19 October 2021

Identity

The Australian Human Rights Commission Ensuring health and bodily integrity: towards a human rights approach for people born with variations in sex characteristics report responded to Terms of Reference requiring it to 'inquire into, and report on, how best to protect the human rights of people born with variations in sex characteristics in the context of medical interventions, including surgical and non-surgical interventions'.  The inquiry considered the 2013 report of the Senate Standing Committee on Community Affairs on involuntary or coerced sterilisation of intersex people, the Victorian Decision-Making Principles for the Care of Infants, Children and Adolescents with Intersex Conditions; 2017 Darlington Statement by Australian and New Zealand intersex organisations and independent advocates; and decisions of the Family Court of Australia. 

The report states that The Commission notes that terminology in this area is contested, and inappropriate language use can have harmful consequences. The Commission is committed to consulting on this issue, with a view to adopting the most appropriate terminology in this project. The Commission’s use of the term ‘people born with variations in sex characteristics’ is intended to refer compendiously to the people whose human rights are the focus of this project. Other terms are also used in this context, and the Commission remains committed to further consultation on terminology. 

 The Commission comments that 

 People born with variations in sex characteristics in Australia have increasingly raised concerns with the Australian Human Rights Commission (the Commission), the Australian Government and the United Nations, about human rights violations in relation to medical interventions conducted without the full and informed consent of the person involved. These interventions are of particular concern in relation to infants and children. 

The  Report provides 

recommendations for how Australia should protect and promote the human rights of people born with variations in sex characteristics in the context of medical interventions to modify these characteristics. These recommendations are framed by principles derived from international human rights law. 

 Applying a human rights analysis to medical interventions in relation to people born with variations in sex characteristics has three principal benefits: 

 • it promotes compliance with international and domestic law 

• the human rights framework provides a near-universal set of norms by which to answer questions regarding medical interventions in relation to people born with variations in sex characteristics • it provides a framework to consider the claimed benefits of performing these medical interventions without a person’s personal consent, against any impingement on human rights. 

These principles are set out in Chapter 2: 

• Bodily integrity principle: All people have the right to autonomy and bodily integrity. Medical interventions on people without their personal consent have the potential to seriously infringe these rights. 

• Children’s agency principle: Children and young people have the right to express their views in relation to decisions that affect them, and those views must be given due weight in accordance with their age and maturity. The ability of children to consent to medical interventions generally increases as they grow older. Children and young people who are able to understand fully the nature and consequences of proposed medical interventions should be able to make their own decisions about whether those interventions proceed. 

• Precautionary principle: Where safe to do so, medical interventions to modify the sex characteristics of a child born with variations in sex characteristics should be deferred until a time when the child is able to make their own decisions about what happens to their body. 

• Medical necessity principle: In some cases, to protect the child’s rights to life or health, it may be medically necessary for a medical intervention to modify the sex characteristics of a child born with variations in sex characteristics to occur, before a child can make their own decision. An intervention will be medically necessary if it is required urgently to avoid serious harm to the child. 

• Independent oversight principle: Given the risk of making a wrong decision, decisions about whether a medical intervention to modify the sex characteristics of a child born with variations in sex characteristics is medically necessary should be subject to effective independent oversight. 

 The Commission recommends new legislative protections, guidance and oversight processes when there is consideration of medical interventions for people under the age of 18 years born with variations in sex characteristics. Legislation should enforce a general requirement that medical interventions take place only with the prior, informed, personal consent of the person concerned – subject to an exception in the case of medical necessity. 

 (a) Consent and decision making 

Under international human rights law, a medical intervention may only take place without the individual’s personal consent where this is a medical necessity or medical emergency. The Commission recommends that this approach be taken in relation to medical interventions for people under the age of 18 years who are born with variations in sex characteristics. This general legal rule reflects a person’s rights of autonomy and agency over their body. A range of practical problems regarding obtaining consent to medical interventions are considered in Chapter 4. To address these problems, the Commission recommends the development of new guidance setting out what is required to obtain informed consent from people under the age of 18 years before performing a medical intervention for a person born with variations in sex characteristics. This guidance should ensure that • medical interventions are proposed only when medically necessary • consent in all cases is fully informed, and • children and younger people are empowered to participate in decision making in a manner consistent with their evolving capacities. Questions raised in this report regarding adequacy of current oversight mechanisms are not intended to suggest parents or doctors are not acting in good faith. Stakeholder submissions indicate quite the opposite. However, as the High Court observed in Marion’s case, good intentions may not be enough to protect children. 

 (b) Medical necessity 

The Commission recommends that medical interventions in relation to a person under the age of 18 without their personal consent should only take place where the intervention is required urgently to avoid serious harm to the person concerned (the ‘medical necessity’ principle). An intervention is ‘required urgently’ if it cannot be deferred without a significant risk of serious harm. The Commission notes (in more detail at 2.3 Applicable human rights), the various UN treaty body committee comments to Australia to limit intervention without personal consent to circumstances of medical necessity. Chapter 5 considers the different rationales put forward for medical interventions in relation to children born with variations in sex characteristics and concludes that such medical interventions should only be permissible if all of the following factors are present: • the medical intervention is required urgently to avoid serious harm • the risk of harm cannot be mitigated in another less intrusive way, and intervention cannot be further delayed • the risk of harm outweighs the significant limitation on human rights that is occasioned by medical intervention without personal consent. Chapter 5 applies the principle of medical necessity to the situation of medical interventions for people born with variations in sex characteristics. The Commission concludes that some rationales used to justify medical interventions are not consistent with this principle including, for example, psychosocial rationales based on ‘normalising’ genitalia. 

(c) Clinical practice and new National Guidelines 

The Commission recommends the development of new National Guidelines to guide decision-making processes to ensure that medical interventions modifying sex characteristics are not undertaken unless intervention is a medical necessity. These are considered in Chapter 6. The recommended National Guidelines should include guidance on • obtaining informed consent and ensuring affected children and younger people are involved in decisions (see Chapter 4) • the application of human rights principles in determining whether a medical intervention is a medical necessity (see Chapter 5) • requirements for independent authorisation of certain medical interventions (see Chapter 7). The Commission recommends that the National Guidelines be developed by a national multidisciplinary expert group convened by the Australian Government and should complement legislative reforms recommended in Chapter 7. The National Guidelines should also promote the best standards of clinical care generally. The national multidisciplinary expert group should develop clinical guidelines and best practice and treatment protocols, including in relation to the provision of psychological and peer support. 

