12 October 2021

Sovereign Stupidity

Another sovereign citizen aka pseudolegal claim, this time considered in Reiman v Commissioner of Police [2021] QDC 242 - 

 [1] On 26 May 2020, the appellant, who did not hold a driver’s licence, was driving an unregistered and uninsured car without number plates on the Tully Mission Beach Road. Police activated their siren. The appellant stopped her car, which remained partly on the roadway. Police asked her to move the car because its position was unsafe, so that they could speak to her about the absence of licence plates, and check if her car was registered. The appellant refused to move the car off the road and to get out of the car, despite direction to do so. More police were called and arrived. The appellant eventually got out of the car. In the course of speaking with a police officer, the appellant threw a bottle of iced coffee towards him. The liquid in the bottle hit him and another officer. 

[2] From that incident, the appellant was charged with seven offences. 

[3] After a summary trial in the Magistrates Court at Tully on 5 March 2021, the appellant was convicted of six of the seven charges. ... 

[5] The appellant appeared on her own behalf in the court below and on appeal. 

[6] The notice of appeal listed the following grounds of appeal: • “No due process • Error in fact of law • No binding contract • No evidence of jurisdiction • Affidavit not accepted as evidence”. 

[7] Based upon the appellant’s oral submissions (which were at times difficult to understand) and documents, the issues in the appeal can be summarised as follows:

1. lack of jurisdiction: the appellant contends that she is not subject to any Queensland government statutes or proceedings, that the police acted without authority or jurisdiction, that she is not required to hold a driver’s licence, and the car she was driving is not required to be registered or insured under a statutory insurance scheme; 

2. lack of procedural fairness: the appellant contends that she was denied a fair trial; and 

3. provocation and self defence: the appellant contends that with respect to charges 6 and 7 (the two charges of serious assault police), the learned Magistrate erred in her consideration of the defences of provocation and self defence.

[8] For the reasons that follow, the appeal should be dismissed. 

Nature of appeal 

[9] The applicable principles for the hearing of such an appeal are not in dispute. To succeed, the appellant must demonstrate that the decision the subject of the appeal is the result of some legal, factual or discretionary error. 

[10] The appeal is by way of rehearing on the evidence before the Magistrate (and any other evidence introduced with leave of this court) rather than a hearing de novo. The court must consider each of the grounds of appeal having regard to the evidence and to determine for itself the facts of the case and the legal consequences that follow from such findings. [ 

11] The rehearing requires this court to conduct a ‘real review’ of the evidence before the Magistrate and of the Magistrate’s reasons to determine whether they have erred in fact or law. Whilst this does not involve a rehearing of the evidence of witnesses, the court has the power to draw inferences from primary facts, including facts not disputed and findings of fact. 

[12] If, after conducting the necessary review, I am satisfied of the guilt of the appellant, it is appropriate to dismiss the appeal. 

Summary of the evidence at trial 

[13] The prosecution called three police witnesses, and tendered various evidentiary certificates as well as the recordings of the police officers’ body-worn cameras. 

[14] The appellant elected to give evidence. With respect to charges 3, 4 and 5, she did not dispute that she was driving the car, that she did not hold a driver’s licence and that the car was unregistered. The appellant asserted that she was not required to be licenced, and that the car was not required to be registered or insured, for the reasons set out under the lack of jurisdiction ground below. 

[15] With respect to charges 6 and 7, the appellant’s evidence was to the effect that Officer Tamblyn had provoked her by knocking her cigarette out of her mouth to the ground, and that her actions in throwing the contents of the iced coffee bottle at him were justified in self defence. 

[16] I deal with each of the grounds of appeal below. 

Lack of jurisdiction ground 

[17] For this ground, the appellant’s oral and written submissions, and the documents she sought to rely upon, included the following statements:

1. “I, Yvette Terese, the affiant, am not a Legal Fiction Person nor a Corporate Entity or some kind of Partnership, BUT INSTEAD am a living breathing, sovereign, flesh and blood Human Being with a living soul, with a distinct Mind is capable of possessing Knowledge”; 

2. “I am a woman, a living woman. I am not dead or lost at sea. I stand under the jurisdiction of my flag[6]”; 

3. the appellant had renounced any “contract” or “agreement” with any government agency or entity; 

4. “slavery and peonage are immoral and fraud, misrepresentation, nondisclosure, intimidation, deceit, concealment of material fact, lying, and treachery are morally wrong”; 

5. the appellant had “absolutely no desire whatsoever to be a “client” (slave) of any governmental agency, state or federal”; 

6. the appellant had “unalienable/inalienable indefeasible rights to life, liberty, freedom and property”.

 [18] Despite the appellant’s apparently strongly held belief otherwise, none of these repeated incantations have any relevant legal effect. 

[19] The appellant also submitted that:

1. she did not recognise Queensland as a jurisdiction of the Commonwealth of Australia and she is not subject to the statutory laws and jurisdiction of the State of Queensland, because laws were created by God, in the Bible, upheld by the Magna Carta and reflected in the constitution, and because of the operation of s 109 of the Commonwealth Act 1901; 

2. the police acted without lawful authority; 

3. the Magistrates Court and District Court are unlawful and have no jurisdiction over her; 4. persons interacting with her must produce evidence of their lawful authority and pay a fee of “four-hundred-thousand dollars credit in gold or silver”; 

5. she was travelling under her “inalienable right” under the Magna Carta and ss 51 and 92 of the Commonwealth Constitution; 

6. the police were committing “war crimes” under the Geneva Convention; 

7. when arrested she was “kidnapped” and falsely imprisoned.

 [20] Despite contending that the District Court lacked jurisdiction and was a fraud, when invited to discontinue her appeal, the appellant declined to do so. 

[21] It is unnecessary to answer every incomprehensible contention raised by the appellant when the unremarkable proposition that she is bound by the statutory law of Queensland is a complete answer to all her claims under this ground. 

[22] Her submissions are misconceived and devoid of merit. The jurisdictional arguments raised by the appellant have been considered and rejected in other cases. Just a few examples will suffice. 

[23] The argument as to the effect of Magna Carta and its supposed inconsistency with State legislation has been dealt with in a number of cases, the general thrust of which is that it is wrong to suppose that local legislation may not be made in conflict with the Magna Carta : “an applicable enactment, whether Queensland, Commonwealth or Imperial is capable in law of repealing Magna Carta either completely or to the extent that it is inconsistent with that enactment.” 

