29 October 2020

Metadata Retention

The Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security report on metadata retention makes the following recommendations. The Committee is required by Section 187N of the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (Cth) to review the mandatory data retention regime prescribed by Part 5-1A of that Act. 

R 1 Within 18 months from the date of the Committee’s report, the Committee recommends that the Department of Home Affairs prepare national guidelines on the operation of the mandatory data retention scheme by enforcement agencies. In general terms, the purpose of the national guidelines would be to ensure greater clarity, consistency and security in respect of requests for – and the collection and management of – telecommunications data by enforcement agencies across Australia.  

To that end, the national guidelines must be: consistent with the requirements of the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 and other relevant Commonwealth legislation (as amended in accordance with the other recommendations made by the Committee in this report); and adopted and followed by each enforcement agency. 

In developing the national guidelines, the Department of Home Affairs should meet and consult with (at a minimum):

  • the Privacy Commissioner; 

  • the Commonwealth Ombudsman; 

  • each criminal law-enforcement agency; 

  • industry representatives; 

  • the Law Council of Australia; and 

  • the Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Communications.

 Meeting is of course not the same as taking on board and giving effect to concerns.

The national guidelines should be made public (except to the extent they contain classified information, if any). 

R 2  The Committee recommends that the Telecommunication (Interception and Access) Act 1979 be amended to clearly define the term “content or substance of a communication” for the purpose of providing greater certainty and enhancing privacy protections. 

The Department of Home Affairs should, at a minimum, meet and consult with the following in seeking to develop this definition: the Communications Alliance and other industry representatives; the Commonwealth Ombudsman; the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security; the Law Council of Australia; and the Privacy Commissioner. 

Moreover, in defining the term “content or substance of a communication”, Home Affairs should specifically consider whether some information that is currently treated as telecommunications data should now be regarded as content given what that information can reveal about an individual. 

R 3 The Committee recommends that Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 be amended so that, if a provider discloses any of the information referred to in section 187A(4) of the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act to ASIO or a criminal law-enforcement agency, ASIO or the enforcement agency (as applicable) must: not use the information; immediately quarantine the information; notify the Commonwealth Ombudsman or the IGIS (as applicable) of the disclosure; and following consultation with the Ombudsman or the IGIS (as applicable), destroy the information. 

R 4  The Committee recommends that the data retention period be kept at two years. 

R 5  The Committee recommends that section 187A of the Telecommunication (Interception and Access) Act 1979 be amended to clarify that service providers are not required to store information generated by Internet of Things devices. 

R 6  The Committee recommends that the Telecommunication (Interception and Access) Act 1979 be amended to include the following additional reporting requirements:

  • the number of authorised officers in each enforcement agency and ASIO; 

  • the number of authorisations made by each authorised officer; 

  • the number of individuals that the authorisations by each enforcement agency and ASIO related to; and 

  • in respect of authorisations in relation to criminal investigations, the specific offence – or offences – that the authorisations related to. 

R 7 The Committee recommends that, in consultation with other stakeholders (agencies with access to the Mandatory Data Retention Regime, the Inspector General of Intelligence and Security, the Commonwealth Ombudsman and the Commonwealth Privacy Commissioner), the Department of Home Affairs should within 18 months of this report develop guidelines for data collection to be applied across the Mandatory Data Retention Regime and the most cost effective way to achieve the intended outcome of facilitating better oversight, including an ability for enforcement agencies and Home Affairs to produce reports to oversight agencies or Parliament when requested. As a minimum, any such report should include the following information (in respect of each occasion on which the powers in Chapter 4 of the Telecommunication (Interception and Access) Act 1979 were used):

  • the section of the Telecommunication (Interception and Access) Act 1979 used to access the data; the case number associated with the authorisation; 

  • the specific offence – or offences – that the investigation related to; 

  • if the authorisation related to a missing person case, the name of the missing person brief reasons why the authorised officer was satisfied that the disclosure was reasonably necessary; 

  • where the data related to a person who did not have an obvious relationship to a suspect in an investigation, brief reasons why the authorised officer was satisfied that any interference with the privacy of the person that may have resulted from the disclosure or use of the telecommunications data was justifiable and proportionate; 

  • the name(s) of the officers involved in the case; the name and appointment of the authorising officer; 

  • if the agency became aware that the carrier disclosed any of the information referred to in section 187A(4) and action taken.

Where practicable, the report should also include:

  • whether or not the data was used to rule someone out from an investigation; 

  • whether or not the person whose data was accessed was eventually charged, prosecuted and/or convicted of a crime; 

  • whether or not the data accessed eventually led to the charge, prosecution and/or conviction of another person for a crime; and 

  • the cost of the disclosure. 

For the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, the additional record-keeping requirements should include:

  • the nature of the national security risk that led to the authorisation being given; and 

  • brief reasons why the authorised officer is satisfied that any interference with the privacy of the person that may result from the disclosure or use of the telecommunications data is justifiable and proportionate. 

R 8  The Committee recommends that section 306(5) of the Telecommunications Act 1997 be amended to require telecommunications service providers to keep detailed records of the kinds of information included in each disclosure of telecommunications data, including the types of telecommunications data that were disclosed. 

R 9  The Committee recommends that the Telecommunication (Interception and Access) Act 1979 be amended so that:

  • ASIO and enforcement agencies are required to retain telecommunications data for a prescribed minimum period to ensure that the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security and the Commonwealth Ombudsman (as applicable) are able to perform their oversight functions; and 

  • Having satisfied the requirements of the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security or the Commonwealth Ombudsman (as applicable) ASIO and enforcement agencies are required to delete telecommunications data as soon as practicable after the telecommunications data is no longer needed (e.g. in the case of an enforcement agency, after an investigation has concluded). 

R 10 The Committee recommends that the Telecommunication (Interception and Access) Act 1979 be amended so that: authorised officers may only make verbal authorisations for the disclosure of telecommunications data in emergency situations; and the record-keeping obligations that apply to written authorisations also apply to verbal authorisations except that: the written record must be made as soon as practicable after the making of the verbal authorisation; and for each verbal authorisation, the authorised officer must make a record of the reasons why the authorisation had to be made verbally. 

R 11  The Committee recommends that section 5AB of the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 be amended with a view to reducing the number of officers and officials of criminal law-enforcement agencies who may be designated as “authorised officers” and the circumstances in which those designations may be made. At a minimum:

  • only officers or officials who hold a supervisory role in the functional command chain should normally be capable of being designated as ‘authorised officers’; 

  • although other individuals who hold specific appointments – rather than entire classes of officers or officials – may be capable of being designated as ‘authorised officers’; 

  • in order to authorise an individual to be an authorised officer, the head of an enforcement agency must be satisfied that it is necessary for the individual to be an ‘authorised officer’ in order for the individual to carry out his or her normal duties; 

  • and prior to the head of an enforcement agency authorising an individual to be an ‘authorised officer’: the relevant senior officer or official must complete a compulsory training program in relation to Chapter 4 of the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979; 

  • and the head of the enforcement agency must be satisfied that the senior or official has the requisite experience, knowledge and skills to exercise the powers under Chapter 4 of the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979. 

R 12  The Committee recommends that section 180 of the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act be amended to specify when a revocation of an authorisation takes effect. 

