16 June 2022

Searches

iTnews reports that the Australian Border Force conducted over 41,410 warrantless (legal) searches of electronic devices at the border between 2017 and 2021. 

The FOI-based report  indicates that travellers do not have to be informed of their rights by border officials, including that "travellers have no legal obligation to provide a password/passcode or provide assistance to access an electronic device at the border." The ABF "may" advise travellers of their rights but there is no policy requiring them to do so. Its broad search powers authorise device searches for a range of reasons, including on suspicion that a traveller has or intends to engage in work prohibited by their visa. Searches are also made on behalf of, and copied data shared with, other federal agencies. 

iTnews notes that inconsistencies in the way data is recorded preclude itemisation of the type of device searched, nor whether the device belonged to Australian citizens. 

The FOI indicates that between May 2020 and the end of 2021, 951 phones were searched. The remaining 40,459 searches - conducted between 2017 to 2021 - may have been smartphones or laptops or removable hard drives. There were probably more searches in the period, as the 41,410 searches does not capture instances where travellers refused to provide their passcode. 

Device searches peaked at 14,927 in 2019, dropping to 3447 in 2020. iTnews states the ABF could not confirm whether this was related to the drop in air travel or other reasons. 17,085 of the 40,459 examinations to May 2020 were recorded as impacting Australian citizens; the ABF subsequently stopped recording nationality. 

 The ABF indicates that it "retains data on the number of searches, and the details of those searches".  It would not say if it had accessible data on how many of the 41,410 searches resulted in an outcome - such as the discovery of prohibited items, arrests or convictions - nor if that data could be released. 

 The ABF indicated that "travellers have no legal obligation to provide a password/passcode or provide assistance to access an electronic device at the border." Presumably that will changes.

Devices can be taken offsite for forensic 'examination'.  If a traveller exercises their right to refuse to provide a passcode, the device can be taken from the border and given to the ABF's digital forensic team for examination. “Most devices held for examination are returned to the traveller within 14 days, and often sooner if no material is found to warrant further investigation”, with "some devices may need to be held for longer but only under exceptional circumstances, such as for technical reasons or for those devices that contain vast amounts of data.”

Gangs

Regulatory approaches to preventing organised crime among outlaw motorcycle gangs' by Christopher Dowling and Anthony Morgan (AIC Trends and issues in crime and criminal justice 652, 2022) comments 

Australia’s response to organised crime has relied on the criminal justice system, using strong enforcement and legal regimes to dismantle criminal groups, and deter or imprison offenders (Ayling 2017, 2014). Outlaw motorcycle gangs (OMCGs) have been the most visible target of these measures, given their prominence in Australia’s organised crime landscape. Many Australian states and territories have adopted suites of laws which criminalise OMCGs and the association of their members. These laws have been introduced alongside dedicated police operations focused on disrupting the operation of OMCGs through high-intensity, low-tolerance enforcement activity. 

Regulatory approaches rooted in civil and administrative law, meanwhile, are being increasingly used against organised crime in Europe (for a review, see Spapens, Peters & Van Daele 2015). These approaches focus on reducing opportunities for organised crime by blocking groups and offenders from elements of the legitimate economy that can enable it. This typically includes restrictions on the issuing of licences, permits, contracts, subsidies or grants, and the denial of real estate and other assets. Such measures can be critical to cutting off offenders from the funding streams, physical and technical infrastructure and mechanisms for concealing illicit revenue that facilitate organised crime. 

Early examples of these approaches are evident in Italy (Calderoni & Di Stefano 2015; La Spina 2014) and Japan (Reilly 2014), which have long histories of private and public sector infiltration by mafia and yakuza crime organisations, respectively. More recently, the whole-of-government OMCG strategy introduced in the Netherlands best exemplifies the implementation of a regulatory approach to this offender population (van Ruitenburg 2020). Although it incorporates criminal justice measures as well, this strategy takes a broad view of disruption, with interventions coordinated across government targeting all of the conditions necessary for OMCGs to operate, including employment, finances and location. 