[24] The appellant’s arguments were similar to those advanced unsuccessfully in Hubner v Erbacher [2004] QDC 345. I respectfully adopt the analysis of White DCJ at [10]-[17] in which he concluded that the appellant, as a resident of Queensland, was subject to the laws of Queensland, including those relating to vehicle registration, compulsory third party insurance, driver licensing and number plates.

The judgment in Huber states

 [1] On 25 June 2003 the appellant was convicted in the Magistrates court at Atherton of the following offences:- 1. That on the 28th day October 2002 at Yungaburra in the Magistrates Court District of Cairns in the State of Queensland he used on a road namely Gordonvale-Atherton Road, Yungaburra, a vehicle namely a motor car which was not a registered vehicle contrary to s 10 of the Transport Operations (Road Use Management – Vehicle Registration) Regulation 1999. 2 2. That on the 27th day of October 2002 in the Magistrates Court District of Cairns in the State of Queensland he without reasonable excuse had in his possession a thing that purported to be but was not a number plate. The appellant appeals to the District Court against his conviction for these offences. ... Ultimately His Worship proceeded on the basis that the appellant pleaded not guilty to the charges. The prosecutor called evidence from two police officers, Sgt Daniel John Erbacher and Sen Const Paul John Morley. Evidence was also given by Maureen Bridget Forsayth, an officer of the Queensland Transport Department. 

[3] Sgt Erbacher and Sen const Morley gave evidence that they were performing road patrols on the Gillies Highway between Yungaburra and Atherton. The evidence was that the road was also known as the Gordonvale-Atherton Road. At about 2.10 in the afternoon the officers intercepted a Ford F250 utility which was being driven by the appellant. The officers noticed, attached to the vehicle, what appeared to be a number plate bearing the numbers 351-F250. It had the letters AUS printed down the side of the number plate and the words “HM ELECTORS PARLIAMENT QUEENSLAND” printed underneath the number. Const Morley asked the appellant to produce his driver’s licence which he did and which confirmed the appellant’s identity. Const Morley asked the appellant where he had obtained the number plate and he responded that he had bought them from a friend in Victoria for $400.00. Morley also noticed that there was not a Queensland Transport registration sticker attached to the vehicle and when asked why, the appellant replied that he did not need a registration sticker because it is his right under the Constitution and the Magna Carta 1215 and he believed he did not need one. Const Morley seized the registration plates and they were tendered to the Court. The evidence was that the appellant’s home address was Park Avenue, Yungaburra. That is consistent with all of the appeal documents filed by the respondent. 

[4] Sgt Erbacher gave evidence that the following day, 28 October 2002, he and Morley were again on patrol on the Gillies Highway near its intersection with Marks Lane. At about 12.30 pm they intercepted the same orange Ford F250 model utility which they had seen the day before and they again observed the appellant to be the driver. When asked to explain, the appellant once again asserted that according to the Magna Carta and the Constitution he was not obliged to have the vehicle registered. 

[5] Maureen Forsayth gave evidence of having searched the Queensland Transport records. She ascertained that the orange Ford F250 utility had previously been registered to the appellant but that the registration expired on 31 July 2002. 

[6] The appellant did not give evidence at the trial and nor did he attempt in any way to dispute the factual evidence given by the prosecution witnesses. In fact, he specifically told His Worship that what the prosecution witnesses had said in evidence was true (T 44 L50). 

[7] As to the first offence of which the appellant was convicted s 10 of the Transport Operations (Road Use Management – Vehicle Registration) Regulation 1999 provides as follows:- 

“A person must not use or permit to be used on a road a vehicle that is not a registered vehicle unless – (thereafter the section contains some exceptions, none of which are suggested to apply in the present case). Maximum penalty – 80 penalty units.”

Relevantly, s 5 of the Regulation provides as follows:-

“(1) In this regulation a vehicle is taken to be a registered vehicle if it has current registration under this regulation. (2) In this regulation a vehicle is taken to be an unregistered vehicle if – (a) It has no current registration under this regulation because – ... (ii) it has had registration under this regulation but the registration has expired or been cancelled and (b) Nothing in this regulation permits its use on a road whether or not under limited circumstances.”

On the undisputed evidence the appellant’s vehicle was not a registered vehicle within the meaning of s 5. The fact and place of its use was not disputed. Therefore the appellant was clearly guilty of the offence charged. 

[8] As to the second offence s 76 of the Regulation provides as follows:-

“(1) A person must not, unless the person has a reasonable excuse – make, sell or have in the person’s possession anything that purports to be but is not a registration certificate, registration label, number place or permit. Maximum penalty – 40 penalty units.”

The appellant had the offending number plate attached to his vehicle as if it were a number plate issued pursuant to the Regulation. There can be no doubt that it was not a number plate and by reason of the manner of its use it purported to be a number plate. The appellant offered no reasonable excuse for having it in his possession. He was therefore guilty of the second offence.

[9] As I have said the appellant did not in any way attempt to dispute the prosecution evidence. He accepted that the evidence put forward in the prosecution case was true. Rather, in the court below and on appeal, he directed his arguments towards demonstrating that either the relevant regulation was not a valid law or that other legal rights, which he claimed to have, prevailed over such law. Some of the rights/freedoms which he asserted either in the court below and/or on appeal are as follows:-

(a) Freedom of conscience. (b) Freedom of belief. (c) Right to exercise free will. (d) Freedom of movement. (e) Right of passage on a public road. (f) Right of renunciation. (g) Right of privacy. (h) Rights as an elector.  (i) Right to be empanelled as a juror. (j) Right to form political unions. (k) A common law right to register his vehicle with the entity of his choice. (l) A duty to uphold the teachings of Jesus Christ. (m) Right of peaceful protest. (n) Rights under the Magna Carta 1215. (o) Rights under the Australian Constitution.

