26 October 2021

Casino Regulation

The report of the Royal Commission into the Casino Operator and Licence (aka the Finkelstein inquiry into Melbourne's Crown Casino) offers a bleak view of governance

The report states that the Royal Commission was

 established to inquire into, and report on, the suitability of Crown Melbourne to hold its casino licence. The precursor was two findings in the Bergin Report: Crown Melbourne facilitated millions of dollars to be laundered through a bank account of its subsidiary. Crown Melbourne allowed operators with links to organised crime to arrange for junket players to gamble at the casino. The main focus of the Commission’s inquiries was to discover whether the misconduct identified in the Bergin Report was more widespread and, if it was, who was involved and what should be done. 

Within a very short time, the Commission discovered that for many years Crown Melbourne had engaged in conduct that is, in a word, disgraceful. This is a convenient shorthand for describing conduct that was variously illegal, dishonest, unethical and exploitative. The catalogue of wrongdoing is alarming, all the more so because it was engaged in by a regulated entity whose privilege to hold a casino licence is dependent upon it being, at all times, a person of good character, honesty and integrity. 

It is difficult to grade the seriousness of the misconduct. Some was so callous that it is hard to imagine it could be engaged in by such a well-known corporation whose Melbourne Casino Complex is visited by millions annually. 

A trigger for the Bergin Inquiry was the arrest in October 2016 of 19 China-based Crown staff, and the subsequent imprisonment of 16 of those staff. The staff had been illegally promoting gambling in Australia to Chinese residents who would gamble large sums. Crown executives were warned that Chinese officials intended to crack down on this activity. Yet they did nothing to protect their staff. Despite knowing that staff who worked in Indonesia, Malaysia, Taiwan and Singapore were also likely contravening their local laws, Crown let them carry out promotional activities as the chance of them being charged was not significant. To have done so after the China arrests is nothing short of appalling. 

Crown’s underpayment of casino tax shows a similar disregard of the law. In 2011, Crown Melbourne embarked upon a plan to minimise its casino tax by claiming as a deduction amounts that its internal and external lawyers said were not, or were probably not, deductible items. The plan involved concealing from the regulator the true nature of the deductions for fear of getting caught. In the end the plan failed when its existence was exposed by the Commission. Already, over $61.5 million in back taxes and interest has been repaid. More is likely due. 

Not only was Crown Melbourne content to breach local laws, it also happily assisted its wealthy Chinese patrons to breach the currency laws of their country. Between 2012 and 2016, those patrons transferred up to $160 million from accounts in China to the Crown Towers Hotel. Purportedly this was to pay for hotel services, but in reality it was to spend at the gambling tables. In addition to Crown Melbourne assisting to breach Chinese currency laws, what occurred also contravened local laws and likely allowed money laundering to take place. 

Crown Melbourne’s relationship with the regulator provides more evidence of its indifference to acceptable conduct. Over the years the regulator conducted several investigations into Crown Melbourne’s affairs. Instead of cooperating with those investigations in the manner that is expected of a regulated entity, Crown Melbourne took the opposite tack. It bullied the regulator. It provided it with false or misleading information. It delayed the investigatory process. All in all, it took what steps it could to frustrate the regulator’s investigations. 

Perhaps the most damning discovery by the Commission is the manner in which Crown Melbourne deals with the many vulnerable people who have a gambling problem. The cost to the community of problem gambling is enormous. It is not only the gambler who suffers. It also affects many other people, and institutions. 

Crown Melbourne had for years held itself out as having a world’s best approach to problem gambling. Nothing can be further from the truth. The Commission heard many distressing stories from people whose lives were ruined by gambling but whose situation might have been improved if casino staff had carried out their obligations under Crown Melbourne’s Gambling Code. 

The Commission looked for reasons to explain why Crown Melbourne acted as it did. Not all the reasons are known. But some stand out. First, Crown Melbourne’s board failed to carry out one of its prime responsibilities; namely, to ensure that the organisation satisfied its legal and regulatory obligations. Perhaps the board was not told what was going on. The alternative, to adopt an old expression from the railroad industry, is that the board ‘fell asleep at the wheel’. 

Second, many senior executives involved in the misconduct were indifferent to their ethical, moral and sometimes legal obligations. Some were motivated by a drive for profit. Some simply did what they did because they could. Third and regrettably, both internal and external lawyers who knew that Crown Melbourne was wanting to engage in conduct that contravened some laws failed to counsel Crown Melbourne not to go ahead. They would say this is not the function of a lawyer, whose only role is to advise on what the law is. While that might sometimes be a defensible position, it cannot be right when the client/employer is a regulated entity that must remain of good repute, having regard to its ‘character, honesty and integrity’. 

Last, there is the Packer/CPH influence. This was dealt with in great detail by the Hon. Patricia Bergin, AO, SC who found that their influence encouraged Crown to put profit ahead of other motives for action. The Packer/CPH influence was only touched upon during this Commission’s inquiries and then largely through the evidence given by Crown’s directors. That evidence confirmed Ms Bergin, SC’s views. When these facts came to light, it was inevitable that Crown Melbourne would be found unsuitable to hold its casino licence. No other finding was open. The only difficult question was what should be done in that circumstance. 

Deciding what to recommend was a demanding task. It required the weighing up of two almost irreconcilable positions. On one side, there was the overriding need to maintain the integrity of the licensing system. That requires the cancellation of a casino licence held by an unsuitable person. On the other side, there were two factors: the risk that cancellation of Crown Melbourne’s licence would cause considerable harm to the Victorian economy and innocent third parties; and whether, in a short time, Crown Melbourne could so ‘remake’ itself that it would once again become suitable to hold a casino licence. 

In reality there is no correct view. It was simply necessary to make a recommendation knowing that whatever the decision, there will be legitimate criticism from those who would go the other way. 

Although Crown Melbourne rightly deserves criticism for its past misconduct, and no one connected with the organisation is entitled to much sympathy, what tipped the balance against the cancellation of its licence was that Crown Melbourne has, at great financial cost, embarked on a significant reform program led by people of good will and skill. The program is likely to succeed. If it does, that will be to the benefit of Victoria. 

Important steps towards reform have been taken. Most significant among them is the appointment of a new board and new and highly motivated senior executives. 

Still, the road forward will not be easy. If the recommendations are accepted, Crown Melbourne will not be in control of its own destiny. For the next two years, the ultimate decision maker at Crown Melbourne will be a Special Manager. This manager, most likely a firm, will oversee all aspects of the casino’s operations. It will keep a watchful eye on the progress of reform. It will make sure that all rules and regulations are complied with. It will investigate particular aspects of the casino’s operations. 

At the end of the two-year period, the Special Manager will report what has occurred to the regulator. The regulator will then decide whether it is ‘clearly satisfied’ that Crown Melbourne has returned to suitability. This will be a tough test to satisfy. The regulator will be tasked to make its decision ‘on the papers’. That is, there will be no further inquiries. The regulator will undertake its task by reference only to the results of the three inquiries into the Crown companies that have been carried out or are presently underway and the reports of the Special Manager. 

If, after taking that material into account, the regulator is not ‘clearly satisfied’ that Crown Melbourne is suitable to hold its casino licence, the licence will be cancelled forthwith.

The Report states 

My Terms of Reference raise a number of questions. Those questions and my answers are: 

Q: Whether Crown Melbourne is a suitable person to continue to hold the casino licence under the Casino Control Act. A: No. 

Q: Whether Crown Melbourne is complying with the Casino Control Act, the Casino (Management Agreement) Act, the Gambling Regulation Act (together with any regulations or other instruments made under any of those Acts), and any other applicable laws. A: No. Crown Melbourne has contravened the Casino Control Act in various respects and has contravened the Casino (Management Agreement) Act in various respects. The details are found in Part 2 of this Report. 

Q: Whether Crown Melbourne is complying with the Crown Melbourne Contracts. A: No. Crown Melbourne has contravened provisions of the Management Agreement and the Casino Agreement. The details are found in Part 2 of this Report. 

Q: Whether it is in the public interest for Crown Melbourne to continue to hold the casino licence in Victoria. A: Not necessary to answer. 

Q: If you consider that Crown Melbourne is not a suitable person, or that it is not in the public interest for Crown Melbourne to hold the casino licence in Victoria, what action (if any) would be required for Crown Melbourne to become a suitable person, or for it to be in the public interest for Crown Melbourne to continue to hold the casino licence in Victoria. A: I recommend that the Casino Control Act be amended to create the position of a Special Manager with power to oversee and exercise control over the affairs of a casino operator who has been found to be unsuitable. In relation to Crown Melbourne, the Special Manager should be appointed to oversee and control its affairs for a period of two years. At the end of that period, the regulator should determine whether it is clearly satisfied that Crown Melbourne has become a suitable person to hold its casino licence and that it is in the public interest for it to do so. Details are explained in Chapter 16. 

Q: Whether Crown Resorts is a Suitable Associate of Crown Melbourne. A: No. 