 (d) Oversight of medical interventions 

The Commission recommends the establishment of Independent Panels to provide appropriate oversight of medical interventions in relation to children born with variations in sex characteristics, through the application of a human rights framework. Chapter 7 discusses how a human rights framework for decision making about medical interventions should be incorporated into Australian domestic law and policy, and what independent oversight mechanisms should be established. Oversight, in this context, refers to mechanisms by which an independent decision maker determines whether a medical intervention may be carried out on a person under the age of 18 without personal consent. The Commission recommends reform of oversight mechanisms by legislation by • establishing Independent Panels with responsibility to decide whether to authorise medical interventions in respect of people born with variations in sex characteristics • defining the circumstances in which interventions without personal consent may be authorised, which should be limited to circumstances of medical necessity • recognising that in emergency situations there should be an expedited authorisation process or, where this still does not provide time to deal with the emergency, a requirement for subsequent notification of the Independent Panel. 

 (e) Enforcement 

The Commission recommends legislation to prohibit medical interventions in relation to people under the age of 18 years born with variations in sex characteristics otherwise than in accordance with the medical necessity principle. Additionally, there should be appropriate criminal penalties for carrying out a relevant intervention without authorisation from an Independent Panel. Chapter 8 discusses how obligations placed on health practitioners and others to apply to an Independent Panel prior to performing medical interventions might be enforced in practice, under criminal law, and through regulation of health professionals. 

 (f) Support, health records and data collection People affected by medical interventions modifying sex characteristics need adequate support. Stakeholders raised concerns about records having been destroyed, failure to appropriately share records between treating health professionals, and inadequate record security. The Commission recommends in Chapter 9 that governments provide sufficient public funding for peer support organisations, comprehensive psychological and psychiatric health services, and comprehensive and up-to-date consumer resources for people born with variations, and their parents or guardians. While support for individuals born with variations is central, supports for parents or guardians is also crucial to enable families to best understand all the considerations in caring for a child born with a variation. Australian governments should also consult on establishing and funding coordinator positions to integrate care across multiple specialties and institutions. The Commission considers that there is a need for long-term, longitudinal data on past and current practices to better understand the health and psychosocial effects of different interventions. The Commission therefore recommends the Australian Government facilitate the establishment of a national databank to assist research on the frequency of variations in sex characteristics and the effects of medical interventions and non-intervention. The Australian Government and state and territory governments should also fund and facilitate collaborative medical, psychological, health and wellbeing research, and socio-economic research to tackle stigma and disadvantage as relates to exclusion in schooling and employment.

The Report states 

In 2013, the Senate Community Affairs References Committee (Senate Committee) conducted an inquiry into the involuntary or coerced sterilisation of intersex people in Australia (Senate Committee Inquiry). In its final report, the Senate Committee made a number of recommendations to better protect the human rights of intersex people. In its formal response in May 2015, the Australian Government welcomed the report and recognised the harm experienced by many people subjected to forced sterilisation. It committed to raising with the states and territories the Senate Committee’s recommendations regarding the legal framework regulating sterilisation for people with disability, with a view to promoting consistency between Australian jurisdictions. In respect of ‘involuntary or coerced sterilisation of intersex people’, the Government acknowledged the report’s main recommendations and specifically noted the benefit of further research on the desirability of ‘bringing the medical treatment of intersex variations into the jurisdiction of guardianship tribunals’ and/or the Family Court of Australia, but did not support amending the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) to expand the Family Court’s role at that time. Broadly speaking, the Australian Government has emphasised the responsibility of the states and territories and has not committed to the implementation of particular reform in this area. 

During the Commission’s inquiry, state governments had also been considering how to better protect the rights of people born with variations in sex characteristics and provide better support to them and their families. In July 2021, the Victorian Government committed to prohibiting deferrable medical interventions on intersex people without personal consent, and introducing an oversight panel to ensure compliance with the prohibition. The Commission welcomes this commitment. In July 2021, the report (i) Am Equal: Future Directions for Victoria’s Intersex community, outlined a collaborative approach that importantly includes people born with variations in sex characteristics and their advocacy and peer support organisations. Its three main focus areas – Future Intersex Resourcing, Future Intersex Health and Wellbeing Centre, and Improving Future Treatment – are consistent with the Commission’s views reflected in this Report. The proposals to develop: a mechanism to prohibit deferrable medical interventions modifying a person’s sex characteristics without personal consent; an oversight panel to ensure compliance with the prohibition; provisions which ensure the collection of data and transparency over what treatments are being performed and support for the development of National Guidelines, are welcome and consistent with key recommendations in this Report. 

The Commission also welcomes the ACT Government’s work to protect the rights of people born with variations in sex characteristics and provide better support to them and their families. In October 2019, the ACT Government committed to developing a plan for managing deferrable medical interventions for people born with variations in sex characteristics. This has involved consulting with intersex people and experts in the field; reviewing the existing literature and initiatives in other countries; and testing key issues with stakeholder individuals and organisations. The Commission has engaged with the ACT’s efforts to formulate a proposal to develop such protections. There is congruence in the approach proposed by the ACT Government and that of the Commission’s, as articulated in this report.

The Commission's Recommendations are 

1: Laws and practices concerning medical interventions to modify the sex characteristics of people born with variations in sex characteristics should be guided by a human rights framework based on the following principles.

1. Bodily integrity principle: All people have the right to autonomy and bodily integrity. Medical interventions on people without their personal consent have the potential to seriously infringe these rights. 

2. Children’s agency principle: Children and young people have the right to express their views in relation to decisions that affect them, and those views must be given due weight in accordance with their age and maturity. The ability of children to consent to medical interventions generally increases as they grow older. Children and young people who are able to understand fully the nature and consequences of proposed medical interventions should be able to make their own decisions about whether those interventions proceed. 

3. Precautionary principle: Where safe to do so, medical interventions to modify the sex characteristics of a child born with variations in sex characteristics should be deferred until a time when the child is able to make their own decisions about what happens to their body. . 

4. Medical necessity principle: In some cases, to protect the child’s rights to life or health, it may be medically necessary for a medical intervention to modify the sex characteristics of a child born with variations in sex characteristics to occur before a child can make their own decision. An intervention will be medically necessary if it is required urgently to avoid serious harm to the child. 

5. Independent oversight principle: Given the risk of making a wrong decision, decisions about whether a medical intervention to modify the sex characteristics of a child born with variations in sex characteristics is medically necessary should be subject to effective independent oversight. 

