09 November 2020

IP Nationalism

'Economic Nationalism in Intellectual Property Policy and Law' (Research Paper of the Faculty of Law of Goethe University Frankfurt/M. No. 6/2020) by Alexander Peukert comments 

The long-standing battle between economic nationalism and globalism has again taken center stage in geopolitics. This article applies this dichotomy to the law and policy of international intellectual property (IP). Most commentators see IP as a prime example of globalization. The article challenges this view on several levels. In a nutshell, it claims that economic nationalist concerns about domestic industries and economic development lie at the heart of the global IP system. To support this argument, the article summarizes and categorizes IP policies adopted by selected European countries, the European Union, and the U.S. Section I presents three types of inbound IP policies that aim to foster local economic development and innovation. Section II adds three versions of outbound IP policies that, in contrast, target foreign countries and markets. Concluding section III traces a dialectic virtuous circle of economic nationalist motives leading to global legal structures and identifies the function and legal structure of IP as the reason for the resilience and even dominance of economic nationalist motives in international IP politics. IP concerns exclusive private rights that are territorially limited creatures of (supra-)national statutes. These legal structures make up the economic nationalist DNA of IP.

Branding

'Surveillance in South Africa: From Skin Branding to Digital Colonialism' by Michael Kwet in Jeffrey Vagle and Michael Kwet (eds) The Cambridge Handbook of Race and Surveillance (Cambridge University Press, 2021) comments 

South Africa’s long legacy of racism and colonial exploitation continues to echo throughout post-apartheid society. For centuries, European conquerors marshaled surveillance as a means to control the black population. This began with the requirements for passes to track and control the movements, settlements, and labor of Africans. Over time, surveillance technologies evolved alongside complex shifts in power, culture, and the political economy. 

This Chapter explores the evolution of surveillance regimes in South Africa. The first surveillance system in South Africa used paper passes to police slave movements and enforce labor contracts. To make the system more robust, various white authorities marked the skin of workers and livestock with symbols registered in paper databases. At the beginning of the twentieth century, fingerprinting was introduced in some areas to simplify and improve the passes. Under apartheid, the National Party aimed to streamline a national, all-seeing surveillance system. They imported computers to impose a regime of fixed race classification and keep detailed records about the African population. The legal apparatus of race-based surveillance was finally abolished during the transition to democracy. However, today a regime of Big Data, artificial intelligence, and centralized cloud computing has ushered in a new era of mass surveillance in South Africa. 

South Africa’s surveillance regimes were always devised in collaboration with foreign colonizers, imperialists, intellectuals, and profit-seeking capitalists. In each era, the United States increased its participation. During the period of settler conquest, the US had a modest presence in Southern Africa. With the onset of the minerals revolution, US power expanded, and American capitalists and engineers with business interests in the mines pushed for an improved pass system to police African workers. Under apartheid, US corporations supplied the computer technology essential to apartheid governance and business enterprise. Finally, during the latter years of post-apartheid, Silicon Valley corporations, together with US surveillance agencies, began imposing surveillance capitalism on South African society. A new form of domination, digital colonialism, has emerged, vesting the United States with unprecedented control over South African affairs. To counter the force of digital colonialism, a new movement may emerge to push to redesign the digital ecosystem as a socialist commons based on open technology, socialist legal solutions, bottom-up democracy, and Internet decentralization.

SOCI

The Security Legislation Amendment (Critical Infrastructure) Bill 2020 (Cth) - aka SOCI - is identified as reflecting a commitment to 'protecting the essential services all Australians rely on by uplifting the security and resilience of our critical infrastructure'. 

The consultation version of the Explanatory Memo states 

As the threats and risks to Australia’s critical infrastructure evolve in a post-COVID world, so too must our approach to ensuring the ongoing security and resilience of these assets and the essential services they deliver. 

2. Critical infrastructure is increasingly interconnected and interdependent, delivering efficiencies and economic benefits to operations. However, connectivity without proper safeguards creates vulnerabilities that can deliberately or inadvertently cause disruption and result in cascading consequences across our economy, security and sovereignty. 

3. Threats ranging from natural hazards (including weather events) to human induced threats (including interference, cyber attacks, espionage, chemical or oil spills, and trusted insiders) all have the potential to significantly disrupt critical infrastructure. Recent incidents such as compromises of the Australian parliamentary network, university networks and key corporate entities, natural disasters and the impacts of COVID-19 illustrate that threats to the operation of Australia’s critical infrastructure assets continue to be significant. Further, the interconnected nature of our critical infrastructure means that compromise of one essential function can have a domino effect that degrades or disrupts others. 