[10] What the appellant seems to have conveniently overlooked or failed to appreciate is that there is a hierarchy of laws. The supreme laws so far as Queensland and people within the State of Queensland are concerned, are the laws of the Commonwealth Parliament enacted pursuant to the provisions of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act and the laws enacted by the Queensland Parliament pursuant to the Constitution Act of 1867 as amended (the Constitution of the State of Queensland). I am indebted to Chesterman J for his judgment in the Court of appeal case of Carnes v Essenberg & Ors 1999 QCA 339 (23 August 1999). In that case the appellant was convicted in the Magistrates Court at Kingaroy for offences against s 50 of the Weapons Act. In that case the appellant relied expressly on the provisions of Magna Carta. However, the reasoning which applied to the Magna Carta applies equally to any other rights which may be asserted on the basis of the common law, natural law, the Bill of rights 1688 or any other claimed source of freedom or legal right. His Honour said:- 

“Mr Essenberg has two points. He maintains that Magna Carta was and remains a pre-eminent source of legal obligation binding on all courts and governments and that any subsequent developments of legal principle or enactments of parliament that have occurred in the last 800 years that might be thought to have diminished the force of Magna Carta are invalid. By its terms he claimed a right to trial by jury. But the proceedings brought against him for contravention of the Weapons Act were simple offences prosecuted before a Magistrate. Mr Essenberg has a second point. He claims that by the Bill of Rights 1688 he as a citizen has a right to bear arms suitable for his defence. He asserts that that right also remains untouched by 300 years of legal and political development. He argues that the Weapons Act is invalid because it takes away that right. Magna Carta formed part of the system of imperial laws which apply to the colonies of eastern Australian on their settlement. So did the Bill of Rights. The historical importance and the influence on the constitutional development in English speaking countries of those two enactments are profound. However it is completely inaccurate to say that colonial parliaments or indeed the Parliament of Westminster could not alter, modify or even repeal the provisions of centuries old legislation.

The Australian Courts Act 1828 was enacted by the imperial parliament to allow for the establishment of an organised judiciary in the colonies and to facilitate the making of local laws. Section 24 provided that – “All laws and statutes in force within the realm of England at the time of the passing of this Act shall be 5 applied in the administration of justice in the Courts of New South Wales so far as the same can be applied within the said colonies and it shall be lawful that the governors of the said colonies respectively with the advice of legislative councils of the said colonies to make and establish such limitations and modifications of any such laws and statutes as may be deemed expedient.” The Australian Courts Act became part of the law of Queensland upon its separate establishment in 1859. It may be noted also that the Colonial Laws on Validity Act 1865 was passed by the Imperial Parliament to remove doubts about the extent to which Australian colonial parliaments could alter Imperial legislation as it applied to the colonies. As Dr Lumb points out in his work on the Constitution of the Australian States, the result of that Act was that no colonial law was void on the ground that it was repugnant to the fundamental principles of English law. The matter is made even more explicit by s 3(2) of the Australia Act 1986 which provides that no law and no provision of any law made after that Act by the Parliament of the State shall be void or inoperative on the ground that it is repugnant to the laws of England or to the provisions of an existing or future Act of Parliament of the United Kingdom. The supremacy of parliament to make laws contrary to what had been the common law is expressly recognised by the courts. It is enough to refer to the decision of the High Court in Kable v The Director of Public Prosecutions 189 CLR 51 at pp 73-74 in the judgment of Justice Dawson. His Honour pointed out that that champion of the common law Chief Justice Coke had, in his institute of the laws of England in the early 17th century accepted that Magna Carta could be altered by English Parliament. Indeed he referred to Bills of Attainder which allowed for trial contrary to Magna Carta as being lawful enactments. Justice Dawson went on:-

“Judicial pronouncements confirming the supremacy of parliament are rare but their scarcity is testimony to the complete acceptance by the courts that an Act of Parliament is binding upon them and it cannot be questioned by reference to principles of a more fundamental kind.”

The passage goes on and concludes:-

“There can be no doubt that Parliamentary supremacy is a basic principle of the legal system which has been inherited in this country from the United Kingdom.”

That is enough to dispose of the arguments that Magna Carta and the Bill of Rights are untouchable and unalterable sources of private rights or immunities. The Criminal Code and the Justices Act of Queensland have changed the manner in which prosecutions may be brought. The Weapons Act has abrogated the right of citizens to go armed in public.” 

[11] The law making powers of the Legislative Assembly of the State of Queensland are contained in s 9 of the Constitution Act 1867 and still apply. That power is “to make laws for the peace, welfare and good government of the colony in all cases whatsoever”. These words have traditionally been used to confer “the widest legislative powers appropriate to a sovereign”. See Ibralebbe v The Queen 1964 AC 900 at 923 and Union Steamship Co of Australia Pty Ltd v King (1998) 166 CLR 1 at 9-10. They have been held to admit of no inquiry by the courts as to whether as a matter of fact or law a particular statute is or is not a prudent exercise of the power or is calculated to attain its particular end or object. See Reil v The Queen (1885) 10 Appeal Cases 673 at 678. 

[12] The Parliament of Queensland passed the Transport Operations (Road Use Management) Act 1995. The Act received Royal Assent on 5 April 1995. All provisions of that Act had commenced by 1 July 1995. 

[13] Section 171 of the Act so far as is relevant provides as follows:-

“(1) The Governor-in-Council may make regulations under this Act. (2) A regulation may be made prescribing offences for a contravention of a regulation and fixing a maximum penalty of not more than 80 penalty units for a contravention.”

Sections 146, 147, 148, 149, 150 and subsection 171(3) give the Governor-in-council power to make regulations covering an enormously wide area of subject matter. In my view there is no doubt that the Transport Operations (Road Use Management – Vehicle Registration) Regulation 1999 was within the regulatory power given to the Governor-in-Council by the provisions of the Act. The regulation was made by the Governor-in-Council on 30 September 1999 and notified in the Government Gazette of 1 October 1999. All of the original provisions commenced by 1 January 2000. The terms of s 10 and s 76 of the Regulation which I have set out above were in force at the time of the incidents giving rise to the offences with which the appellant was charged. Subject to the provisions of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act the provisions of the Transport Operations (Road Use Management – Vehicle Registration) Regulation 1999 was a valid regulation enacted pursuant to the legislative power of the Queensland Parliament and prevails over all common law or other rights and freedoms to the extent that they are inconsistent therewith. To adopt the words of Chesterman J, the Act and Regulation abrogated any rights which the appellant may have previously had. 