Q: If you consider that Crown Resorts is not a Suitable Associate of Crown Melbourne, what action (if any) would be required for Crown Resorts to become a Suitable Associate of Crown Melbourne. A: No action is required. If, in two years, the regulator decides that Crown Melbourne is a suitable person to continue to hold its casino licence, it is likely that Crown Resorts will be a suitable associate of Crown Melbourne. 

Q: Whether any other existing associates of Crown Melbourne are not Suitable Associates of Crown Melbourne. A: It is unlikely that James Packer and the CPH group are presently associates of Crown Melbourne. However, they will become associates on the expiry of the undertakings they have given to the Independent Liquor and Gaming Authority (NSW). Details are explained in Chapter 20. 

Q: If you consider that any other existing associates of Crown Melbourne are not Suitable Associates of Crown Melbourne, what action (if any) would be required for those persons to become Suitable Associates of Crown Melbourne. A: Although the CPH group is not currently an associate of Crown Melbourne, I recommend that the Casino Control Act be amended to require the group to reduce its shareholding in Crown Resorts from its current 37 per cent holding to less than a 5 per cent holding. In that event, neither Mr Packer nor the CPH group will become an associate of Crown Melbourne after their undertakings to ILGA have expired. 

Q: Whether you consider changes to relevant Victorian legislation, including the Casino Control Act and the Victorian Commission for Gambling and Liquor Regulation Act, as well as the Crown Melbourne Contracts, are necessary for the State to address your findings and implement your recommendations. A: Yes. The details of all proposed legislative and other changes are found in my recommendations. 

Q: Whether there are any other matters necessary to satisfactorily resolve the matters set out above. A: Yes. The details are found in my recommendations.

The consequent recommendations have two main objectives -  to add to the regulator’s power to obtain information and to create the office of a Special Manager, who may be appointed by the Minister or the regulator to take control of a casino in certain limited circumstances. 

Specific recommendations are

Recommendation 20: New powers for the regulator 

It is recommended that the Casino Control Act be amended to permit the regulator: to require any person attending for an examination under section 26(1)(c) to answer questions on oath or affirmation in addition to the powers conferred by section 26, to require a casino operator or an associate to provide it with a written statement (verified on oath or affirmation) containing such information as the regulator reasonably requires to carry out its duties or perform its functions to make a costs order in respect of any action under section 20 to require the casino operator to retain at its own cost and pay for a suitably qualified expert: approved by the regulator engaged on terms approved by the regulator to inquire into and report to the regulator on any matter the regulator reasonably requires to carry out its duties or perform its functions to direct the casino operator to provide the expert with all information the expert reasonably requires to require the casino operator to comply with any recommendation made by the regulator as a result of an investigation under section 25. 

Recommendation 21: Special Manager 

It is recommended that the Casino Control Act be amended to the following effect: The regulator has power by an instrument in writing to appoint a Special Manager to oversee the affairs of the casino operator: if the regulator is directed to do so by the Minister; or where it appears to the regulator that at least one of the following situations exist: there are reasonable grounds to suspect that the casino operator has contravened, in a material respect, a provision of its casino licence, the Casino Control Act, or any agreement entered into under sections 15 or 142 of the Casino Control Act the casino operator is or may no longer be a suitable person to hold a casino licence it is in the public interest because fraud, misfeasance or other misconduct by a person concerned with the affairs of the casino operator is alleged in any case it is in the public interest. The Special Manager: may be a body corporate or unincorporate if a body corporate or unincorporate, the Special Manager must nominate one or more individuals to carry out any of its functions that can only be undertaken by a natural person. The Special Manager must be qualified for appointment by virtue of their knowledge of, or experience in, industry, commerce, law or public administration. The instrument appointing the Special Manager must specify: the period of the appointment the terms and conditions (if any) to which the appointment is subject any particular functions the Special Manager is to perform any other matter the regulator considers appropriate if appointed at the direction of the Minister, any function specified in the Minister’s direction. The functions of the Special Manager shall be to: oversee the affairs of the casino operator including the casino operations carry out investigations that are specified in the instrument of appointment report to the regulator on any matter it has investigated otherwise comply with any direction in the instrument of appointment. The Special Manager or, if a body corporate or unincorporate, the nominated person(s), should have the following rights, privileges and powers: the rights and privileges of a director of the casino operator, but not the right to vote despite not having the right to vote, the power to: direct the board of directors of the casino operator to take particular action direct the board of directors of the casino operator to refrain from taking particular action if the Special Manager believes that the direction: is in the best interests of the casino operator or of the casino operations; or is necessary to secure compliance with any law or regulation governing the casino operator or the casino operations. A failure to comply with a direction should be a strict liability offence carrying a significant penalty. Without limiting its rights, privileges and powers, the Special Manager may: investigate the affairs of the casino operator and the casino operations attend meetings of the board of directors and any subcommittee of the board attend meetings of the casino operator’s management, including meetings of any audit committee and compliance committee inspect all the books and records of the casino operator obtain the advice of, or services from, any third party including experts require any director, officer, employee or agent of the casino operator to provide such information, including confidential or privileged information, as the Special Manager requires to carry out its duties. A person who fails to comply with a requirement to provide information will be guilty of a strict liability offence with a significant penalty. The court may direct the person to comply with the requirement. The Special Manager may carry out its functions, and any director or officer of the casino operator acting under the direction of the Special Manager must observe that direction, despite: the Corporations Act, except to the extent of any inconsistency the casino operator’s constitution. The Special Manager may if special circumstances arise, and if so directed by the regulator must, make interim reports to the regulator and on the termination of its appointment shall report its opinion on, or in relation to: the conduct of the casino operator and casino operations the particular affairs of the casino operator or casino operations that the instrument of appointment requires the Special Manager to investigate. A report may contain confidential or privileged information. A copy of any interim report and the final report must be forwarded to the Minister. Neither the Minister nor the regulator is to provide a copy of a report to any person unless it is in the public interest to do so. If the report contains information the subject of legal professional privilege, the privilege does not cease. The regulator must consider any interim report or the final report and decide what action, including disciplinary action, it should take. The costs and expenses of the Special Manager and any costs incurred by the regulator in connection with the Special Manager process must be paid by the casino operator. The Special Manager is to be given an indemnity by the State for properly incurred debts. If a Special Manager is appointed to Crown Melbourne: The regulator must within 90 days of receiving the Special Manager’s final report decide whether it is clearly satisfied that: Crown Melbourne has become a suitable person to continue to hold its casino licence; and it is in the public interest that Crown Melbourne’s casino licence should continue in force. The regulator must engage a senior counsel to assist in its deliberations. For the purposes of its decision, the regulator must only have regard to: the Bergin Report (and documents/evidence tendered) the Report of this Royal Commission (and documents/ evidence tendered) the Reports of the Perth Royal Commission (and documents/evidence tendered) the report(s) of the Special Manager. If the regulator is not clearly satisfied that: Crown Melbourne has become a suitable person to continue to hold its casino licence; and it is in the public interest that Crown Melbourne’s casino licence should continue in force, the casino licence granted to Crown Melbourne on 19 November 1993 under Part 2 of the Casino Control Act should forthwith be cancelled. If the regulator has not made a decision within 90 days of receiving the Special Manager’s final report, the casino licence should be cancelled forthwith. 

Recommendation 22: Appointment of the Special Manager 

It is recommended that the Minister direct the regulator to appoint the Special Manager to Crown Melbourne for a period of two years. The direction should specify the matters the Special Manager is required to investigate and report on. Those matters could include the following: details of each direction the Special Manager has given to members of the board whether the direction was complied with whether the casino operator has put in place appropriate policies, processes and structures to meet its obligations under the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act whether those Anti-Money Laundering/Counter-Terrorism Financing policies, processes and structures are being implemented whether the casino operator has put in place appropriate risk management policies, processes and structures whether those risk management policies, processes and structures are being implemented whether the casino operator has revised its Responsible Service of Gambling practices to take account of the concerns highlighted in this Commission’s Report whether the casino operator has adopted policies, processes and structures that will enable it to comply with its Responsible Gambling Code of Conduct in force whether the casino operator is complying with its Responsible Gambling Code of Conduct whether the casino operator is conducting its casino operations in a manner that has regard to the best operating practices in casinos of a similar size and nature to the Melbourne Casino whether the casino operator has conducted a ‘root cause’ analysis into the failures outlined in the Bergin Report and in the Report of this Commission, and what the findings were whether there is any evidence of maladministration whether there is any evidence of illegal or improper conduct whether the casino operator has engaged in any conduct that may give rise to a material contravention of any law the conduct of the casino operations generally. Further details of the matters the Special Manager could investigate are set out in Appendix I. 