4. The consequences of a prolonged and widespread failure in the energy sector, for example, could be catastrophic to our economy, security and sovereignty, as well as the Australian way of life, causing:

  • shortages or destruction of essential medical supplies; 

  • instability in the supply of food and groceries; 

  • impacts to water supply and sanitation; 

  • impacts to telecommunications networks that are dependent on electricity; 

  • the inability of Australians to communicate easily with family and loved ones; 

  • disruptions to transport, traffic management systems and fuel; 

  • reduced services or shutdown of the banking, finance and retail sectors; and 

  • the inability for businesses and governments to function. 

5. While Australia has not suffered a catastrophic attack on critical infrastructure, we are not immune:

  • over the last two years, we have seen several cyber attacks in Australia that have targeted the Federal Parliamentary Network, as the transport and education sectors; 

  • malicious actors have taken advantage of the pressures COVID-19 has put on the health sector by launching cyber attacks on health organisations and medical research facilities; and 

  • key supply chain businesses transporting groceries and medical supplies have also been targeted. 

6. Accordingly, Government will introduce an enhanced regulatory framework, building on existing requirements under the SOCI Act. The Security Legislation Amendment (Critical Infrastructure) Bill 2020 gives effect to this framework by introducing:

  • a Positive Security Obligation for critical infrastructure, including a risk management program, to be delivered through sector-specific requirements, and mandatory cyber incident reporting; 

  • enhanced cyber security obligations for those assets most important to the nation, described as systems of national significance; and 

  • government assistance to relevant entities for critical infrastructure sector assets in response to significant cyber attacks that impact on Australia’s critical infrastructure assets. 

7. These changes will be underpinned by enhancements to Government’s existing education, communication and engagement activities, under a refreshed Critical Infrastructure Resilience Strategy. This will include a range of activities that will improve our collective understanding of risk within and across sectors. 

8. The enhanced framework will uplift security and resilience in all critical infrastructure sectors. When combined with better identification and sharing of threats, this framework will ensure that Australia’s critical infrastructure assets– whether industry or government owned and operated – are more resilient and secure. Government will work in partnership with responsible entities of critical infrastructure assets to ensure the new requirements build on and do not duplicate existing regulatory frameworks. 

9. This framework will apply to owners and operators of critical infrastructure regardless of ownership arrangements. This creates an even playing field for owners and operators of critical infrastructure and maintains Australia’s existing open investment settings, ensuring that businesses who apply security measures are not at a commercial disadvantage. 

10. The Australian Government’s Critical Infrastructure Resilience Strategy currently defines critical infrastructure as: ‘those physical facilities, supply chains, information technologies and communication networks, which if destroyed, degraded or rendered unavailable for an extended period, would significantly impact the social or economic wellbeing of the nation, or affect Australia’s ability to conduct national defence and ensure national security.’ 

11. Within that broad definition of critical infrastructure, the SOCI Act currently places regulatory obligations on specific entities in the electricity, gas, water and maritime ports sectors. However, as the security landscape evolves, so must our approach to managing risk across all critical infrastructure sectors. 

12. As such, the amendments in this Bill will enhance the obligations in the SOCI Act, and expand its coverage to the following sectors: communications; financial services and markets; data storage and processing; defence industry; higher education and research; energy; food and grocery; health care and medical; space technology; transport; and water and sewerage. ... 

The reforms 

14. The Commonwealth needs to establish a clear, effective, consistent and proportionate approach to ensuring the resilience of Australia’s critical infrastructure. The amendments to the SOCI Act will drive the uplift of the security and resilience of Australia’s critical infrastructure. 

15. The Security Legislation Amendment (Critical Infrastructure) Bill 2020 (the Bill) will introduce an all-hazards Positive Security Obligation for a range of critical infrastructure assets across sectors. This ensures industry is taking the appropriate steps to manage the security and resilience of their assets. The specific matters to be included in a critical infrastructure risk management program will be prescribed in rules, which will be co-designed between industry and government. 

16. The Bill also recognises those assets that are the most critical to the security, economy and sovereignty of Australia. These ‘systems of national significance’ will bear additional cyber obligations recognising the cyber threat environment we currently face. Finally, while these measures are designed to ensure we do not suffer a catastrophic cyber attack, the Bill will ensure Government has the necessary powers to provide direct assistance to industry in the event of a serious cyber security incident. 

Positive Security Obligation 

17. The Positive Security Obligation will build on the existing obligations in the SOCI Act to embed preparation, prevention and mitigation activities into the business as usual operating of critical infrastructure assets, ensuring that the resilience of essential services is strengthened. It will also provide greater situational awareness of threats to critical infrastructure assets. 

