03 November 2020

Fake Health News

'From Anti-Vaxxers to Antisemitism: Conspiracy Theory in the COVID Pandemic' by the Office of HM's Official Adviser on Antisemitism  comments 

This report analyses the role of antisemitism in ‘anti-vaxxer’ conspiracy theories, a movement that has grown significantly in 2020 during the Covid-19 pandemic. Looking at private and public groups on Facebook, this report evaluates the saturation of antisemitism in the anti-vaxxer and anti-lockdown movements. 

 The author/s conclude 

This report identifies the prevalence of antisemitism within the anti-vaccination groups on social media. Whilst not all anti-vaxxers share antisemitic attitudes, it is probable that their propensity to conspiracy theory reduces their resilience to antisemitic beliefs and attitudes. In nearly all the Facebook groups identified this study, users were able to see and interact with antisemitic content, including links to extremist content on sites such as BitChute. Even when initial posts relating to the pandemic did not include any antisemitic content, conversations within the post’s comments section were often openly antisemitic and provided an opportunity for others to be radicalised. 

As conspiracy theories provide comfort when faced with uncertainty and adversity, it should come as no surprise that anti- vaccination groups have grown and multiplied during the COVID-19 pandemic. This report identified the emergence and growth of local anti-vaccination and anti-lockdown groups on Facebook and their movement to ‘alternative’ social media platforms popular with the far-right. Members of these groups were often very active, organising local meetups and anti-lockdown actions, including targeting local and national businesses that were complying with Public Health England guidelines. 

The UK Government must not be complacent about the levels of misinformation on social media and its infiltration into local communities. The Government needs to urgently tackle the growth of conspiracy theory during the pandemic if the public are to remain trustful and confident in public health guidelines and recommendations. As temporary restrictions on individual freedoms look set to be prolonged or extended as the United Kingdom enters a three-tier system of coronavirus controls, the need to address antisemitic and anti-vaccination conspiracy theory will become more acute. 

Most people are desperate for a safe and effective vaccine for COVID-19, as are governments across the world. Once a vaccine becomes available it will be essential to quickly sideline the conspiracy theories and misinformation of the antivaxxers. Exposing their links to antisemitism and age old conspiracy theories can only assist the public health message, but in doing so government and civil society organisations must also combat the resurgence of antisemitism that, as this report evidences, is present in 79% of antivaxxer networks. The attempts to blame ‘the other’ for the economic and health problems of COVID-19 will inevitably mean an increase in antisemitism at precisely the moment that nations will need to be at their most united. Exposing the level of antisemitism amongst the anti-vaxxer movement now is therefore of the utmost importance.

02 November 2020

Corruption and proposed Commonwealth Integrity Commission (CIC)

Peiple who've observed recurrent denials by the Commonwealth Government of the need for a national anti-corruption agency, alongside systemic disregard of questions regarding specific politicians, may be unimpressed by today's announcement that the Government 'has committed to establishing a Commonwealth Integrity Commission (CIC) to strengthen integrity arrangements across the federal public sector'. 

When you check the consultation draft - reflecting the December 2018 paper noted here - it is not much of a commitment, rather than merely something that is painfully overdue. 

The Attorney-General's Department states - 

The CIC will be a centralised, specialist centre investigating corruption in the public sector. It will be established as an independent statutory agency, led by the Integrity Commissioner and assisted by the Law Enforcement Integrity Commissioner and the Public Sector Integrity Commissioner. The draft legislation is the result of detailed planning to ensure the new body has both the resources and powers that it needs to investigate allegations of criminal conduct that could occur across the public sector. 

The CIC will have greater investigatory powers than a Royal Commission. These include the ability to:

  • hold hearings and compel witnesses to testify 

  • enter and search premises 

  • require people to surrender documents and other evidence 

  • use telecommunication interceptions 

  • have individuals arrested and confiscate passports.

The Australian Government sought views on the proposed CIC model via a consultation paper, as well as advice from an expert panel that was engaged to advise the government on the reforms. 

The Australian Government has considered feedback on the previous consultation paper and has developed draft legislation to establish the new agency. 

The draft legislation comprises two Bills:

  • Commonwealth Integrity Commission Bill 2020 (the draft Bill) – which would establish the CIC. 

  • Integrity and Anti-Corruption Legislation Amendment (CIC Establishment and Other Measures) Bill 2020 – which would make necessary amendments to various Acts to give effect to the new CIC scheme.

The first phase of the government’s plan for a CIC is already underway. The Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity’s (ACLEI) jurisdiction will be expanded from 1 January 2021 to cover four new agencies, and additional funding and staff were allocated to ACLEI in the 2020-21 Budget to undertake those functions. The second phase will be the full delivery of the CIC by legislation, which will subsume ACLEI and cover the remainder of the public sector. 

The public sector integrity division will have jurisdiction over the rest of the public sector and other regulated entities. This division will investigate potential criminal corrupt conduct perpetrated by:

  • public sector, intelligence agency and Australian Defence Force employees 

  • the staff of federal judicial officers 

  • parliamentarians and their staff 

  • higher education providers and research bodies (in some circumstances). 