Recommendation 23: Periodic review 

It is recommended that, if, following the receipt of the Special Manager’s report, the regulator does not cancel Crown Melbourne’s casino licence, the Casino Control Act be amended so that the next investigation due to be undertaken pursuant to section 25 of the Casino Control Act is deferred for at least three years. The manager The following recommendations are designed to assist a manager who is appointed to operate a casino on the cancellation or suspension of a casino licence. Currently, under the Casino Control Act, a manager must manage the casino on their own account. The recommendations will enable the manager to step into the shoes of the casino operator. They also prevent owners of personal property used in the casino operations from taking possession of their property while used by the manager. 

Recommendation 24: Additional functions and powers of the manager 

It is recommended that the Casino Control Act be amended to include the following provisions relating to the manager: Upon appointment the manager: has control of the casino operator’s casino operations and all the property used in those operations may carry on those operations and manage that property may dispose of any of the property used in the casino operations and pay the net proceeds of sale to the persons entitled to the proceeds may perform any function and exercise any power that the casino operator or any of its officers could have exercised in relation to the casino operations when performing a function or exercising a power as manager of the casino operator, is taken to be acting as the casino operator’s agent. The regulator is to determine the rate of compensation payable to the manager by the former casino operator and to approve the costs and expenses incurred by the manager. During the period of management, the former casino operator must: use its best endeavours to facilitate the operation of the casino within the casino complex afford the manager all appropriate rights, including rights of access and egress over the casino complex, as are necessary to enable the manager to operate a casino in the casino complex. The manager is to be given an indemnity by the State for properly incurred debts. 

Recommendation 25: Property rights of third parties 

It is recommended that the Casino Control Act be amended so that a third party cannot, without the regulator’s permission: enforce any security interest (as defined in the Corporations Act) over property that the manager retains for use in the casino’s operations take possession of any property retained by the manager for use in the casino’s operations levy execution on any judgment obtained against the former casino operator. Inspectors Inspectors are in attendance at the casino. These recommendations broaden the inspectors’ functions and give them additional powers. Their purpose is to ensure there is appropriate supervision of conduct on the casino floor and to assist in the detection of criminal activity. 

Recommendation 17: Functions of inspectors 

It is recommended that the Casino Control Act be amended to add to inspectors’ functions the following: to ascertain whether money laundering is taking place to ascertain whether loansharking is taking place to ascertain whether illicit drugs are being sold to make an exclusion order when appropriate on behalf of the casino operator, to withdraw a person’s licence to remain on the casino premises any other functions as are prescribed by regulation. 

Recommendation 18: Powers of inspectors 

It is recommended that the Casino Control Act be further amended so that: inspectors have free and unfettered access to all parts of the casino, all the surveillance equipment used by the casino operator, and all the books and records of the casino wherever they be located any interference with inspectors’ performance of their functions is to be a strict liability offence the contravention of which should carry a significant penalty. The casino operator These recommendations impose obligations on a casino operator to cooperate with the regulator and prohibit the casino operator from giving false or misleading information to the regulator. 

Recommendation 19: Cooperation with the regulator 

It is recommended that the Casino Control Act be amended: to oblige a casino operator to cooperate with the regulator in relation to the performance by the regulator of its functions. Cooperation requires the licensee to make full and frank disclosure of all information that relates to the performance by the regulator of a particular function to oblige the casino operator to notify the regulator of a material breach, or a likely material breach, of the Casino Control Act, the Casino (Management Agreement) Act, the Gambling Regulation Act, its Responsible Gambling Code of Conduct and any agreements made pursuant to sections 15 and 142 of the Casino Control Act. A breach or likely breach will be material having regard to, among other things, the number and frequency of similar previous breaches or likely breaches, the impact of the breach or likely breach and any other matter prescribed by regulation to prohibit the casino operator from making false or misleading statements or providing false or misleading material to the regulator to make a contravention of those obligations a strict liability offence that carries a significant penalty. Structure of the casino operator There are two reasons for these recommendations. One is to put a limit on the ownership of shares in a casino operator to prevent outside influence. The other is to secure the independence of the board and the senior management of the casino operator. 

Recommendation 28: Limit on shareholding 

It is recommended that the Casino Control Act be amended as follows: No person shall have or acquire a relevant interest in 5 per cent or more of the issued capital in a casino operator or 5 per cent or more of the issued capital in the holding company or intermediate holding company of which the casino operator is a subsidiary, without the regulator’s approval. If a person does hold or acquire a relevant interest in 5 per cent or more of the issued capital of a casino operator, or 5 per cent or more of the issued capital in the holding company or intermediate holding company of a casino operator without the regulator’s approval, that holding or acquisition should be deemed to be a breach by the casino operator of its casino licence. ‘Relevant interest’ should have the same meaning as in sections 608 and 609 of the Corporations Act. If the regulator requests the casino operator, its holding company or any intermediate holding company of a casino operator to take steps to discover who holds a relevant interest in the casino operator, or its holding company or any intermediate holding company and they fail to do so, that failure should be deemed to be a breach of the casino licence. The restriction on shareholding should not apply to any existing shareholding in Crown Resorts (at the current holding) and Crown Melbourne, other than CPH’s shareholding in Crown Resorts. It should apply to CPH with effect from September 2024. If a person contravenes the 5 per cent rule, the regulator may serve that person with a notice requiring the person to dispose of the relevant interest within a specified time. A failure to comply with the notice should be an offence with a significant penalty. In addition, the Supreme Court should have power to make any order it considers appropriate to secure compliance with the regulator’s notice, including an order directing the person to dispose of any relevant interest. 

Recommendation 29: An independent board 

It is recommended that the Casino Control Act be amended to impose an obligation that a casino operator must have a majority of its board as independent directors, including independent of any ultimate or intermediate holding company. 

Recommendation 30: Independence of senior management 

For the avoidance of any doubt about the construction of the Casino Agreement, it is recommended that the Casino Control Act be amended so that: the board of a casino operator is not permitted to delegate any of its functions to any person or body of persons other than a subcommittee of the board or an individual director the casino operator must appoint a full-time: chief executive officer (however described) chief financial officer (however described) chief operating officer (however described) heads of Gaming, Surveillance, International and Domestic VIP Business and Compliance (however described) and ensure that those persons do not report to, or take instructions from, any person or group of persons other than the board of the casino operator or an officer of the casino operator the Minister has power to vary these requirements. The amending legislation should make clear that it does not diminish any of the other obligations imposed by clauses 22 and 28 of the Casino Agreement. Money laundering The following recommendations are designed to reduce the incidence of money laundering in a casino. They cover junkets, carded and cashless play, the proper identification of customers, and enhanced cooperation with law enforcement agencies. 

Recommendation 2: Carded play 

It is recommended that a direction be given to Crown Melbourne pursuant to section 23(1) of the Casino Control Act to the effect that carded play be compulsory at the Melbourne Casino for all gaming. 

Recommendation 3: Cashless play 

It is recommended that a direction be given to Crown Melbourne pursuant to section 23(1) of the Casino Control Act to the effect that Crown Melbourne phase out the use of cash at the Melbourne Casino, save for gaming transactions of $1,000 or less. 

Recommendation 1: Improved identification 

It is recommended that section 122 of the Casino Control Act be amended to include a new sub-paragraph for procedures for the verification of the identity of all persons seeking to enter the Melbourne Casino. The system should include requirements for the retention of customer data. 

Recommendation 6: Single patron bank account 

It is recommended that a direction be given to Crown Melbourne pursuant to section 23(1) of the Casino Control Act to the effect that on and from 30 June 2022, it must keep and maintain a single account as approved by the regulator at an authorised deposit-taking institution in the state for use for all banking transactions by patrons. 

Recommendation 8: Regulation of junkets 

It is recommended that the Casino Control Act be amended to prohibit a casino operator from dealing with junket tour operators. 

Recommendation 7: Surveillance footage 

It is recommended a direction be given to Crown Melbourne pursuant to section 23(1) of the Casino Control Act to the effect that it retain all security and surveillance CCTV footage for a period of 12 months. 

Recommendation 4: Information sharing with state law enforcement 

It is recommended that a direction be given to Crown Melbourne pursuant to section 23(1) of the Casino Control Act to the effect that it enter into an information-sharing protocol with Victoria Police. The protocol must set out, to the satisfaction of Victoria Police, the information-sharing arrangements between Crown Melbourne and Victoria Police, which against the background of what Victoria Police needs, prescribes what information Crown Melbourne must provide, and the format and timeframes for the provision of that information. 

Recommendation 5: Information sharing with federal law enforcement 

It is recommended that the regulator, if it deems appropriate, give a direction to Crown Melbourne pursuant to section 23(1) of the Casino Control Act to the effect that Crown Melbourne enter into a similar arrangement with the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission and the Australian Federal Police. Responsible service of gambling The purpose of the following recommendations is to deal with problem gambling. One recommendation is to make compulsory a pre-commitment system that imposes limits on time and money spent on gambling. The other recommendation is to impose obligations on the casino operator to properly supervise the gaming floor. There are also recommendations dealing with the collection of data that may be used for research into problem gambling. 

