and shared modalities of listening. In short, the home is fundamentally a negotiated socio-material, as well as complex sonic order. We follow the foundational efforts of sociologists and other socio-cultural researchers interested in music’s role in everyday life such as DeNora (2000, 2003) and Bull (2007). We also concur with Nowak and Bennett (2014, 375) who suggest that studying musical listening requires a focus on “sound environments”: meaning the spaces, temporal orientations, bodily states and choice of technologies, that enable the consumption of music in everyday life. Our approach therefore focuses on one central sound phenomena within the home: the use of music as a means of aestheticizing and manufacturing domestic sonic havens. This approach provides our argument with an empirical anchorage point, allowing for the exploration of how music and its placement within the home responds to and signifies the presence of a finely balanced auditory interaction order.

Legal practitioner and police fraud

In Legal Profession Conduct Commissioner v Semaan [2017] SASCFC 19 the South Australian Supreme Court stated

This is an application by the Legal Profession Conduct Commissioner (the Commissioner) seeking an order that the name Fadi Semaan (the Practitioner) be struck off the roll of legal practitioners. The Practitioner does not oppose that order. 

2 In December 2010, the Practitioner was conferred a Bachelor of Laws and Legal Practice by Flinders University. He was engaged as an associate in the High Court of Australia during 2011. 

3 In January 2012, towards the end of his associateship, the Practitioner applied to a law firm (the firm) for employment as a solicitor. He sent the firm a copy of his curriculum vitae (CV) by email on 17 January 2012. The Practitioner later admitted having falsified the part of his CV which set out his work experience. 

4 On or about 2 February 2012, the Practitioner deliberately altered his academic transcript using computer imaging technology. On the altered transcript he:

• elevated his law degree to show that he had been conferred Honours when he had not; 

• falsified 21 subject grades in his law degree, generally increasing his grades to distinctions and high distinctions; and 

• forged a commerce degree, which he had never been awarded.

5 On 6 February 2012 the Practitioner was admitted to practice as a barrister and solicitor in the Supreme Court of South Australia. On 10 February 2012, four days after his admission, the Practitioner sent the altered transcript (dated 2 February 2012) to the firm by email in support of his application for employment. 

6 It was the second time that the Practitioner had provided a falsified academic record to the firm. The first time was in 2010 on an unsuccessful attempt to obtain a clerkship. However, the Practitioner was successful on this second attempt and was employed by the firm on 2 April 2012. On 29 June 2012, he resigned from his employment. 

7 On 14 August 2012 the firm discovered that the Practitioner’s altered transcript was fraudulent after noting discrepancies between the transcript he had submitted in 2010 and the altered transcript submitted on 10 February. The firm reported the matter to the Law Society of South Australia, who then reported the matter to the Legal Practitioners Conduct Board, pursuant to s 14AB of the Legal Practitioners Act 1981 (SA) (the Legal Practitioners Act).

Meanwhile, we might be asking some disquieting questions about the effectiveness of vetting in the Victoria Police.

Following an IBAC investigation (labelled Operation Salina) The Age reports

A senior Victoria Police officer has pleaded guilty to 10 fraud offences, including dishonestly obtaining six properties and rorting Centrelink, following a major investigation by the state's corruption watchdog. Sergeant Rosa Catherine Rossi, 57, also pleaded guilty in the Melbourne Magistrates Court to unauthorised access of the police database, LEAP, and falsely claiming in statutory declarations that her name was Dianne Marshall and she lived in Endeavour Hills. 

Misuse of the database and fake identification are salient because Rossi has been using the data to appropriate residential properties.

The Age states that

Rossi used a string of aliases over the past 20 years, including Nora Marguglio, Rosa Spencer and Bella Rossi. 

In 2005, she declared bankruptcy under her former name Rossa Catherine Marguglio, owing more than $750,000 to several banks and racking up massive debts on several credit cards. Rossi became familiar with the financial system while working as a teller at a bank. 

At the same time she worked as a beautician at a Cheltenham nursing home. She left both jobs under a cloud.