R 13  The Committee recommends that section 178 amended and section 179 be repealed so that an authorised officer cannot make an authorisation for access to existing information or documents unless he or she is satisfied that the disclosure is reasonably necessary for: the investigation of: a serious offence; or an offence against a law of the Commonwealth, a State or a Territory that is punishable by imprisonment for at least 3 years. For the avoidance of doubt ‘serious offence’ is as defined in section 5D of the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979. 

R 14  The Committee recommends that Division 3 of Part 4–1 of the Telecommunication (Interception and Access) Act 1979 be amended to: increase the threshold for ASIO to authorise the disclosure of telecommunications data so that it is consistent with the threshold for ASIO to intercept telecommunications or access stored communications under a telecommunications service warrant issued under Part 2-2 of the Act; and introduce a new provision, modelled on section 180F of the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act, requiring ASIO to consider privacy before making an authorisation. 

R 15  The Committee recommends that section 280(1)(b) of the Telecommunications Act 1997 be repealed. Moreover, the Committee recommends that the Government introduce any additional amendments to Commonwealth legislation that are necessary to ensure that: only ASIO and the agencies listed in section 110A of the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 be permitted to authorise the disclosure of telecommunications data; and those agencies can only access telecommunications data through Part 4–1 of the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 and through no other legal mechanism. 

R 16  The Committee recommends that sections 186 and 187P of the Telecommunication (Interception and Access) Act 1979 be amended so that: the Minister must complete the report(s) referred to in section 186(2) and 187P as soon as practicable and, in any event, within 3 months after each 30 June; and the Minister must cause a copy of the report(s) to be tabled in each House of the Parliament as soon as practicable and, in any event, within 15 sitting days after the date on which the report is completed. 

R 17  The Committee recommends that state and territory criminal law-enforcement agencies under section 110A be prescribed as ‘organisations’ under section 6F of the Privacy Act 1988  in relation to their collection and use of telecommunications data for the purposes of the Notifiable Data Breach regime. 

R 18  The Committee recommends that section182(2) of the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 Act be amended in line with section 68(d) for the consideration of the communication of telecommunications data for disciplinary action and termination of employment. 

R 19  The Committee recommends that section 29 of the Australian Information Commissioner Act, and any other statutes that apply similar constraints on information sharing by relevant oversight agencies, be amended so that agencies that have an oversight function in respect of the mandatory data retention regime are able to share intelligence on matters of regulatory concern where there is a public interest in doing so. 

R 20  The Committee recommends that the Intelligence Services Act 2001 and the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 be amended so that the Committee may commence a review of the mandatory data retention scheme by June 2025.  

R 21 The Committee recommends that Division 1 of Part 5-1A of the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 be amended to require service providers to store information of the kind specified in or under section 187AA, or documents containing information of that kind, on servers located in Australia unless specifically exempted. 

R 22  The Committee recommends that: agencies that have access to telecommunications data should develop minimum standards for the security of telecommunications data held within their control or premises; and, entities subject to telecommunications data retention requirements under the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act should be required to demonstrate to the Australian Communications and Media Authority that they have met minimum standards for ensuring the security of retained data: these minimum standards, applying to entities subject to telecommunications data retention requirements should be developed by the Australian Communications and Media Authority.

Interference

Third Oxford Statement on International Law Protections Against Foreign Electoral Interference through Digital Means articulates 

a short list of consensus protections that apply under existing international law to foreign cyberoperations with adverse consequences on electoral processes, such as balloting, verifying, and providing electorates with procedural information about how to participate in an electoral process and substantive information related to that process. The Statement enumerates a range of duties of states: negative duties – to refrain from conducting cyber operations that have adverse consequences for electoral processes in other states, and not to render assistance to such operations, – as well as positive requirements of due diligence, and duties to protect and ensure the integrity of their own electoral processes from interference by other states.   ... 

Use of digital means to disrupt or undermine elections and to interfere with a population’s right to govern itself strikes at the very core of democracy. This Statement makes clear that international law addresses and forbids such brazen assaults on the rule of law, and states should refer explicitly to such law when speaking about election interference. 

The Statement reads

 We, the undersigned public international lawyers, have watched with growing concern reports of cyber incidents targeting electoral processes around the world, including allegations of foreign state and state-sponsored interference. We also note that the COVID-19 pandemic raises additional challenges to ensuring the integrity of such processes. 

Whereas: 

Two prior Oxford Statements have described the rules and principles of international law governing cyber operations that threaten two areas of pressing global importance, namely the safeguarding of the health care sector and global vaccine research; 

International law protects electoral processes, and efforts to interfere, including by digital means, with a state’s choice of its political leaders or other matters on which it has free choice contravene basic principles of the international order; 

The Charter of the United Nations (UN) establishes sovereign equality and each state’s political independence as bedrock elements of the international system; the UN General Assembly has affirmed that no state “has the right to intervene directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other state”; and the International Court of Justice has held that every sovereign State has the right “to conduct its affairs without outside interference”; 

Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights declares that “[e]very citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without … unreasonable restrictions [t]o take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives; [t]o vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors”; electoral interference can infringe human rights protected under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the American Convention on Human Rights, and the European Convention on Human Rights; 

Other international instruments, such as the Paris Call for Trust and Security in Cyberspace (2018), have called on all stakeholders to “[s]trengthen their capacity to prevent malign interference by foreign actors aimed at undermining electoral processes through malicious cyber activities”; 

All efforts by states and others to prevent such malign interferences should be consistent with international law; 

The International Law Commission’s 2001 Articles on State Responsibility establish that a state is responsible for the conduct of its organs or officials, as well as for conduct carried out by persons or groups acting on the instructions of, or under the direction or control of, the state; 

In line with the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, online intermediaries and digital media companies should “conduct due diligence to ensure that their products, policies and practices … do not interfere with human rights”, as recognised in the April 2020 Joint Declaration on Freedom of Expression and Elections in the Digital Age, adopted by the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression, the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, and OAS Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression. 

As states and other stakeholders learn more about the ways in which foreign cyber actions can adversely affect domestic electoral processes and how best to address such harms, international law can be further clarified and strengthened by state practice that becomes accepted as customary international law. 

We affirm that all states are bound to act in accordance with the rules and principles identified below. 

Applicability 

1. International law applies to cyber operations by states, including those that have adverse consequences for the electoral processes of other states. 

a. “Electoral processes” refer but are not limited to processes for selecting or electing individuals for public office, referenda, and plebiscites. These include:

i. Balloting: registering, casting, tabulating, or assuring the integrity of a ballot including voter registries, ballot security and integrity protocols, voting machines, and paper ballots; 

ii. Verifying: systems used for reporting, recording, verifying and auditing votes and results of an election; 

iii. Informing: public or private systems that provide an electorate with procedural information about how to participate in an electoral process, as well as substantive information, of whatever origin, related to an electoral process, including information on individuals or groups participating in electoral processes, such as candidates for elective office, political parties, or organizations. 

b. Adverse consequences, in the electoral context, include actions, processes or events that intervene in the conduct of an electoral process or undermine public confidence in the official results or the process itself. These actions include but are not limited to intrusions into digital systems or networks that cast doubt on the integrity of election data, such as votes and voter registers, as well as cyber operations against individuals and entities involved in the election. 