[14] I turn now to the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act. Section 4 of the Australian Constitution preserves the law making powers of the State Parliaments subject to the provisions of the Constitution. Section 52 of the Australian Constitution provides for a list of exclusive powers of the Commonwealth Parliament. They did not include the power to make laws in relation to transport operations and road use management. Chapter V of the Australian Constitution deals specifically with the States and preserves the constitution of each of the States. 

[15] The appellant sought to rely on certain sections of the Australian Constitution; I will deal with them briefly in turn. Section 92 of the Constitution provides, so far as is relevant:-

“On the imposition of uniform duties of customs, trade, commerce and intercourse among the States whether by means of internal carriage or ocean navigation shall be absolutely free.”

There is nothing inconsistent with the provisions of the Act and Regulation and s 92 of the Australian Constitution. The provisions of the Act and Regulation dealing with transport operations and road use management and vehicle registration within the State of Queensland having nothing whatsoever to do with trade, commerce and intercourse amongst the States. 

[16] Section 116 of the Australian Constitution provides as follows:-

“The Commonwealth shall not make any law for establishing any religion or for imposing any religious observance or for prohibiting the free exercise of any religion and no religious test shall be required as a qualification for any office or public trust under the Commonwealth.”

Firstly, the Queensland Acts are not laws purportedly made by the Commonwealth. Secondly, the Act and Regulation have nothing to do with religion. 

[17] Section 117 of the Australian Constitution provides as follows:-

“A subject of the Queen resident in any State shall not be subject in any other State to any disability or discrimination which would not be equally applicable to him if he were a subject of the Queen resident in such other State.”

In my view this section has no application. Mr Hubner is a resident in Queensland, the relevant laws which he purports to attack are not the laws of any other State, they are the laws of Queensland.

Cheating Sites

Whack a mole? Tertiary Education Quality and Standards Agency v Telstra Corporation Ltd [2021] FCA 1202 comments

1 The applicant, the Tertiary Education Quality and Standards Agency (TEQSA), seeks orders pursuant to s 127A of the Tertiary Education Quality and Standards Agency Act 2011 (Cth) (TEQSA Act) requiring the respondent carriage service providers (CSPs) to take steps to disable access to the online locations at the following domain names: ‘assignmenthelp4you.com’ and ‘assignmenthelp2u.com’, and the associated Uniform Resource Locators (URLs) and Internet Protocol (IP) addresses identified in the amended originating application and Schedule A to the amended concise statement (together, the Online Locations). 

2 The Online Locations (which appear to be operated by a person or persons located in India) are websites which are, or were, accessible to internet users (including in Australia) at the URLs, domain names, and the IP addresses specified in Schedule A to the amended concise statement. The Online Locations advertise or publish an advertisement to students undertaking courses of study offered by various Australian higher education providers, and offer services which include assignment, dissertation and essay writing for a fee. Those higher education providers include the University of Sydney, the University of New South Wales, La Trobe University , the University of Technology, the University of Melbourne, the University of Western Australia, the University of Queensland, the University of South Australia and the Australian Institute of Business and Management Pty Ltd (trading as King’s Own Institute). 

3 Although the site-blocking orders are sought in respect of two domain names, URLs and IP addresses, it is contended by TEQSA that they emanate from the same source and advertise the same service in substantially the same terms. This is in a context where the online location at the domain name ‘assignmenthelp4you.com’, became inaccessible (at least temporarily) very shortly after TEQSA notified the operator of this application. Around the same time, the online location became accessible at the domain name ‘assignmenthelp2u.com’, revealing strong similarities to ‘assignmenthelp4you.com’. 

4 The basis of the application for the orders sought is that the Online Locations advertise, publish or broadcast advertisements for an academic cheating service to students undertaking Australian courses of study with higher educator providers thereby, (at least) facilitating a contravention of s 114B(2) of the TEQSA Act. 

5 Each of the respondents is a CSP within the meaning of s 5 of the TEQSA Act and s 87 of the Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth), and provides access to the internet for users of its internet service in Australia. Each of the respondent CSPs were notified of this application in accordance with s 127A(6)(b) of the TEQSA Act and have filed submitting appearances. 

6 No entity has opposed the orders that TEQSA seeks, nor contested the facts and contentions set out in TEQSA’s amended concise statement. ... 

10 As noted above, this application is based on a contravention of s 114B(2) which is relevantly in the following terms:

114B Prohibition on advertising academic cheating services (1) A person commits an offence if: (a) the person advertises, or publishes or broadcasts an advertisement for, an academic cheating service to students undertaking, with a higher education provider: (i) an Australian course of study; or (ii) an overseas course of study provided at Australian premises; and (b) either: (i) the person does so for a commercial purpose; or (ii) the academic cheating service has a commercial purpose. Penalty: 2 years imprisonment or 500 penalty units, or both. (2) A person contravenes this subsection if the person advertises, or publishes or broadcasts an advertisement for, an academic cheating service to students undertaking, with a higher education provider: (a) an Australian course of study; or (b) an overseas course of study provided at Australian premises. Civil penalty: 500 penalty units.

11 These provisions were introduced into the TEQSA Act by amendments in 2019. The Explanatory Memorandum to the Tertiary Education Quality and Standards Agency Amendment (Prohibiting Academic Cheating Services) Bill 2019 (Cth) (the Bill) introducing ss 114B and 127A, stated: Section 127A will be particularly important to reduce the visibility of, and ease of access to, overseas websites that provide or advertise cheating services. While prosecution of overseas website operators and content authors may be difficult, blocking of these sites by internet service providers...is an action that can be taken from within Australia and will go some way to reducing their availability and impact. 

12 This is the first application under s 127A. That said, the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) contains s 115A, which is a similar provision to s 127A. Section 115A provides, in that context, for site-blocking injunctions against foreign online locations that have the primary purpose or effect of infringing copyright or facilitating copyright infringement. ... 

24 I am satisfied that, as TEQSA submitted, the persons operating the Online Locations are advertising an academic cheating service to students undertaking an Australian course of study with a higher education provider, in contravention of s 114B(2). It follows that the Online Locations are facilitating the operators’ contravention of (at least) s 114B(2) for the purpose of s 127A(1) of the TEQSA Act. 