She then joined Victoria Police. Filter fail, as one of my students says!

Rossi exploited her role during an 18-month crime spree, often wearing her uniform to help persuade others to furnish her with private information. 

Rossi pleaded guilty to deceiving locksmiths to fraudulently take possession of houses in Malvern East, Chadstone, Brooklyn and three rural properties in Willaura, about 230 kilometres west of Melbourne. 

She accessed LEAP, without authorisation, to acquire information about the owner of the Malvern East home in October 2016. A month later, she obtained the property by deception after telling a locksmith it was a deceased estate and she was the owner ... 

Operation Salina, also resulted in Rossi being charged with fraudulently claiming rent assistance from Centrelink on behalf of another woman.

The Herald Sun reports

A decorated police sergeant has admitted to fraud and perjury after she was ­busted using her badge and position in the force to steal homes across the state. Sgt Rosa Rossi deceived locksmiths during an 18-month crime spree, ordering them to change locks on five houses, ­allowing her to illegally obtain vacant properties. 

The senior officer [an Inspector] has also admitted to trying to lease a stolen home in Brooklyn to an unsuspecting tenant. 

Sgt Rossi, a high-ranking police member who was awarded a group citation medal for merit, had earlier stated she was looking forward to her day in court so that she could tell her side of the story. But yesterday the police-woman remained silent as the Melbourne Magistrates’ Court heard she would plead guilty to 10 offences on the morning her committal trial was to begin. ... 

Sgt Rossi pleaded guilty to five counts of obtaining property by deception and defrauding the Commonwealth by receiving “rent assistance” payments to which she was not entitled. She has also admitted to using the Victoria Police ­database to access restricted information and making false statements about her identity.

The Inspector charged by IBAC admitted he lied to anti-corruption investigators about his relationship with Sgt Rossi. He reportedly claimed he perjured himself because he was worried his wife would find out he had been texting Rossi.

NSW Offender Registration

The NSW Law Enforcement Conduct Commission's The New South Wales Child Protection Register: Operation Tusket Final Report released last week reveals disquieting problems with administration of a key offender and identity register.

The Commission states 

 The NSW Police Force established the Child Protection Register (the Register) in 2001, following the passage of the Child Protection (Offenders Registration) Act 2000 (NSW) (CPOR Act). The CPOR Act requires offenders who have been convicted and sentenced for certain offences involving children or child abuse material to register with police when they re-enter the community. They must then provide reports to police of their personal details for a number of years. The purpose of the Register is to protect children from serious harm and ensure the early detection of offences by repeat child sex offenders who are in the community. The Register is a database that assists police to monitor and investigate these offenders. 

The Commission’s investigation has established that there have been problems with the Register for 17 years. Significant errors in the application of the CPOR Act started occurring as early as 2002. These errors have included incorrect decisions by the NSW Police Force about which persons should be included on the Register, and incorrect decisions about how long persons were legally required to make reports of their personal information to police under the CPOR Act (their ‘reporting period’). Some of these errors have resulted in child sex offenders being in the community without being monitored by the NSW Police Force as required by the CPOR Act. The Commission reviewed one case in which a person reoffended while unmonitored. Other errors have caused the NSW Police Force to unlawfully require people to report their personal information to police for a number of years. As a result, people have been wrongly convicted, and even imprisoned, for failing to comply with CPOR Act reporting obligations, when in fact those obligations did not apply to them at the relevant time. Two persons were unlawfully imprisoned for more than a year in total. 

The NSW Police Force has been aware for a number of years that there were significant issues with the Register. In 2014 the NSW Police Force Child Protection Registry (the Registry), the specialist unit in the State Crime Command responsible for maintaining the Register, started filing internal reports warning of systemic issues causing inaccuracies in the Register. Multiple reports from the Registry prompted the NSW Police Force to review 5,749 Register case files. This review was started in 2016 and took two years to complete. In October 2018 it concluded that 44 per cent (2,557) of those Register case files had contained errors. 