Duty to Refrain 

2. A state must refrain from conducting, authorising or endorsing cyber operations that have adverse consequences for electoral processes in other states. States must refrain from, inter alia

a. Interfering, by digital or other means, with electoral processes with respect to balloting or verifying the results of an election; 

b. Conducting cyber operations that adversely impact the electorate’s ability to participate in electoral processes, to obtain public, accurate and timely information thereon, or that undermine public confidence in the integrity of electoral processes. 

c. Conducting operations that violate the right to privacy, freedom of expression, thought, association, and participation in electoral processes. 

Duty Not to Render Assistance 

3. A state must not render assistance to cyber operations that it knows will likely have adverse consequences for electoral processes in other states. 

Due Diligence 

4 a. When a state is or should be aware of a cyber operation that emanates from its territory or infrastructure under its jurisdiction or control, and which may have adverse consequences for electoral processes abroad, that state must take all feasible measures to prevent, stop and mitigate any harms threatened or generated by the operation. 

b. To discharge this obligation, states may, to the extent feasible, be required to, inter alia, investigate, prosecute or sanction those responsible, take measures to prevent or thwart operations spreading misleading or inaccurate information, and/or assist and cooperate with other states in preventing, ending, or mitigating the adverse consequences of foreign cyber operations affecting electoral processes. 

c. The measures taken to discharge a state’s obligations should be carried out in full compliance with other rules of international law. 

Obligation to Protect Against Foreign Electoral Interference 

5. States have an obligation to protect and ensure the integrity of their own electoral processes against interference by other states. To discharge this obligation, states may be required to put in place electoral security measures, such as legislation and backup systems, as well as to secure the availability of public, timely and accurate information on electoral processes. Any restrictive measures taken by states that interfere with human rights must be in accordance with applicable legal requirements, such as legitimate purpose, legality, necessity, proportionality and non-discrimination. 

6. These rules and principles are without prejudice to other applicable international rules and ongoing processes. 

27 October 2020

Legal Privilege

In Commissioner of Police v Barbaro [2020] QCA 230  Sofronoff P and Philippides and Mullins JJA have found, in the specific circumstances, that an assertion that some communications on a mobile phone are protected by legal privilege constitutes a reasonable excuse not to comply with a search warrant requiring the subject to give the PIN to police. 

The judgment states 

[1]  On 22 May 2018 police obtained a warrant from a magistrate to search certain premises on the Gold Coast. The warrant asserted the commission of certain offences by the respondent authorised a police officer to “seize a thing found at the relevant place ... that the police officer reasonably suspects may be warrant evidence or property to which the warrant relates”, which included “mobile phones”. The warrant also expressly required the specified person to allow a police officer to “examine the stored information to find out whether it may be evidence of the commission of an offence” and to copy such information. 

[2] Section 154(1) of the Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld) provides that a magistrate who issues a search warrant may order a “specified person” to “give a police officer access to ... the access information ... necessary for the police officer to be able to use the storage device to gain access to stored information that is accessible only by using the access information”. Section 150AA of the Act defines the term “storage device” to include a “device on which information may be stored electronically”. A mobile phone is such a device. The same section defines “access information” to mean information that is necessary for a person to access and read information stored electronically on a storage device. That definition applies to a password that permits access to the content of a mobile phone. Section 156(3) of the Act provides that a warrant that contains an order to furnish access information must state that a failure, without reasonable excuse, to comply with the order may be dealt with under s 205A of the Criminal Code (Qld). That provision of the Code makes it an offence for a person to contravene an order made under s 154(1) of the Act. 

[3] The two parts of the warrant, namely the express order to give access information and the warning that a failure to give the information without a reasonable excuse may result in a charge being laid alleging the commission of an offence against s 205A of the Code, have to be read together. The result of such a reading is that the order is one which requires a person to furnish access information unless the person has a reasonable excuse to refuse to do so. 

[4] Police executed the warrant at the relevant premises on 24 May 2018 and found a mobile phone that belonged to the respondent. A police officer ordered the respondent to reveal the PIN that would unlock it. It is common ground that the respondent was a “specified person” to whom such an order could be given and that the respondent was obliged to give the information unless he had a reasonable excuse for refusing and that, if he refused without a reasonable excuse, he would be guilty of an offence under s 205A of the Code. The respondent refused to give the information and, accordingly, he was charged. 

[5] At the trial in the Magistrates Court, the prosecution led evidence to prove the facts set out above, none of which was disputed. The respondent gave evidence. He said that the reason he had refused to reveal the password was that he had been in the habit of using the phone to communicate with his solicitor by using various text messaging systems on his phone. The phone contained numerous privileged written communications between the respondent and his solicitor and he did not wish police to read these messages. This evidence was not challenged. The respondent claimed at his trial that his right to protect privileged information constituted a reasonable excuse for his refusal. For reasons that it is unnecessary to detail, the learned Magistrate rejected this defence and found the respondent guilty. 

[6] The respondent appealed to the District Court and Kent QC DCJ upheld his appeal. In substance the respondent submitted, and Kent QC DCJ accepted, that he was entitled to maintain his privilege against disclosure of certain of the information even if other information contained on the phone was not privileged and this claim constituted a reasonable excuse for his refusal. His Honour set aside the conviction. 

[7] The Commissioner of Police has applied for leave to appeal against that decision. She submitted that leave to appeal should be granted because the appeal would raise an important question of law. That submission should be accepted and leave to appeal should be granted. 

[8] As the appellant has framed her case, the question in this appeal is whether, as a matter of law, the respondent’s asserted reason for refusing to give up his password was capable of constituting a reasonable excuse. The Commissioner submitted that Kent QC DCJ failed to take into account that legal professional privilege could not have attached to all the information stored on the phone. In her written submissions, the Commissioner submitted that unless the respondent was able to claim that all of the information on the phone was privileged, “the dominant purpose test cannot be satisfied and the privilege cannot be relied on to prevent a compulsory process for the obtaining of evidence” (italics in the original). The Commissioner pointed out, correctly, that the respondent’s claim did not go so far as to assert that all the information on the phone was privileged nor did his evidence identify the documents over which he claimed privilege.  ... It was submitted that because privilege could not attach to all of the documents on the phone it followed that a claim of privilege could not be relied upon as a reasonable excuse to refuse to disclose the password. 

The QCA did not accept those submissions, stating 

[10] It has been established that legal professional privilege is a rule of substantive law which may be availed of by a person to resist the giving of information or the production of documents which would reveal communications between a client and his or her lawyer made for the dominant purpose of giving or obtaining legal advice. The right to refuse to disclose information extends to a right to resist giving information required by a search warrant. 

[11] Three things can be said about the expression “reasonable excuse”. First, the word “reasonable” connotes that the excuse must be objectively reasonable. Second, whether something is “reasonable” will depend not only upon the particular facts of the case but also upon the statutory context in which the word appears. Third, although it need not be the only reason, the asserted reasonable excuse must actually be a person’s reason for withholding the access information. 