25 The below statements made on the website of ‘assignmenthelp4you.com’ (and exhibited in screenshots taken by Ms Pritchard in April and May 2021) reveal, inter alia, that it variously advertised and published the following services: ‘Find Best Academic Writers for Hire! Get Classroom Assignment Writing Service Acquire world’s best online assignment writing service at cheaper rate! ... No plagiarism policy – Enhance your academic grade with scoring high in each assignment! ... Order An Assignment!!’. ‘Buy Premium Writing Services’, ‘we deliver assignments of high quality that always meets your requirement and urgent deadlines, ‘...we deliver ....tailored academic papers...’, ‘expertise in composing dissertations for students...’, ‘Buy custom essay from professional writers’: ‘Buy Custom Essay - Acquire Top Quality Essay Writing Service!’, ‘Completely original and authentic papers ... Timely assignment delivery’, ‘If a student... cannot give much to complete their assignments, therefore, students hire a professional essay writer to ease their academic stress’, ‘The affordable essay help is served by our tutors as the own high experience and professional skills thus we have hired best writers who know how to tackle the difficult academic tasks of students’. ‘If you have a tight deadline and your assignment date is near, our experts can prepare your assignment on an urgent basis also’, ‘We also ensure you about the quality of assignment done by our academic writers. Assignment writers of Assignmenthelp4you have the potential to write lengthy or complicated assignments of any subject in the last minutes of submissions’. 

26 These statements show that the website ‘assignmenthelp4you.com’ advertised an academic cheating service as defined in s 5 of the TEQSA Act. 

27 This service was expressly advertised as being delivered to students in Australia, amongst others. So much is evident from the following examples (also taken by Ms Pritchard in April and May 2021), as set out by TEQSA in its submissions: (a) The Online Location available at assignmenthelp4you.com included a page titled ‘Acquire La Trobe University Australia Assignment Help By Hiring Academic Experts At Best Prices! It invites students to ‘come to us anytime and avail the benefits of our trustworthy La Trobe University Australian assignment help service’, and sets out a ‘List of Topics Covered by Courses of La Trobe University Australia’, including FIN1FOF Fundamentals of Finance and ACC1AMD Accounting for Management Decisions. (b) The Online Location available at assignmenthelp4you.com also included a similar page in relation to ‘Kings Own Institute’, which makes reference to courses including ACC301 Tax Law and FIN200 Corporate Financial Management. (c) Further, the Online Location available at assignmenthelp4you.com made reference to a large number of other Australian tertiary education institutions, including RMIT University , Charles Sturt University, University of Melbourne, University of Queensland, University of Technology Sydney, University of New South Wales, University of Western Australia, etc. 

28 Ms Pritchard’s evidence establishes that the subjects referred to in subparagraphs (a) and (b), recited above, are subjects offered by Australian higher education providers, and each of the institutions referred to in subparagraph (c) are on the National Register of Higher Education Providers, which TEQSA is required by ss 198(1) and 198(5) of the TEQSA Act to establish, maintain and make available for inspection on the internet. Indeed, of the 70 institutions listed on ‘assignmenthelp4you.com’, 54 were higher education providers for the purposes of the TEQSA Act.

Contract Management

Yesterday's ANAO report Management of the Civil Maritime Surveillance Services Contract comments 

1. Civil maritime surveillance has been identified by the Department of Home Affairs (Home Affairs) as important to deterring, preventing, detecting and responding to civil maritime threats, including illegal maritime arrivals as part of Operation Sovereign Borders. Following a tender process, on 3 March 2006 a contract commenced between the Australian Government1 and Surveillance Australia Pty Ltd (Surveillance Australia) for the provision of a ‘Detect-Classify-Identify-Report’ surveillance service to inform ‘maritime zone awareness’. 

2. The contract requires the provision of 10 fixed-wing Dash–8 aircraft (six Dash–8 202 and four Dash–8 315), modified with specialised surveillance information management system (SIM) equipment which links aerial surveillance assets to the Australian Border Operations Centre. The contractor is required to provide 15,000 flying hours per annum. Home Affairs is to make monthly payments comprising a service charge (covering one twelfth of the annual fixed charge, an hourly charge and any monthly performance deductions) and reimbursable expenses (including landing and navigation charges and accommodation and meal allowances). 

3. At the time it was entered into, the contract was to expire on 31 December 20192 and had a reported value of $1,187 million.3 Since the contract was executed, there have been 40 contract change proposals (CCPs) approved and Home Affairs has identified that these have significantly reshaped the contract. 

Rationale for undertaking the audit 

4. The contract with Surveillance Australia is the larger of two4 that are in place under ‘Project Sentinel’ for aerial surveillance to prevent people smuggling and manage other maritime threats across the North West approaches of Australia. This ANAO performance audit commenced in the second last year of the extended 14 year contract term to: assess and provide transparency over the services that have been provided to date; provide independent assurance to the Parliament as to whether Home Affairs is managing the provision of contracted services effectively given their importance to Project Sentinel; and examine whether there has been appropriate planning for the end of the contract on 31 December 2021. 

5. This audit was undertaken in a similar timeframe to a separate audit of the Management of the Search and Rescue Contract by the Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA), which provided an opportunity to compare and contrast two aircraft service contracts (and their management) with contractors that are subsidiaries of the same parent company, Cobham Ltd (Cobham). The report of the audit of AMSA was tabled on 18 January 2021 (Auditor-General Report No. 27 2020–21) and concluded that AMSA’s management of the search and rescue contract has been fully effective. 

Audit objective and criteria  

6. The audit objective was to assess whether the Department of Home Affairs is effectively managing the Civil Maritime Surveillance Services contract. 

7. To form a conclusion against the objective, the following high level criteria were adopted: Has the contract delivered against the planned cost, scope and delivery timeframe? Have the specified surveillance assets been provided? Have the specified surveillance services been provided? 

8. At the time the audit commenced, there was a fourth criterion (‘Has there been appropriate planning for the end of contract?’) and the audit scope was to include the transitional arrangements in place for the period post the expiry of the contract on 31 December 2021. In December 2020, twelve months6 out from the expiry of the contract and with no further extension options available, the Secretary of Home Affairs did not agree to a recommendation from his department that he agree to issue a Request for Quote to the incumbent provider to continue providing services. 

9. As a result of the path forward not having been resolved by Home Affairs by December 2020, the Auditor-General decided to remove the fourth criterion from the scope of the audit. As at August 2021 with four months remaining on the current contract, there are no arrangements in place for the next contract. 