Recommendation 9: Player card data 

It is recommended that a direction be given to Crown Melbourne pursuant to section 23(1) of the Casino Control Act that the player card collect, to the extent practicable, data relating to: player buy-in (time, amount) player buy-out (time, amount) play periods (date, start time, end time) player turnover player losses and wins gambling product such further information as the regulator reasonably requires for anti-money laundering and Responsible Service of Gaming purposes. 

Recommendation 10: Pre-commitment and time limits 

It is recommended that as soon as possible, the YourPlay system be a full, mandatory, binding, pre-commitment system for Australian residents gambling on EGMs at the Melbourne Casino. The pre-commitment system should operate in the following manner: Each player must set a daily, weekly or monthly time limit and a daily, weekly or monthly loss limit. If the pre-set time limit or the pre-set loss limit is reached, the player cannot continue to gamble on an EGM and the limit(s) cannot be altered, for 36 hours. No player can gamble on an EGM for more than 12 hours in any 24-hour period. If a player has gambled for 12 hours in any 24-hour period, the player must take a break for 24 hours. A player cannot gamble continuously on an EGM for more than three hours. A player must take a break of at least 15 minutes after three hours of continuous gambling. A player cannot gamble on EGMs for more than 36 hours per week. There should be a default pre-set loss limit that the player can modify. The default pre-set loss limit should be set by regulation. It could be calculated by reference to the median income of a wage earner less the standard cost of living. Or it could be calculated by estimating the median losses of a recreational gambler. The pre-set loss limit should be reviewed at least annually. For the effective operation of a full, mandatory, binding YourPlay system, internal control systems are needed to ensure that a customer is unable to acquire more than one card. The systems need to be approved under section 122 of the Casino Control Act. 

Recommendation 11: Gambling Code 

It is recommended that a new Ministerial Direction be made under section 10.6.6 of the Gambling Regulation Act, in respect of a casino operator, which includes the following requirements: a duty to take all reasonable steps to prevent and minimise harm from gambling, including by monitoring the welfare of players, discouraging intensive and prolonged play and intervening when a person is displaying behaviour that is consistent with gambling harm a duty to take all reasonable steps to ensure that players on the gambling floor are regularly observed to monitor behaviour that is consistent with gambling harm a duty to ensure that there is a sufficient number of responsible gambling officers (however called) at the casino. It is recommended that the Ministerial Direction: set maximum play period limits prescribe how long a break in play should be identify the period at which players should be interacted with, and the form of interaction, while gambling. Different rules will be needed for different gambling products. For EGMs, the periods of play should mirror those recommended for YourPlay. For other gambling products, the limits should not be less onerous than those approved by Crown Resorts in May 2021 for domestic customers. 

Recommendation 12: Data collection 

It is recommended that to facilitate data collection for research purposes there should be established a Gambling Data Committee made up of three persons, one appointed by the regulator, one appointed by Crown Melbourne and one appointed by the Victorian Responsible Gambling Foundation. The committee should have the following functions: to identify the data to be included in a repository to ensure the data is up-to-date and comprehensive. The committee should be required to carry out the following tasks: oversee the design and structure of the repository and its user interface identify the data that is to be publicly available and data that will have restricted access ensure processes and procedures are put in place for the efficient maintenance and updating of the repository establish protocols to anonymise data to respect the privacy of gamblers establish a register of recognised researchers establish a simple process by which a request for data is to be made. 

Recommendation 13: Crown Melbourne data 

It is recommended that the committee have power to direct Crown Melbourne and the monitoring licensee for the YourPlay system to provide data that is reasonably required and in a particular format. 

Recommendation 14: Costs of data collection 

It is recommended that the cost of establishment and operation of the committee is paid for by the government, with staff and Secretariat support provided by the Victorian Responsible Gambling Foundation. Miscellaneous The following recommendations deal with a variety of subjects such as the consequence of the non-payment of casino tax, removing the circumstances in which the State may be liable to pay damages for action taken in consequence of a casino operator’s conduct and the review of penalties under the Casino Control Act that were fixed 20 years ago. There is also a recommendation to clarify the definition of an ‘associate’. 

Recommendation 16: Unpaid casino tax 

It is recommended that the Taxation Administration Act be amended to cover casino tax payable under the Management Agreement as well as any other taxes payable under the Casino Control Act. 

Recommendation 31: Actions against the State 

It is recommended that legislation be enacted to the effect that: no action claim or demand whatsoever may be made or allowed against the State of Victoria or any responsible Minister of the State in respect of any damage, loss or injury alleged to have been sustained as a result of the implementation of any recommendation made in this Report no decision made to implement any recommendation in this Report may be subject to any appeal or any order in the nature of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus or the grant of any declaration or injunction. 

Recommendation 15: Damages payable by the State 

It is recommended that the following obligations under the Management Agreement be repealed: the obligation on the State or the regulator to obtain the written consent of Crown Melbourne before action is taken to cancel or vary Crown Melbourne’s casino licence pursuant to section 20(1)(e) of the Casino Control Act the obligation on the State to pay compensation pursuant to clauses 24A.3 or 24A.4 for action taken by the State or the regulator that is a Trigger Event, if a reason for the cancellation or variation or action (as the case may be) is the conduct of Crown Melbourne. 

Recommendation 27: Penalties 

It is recommended that there be a thorough review of all the penalties imposed by the Casino Control Act. Most should be substantially increased. Special attention should be given to the penalty to be imposed for disciplinary action. Currently the penalty is a fine not exceeding $1 million. It is recommended that the penalty be increased to at least $10 million. 

Recommendation 32: Definition of associate 

It is recommended that the Casino Control Act be amended so that ‘associate’ means: the holding company and each intermediate holding company of the casino operator (holding company to be defined as in the Corporations Act); any person who has a relevant interest (as defined in the Corporations Act) in at least 5 per cent of the issued capital of the casino operator, or any of its intermediate holding companies or its ultimate holding company; any director or officer (as defined in the Corporations Act) of the casino operator, any of its intermediate holding companies or its ultimate holding company; and any individual or company certified by the regulator to be an associate. 

Recommendation 33: Increase in shareholding 

It is recommended that an associate cannot increase its relevant interest in the issued capital of the casino operator, or any of its intermediate holding companies or its ultimate holding company, without the written approval of the regulator. 

Recommendation 26: The area of the sub-lease 

It is recommended that steps be taken to ensure that the area in which the Melbourne Casino’s casino operations are being conducted and the area that is to be the subject of a sub-lease under the Management Agreement are the same. If the matter cannot be agreed then legislation will be necessary.

21 October 2021

Health Data Opacity

'The Big Data Regulator, Rebooted: Why and How the FDA Can and Should Disclose Confidential Data on Prescription Drugs and Vaccines' by Amy Kapczynski and Christopher J. Morten in (2021) 109(2) California Law Review 493 comments 

Medicines and vaccines are complex products, and it is often extraordinarily difficult to know whether they help or hurt. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) holds an enormous reservoir of data that sheds light on that precise question, yet currently releases only a trickle to researchers, doctors, and patients. Recent examples show that data secrecy can be deadly, and existing laws such as the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) cannot solve the problem. We present here a wealth of new evidence about the urgency of the problem and argue that the FDA must “reboot” its rules to proactively disclose all safety and efficacy data for drugs and vaccines with minimal redactions, deploying data use agreements to ensure the most sensitive data is handled appropriately. In line with the literature that has been critical of simplistic calls for “transparency,” we urge a more contextual form of “data publicity.” We also show that clinical trial data publicity can be achieved without legislative reform, while respecting privacy, protecting any legitimate trade secrets, and maintaining or improving incentives to innovate. The FDA must adapt to protect and expand structural accountability and to protect the public and its trust. The model we offer here could guide similar action at other regulatory agencies as well, enabling better oversight of information-intensive industries and helping safeguard the agencies themselves. 

The authors argue 

Few issues are more important to the American public than the quality and safety of our medicines. About half of all Americans take one or more prescription drugs, and medicines represent a startling 2% of total U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) each year. Life as we know it relies on vaccines that prevent dangerous diseases. But there is a structural problem at the heart of our system for the development and assessment of therapeutics and vaccines: a problem of secrecy in the age of big data. 

The problem of data secrecy is especially visible in the shadow of the COVID-19 pandemic. As we complete this in the summer of 2020, governments around the world are taking unprecedented measures to promote the development of a COVID-19 vaccine. Billions of dollars of public money are being invested, with dozens of potential vaccines in development. But researchers have raised an outcry, pointing out that they have no access to some of the most basic and important information about the design and outcomes of the most promising COVID-19 vaccine trials. Access to this information could enable scientists to understand key clinical trial decisions in time to influence them, to evaluate the quality of the evidence as it emerges, and to protect against mistakes and misconduct, such as changes in trial endpoints that produce spurious results. Researchers could also make novel uses of the data collected, advancing our understanding of COVID-19 at a critical time. Under pressure, several companies (as of this writing) have begun to release some such data voluntarily.  This is a positive step and a proof of concept. But there are important gaps in what has been provided and no systems in place to be sure that they will be remedied, despite the extraordinary stakes. 