[12] In this case the word appears in a search warrant pursuant to which police were endeavouring to obtain evidence, including in the form of written information, that might tend to prove the commission of offences by the respondent. The mobile phone in this case was one of the kinds of things expressly referred to in the warrant as a “storage device” that might contain “stored information” and the warrant expressly empowered a police officer to look at that information “to find out whether it may be evidence of the commission of an offence”. In this way, the service of the warrant upon the respondent, the seizure of his phone and the demand for the password that would unlock the phone constituted an unmistakeable assertion by police that they intended to read the information contained on the phone including any privileged information as soon as that was practicable. ... 

[14] In this case the demand made of the respondent to reveal the password that would unlock his phone was made in terms that did not suggest that police accepted any limitation upon their powers of inspection of documents that they found on the phone. Police were asserting a right to read every document on the phone. 

[15] The context in which the words “reasonable excuse” appear in this case is of significance to the result of the appeal. The words appear in the warrant because a statute required that they be used to qualify the otherwise absolute terms of the obligation of disclosure that the warrant imposed upon the respondent. This search warrant was part of the investigative pre-trial process of the criminal law, the function of which is to authorise the seizure of material that will implicate a person in the commission of an offence. This is a process that is intended to yield evidence which can be tendered by the prosecution to obtain a conviction. Undoubtedly, some of the best evidence of that kind might well be found in what an alleged offender has confided to a lawyer. Yet such material is held to be immune from disclosure because the ability of a client to confide freely in a lawyer is regarded by the law as indispensable to the functioning of our legal system. It is in the public interest that candid communications be permitted between lawyers and their clients and it is for this reason that privileged communications are protected against disclosure. Indeed, so important is this principle that the improper disclosure of communications that are the subject of privilege might even result in criminal proceedings being stayed. 

[16] The appellant’s submissions, that the respondent did not go so far as to claim that every piece of information on the phone was privileged, thereby failing to satisfy the dominant purpose test, and that the respondent failed to identify the privileged documents, are beside the point. 

[17] The dominant purpose test established by Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation is concerned with the question whether legal professional privilege attaches or does not attach to a particular piece of information. It is irrelevant to this case because the existence of privilege over at least some of the documents on the phone has been accepted. .... 

[18] In this case, for the reasons given, the respondent was faced with an apparent demand by police for access to the contents of his phone, which, so far as one could tell by their actions, the police officers intended to read as soon as was practicable. Disclosure of the password would have meant putting police officers in an immediate position to read the privileged information. The only way to protect the confidentiality of the privileged information was for the respondent to deny access to the phone. The warrant was sufficient authority for police to take the phone away in order to preserve any evidence that might be on the phone so there was no risk that evidence might be lost. There were no extraneous factors that might have rendered his refusal, at that time, unreasonable.

Importantly 

[19] That is not to say that the result will always be the same when police require access information to enable them to examine the contents of a mobile phone. It will not always be a reasonable excuse to refuse to disclose access information just because the phone contains privileged information. Everything will depend upon the circumstances. Police remain free to seize a phone, provided the warrant authorises such seizure, and the presence of privileged information on a phone may cease to constitute a reasonable excuse if circumstances change, such as the making of adequate arrangements to ensure that their search of the phone is done in a way that does not involve breaching privilege. In any case, it will be for the person claiming the excuse to establish the claim for privilege if the claim is contested. The respondent did so here.

Fairness

'Contractual Fairness: Statutory Innovation and Statutory Interpretation' by May Fong Cheong in Prue Vines and M Scott Donald (eds), Statutory Interpretation in Private Law (Federation Press, 2019) 185-206 considers 

statutory innovation and statutory interpretation in two pieces of Australian legislation: the unfair contract terms law in the Australian Consumer Law, and unjust contracts under the Contracts Review Act 1980 (NSW). These provisions raise the challenge to interpret statutes which seek to give content to indeterminate value of fairness and justice. The analysis of the cases shows that the courts have faced up to the challenge of interpreting and applying open-ended criteria of unfairness and unjustness in both statutes respectively in articulating norms and precepts embodied in the provisions which reflect the values of community and society. The continued utility of both statutes, will rest, in part, on innovative and consistent application of statutory interpretation as well as sensitivity to the three disinclinations cautioned by Kirby P in West v AGC (Advances) Ltd (1986) 5 NSWLR 610.

SGD Wellbeing

The US National Academies report Understanding the Well-Being of LGBTQI+ Populations (2020) edited by Charlotte J. Patterson, Mart n-Jos Seplveda and Jordyn White comments 

At more than 11 million, the number of self-identified lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) individuals living in the United States is roughly equivalent to the population of Ohio. The LGBT population has increased substantially over the past decade, with much of this growth driven by younger generations, women, bisexual people, and racial and ethnic minorities. In a shift from prior years, a majority of Americans now approve of same-sex relationships and support legal protections to ensure fundamental civil liberties on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity. 

The laws, too, have changed: in 2015 the U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Obergefell v. Hodges (576 U.S. 644) extended marriage equality for same-sex couples nationwide. In 2020, the Supreme Court ruled in Bostock v. Clayton County (140 S. Ct. 1731) that the prohibition of sex discrimination in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act protects individuals from discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity in employment. Many states, municipalities, and private corporations have expanded nondiscrimination protections in workplaces, health care settings, and schools to include sexual orientation and gender identity. The demographic shifts observed in LGBT populations challenge researchers and policy makers to collect more and better data and to consider the degree to which research questions, media discussions, and policy decisions reflect the most pressing needs of these populations and the contemporary challenges they face (Conclusions 3-1, 3-2). 

As the population evolves, so do the terms used to describe individuals who identify as or exhibit attractions to people outside of the traditional male-female gender binary. The acronym LGBTQ is often used in place of LGBT, in which the “Q” may refer to queer or questioning. In some contexts, the acronym is expanded further to include “I” for intersex, “A” for asexual or ally, or “+” as an acknowledgment of the diversity of non-binary and gender-nonconforming individuals. 

Throughout this report, the phrase “sexual and gender diverse” is used to describe individuals who identify as lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, intersex, non-binary, or who exhibit attractions and behaviors that do not align with heterosexual or traditional gender norms. The committee acknowledges that no term is perfect or completely inclusive, and our intention is not to promote the phrase or its acronym, SGD, for widespread use. Instead, the goal is to highlight the variety of identities and communities within SGD populations and the need for greater understanding of the differences that exist within and between them. 

A growing need for advanced data collection 

Despite the population trends, many current national surveys and other data collection instruments lack measures of sexual orientation, gender identity, and sexual behavior and attraction, which makes it difficult to accurately report the size and other characteristics of SGD populations. Questions about sexual orientation and gender identity that do appear in data collection instruments are presented inconsistently with differing terms and are often separated from other demographic measures (Conclusion 4-1). 

Gaps in gender identity data collection preclude insights into trends in transgender population size over time, and population-level data about people with intersex traits are not available at all. In addition, little research has been conducted on sexual attraction and behaviors, and almost no population-level data exist for people with intersex traits (Conclusion 4-2). 