There are recent examples of regulatory measures having been introduced in Australia, although they have typically been implemented within a broader criminal justice framework (Ayling 2017). Many Australian states and territories have now established regimes of judicial orders which restrict the activities of individuals with histories of organised crime related offending, including engagement in certain industries and financial activities. Recent changes to the Transport Security Amendment (Serious Crime) Act 2021 aim to prevent exploitation of the aviation and maritime transport sectors— an enabler of organised crime—by introducing more stringent eligibility criteria for people applying for a card that would allow them to work in Australia’s airports and seaports. 

Regulatory approaches, used alongside criminal justice approaches, open up a wider variety of angles from which to target organised crime and particularly its enablers. Nevertheless, there is little local or international evidence to support the impact of these measures. Where research has been undertaken, it was often not able to completely disentangle specific regulatory interventions from other measures, making it difficult to infer the true source of any change. This is evident in a recent evaluation of the whole-of-government approach to OMCGs in the Netherlands (Klement and Blokland 2021). While results show that the introduction of this approach led to a gradual reduction in the rate of recorded organised crime offending by OMCG members, the wide range of criminal justice and regulatory measures incorporated make it challenging to identify the specific mechanisms at work.

15 June 2022

Regulation

'Inherited regulation for advanced ARTs: comparing jurisdictions’ applications of existing governance regimes to emerging reproductive technologies' by Walter G Johnson and Diana M Bowman in (2022) 9(1) Journal of Law and the Biosciences comments 

Over the past 5 years, advanced assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs), such as mitochondrial replacement therapies (MRTs) and heritable human genome editing (HHGE), have raised global policy concerns and fears of ‘unregulated’ proliferation. Yet, few innovations are ever truly unregulated and more often fall within the scope of one or more pre-existing regulatory regimes, a process referred to as ‘inherited regulation’. While the United Kingdom has enacted new legislation to specifically authorize and closely regulate MRTs, many jurisdictions will likely default to current oversight systems to manage advanced ARTs. This article evaluates and compares how several jurisdictions have already used four types of inherited regulatory regimes to manage MRTs and HHGE. Cases are drawn from jurisdictions where inherited regulatory interventions on advanced ARTs have taken place (USA, Greece, Ukraine, China, and Russia) and include jurisdictions closely connected with those cases (Mexico and Spain). When accounting for political, cultural, and religious contexts, many of these inherited regimes offer promise as starting points for governance of advanced ARTs, yet each will require further adjustments and tailoring to adequately manage the benefits and risks of these powerful innovations.

The authors argue 

Technology has long influenced how and when human reproduction can occur, transforming and being transformed by everything from social values to economic structures in the process. Yet, over the past four-and-a-half decades, the actual or potential role of technology in reproduction has rapidly expanded. The birth of Louise Brown in 1978 through in vitro fertilization (IVF) catalyzed the clinical application of assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs) around the world as well as ethical and policy debates around their use. Incremental innovation in ART methods now occurs continuously, aiming to increase the success rates of pregnancy and live births through established fertility treatments. However, more radical or ‘seismic’ innovations in ARTs have also occurred since the turn of the millennium, making novel reproductive options possible with corresponding policy implications. 

These advanced ART techniques move beyond IVF and related methods by manipulating gametes, embryos, or even somatic cells at the organelle, genomic, or gene expression levels, ultimately producing a viable embryo biologically related to the intended parents. Advanced ART techniques began to arise over two decades ago with reproductive cloning and ooplasmic transfer, although the controversies they provoked resulted in legislative and regulatory actions to block their use in many jurisdictions. Unlike earlier advanced ARTs, which lack direct health benefits for the resulting children, newer advanced ARTs promise significant benefits to at least a small number of families who otherwise would be unable to have a healthy, biologically related child. Such techniques, including mitochondrial replacement therapies (MRTs) and heritable human genome editing (HHGE), have not yet achieved widespread use. Yet, the healthy births of multiple children from MRTs across a handful of jurisdictions and a single use of HHGE yielding three children in China foreshadows a coming time where the technologies may become more widely adopted. 