Other considerations 

The government is considering whether the CIC should be given jurisdiction over federal judicial officers. Any model would need to be mindful of the separation of powers in Australia’s system of government, and will need to respect and maintain the independence of the federal courts and judges enshrined in the Australian Constitution. 

The government is also continuing to consider the interaction between the CIC and Public Interest Disclosure scheme. This will ensure that public officials who disclose corrupt conduct to the CIC are protected from reprisal action. 

Transitional arrangements for the effective operation of the CIC are also being settled. This includes, for example, mechanisms for the transfer of ongoing ACLEI investigations to the CIC, and establishing that the CIC may investigate conduct within jurisdiction that occurred before it commenced. 

These will be particular areas for further consultation. 

The government is committed to a national comprehensive consultation process on the draft legislation. A series of consultation sessions will be arranged for the law enforcement and public sector groups that would be regulated under the legislation, as well as roundtable meetings with civil society, academia and other stakeholder representatives from all states and territories. These sessions will be held across the consultation period which will run from November 2020 to March 2021.

01 November 2020

Extradition and a Pseudolegal Shopping List

In Matson v Attorney-General [2020] FCA 1558 Baron Matson (aka Baron Bronstein, Philip Fletcher and Lincoln Robert Marshall) has unsuccessfully relied on Magna Carta - quelle surprise - and Love and Thoms in seeking to prevent his extradition to the United States on charges regarding conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud, mail fraud, wire fraud and conspiracy to commit money laundering. 

Matson argued

(a) The Extradition Act 1988 (Cth) and the Extradition (United States of America) Regulations create a “conflict of interest” and fail to sufficiently protect the fundamental human rights and constitutional implied rights of Australian citizens by empowering the Executive Government to determine the surrender outcome and assess the fundamental human rights of persons subject to extradition while at the same time assisting the governments of foreign states requesting extradition in their legal proceedings, such as Mr David Reed and Mr Stephen Bouwhuis have done in the case of the US Government. In their current form and practice the Extradition Act 1988 (Cth) and the Extradition (United States of America) Regulations are profoundly unjust and inconsistent with international law, and are inconsistent and beyond the power provided under s 61 of the Constitution; 

(b) The Extradition Act 1988 (Cth) and the Extradition (United States of America) Regulations subject the resident of one State to a disability or discrimination in another State which would not be equally applicable to him or her if he or she were a resident in such other state by reason of the application of different rules of evidence in contravention of section 117 of the Constitution. Further, the varying application of Human Rights Law in different States and Territories, as the State of Victoria and the ACT have incorporated legislation to incorporate fundamental human rights enshrined in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) while the other States and Territories have not, resulting in a contravention of section 117 of the Constitution; 

(c) The Extradition Act 1988 (Cth) and the Extradition (United States of America) Regulations infringe the Magna Carta , common law rights and accepted principles of international customary law, so fundamental they cannot be overturned by legislation:

(i) Magna Carta Paragraph 29: “No freeman is to be taken or imprisoned or disseised of his free tenement or of his liberties or free customs, or outlawed or exiled or in any way ruined, nor will we go against such a man or send against him save by lawful judgement of his peers or by the law of the land. To no-one will we sell or deny or delay right or justice”; 

(ii) common law rights such as procedural fairness, natural justice, liberty, speedy trial, duty of fairness, due process, protection from excess of power and the common law principle which requires relevant considerations to be taken into account and the decision not to be Wednesbury unreasonable; 

(iii) the common law sufficed on its own to indicate that a “legitimate expectation” was generated by the UDHR, ICCPR, ICERD and CAT as accepted part of international customary law. The UDHR, ICCPR, ICERD and CAT are all now internationally accepted and entrenched as part of international customary law; and 

(iv) the principle of international customary law that treaties will be interpreted in good faith and that Governments will uphold both the “Rule of Law” and respect fundamental human rights of all people including its own citizens.

(d) The Extradition Act 1988 (Cth) and Extradition (United States of America) Regulations are beyond power and not for the peace, order and good government of the Commonwealth with respect to external affairs within the meaning of section 51 xxix of the Constitution by reason of the Extradition Act 1988 (Cth) and Extradition (United States of America) Regulations being inconsistent with:

(i) the Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth), Schedule II - International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) Articles 2, 5, 7, 9, 10, 14 and 26; 

(ii) the Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT), sections 8(1), 8(2) and 8(3), 10(1) and 10(2) and 22(1) and 22(2)(a) and 22(2)(b) of the Act; 

(iii) the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth), sections 9 and 10 of the Act; and Schedule I - International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD), Articles 1, 2, 5, 6 and 7; 

(iv) the United Nations Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous People, Articles 2, 7, 15, 17, 19, 25, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45 and 4; and 

(v) the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT). ...