To address the lack of broad and consistent data, the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine convened a committee of experts to review the available evidence and identify future research needs related to the well-being of sexual and gender diverse populations across the life course. The committee focused on eight domains of well-being: the effects of various laws and the legal system on SGD populations; the effects of various public policies and structural stigma; community and civic engagement; families and social relationships; education, including school climate and level of attainment; economic experiences (e.g., employment, compensation, and housing); physical and mental health; and health care access and gender-affirming interventions. The well-being of an individual can be thought of as an outcome of experiences with family and personal relationships, as well as interactions with many societal sectors and such systems as education, employment, and government. 

Changes to the Legal Landscape 

SGD populations come into contact with the law in a variety of contexts, including employment, health care, housing, public accommodations, interactions with the criminal justice system, and government-administered systems, such as foster care, adoption, and immigration. In some of these realms, there have been important reforms that have enhanced the quality of life for SGD people; in others, mistreatment and discrimination remain frequent occurrences, especially for marginalized groups within the SGD population. In the face of changing public attitudes as well as evolving law, the effect of the legal system on the well-being of these groups is uneven and, at times, contradictory (Conclusion 5-1). 

Approximately 50 percent of the U.S. population lives where there is a state law that explicitly protects SGD people from at least one form of discrimination. The laws pertaining to such issues as gender markers on essential documents, family proceedings, and religious exemptions from anti-discrimination vary greatly in scope between levels of government and across states (Conclusion 5-2). 

Mistreatment during interactions with the police and the prison system is a common experience for SGD people (Conclusion 5-3). 

The criminalization of HIV exposure and the criminalization of sex work disproportionately affect homeless youth and transgender women, especially transgender women of color. Data suggest that sexual orientation and gender identity bias and hate crimes have increased since 2013, and although they account for a small share of all hate crimes, they tend to be more violent and result in severe bodily injury. 

Effects of public policy and stigma 

Policies seldom change without outside social forces organizing to create that change. Policy advocates and social movements can activate public opinion by drawing attention to social problems. Recently, the attitudes of adults in the United States have undergone a massive shift in accepting SGD populations and on numerous policies that would further the well-being of SGD people. However, the pursuit of policies likely to garner public favorability can potentially stigmatize or erase certain SGD groups, such as bisexual and transgender people (Conclusion 6-1). 

The attitudes of the general public affect public policies both directly and indirectly. In general, the emergence of more inclusive laws and policies is often perceived as a signal that society has changed to be less stigmatizing to SGD populations (Conclusion 6-2). 

The well-being of SGD populations is affected by stigma, which can occur at individual, interpersonal, and structural levels. The concept of stigma helps explain how dominant cultural beliefs and differences in access to power can lead to labeling, stereotyping, separation, status loss, and discrimination for those who do not align with societal norms. Structural stigma— which includes institutional policies and practices, as well as public attitudes—is an important mechanism that contributes to inequalities for sexual and gender diverse populations across numerous domains that are essential for living healthy, productive, and fulfilling lives, including socioeconomic well-being, physical and mental health, and physical safety (Conclusion 6-3). 

There is now a growing body of evidence that structural stigma affects the health and well-being of people of diverse sexualities and genders, but there has been little research on the ways in which structural stigma develops and evolves over the life course. Furthermore, most structural stigma research has focused on gay men and lesbian women and has not considered intersectional characteristics such as race, ethnicity, gender identity, geography, and socioeconomic status (Conclusion 6-4). 

Community and civic engagement 

SGD communities represent a variety of racial, ethnic, and cultural identities and experiences. Over the past several years, spaces for public convening and engagement in social, cultural, and personal activities have diminished substantially for SGD people. Online SGD communities often arise out of the need for information, connection, and support. Because access to space is linked to participation in public culture, which is also influenced by the intersections of race, gender, sexuality, and social class, less visible and marginalized SGD groups, as well as SGD people of color, do not always have access to the same spaces as do SGD people of other races and classes (Conclusion 7-1). 

The past several years have seen the insurgence of LGBTQ+-affirming churches, denominations, and non-institutional spiritual practices, as well as gay-straight alliances on school, college, and university campuses. Community connectedness has been shown to help SGD people address health disparities by connecting them to important resources (Conclusion 7- 2). 

In civic affairs, lesbian, gay, and bisexual adults tend to be more civically and politically engaged than heterosexual adults (Conclusion 7-3). 

In addition, transgender people are registered to vote at higher rates than the cisgender population. Connectedness to other SGD people is a strong predictor of sociopolitical involvement. 

Families and social relationships 

Close, supportive, and stable relationships foster health and well-being, and relationships early in life have implications for the quality and stability of social ties in adolescence and adulthood. SGD youth are at higher risk of depressive symptoms, anxiety, and suicidality than other similarly situated youth. Parental acceptance of their SGD youth is associated with positive adjustment; conversely, parental rejection is associated with a range of emotional and behavioral health problems. Supportive teachers are among the most important nonfamily adults in the lives of contemporary SGD youth. Maintaining friendships throughout and following the coming out process supports positive adjustment for SGD youth. 

Romantic relationships in youth are also supportive in many cases, although the risk of intimate partner violence is higher for SGD youth than for other youth (Conclusion 8-1). 

Throughout adulthood, people who are more socially connected have better mental and physical health and lower mortality than those who are more socially isolated. Friends and chosen family members may also play an important role in SGD communities. 

The legal status of romantic unions is associated with the health and well-being of SGD populations, as well as other markers of advantage and disadvantage—particularly socioeconomic status (Conclusion 8-2). 

Those of higher socioeconomic status are more likely to marry, and marriage itself may also provide economic benefits. As with different-sex couples, legally recognized same-sex relationships are less likely than others to dissolve over time. Lesbian, gay, and intersex individuals are less likely than heterosexual individuals to become parents. Less is known about the prevalence of parenthood among bisexual and transgender people. Both children and adolescents have been found to enjoy supportive relationships with lesbian and gay parents, and children of lesbian and gay parents have shown the typical development of other children (Conclusion 8-3). 

Additional research is needed on relationship development in adolescence, adult family formation among SGD (especially bisexual, transgender, and intersex) people, as well as family processes and couple dynamics among older SGD individuals and families. 

Educational Environments 

Experiences that SGD students have in school are important not only because negative experiences undermine personal well-being, but also because school experiences set the groundwork for educational attainment, future occupational achievement, and socioeconomic status (Conclusion 9-1). 

Although most research has focused on secondary schools, similar patterns of discriminatory behavior, bullying, and victimization have been documented for sexual minority and transgender students in higher education. Because SGD youth are coming out at younger ages than in previous years, research on school experiences that extended to elementary schools and continued through higher education could help researchers gain a clearer understanding of the way these experiences affect students over their life course. Although no federal law explicitly prohibits discrimination in education based on sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, or intersex characteristics, federal courts and agencies have found that such discrimination may be covered under the federal ban on sex discrimination. State and local K–12 education policies with clear language regarding protection of SGD students from bullying and discrimination (including sexual orientation and gender identity) are associated with positive school climates and with student well-being and success (Conclusion 9- 2). 

In schools with such policies, teachers are also seen as being more supportive of LGBT students and are more likely to intervene in bullying. 

Several small studies of same-sex couple families have shown that they may experience homophobia expressed by teachers and that teachers may exclude those parents from activities or events (Conclusion 9-4). Schools can adopt such strategies as professional education and training for teachers, administrators, and other personnel (e.g., bus drivers, cafeteria workers) to improve school experiences and promote a positive school climate for all students (Conclusion 9-3). 