18. The Positive Security Obligation involves three aspects:

  • adopting and maintaining an all-hazards critical infrastructure risk management program; 

  • mandatorily report serious cyber security incidents to the Australian Signals Directorate (ACSC); and 

  • where required, providing ownership and operational information to the Register of Critical Infrastructure Assets. 

19. Importantly, each aspect of the Positive Security Obligation will only apply once a rule is made in relation to that aspect for a critical infrastructure asset or class of critical infrastructure assets. The rules will prescribe which aspects are ‘switched on’ for a critical infrastructure asset or class of critical infrastructure assets. 

20. The critical infrastructure risk management program will require responsible entities of critical infrastructure assets to manage and mitigate risks. Responsible entities of critical infrastructure assets will be required to take an all-hazards approach when identifying and understanding those risks – both natural and human induced hazards. 

21. Partnerships with industry sit at the foundation of this measure. Government and industry stakeholders will work together to co-design the sector-specific requirements which will underpin the risk management program obligation. The co-design process will develop a clear set of requirements for each of the regulated sectors, which:

  • recognise and do not duplicate existing regulatory or non-regulatory approaches across sectors; 

  • are principles-based and proportionate to the risk profile of the particular sector; and 

  • impose the least regulatory burden necessary to achieve the security outcomes. 

22. Responsible entities of critical infrastructure assets will be required to report serious cyber security incidents to the relevant Commonwealth body. The objective of this reform is to collect information which will support the development of an aggregated threat picture and comprehensive understanding of cyber security risks to critical infrastructure in a way that is mutually beneficial to Government and industry. This will better inform both proactive and reactive cyber response options – ranging from providing immediate assistance to industry to working with industry to uplift broader security standards. 

23. Part 2 of the current SOCI Act requires assets covered by the Act to provide ownership and operational information to the Secretary of Home Affairs. This information is held on the Register of Critical Infrastructure Assets (the Register). The Bill will extend this requirement to the expanded class of critical infrastructure assets where appropriate (for example, it may not be necessary where information is being collected under an equivalent regime for certain assets). 

24. The increased range of sectors covered by the Register will enable the Government to develop and maintain a comprehensive picture of national security risks, and apply mitigations where necessary. Analysis of the information in the Register will enable the Critical Infrastructure Centre to:

  • assess ultimate ownership, and therefore influence and control over, critical infrastructure assets; 

  • analyse interdependencies among critical infrastructure assets and sectors; and 

  • identify commonalities in services being used by critical infrastructure assets, such as shared IT service providers or shared control systems. 

25. The successful delivery of all aspects of the Positive Security Obligation is predicated on the identification of sector-specific regulators to manage the implementation and compliance of these elements of the reforms. The Department of Home Affairs, or other relevant Commonwealth regulator prescribed in the rules, will be provided with the standard monitoring and investigation powers under the Regulatory Powers (Standard Provisions) Act 2014 to support compliance and enforcement activities. 

26. Regulators will adopt a risk-based approach to developing and enforcing the Positive Security Obligation. Sector regulators will work with entities to ensure the Positive Security Obligation is applied in a proportionate and reasonable manner, taking into account the needs and existing capabilities of each sector. Regulators will have a role in monitoring and enforcing compliance while seeking to minimise the economic and operational impact on businesses. 

Enhanced Cyber Security Obligations for systems of national significance 

27. The Enhanced Cyber Security Obligations in the Bill will support a bespoke, outcomes-focused partnership between Government and Australia’s most critical assets – privately declared as ‘systems of national significance’. These obligations will enhance the already mature Government-industry information sharing arrangements to build an aggregated threat picture and comprehensive understanding of cyber security risks to critical infrastructure in a way that is mutually beneficial to Government and industry. 

28. Systems of national significance are a significantly smaller subset of critical infrastructure assets that, by virtue of their interdependencies across sectors and cascading consequences of disruption to other critical infrastructure assets and critical infrastructure sectors, are crucial to the nation. 

29. Under the Enhanced Cyber Security Obligations, the Secretary of Home Affairs may require the responsible entity for a system of national significance to undertake one or more prescribed cyber security activities. These include the development of cyber security incident response plans, cybersecurity exercises to build cyber preparedness, vulnerability assessments to identify vulnerabilities for remediation, and provision of system information to build Australia’s situational awareness. The Bill explicitly requires the Secretary of Home Affairs to request the prescribed activity in order to ensure activities have a clear, stated security objective. 

30. Through consultation in developing this Bill, stakeholders provided support for greater threat information sharing and partnerships with Government. The Enhanced Cyber Security Obligations will support the sharing of near-real time threat information to provide industry with a more mature understanding of emerging cyber security threats, and the capability to reduce the risks of a significant cyber attack against Australia’s most critical assets. 