Conclusion 

10. The department’s management of the Civil Maritime Surveillance Services contract has not been effective and, as a result, while surveillance services have been provided, the quantum and range of those services has fallen short of the contractual requirements. 

11. The contract has not been managed to secure delivery in line with the planned cost, scope and delivery timeframe. The contract has been varied on 40 occasions as of March 2021 with the effect of significantly changing the scope of the services to be delivered and increasing the term and value of the contract. The department has recognised that variations to the contract have significantly reshaped it and those variations have increased the cost by more than 29 per cent. There has been a high turnover of officers responsible for the management of the contract and the department has not ensured that each of its contract managers had appropriate training or experience. 

12. There were shortfalls and delays in the provision of the contracted surveillance assets. At the commencement of services under the contract, delays in the modification program meant that four fully compliant aircraft were not available and nine of the 26 required aircrews were not provided. There was also a delay in the provision of the SIM required for the acceptance of the full surveillance system. The department did not effectively apply the contractual framework to manage the shortfalls and delays. 

13. Home Affairs has not received the required quantum of surveillance services and the aircrew requirements have not been met. Under the contracted performance framework, Home Affairs has calculated that Overall Contract Performance (OCP) has met the specified 90 per cent threshold for 92 per cent of the period from 1 January 2008 to 31 December 2020. In contrast to this high level of calculated performance: the contracted Rate of Effort (RoE) in terms of hours flown has not been achieved in any year and has fallen short by an average of seven per cent each year; of the total missions planned, 25 per cent have only been partially completed and a further 11 per cent have been cancelled or aborted; and aircrew requirements have never been met with the number of aircrew on average each month 33 per cent below that contracted (where data is available for analysis). 

Supporting findings 

Contract delivery against planned cost, scope and timeframe 

14. With an authorised cost of $1,187.3 million or $98.9 million per annum, the department contracted in March 2006 for the delivery of civil maritime surveillance services to December 2019, with an option to extend for a further two years. The contract requires that Surveillance Australia provide 10 Dash–8 aircraft, to be operated from bases at Darwin, Cairns, Broome and Horn Island from the scheduled handover date of 1 January 2008; the delivery of the SIM, and the provision of 26 aircrew to meet the annual planned rate of 13,613 flying hours. 

15. The contract has been subject to 40 variations, with a significant variation to further extend the contract approved by the department in March 2021. The department has recognised that the variations have significantly reshaped the contract. The variations have also increased its duration by two years to date and have increased the authorised cost by more than 29 per cent. 

16. Contract managers have not been provided with appropriate training and have not had appropriate experience. Contract managers have also not received appropriate support due to there being no approved contract management plan in place until August 2018, more than 12 years after the contract commenced. There has been significant turnover in contract management staff, in addition to contract management responsibilities changing a number of times, exacerbated by the poor state of records from the time the contract was entered into. Action has recently been taken by the department to improve the resourcing of the management of the contract.

And on and on it goes. 

COVID changes

'Never Let a Crisis Go to Waste': The Impact of COVID-19 on Legal Education' by Peter D Burdon comments 

The COVID-19 pandemic represents the most significant rupture to universities since the advent of neoliberalism. In Australia, the economic shock was brought about primarily by a drop in international student fees, border closures, plus efforts from the Federal government to keep public universities from accessing financial support. In this paper I discuss the impacts of COVID-19 on legal education. What concerns me in particular is the rhetoric under which massive structural changes have been justified in response to the pandemic. Most commonly, university leaders have sought to externalise the problem and adopt the language of unforeseeability, emergency and necessity. Changes to learning and teaching have also been described as an ‘opportunity’ to re-examine outdated pedagogical practices and forms of assessment. While not denying the unprecedented nature of the pandemic, this paper argues that current changes in higher education are not a break from the past but a continuation of the neoliberal project. 

To support this argument my paper proceeds in three parts. In part one I develop the argument that the idea of a university is an empty signifier that changes over time. Attention is given to the role of neoliberalism in shaping the contemporary university and learning and teaching. In part two I develop a theory of crisis capitalism in conversation with scholars of political science and political economy. Crisis, from this perspective, represents an opportunity through which unpopular reforms could be promoted under the language of necessity. With this theoretical framework in place, part three critically examines five recent changes that are relevant to learning and teaching: job losses and casualization; cuts to programs; finding new markets for international students; online teaching; and changes to assessment. 

While not denying the scale of the challenge that confronts higher education, I argue that university leaders are using the COVID-19 pandemic as a crisis to push through unpopular reforms. I substantiate this argument by comparing statements prior and during the pandemic and through a reading of how leaders have used the language of necessity. Ultimately, I concluded that Rahm Emanuel’s dictum that one should ‘never let a crisis go to waste’ is the governing mantra in universities today and will have a profound impact on learning and teaching for decades to come.  

US School Surveillance

The CDT Online and Observed: Student Privacy Implications of School-Issued Devices and Student Activity Monitoring Software by DeVan L. Hankerson, Cody Venzke, Elizabeth Laird, Hugh Grant-Chapman and Dhanaraj Thakur  reports

 Finding #1: Students using school-issued devices are monitored to a greater extent than their peers using personal devices. 

Finding #2: LEAs with wealthier student populations reported that their students are more likely to have access to personal devices, which are subject to less monitoring than school-issued devices. 

Finding #3: LEAs feel compelled to monitor student activity to satisfy perceived legal requirements and protect student safety. 

Finding #4: Most prevalent community concerns were focused on appropriate use of student activity monitoring data for disciplinary purposes. 

Finding #5: LEAs communicate privacy expectations to students and families, but are unsure about how much detail about student activity monitoring to include in those messages. 

Finding #6: LEAs are holding device and student activity monitoring software vendors accountable on privacy and security through data sharing and privacy agreements. 

Finding #7: LEAs are looking for ways to improve the privacy and security protections for devices and data shared with student activity monitoring vendors.

The CDT states 

Many school districts across the nation expanded efforts to provide devices like laptops and tablets to students during the global pandemic in an effort to close the homework gap and address inequities in technology access. Part of this shift included the introduction of student activity monitoring software and other digital tools aimed in part at facilitating remote classroom management and driving student engagement. However, these tools can also be used in ways that are unduly intrusive. In this report, we examine whether students who receive school-issued devices are subject to more monitoring than their peers who have their own devices. We also examine local education agencies’ motivations in implementing monitoring and how they communicate about it with parents and students. Building on recent CDT guidance on how schools could address privacy gaps in the implementation of remote education technology (Quay- de la Vallee & Venzke, 2020), this report presents findings based on virtual semi-structured interviews with nine individuals from five local education agencies (LEAs), including district level administrators and information technology (IT) directors..