Students with access to LGBTQ-related resources are more likely to believe that adults care about them and that teachers are fair. 

Economic Stability 

Evidence suggests that transgender people—and possibly bisexual people—have lower incomes and higher poverty than lesbian, gay, and cisgender heterosexual people (Conclusion 10-1). Research on individual earnings suggests that, after controlling for differences in income- related characteristics, gay and bisexual men earn less than heterosexual men, while lesbian and bisexual women earn less than heterosexual men but more than heterosexual women. Lesbian women and gay men may have mitigated some of the effects of discrimination on earnings and household income through adaptive strategies in education, occupations, and family decisions, but they still face discrimination in the labor force. Poverty and economic insecurity are more common among LGBT people than among cisgender heterosexual people. Among self-identified single and coupled LGBT people, bisexual and transgender people are more at risk of poverty and lesbian and gay people are at equal risk of poverty than self-identified heterosexual cisgender people of the same sex. Some subgroups of the LGBT population are at greater risk of poverty or low-income status: unmarried people, people with children, Black people, people living in rural areas, and people over age 50. 

Studies based on self-report data show that many LGBT people believe that they have been treated unequally in the workforce (Conclusion 10-2). 

Many individual employers have created their own nondiscrimination policies, but these are voluntary. SGD populations have also experienced compensation and benefit discrimination in the workplace. In 2020, the Supreme Court held in Bostock v. Clayton County that discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity is prohibited by Title VII, the federal law that is part of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. The efficacy of this nationwide anti-discrimination protection will depend on how well federal and state agencies and courts carry out its mandate. 

There is a greater risk of homelessness among LGBTQ youth than other youth, with elevated risk for LGBTQ youth of color. Adult homelessness may be particularly acute among transgender and gender-nonconforming populations. There are four main factors associated with LGBTQ homelessness: stigma, discrimination, and exclusion; mental health issues and substance use; sexual risks and vulnerability; and a lack of access to interventions and supports. 

Some research finds that LGBT populations have lower homeownership rates than cisgender heterosexual people, which may point to discrimination in mortgage lending practices (Conclusion 10-3). 

SGD populations may also face barriers in the markets for credit and rental housing. Nearly a quarter of respondents to the 2015 U.S. Transgender Survey said they had experienced housing discrimination in the past year. There is also evidence of differential and discriminatory treatment among men in same-sex couples compared with women in same-sex couples. 

More research is needed to assess the economic well-being of transgender people, non- binary people, and people with intersex traits. There is also much more to be understood about how certain economic conditions affect SGD populations—particularly for groups identified as having bigger economic challenges, such as people in rural areas, older SGD people, and SGD people of color. 

Physical and mental health

The physical and mental health of SGD populations is substantially affected by external influences that include discrimination, stigma, prejudice, and other social, political, and economic determinants of health. In addition to health disparities related to sexual orientation, gender identity, and intersex status, many SGD people also experience health disparities related to intersecting aspects of identity that include but are not limited to race and ethnicity (Conclusion 11-1). 

Lesbian and bisexual women have higher odds of risk factors for cardiovascular disease, such as hypertension and diabetes, and they also have more risk factors for breast cancer than heterosexual women. Transgender adults may have elevated rates of cardiovascular disease and myocardial infarction than their cisgender counterparts. LGBT people and people with intersex traits are at risk of violence from family members, peers, intimate partners, and strangers as a result of their sexual orientation, gender identity, or intersex status. Some of the highest risks of violence affect bisexual women and transgender people, particularly transgender women of color. Black transgender women are also disproportionately affected by HIV, as are cisgender gay and bisexual men and other men who have sex with men. 

Mental health disparities in SGD populations include heightened anxiety and depressive symptoms and greater suicidality among LGBT people in comparison with heterosexual or cisgender individuals. Substance use and behavioral health disparities include greater use of tobacco, alcohol, and other drugs among LGBT people than among heterosexual or cisgender individuals. Sexual minority individuals are also less likely than their heterosexual counterparts to report healthy sleep, and similar disparities may exist for transgender people. 

Because both clinical and population research studies rarely include measures of sexual orientation, gender identity, and intersex status, the full scope and magnitude of physical and mental health disparities and their differential effects across and within SGD populations is not known (Conclusion 11-2). 

There is a particular lack of longitudinal research, as well as a relative dearth of data on intersections with other aspects of identity such as race, ethnicity, age, and disability. 

The disparities affecting SGD populations are driven by experiences of minority stress, which include both structural and interpersonal stigma, prejudice, discrimination, violence, and trauma (Conclusion 11-3). Another important concept in relation to minority stress is resilience, which is the ability to maintain normal physical and psychological functioning when stress and trauma occur. More research is needed to elucidate the origins, pathways, and health consequences of minority stress and factors that support resilience among SGD populations. 

Evidence-based interventions are needed to prevent and address health inequities (Conclusion 11-4). 

These interventions need to address the root causes and multilevel factors driving SGD health disparities. Leveraging resilience, including building on strategies SGD people have used to resist societal oppression, is an important part of optimizing SGD health and well-being. 

Coverage, Access and Utilisation of Health Care 

Access to comprehensive, affirming, and high-quality health care services is a human right for all people. Laws that guarantee access to health care services, health insurance coverage, and public health programs for all, regardless of sexual orientation, gender identity, and intersex status, are critical to the health and well-being of SGD people. Similarly, laws and policies that provide affordable, comprehensive health insurance coverage could combat health risks, such as uninsurance and poverty, among SGD populations. 

It is important to provide culturally responsive and clinically appropriate care for SGD populations. Health services and procedures that are particularly important for the health and well-being of SGD populations include but are not limited to pre- and post-exposure prophylaxis for HIV; HIV treatment and care; abortion, fertility, and other reproductive health services; affirming mental and behavioral health care services; and gender-affirming care for transgender people. SGD people also need access to timely and anatomically appropriate preventive screenings (Conclusion 12-1). 

Gender-affirming care for transgender, non-binary and other gender diverse people is an essential intervention to improve health and well-being (Conclusion 12-2). 

Provision of this care needs to be individualized and conducted in partnership between patients and their providers. Insurance coverage of gender-affirming services and procedures by public and private payers is necessary to facilitate access to these services and to avoid discrimination on the basis of sex and gender identity. 

Conversion therapy to change sexual orientation or gender identity can cause significant trauma (Conclusion 12-3). 

Elective genital surgeries on children with intersex traits who cannot participate in consent can be similarly detrimental to health and well-being. 

The research recommendations are 

Though trends in SGD population data collection have shifted, the data that exist and the research methodologies behind current study measures are not sufficient to capture and convey the richness of SGD communities or to underscore the varied effects that unique and intersecting identities have on health and well-being outcomes for SGD people. The 2011 report of the Institute of Medicine on the health of LGBT populations noted that SGD populations are often considered a single monolithic group, which obscures important differences among individuals and communities. This committee emphasizes an urgent need for robust scientific evidence that includes not just lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender people, but also intersex people, people with same-sex or same-gender attractions or behaviors, and people who identify as asexual, Two-Spirit, queer, or other terms under the SGD umbrella. 

