28 May 2021

LGBTIQ Kids

'Is the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child Doing Enough to Protect the Rights of LGBT Children and Children with Same-Sex Parents?' by  Paula Gerber and Aaron Timoshanko in (2021) Human Rights Law Review comments

 Children often face discrimination, bullying and even violence because of their sexual orientation or gender identity, as do children raised by parents who are lesbian, gay, bisexual or transgender (LGBT). This article considers what the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child is doing to protect the rights of LGBT children and children with LGBT parents. To make such an assessment, this article critically analyses the Committee’s Concluding Observations over a 10-year period, its General Comments and its Views on Individual Communications. The conclusion reached is that while the Committee has made encouraging progress in recent years when it comes to addressing LGBT related issues, there is still room for improvement in the way the Committee seeks to protect children from discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity. 

 The authors argue 

 Lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (‘LGBT’) children and children with LGBT parents can face significant challenges growing up in a heteronormative world. LGBT children, and children being raised by same-sex parents, especially in their adolescent years, are likely to experience higher rates of discrimination, bullying and violence, particularly in the school environment. The school playground is often the first place that children experience the hurt and humiliation that comes from not conforming to heteronormative standards. A United Kingdom study in 2007 found that 65 per cent of lesbian, gay and bisexual students had been bullied at school due to their sexual orientation, with more than a quarter also being physically abused. Outside of the UK, LGBT students experience similar levels of abuse. As a result of homophobic and transphobic bullying, LGBT students can experience a ‘loss of confidence, low self-esteem, anxiety, depression and social isolation, and it can often result in reduced school attendance, early school dropout, and poorer academic performance and achievement’, which can have long lasting consequences for the child. At times, LGBT children and children with same-sex parents are also refused admission to, or are expelled from, school due to their sexual orientation or gender identity (‘SOGI’), or that of their parents. 

Because of the discrimination they face, LGBT children are at higher risk of developing problems with alcohol and substance abuse, when they reach adolescence.10 LGBT children are also vulnerable to involuntary or coercive sexual orientation change efforts (commonly referred to as ‘conversion therapy’), which may cause ‘treatment-related anxiety, suicidal ideation, depression, impotence, and relationship dysfunction.’ LGBT youth also face increased risk of homelessness if they are rejected by their parents because of their SOGI. Once on the streets, LGBT youth are more vulnerable to sexual exploitation, abuse and risky sexual behaviours, which may increase their chances of contracting a sexually transmitted disease. LGBT youth are also at a significantly higher risk of suicide. Approximately 30 per cent of LGBT youth around the age of 15 have attempted suicide, with suicide the leading cause of death among gay and lesbian adolescents in the United States. The disproportionately high rate of suicide among LGBT youth is not due to their SOGI, but rather, the persistent discrimination, harassment and social exclusion they experience. 

Bisexual youth may face biphobia, which is ‘prejudice, fear or hatred directed toward bisexual people’ and/or ‘bi erasure’, in which bisexual people are ‘excluded or rendered invisible’ in the LGBT community.  Transgender children experience their gender differently to their biological sex. 

There are limitations associated with using an acronym, like LGBT, to reflect the rich diversity of individuals’ lived experiences, which can be lost with the use of the ‘umbrella’ term, LGBT. Specifically, it encourages the perception that the LGBT community is homogenous and susceptible to a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach. Whilst acknowledging these limitations, LGBT is still the most appropriate term to use in this research, since it is one of the terms consistently used by the United Nations (‘UN’) Committee on the Rights of the Child (‘Committee’) and is widely used in scholarly literature. ... 

 There has been little scholarly attention paid to the work of the Committee in relation to LGBT children and children with same-sex parents. Indeed, there appears to have been only five studies that relate to the rights of LGBT children under the Convention on the Rights of the Child (‘CRC’), and none of them involved any empirical analysis of the Committee’s work relating to LGBT children and children with same-sex parents. This article seeks to make a modest contribution to filling this gap. This article analyses the major outputs of the Committee, including Concluding Observations (from 1 January 2010 to 1 January 2020), General Comments and Views on Individual Communications, in order to assess the extent to which the Committee is promoting and protecting the rights of LGBT children and children with same-sex parents. This analysis reveals that while the Committee’s awareness of SOGI issues is growing, there is still room for improvement. 