Government Assistance

31. This Bill introduces a Government Assistance regime to respond to serious cyber security incidents that applies to all critical infrastructure sector assets. Government recognises that industry should and in most cases, will respond to the vast majority of cyber security incidents, with the support of Government where necessary. However, Government maintains ultimate responsibility for protecting Australia’s national interests. As a last resort, the Bill provides for Government assistance to protect assets during or following a significant cyber attack. 

32. During consultation, stakeholders were broadly supportive of the Government actively protecting critical infrastructure in exceptional circumstances, while calling for clearly defined safeguards and oversight mechanisms. The Government Assistance powers in the Bill are clearly defined and are confined, proportionate and appropriate. Further details on the scope of powers and safeguards are outlined in Part 3A of the Bill. 

Consultation 

33. Over a five week period from 12 August 2020, the Department of Home Affairs on behalf of the Australian Government, undertook an extensive consultation process. During this period the Department met with over 2,000 people from over 540 entities across all affected sectors, peak bodies and states and territories, and received 194 submissions. 

34. Consultation revealed cautious support for an enhanced regulatory framework for Australia’s critical infrastructure while noting:

  • the need for genuine co-design of sector-specific requirements and recognition that voluntary partnerships remain the first preference for resolving incidents; 

  • the need for greater clarity around how critical infrastructure assets and systems of national significance are to be defined; 

  • concern over the extent of the proposed Government Assistance powers; 

  • the unclear and possibly high regulatory impost, as well as possible duplication with existing regulatory frameworks (particularly in sectors with existing, mature security frameworks); and 

  • the risks in pursuing the reforms on an expedited timeframe. 

35. Feedback received during consultation has informed the development of an exposure draft Bill. 

36. Further engagement on the exposure draft legislation, coupled with ongoing stakeholder co- design, a continued emphasis on cooperative partnerships and graduated implementation of sector-specific obligations, will minimise regulatory burden, and manage industry and jurisdictions’ concerns. 

Voluntary engagement through the Trusted Information Sharing Network 

37. Increased engagement and education will underpin the success of the regulatory reforms outlined above. The Trusted Information Sharing Network for Critical Infrastructure Resilience was established in 2003 and remains the primary voluntary engagement mechanism for business-government information sharing and resilience building initiatives. However, in recent years industry has sought greater value from this mechanism. 

38. The Government will enhance the existing Trusted Information Sharing Network by co-designing with industry a new fit-for-purpose engagement mechanism that allows for greater cross-sector collaboration in preparing for and responding to the evolving environment. The refreshed engagement mechanism will ensure industry participants can discuss resilience issues which impact Australia’s critical infrastructure which will increase participation by owners and operators of critical infrastructure, supply chain entities and state and territory governments. 

39. The new engagement mechanism will be a channel for developing and communicating critical infrastructure resilience information and a forum to co-design sector-specific obligations and best practice guidance. This approach will encourage all affected responsible entities, large and small, to participate in their design and ensure the resulting obligations provide a level playing field for all participants. The new engagement mechanism will also be used to inform the new Critical Infrastructure Resilience Strategy (due for release in early 2021), capturing lessons learned from crises this year including COVID-19.

07 November 2020

Funding Hatespeech

'Bankrolling Bigotry: An Overview of the Online Funding Strategies of American Hate Groups', a report by Global Disinformation Index and Institute for Strategic Dialogue, comments 

Hatred is surging across the United States. Figures released by the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) suggest that the number of hate groups rose steadily between 2014 and 2018, including a 55% growth in the number of number of white nationalist groups active between 2017 and 2019. In 2018 the FBI announced that hate crimes were at the highest volume they had been for 16 years, and recent analysis from the Center for Strategic and International Studies identifies white supremacists as the most significant terror threat facing the US. This matches global trends where white supremacist terrorism has spiked by 320%, in part buoyed by a broad morass of hate against communities including Jews, Muslims, immigrants, people of colour, people with disabilities and the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer and others (LGBTQ+) community. 

This hatred has come to the streets over the course of 2020. As civil rights protesters have demonstrated across the country, groups such as the Proud Boys have incited hatred and participated in violent clashes. Such hatred threatens the safety, security and wellbeing of minority communities, and societal harmony writ large. 

There is a clear need for greater efforts to be made to tackle hate groups. While these groups remain free to mobilise they can target minority communities with hatred and violence, as well as proselytise and recruit new members. The struggle against these actors plays out in many ways. Civil society groups produce counter-messaging, which undermines the propaganda of hate; specialist practitioners work to de-radicalise individuals involved in extremist movements; and activists and academics build evidence bases and advocate for changes from social media platforms to improve and enforce their policies against hate-mongers. 