In the wake of social change and ongoing legal developments regarding protections for SGD people in employment, health care, military service, family formation, and other key areas of life, it is increasingly important to understand how the provision or the denial of access to opportunities and resources affects SGD people over the entire life course. A varied, comprehensive, and inclusive research infrastructure for SGD populations is essential in understanding the unique and shared challenges these individuals and communities face and for guiding actions to improve their well-being across domains, including social justice and legal equality, health and health care, employment, education, and housing. Effectively addressing disparities related to sexual orientation, gender identity, and intersex status will require collaborative and coordinated efforts among federal, state, and private stakeholders. In addition, it will be important to involve SGD communities themselves, including SGD people of color, in all aspects of the research process. Meaningful community participation is a critical way that SGD population research can retain accountability and accurately reflect the lives and experiences of the communities that are under study. In all research activities, SGD communities should be treated as partners rather than solely as research subjects, and all data should be collected and analyzed in ways that ensure respondent privacy and confidentiality and provide robust protections from discrimination. 

The committee’s recommendations aim to identify opportunities to advance understanding of how individuals experience sexuality and gender and how sexual orientation, gender identity, and intersex status affect SGD people over the life course. 

Our recommendations are in five categories:

(1) population data; 

(2) measurement challenges related to understanding SGD populations; 

(3) critical data gaps; 

(4) improvement of the research community’s ability to use these data; and 

(5) application of data to the development of high-quality, evidence-based interventions and programs.

In each category, the committee makes efforts to identify specific actors that are best positioned to respond to particular aspects of the research landscape. The committee has concluded that investing in research infrastructure and in a robust and comprehensive program of research in the ways described below will support the development of stronger, evidence-based policies and practices in the areas addressed in this report. 

Population Data 

In order to make valid claims about the status of SGD populations in the United States, researchers, policy makers, and practitioners need accurate, consistent, and representative population-level data that describe SGD populations in all their complexity. 

R 1: Entities throughout the federal statistical system; other federal agencies; state, local, and tribal departments and agencies; private entities; and other relevant stakeholders should consider adding measures of sexual orientation, gender identity, and intersex status to all data collection efforts and instruments, such as population-based surveys, administrative records, clinical records, and forms used to collect demographic data. 

In response to Recommendation 1, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) should reconvene the Federal Interagency Working Group on Improving Measurement of Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity (SOGI) in Federal Surveys and charge it with developing government-wide standards for the collection of data on sexual orientation, gender identity, and intersex status. The establishment of measurement standards could bolster high-priority data collection activities throughout the relevant entities. 

Measurement Challenges 

Because of the complicated ways that race, class, sex, gender identity, sexual orientation, and other factors interact to create people’s experiences, current measures do not always sufficiently reflect the lived experiences of these populations. 

R 2: Federal statistical agencies, state, local, and tribal departments and agencies, private entities, and other relevant stakeholders should fund and conduct methodological research to develop, improve, and expand measures that capture the full range of sexual and gender diversity in the population—including but not limited to intersex status and emerging sexual and gender identities, sexual behaviors, and intersecting identities—as well as determinants of well-being for sexual and gender diverse populations. 

The routine inclusion of sexual orientation, gender identity, and intersex status questions on federally supported surveys and in other research can also advance the generation and use of measures that help researchers understand how factors such as stigma and disclosure affect the health and well-being of SGD populations across the life course. 

Critical Data Gaps 

When focusing on underrepresented groups, it is sometimes necessary to employ alternative methods that capture adequate samples of the population in question for effective study. Some data gaps could be addressed through observational studies of specific populations, while others might require experimental studies, qualitative explorations of specific topics, or other methods. 

R 3: Public and private funders should support, and researchers should conduct, studies using a variety of methods and sampling techniques--driven by the questions under study--in order to examine family and other social relationships, community, health, education, economic, and legal issues that will enhance understanding of sexual and gender diverse populations. 

Data needs of this kind are particularly important for the study of small groups, such as transgender women of color, Native American Two-Spirit people, and people with intersex traits. 

Data Use 

Once comprehensive, accurate data are collected, it is critical that researchers have the ability to access these data to address emerging research questions. By improving the research community’s ability to access, link, and use existing data, stakeholders could substantially advance the relevance and impact of research. 

R 4: The U.S. Office of Management and Budget should convene federal, state, and private funders, as well as other relevant stakeholders, to address significant problems in linking data from different datasets to facilitate research on the health status and well-being of sexual and gender diverse people. These stakeholders will differ by content area but could include researchers, legal advocacy groups, research institutions and centers, think tanks, policy tracking groups, health, and surveillance organizations. 

The goal of this recommendation is to allow data that have been housed within specific agencies or industries to be linked in ways that provide the research community a more complete picture of the prevalence, distribution, and lived experiences of SGD populations. 

Evidence-based programming and interventions 

The ultimate goal of collecting more accurate and relevant data should be to enhance understanding of the mediating factors that can highlight the positive differences and close the disparities that exist between SGD and heterosexual or cisgender populations. Comprehensive and accurate population-level data can play a critical role in the development, implementation, and evaluation of programs, services, and interventions that support the health and well-being of SGD populations. The data deficits described throughout this report have led to a relative dearth of programming to address the specific needs of these populations, as well as an absence of evidence-based processes to evaluate the programs. 

R 5: Public and private research funders, together with federal statistical agencies, should prioritize research into the development, implementation, and evaluation of evidence-based services, programs, and interventions that promote the well-being of SGD populations. 

Placing scientific evidence at the forefront of program planning will allow researchers, policymakers, and public and private stakeholders to develop services and interventions that will directly benefit SGD communities. 

Conclusion 

The increase in prevalence and visibility of SGD populations illuminates the need for greater understanding of the ways in which current laws, systems, and programs affect their well- being. Individuals who identify as lesbian, gay, bisexual, asexual, transgender, non-binary, queer, or intersex, as well as those who express same-sex or -gender attractions or behaviors, will have experiences across their life course that differ from those of cisgender and heterosexual individuals. Characteristics such as age, race and ethnicity, and geographic location intersect to play a distinct role in the challenges and opportunities SGD people face. This report underscores the need for researchers to seek to understand disparities and advance equity both within and across SGD populations

Facebook and Fake News

'Research note: The scale of Facebook’s problem depends upon how ‘fake news’ is classified' by Richard Rogers in (2020) Misinformation Review comments 

Ushering in the contemporary ‘fake news’ crisis, Craig Silverman of Buzzfeed News reported that it outperformed mainstream news on Facebook in the three months prior to the 2016 US presidential elections. Here the report’s methods and findings are revisited for 2020. Examining Facebook user engagement of election-related stories, and applying Silverman’s classification of fake news, it was found that the problem has worsened, implying that the measures undertaken to date have not remedied the issue. If, however, one were to classify ‘fake news’ in a stricter fashion, as Facebook as well as certain media organizations do with the notion of ‘false news’, the scale of the problem shrinks. A smaller scale problem could imply a greater role for fact-checkers (rather than deferring to mass-scale content moderation), while a larger one could lead to the further politicization of source adjudication, where labelling particular sources broadly as ‘fake’, ‘problematic’ and/or ‘junk’ results in backlash.