2: The development of new resources to increase awareness of variations of sex characteristics in the community, educational, service and employment settings, and to reduce the associated stigma. To undertake this, the Australian Government and state and territory governments should fund community organisations led by people born with variations in sex characteristics to . 

3: New National Guidelines on medical interventions for people born with variations in sex characteristics (see Recommendation 6) should set out what is required to obtain informed consent before performing a medical intervention for a person born with variations in sex characteristics. This guidance should require that:

(a) Treating practitioners provide accurate, up-to-date, evidence-based medical information including about: (i) the variation in question (ii) the exact nature of any proposed intervention, why it is medically necessary, and the degree of any risk from the intervention (iii) what alternatives exist, including other medical interventions or delaying or deferring the proposed intervention (iv) the likely long-term effects and outcomes if the proposed intervention is carried out immediately, at a later time, or if the intervention is not carried out (v) what uncertainty, if any, exists in relation to the current state of medical knowledge underpinning any recommended intervention (vi) any diversity of medical opinion about the proposed intervention (vii) the benefits of peer support, and contact information for relevant groups. 

(b) Treating practitioners document fully the information provided, how they have included children in decision-making processes and the steps they have taken to effectively communicate the information, taking into account the age, decision-making ability or other characteristics of the person. 

(c) people born with variations in sex characteristics and, where they are children, their parents and other family members, are provided information in clear, accessible, non-technical language that they can understand 

(d) Treating practitioners refer people born with variations in sex characteristics, and where relevant their parents and other family members, to peer support and advocacy organisations, and services such as psychologists and social workers, who can provide further information to help inform their decision-making. 

(e) children are included in decision making in an age-appropriate way, including by being given support to understand any medical advice and to express their views, with due weight being given to those views according to their age and capacity. Where a child has sufficient understanding, the child’s informed consent should be sought. Where the view is formed that the child does not have sufficient understanding for their consent to be sought, the reasons and evidence for this should be documented along with a description of any attempts made to seek the views of the child 

(f) people with variations in sex characteristics and, where they are children, their parents and other family members, are provided with adequate time to make treatment decisions, with access to necessary support, to ensure they do not feel undue pressure to consent.

 4: Medical interventions modifying sex characteristics of children may be conducted without personal consent only in circumstances of medical necessity. Circumstances of medical necessity exist only where all of the following factors are present:

(a) the medical intervention is required urgently to avoid serious harm 

(b) the risk of harm cannot be mitigated in another less intrusive way, and intervention cannot be further delayed 

(c) the risk of harm outweighs the significant limitation on human rights that is occasioned by medical intervention without personal consent. 

5: All people born with variations in sex characteristics should have access to comprehensive, appropriately qualified multidisciplinary care, with input from mental health and other key professionals, and other people with variations. Care should be available across their lifespan and regardless of where they live. 

6: (a) The Australian Government should convene and fund a national multidisciplinary expert group to develop National Guidelines on medical interventions for people born with variations of sex characteristics (National Guidelines), with input from specialist clinicians and health professional bodies, people with lived experience and their parents and carers, advocacy and peer-support groups, and human rights organisations. (b) The National Guidelines should reflect human rights principles including in relation to medical necessity (see Recommendation 4) and the provision of adequate information for informed consent (see Recommendation 3), as well as include best practice and treatment protocols for the management of different variations in sex characteristics and reviews of existing and emerging evidence-based research. (c) The National Guidelines should be reviewed periodically, to ensure guidance is based on the best available data and evidence. 

7: (a) The Australian Government and state and territory governments should legislate to establish one or more independent panels with responsibility to decide whether to authorise medical interventions modifying sex characteristics of people under the age of 18 years born with variations (Independent Panels). (b) Whenever a clinician or clinical treatment team intends to make such a medical intervention, they should be required to apply to an Independent Panel prior to performing the intervention. (c) Independent Panels should be constituted by members with expertise that includes relevant clinical expertise, lived experience of being born with variations in sex characteristics, and human rights. 

8: (a) An Independent Panel should only authorise a medical intervention for a person under the age of 18 years where it is satisfied that the person concerned either: (i) has the ability to provide personal consent and has provided such consent, or (ii) is not able to provide personal consent and the intervention is a medical necessity. (b) In rare emergency situations, where there would be a real risk of serious and irreparable harm to the person if the intervention were not carried out immediately, the Independent Panel should have an expedited process to consider the request for authorisation. Only where this still does not provide enough time to address the emergency, should an intervention proceed without authorisation. In those circumstances the relevant Independent Panel must be notified promptly following the conduct of the medical intervention. (c) Independent Panels, in determining whether a medical intervention is authorised, should be informed by the National Guidelines on medical interventions for people born with variations of sex characteristics. 

9: The Australian Government and state and territory governments should legislate to prohibit medical interventions for people born with variations in sex characteristics otherwise than in accordance with Recommendations 7 and 8. There should be appropriate criminal penalties for breaching this legislative prohibition. 

10: The Australian Government and state and territory governments should provide sufficient public funding for: 

(a) sustainable operation of advocacy and peer support organisations led by people born with variations of sex characteristics 

(b) comprehensive psychological and psychiatric health services, for people born with variations of sex characteristics, their parents and other family members 

(c) improved access to peer support and health services, including online and by telephone 

(d) comprehensive and up-to-date consumer resources for people born with variations in sex characteristics, their parents and other family members informed by clinical, peer support and human rights experts.

The Australian Government and state and territory governments should also consult on establishing and funding coordinator positions to integrate care across multiple specialties and institutions. 

11: The Australian Government should facilitate the establishment of a national databank to assist research on: 

(a) the frequency of variations in sex characteristics, including specific variations 

(b) the short-, medium- and long-term effects of medical interventions and non-intervention. 

12: The Australian Government and state and territory governments should fund and facilitate collaborative research, co-designed by community organisations led by people born with variations of sex characteristics, including:

(a) medical, psychological, health and wellbeing research, across the lifespan, that affirms human rights norms and helps people born with variations of sex characteristics to flourish 

(b) socio-economic factors that put people born with variations in sex characteristics that risk leading to stigma and disadvantage, including emerging issues such as social exclusion in schooling and employment. 

(c) any research that investigates the circumstances and needs of all sexual and gender minorities should disaggregate data on people born with variations of sex characteristics.