Another area where there has been successful activism over recent years is in limiting the ability of hate groups to raise funds. Advocacy groups like SumOfUs have helped wage campaigns that put pressure on companies whose products are used to facilitate the funding of hate. A number of individuals involved in promoting hatred have been banned from platforms such as PayPal, limiting their ability to make money or raise donations. 

The extent to which hate groups use different platforms to raise funds is currently not widely understood, however, so their efforts to limit this activity are not always effective. To improve our ability to check the scale and nature of online funding by hate groups, the Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD) and Global Disinformation Index (GDI) have analysed the digital footprints of 73 US-based hate groups, identified through existing studies conducted by the SPLC and Anti-Defamation League (ADL), with additional coding and vetting by ISD and GDI analysts. These groups were then assessed for the extent to which they used 54 funding mechanisms. The research aimed to map out the online infrastructure behind hate groups’ financing and fundraising in order to support efforts to defund and therefore disempower hate movements in the US. 

Through this research, we found that hate groups use popular platforms such as PayPal, Facebook Fundraisers and Stripe, although these platforms often have explicit policies supposedly preventing their use to facilitate hate or violence. Through this work we have improved our understanding of how different types of groups raise money using a broad spectrum of online platforms and services. This work has informed a series of recommendations which, if enacted, could diminish the ability of those who seek to spread hatred to succeed.

The key findings are 

• We analysed the digital footprints of 73 US-based groups involved in promoting hatred against individuals on the basis of their gender, sexuality, race, religion or nationality. We checked for their use of 54 online fundraising mechanisms, which included 47 platforms, 5 different cryptocurrencies and the presence of membership or consulting services, ultimately finding 191 instances of hate groups using online fundraising services to support their activity. 

• The platform most commonly used by the hate groups studied was Charity Navigator, an organisation that assesses charities in the US and ranks them according to a certain set of criteria; currently it is used by 29 groups. The second most commonly used platform was PayPal, currently used by 21 of the groups we analysed, followed by Facebook Fundraisers, currently used by 19 groups. Charity Navigator and Facebook Fundraisers are both powered by Network for Good, a fundraising software company that allows any non-profit with a profile on the non-profit information service Guidestar to use their service to raise funds. 

• A number of the hate groups analysed in this report have non-profit status in the US: 32 of the 73 (44%) hate groups have either 501(c)(3) or 501(c)(4) tax status in the US. This potentially helps legitimise hate groups and provides them with avenues through which to raise money. 

• More than one-third (38%) of the platforms analysed do not have a policy which explicitly prohibits hate groups from using their services. A majority – 29 of the 47 (62%) platforms – included in the investigation had policies designed to push back against or ban hateful activity in some way. 

• Hate groups used 24 of those 29 (83%) platforms with policies against hate speech, showing a failure to implement and enforce these policies. 

• Different types of hate groups prioritised different funding mechanisms. When identifying hate groups for analysis we subcategorised them according to their ideology. Through this we found that white supremacist organisations were least likely to use funding mechanisms such as onsite donation forms, crowdfunding mechanisms or onsite retail, instead preferring to use cryptocurrency donations. This potentially reflects proactive policy enforcement by funding platforms, suggesting that policy enforcement can become an effective tool limiting the activities of hate groups online. It may also be a result of the preferred mobilisation strategies of these groups, which prioritise decentralised organisation and the incitement of violence. Conversely anti-LGBTQ+ groups, which are in some instances well-established organisations that operate under the banner of legitimate religious groups, had the most diverse funding strategies.

The recommendations are 

• Platforms should adopt policies which limit their use by hate groups: We found that 38% of the platforms studied did not have any policies in place prohibiting their use by hate groups. Furthermore, some platforms only had limited policies in place prohibiting violent organisations, but ignored their use by non-violent hate groups. The mass proliferation of hatred against minority communities helps inspire violence and fuels community polarisation and societal destabilisation. We recommend that platforms that facilitate organisational fundraising adopt comprehensive policies banning their use by groups that promote hatred and discrimination of individuals according to their identity, including gender, sexuality, race, religion, disability or nationality. 

• Where platforms do have policies to prevent the abuse of services by hate groups, they should be more proactive and comprehensive in their enforcement: Hate groups used 83% of the platforms we identified that had policies in place around hatred. It is essential that organisations are more proactive in the enforcement of their terms of service so that they live up to the values which they publicly express, and limit their abuse by hate groups. This might include greater resource allocation to safety and policy teams dealing with such issues on the platforms, or proactive outreach to experts who can provide support in identifying and analysing the activity of hate groups on the platforms. 