Part 2 of the article begins with an examination of the historical context of the CRC. This helps to explain why the Committee has been slow to consider the vulnerability of LGBT children and children with same-sex parents. This historical analysis is followed by a critique of the text of CRC, in order to identify the provisions that are most relevant to a consideration of the rights of LGBT children and children with same-sex parents. Part 3 reviews the Committee’s Concluding Observations, noting the Committee’s increasing use of SOGI terminology and a greater level of precision when using different terms. This indicates a growing awareness and sensitivity by the Committee to the rights of LGBT children and children with same-sex parents. Nevertheless, the Committee’s work in this space would be improved by refraining from ‘bundling’ minorities together, when making recommendations. 

Part 4 examines the 25 General Comments published by the Committee, to determine the extent to which issues relating to LGBT children and children with same-sex parents have been addressed. This analysis reveals that LGBT related issues were briefly discussed by the Committee in its General Comments in 2003 and then not again until 2011. Since that time, both the quantity and quality of the Committee’s engagement with LGBT issues has improved. However, there is still significant scope for improvement, and this is highlighted in the comparison of levels of engagement of other UN treaty committees with these issues in their General Comments. Part 5 examines the Committee’s Views on Individual Communications. As the Committee has only had the power to receive complaints alleging violations of the CRC since April 2014, and there are only 46 State Parties to this latest Optional Protocol, it is not surprising that there have only been 39 Views published by the Committee. None of these communications related to the rights of LGBT children or children with same-sex parents. 

The conclusions are set out in Part 6, along with recommendations for how the Committee could better promote and protect the rights of LGBT children and children with same-sex parents.

Data Protection

'Comparing Constitutional Privacy and Data Protection Rights within the EU' (University of Cambridge Faculty of Law Research Paper No. 21/2021) by David Erdos comments 

Although both data protection and the right to privacy (or respect for private life) are recognised within the EU Charter, they are otherwise generally seen as having very different constitutional histories. The right of privacy is often seen as traditional and data protection as novel. Based on a comprehensive analysis of rights within EU State constitutions, it is found that this distinction is overdrawn. Only five current EU States recognised a constitutional right to privacy prior to 1990, although approximately three quarters and also the European Convention do so today. Subsidiary constitutional rights related to the home and correspondence but not honour and/or reputation are more long-standing and this helps link the core of privacy to the protection of intimacy. Constitutional rights to data protection emerged roughly contemporaneously and were often linked to a general right to privacy but are still only found in around half of EU States. There is also no clear consensus on specific guarantees, although around half of the States which recognise these do include rights to transparency and a slightly lower number right to rectification. This could suggest that data subject empowerment over a wide range of connected information is an important emerging particularity tied to data protection as a constitutional guarantee.

25 May 2021

DTC Genomics and Blockchain

'Envisioning the FTC as a Facilitator of Blockchain Technology Adoption in the Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing Industry' by Noah Spector in (2021) 23 Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment and Technology Law 679 comments 

Seemingly overnight, the kingpins of the direct-to-consumer genetic testing (DTC-GT) industry shifted their focus from exploring their customers’ DNA to commodifying it. Companies like Ancestry or 23andMe that were once exclusively known as mere sources of “infotainment” now regularly sell consenting customers’ genetic data to pharmaceutical researchers or use it to develop drugs of their own. To gain these customers’ consent, both firms employ a series of long, complex clickwrap contracts that largely fail to apprise their readers of the potential risks of sharing their genetic data. Nor do these agreements provide any form of compensation to those consumers whose data ultimately facilitates the development of a new, profitable drug. 

Understandably, the relative autonomy major DTC-GT firms wield over their customers’ genetic information—and the manner in which that autonomy is gained—raises serious privacy and bioethical concerns. More directly, it reflects a stark lack of federal oversight of the data management and storage practices of the DTC-GT industry as a whole. The emerging patchwork of state consumer privacy laws—while certainly more robust than any existing federal legislation—likewise falls short in fully protecting the privacy and dignitary interests of the DTC-GT consumers whose genetic data is shared and mined for profit. 

This is not to say that DTC-GT consumers should be uniformly prohibited from contributing their genetic data to medicinal research. Such behavior should be encouraged to the extent this information can be transferred and stored securely. Nevertheless, the current exploitation of consumer data by major DTC-GT firms may, over the long term, inhibit medicinal progress by undermining demand for genetic testing and, thus, the pool of genetic data available for research. Accordingly, consumers and researchers alike would benefit from a more secure and equitable method of exchanging genetic information. 