In this article, we trace how multiple states have already used available regulatory systems to steer the use of, or prohibit, certain advanced ART techniques. Scholars have already begun to make comparisons of several states’ approaches to one type of advanced technique, MRTs, addressing the matters of how jurisdictions conceptualize and categorize the technology or whether states have or will enact novel regulatory regimes. This article takes a different approach by comparing oversight responses to both MRTs and HHGE that are grounded in existing rules and regulatory authorities (rather than novel frameworks) and examining the type of regulatory regime applied in each case, assuming that the regulation of one form of advanced ART will undoubtedly inform decision-making around others. By focusing on how jurisdictions can use existing oversight mechanisms, conceptualized here through the lens of inherited regulation, we aim to illustrate how these advanced ARTs are not truly ‘unregulated’ and explore the normative dimensions of wielding inherited regulation in this space. As global debates continue over how states and the international community should respond to MRT and HHGE, comparative analysis and a recognition that advanced ARTs can trigger inherited regulatory regimes may offer insights relevant to policymakers and stakeholders more broadly. 

In this article, we find evidence of jurisdictions taking multiple different approaches to using existing regulatory structures and instruments to manage advanced ARTs, and we argue that effectively using these regimes will require policymakers to thoughtfully, and incrementally, tailor their requirements to advanced ARTs. For some jurisdictions, this will require coordinating multiple inherited regimes, potentially at multiple levels of government. Section II provides an overview of two nascent advanced ARTs, which have already seen clinical use, before Section III introduces the theoretical framework of inherited regulation. Five case studies of inherited regulatory interventions on advanced ARTs are presented in Section IV, followed by a comparison and discussion of these cases in Section V. Concluding thoughts and implications for policy strategies around advanced ARTs and inherited regulation are set out in Section VI.

Informatics

'Family informatics' by Enrico Coiera, Kathleen Yin, Roneel V Sharan, Saba Akbar, Satya Vedantam, Hao Xiong, Jenny Waldie and Annie Y S Lau in (2022) 29(7) Journal of the American Medical Informatics Association 1310–1315 comments 

While families have a central role in shaping individual choices and behaviors, healthcare largely focuses on treating individuals or supporting self-care. However, a family is also a health unit. We argue that family informatics is a necessary evolution in scope of health informatics. To deal with the needs of individuals, we must ensure technologies account for the role of their families and may require new classes of digital service. Social networks can help conceptualize the structure, composition, and behavior of families. A family network can be seen as a multiagent system with distributed cognition. Digital tools can address family needs in (1) sensing and monitoring; (2) communicating and sharing; (3) deciding and acting; and (4) treating and preventing illness. Family informatics is inherently multidisciplinary and has the potential to address unresolved chronic health challenges such as obesity, mental health, and substance abuse, support acute health challenges, and to improve the capacity of individuals to manage their own health needs. 

The authors state

 A family is a network of individuals that may share obligations, needs, behaviors, routines, and rituals that can shape individual health choices. Family members may have a shared genetic, environmental, or socioeconomic context and together have emergent needs that may supersede those of the individual. 

Healthcare services in the main focus on the needs of individuals and see families as a support mechanism for the individual. Families for example can have a collective responsibility for managing geriatric, pediatric, and mental health conditions of their members. However, a family itself is a health unit, and different families exhibit different degrees of ‘health’. Serious illness in one family member may create psychological burden on others. In a pandemic, one infected family member may force all to isolate with heightened risk of infection. Resource- or time-poor families may put collective needs (such as securing financial income) above any impact on the health of individuals. Family coping styles such as adaptability may contribute to positive health outcomes for family members but some family behaviors can be obstructive and create barriers to health management. Family influences may affect the management of acute and chronic conditions, and play a significant role in preventative health. 