There are a number of factors which have contributed over time to the errors in the Register. One of the most significant factors is the difficulty of interpreting and applying the provisions of the CPOR Act. Another is the insufficient resources allocated to the Registry to handle an ever-increasing workload. 

The CPOR Act places obligations on courts and certain government agencies to assist the NSW Police Force to implement the registration scheme. However, almost since its inception, this multi-agency system has not been functioning as Parliament intended, particularly in relation to the identification of who are registrable persons. The NSW Police Force has taken a number of significant steps since the start of the Commission’s investigation to improve the administration of the Register, including doubling the staff in the Registry. This report contains 11 recommendations to remedy the unlawful conduct that has occurred and prevent further errors in the Register. Our key recommendations are that the NSW Police Force ensures that adequate resources are allocated to the Registry now and into the future to enable it to maintain the Register; that the CPOR Act be urgently referred to the NSW Law Reform Commission for comprehensive review so that the fundamental problems with the legislative framework can be addressed and the various statutory responsibilities of the NSW Police Force, courts and government agencies reconsidered, and that an independent body conduct audits of the Register. 

In Chapter 1 we describe how we conducted our investigation, referred to as Operation Tusket. Our investigation commenced in September 2017 on the basis of information provided in a public interest disclosure. Early in the investigation the NSW Police Force acknowledged there were a significant number of errors in the Register. The Commission and the NSW Police Force adopted a collaborative approach, sharing information and expertise to identify and address issues throughout the investigation. 

In Chapter 2 we set out the key elements of the Child Protection Register. We explain the purposes of the Register, and what are the consequences under the CPOR Act if a person is determined to be a ‘registrable person’. We describe the roles and responsibilities of the NSW Police Force Child Protection Registry and other police officers in relation to the Register. We explain that the Register is part of a national framework of different statutory registration schemes for sex offenders across Australia. 

In Chapter 3 we discuss the nature and extent of the errors that have occurred in the Register over time, including the results of the review of Register case files initiated by the NSW Police Force (called the ‘CPR case review’). We highlight the serious consequences of these errors through several case studies. We found that since 2002 the NSW Police Force has made over 700 incorrect decisions about who were ‘registrable persons’ under the CPOR Act, or about the length of registrable persons’ reporting periods. We also found that the NSW Police Force has unlawfully required people to report their personal information, and conducted unlawful inspections of persons’ homes, as a result of incorrect information in the Register. The NSW Police Force has also charged and arrested people for not complying with CPOR Act reporting obligations when those people were not under any obligation to report under that Act. As a result, at least seven people were wrongly convicted of offences under the CPOR Act. 

Chapter 4 explores the responses of the NSW Police Force to those persons who have been subjected to unlawful or unjust actions as a consequence of the errors in the Register. The NSW Police Force was generally proactive in seeking annulments from the courts when it identified that persons had been wrongly convicted for offences under the CPOR Act. However, in 2016 the NSW Police Force made the decision not to notify persons that it had made errors in their cases. Relying on internal legal advice, the NSW Police Force intentionally limited the information it provided to such persons, to avoid the prospect of civil claims. We found that on at least three occasions, the NSW Police Force wrote letters which were in fact misleading. The NSW Police Force now acknowledges that these letters are misleading, and has agreed to notify all those who may have been subjected to unlawful or unjust actions as a result of errors in the Register. 

In Chapters 5 to 8 we discuss the systemic problems which have contributed to the occurrence of so many errors in the administration of the Register. 

Chapter 5 looks at the resourcing of the Registry over time. There has been a steady increase in the demand, complexity and scope of the Registry’s work. In October 2003 there were 916 persons on the Register. By August 2019 there were 4,344. The Registry’s resources were not increased proportionate to its increasing workload. This resulted in the Registry being understaffed, which impacted on the accuracy of its work, its ability to engage in proactive investigative activities, and the welfare of its staff. Since the start of our investigation the NSW Police Force has added 14 officers to the Registry. We recommend that the NSW Police Force adopt a responsive model of resourcing for the Registry into the future. 