 Rogers' research questions were 

  •  To what extent is ‘fake news’ (as defined in the 2016 seminal news article) present in the most engaged-with, election-related content on Facebook in the run-up to the 2020 US presidential elections? 
  • How does the current ‘fake news’ problem compare to that of the 2016 election period, both with the same as well as a stricter definition of ‘fake news’? 
  • How does the scale of the problem affect the viability of certain approaches put forward to address it? 
  • Is there more user engagement with hyperpartisan conservative or progressive sources in political spaces on Facebook? 
  • How does such engagement imply a politicization of the ‘fake news’ problem? 

 He states 

 The ‘fake news’ problem around the US elections as observed in 2016 has worsened on Facebook in 2020. In the early months in 2020 the proportion of user engagement with ‘fake news’ to mainstream news stories is 1:3.5, compared to 1:4 during the same period in 2016. It is both an observation concerning the persistence of the problem and an admonition that the measures undertaken to date have not lessened the phenomenon. If one applies a stricter definition of ‘fake news’ such as only imposter news and conspiracy sites (thereby removing hyperpartisan sites as in Silverman’s definition), mainstream sources outperform ‘fake’ ones by a much greater proportion. 

The findings imply that how one defines such information has an impact on the perceived scale of the problem, including the types of approaches to address it. With a smaller-scale problem, fact-checking and labelling become more viable alongside the ‘big data’ custodial approaches employed by social media firms. 

Given there are more hyperpartisan conservative sources engaged with than hyperpartisan progressive ones, the research points to how considerations of what constitutes ‘fake news’ may be politicized. 

The findings are made on the basis of Facebook user engagement of the top 200 stories returned for queries for candidates and social issues. Based on existing labelling sites, the stories and by extension the sources are classified along a spectrum from more to less problematic and partisan. 

The initial ‘fake news’ crisis (Silverman, 2016; 2017) had to do with fly-by-night, imposter, conspiracy as well as so-called ‘hyperpartisan’ news sources outperforming mainstream news on Facebook in the run up to the 2016 US presidential elections. In a sense it was both a critique of Facebook as ‘hyperpartisan political-media machine’ (Herrman, 2016) but also that of the quality of a media landscape witnessing a precipitous rise in the consumption and sharing of ‘alternative right’ news and cultural commentary (Benkler et al., 2017; Holt et al., 2019). The events of the first crisis have been overtaken by a second one where politicians as President Trump in the US and elsewhere employ the same term for certain media organizations in order to undermine their credibility. Against the backdrop of that politicization as well as rhetorical tactic, scholars and platforms alike have demurred using the term ‘fake news’ and instead offered ‘junk news,’ ‘problematic information,’ ‘false news’ and others (Vosoughi et al., 2018). Some definitions (as junk news and problematic information) are roomier, while others are stricter in their source classification schemes.   

Subsumed under the original ‘fake news’ definition are imposter news, conspiracy sources and hyperpartisan (or ‘overly ideological web operations’) (Herrman, 2016), and the newer term ‘junk news’ covers the same types of sources but adds the connotation of attractively packaged junk food that when consumed could be considered unhealthy (Howard, 2020; Venturini, 2019). It also includes two web-native source types. ‘Clickbait’ captures how the manner in which it is packaged or formatted lures one into consumption, and ‘computational propaganda’ refers to dubious news circulation by bot and troll-like means, artificially amplifying its symbolic power. Problematic information is even roomier, as it expands its field of vision beyond news to cultural commentary and satire (Jack, 2017). Stricter definitions such as ‘false news’ would encompass imposter and conspiracy but are less apt to include hyperpartisan news and cultural commentary, discussing those sources as ‘misleading’ rather than as ‘fake’ or ‘junk’ (Kist & Zantingh, 2017). 

Rather than an either/or proposition, ‘fake news’ could be understood as a Venn diagram or matryoshka dolls with problematic information encompassing junk news, junk news fake news, and fake news false news (Wardle, 2016; 2017). (While beyond the scope, the definition could be broadened even further to include more media than stories and sources, such as video and images.) 

Depending on the definition, the scale of the problem changes as does the range of means to address it. With ‘false news’, it grows smaller, and fact-checking again would be a profession to which to turn for background research into the story and the source. Fact-checking has been critiqued in this context because of the enormity of the task and the speed with which the lean workforces must operate. Facebook for one employs the term ‘false news’ and has striven to work with fact-checking bodies, though its overall approach is multi-faceted and relies more on (outsourced) content reviewers (Roberts, 2016; Gillespie, 2018). Other qualitative approaches such as media literacy and bias labelling are also manual undertakings, with adjudicators sifting through stories and sources one by one. When the problem is scaled down, these too become viable. 

Roomier definitions make the problem larger and result in findings such as the most well-known ‘fake news’ story of 2016. ‘Pope Francis Shocks World, Endorses Donald Trump for President’ began as satire and was later circulated on a hyperpartisan, fly-by-night site (Ending the Fed). It garnered higher engagement rates on Facebook than more serious articles in the mainstream news. When such stories are counted as ‘fake’, ‘junk’ or ‘problematic’, and the scale increases, industrial-style custodial action may be preferred such as mass contention moderation as well as crowd-sourced and automated flagging, followed by platform escalation procedures and outcomes such as suspending or deplatforming stories, videos and sources. 

As more content is taken down as a result of roomy source classification schemes, debates about freedom of choice may become more vociferous rather than less. It recalls the junk food debate, and in this regard, Zygmunt Bauman stressed how we as homo eligens or ‘choosing animals’ are wont to resist such restrictions, be it in opting for ‘hyperprocessed’ food or hyperpartisan news and cultural commentary (2013). 

Labelling hyperpartisan news as ‘fake’ or ‘junk’, moreover, may lead to greater political backlash. Indeed, as our findings imply, the ‘fake news’ or ‘junk news’ problem is largely a hyperpartisan conservative source problem, whereas the ‘false news’ one is not. As recently witnessed in the Netherlands, the designation of hyperpartisan conservative sources as ‘junk news’ drew the ire of the leader of a conservative political party, who subsequently labelled mainstream news with the neologism, ‘junk fake news’ (Rogers & Niederer, 2020; Van Den Berg, 2019). Opting for the narrower ‘false news’ classification would imply a depoliticization of the problem.

26 October 2020

Forensic DNA

'Māori views of forensic DNA evidence: an instrument of justice or criminalizing technology?' by Annabel Ahuriri-Driscoll, Juan Tauri and Johanna Veth in (2020) New Genetics and Society comments 

 DNA profiling is just one of many tools available to police in a criminal investigation. However, unlike any other criminal investigative tool, DNA profiling has captured the public imagination. Its portrayal in popular fiction has given rise to the “CSI effect”, whereby the weight and credibility of science, combined with the predictive potential of DNA, produce an aura of infallibility and certainty only amplified by creative license. 

Genetic material holds particular significance for Indigenous peoples, establishing identity and group membership, as well as associated rights. This taonga (treasure) status entails particular sensitivities regarding its handling and use; these have been well explored in health, but less so in the forensic context. This article presents professional and lay Māori perspectives on forensic DNA technologies in New Zealand, highlighting the inseparability of these from Indigenous experiences of criminalization but also their value in informing operational, ethical and justice-oriented considerations