The inability to access data related to COVID-19 vaccine development sheds light on the problems caused by systemic data secrecy in clinical trials. Therapeutics and vaccines are complex products. We cannot know whether they hurt or help without rigorous clinical trials, whose conduct and interpretation are highly complicated. Today these trials, particularly at later stages, are typically conducted by companies with strong financial interests in the outcomes. This is a key justification for our drug regulatory system: independent experts are needed to protect the public by examining and validating data about the effects of medicines. But our drug regulatory bodies are under-resourced, and recent examples show that outside expert analysis can reveal concealed risks of medicines. 

The rise and fall of the painkiller rofecoxib (Vioxx) offers a stark example of the harms of data secrecy. The drug was promoted as being safer than aspirin and became a blockbuster. It earned $2 billion each year for Merck before it was abruptly removed from the market because it caused heart attacks, strokes, and heart failures. The evidence only became known to outside experts through litigation. Later independent research showed that signals of these risks were present in data held by the FDA nearly 3.5 years before the drug was withdrawn from the market. That evidence did not reach doctors or patients because the data was not made available to the scientific community. An FDA official later estimated that tens of thousands of people died as a result. 

Data secrecy also causes harm by undermining our health care system. Secrecy prevents us from making the best allocation of scarce resources and obscures avenues for systematic reforms at the FDA and in the pharmaceutical industry. Data secrecy may also undermine trust. The American public, for example, expressed widespread hesitancy about any COVID-19 vaccine that was to be rushed to market before the November 2020 U.S. election. Sharing safety and efficacy data on drugs and vaccines—including COVID-19 vaccines—would help to secure public trust in the FDA review process and in the products that emerge from it and would help to protect the scientific integrity of the FDA review process from political pressure.  

There is, accordingly, an emerging consensus that independent researchers need better access to clinical trial data to keep both the industry and regulators honest and accountable. Yet existing tools for an independent assessment of clinical trial data are inadequate. What remains missing is an effective legal and regulatory framework for the release of this data within the United States. For several years, working closely with medical researchers and a legal team, we have worked to maximize the potential of existing strategies for clinical trial data disclosure. This Article sets out a key lesson of that work: existing tools are inadequate for the task. If researchers are to have systematic access to the clinical trial data needed to help spot unsafe and ineffective medicines, the FDA will have to make clinical trial data available proactively. 

We show that the agency can, consistent with existing law, make clinical trial data available proactively. We describe how the FDA can do so while navigating the two main challenges of data sharing: protecting the privacy of individuals who participate in trials and addressing claims that company data should remain confidential. Drawing on examples of successful data sharing in other countries and at other agencies, we also show that the process can be done effectively and manageably. Our central contribution is a wealth of new evidence about the significance of the problem and an updated argument for proactive disclosure that can be achieved without legislative reform. We reveal the flaws in arguments that comprehensive proactive disclosure is prohibited under U.S. federal statutes  or, if permitted, will require expensive compensation to the industry for intellectual property violations. 

This Article is centrally aimed at solving an important public health problem, but it also contributes to two broader literatures. The first is the literature on transparency and the implications of freedom of information laws. Transparency as an ideal has been rightly criticized recently as having taken on a formalistic, decontextualized quality. As an ideal, transparency does not appropriately recognize that “freedom” at times requires more than unfettered, standardless exchange and does not appreciate how freedom of information laws can be weaponized to undermine public interests. We show here that the implications of data sharing turn on and should be sensitive to a broader political-economic context. Data sharing can serve public interests because of a wider ecology that provides researchers with the necessary resources to analyze the data and includes publications and norms (of the “open science” tradition in academic medicine, for example) that help generate and validate important new insights and challenge false claims. Data itself does not produce these insights, and a context that enables trustworthy analysis is essential if data sharing is to work well. 

To this end, we argue that data use agreements will be an important component of data disclosures in our “big data” age. They provide a means to navigate issues of privacy and commercial interest—issues that can otherwise shut down data sharing, rightly or wrongly—and a mechanism to develop and impose other publicly minded conditions. The role of these agreements here illustrates the importance of contract as a tool to facilitate information exchange and innovation. Decontextualized demands for “openness” have gained traction in recent decades and might suggest that in every instance we need unfettered data exchange that treats all parties equally, including companies. We argue instead that the FDA should prioritize health researchers over industry actors and that it should use data use agreements to ensure those researchers protect legitimate public interests. These contracts are possible only with proactive disclosure and are inconsistent with reactive FOIA requests. 

We join other scholars in suggesting that the future of freedom of information, if it is to achieve its aims, lies in the development of robust proactive disclosure systems. In part to mark these distinctions, we call what we seek here not data transparency, but data “publicity.” The term as we use it, which draws upon early progressive traditions, marks the need for attention to context, power, and resources if data sharing is to serve the public. We also seek to contribute to the broader literature on the future of the regulatory state and the conditions of democracy broadly understood. Today, we live in an extraordinarily information-intensive age. Decades of dramatic advances in technologies for information processing have transformed the core of the modern economy and enabled the emergence of massively complex new industries and firms. This means that not only pharmaceuticals but also products like cars, insurance, airplanes, and phones are far more informationally intensive today than they were twenty years ago. Informationally intensive products and systems are complex, opaque, and dynamic. Systems that are improperly or fraudulently designed — think here about Volkswagen’s deceptive “defeat device” to evade emissions testing, or Boeing’s defective automated flight software for the 737 Max — generate serious social and individual harms. Regulators face growing challenges in this environment, and we need structures to allow the public to hold both regulators and the industry accountable. Yet the same barriers that appear in this context—issues of privacy, corporate claims to trade secrecy and confidentiality, and difficulties with reactive data release models (FOIA especially)—will reappear throughout the administrative state. Our Article thus can help inform a wide variety of regulators who face related issues, whether in the area of consumer products, environmental protection, or artificial intelligence. Data publicity will have plausible benefits elsewhere, and regulators can learn from how it can be achieved at the FDA. But they must also learn from the fertile conditions in the pharmaceutical and medical context that allow clinical trial data publicity to inform the public. It is not open data alone, but data publicity in a context where resources and expertise exist to enable intelligible uses of such data, that furthers democratic accountability. 

 We begin in Part I by describing the need for proactive disclosure of safety and efficacy data  and why existing legal avenues, such as FOIA, fail to create adequate data publicity. In Part II, we show that, contrary to the conventional wisdom and the (usual) view of the FDA itself, federal law does not prohibit the FDA from disclosing such data, even from the moment of drug or vaccine approval. Consistent proactive disclosure, however, will require revisions to the FDA’s current regulations, corrections to its interpretations of certain statutes, and, for the most sensitive data, data use agreements. We also show that the move should not hurt and may improve innovation, nor should it require compensation under the Takings Clause. If the agency does not act, Congress can and should, as we describe in Part III. 


19 October 2021

Identity

The Australian Human Rights Commission Ensuring health and bodily integrity: towards a human rights approach for people born with variations in sex characteristics report responded to Terms of Reference requiring it to 'inquire into, and report on, how best to protect the human rights of people born with variations in sex characteristics in the context of medical interventions, including surgical and non-surgical interventions'.  The inquiry considered the 2013 report of the Senate Standing Committee on Community Affairs on involuntary or coerced sterilisation of intersex people, the Victorian Decision-Making Principles for the Care of Infants, Children and Adolescents with Intersex Conditions; 2017 Darlington Statement by Australian and New Zealand intersex organisations and independent advocates; and decisions of the Family Court of Australia. 

The report states that The Commission notes that terminology in this area is contested, and inappropriate language use can have harmful consequences. The Commission is committed to consulting on this issue, with a view to adopting the most appropriate terminology in this project. The Commission’s use of the term ‘people born with variations in sex characteristics’ is intended to refer compendiously to the people whose human rights are the focus of this project. Other terms are also used in this context, and the Commission remains committed to further consultation on terminology. 

 The Commission comments that 

 People born with variations in sex characteristics in Australia have increasingly raised concerns with the Australian Human Rights Commission (the Commission), the Australian Government and the United Nations, about human rights violations in relation to medical interventions conducted without the full and informed consent of the person involved. These interventions are of particular concern in relation to infants and children. 

The  Report provides 

recommendations for how Australia should protect and promote the human rights of people born with variations in sex characteristics in the context of medical interventions to modify these characteristics. These recommendations are framed by principles derived from international human rights law. 

 Applying a human rights analysis to medical interventions in relation to people born with variations in sex characteristics has three principal benefits: 

 • it promotes compliance with international and domestic law 

• the human rights framework provides a near-universal set of norms by which to answer questions regarding medical interventions in relation to people born with variations in sex characteristics • it provides a framework to consider the claimed benefits of performing these medical interventions without a person’s personal consent, against any impingement on human rights. 