11 October 2021

Crime and Responsibility

The ACT LGovernment has released a report on what is needed for raising the age of criminal responsibility. 

The report states 

The ACT Legislative Assembly has committed to raising the minimum age of criminal responsibility. In preparation, the government commissioned a review of the service system (Review) in order to identify service gaps, implementation issues and alternative models to meet the needs of 10–13-year- olds likely to be affected by the proposed reform.

A team including Emeritus Professor Morag McArthur, Curijo Pty Ltd – an Aboriginal consulting company – and Dr Aino Suomi from the Australian National University carried out the Review between March 2021 and August 2021. 

This report outlines the gaps in the current service system that will require attention in order to meet the needs of children and young people aged 10–13. We will refer to them as ‘children’ from this point, and the term will include young people within the target range. This report identifies opportunities for reform to achieve improved outcomes for children and their families. It also proposes an alternative response to meet the needs of children affected by the changing legislative environment. The Review concluded that, overall, the service system requires reform. 

This Review used multiple sources of data to inform its findings: published key literature; ACT administrative data and casefile review; interviews with young people and families involved in youth justice; and wide-ranging consultations with non-government services, government directorates and key advocacy groups in the ACT. The data used for the Review point to a complex set of needs in children who are at risk of early offending. The findings showed that these complex needs shape children’s pathways across health/mental health, education and child protection services. The Review also highlighted significant agreement on the service challenges that face the ACT system in responding to children with complex needs. There was also a strong consensus among the groups about what should happen to address these challenges. 

This report concludes by outlining what is required to respond effectively to the needs of children who are most affected by raising the age of criminal responsibility. Based on the findings of this report, we argue for seizing the opportunity for comprehensive systems reform. This means building a stronger, more coordinated service system, ensuring early identification of needs and providing more universal support to meet those needs. These reforms are underscored by a shared responsibility for children’s wellbeing and safety. Raising the age of criminal responsibility highlights the importance of early, coordinated and sustained help for children and their families. A key outcome of this reform is to meet children’s needs. This outcome will not only be of value to them and their families but will benefit the wider community as well. 

Key Themes 

Children who are at risk of offending experience multiple health and mental health challenges, often with significant underlying trauma and disability. They are known to disengage from school early and to develop problems with substance misuse and are, too often, from Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander backgrounds or from families where parents have been incarcerated. Many of these children are involved with the child protection system and have a history of family violence (as victims and/or perpetrators), sexualised behaviours and sexual exploitation. They are also at risk of homelessness. 

Children who offend or who are at risk of offending have complex needs 

By the time children interact with the youth justice system, unmet needs have often multiplied and become more complex. The literature clearly recognises that the complexity and clustering of risks and unmet needs increase the probability of future problems. Tackling these issues requires coordinated or multiservice interventions (Baglivio et al., 2020; Farrington, 2002) as well as trauma- informed service responses matched to individual needs. 

Gaps in the current ACT service system 

The literature and the stakeholders consulted in this Review identified the issue that service systems are often unable to meet children’s complex needs, because of a lack of identification and assessment; ineffective information sharing and communication between services; a lack of coordination between services; service gaps; and a lack of familiarity with existing services or the functions of other services (including referral pathways). 

Barriers to adequately addressing complex needs in the ACT include a lack of coordination and integration across the service system, including: limited information sharing; lack of capacity to work with children with multiple needs; limited specialised and generalist programs; service delivery modes that are inflexible; barriers to navigating the system; limited understanding of child-specific familial and cultural needs; and long waiting lists for specialised services. Stakeholder consultations revealed that demand outstrips the availability of services. Almost all stakeholders raised the difficulty of accessing mental health and alcohol and other drug services, identifying long waiting lists or narrow eligibility criteria as some of the main reasons. As a result, and only when problems escalate, the tertiary services (e.g., child protection or Youth Justice) will attempt to comprehensively address the needs of these children. One of the major concerns identified in the consultations was that children aged 10–13 – most affected by the reform – are commonly not eligible for a range of services in the ACT. This is particularly true for children under 12 years of age. They are too young to access many of the adolescent services and too unwell or complex for early intervention services, but not complex enough to access specialised services. They may also have comorbidities (e.g., disability and/or AOD or trauma response) that exclude them from key mental health services. 

The consultations also identified a range of workforce capability issues, including the structure of funding arrangements and tendering in the community services sector. They also included significant workforce shortages in key areas, such as allied health professionals available to support children with trauma experiences and emerging mental health challenges. 

More is required to develop a trauma-informed workforce. The ACT needs a workforce plan, tailored for specific service contexts and including a training and professional development strategy designed to operationalise trauma-informed care principles into practice and build the capacity of the sector to be more collaborative, child and young person -centred and culturally safe. If mainstream organisations set up to support children and families are not taking the lead in working in trauma- informed and culturally effective/sensitive ways, they can inadvertently cause further harm. 

A range of stakeholders identified the need for safe accommodation for children. They emphasised that this need will be intensified with the change to the age of criminal responsibility. Key aspects of remedying the lack of safe (and secure) accommodation include crisis accommodation for the age group and a secure therapeutic facility for children in need of mental health treatment and who are at risk of harming themselves or others. 

Implementing a strong narrative to communicate the changes 

Stakeholders highlighted the importance of bringing the community along with the reform by clearly communicating the key arguments and benefits of a therapeutic or public health response over a youth justice response. Broad arguments should include the science of brain development, the serious impacts of trauma on behaviours and the evidence of negative long-term outcomes associated with early interactions with the justice system. 

The narrative further needs to explain clearly the effectiveness of non-criminal processes in meeting children’s needs: evidence shows that therapeutic approaches prevent criminal/harmful behaviours in young people. It is also important to acknowledge the experiences of victims and to ensure that those who have been harmed will not be forgotten or ignored. As part of developing an alternative response, it will be important to recognise the rights and interests of people impacted by the harmful behaviour of children; they will require access to the same, or similar, supports as are currently available to victims of crime. Restorative processes have been built into the therapeutic proposal identified in this report, to ensure that victims and children have the opportunity to engage in restorative processes. Children who are held accountable for harmful behaviour, then repair damaged relationships and achieve closure, may be at decreased risk of (re)offending. 