Chapter 6 examines the legislative framework for the Register. The NSW Police Force and the Commission agree that the CPOR Act is so complex and ambiguous in important respects that it creates an inherent risk of errors in the Register that the NSW Police Force cannot effectively mitigate. The legislative framework creates such practical difficulties that it undermines the Act’s object of ensuring that registrable persons are monitored and comply with their obligations. The Commission’s analysis of the CPOR Act, incorporating input from the NSW Police Force, identified over 20 issues. These issues are set out in full in Appendix 2, with examples of cases in which the complexity or ambiguity in the Act have led to errors. We recommend that the Attorney-General urgently refer the CPOR Act to the NSW Law Reform Commission for comprehensive review, to be completed within six months. 

In Chapter 7 we explain that courts and ‘supervising authorities’ have obligations under the CPOR Act to assist the NSW Police Force to implement the Register. However, there have been problems with compliance with some of these obligations for many years. Since 2003 authorities have been relying on the NSW Police Force to determine who the CPOR Act requires to be registered, even though the Act does not contemplate this role being performed by police. This shift away from the system envisioned by the CPOR Act has resulted in the NSW Police Force making decisions under that Act without access to adequate information. The NSW Police Force has already adopted some of our recommendations for interim solutions to improve the Registry’s access to the information necessary to implement the CPOR Act. However, ultimately, the respective roles of the courts, the NSW Police Force and other authorities in relation to the Register need to be reconsidered as part of the review of the CPOR Act recommended in Chapter 6. 

In Chapter 8 we discuss the electronic systems that the Registry uses to keep the information on the Register about offenders’ reporting obligations up to date. In 2014 Registry officers began to notice issues with these systems, and in 2015 it was reported that these problems had resulted in registered child sex offenders being released into the community without being monitored by the NSW Police Force under the CPOR Act. The NSW Police Force approved an IT project in 2017 to fix the issues with the electronic systems. At the time of writing, this project had not yet been completed. We recommend that the NSW Police Force take steps to ensure that the project is completed as soon as possible. 

In Chapter 9 we consider mechanisms to improve governance, quality assurance and accountability in relation to the Register. We recommend that an interagency committee and governance framework, involving the NSW Police Force, courts and supervising authorities, be established to improve compliance with each authority’s obligations under the CPOR Act. We also recommend that the NSW Police Force develop an internal governance framework to ensure all local commands comply with the statutory framework when managing registrable persons. We further recommend that the statutory framework for the Register be amended to provide for independent compliance audits of the Register, similar to the Sex Offenders Registration Act 2004 (Vic).

The Commission summarises its findings as

1: Since 2002 the NSW Police Force has made over 700 incorrect decisions about the administration of the Child Protection Register, including: • incorrect decisions that 96 people were not ‘registrable persons’ under the CPOR Act; • incorrect decisions that 43 people were ‘registrable persons’ under the CPOR Act; • incorrectly calculating the reporting periods of 485 registrable persons as being shorter than the periods required by the CPOR Act, and • incorrectly calculating the reporting periods of 144 registrable persons as being longer than the periods required by the CPOR Act. These incorrect decisions arose, wholly or in part, from mistakes of law or fact. 

2: As a result of the incorrect decisions referred to in Finding 1, the NSW Police Force unlawfully required persons to report their personal details to police for a number of years. Some of these persons were also subjected to unlawful home inspections by the NSW Police Force, in purported reliance on the power in s 16C of the CPOR Act. 

3: As a result of the incorrect decisions referred to in Finding 1, the NSW Police Force charged and arrested persons for failing to comply with reporting obligations or providing false or misleading information under the CPOR Act, when those persons were not under any obligation to report under that Act at the relevant time. These were actions of a serious nature which, although not unlawful, were unjust or oppressive in their effects. 

4: The NSW Police Force made decisions to write letters to Mr DD, Mr NN and Mr KK about their obligations under the CPOR Act, which were in effect misleading. These decisions, although not unlawful, were unreasonable or unjust in their effects.