These principles are set out in Chapter 2: 

• Bodily integrity principle: All people have the right to autonomy and bodily integrity. Medical interventions on people without their personal consent have the potential to seriously infringe these rights. 

• Children’s agency principle: Children and young people have the right to express their views in relation to decisions that affect them, and those views must be given due weight in accordance with their age and maturity. The ability of children to consent to medical interventions generally increases as they grow older. Children and young people who are able to understand fully the nature and consequences of proposed medical interventions should be able to make their own decisions about whether those interventions proceed. 

• Precautionary principle: Where safe to do so, medical interventions to modify the sex characteristics of a child born with variations in sex characteristics should be deferred until a time when the child is able to make their own decisions about what happens to their body. 

• Medical necessity principle: In some cases, to protect the child’s rights to life or health, it may be medically necessary for a medical intervention to modify the sex characteristics of a child born with variations in sex characteristics to occur, before a child can make their own decision. An intervention will be medically necessary if it is required urgently to avoid serious harm to the child. 

• Independent oversight principle: Given the risk of making a wrong decision, decisions about whether a medical intervention to modify the sex characteristics of a child born with variations in sex characteristics is medically necessary should be subject to effective independent oversight. 

 The Commission recommends new legislative protections, guidance and oversight processes when there is consideration of medical interventions for people under the age of 18 years born with variations in sex characteristics. Legislation should enforce a general requirement that medical interventions take place only with the prior, informed, personal consent of the person concerned – subject to an exception in the case of medical necessity. 

 (a) Consent and decision making 

Under international human rights law, a medical intervention may only take place without the individual’s personal consent where this is a medical necessity or medical emergency. The Commission recommends that this approach be taken in relation to medical interventions for people under the age of 18 years who are born with variations in sex characteristics. This general legal rule reflects a person’s rights of autonomy and agency over their body. A range of practical problems regarding obtaining consent to medical interventions are considered in Chapter 4. To address these problems, the Commission recommends the development of new guidance setting out what is required to obtain informed consent from people under the age of 18 years before performing a medical intervention for a person born with variations in sex characteristics. This guidance should ensure that • medical interventions are proposed only when medically necessary • consent in all cases is fully informed, and • children and younger people are empowered to participate in decision making in a manner consistent with their evolving capacities. Questions raised in this report regarding adequacy of current oversight mechanisms are not intended to suggest parents or doctors are not acting in good faith. Stakeholder submissions indicate quite the opposite. However, as the High Court observed in Marion’s case, good intentions may not be enough to protect children. 

 (b) Medical necessity 

The Commission recommends that medical interventions in relation to a person under the age of 18 without their personal consent should only take place where the intervention is required urgently to avoid serious harm to the person concerned (the ‘medical necessity’ principle). An intervention is ‘required urgently’ if it cannot be deferred without a significant risk of serious harm. The Commission notes (in more detail at 2.3 Applicable human rights), the various UN treaty body committee comments to Australia to limit intervention without personal consent to circumstances of medical necessity. Chapter 5 considers the different rationales put forward for medical interventions in relation to children born with variations in sex characteristics and concludes that such medical interventions should only be permissible if all of the following factors are present: • the medical intervention is required urgently to avoid serious harm • the risk of harm cannot be mitigated in another less intrusive way, and intervention cannot be further delayed • the risk of harm outweighs the significant limitation on human rights that is occasioned by medical intervention without personal consent. Chapter 5 applies the principle of medical necessity to the situation of medical interventions for people born with variations in sex characteristics. The Commission concludes that some rationales used to justify medical interventions are not consistent with this principle including, for example, psychosocial rationales based on ‘normalising’ genitalia. 

(c) Clinical practice and new National Guidelines 

The Commission recommends the development of new National Guidelines to guide decision-making processes to ensure that medical interventions modifying sex characteristics are not undertaken unless intervention is a medical necessity. These are considered in Chapter 6. The recommended National Guidelines should include guidance on • obtaining informed consent and ensuring affected children and younger people are involved in decisions (see Chapter 4) • the application of human rights principles in determining whether a medical intervention is a medical necessity (see Chapter 5) • requirements for independent authorisation of certain medical interventions (see Chapter 7). The Commission recommends that the National Guidelines be developed by a national multidisciplinary expert group convened by the Australian Government and should complement legislative reforms recommended in Chapter 7. The National Guidelines should also promote the best standards of clinical care generally. The national multidisciplinary expert group should develop clinical guidelines and best practice and treatment protocols, including in relation to the provision of psychological and peer support. 

 (d) Oversight of medical interventions 

The Commission recommends the establishment of Independent Panels to provide appropriate oversight of medical interventions in relation to children born with variations in sex characteristics, through the application of a human rights framework. Chapter 7 discusses how a human rights framework for decision making about medical interventions should be incorporated into Australian domestic law and policy, and what independent oversight mechanisms should be established. Oversight, in this context, refers to mechanisms by which an independent decision maker determines whether a medical intervention may be carried out on a person under the age of 18 without personal consent. The Commission recommends reform of oversight mechanisms by legislation by • establishing Independent Panels with responsibility to decide whether to authorise medical interventions in respect of people born with variations in sex characteristics • defining the circumstances in which interventions without personal consent may be authorised, which should be limited to circumstances of medical necessity • recognising that in emergency situations there should be an expedited authorisation process or, where this still does not provide time to deal with the emergency, a requirement for subsequent notification of the Independent Panel. 

 (e) Enforcement 

The Commission recommends legislation to prohibit medical interventions in relation to people under the age of 18 years born with variations in sex characteristics otherwise than in accordance with the medical necessity principle. Additionally, there should be appropriate criminal penalties for carrying out a relevant intervention without authorisation from an Independent Panel. Chapter 8 discusses how obligations placed on health practitioners and others to apply to an Independent Panel prior to performing medical interventions might be enforced in practice, under criminal law, and through regulation of health professionals. 

 (f) Support, health records and data collection People affected by medical interventions modifying sex characteristics need adequate support. Stakeholders raised concerns about records having been destroyed, failure to appropriately share records between treating health professionals, and inadequate record security. The Commission recommends in Chapter 9 that governments provide sufficient public funding for peer support organisations, comprehensive psychological and psychiatric health services, and comprehensive and up-to-date consumer resources for people born with variations, and their parents or guardians. While support for individuals born with variations is central, supports for parents or guardians is also crucial to enable families to best understand all the considerations in caring for a child born with a variation. Australian governments should also consult on establishing and funding coordinator positions to integrate care across multiple specialties and institutions. The Commission considers that there is a need for long-term, longitudinal data on past and current practices to better understand the health and psychosocial effects of different interventions. The Commission therefore recommends the Australian Government facilitate the establishment of a national databank to assist research on the frequency of variations in sex characteristics and the effects of medical interventions and non-intervention. The Australian Government and state and territory governments should also fund and facilitate collaborative medical, psychological, health and wellbeing research, and socio-economic research to tackle stigma and disadvantage as relates to exclusion in schooling and employment.

The Report states 

In 2013, the Senate Community Affairs References Committee (Senate Committee) conducted an inquiry into the involuntary or coerced sterilisation of intersex people in Australia (Senate Committee Inquiry). In its final report, the Senate Committee made a number of recommendations to better protect the human rights of intersex people. In its formal response in May 2015, the Australian Government welcomed the report and recognised the harm experienced by many people subjected to forced sterilisation. It committed to raising with the states and territories the Senate Committee’s recommendations regarding the legal framework regulating sterilisation for people with disability, with a view to promoting consistency between Australian jurisdictions. In respect of ‘involuntary or coerced sterilisation of intersex people’, the Government acknowledged the report’s main recommendations and specifically noted the benefit of further research on the desirability of ‘bringing the medical treatment of intersex variations into the jurisdiction of guardianship tribunals’ and/or the Family Court of Australia, but did not support amending the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) to expand the Family Court’s role at that time. Broadly speaking, the Australian Government has emphasised the responsibility of the states and territories and has not committed to the implementation of particular reform in this area. 

During the Commission’s inquiry, state governments had also been considering how to better protect the rights of people born with variations in sex characteristics and provide better support to them and their families. In July 2021, the Victorian Government committed to prohibiting deferrable medical interventions on intersex people without personal consent, and introducing an oversight panel to ensure compliance with the prohibition. The Commission welcomes this commitment. In July 2021, the report (i) Am Equal: Future Directions for Victoria’s Intersex community, outlined a collaborative approach that importantly includes people born with variations in sex characteristics and their advocacy and peer support organisations. Its three main focus areas – Future Intersex Resourcing, Future Intersex Health and Wellbeing Centre, and Improving Future Treatment – are consistent with the Commission’s views reflected in this Report. The proposals to develop: a mechanism to prohibit deferrable medical interventions modifying a person’s sex characteristics without personal consent; an oversight panel to ensure compliance with the prohibition; provisions which ensure the collection of data and transparency over what treatments are being performed and support for the development of National Guidelines, are welcome and consistent with key recommendations in this Report. 