A therapeutic response to meet children’s complex needs 

The report offers an overview of an alternative response to meet the needs of children affected by raising the age of criminal responsibility. The response includes a non-justice embedded youth worker model and safe accommodation options to support police’s interactions with children who may be at risk of antisocial or unsafe behaviour. The alternative response proposes a Multidisciplinary Therapeutic Panel (MTP), a collaborative forum to make service delivery decisions for children with complex and challenging needs. The MTP would consider and review children who have been referred to the panel because of the level of complexity of their needs or because there are insufficient or inadequate existing service responses to meet those needs. The work with children and their families would be coordinated by a new wraparound service. 

The wraparound service would develop individualised child and family-centred plans to respond to the complex needs of children. It would be an intensive, structured process, convening a team of highly skilled professionals and involving the child and their family members along with professionals and natural supports relevant to a child with complex needs and their family circumstances. 

The assessment process of the wrapround service would embed restorative processes by utilising Family Decision Making. The opportunity for children to participate in a restorative meeting would be considered as a way of ensuring that victims’ needs are also met. An important part of the proposed approach is to make available a range of restorative practices: restorative meetings; the provision of an apology; victim impact letters; or other forms of reparation. Appropriately used restorative processes are likely to have a therapeutic and empowering impact on both the victim and the perpetrator of harm. 

The MTP and wraparound service would be overseen by a legislated Oversight Committee, responsible for identifying systemic issues that may have arisen because of the changes to raising the age of criminal responsibility and for recommending policy and legislative changes. The alternative response is based on the voluntary engagement of children and their families, because mandated measures are often ineffective and unaligned with the therapeutic aims of the suggested approach. If, however, the ACT Government determines that a mandated response for children with complex needs is necessary, the current legislative levers are already in place – albeit requiring amendments. A mandated response to children should be used: • only as a measure of last resort (for example with repetitive harmful behaviour) • only where there is a risk of harm to the child and or others and that harm is likely to be serious • only where significant attempts at voluntary engagement have been exhausted. 

The need for strong systems for early help and support 

This Review identifies the need for a stronger focus on early support. Decades of research in Australia and internationally demonstrate the benefits of early interventions for children, families and communities. The current ACT service system has limited prevention, early intervention and individualised support services available to children generally and for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children and families specifically. 

Further building the capacity of universal settings, such as early education and care, maternal and child health and schools, will be critical in identifying and responding to the needs of individual children and families. Locating supportive services in universal settings improves the prevention and early intervention possibilities. Schools are particularly important, because they are often where the needs of children and families are first identified. There is much more to be done to ensure that schools are adequately resourced and supported to engage actively with disability, mental health and welfare providers in order to enable integrated and holistic support for children at risk and their families. Stronger relationships can be built between schools and services in the non-government sector. Although schools cannot, by themselves, solve the complex social, economic and family challenges that present daily in the classroom, they remain an important site from which to provide trauma-informed responses, opportunities for early identification and assessment of need. 

Improved integration of responses 

Children’s (and their families’) needs cross directorate boundaries. Families whose children experience a range of issues may find themselves navigating different service systems and multiple service networks, including health, mental health, education and statutory child protection. Collaborative approaches recognise the complex and interlinked nature of issues for children and families and are better able to address complexity through coordinated interventions. 

Despite several serious attempts by the ACT to increase integration across the service systems, stakeholders throughout the consultations still pointed to a system that remains siloed. Information sharing remains an issue. The reforms required to respond to the decision to raise the age of criminal responsibility necessitate the acknowledgement that our service systems need transformative change. All the proposals hinge on creating a coordinated service response through collaboration and sharing responsibility. No single service, agency or directorate can devise and implement a comprehensive plan that would adequately improve outcomes for children with complex needs who engage in harmful and unsafe behaviour. 

A self-determined Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander response 

Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children are overrepresented in the youth justice system and experience ongoing impacts from colonisation, dispossession and alienation from Indigenous cultures. They also have high levels of individual risk factors, such as mental illness and disabilities. 

Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people must be strongly represented in building the alternative response that will be required when the age of criminal responsibility is raised. This includes representation on the proposed MTP and employment in the wraparound service. The Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander community and service providers must be actively engaged in determining appropriate services to meet the needs of children and families. 

Self-determination in responses to children at risk of early offending will require a strengthening of the role of our current Aboriginal organisations, provision of appropriate funding and support for any new initiatives. Workforce capacity building and other support will help to ensure that our Aboriginal Community Controlled Services are sustainable. 

An Independent Authority for children’s safety and wellbeing 

This report calls for an independent authority to oversee and support systems implementation of the reform and to respond to the identified critical service gaps. Currently, many different directorates are responsible for children’s wellbeing and safety, their health, their education and their participation in society. An independent authority would be a vital mechanism in creating an integrated whole-of- government and whole-of-community system to support children’s wellbeing and safety. It would help to develop a greater sense of shared responsibility across government and communities. 

The authority would be responsible for collaboratively developing a shared framework that can be used as a key driver for more joined-up approaches across directorates. This framework would provide the authorising (policy) environment and actively enable services across sectors to work differently and more collaboratively, including at the practitioner level.

10 October 2021

Junk

'Low-Quality Patents in the Eye of the Beholder: Evidence from Multiple Examiners' by Gaétan de Rassenfosse, William E Griffiths, Adam B Jaffe and Elizabeth Webster in (2020) 37(3) The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 607–636 comments 

A low-quality patent system threatens to slow the pace of technological progress. Concerns about low patent quality are supported by estimates from litigation studies suggesting that most US patents granted should not have been issued. We propose a new model for measuring patent quality, based on equivalent patent applications submitted to multiple offices. Our method allows us to distinguish whether low-quality patents are issued because an office implements a low standard or because it violates its own standard. The results suggest that quality in patent systems is higher than previously thought. Specifically, the percentage of granted patents that are below each office’s own standard is under 10% for all offices. The Japanese patent office has a higher percentage of granted patents below its own standard than those from Europe, the USA, Korea, and China. This result arises from the fact that Japan has a higher standard than other offices.