Recommendations are

 1: Notify persons who may have been subjected to unlawful or unjust actions by the NSW Police Force. The NSW Police Force write to each of the 277 people identified by the CPR case review who may have been subjected to unlawful or unjust actions by the NSW Police Force as a result of errors in the Child Protection Register. Each letter should: • explain the specific error that was made in their case; • identify each of the types of actions that the NSW Police Force may have mistakenly subjected the person to as a result of that error, and • apologise for these errors, and suggest the person may wish to obtain independent legal advice. 

2: Adopt a responsive model of resourcing for the Child Protection Registry. The NSW Police Force ensure that the resourcing of the Registry is reviewed at least every two years, and that staffing is maintained at a level sufficient to perform statutory functions under the CPOR Act efficiently and accurately. 

3: Refer the CPOR Act to the NSW Law Reform Commission for review. The Attorney-General urgently refer the Child Protection (Offenders Registration) Act 2000 (NSW) to the NSW Law Reform Commission for comprehensive review, to be completed within six months. 

4: Introduce a statutory review mechanism. A provision should be included in the Child Protection (Offenders Registration) Act 2000 (NSW) (or any Act which replaces it) which gives a person the right to seek review by the NSW Police Force of the decision that they meet the definition of a registrable person under the Act, and/or the decision as to which reporting period applies to the person. Consideration should be given to providing a right of appeal from the NSW Police Force review to a tribunal or court. 

5: Establish a dedicated legal officer position in the Child Protection Registry. The NSW Police Force establish at least one ongoing legal officer position within the Registry that is dedicated solely to supporting Registry staff, and fill that position as a matter of priority. 

6: Provide reasons for decisions under the CPOR Act. The NSW Police Force provide written notification to each person placed on the Register of the basis upon which their status as a registrable person and their reporting period has been determined, including the sections of the CPOR Act relied on. For persons already on the Register, this information is to be provided upon request. 

7: Prioritise the ‘CPR COPS’ upgrade project. The NSW Police Force prioritise the recruitment for the CPR COPS upgrade project to ensure that the project is completed as soon as possible. 

8: Establish an Interagency Child Protection Register Committee. The NSW Police Force initiate the establishment of a Child Protection Register Committee with relevant authorities to discuss and decide the obligations,  compliance risks and mitigation strategies of each authority in relation to the statutory framework governing the Register.  

9: Develop an interagency governance framework. The NSW Police Force initiate the creation and implementation of a robust interagency governance framework to ensure consistent service delivery in accordance with each authority’s responsibilities under the statutory framework for the Register.

10: Implement a Child Protection Register governance framework. The NSW Police Force develop and implement a governance framework to ensure compliance by all local commands across New South Wales with the statutory framework for the Register. This framework should: • leverage the expertise of the Child Protection Registry to support local commands and provide quality assurance; • ensure that emerging compliance risks are identified and addressed, and • contain appropriate reporting mechanisms to ensure future accountability. 

11: Introduce independent compliance auditing of the Child Protection Register. Provisions should be included in the Child Protection (Offenders Registration) Act 2000 (NSW) (or any Act which replaces it) for independent compliance audits of the Register, with publicly reported (and de-identified) results, similar to those in the Sex Offenders Registration Act 2004 (Vic).

Photos

'Gorgeous Photograph, Limited Copyright' by Justin Hughes in Routledge Companion to Copyright and Creativity in the 21st Century (Routledge, 2020, Forthcoming) comments 

 This chapter explores how copyright protection of photographs is shaped by the dual nature of photography as both creative expression and a system of recording reality. Starting with the Supreme Court’s 1884 Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony opinion, the chapter explains how under American copyright law a photograph will have copyright protection only if it has original expression; that original expression can take the form of composition, selection of background, lighting, angle, shading, positioning of subjects, and a whole variety of “inputs” in the process of creating the photograph. Indeed, reading court decisions carefully it is clear that courts look for creativity less in the final photographs and more in the process of photography (including choice of camera, filters, lenses, and processing techniques, both analog and digital). 