(e) The Extradition Act 1988 (Cth) and Extradition (United States of America) Regulations are inconsistent with the requirements of Chapter III of the Constitution by reason of the Act and Regulations conferring non-judicial powers on the courts thereby forcing Chapter III courts to perform administrative quasi-judicial functions without due consideration of the inherent characteristics of a Chapter III court as intended by those whom framed the Constitution. Further, the Chapter III courts must in reality and by appearance be independent or separate from the executive and the Parliament. The Extradition Act 1988 (Cth) and Extradition (United States of America) Regulations are inconsistent the Constitution because an “abuse of process” has been deemed as an unavailable option under the Extradition Act 1988 (Cth) legislation which is against the traditional conceptions of any Chapter III court. 

(f) The Extradition Act 1988 (Cth) and Extradition (United States of America) Regulations derogate from universally accepted fundamental human rights and fail to provide for the United Nations ICCPR Article 14 minimum guarantees in criminal proceedings, fail to ensure a fair extradition process and fail to respect the “Rule of Law” which is an over reach of the power conferred on Parliament. In particular, there is no requirement for legal representation at any stage of the extradition proceedings under the Extradition Act 1988 (Cth) despite the serious nature and consequences of extradition. Moreover, the Extradition Act 1988 (Cth) and Extradition (United States of America) Regulations require arbitrary punishment and arbitrary abrogation of fundamental human rights without the fair and impartial application of the relevant law to facts which have been properly ascertained and is also inconsistent with the Governments representations, long established practice and published policy regarding:

(i) Indigenous human rights protection; 

(ii) Anti-discrimination and equality; 

(iii) Constitutional implied rights; 

(iv) Government accountability; 

(v) Freedom of Information and transparent Government; and 

(vi) Extradition and mutual assistance in criminal matters;

(g) The Extradition Act 1988 (Cth) and Extradition (United States of America) Regulations are inconsistent with the constitutional implied rights under the Constitution, including the constitutional implied rights to stay, live and die in Australia as First Nations people have done for over 60,000 years; due process, equality before the law, fairness [or not to be treated unfairly] and protection from cruel and unusual punishment; 

(h) The Extradition Act 1988 (Cth) and Extradition (United States of America) Regulations are also inconsistent with international customary law including the international peremptory norms of international extradition law and extradition treaties: (i) United Nations Model Treaty on Extradition 1990, Article 3 and 4; and (ii) Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969, Article 19, 26, 31, 53, 62 and 64; 

(i) The Extradition Act 1988 (Cth) and Extradition (United States of America) Regulations derogate traditional common law rights and enshrined constitutional principles derived from the UK “Bill of Rights” by providing for arbitrary arrest and arbitrary abrogation of fundamental human rights without a fair hearing. This arbitrary arrest and arbitrary abrogation of fundamental human rights is potentially indefinite with no reasonable or genuine opportunity of a person subject to extradition proceedings being granted bail or being able to challenge the legality of their detention, contrary universally accepted standards established by international customary law and the traditional common law right of liberty; 

(j) The Extradition Act 1988 (Cth) and Extradition (United States of America) Regulations fail to sufficiently protect the rights of Australian citizens, particularly the fundamental human rights of indigenous Australians, which is inconsistent with recognising the human dignity of a person subject to extradition as a full member of the human community, and in its current form and practice is profoundly unjust and inconsistent with international law. In 2015 the United Nations Human Rights Committee (UNHRC) in communication 1973/2010 gave a strong recommendation to the Commonwealth of Australia to change the current form and practice of the Extradition Act 1988 (Cth), so that all Australians can fully enjoy ICCPR human rights. The UNHRC also found the Commonwealth in breach of ICCPR Articles 9(1) and 9(4) because of the arbitrary detention of Mr Hew Griffiths while he contested his extradition to the US. In a clear snub to the United Nations Human Rights Committee the Commonwealth has taken no steps to change the Extradition Act 1988 (Cth). 

(k) The Extradition Act 1988 (Cth) and Extradition (United States of America) Regulations are invalid as the exercise of legislative power is not proportional to, nor is it appropriately adapted to section 51 xxix external affairs head of power in the Constitution. The Extradition Act 1988 (Cth) and Extradition (United States of America) Regulations fail the “Proportionality Test” as they both infringe constitutional implied rights of those persons subject to extradition proceedings, including the constitutional implied rights to stay, live and die in Australia as First Nations people have done for over 60,000 years; due process, equality before the law, fairness [or not to be treated unfairly] and protection from cruel and unusual punishment, and further deny fundamental human rights of those persons subject to extradition proceedings, and are not reasonably or appropriately adapted to achieve the ends that lie within the limits of constitutional power, and are inconsistent with recognising the “human dignity” of a person as a full member of the human community, particularly for First Nations people whose recognition, constitutional implied rights and fundamental human rights have all long been denied and ignored under the Constitution. 