15 October 2021

Conscription and Political Pamphlets

The discussion of 'civil conscription' as part of today's judgment in Kassam v Hazzard; Henry v Hazzard [2021] NSWSC 1320 regarding COVID public health orders

Civil Conscription 

Section 51(xxiiiA) of the Constitution confers on the Federal Parliament legislative power to make laws for the peace, order and good government of the Commonwealth with respect to:

“[t]he provision of maternity allowances, widows pensions, child endowment, unemployment, pharmaceutical, sickness and hospital benefits, medical and dental services (but not so as to authorise any form of civil conscription, benefits to students and family allowances; …” (emphasis added)

This legislative power was inserted into s 51 with effect from 19 December 1946 by the Constitution Alteration (Social Services) Act 1946 following its passage in a referendum. The historical events that lead to the passage of this provision in this particular form are described in Wong v The Commonwealth (2009) 236 CLR 573; [2009] HCA 3 at [18] to [55] per French CJ and Gummow J, at [174] to [191] per Hayne, Crennan and Kiefel JJ and, to an extent, by Heydon J at [271] to [277] (“Wong”). It suffices to note two matters about that history. 

First, the phrase “civil conscription” has its origins in the debate about whether “industrial conscription”, that is, the use of compulsory civilian labour, would or would not be deployed in the war effort, as it eventually was (Wong at [31] to [40]; see Reid v Sinderberry (1944) 68 CLR 504). 

Second, the carve out from the referendum proposing the grant of legislative power so as to not authorise any form of civil conscription was suggested by the then opposition and agreed to by then government (Wong at [50] to [51]) and no doubt helped secure its passage. It stands in contrast to the nationalisation of medical services that took place in the United Kingdom around the same time (Wong at [274]). Thus, the phrase “civil conscription” was deployed so as to preclude compulsory service by medical professionals which might not answer the description “industrial conscription” (Wong at [50]). 

Bearing that in mind, two aspects of the concept of civil conscription of s 51(xxiiiA) should be noted. First, the preclusion on authorising civil conscription only qualifies a (Commonwealth) law for the “provision” of “medical or dental services” (the BMA Case at 254 per Rich J, at 261 per Dixon J, at 282 per McTiernan J, at 286 per Williams J, contra per Latham CJ at 253 and Webb J not deciding at 292; Alexandra Private Geriatric Hospital Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1987) 162 CLR 271 at 279; [1986] HCA 6; “Alexandra”). 

Second, civil conscription is directed to compulsive service in the provision of medical services. In the BMA Case a majority, Latham CJ, Rich, Williams and Webb JJ, Dixon and McTiernan JJ dissenting, upheld a challenge to the validity of a legislative requirement for pharmacists to write scripts for medicines on a particular form regardless of whether the medicine was to be obtained for free by the patient under the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme. The widest reading of the majority’s conclusion was that the prohibition on civil conscription in relation to medical and dental services strikes down any “compulsion of law requiring that men … perform work in a particular way” (at 249 per Latham CJ). Dixon J in dissent concluded that nothing in the impugned provision compelled the rendering of medical services to patients in any capacity whether regularly, occasionally, for a short period or intermittently (at 278). His Honour’s approach was effectively adopted in the General Practitioner’s Case (1980) 145 CLR 532 at 556-557 per Gibbs J. at 563 per Stephen J, at 564 per Mason J and 571 to 572 per Wilson J; Wong at [195]). In Wong, Hayne, Crennan and Kiefel JJ also applied the approach of Dixon J in the BMA Case while accepting that civil conscription can arise from the practical and not just legal effect of a legislative provision (at [209]). Even so, their Honours concluded that the practical effect of the scheme for the payment of medical benefits in the Health Insurance Act did not amount to civil conscription in that it did not compel a medical practitioner, legally or practically, to provide a service on behalf of the Commonwealth or at all to treat any patient or particular patient ([id]). Their Honours also concluded that, accepting that the practical effect of the Health Insurance Act was to require doctors who wish to practise to participate in the Medicare scheme (at [224]), a requirement to comply with a standard of practice is not a form of civil conscription (at [226]). 

Similarly, after reviewing the history of s 51(xxiiiA), French CJ and Gummow J in Wong reached the same conclusion. In so doing, their Honours described the meaning of “civil conscription” in s 51(xxiiiA) as follows (at [60]): 

“The legislative history and the genesis of s 51(xxiiiA) supports a construction of the phrase "(but not so as to authorize any form of civil conscription)" which treats "civil conscription" as involving some form of compulsion or coercion, in a legal or practical sense, to carry out work or provide services; the work or services may be for the Commonwealth itself or a statutory body which is created by the Parliament for purposes of the Commonwealth … it also may be for the benefit of third parties, if at the direction of the Commonwealth.” (emphasis added) 

The effect of the Kassam plaintiffs’ written submissions was that Order (No 2) effected a form of civil conscription because it effectively required unvaccinated persons to obtain a COVID-19 vaccine. [157] This wrongly assumed that s 51(xxiiiA) proscribes the compulsory acquisition of medical services which it does not. In oral submissions, counsel for the Kassam plaintiffs, Mr King, was pressed on how any doctors or any other medical professional was compelled to provide a medical or dental service. He contended that [158]

“…the effect of the order is what is critical in our respectful submission, and the effect of that order is to conscript both patients and doctors, their doctors, to obtain a double vaccination, or in relation to the earlier orders a single vaccination, as the price of giving up their employment and their right to protect and look after their families.” 

This contention was repeated in a written submission filed on 4 October 2021. [159] Nothing in any part of Order (No 2) or the PHA involves any element of coercion on a doctor or other medical provider to vaccinate anyone. Otherwise, this submission simply repeats the wrong assertion that s 51(xxiiiA) operates on the acquisition of a medical service as opposed to its provision. 

In his submissions, Dr Harkess contended that a medical or dental service was provided by a person who received a COVID-19 vaccine because theycontribute to the eventual establishment of “herd immunity”. He submitted that it follows that those who were “compelled” to be vaccinated were civilly conscripted to provide dental and medical services. [160] It suffices to state that contributing to the general health of the community by adding to herd immunity is not providing a medical service. 

Wong establishes that s 51(xxiiiA) is to be interpreted according to its historical purpose as explained above. On any sensible reading of the authorities the impugned orders do not impose any form of civil conscription as referred to in s 51(xxiiiA).