• Industry bodies such as the Electronic Transactions Association or the Merchant Acquirer’s Committee should take on a leadership role in developing standard-setting guidelines about hate and extremism in order to encourage the broad adoption of policies to limit online fundraising tools for hate groups: industry standard guidelines should be drawn up to help guide a more cohesive and uniform response to the misuse of financial technology by extremists at a policy level. 

• Congressional debate on whether such groups should qualify for non-profit tax status: 44% of the hate groups in our study are registered non- profit organisations in the US. An Internal Revenue Service (IRS) designation may act as a sort of kite mark, making platforms and payment providers wary of acting against a group. Through our research we found evidence that being registered as non-profits helped the groups studied raise funds. Following the outcome of the 2013 “IRS targeting scandal”, which found that the IRS had used inappropriate and politically-motivated criteria to identify tax-exempt applications, it is believed that the debate over the non-profit status of groups that discriminate against immutable characteristics should fall onto Congress.

05 November 2020

COVID app

'Tracking, tracing, trust: contemplating mitigating the impact of COVID‐19 through technological interventions' by Kobi Leins, Christopher Culnane and Benjamin IP Rubinstein in (2020) 213(1) Medical Journal of Australia 6-8.e1 comments 

A false impression of technological panacea may see much needed interventions overlooked and may introduce unintended consequences and risks. 

In the face of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID‐19) limiting free movement, experts are scrambling to mitigate the profound impact that the disease is having on our lives. For many countries, this approach involves increased testing, isolation, and education about hygiene practices until a vaccine is found. To varying degrees, without much evidence as to their efficacy, countries are turning to technology to solve some of the current challenges. Increasingly, smartphone applications (apps) are being contemplated for tracking proximity of people to determine possible sources of transmission, with elements of technological solutionism. Such technical solutions require trust, and without honest and clear information about the possibilities and limitations of technologies, an app's benefits may be undermined by low adoption, or conversely a false impression of a technological panacea may see much needed interventions overlooked. For example, the Australian Government's target of a 40% uptake of the COVIDSafe app may or may not be effective in helping to control the disease, while 60% uptake is supported by independent modelling from the United Kingdom. Furthermore, such summary statistics do not clarify to the public the wide range of other factors and assumptions that must be considered in predicting the app's efficacy. 

Much is being written about the different technological models and whether they trace, track and comply with privacy and human rights frameworks, including whether this information can, in fact, ever be anonymised. Fully effective anonymisation is unlikely when collecting data as granular as regular interaction with others in addition to age, gender and postcode demographics, as has been demonstrated by previous attempts to de‐anonymise data. If these data are accidentally or deliberately linked with other datasets, such as births in hospitals or the public Myki public transport dataset, anonymity is virtually impossible to guarantee. Successful uptake of new technologies requires trust. When adoption is insufficient, collective benefits are not guaranteed. Civil society in the United Kingdom called for clear and comprehensive primary legislation to regulate data processing in symptom tracking and digital contact tracing applications, including with a strict purpose, access and time limitations.6 Such regulation may improve trust.

04 November 2020

CSIRO Biosecurity report

The latest CSIRO biosecurity report - Australia’sBiosecurity Future: Unlocking the next decade of resilience (2020–2030) - states

The world is currently experiencing the impact of a severe biosecurity event. Early in 2020, Australia, along with the rest of the world was hit with a virulent COVID-19 pandemic. The virus, believed to be transmitted from animals to humans, has dramatically affected individuals, communities, industry and economies. Thousands have died and thousands more have been ill. People have had to significantly change how they live and work; many businesses have disappeared, shut down or changed their operating models; and national and global economic growth has experienced a severe contraction. Full recovery is likely to take some years and until a vaccine is produced, it will be uneven and tied to the severity and frequency of new waves of infection. Australia has coped relatively well with this outbreak, but will we be sufficiently prepared to cope with the next incursions? 

Australian Governments have long acknowledged the need for a coordinated approach to biosecurity that builds on the natural protection that comes from being an island nation. However, despite significant efforts by governments, industry, not for profit organisations and various players in the community, this paper highlights the alarming fact that annual interceptions of materials that present a biosecurity risk to Australia have increased by almost 50% in the five years to 2017 to just over 37,000. If that is not sufficiently concerning, the paper highlights that the cumulative burden of yet to be eradicated or ineradicable species has also risen considerably in the last decade. 

Australia is a small but open nation which relies heavily on trade for its prosperity; it is not surprising that the number of biosecurity incursions has increased along with increases in our trade and travel. Given that these are likely to continue increasing, business as usual will ensure that the burden of biosecurity threats will only continue to escalate. 

Business as usual will ensure that the burden of biosecurity threats will only continue to escalate. 

Partnering with Animal Health Australia, Plant Health Australia and the Centre for Invasive Species Solutions, CSIRO Futures and CSIRO Health and Biosecurity have produced a succinct and plausible case for the pressing need to transform, rather than just scale up, our biosecurity system. 