This Note argues that the recent advent of “blockchain genomics”—a form of exchange that allows consumers to securely loan out their genetic information for research purposes in return for compensation—fits that bill. With mainstream DTC-GT firms unlikely to adopt such a system and no legislative solution on the horizon, this Note further suggests a role for the FTC, the country’s de facto privacy regulator, to nudge major DTC-GT firms in that direction by exercising various tools of its soft regulatory authority.

14 May 2021

Surfers

'Can Surfers Have Traditional Knowledge Intellectual Property?' by Todd Berry and Charles Lawson in (2021) 8(2) Griffith Journal of Law & Human Dignity comments 

 Various international agreements address traditional knowledge (TK), Indigenous Peoples and local communities. A distinction exists between the traditional knowledge of Indigenous Peoples and the traditional knowledge of local communities. The World Intellectual Property Organisation’s (WIPO) Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore (IGC) is negotiating a text in anticipation of a Diplomatic Conference to agree on binding obligations about TK distinguishing between the TK of Indigenous Peoples and local communities. This article reports on a pilot study assessing the TK of the surfing community of the Gold Coast, Australia in the context of a local community’s TK. Through semi-structured interviews of surfers and non-surfers the following hypotheses were tested: (1) that surfers exist as a local community; and (2) as a local community, surfers have special forms of knowledge and practices particular to their local community that might be characterised as TK. The results of this pilot study show that surfers are a local community and that they do have special forms of knowledge and practices that might be characterised as TK. If this is the intended reach of WIPO’s new form of intellectual property, then this will extend well into the economies of developed countries.

12 May 2021

Privacy

'Comparing Constitutional Privacy and Data Protection Rights within the EU' by David Erdos comments 

Although both data protection and the right to privacy (or respect for private life) are recognised within the EU Charter, they are otherwise generally seen as having very different constitutional histories. The right of privacy is often seen as traditional and data protection as novel. Based on a comprehensive analysis of rights within EU State constitutions, it is found that this distinction is overdrawn. Only five current EU States recognised a constitutional right to privacy prior to 1990, although approximately three quarters and also the European Convention do so today. Subsidiary constitutional rights related to the home and correspondence but not honour and/or reputation are more long-standing and this helps link the core of privacy to the protection of intimacy. Constitutional rights to data protection emerged roughly contemporaneously and were often linked to a general right to privacy but are still only found in around half of EU States. There is also no clear consensus on specific guarantees, although around half of the States which recognise these do include rights to transparency and a slightly lower number right to rectification. This could suggest that data subject empowerment over a wide range of connected information is an important emerging particularity tied to data protection as a constitutional guarantee.

'Outsourcing Privacy' by Ari Ezra Waldman in (2021) 96 Notre Dame Law Review comments 

An underappreciated part of the narrative of privacy managerialism—and the focus of this Essay—is the information industry’s increasing tendency to outsource privacy compliance responsibilities to technology vendors. In the last three years alone, the International Association of Privacy Professionals has identified more than 250 companies in the privacy technology vendor market. These companies market their products as tools to help companies comply with new privacy laws like the General Data Protection Regulation, with consent orders from the Federal Trade Commission, and with other privacy rules from around the world. They do so by building compliance templates, pre-completed assessment forms, and monitoring consents, among many other things. As such, many of these companies are doing far more than helping companies identify the data they have or answer data access requests; many of them are instantiating their own definitions and interpretations of complex privacy laws into the technologies they create and doing so only with managerial values in mind. This undermines privacy law in four ways: it creates asymmetry between large technology companies and their smaller competitors, it makes privacy law underinclusive by limiting it to those requirements that can be written into code, it erodes expertise by outsourcing human work to artificial intelligence and automated systems, and it creates a “black box” that undermines accountability.

Citizenship

'A Doctrinal and Feminist Analysis of the Constitutionality of the Australian Citizenship Revocation Laws' by Matilda Gillis in (2020) 41(2) Adelaide Law Review 449 comments 

This article examines the Australian Citizenship Amendment (Allegiance to Australia) Act 2015 (Cth) (the ‘2015 Amendment Act’) and the Australian Citizenship Amendment (Citizenship Cessation Act) 2020 (Cth) (the ‘2020 Amendment Act’) (together, the ‘Citizenship Revocation Laws’). These Amendment Acts significantly extended the ways in which the Commonwealth government could deprive dual citizens of their Australian citizenship. This article argues that a classic doctrinal analysis of the Citizenship Revocation Laws does not give a clear answer as to their constitutionality. Rather, it results in two plausible but opposite outcomes. This article contends that this leaves space for other interpretive pathways and accordingly argues that a feminist approach could provide some useful guidance on the questions of constitutionality under consideration here. This feminist analysis suggests both that the 2015 Amendment Act and 2020 Amendment Act should be considered unconstitutional and, more generally, that Australian citizenship is inviolable.