Points of note include paras [147]-[148] -

In his affidavit Professor Borody asserts that the Federal Minister for Health wrote to him on 27 August 2020 and “specifically instructed me that doctors in Australia can prescribe ivermectin and other components of ‘off label’.  He annexes that letter. The letter does not contain any instruction that doctors in Australia can prescribe ivermectin and other components off label. In fact, what the Minister stated was:

“Whilst shown to be effective in the lab environment, ivermectin cannot be used in humans for COVID-19 until further testing and clinical trials have been completed to show that it is safe and effective in humans. 

… I acknowledge some physicians are prescribing ivermectin off label. As you would know the practice of prescribing registered medicines outside their approved indications is not regulated nor controlled by therapeutic goods Association as it is at the discretion of a prescribing physician.”

The balance of the letter encourages Professor Borody to seek funding for trials of ivermectin. It suffices to state that nothing in Professor Borody’s report provides any assistance for the Kassam plaintiffs claim that the impugned orders are unreasonable.

Elsewhere the Court states

Finally on this topic, I note that the Henry plaintiffs relied on the dissenting judgment of Deputy President Dean of the Fair Work Commission in an unfair dismissal case that addressed whether an employee who objected to being vaccinated could be reinstated to work at an aged care centre (Kimber v Sapphire Coast Community Aged Care Ltd [2021] FWCB 6015). In particular, they relied on various passages in the Deputy President’s judgment to the effect that “vaccine mandates” embodied in the various public health responses to COVID-19 amount to a form of coercion that violates a person’s right to bodily integrity (at [115] to [129]). 

Given the very different jurisdictions being exercised by the Fair Work Commission and this Court, I would not ordinarily address the reasoning in their decisions (and I doubt they would address the reasoning in mine). However, as the Henry plaintiffs sought to rely on the reasoning it is necessary to record why that judgment is of no assistance. 

First, the relevant parts of the decision relied on by the Henry plaintiffs do not address the case law concerning consent to a medical treatment. 

Second, the passages relied on and passages to similar effect throughout the judgment appear to contain assertions about the efficacy and safety of COVID-19 vaccines and other aspects of the public health response to COVID-19 that were not reflected in the evidence that I found persuasive in this case and as far as I can ascertain were not the subject of evidence in that case. 

Third, elsewhere in her reasons, the Deputy President considered it necessary to opine on matters affecting either the validity or the appropriateness of making the Aged Care Order under the PHA (at [147] to [173]). The function of determining its validity is for this Court to discharge and the function of determining whether it should have been made is for the political process. The Fair Work Commission has neither function. 

Fourth, the Deputy President’s judgment concludes with a number of clarion calls imploring “all Australians” to do things such as “vigorously oppose the introduction of a system or medical apartheid and segregation” (at [182]) and “vigorously oppose the ongoing censorship of any views that question the current policies regarding COVID” (at [183]). Political pamphlets have their place but I doubt that the Fair Work Commission is one of them. They are not authorities for legal propositions. 

In the end result, provisions such as clause 4.3 and 5.8 do not amount to a violation of anyone’s right to bodily integrity but instead impede their freedom of movement which has consequential effects on their ability to work. Freedom of movement is undoubtedly important, although it is not necessarily some form of positive right. Regardless, the PHA is clearly directed to limiting that freedom, sometimes severely.

Dumps

Another 'we didn't bother to clear the filing cabinets' inciodent, with the ABC reporting 'confidential documents including child protection information were dumped at a Darwin tip last week when the Northern Territory Families department threw out old filing cabinets'. 

 The documents were inside old filing cabinets discarded by Territory Families during an office clean-out Members of the public who find any of the documents are urged to come forward It is possible some of those documents are now out in the community after some cabinets were sold from the tip's on-site shop over the weekend. 

Territory Families, Housing and Communities has since launched an investigation into how the sensitive information ended up at Darwin's Shoal Bay Waste Management facility. Nicole Hurwood, acting chief executive of Territory Families, said the agency believed the documents were thrown out on October 7 during an office clean-up when leftover or broken office cabinets were dumped at the tip. 

She said it became aware of the mistake on Monday and arranged to have the office cabinets immediately secured and then searched to retrieve any documents. Territory Families was now working to identify and contact anyone whose private information may have been dumped at the tip by accident ... 

"Agency officers have discovered a range of different documents [at the tip], including corporate documents and some child protection documents," Ms Hurwood said on Friday. "What we do know at this stage is there [was] information relating to about six families and some lists with child protection information on them." 

She said the agency did not know if any of the the private documents have ended up in public hands, adding "there were cabinets sold from the Shoal Bay Recycling Centre over the weekend". "We will be relying on the public or the people who find those documents to come forward," she said, saying they should contact Territory Families' complaint line.

Hurwood indicates that Territory Families was undertaking an internal investigation to "minimise that risk from occurring again". The efficacy of that review is uncertain, given  that Territory Families lost dozens of confidential documents — including a child protection investigation, a child death file and other documents regarding clients and staff dating back to 2009— at the Alice Springs tip i. They were located in filing cabinets and pedestal drawers accidentally sent to the tip during an office relocation.

14 October 2021

Identity Crime

The ABC reports the arrest on the Gold Coast of a 45 year old woman, charged under the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law with pretending to be a doctor.

She had been issuing fake COVID-19 "medical exemption" certificates, allegedly issuing around 600 false certificates. 

 Police issued a search warrant on Wednesday morning for an address in Labrador and arrested the woman, who is from Darling Heights in the Toowoomba region. 

She was charged under Health Practitioner National Law with five counts of taking a title indicating a person is a health practitioner.

In this instance there is coverage under Health Practitioner Regulation National Law (Queensland) ss 113, 115, 116, 117 and 118 alongside associated advertising provisions.

The first conviction under the National Law was in 2014, with Jayne Walton being prosecuted by the Australian Health Practitioner Regulation Agency (AHPRA), found guilty of using the title ‘psychologist’ and claiming to be a registered psychologist, and ordered to pay fines totaling $20,000. Other health practitioner title offences - a form of identity crime - are noted elsewhere in this blog, for example here.

The woman is reported as having charged $150 per fake certificate and claim that "her interpretation of the legislation" authorises her to issue the certificates even thougfh she is not a registered practitioner. It is unclear if people who paid for the certificates were aware they were not genuine; purchasers who were aware that the certificates were fake could potentially be charged with fraud-related offences. 

Subsequent reports indicate that the woman recently gained a doctorate in Professional Research (Addiction) at the University of Southern Queensland, claims experience as a patient in psychiatric institutions in four countries and is a "spiritual insights" and recovery coach. 