Given the cost of COVID-19 to Australia, this paper is extraordinarily timely. It merits significant attention and further investigation by all those who have an interest in seeing Australia retain and improve our biosecurity status and our way of life. It is an important reminder and wakeup call that we need to set ourselves up to be able to adequately respond to the biosecurity challenges that an increasingly interconnected world is going to present to us. It is an important reminder and wakeup call that we need to set ourselves up to be able to adequately respond to the biosecurity challenges that an increasingly interconnected world is going to present to us. 

About this report

In 2014, CSIRO published ‘Australia’s Biosecurity Future: Preparing for future biological challenges’, which identified major biosecurity trends facing Australia’s biosecurity landscape, with a focus on an agricultural, environmental and marine biosecurity sector audience. Focusing on the same primary audience, this report seeks to build on the 2014 publication by describing an ideal 2030 future state and identifying actions that can be taken to get there. The report also aims to encourage discussions across government and industry around the importance of cross-disciplinary management of biosecurity risks. The report was developed collaboratively through interviews and workshops with Commonwealth and state governments, research, industry and non-government organisations (NGOs), totalling 57 individuals representing 26 organisations (see Appendix A). 

Outbreaks across biosecurity sectors are continuing to rise in volume and complexity 

Biosecurity is critical to supporting the health of Australians, their environment and the competitiveness of key industries through biosecure trade networks. While Australia has one of the strongest biosecurity systems globally, outbreaks across human, agriculture, environment and marine health are continuing to rise in volume and complexity. This is due to a range of factors including growing levels of trade and travel, urbanisation, climate change and biodiversity loss. 

Between 2012 and 2017, the annual number of interceptions of biosecurity risk materials at Australian borders rose by almost 50%, to 37,014.  Figure 1 provides an indication of the number of new incursions in Australia since 2010 as well as the growing cumulative burden created by species which have established and are yet to be eradicated or have been deemed ineradicable.  

Scaling current approaches will not be enough to mitigate these growing risks 

While the relatively consistent level of new incursions in Figure 1 is due to Australia’s strong biosecurity system, the costly ongoing management of established species coupled with the increasing risk of new incursions is placing growing strain on the system which is already experiencing resourcing challenges. While investments are being made towards some of these challenges, continuing along the ‘business as usual’ (BAU) trajectory of slow and incremental change could expose Australia to significant triple bottom line risks over the next 10 years. 

Scaling the current system through additional funding allocation will not be enough. Modelling shows that even almost tripling investment in interventions out to 2025 will still result in increased residual biosecurity risk compared to 2014–2015 levels. This suggests that the system requires more transformational change in approaches and responsibilities to generate greater efficiencies and effectiveness. 

Now is the time for a system re-think 

The COVID-19 pandemic has increased community and public awareness of the importance of biosecurity and has enhanced familiarity with broad biosecurity concepts. This presents a unique opportunity to make transformational changes to Australia’s biosecurity system while engagement levels are comparatively high. 

Preparing Australia for biosecurity resilience in 2030 will require setting nationally coordinated goals across the One Health spectrum (human, agricultural, environmental and marine health sectors). 

To assist with these discussions, this report describes potential 2030 scenarios for a ‘business as usual’ and ‘transformational’ trajectory (Figure 2). 

Pursuing the transformational trajectory will require stronger collaboration across governments, industry, research and the community. 

This report provides 20 recommendations (Figure 3) which aim to highlight priority areas for system improvement. While suggested lead stakeholder groups are provided for each recommendation, all require deeper cross-disciplinary discussions and planning. 

Recommendations fall under three themes:

  • System connectivity – Digitising processes, enhancing partnerships and greater data sharing across supply chains and the One Health sectors to facilitate market access and ensure the system is capable of understanding and managing emerging risks and established pests and diseases. 

  • Shared responsibility – Harnessing the collective knowledge and capability of citizens, communities and industries to ensure national biosecurity efforts are optimised; and that all Australians are aware of, and value, their role in managing biosecurity risks. 

  • Innovation in science and technology (S&T) – Creating national innovation platforms for developing and commercialising next-generation technologies and services that target priority biosecurity risks and can be sold globally. 

Many of these transformational shifts will take 10 years to plan and successfully implement, meaning collaborative, national action needs to be taken today. 

Business as usual trajectory 

Australia’s biosecurity system continues to face significant resourcing challenges which are compounded by more frequent pest incursions alongside human, plant and animal disease outbreaks. This harms Australia’s reputation as a biosecure trading partner and safe travel destination, which negatively impacts established industries, the environment and the economy. Australia is largely reactionary; with stakeholders sharing intelligence and investing in the system during times of crisis but less so during more stable periods. 