(l) The Extradition Act 1988 (Cth) and Extradition (United States of America) Regulations are invalid as they infringe upon the implied “religious freedoms” and the “cultural practices” of First Nations people provided under section 116 of the Constitution, by failing to recognise the importance of First Nations peoples “special connection” with Australia and the spiritual significance of “Dreaming” and being connected with the land. The effects of permanently separating an Indigenous Australian citizen from their family, culture and country are plainly oppressive and unjust not only for the individual but also for the extended family and community of the individual subject to extradition. Australia is the “Spiritual Place” of First Nations people, and the Applicant therefore has a constitutional implied right, a fundamental human right and an un-extinguished common law right to stay, live and die in Australia as has happened for over 60,000 years. Not only does the land belong to First Nations people, but they belong to it - now and forever. They have belonged to it in the past, the now, and in the future when they will die and return in spirit and in substance to their “Dreaming-place”. Any legislation that purports to sever this constitutional implied right, fundamental human right and an un-extinguished common law right, of First Nations people to live and die in Australia, is beyond power and invalid under any modern interpretation of the Constitution.

In contrast the Court states, at [345] onwards 

In Vasiljkovic v The Commonwealth of Australia [2006] HCA 40; (2006) 227 CLR 614, a majority of the High Court held that Pt II of the Extradition Act (which includes s 22) and regulations with respect to an extradition treaty between Australia and Croatia were supported by the external affairs power in s 51(xxix) of the Constitution and did not offend the separation of powers inherent in the structure of the Constitution. Chief Justice Gleeson observed at [36]–[37]:

36. The Regulations, and Pt II of the Act, are supported by s 51(xxix) of the Constitution: the external affairs power. As French J said in Hempel v Attorney-General (Cth): “[T]he subject matter of extradition is directly concerned with international relations ... The nature of extradition is such that a law with respect to it is likely to be a law with respect to external affairs whether or not there is in existence any supporting treaty”. The external affairs power is not confined to the implementation of treaties. Making arrangements, by treaty or otherwise, for the extradition of alleged fugitive offenders, and giving effect to those arrangements, are matters that directly concern Australia’s relations with other countries and are part of that aspect of its external affairs. 

37. The conferral of power in s 51(xxix) is subject to the Constitution. Is the deprivation of liberty necessarily involved in the extradition process, or the particular scheme of Pt II of the Act, contrary to the Constitution? It may be accepted that, subject to qualifications, “the power to order that a citizen be involuntarily confined in custody is, under the doctrine of the separation of judicial from executive and legislative powers enshrined in our Constitution, part of the judicial power of the Commonwealth entrusted exclusively to Ch III courts”. However, as Gaudron J pointed out in Kruger v The Commonwealth, there are well-known exceptions to that general proposition and, further, those exceptions do not fall within precise and confined categories. They include, for example, arrest and custody pending trial, and detention by reason of mental illness or infectious disease. They also include the process of extradition. (See also [87], [222])

Accordingly, the High Court has held that the Extradition Act, and by extension the Extradition Regulations, are supported by the external affairs power and do not infringe the Constitution. Therefore, Grounds (a)-(l) of the particulars in support of paragraph 10 relating to their inconsistency with international customary law, common law rights and the Magna Carta cannot succeed. 

In Ground (k), Mr Matson alleges that the Extradition Act and the Extradition Regulations, “infringe constitutional implied rights of those persons subject to extradition proceedings, including the constitutional implied rights to stay, live and die in Australia as First Nations people have done for over 60,000 years”. Mr Matson indicated at the hearing on 18 November 2019 that he relied upon arguments raised in Love and Thoms (which was concerned with the “aliens” power). The judgment in Love and Thoms was delivered after I had reserved my judgment, and I indicated to Mr Matson at the hearing on 18 November 2019 that he could make submissions on the relevance of that judgment once handed down. 

The written submissions prepared by Mr Burnside QC and Mr Freeman for the purpose of the interlocutory hearing on 25 June 2020 stated with respect to Love and Thoms, “The Applicant concedes that his argument that the constitutional validity of the Extradition Act 1988 (Cth), as it applies to him is without foundation”. Mr Matson later purported to withdraw this concession in written submissions filed for the purpose of the interlocutory hearing on 28 August 2020. However, Mr Matson has not otherwise made submissions regarding any implied constitutional right for Indigenous people to not be removed from Australia that is said to arise from the decision in Love and Thoms. I therefore consider this argument to be abandoned, and will not consider it.

31 October 2020

Schmitt and Pezzullo

From 'The most powerful mandarin in our 'extended' security state' by Brian Toohey in the Brisbane Times 

Michael Pezzullo is by far the most powerful public servant in Australia. He created and runs the ever-expanding Home Affairs Department, he oversees a ceaseless avalanche of draconian new laws and he gives public speeches about what he sees as the global “duality of good and evil”. 

Home Affairs already includes ASIO, the Australian Federal Police, Border Force, the Criminal Intelligence Commission, the Transactions and Analysis Centre, Immigration, and many other bodies. New laws make it a criminal offence to cause “intangible” damage to Australia's international relations, without explaining how anyone could know they were having an “intangible” effect. Another new criminal offence is to receive "inherently harmful information", regardless of whether it’s classified. 

In a speech in Canberra this month that sparked remarkably little alarm, Pezzullo said responding to the problems created by global forces required “nothing less than the transformation of the state itself, and the state’s relationship with society”. 

He wanted what he called an “extended state” consisting of the “entire apparatus” of all Australian governments, the business sector, the scientific and industrial research establishment, not-for-profit and community organisations including charities, and households as required for security and other purposes. Pezzullo wanted a “closer integration of security, economic and social policy”.