Her Amazon books profile states 

She now spends her days with her life partner and spiritual advisor, Venerable Monk Xu. They have joined forces to ensure their mission reaches a higher purpose and together have opened a small sanctuary that seeks to spiritually enlighten, train (body mastery), teach and coach hundreds of people to turn away from addiction and live a life of dedication and purpose. 

She continually fills her mind with self-development, educational and academic pursuits of excellence and just recently completed her Master of Public Health (MPH) at University of Queensland (Ranked 47th Best University in the World). Her passion, Coaching With Substance is a registered Public Benevolent Institution with a charitable vision to eradicate the harms caused by addiction, addictive behaviours and co-morbid mental illnesses, one client at a time. As the Founder, she spends her waking moments dedicated to her cause & life purpose.

13 October 2021

Hacking

'The Simulation of Scandal: Hack-and-Leak Operations, the Gulf States, and U.S. Politics' by James Shires in (2020) 3(4) Texas National Security Review 10–29 comments 

Four hack-and-leak operations in U.S. politics between 2016 and 2019, publicly attributed to the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia, should be seen as the “simulation of scandal" — deliberate attempts to direct moral judgment against their target. Although “hacking” tools enable easy access to secret information, they are a double-edged sword, as their discovery means the scandal becomes about the hack itself, not about the hacked information. There are wider consequences for cyber competition in situations of constraint where both sides are strategic partners, as in the case of the United States and its allies in the Persian Gulf. 

Hack-and-leak operations (HLO) are a new frontier in digital forms of foreign interference, epitomized by the success of Russian intelligence agencies in obtaining and disseminating documents from the Democratic National Committee (DNC) during the 2016 U.S. presidential election campaign.1 HLO and other information operations are widely seen as a severe threat to liberal democratic structures and U.S. policymakers have mobilized significant resources in response, including threat intelligence and cyber security protections, increased election and voting security, legislative pressure on social media companies, and even offensive cyber attacks. 

This “whole-of-nation” approach is largely based on the events of the 2016 U.S. election, and specifically Russian interference in the election process. However, it is hard to pinpoint the exact impact of the Russian disinformation operations. Controversial candidates, a combative and polarized media environment, and entrenched economic and social divisions were all key factors in the 2016 election result. Furthermore, foreign interest in the U.S. election was not limited to the Russian government; other state and nonstate actors also sought to influence candidate campaigns in their favor. The danger is that academic and policy understandings of HLO are over-reliant on a single case. This article therefore asks: How do other HLO cases alter our understanding of this new phenomenon, including motives, means, and consequences? 

HLO occur frequently worldwide, but their political contexts vary widely and have uncertain implications for U.S. politics.6 Consequently, this article expands our understanding of HLO through a detailed qualitative analysis of four operations that targeted political figures in the United States in the period following the DNC operation (October 2016 to January 2019), thus keeping the political and media environment constant as far as possible. These cases replicate many of the striking features of the DNC operation: access through phishing, the release of large collections of emails, publication in national media outlets, and even direct references to “DCLeaks,” the identity assumed by the Russian intelligence agencies to disseminate the DNC documents. These cases have been publicly attributed to governments in the Middle East, namely Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and thus broaden conceptions of digital foreign interference to allies as well as adversaries. 

This article argues that HLO are the “simulation of scandal”: deliberate attempts to direct public moral judgment against their target. The success of HLO depends on the shifting power dynamic between the scandal-maker and the scandal-subject, referred to in Arabic as kāshif and makshūf, respectively. At the center of this dynamic are the digital technologies used to obtain and release secret information. These hacking tools are a double-edged sword, as their discovery often means the scandal becomes about the hack itself, not about the hacked information; in other words, the kāshif becomes the makshūf. These cases also highlight other overlooked aspects of HLO: the utility of “activist” cover, the involvement of new actors such as public relations (PR) agencies and law firms, and the leaker’s wary reliance on mistrustful relationships with traditional media. Finally, the article identifies wider consequences for cyber competition in situations of constraint where both sides are strategic partners. In such situations, HLO offer a powerful but indirect and unpredictable means of influence. 

The first section places HLO within the literature on cyber conflict and information operations. The second section draws on sociological accounts of mediatized and digitalized leaks to explore the simulation of scandal. The rest of the article concerns the four case studies: The third section provides an overview of each case; the fourth analyzes their coverage in prominent media outlets; and the fifth discusses reasons behind their differing effects. A conclusion places this discussion in a broader strategic context, highlights limitations, and suggests further work.

GDPR and CCPA

'Catalyzing Privacy Law' by Anupam Chander, Margot E. Kaminski and William McGeveran in (2021) Minnesota Law Review comments 

When the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) took effect in May 2018, it positioned the European Union as the world’s privacy champion. A flurry of emails updating privacy policies landed in in-boxes across the globe, attesting to the international reach of the European rule.  A month later, California enacted the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA), establishing the nation’s most stringent omnibus privacy protections, effective as of January 1, 2020. California, the home of many of the world’s largest data-based enterprises, emerged as a dark horse contender in the privacy regulator race. In the past year, state after state considered broad data privacy legislation, and eleven comprehensive federal privacy bills were introduced in Congress. 

What is catalyzing U.S. privacy law? The conventional wisdom holds that Europe is setting the global standard for information privacy. There is much truth to this—some 142 countries and counting now have a broad data privacy law, typically modeled on the GDPR. Scholars writing insightfully about the global race to information privacy have tracked the spread of data privacy laws across the world, noting Europe’s influence on these developments.  In a recent article, Paul Schwartz observes that the European Union pioneered international privacy law to enable commerce among nations within the bloc itself. He argues that other countries largely adopted the European Union’s data privacy model, reflecting its “success in the marketplace of ideas.” 

Schwartz cites the CCPA as an example of Europe’s success in spurring other jurisdictions to enact similar laws. Journalists reporting on the CCPA’s enactment, too, have frequently referred to it as “GDPR lite” and “California’s version of GDPR.” And as the push for federal legislation intensifies, many characterize it as a national response to the GDPR. 

This Article challenges this emerging consensus. Despite decades of European privacy law, the United States showed little appetite until now for broad privacy legislation.  Instead, norm entrepreneurs in California helped establish a new privacy framework that, as we show, differs significantly—and consciously—from the European model. Our close comparison of the new California and European laws reveals that the CCPA is not simply GDPR-lite: it is both more and less demanding on various points. It offers a fundamentally different regime for data privacy. And the numerous legislative proposals in state houses show greater fealty to California’s model than to the European antecedent.  Bills pending before Congress reflect pressure not from Brussels, but from Sacramento. 