The chapter describes how we can generally organize the recognized sources of copyrightable expression in a photograph into three categories: [a] creative choices in constructing the scene; [b] creative choices in initial image capture, and [c] creative choices in manipulating the image. 

The chapter then explores what this legal framework means for modern practices, concluding that many photographic and audiovisual records do not merit copyright protection; that photojournalists will often have only “thin” copyright protection over their work; that copyright law is only a very limited tool against “deep fakes;” and that most selfies do get at least some copyright protection. 

The chapter concludes with a discussion of the fair use doctrine and how the emergence of “transformative use” analysis threatens the work of freelance photographers far more than other creative professionals. Fortunately, it appears that appellate courts have recognized that concern and have appropriately dialed back “transformative use” analysis as it applies to photography.

Corporations

'The Corporation as a Category in Private Law' by Paul B. Miller and Andrew S. Gold in Hanoch Dagan and Benjamin Zipursky (eds.) Research Handbook on Private Law Theories (Elgar, Forthcoming) comments 

In this chapter, we examine the conceptualization of the corporation in private law, focusing particularly on categorization functions served by the corporate form. We argue that corporations are conceptualized as a distinctive kind of legal actor, their legal agency being constituted by private and public law alike. We explain the essentials of the corporate form, so understood, and outline the internal and external categorization functions that it performs in private law. Throughout, we emphasize that private law has ensured the legal and practical efficacy of the corporate form by adapting for exigencies generated by the artificial personality of corporations. We conclude with some observations about the challenges corporations present to general private law theory, including the work of corrective justice and civil recourse theorists. Amongst other things, we explain why leading theories of private law need to be significantly amended to account for the legal nature and moral status of corporations. 

Genomics

' The Personal Genome Project-UK, an open access resource of human multi-omics data' by  Olga Chervova, Lucia Conde, José Afonso Guerra-Assunção, Ismail Moghul, Amy P. Webster, Alison Berner, Elizabeth Larose Cadieux, Yuan Tian, Vitaly Voloshin, Tiago F. Jesus, Rifat Hamoudi, Javier Herrero  and Stephan Beck  in (2019) 6 Scientific Data  257 comments

Integrative analysis of multi-omics data is a powerful approach for gaining functional insights into biological and medical processes. Conducting these multifaceted analyses on human samples is often complicated by the fact that the raw sequencing output is rarely available under open access. The Personal Genome Project UK (PGP-UK) is one of few resources that recruits its participants under open consent and makes the resulting multi-omics data freely and openly available. As part of this resource, we describe the PGP-UK multi-omics reference panel consisting of ten genomic, methylomic and transcriptomic data. Specifically, we outline the data processing, quality control and validation procedures which were implemented to ensure data integrity and exclude sample mix-ups. In addition, we provide a REST API to facilitate the download of the entire PGP-UK dataset. The data are also available from two cloud-based environments, providing platforms for free integrated analysis. In conclusion, the genotype-validated PGP-UK multi-omics human reference panel described here provides a valuable new open access resource for integrated analyses in support of personal and medical genomics.

The authors state

The Personal Genome Project UK (PGP-UK) is a member of the global PGP network together with the PGPs in the United States, Canada, Austria and China. The PGP network aims to provide multi-omics and trait data under open access to the community. This contributes to personalised medicine by advancing our understanding of how phenotypes and the development of diseases are influenced by genetic, epigenetic, environmental and lifestyle factors. While all five PGP centres generate whole-genome sequencing (WGS), some PGPs, such as PGP-UK, produce additional multi-omics data. 

To participate in this study, volunteers must pass the eligibility criteria (e.g. be a UK citizen or permanent resident), sign the open consent form and pass a very thorough entrance exam. The objective of the exam is to ensure that the participant understands the key PGP-UK procedures and the potential risks of being involved in a project of this nature. At present, 1100 subjects have successfully enrolled in the project, and over a hundred of them have had their genomes sequenced. Once enrolled, participants are invited for sample collection which involves giving a blood or saliva sample or both for DNA and RNA extraction. DNA sequencing is then performed followed by data analysis. The results are reported back to the participants in the form of a Genome Report that is made publicly available after a grace period of one month. However, the participant is able to withdraw from the project at any time. DNA methylation data is generated using the Illumina HumanMethylation450 BeadChip array (450 k) and results are displayed in a freely available Methylome Report, a unique feature of the UK branch of the project. The preparation of both Genome and Methylome reports is discussed in more details in the Usage Notes Section. ... 