That speech featured

At one level, security dilemmas reduce logically to human difference and alterity, whether one reads Hobbes, Foucault, Schmitt or Heidegger, or for that matter Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche or Derrida, to name a few of the relevant thinkers.

An unimpressed Toohey comments "Sartre and Kierkegaard crack a mention elsewhere in the speech".

Pezzullo concluded

Public institutions have to be designed to operate at the intersection of prosperity, security and unity. Security has to be subordinated to the greater end of an open, prosperous and unified society. Security is an array of effects which support resilience and which are generated through a cycle of practices – namely threat scanning, risk management, planning, preparation and exercising, and operations, including first response, emergency management and, as necessary, disaster recovery and reconstruction. 

Security focuses on the logical anticipation of dangers to come, and is best informed by a realistic (as distinct from a neurotic) ‘anxiety’ which is centred on defined dangers – or at least imaginable dangers. I do not therefore deny a link of sorts to fear and anxiety – but nor would I start there. 

The operational state: within government, departments and agencies have to be designed to be operational – able to plan, to prepare, and to undertake operational missions as directed. The age of the programmatic or regulatory agency (the 1980s-2010s) is passing. While of course they have their place, even in wartime, departmental operations which are focused on the pursuit of purposive outcomes as distinct from the supervision of arms-length processes are back in vogue, and not before time. 

While much has been done in recent years to better link law enforcement, security intelligence, countering foreign interference, countering terrorism, immigration, citizenship, social cohesion, customs, border protection, maritime security, critical infrastructure protection, aviation and port security, supply chain security, cybersecurity, emergency management, disaster recovery, biosecurity and public health management and so on, governments will always be mindful of opportunities to achieve yet more scale and more agility in the generation of operational effects. 

While national security effects will typically continue to be delivered by the principal departments of state – Foreign Affairs and Trade, Defence, and Home Affairs, working alone, or in combination – security effects are also being delivered through other combinations, such as through the partnerships that Home Affairs has with Treasury (in foreign investment screening); Agriculture (biosecurity); Transport (aviation and maritime security); Communications (telecommunications security, for instance in relation to 5G technology); Industry (supply chains and scientific research); Energy (energy security); Health (pandemic response) and Education (foreign interference in universities). 

The extended state: perhaps the time has come to speak of the ‘extended state’ where public institutions in the executive remain the vital centre, as they possess convening power, threat intelligence, regulatory powers (for instance in the creation and enforcement of security obligations), emergency powers (as laid down in law), and the operational capabilities and capacities of which I spoke earlier. The ‘extended state’ for the purposes of security as I have defined it, which is a networked and dynamic conception of security which comprehends sectors across society and the economy, consists of the entire apparatus of the Australian Government, which convenes and coordinates; along with State, Territory and municipal governments; as well as the business sector, including finance and banking, food and groceries, health and medical services, transport, freight and logistics, water supply and sanitation, utilities, energy, fuel, telecommunications; the scientific and industrial research establishment; as well as non-for-profit and community organisations, including charities; and households as might be required.

30 October 2020

Trading

'Online Behavioral Targeting: Are Knowledgeable Consumers Willing to Sell Their Privacy?' by H. Li and A. Nill in (2020) 43 Journal of Consumer Policy 723–745 comments 

 Unbeknownst to many online consumers, their personal information is being traded on a flourishing and rapidly increasing market for privacy data. In a process often labeled online behavioral targeting (OBT), data mining companies and online brokers collect, analyze, buy, and sell consumers’ personal data in an effort to enable online and offline marketers to deliver personalized, highly relevant, and ultimately profitable advertisements. For the most part, consumers have not yet been afforded the opportunity to meaningfully participate in this market for privacy data. The purpose of this article is to explore more deeply the impact of knowledge on consumers’ potential willingness to keep versus trade their private information. Using survey data methodology, we find that those consumers who are more knowledgeable about OBT are willing to pay more for keeping their data private and, at the same time, are willing to sell their data for less money than less informed consumers.

The authors argue 

Dan Abate could not explain why he received so many advertisements about diabetes-related medications--online and via regular mail---until he discovered that his name showed up in a database of millions of people with “diabetes interest.” Acxiom Corp., one of the world’s biggest data mining companies, sells this list to advertisers and data brokers. One of Acxiom Corp’s customers, the data reseller Exact Data, posted Dan’s full name and his physical address online, along with 100 others, under the header “Sample Diabetes Mailing List.” This is just one of hundreds of medical databases up for sale to marketers (Pettypiece and Robertson 2014). A data broker such as Exact Data typically buys those lists wholesale for a mere 20 cents per name and breaks the data down into sub-categories, including income level, sex, profession, geography, and ethnicity. These customized lists are sold to marketers such as pharmaceutical companies who in turn can send customers highly relevant advertisements. Dan’s story is an example of online behavioral targeting (OBT) and its potential consequences in the physical world. While Dan’s personal information has been bought and sold several times, he has not been afforded the opportunity to meaningfully participate in this market for privacy data. He had no control over how his data were being used, and, in fact, he was not even aware that his personal data had been traded. 