Thus, California has emerged as a kind of privacy superregulator, catalyzing privacy law in the United States. Rather than the supranational EU, the subnational state of California — and, more specifically, a small network of determined individuals within that state — is now driving privacy in a significant part of the world. The emergence of the CCPA demonstrates the central role of local networks and norm entrepreneurship, contesting on the ground of what we call “data globalization.”  

We are thus witnessing a paradigm shift in the policy conversation around data privacy law. Until now, the rules of transatlantic privacy rested on awkward negotiated mechanisms to transfer data between two seemingly irreconcilable regimes. Now we are witnessing what might be characterized as a regulatory race on both sides of the ocean. 

This Article is the first to critically evaluate the relationship between California’s privacy law, Europe’s data protection regulation, and possible future state and federal privacy law.  This study is also of practical interest, answering questions for individuals and businesses alike: For businesses, whose laws should I follow? For individuals, who will protect my privacy? Studying these questions leads, in turn, to another set of inquiries about the ways in which catalysis from the GDPR and CCPA govern privacy outside either Europe or California. When Europe’s laws meet California’s, who wins? If indeed European or Californian regulation will be applied globally de facto, why then should anyone else legislate? 

The answers to all of these questions have implications not only for the shape of information privacy law but for understanding inter-jurisdictional regulatory dynamics in the digital economy. While data shares some characteristics with cars, pollution, and corporate charters—all the subject of prior globalizations of legal compliance and legal rules — it also differs because of its simultaneous and instantaneous global effects. Data disobeys borders and operates at Internet speed. Equally important, the answers to these questions shed light on the prospects of countries across the world as they vie for advantage in the information age. Ultimately, our account of privacy catalysis tests the operation of both federalism and international regulatory competition in the twenty-first century. Our analysis proceeds as follows. Part I situates our discussion of regulatory catalysis in data privacy within the broader frame of the theory of regulatory competition, borrowing lessons from areas such as corporate and environmental law. Part II compares the substance of the GDPR and the CCPA and the ways in which their structures promote catalysis in other jurisdictions. Part III turns to the race for data privacy law. We are the first to disentangle the catalytic effects on U.S. federal and state laws coming from both Brussels and Sacramento and to show that the resulting proposals are distinctly American and owe a greater debt to the CCPA than to the GDPR. As it once did with pioneering environmental regulation, California has emerged as a super-regulator again, this time with respect to data in the information age.

Courts

'The Rise of Judicial Self-Governance in the New Millennium' by Tim Bunjevac in (2021) 44(3) Melbourne University Law Review 412 comments 

A vast majority of court systems in the world are managed by the executive government, but a small and growing number of jurisdictions, including Victoria, South Australia and the Australian federal courts, have transitioned to judicial management of the court system. This article analyses the emergence of new institutions of judicial self-governance in Australia and overseas, with a particular emphasis on the establishment and regulation of judicial councils and judicial management boards inside judge-managed courts. The article also provides an introductory overview of the emerging scholarly discipline of judicial self-governance by identifying a range of unexplored institutional design questions and research directions for consideration and adaptation by Australian scholars who may be interested in examining the regulation of judge-managed institutions from a legal, political, institutional, managerial or constitutional perspective. 

 Bunjevac asks 

Imagine that you have been appointed professor of constitutional law or political science at a leading university in a particular country. You are asked to analyse a major court system reform that was introduced five years ago, which placed the judiciary in charge of the operational management of the court system. From the legislative provisions, you establish that the Reform Act was formally passed in Parliament in 2014, but are unable to gather any information about any consultations with the general public, legal profession, research institutes, non-government organisations or the academy in the lead-up to the reform. A brief media release states that the reform was approved following a closed consultation process involving only a handful of senior court officials and the government. 

Through your research you establish that no law lecturer, professor, management expert, barrister, solicitor, prosecutor or judge commented on the Bill when it was introduced in Parliament, even though the proposed changes were intended to have a significant impact on the administration of justice in this country. Similarly, none of the major media outlets had shown any interest, and you are unable to locate any pre-reform media interviews with the chief protagonists, despite the fact that the changes directly affected the way in which hundreds of millions of dollars in public money were to be expended every year. 

As you continue your research, you realise that even today little is known about the inner workings of the reformed judicial institutions or the way in which the changes have impacted upon the constitutional separation of powers. No empirical research or official evaluation of the reform has been undertaken by anyone, although there are rumours that unnamed court officials recently prevented a researcher from conducting an empirical evaluation of the reform on questionable grounds. 

You turn your attention to ordinary officers who perform day-to-day tasks in the court system and find that most of them are working under relentless pressure, and that their levels of psychological distress are significantly higher than that among the general population. Disturbingly, you also learn that several judicial and court officers recently committed suicide, reportedly due to their ‘unrelenting workloadand ‘abuse of power’ by a presiding judge. 

Is this another ‘vignette from a banana republic or a central European backwater recently emerged from authoritarian rule?’ In fact, this fictional story is partly based on actual events surrounding the landmark court system reform in Victoria, which introduced judicial self-governance in the courts and established an independent judicial council called Court Services Victoria (‘CSV’) in 2014. Victoria thus joined South Australia and the Australian federal courts as members of a select group of jurisdictions from around the world, where judges are fully in charge of court administration and seemingly in control of their own institutional destiny. In practical terms, this means that judges are now responsible not only for their traditional administrative arrangements that focus on case management and legal procedure; they also have assumed the responsibility to act as executive managers and policymakers for the financial, technical, administrative and human resources operations of the entire court system. Above all, judges are now responsible for generating new solutions that will improve the administration of justice and respond to a myriad of well-documented challenges that they inherited from the government-run system of court administration. But are judges and judge-managed institutions in a position to meet these expectations? No empirical studies have been conducted into the wider systemic effects of judicial self-governance in any Australian jurisdiction where it was introduced, despite a number of early-warning signals that warranted at least a scholarly enquiry. This article argues that the apparent lack of academic, political or general interest in this area is a concerning trend that may ultimately have unforeseen consequences for judicial independence and the administration of justice in this country. As recent experiences from a diverse group of international jurisdictions demonstrate, the institutional self-governance of the judiciary is not necessarily a ‘one-way path and an unquestionable good’; it can be ‘reduced and even abused’, especially if judges fail to develop the necessary administrative capacity to manage the court system in a more challenging institutional and political environment. 