A pilot cohort of ten members of the public make up the PGP-UK multi-omics reference panel. For this cohort, we collected whole-genome bisulfite sequencing (WGBS) and RNA sequencing (RNA-seq) in addition to WGS and 450 k data. Figure 1 shows a schematic of the PGP-UK workflow. More information about PGP-UK can be found in1,2 and on the project’s website www.personalgenomes.org.uk. ... 

While controlled access multi-omics data can be submitted into a single public repository (e.g. EGA in Europe or dbGaP in the USA), there is currently no single public repository for open access multi-omics data. Consequently, the different types of datasets (WGS, WGBS, RNA-seq, 450 k) were submitted to the corresponding repositories (European Nucleotide Archive (ENA), European Variation Archive (EVA), ArrayExpress) at EMBL-EBI. The details are given in the Data Records section and direct data download links are provided on the PGP-UK data web page www.personalgenomes.org.uk/data. For convenience, we offer a web API to download all the available PGP-UK data (see Data Records). The cumulative size of the PGP-UK multi-omics reference panel exceeds 2TB, which means that it would take over 3 days (more than 85 hours) to download (with mean UK download speed of 54.2 Mbps, Ofcom 2018). To overcome this limitation, we collaborated with two cloud platform providers (Seven Bridges Genomics and Lifebit) to host PGP-UK data in their respective clouds for unrestricted access as briefly described in Data Records section. 

In this paper, we describe the PGP-UK multi-omics human reference panel derived from 10 participants. We followed best practices to perform various quality control (QC) checks to ensure the quality of the pilot WGS, WGBS, RNA-seq and 450 k datasets as described in the Technical Validation section. Finally, we describe the methods employed for multi-omics data matching, which ensures that samples are mapped to the correct participant.

'Direct to consumer genetic testing' by Rachel Horton, Gillian Crawford, Lindsey Freeman, Angela Fenwick, Caroline F Wright and Anneke Lucassen in (2019) 367 BMJ l5688 offers cautions about DTC genomics. The authors note

 Direct-to-consumer (DTC) genetic tests are sold online and in shops as a way to “find out what your DNA says.” Testing kits typically contain instructions and equipment for collecting a saliva sample, which customers post to the DTC company for analysis. 

Some DTC genetic tests promise insights into ancestry or disease risks; others claim to provide information on personality, athletic ability, and child talent. However, interpretation of genetic data is complex and context dependent, and DTC genetic tests may produce false positive and false negative results.

Anyone concerned about a result from a DTC genetic test might turn to their general practitioner (GP) or other primary healthcare provider for advice. This practice pointer aims to help clinicians in this scenario and explains what sort of health information is provided by these tests, their limitations, and how clinicians 

... What health information do DTC genetic tests provide? 

DTC genetic tests might provide a range of health information: 

• Polygenic risk scores—combine many different common variants across the genome to place someone in a broad risk category, eg, “your genes predispose you to weigh about 3% more than average.” The validity and utility of these risk scores for predictive clinical purposes is hotly debated. In our opinion, although polygenic scores may be useful in researching the causes of disease, or stratifying populations into higher and lower risks they are rarely able to usefully predict disease ;

• Genotype at specific points—looks at specific variants that influence the chance of developing particular diseases, eg, “you have two copies of the ε4 variant in the APOE gene. People with this result have an increased risk of developing late onset Alzheimer’s disease.” This type of testing can also be used to identify variants that affect drug metabolism. 