Transformational trajectory 

Australia is considered the most biosecure trade partner globally. This has been enabled by enhanced data sharing networks, national coordination of biosecurity activities, and investments in new technology applications; all of which have eased resourcing pressures and resulted in a system that more efficiently identifies and manages emerging risks. Engaged communities contribute to surveillance activities, reducing the risks of new incursions or spreading of existing established pests and diseases. Businesses play a greater role in the provision of biosecurity services, enabled by co-developed arrangements with government that ensure criteria around national interests are met. 

Enabling themes and recommendations for pursuing the transformational trajectory 

System connectivity 

Digitised processes and data sharing

1. Develop procedures and systems for timely biosecurity information exchange 

2. Modernise export compliance processes 

3. Optimise export protocols through regular assessment of supply chain risk reduction activities 

Domestic and international partnerships

4. Develop stronger partnerships within the national system to bolster shared responsibility 

5. Strengthen relationships with international counterparts and partners 

6. Improve pre-border clearance of imports

Shared responsibility 

Community and public engagement

7. Develop and promote a single source of biosecurity information to the public 

8. Create robust and verifiable citizen science programs to help engage and empower the public 

9. Develop biosecurity education and communication programs to build public and community awareness

Indigenous engagement

10. Make biosecurity engagement with Indigenous communities a more systemic process of the system. 

11. Empower Indigenous involvement in biosecurity through co-development of fit-for-purpose technology solutions and creation of economic opportunities 

12. Increase Indigenous representation at senior decision-making levels

Industry engagement

13. Identify the non-negotiable government conditions and industry incentives associated with privatisation of biosecurity services and activities 

14. Invest in social science research to better understand non-compliance behaviours 

15. Investigate improvements to incentivise accurate and timely biosecurity detection reporting

Innovation in S&T 

Supporting innovation 

  • 16. Set national biosecurity innovation priorities 

  • 17. Drive development, investment, commercialisation and manufacture of innovative technologies for biosecurity 

  • 18. Better integrate social, cultural and ethical considerations into the development, policy and regulation setting of new technologies

Science and technology capability 

19. Invest in pathways for the career development and training of biosecurity-relevant specialists and researchers 

20. Bolster Australia’s vaccine development capability and pipeline

Gait Biometric

In R v Crupi (Ruling No 1) [2020] VSC 654 the Victorian Supreme Court has considered the problematic gait biometric. 

The Court states 

This is a ruling about the admissibility of evidence of forensic gait analysis (FGA). Such evidence has been admitted in the UK and Canada but, to my knowledge, this is the first time its admissibility has been the subject of a ruling in Australia. 

In this instance the evidence failed the test of relevance under the Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) s 55 and is inadmissible under s 56 of that Act. 

The Court notes 

The leading case in the UK is Otway v R [2011] EWCA Crim 3. In Otway, a murder case, a podiatrist (Blake) was permitted to give FGA evidence. Forensic podiatry and CCTV analysis were key aspects of his practice. He gave evidence of the similarities between the gait of the offender, recorded on CCTV at a petrol station, and Otway’s gait, recorded on CCTV at a police station and a cell block. The gait features referred to did not include step length, step frequency or walking speed, as in the present case. See also Hashi v R [2014] EWCA Crim 1243, another murder case, where a podiatric surgeon (Francis), experienced in FGA comparative analysis, gave evidence based on CCTV footage of the similarities between the gait of the offender and Hashi’s gait. I note that the FGA expert in Hashi v R, looked for dissimilarities as well as similarities in undertaking his comparative analysis. The importance of such an approach is stressed in the recently published textbook by Haydn D Kelly, Forensic Gait Analysis (CRC Press, 2020) eg, 186. For an overview of FGA, see also The Royal Society and The Royal Society of Edinburgh ‘Forensic gait analysis: a primer for courts’ (2017). 

The leading case in Canada is R v Aitken [2012] BCCA 134. A UK podiatric surgeon (Haydn D Kelly), who since 2006 had been a researcher in FGA identification and who has given FGA evidence in the UK courts on many occasions, was permitted to give evidence that there was “a very strong likeness” between certain features of the offender’s gait and Aitken’s gait in the relevant CCTV footage. The similar features were the degree of abduction (toe-out gait) and eversion (inward foot rolling). Professor Gary Edmond, of the School of Law at the University of New South Wales, discusses Aitken v R, Otway v R , and Haydn D Kelly in an article highly critical of the lack of scientific rigour of FGA: see Edmond & Cunliffe, 'Cinderella Story: The Social Production of a Forensic Science' 106 J Crim. L. & Criminology 219 (2016).