OBT potentially enables marketers to deliver personalized, highly relevant, and ultimately profitable advertisements. While the revenue of those advertisements allows “free” access to most of the content provided on the Internet, consumers---often without their knowledge---“pay” for it by allowing online marketers access to their private information. For example, Dan Abate from the example above likely filled out a website registration form that asked for his health information in order to grant him “free” access to the site. One such site is Primehealthsolutions.com, which provides basic health information on a variety of conditions. The site makes money by collecting data on users and their diseases and reselling this information to data brokers. 

An analysis of the main marketing publications dealing with digital, social media, and mobile marketing over the last 15 years revealed a lack of comprehensive answers to some of the fundamental questions concerning the use of big data from a consumer privacy perspective (Lamberton and Stephen 2016). Little research addresses the question how consumers are or can potentially control their private information to their own benefit in a world where this information---knowingly or unknowingly, consented, or unconsented---is already widely accessible and available to a host of marketers and other interested parties (Ferrell 2016; Martin and Murphy 2017; Martin 2016). Accordingly, our overarching research interest is no longer if consumers are willing to disclose their private data---it is too late to put the genie back in the bottle---but are consumers able and willing to actively gain more control over their personal information, if they were provided with the opportunity to do so? Senator Ron Johnson pointedly asked Mark Zuckerberg this question in the senate hearing April 2018: “Have you thought about that model, where the user data is actually monetized by the actual user” (Washington Post 2018)? Would consumers be interested in such a model? 

The main theoretical contribution of our analysis is to show that knowledge has a significant impact on consumers’ ability and willingness to actively control their data. The main public policy implication is that knowledgeable consumers are much more likely to perceive their personal data as a tradable good. In other words, educating and informing consumers about OBT are necessary before a market-based solution for private data. Consumers who lack knowledge about OBT have often unrealistic expectations about the market value of their personal information, are oblivious of the current tradeoff between free online content and collection of personal data, and would neither be willing nor capable of participating in a market for online data in a meaningful wa

Privacy Act Inquiry

It's that time of of the year, where governments - in what one of my more mordant friends describes as 'take out the trash' mode - announce short consultations on matters that are important but politically inconvenient. The national Government has today announced an inquiry into the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth), with responses to the issues paper due by 29 November. 

The Review reflects the Attorney-General's 12 December 2019 announcement that the Government would conduct a review of the Act to 'ensure privacy settings empower consumers, protect their data and best serve the Australian economy'. The announcement was part of the Government's response to the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission's Digital Platforms Inquiry. 

A-G's has hopefully dusted off the various ALRC reports from George Brandis's famous mahogany bookshelves (ignoring Brandis' unsuccessful attempt to euthanase the OAIC on the grounds that neither FOI nor privacy protection were really necessary). 

A-G's states 

We will draw on a range of sources for the review and invite submissions on matters for consideration. We will also meet with stakeholders on specific issues and consider research and reports on privacy issues. 

Those sources include

  • ACCC Digital Services Advertising Inquiry 
  • ACCC Digital Platforms Inquiry Final Report, 2019 
  • Data Availability and Use, Productivity Commission Inquiry Report, 2017 
  • Serious Invasions of Privacy in the Digital Era, ALRC Final Report 123, 2014 
  • For Your Information: Australian Privacy Law and Practice, ALRC Report 108, 2008

The Terms of Reference are -

  •  the scope and application of the Privacy Act
  • whether the Privacy Act effectively protects personal information and provides a practical and proportionate framework for promoting good privacy practices 
  • whether individuals should have direct rights of action to enforce privacy obligations under the Privacy Act 
  • whether a statutory tort for serious invasions of privacy should be introduced into Australian law
  •  the impact of the notifiable data breach scheme and its effectiveness in meeting its objectives
  •  the effectiveness of enforcement powers and mechanisms under the Privacy Act and how they interact with other Commonwealth regulatory frameworks 
  • the desirability and feasibility of an independent certification scheme to monitor and demonstrate compliance with Australian privacy laws.
The questions in the 89 page issues paper are 
 
Objectives of the Privacy Act 
1. Should the objects outlined in section 2A of the Act be changed? If so, what changes should be made and why? 
 
Definition of personal information 
2. What approaches should be considered to ensure the Act protects an appropriate range of technical information? 
3. Should the definition of personal information be updated to expressly include inferred personal information? 
4. Should there be additional protections in relation to de-identified, anonymised and pseudonymised information? If so, what should these be? 
5. Are any other changes required to the Act to provide greater clarity around what information is ‘personal information’? 
 
Flexibility of the APPs in regulating and protecting privacy 
6. Is the framework of the Act effective in providing flexibility to cater for a wide variety of entities, acts and practices, while ensuring sufficient clarity about protections and obligations? 
 