The Commission also welcomes the ACT Government’s work to protect the rights of people born with variations in sex characteristics and provide better support to them and their families. In October 2019, the ACT Government committed to developing a plan for managing deferrable medical interventions for people born with variations in sex characteristics. This has involved consulting with intersex people and experts in the field; reviewing the existing literature and initiatives in other countries; and testing key issues with stakeholder individuals and organisations. The Commission has engaged with the ACT’s efforts to formulate a proposal to develop such protections. There is congruence in the approach proposed by the ACT Government and that of the Commission’s, as articulated in this report.

The Commission's Recommendations are 

1: Laws and practices concerning medical interventions to modify the sex characteristics of people born with variations in sex characteristics should be guided by a human rights framework based on the following principles.

1. Bodily integrity principle: All people have the right to autonomy and bodily integrity. Medical interventions on people without their personal consent have the potential to seriously infringe these rights. 

2. Children’s agency principle: Children and young people have the right to express their views in relation to decisions that affect them, and those views must be given due weight in accordance with their age and maturity. The ability of children to consent to medical interventions generally increases as they grow older. Children and young people who are able to understand fully the nature and consequences of proposed medical interventions should be able to make their own decisions about whether those interventions proceed. 

3. Precautionary principle: Where safe to do so, medical interventions to modify the sex characteristics of a child born with variations in sex characteristics should be deferred until a time when the child is able to make their own decisions about what happens to their body. . 

4. Medical necessity principle: In some cases, to protect the child’s rights to life or health, it may be medically necessary for a medical intervention to modify the sex characteristics of a child born with variations in sex characteristics to occur before a child can make their own decision. An intervention will be medically necessary if it is required urgently to avoid serious harm to the child. 

5. Independent oversight principle: Given the risk of making a wrong decision, decisions about whether a medical intervention to modify the sex characteristics of a child born with variations in sex characteristics is medically necessary should be subject to effective independent oversight. 

2: The development of new resources to increase awareness of variations of sex characteristics in the community, educational, service and employment settings, and to reduce the associated stigma. To undertake this, the Australian Government and state and territory governments should fund community organisations led by people born with variations in sex characteristics to . 

3: New National Guidelines on medical interventions for people born with variations in sex characteristics (see Recommendation 6) should set out what is required to obtain informed consent before performing a medical intervention for a person born with variations in sex characteristics. This guidance should require that:

(a) Treating practitioners provide accurate, up-to-date, evidence-based medical information including about: (i) the variation in question (ii) the exact nature of any proposed intervention, why it is medically necessary, and the degree of any risk from the intervention (iii) what alternatives exist, including other medical interventions or delaying or deferring the proposed intervention (iv) the likely long-term effects and outcomes if the proposed intervention is carried out immediately, at a later time, or if the intervention is not carried out (v) what uncertainty, if any, exists in relation to the current state of medical knowledge underpinning any recommended intervention (vi) any diversity of medical opinion about the proposed intervention (vii) the benefits of peer support, and contact information for relevant groups. 

(b) Treating practitioners document fully the information provided, how they have included children in decision-making processes and the steps they have taken to effectively communicate the information, taking into account the age, decision-making ability or other characteristics of the person. 

(c) people born with variations in sex characteristics and, where they are children, their parents and other family members, are provided information in clear, accessible, non-technical language that they can understand 

(d) Treating practitioners refer people born with variations in sex characteristics, and where relevant their parents and other family members, to peer support and advocacy organisations, and services such as psychologists and social workers, who can provide further information to help inform their decision-making. 

(e) children are included in decision making in an age-appropriate way, including by being given support to understand any medical advice and to express their views, with due weight being given to those views according to their age and capacity. Where a child has sufficient understanding, the child’s informed consent should be sought. Where the view is formed that the child does not have sufficient understanding for their consent to be sought, the reasons and evidence for this should be documented along with a description of any attempts made to seek the views of the child 

(f) people with variations in sex characteristics and, where they are children, their parents and other family members, are provided with adequate time to make treatment decisions, with access to necessary support, to ensure they do not feel undue pressure to consent.

 4: Medical interventions modifying sex characteristics of children may be conducted without personal consent only in circumstances of medical necessity. Circumstances of medical necessity exist only where all of the following factors are present:

(a) the medical intervention is required urgently to avoid serious harm 

(b) the risk of harm cannot be mitigated in another less intrusive way, and intervention cannot be further delayed 

(c) the risk of harm outweighs the significant limitation on human rights that is occasioned by medical intervention without personal consent. 

5: All people born with variations in sex characteristics should have access to comprehensive, appropriately qualified multidisciplinary care, with input from mental health and other key professionals, and other people with variations. Care should be available across their lifespan and regardless of where they live. 

6: (a) The Australian Government should convene and fund a national multidisciplinary expert group to develop National Guidelines on medical interventions for people born with variations of sex characteristics (National Guidelines), with input from specialist clinicians and health professional bodies, people with lived experience and their parents and carers, advocacy and peer-support groups, and human rights organisations. (b) The National Guidelines should reflect human rights principles including in relation to medical necessity (see Recommendation 4) and the provision of adequate information for informed consent (see Recommendation 3), as well as include best practice and treatment protocols for the management of different variations in sex characteristics and reviews of existing and emerging evidence-based research. (c) The National Guidelines should be reviewed periodically, to ensure guidance is based on the best available data and evidence. 

7: (a) The Australian Government and state and territory governments should legislate to establish one or more independent panels with responsibility to decide whether to authorise medical interventions modifying sex characteristics of people under the age of 18 years born with variations (Independent Panels). (b) Whenever a clinician or clinical treatment team intends to make such a medical intervention, they should be required to apply to an Independent Panel prior to performing the intervention. (c) Independent Panels should be constituted by members with expertise that includes relevant clinical expertise, lived experience of being born with variations in sex characteristics, and human rights. 

8: (a) An Independent Panel should only authorise a medical intervention for a person under the age of 18 years where it is satisfied that the person concerned either: (i) has the ability to provide personal consent and has provided such consent, or (ii) is not able to provide personal consent and the intervention is a medical necessity. (b) In rare emergency situations, where there would be a real risk of serious and irreparable harm to the person if the intervention were not carried out immediately, the Independent Panel should have an expedited process to consider the request for authorisation. Only where this still does not provide enough time to address the emergency, should an intervention proceed without authorisation. In those circumstances the relevant Independent Panel must be notified promptly following the conduct of the medical intervention. (c) Independent Panels, in determining whether a medical intervention is authorised, should be informed by the National Guidelines on medical interventions for people born with variations of sex characteristics. 

9: The Australian Government and state and territory governments should legislate to prohibit medical interventions for people born with variations in sex characteristics otherwise than in accordance with Recommendations 7 and 8. There should be appropriate criminal penalties for breaching this legislative prohibition. 

10: The Australian Government and state and territory governments should provide sufficient public funding for: 

(a) sustainable operation of advocacy and peer support organisations led by people born with variations of sex characteristics 

(b) comprehensive psychological and psychiatric health services, for people born with variations of sex characteristics, their parents and other family members 

(c) improved access to peer support and health services, including online and by telephone 

(d) comprehensive and up-to-date consumer resources for people born with variations in sex characteristics, their parents and other family members informed by clinical, peer support and human rights experts.

The Australian Government and state and territory governments should also consult on establishing and funding coordinator positions to integrate care across multiple specialties and institutions. 

11: The Australian Government should facilitate the establishment of a national databank to assist research on: 

(a) the frequency of variations in sex characteristics, including specific variations 

(b) the short-, medium- and long-term effects of medical interventions and non-intervention. 

12: The Australian Government and state and territory governments should fund and facilitate collaborative research, co-designed by community organisations led by people born with variations of sex characteristics, including:

(a) medical, psychological, health and wellbeing research, across the lifespan, that affirms human rights norms and helps people born with variations of sex characteristics to flourish 

(b) socio-economic factors that put people born with variations in sex characteristics that risk leading to stigma and disadvantage, including emerging issues such as social exclusion in schooling and employment. 

(c) any research that investigates the circumstances and needs of all sexual and gender minorities should disaggregate data on people born with variations of sex characteristics.

15 October 2021

Conscription and Political Pamphlets

The discussion of 'civil conscription' as part of today's judgment in Kassam v Hazzard; Henry v Hazzard [2021] NSWSC 1320 regarding COVID public health orders

Civil Conscription 

Section 51(xxiiiA) of the Constitution confers on the Federal Parliament legislative power to make laws for the peace, order and good government of the Commonwealth with respect to:

“[t]he provision of maternity allowances, widows pensions, child endowment, unemployment, pharmaceutical, sickness and hospital benefits, medical and dental services (but not so as to authorise any form of civil conscription, benefits to students and family allowances; …” (emphasis added)

This legislative power was inserted into s 51 with effect from 19 December 1946 by the Constitution Alteration (Social Services) Act 1946 following its passage in a referendum. The historical events that lead to the passage of this provision in this particular form are described in Wong v The Commonwealth (2009) 236 CLR 573; [2009] HCA 3 at [18] to [55] per French CJ and Gummow J, at [174] to [191] per Hayne, Crennan and Kiefel JJ and, to an extent, by Heydon J at [271] to [277] (“Wong”). It suffices to note two matters about that history. 