Gillis argues

On 3 December 2015, the Commonwealth government passed the Australian Citizenship Amendment (Allegiance to Australia) Act 2015 (Cth) (the ‘2015 Amendment Act’) which amended the Australian Citizenship Act 2007 (Cth) (the ‘Citizenship Act’) and vastly extended the ways in which dual citizens could lose their Australian citizenship. In so doing, the government framed citizenship as a ‘responsibility’ not a ‘right’, and defined the concept of ‘allegiance’ narrowly. On 17 September 2020, the Australian Citizenship Amendment (Citizenship Cessation) Act 2020 (the ‘2020 Amendment Act’) was enacted, which replaced the ‘operation of law’ revocation of citizenship model in the 2015 Amendment Act with a citizenship deprivation model based on ministerial discretion. The 2015 amendments were passed with the support of both sides of Parliament, and with supporting polls from the Australian public, while the 2020 amendments received little public attention in the first place. Questions, however, still remain as to the limits on the Commonwealth government’s power to remove Australian citizenship. 

This article examines what those limits, if there are any, might be. It first sets out the legal and normative conceptions of Australian citizenship and the effect of the Citizenship Revocation Laws on those conceptions. It then undertakes a doctrinal analysis of the constitutionality of those laws and demonstrates that a traditional constitutional analysis, drawing upon principles of statutory interpretation and legal precedent, does not provide adequate guidance in determining the Commonwealth government’s power to withdraw citizenship. A comprehensive review of, and justification for, the application of a feminist approach is not possible here. Instead, this article in turn puts forward the suggestion that a conceptual and historically-based feminist analysis of the issue, drawing on different and diverse branches of feminism, can help both to clarify the nature and existence of constitutional limits and provisionally support a conclusion that Australian citizenship is inviolable. If this conclusion is correct, then citizenship becomes an inappropriate target for government to manipulate in formulating the nation’s strategic and legislative plans. 

There is an argument increasingly made that many areas of law can appropriately be subjected to a feminist method and critique, while remaining both ‘authentic’ and ‘legally plausible’, within mainstream thinking. The matter of citizenship deprivation has not yet been considered from a feminist perspective, despite such laws being increasingly commonplace around the world, and despite feminism’s traditional concern with and critique of citizenship matters. This article attempts to rectify this.

09 May 2021

Ink and Cultural Appropriation

'Whitmill v Warner Bros. and the Visibility of Cultural Appropriation Claims in Copyright Law' by Marie Hadley in (2020) 42(4) European Intellectual Property Review 23-229 comments 

The Māori-inspired tattoo at the heart of the copyright infringement case of Whitmill v Warner Bros. has attracted allegations of cultural appropriation in Aotearoa/New Zealand. An examination of the Māori cultural appropriation claim that surrounds the tattoo and its invisibility throughout the Whitmill v Warner Bros. legal proceedings, shows how the legal system does not receive Indigenous cultural claims over the cultural imagery and arts styles that inspires outsider imagery as an intellectual property interest.

Hadley's 'Historical Contingency of Cultural Appropriation: Government Order No. 7 (1831) and the Trade in Mokamokai' in (2021) 8(1) Law & History explores 

the historical contingency of cultural appropriation. A close study of the trade in preserved tattooed Māori heads (‘mokamokai’) and the law that regulated the trade between Aotearoa New Zealand and New South Wales – Government Order no. 7 (1831) – is used to reflect upon the nature of intercultural consumption. The conditions under which the retail trade in mokamokai developed and thrived are considered. It is argued that the historical demand for mokamokai is characterised by an oppressive appreciation of cultural difference, and the trade’s supply by Māori revealing of local agency and political acumen. Studying the production, consumption, and regulation of culture in a specific historical site offers insight into the intersection of commercial imperatives, problematic social dynamics, and local practices, furthering understanding of cultural appropriation as a form of unauthorised cultural engagement.