Exemptions Small business exemption 
7. Does the small business exemption in its current form strike the right balance between protecting the privacy rights of individuals and avoid imposing unneccessary compliance costs on small business? 
8. Is the current threshold appropriately pitched or should the definition of small business be amended? a. If so, should it be amended by changing the annual turnover threshold from $3 million to another amount, replacing the threshold with another factor such as number of employees or value of assets or should the definition be amended in another way? 
9. Are there businesses or acts and practices that should or should not be covered by the small business exemption? 
10. Would it be appropriate for small businesses to be required to comply with some but not all of the APPs? a. If so, what obligations should be placed on small businesses? b. What would be the financial implications for small business? 
11. Would there be benefits to small business if they were required to comply with some or all of the APPs? 
12. Should small businesses that trade in personal information continue to be exempt from the Act if they have the consent of individuals to collect or disclose their personal information?   
 
Employee records exemption 
13. Is the personal information of employees adequately protected by the current scope of the employee records exemption? 
14. If enhanced protections are required, how should concerns about employees’ ability to freely consent to employers’ collection of their personal information be addressed? 
15. Should some but not all of the APPs apply to employee records, or certain types of employee records? 
 
Political parties exemption 
16. Should political acts and practices continue to be exempted from the operation of some or all of the APPs? 
 
Journalism exemption 
17. Does the journalism exemption appropriately balance freedom of the media to report on matters of public interest with individuals’ interests in protecting their privacy? 
18. Should the scope of organisations covered by the journalism exemption be altered? 
19. Should any acts and practices of media organisations be covered by the operation of some or all 
 of the APPs? 
 
Notice of Collection of Personal Information Improving awareness of relevant matters 
20. Does notice help people to understand and manage their personal information? 
21. What matters should be considered to balance providing adequate information to individuals and minimising any regulatory burden? 
22. What sort of requirements should be put in place to ensure that notification is accessible; can be easily understood; and informs an individual of all relevant uses and disclosures? 
 
Third party collections 
23. Where an entity collects an individual’s personal information and is unable to notify the individual of the collection, should additional requirements or limitations be placed on the use or disclosure of that information? 
 
Limiting information burden 
24. What measures could be used to ensure individuals receive adequate notice without being subject to information overload? 
25. Would a standardised framework of notice, such as standard words or icons, be effective in assisting consumers to understand how entities are using their personal information? 
 
Consent to collection, use and disclosure of personal information  
26. Is consent an effective way for people to manage their personal information? 
27. What approaches should be considered to ensure that consent to the collection, use and disclosure of information is freely given and informed? 
28. Should individuals be required to separately consent to each purpose for which an entity collects, uses and discloses information? What would be the benefits or disadvantages of requiring individual consents for each primary purpose? 
29. Are the existing protections effective to stop the unnecessary collection of personal information? a. If an individual refuses to consent to their personal information being collected, used or disclosed for a purpose that is not necessary for providing the relevant product or service, should that be grounds to deny them access to that product or service? 
30. What requirements should be considered to manage ‘consent fatigue’ of individuals? 
 
Exceptions to the requirement to obtain consent 
31. Are the current general permitted situations and general health situations appropriate and fit-for-purpose? Should any additional situations be included? 
 
Pro-consumer defaults 
32. Should entities collecting, using and disclosing personal information be required to implement pro-privacy defaults for certain uses and disclosures of personal information?   
 
Obtaining consent from children 
33. Should specific requirements be introduced in relation to how entities seek consent from children? 
 
The role of consent for IoT devices and emerging technologies 
34. How can the personal information of individuals be protected where IoT devices collect personal information from multiple individuals? 
 
Inferred sensitive information 
35. Does the Act adequately protect sensitive information? If not, what safeguards should be put in place to protect against the misuse of sensitive information? 
36. Does the definition of ‘collection’ need updating to reflect that an entity could infer sensitive information? 
 
Direct marketing 
37. Does the Act strike the right balance between the use of personal information in relation to direct marketing? If not, how could protections for individuals be improved? 
 
Withdrawal of consent 
38. Should entities be required to refresh an individual’s consent on a regular basis? If so, how would this best be achieved? 
39. Should entities be required to expressly provide individuals with the option of withdrawing consent? 
40. Should there be some acts or practices that are prohibited regardless of consent? 
 
Emergency declarations 
41. Is an emergency declaration appropriately framed to facilitate the sharing of information in response to an emergency or disaster and protect the privacy of individuals? 
 
Regulating use and disclosure 
42. Should reforms be considered to restrict uses and disclosures of personal information? If so, how should any reforms be balanced to ensure that they do not have an undue impact on the legitimate uses of personal information by entities? 
 
Control and security of personal information  
 
Security and retention 
43. Are the security requirements under the Act reasonable and appropriate to protect the personal information of individuals? 
44. Should there be greater requirements placed on entities to destroy or de-identify personal information that they hold? 
 
Access, quality and correction 
45. Should amendments be made to the Act to enhance: a. transparency to individuals about what personal information is being collected and used by entities? b. the ability for personal information to be kept up to date or corrected? 
 
Right to erasure 
46. Should a ‘right to erasure’ be introduced into the Act? If so, what should be the key features of such a right? What would be the financial impact on entities? 
47. What considerations are necessary to achieve greater consumer control through a ‘right to erasure’ without negatively impacting other public interests? 
 