First, the phrase “civil conscription” has its origins in the debate about whether “industrial conscription”, that is, the use of compulsory civilian labour, would or would not be deployed in the war effort, as it eventually was (Wong at [31] to [40]; see Reid v Sinderberry (1944) 68 CLR 504). 

Second, the carve out from the referendum proposing the grant of legislative power so as to not authorise any form of civil conscription was suggested by the then opposition and agreed to by then government (Wong at [50] to [51]) and no doubt helped secure its passage. It stands in contrast to the nationalisation of medical services that took place in the United Kingdom around the same time (Wong at [274]). Thus, the phrase “civil conscription” was deployed so as to preclude compulsory service by medical professionals which might not answer the description “industrial conscription” (Wong at [50]). 

Bearing that in mind, two aspects of the concept of civil conscription of s 51(xxiiiA) should be noted. First, the preclusion on authorising civil conscription only qualifies a (Commonwealth) law for the “provision” of “medical or dental services” (the BMA Case at 254 per Rich J, at 261 per Dixon J, at 282 per McTiernan J, at 286 per Williams J, contra per Latham CJ at 253 and Webb J not deciding at 292; Alexandra Private Geriatric Hospital Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1987) 162 CLR 271 at 279; [1986] HCA 6; “Alexandra”). 

Second, civil conscription is directed to compulsive service in the provision of medical services. In the BMA Case a majority, Latham CJ, Rich, Williams and Webb JJ, Dixon and McTiernan JJ dissenting, upheld a challenge to the validity of a legislative requirement for pharmacists to write scripts for medicines on a particular form regardless of whether the medicine was to be obtained for free by the patient under the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme. The widest reading of the majority’s conclusion was that the prohibition on civil conscription in relation to medical and dental services strikes down any “compulsion of law requiring that men … perform work in a particular way” (at 249 per Latham CJ). Dixon J in dissent concluded that nothing in the impugned provision compelled the rendering of medical services to patients in any capacity whether regularly, occasionally, for a short period or intermittently (at 278). His Honour’s approach was effectively adopted in the General Practitioner’s Case (1980) 145 CLR 532 at 556-557 per Gibbs J. at 563 per Stephen J, at 564 per Mason J and 571 to 572 per Wilson J; Wong at [195]). In Wong, Hayne, Crennan and Kiefel JJ also applied the approach of Dixon J in the BMA Case while accepting that civil conscription can arise from the practical and not just legal effect of a legislative provision (at [209]). Even so, their Honours concluded that the practical effect of the scheme for the payment of medical benefits in the Health Insurance Act did not amount to civil conscription in that it did not compel a medical practitioner, legally or practically, to provide a service on behalf of the Commonwealth or at all to treat any patient or particular patient ([id]). Their Honours also concluded that, accepting that the practical effect of the Health Insurance Act was to require doctors who wish to practise to participate in the Medicare scheme (at [224]), a requirement to comply with a standard of practice is not a form of civil conscription (at [226]). 

Similarly, after reviewing the history of s 51(xxiiiA), French CJ and Gummow J in Wong reached the same conclusion. In so doing, their Honours described the meaning of “civil conscription” in s 51(xxiiiA) as follows (at [60]): 

“The legislative history and the genesis of s 51(xxiiiA) supports a construction of the phrase "(but not so as to authorize any form of civil conscription)" which treats "civil conscription" as involving some form of compulsion or coercion, in a legal or practical sense, to carry out work or provide services; the work or services may be for the Commonwealth itself or a statutory body which is created by the Parliament for purposes of the Commonwealth … it also may be for the benefit of third parties, if at the direction of the Commonwealth.” (emphasis added) 

The effect of the Kassam plaintiffs’ written submissions was that Order (No 2) effected a form of civil conscription because it effectively required unvaccinated persons to obtain a COVID-19 vaccine. [157] This wrongly assumed that s 51(xxiiiA) proscribes the compulsory acquisition of medical services which it does not. In oral submissions, counsel for the Kassam plaintiffs, Mr King, was pressed on how any doctors or any other medical professional was compelled to provide a medical or dental service. He contended that [158]

“…the effect of the order is what is critical in our respectful submission, and the effect of that order is to conscript both patients and doctors, their doctors, to obtain a double vaccination, or in relation to the earlier orders a single vaccination, as the price of giving up their employment and their right to protect and look after their families.” 

This contention was repeated in a written submission filed on 4 October 2021. [159] Nothing in any part of Order (No 2) or the PHA involves any element of coercion on a doctor or other medical provider to vaccinate anyone. Otherwise, this submission simply repeats the wrong assertion that s 51(xxiiiA) operates on the acquisition of a medical service as opposed to its provision. 

In his submissions, Dr Harkess contended that a medical or dental service was provided by a person who received a COVID-19 vaccine because theycontribute to the eventual establishment of “herd immunity”. He submitted that it follows that those who were “compelled” to be vaccinated were civilly conscripted to provide dental and medical services. [160] It suffices to state that contributing to the general health of the community by adding to herd immunity is not providing a medical service. 

Wong establishes that s 51(xxiiiA) is to be interpreted according to its historical purpose as explained above. On any sensible reading of the authorities the impugned orders do not impose any form of civil conscription as referred to in s 51(xxiiiA).

Points of note include paras [147]-[148] -

In his affidavit Professor Borody asserts that the Federal Minister for Health wrote to him on 27 August 2020 and “specifically instructed me that doctors in Australia can prescribe ivermectin and other components of ‘off label’.  He annexes that letter. The letter does not contain any instruction that doctors in Australia can prescribe ivermectin and other components off label. In fact, what the Minister stated was:

“Whilst shown to be effective in the lab environment, ivermectin cannot be used in humans for COVID-19 until further testing and clinical trials have been completed to show that it is safe and effective in humans. 

… I acknowledge some physicians are prescribing ivermectin off label. As you would know the practice of prescribing registered medicines outside their approved indications is not regulated nor controlled by therapeutic goods Association as it is at the discretion of a prescribing physician.”

The balance of the letter encourages Professor Borody to seek funding for trials of ivermectin. It suffices to state that nothing in Professor Borody’s report provides any assistance for the Kassam plaintiffs claim that the impugned orders are unreasonable.

Elsewhere the Court states

Finally on this topic, I note that the Henry plaintiffs relied on the dissenting judgment of Deputy President Dean of the Fair Work Commission in an unfair dismissal case that addressed whether an employee who objected to being vaccinated could be reinstated to work at an aged care centre (Kimber v Sapphire Coast Community Aged Care Ltd [2021] FWCB 6015). In particular, they relied on various passages in the Deputy President’s judgment to the effect that “vaccine mandates” embodied in the various public health responses to COVID-19 amount to a form of coercion that violates a person’s right to bodily integrity (at [115] to [129]). 

Given the very different jurisdictions being exercised by the Fair Work Commission and this Court, I would not ordinarily address the reasoning in their decisions (and I doubt they would address the reasoning in mine). However, as the Henry plaintiffs sought to rely on the reasoning it is necessary to record why that judgment is of no assistance. 

First, the relevant parts of the decision relied on by the Henry plaintiffs do not address the case law concerning consent to a medical treatment. 

Second, the passages relied on and passages to similar effect throughout the judgment appear to contain assertions about the efficacy and safety of COVID-19 vaccines and other aspects of the public health response to COVID-19 that were not reflected in the evidence that I found persuasive in this case and as far as I can ascertain were not the subject of evidence in that case. 

Third, elsewhere in her reasons, the Deputy President considered it necessary to opine on matters affecting either the validity or the appropriateness of making the Aged Care Order under the PHA (at [147] to [173]). The function of determining its validity is for this Court to discharge and the function of determining whether it should have been made is for the political process. The Fair Work Commission has neither function. 

Fourth, the Deputy President’s judgment concludes with a number of clarion calls imploring “all Australians” to do things such as “vigorously oppose the introduction of a system or medical apartheid and segregation” (at [182]) and “vigorously oppose the ongoing censorship of any views that question the current policies regarding COVID” (at [183]). Political pamphlets have their place but I doubt that the Fair Work Commission is one of them. They are not authorities for legal propositions. 

In the end result, provisions such as clause 4.3 and 5.8 do not amount to a violation of anyone’s right to bodily integrity but instead impede their freedom of movement which has consequential effects on their ability to work. Freedom of movement is undoubtedly important, although it is not necessarily some form of positive right. Regardless, the PHA is clearly directed to limiting that freedom, sometimes severely.