Accordingly, the principal aim of this article is to invite the Australian academic community to contribute to this process and take a closer look at the emerging institutions and scholarly discipline of judicial self-governance. Many important issues are at stake. First, what do we know about the concept of judicial independence in the age of judicial self-governance? While the traditional constitutional law lens has been preoccupied with the judiciary’s perennial quest for independence from the executive government, the evolving power of judges in court management and the establishment of judicial administrative formations have received ‘far less attention’, at least when compared to contemporary international scholarship in this area. Two of the most ambitious empirical studies of judicial self-governance that were conducted in the United Kingdom (‘UK’) (2011–15) and Europe (2016–20)  have practically gone unnoticed in Australian constitutional law circles, even though they pointed out ‘huge’ policy and constitutional law implications of judicial self-governance. 

Second, not much is known about the inner workings of the newly-established judicial institutions, such as judicial councils, judicial commissions or judicial management boards inside courts. This is a prospective area for scholarly enquiry, as most of these institutions have been chronically under-researched, while others have been classified as sui generis.  It is perhaps due to their unique position within the judicial arm of government that these institutions have largely escaped the attention of empirical researchers from more established scholarly disciplines in Australia, such as political science, law, corporate governance, public administration and the organisational sciences. As a result, little empirical information is available about the internal operation of the judge-managed institutions or their broader systemic role within the court systems. 

Undertaking scholarly research in this area will necessitate clear identification of the institutional ‘organs’ of judicial self-governance and detailed mapping of the courts’ internal divisions, stakeholders, rules and ‘constitutions’. These issues are explored, from a normative perspective, in Part I of this article, which seeks to examine the newly-established ‘judicial management boards’ in the Supreme and County Courts of Victoria following their transfer to judicial self-governance. However, as Kosař points out, only by conducting empirical research inside courts will we be able to fully understand the multitude of factors that can contribute to the ‘rise and fall of judicial self-governance’ and place us in a position to devise best-practice organisational solutions for the future. Over time, our research may even lead us to the development of an organic theory of judicial self-governance, perhaps initially through the adaptation of concepts borrowed from corporate governance and public administration theory. 

Third, as the recent series of tragic events in the Victorian court system demonstrate, it is insufficient to direct our scientific enquiry at the normative, administrative and institutional levels alone; we must also analyse the personal experiences of individual judges and others within the judicial management structures to ascertain whether their actual role corresponds to that assigned to them on paper (if one is specified at all). Issues of psychological stress, wellbeing, independence and impartiality are most relevant in this context, but so are issues about judges’ competence to act as effective managers while addressing complex operational, procedural and case management tasks in their everyday work routines. Judicial leaders, academic researchers and court system stakeholders ought to be interested to know whether court officials have up-to-date knowledge about the latest international developments in areas such as caseflow management and workload measurement, which are the key to improving the effectiveness of court operations. 

This takes us to the next important issue at stake: how can any identified problems and capability gaps be addressed, and by whom? Most courts in Australia do not possess the necessary resources, know-how or methodological prowess to undertake complex empirical studies that measure how different types of cases are impacting the use of judicial and administrative resources.  Should this task ideally be undertaken by the court staff, managing judges, the judicial council, management consultancy firms, academics or someone else? Unfortunately, there are few — if any — court-system researchers in this country with the required technical expertise to manage such projects on their own. This is partly due to the fact that the latest, state-of-the art workload measurement systems employ sophisticated ‘casemix’ and artificial intelligence (‘AI’) technology that was originally developed for other industries.  To address this ‘capability gap’, Part II of this article identifies the need for comparative empirical research into the jurisdictions that have successfully introduced such systems in courts, using a multidisciplinary approach to investigate the difficult questions involved in establishing such systems that have been identified in the literature: technological, procedural, managerial, legal and ethical issues. 

Finally, for constitutional law scholars and political science researchers who are perhaps more theoretically-inclined, the emergence of institutions of judicial self-governance prompts a range of unexplored constitutional theory questions that have only recently been identified by international scholars. The central research question in this area will be to examine how the transition to judicial self-governance has changed the constitutional separation of powers. Part III of this article places this issue in the Victorian context by pointing out that the Victorian legislation does not regulate the powers of the Minister towards the judicial council and courts, and there are also no provisions that envisage any formal institutional interaction between the self-managed judiciary and Parliament. By contrast, the availability of explicit statutory guarantees of ongoing institutional engagement between the three branches of government was seen as being pivotal to protecting judicial independence in the UK following the landmark constitutional reform that took place in that country in 2005. Australian research that examined the impact of the Victorian reform on the ability of the judiciary to secure adequate funding, protect institutional independence and maintain adequate visibility in a crowded political arena would make a valuable contribution to this field . 

Another constitutional ‘crisis point’ is also conceivable — that the self-managed judiciary has become too independent, indolent, unresponsive or unwilling to engage with the government, Parliament or other stakeholders. Accordingly, there is also a need for future research to examine how the ‘politics of judicial independence’ have played out in the new institutional environment: what formal or informal arrangements are in place to ensure that the new institutions of judicial self-governance remain ‘responsive’ to the needs of government and other justice system stakeholders whose work is intricately connected with the work of the courts? A further aspect that could be investigated in this area is whether there are any ‘hidden guardians’ of judicial independence within the other two branches of government, such as the parliamentary select committees, Presiding Officers, Auditor-General’s and Victorian Government Solicitor’s offices, departmental officials and others. 

As the introductory overview of this article demonstrates, the establishment of new institutions of judicial self-governance necessitates a new scholarly agenda that goes beyond the traditional categories of ‘judicial councils’ or desktop analyses of the ‘models’ of court governance. Much more empirical work is needed to allow us to fully understand the growing international phenomenon of judicial self-governance with all of its dimensions, values, motivations and complexities. Indeed, as the concluding Part of this article points out, European scholars have already started ‘unpacking’ the discipline of judicial self-governance into smaller units, such as judicial councils, informal self-governance, ‘digital’ self-governance, ‘information’ self-governance, ‘regulatory’ self-governance, and ‘ethical’ self-governance of the judiciary. This article offers an initial contribution to this process in Australia by identifying a range of unexplored institutional design questions and research directions for consideration and adaptation by Australian scholars who may be interested in examining the regulation of judge-managed institutions from a legal, political, institutional, managerial or constitutional perspective.