Overseas data flows and third party certification 
48. What are the benefits and disadvantages of the current accountability approach to cross-border disclosures of personal information? a. Are APP 8 and section 16C still appropriately framed? 
49. Is the exception to extraterritorial application of the Act in relation to acts or practices required by an applicable foreign law still appropriate? 
50. What (if any) are the challenges of implementing the CBPR system in Australia? 
51. What would be the benefits of developing a domestic privacy certification scheme, in addition to implementing the CBPR system? 
52. What would be the benefits or disadvantages of Australia seeking adequacy under the GDPR? 
 
Enforcement powers under the Privacy Act and role of the OAIC 
53. Is the current enforcement framework for interferences with privacy working effectively? 
54. Does the current enforcement approach achieve the right balance between conciliating complaints, investigating systemic issues, and taking punitive action for serious non-compliance? 
55. Are the remedies available to the Commissioner sufficient or do the enforcement mechanisms available to the Commissioner require expansion? a. If so, what should these enforcement mechanisms look like? 
 
Direct right of action 
56. How should any direct right of action under the Act be framed so as to give individuals greater control over their personal information and provide additional incentive for APP entities to comply with their obligations while balancing the need to appropriately direct court resources?  
 
Statutory tort 
57. Is a statutory tort for invasion of privacy needed? 
58. Should serious invasions of privacy be addressed through the criminal law or through a statutory tort? 
59. What types of invasions of privacy should be covered by a statutory tort? 60. Should a statutory tort of privacy apply only to intentional, reckless invasions of privacy or should it also apply to breaches of privacy as a result of negligence or gross negligence? 
61. How should a statutory tort for serious invasions of privacy be balanced with competing public interests? 
62. If a statutory tort for the invasion of privacy was not enacted, what other changes could be made to existing laws to provide redress for serious invasions of privacy? 
 
Notifiable Data Breaches scheme – impact and effectiveness 
63. Have entities’ practices, including data security practices, changed due to the commencement of the NDB Scheme? 
64. Has the NDB Scheme raised awareness about the importance of effective data security? 65. Have there been any challenges complying with the data breach notification requirements of other frameworks (including other domestic and international frameworks) in addition to the NDB Scheme? 
 
Interaction between the Act and other regulatory schemes 
66. Should there continue to be separate privacy protections to address specific privacy risks and concerns? 
67. Is there a need for greater harmonisation of privacy protections under Commonwealth law? a. If so, is this need specific to certain types of personal information? 
68. Are the compliance obligations in certain sectors proportionate and appropriate to public expectations?

29 October 2020

Repair Right Inquiry

The Productivity Commission has today been tasked with an inquiry into the Right to Repair in Australia, something that impinges on consumer protection, patent and other law. 

The media release regarding the inquiry states 

 Background 

The term right to repair describes a consumer's ability to repair faulty goods, or access repair services, at a competitive price. This can relate to a range of product faults, including those for which the consumer is responsible. It may include a repair by a manufacturer, a third-party, or a self-repair option through available replacement parts and repair information. 

The Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (CCA) prohibits anti-competitive behaviour such as exclusive dealing (section 47); however, many right to repair issues are the result of conduct that is not being captured by the prohibition. In many cases, suppliers do not impose any such restrictions on consumers with respect to the repair of products they supply. Instead, consumers or third parties are prevented from being able to repair the products due to a lack of access to necessary tools, parts or diagnostic software. 

For these reasons; existing provisions amount to some limited rights or protections in relation to repair facilities in Australia, but do not amount to a full 'right to repair'. As such, premature product obsolescence and a lack of competition in repair markets remain. The expense of repair and product design accelerate the transfer of consumer goods into waste. 

Scope of the inquiry 

The Productivity Commission should examine the potential benefits and costs associated with 'right to repair' in the Australian context, including current and potential legislative, regulatory and non-regulatory frameworks and their impact on consumers' ability to repair products that develop faults or require maintenance. In examining the Australian context, the Productivity Commission should identify evidence of the impact of relevant international approaches. 

In undertaking the inquiry, the Commission should consider:

  • The legislative arrangements that govern repairs of goods and services, and whether regulatory barriers exist that prevent consumers from sourcing competitive repairs; 

  • The barriers and enablers to competition in repair markets, including analysing any manufacturer-imposed barriers, and the costs and benefits associated with broader application of regulated approaches to right of repair and facilitating legal access to embedded software in consumer and other goods; 

  • The impact of digital rights management on third-party repairers and consumers, and how intellectual property rights or commercially-sensitive knowledge would interact with a right to repair; 

  • The effectiveness of current arrangements for preventing premature or planned product obsolescence and the proliferation of e‑waste, and further means of reducing e‑waste through improved access to repairs and increased competition in repair markets; and 

  • The impact on market offerings, should firms have their control over repair removed.

Process 

In undertaking this inquiry, the Commission should consult broadly, including with state and territory consumer affairs regulators. The Commission should undertake an appropriate public consultation process including by holding public hearings, inviting public submissions and releasing a draft report to the public. A final report should be provided to the Government within 12 months of the receipt of these terms of reference.