• Carrier screening—looks at specific variants to identify people who are carriers for particular recessive genetic conditions, eg, “one variant detected in the CFTR gene. If you and your partner are both carriers, each child may have a 25% chance of having this condition.” Many carrier tests are ancestry specific: they test for specific carrier variants common in a particular ancestral group. If someone with a different ancestry were a carrier, this would probably not be detected as it would likely be due to a different carrier variant (which the test would not check). 

• Uninterpreted “raw” genetic data—some DTC genetic test companies provide access to uninterpreted genetic data. Customers can download their data and seek an interpretation using third party services. These usually work by cross referencing the data against freely available genetic databases and constructing a report based on interpretations in these databases (which may not be up to date). They may report variants and disease risks that were not reported or referred to by the original DTC genetic test company, and might repurpose raw data from tests designed to answer other questions, such as ancestry, to try to provide health information. 

Saliently, the practice note asks 'What are the limitations of DTC genetic tests?', noting

•  Predictive value is low when there is no family history of disease
• Identifying a “high genetic risk” via DTC genetic testing does not mean that they will definitely develop the condition. 
• False positives are common, especially where third party interpretation services are used
•  The quality control for DTC genetic tests is variable.  Results found via third party interpretation services need particular care. 

Further cautions for consumers are -

• Does the DTC genetic testing company have real people you can talk to? Are they qualified (eg, genetic counsellors) to advise in response to your clinical concerns? 
• Have you read all the information and small print about the test? Sometimes tests have substantial limitations. 
• If you are worried about a genetic condition in your family, is the DTC genetic test you are thinking about thorough enough to properly check this? 
• Could your decision to have a test affect your family? DTC genetic tests sometimes reveal information that could be relevant to your family—such as a health risk that might run in the family, or that family relationships are different from what you expected. Have you told your family that you are thinking about having a genetic test? 
• Are you happy with what the DTC company might do with your data? DTC companies might collect, store, sell, or undertake research on your genetic data. Do you find that acceptable? Do you know who might have access to your data? 
• Reassuring results can be false negatives 
• DTC genetic tests tend to prioritise breadth over detail. For example, the 23andMe “genetic health risk” report for BRCA1 and BRCA2 currently only checks for three disease-causing variants mainly relevant for people with Ashkenazi Jewish ancestry; this approach would miss in the region of 80% of people with disease-causing BRCA variants in the general population 
• DTC genetic tests are sold as providing answers, and patients may understandably expect that their results will be clearly predictive of future health. These expectations, driven by marketing and media coverage, leave people at risk of over-interpreting results from DTC genetic testing. One common pitfall is to compare the result to a “zero risk,” rather than population risk. 

Parody

'Fame, Parody, and Policing in Trademark Law' by Mark A. Lemley in (2019) Michigan State Law Review comments

 Trademark owners regularly overreach. They often threaten or sue people they have no business suing, including satirists, parodists, non-commercial users, and gripe sites. When they do, they often justify their aggressive legal conduct by pointing to the need to protect their trademarks by policing infringement. Courts have in fact indicated at various points that policing is, if not strictly necessary, at least a way to strengthen a mark. But courts have never held that efforts to block speech-related uses are necessary or even helpful in obtaining a strong mark. Several scholars have accordingly argued that overzealous policing is unnecessary, that it has harmful effects, and that we ought to punish it. But trademark owners continue to do it, in part because it is largely (though not completely) costless and because if there is even a chance a failure to police will cost you your trademark you won’t want to take the chance. So trademark law currently not only doesn’t prevent overreaching; it affirmatively encourages it. 

In this article, I suggest a way that we can align trademark owner enforcement incentives with good public policy. The presence of unauthorized parodies, satires, and complaint sites involving a mark should be evidence of the fame of the mark, and perhaps even a requirement for status as a famous mark. Taking this approach would be consistent with what we know about how society interacts with trademarks. Famous marks become part of a social conversation in a way that ordinary marks don’t. My approach has empirical support: the best-known brands draw more parodies and criticism sites than non-famous marks, and those parodies don’t interfere with the fame of the mark. And it would give trademark owners an affirmative reason to leave critics, satirists, and parodists alone.