There is a similar focus on individuals in health informatics. Information services typically support individual clinician decision making about individual patients or populations. Consumer informatics also mainly focuses on supporting the health needs of individuals through self-care.  While there has been early and promising attention paid to understanding the information needs of families, it is still largely ignored by the mainstream. 

In this paper, we argue that family informatics is a necessary evolution in the scope of health informatics. If we are to comprehensively deal with the health needs of individuals, we must ensure our technologies account for and exploit the role of families. If we are to address the unique health needs of families, we may need new classes of digital service. 

To better understand these opportunities, we use the lens of social networks to conceptualize the structure, composition, and behavior of families. We examine the unique tasks that fall to families and describe possible categories of family-focused digital interventions that could meet these needs.

10 June 2022

Privacy

'What Makes Data Personal?' by Maria LillĂ  Montagnani and Mark Verstraete in (2023) 56(3) UC Davis Law Review comments 

Personal data is an essential concept for information privacy law. Privacy’s boundaries are set by personal data: for a privacy violation to occur, personal data must be involved. And an individual’s right to control information extends only to personal data. However, current theorizing about personal data is woefully incomplete. In light of this incompleteness, this Article offers a new conceptual approach to personal data. To start, this Article argues that personal data is simply a legal construct that describes the set of information or circumstances where an individual should be able to exercise control over a piece of information. 

After displacing the mythology about the naturalness of personal data, this Article fashions a new theory of personal data that more adequately tracks when a person should be able to control specific information. Current approaches to personal data rightly examine the relationship between a person and information; however, they misunderstand what relationship is necessary for legitimate control interests. Against the conventional view, this Article suggests that how the information is used is an indispensable part of the analysis of the relationship between a person and data that determines whether the data should be considered personal. In doing so, it employs the philosophical concept of separability as a method for making determinations about which uses of information are connected to a person and, therefore, should trigger individual privacy protections and which are not. 

This framework offers a superior foundation to extant theories for capturing the existence and scope of individual interests in data. By doing so, it provides an indispensable contribution for crafting an ideal regime of information governance. Separability enables privacy and data protection laws to better identify when a person’s interests are at stake. And further, separability offers a resilient normative foundation for personal data that grounds interests of control in a philosophical foundation of autonomy and dignity values—which are incorrectly calibrated in existing theories of personal data. Finally, this Article’s reimagination of personal data will allow privacy and data protection laws to more effectively combat modern privacy harms such as manipulation and inferences.

09 June 2022

Fakes

Another instance of identity crime - in the form of CV 'enhancement' - with the Victorian County Court hearing that former UK police officer improved his work and education history to gain high-paying Victorian government jobs (including one where he earned over $450,000). The embroidery included claiming diplomas from a fake university. 

 Peter Ravenscroft pleaded guilty to obtaining financial advantage by deception. He claimed he had been a detective inspector for the UK National Crime Squad, rather than actual service as a detective constable at Sussex police. He told prospective employers he was a Leeds University fellow, has a Bachelor of Education from Aston University and had two diplomas from Guildford University. Alas, Guildford U does not exist. He appears to have lied about receiving diplomas from the Australian Institute of Management, Brighton University and Master Builders Victoria.

The profile helped him gain employment at the state Department of Treasury & Finance and at Frankston City Council, where he was paid a total of $456,038 as a compliance and safety manager. He subsequently moved to the state Ombudsman, where he earned $196,857 in salary and superannuation. 

As part of the deceptions he forged certificates of commendation and training from Sussex police and create a fake referee named “Dr John Marshall” who he said supervised him at Frankston.

Ellis J said 'deceiving prospective employers with such blatant and calculated lies is appalling behaviour indeed, noting that the fraud was 'probably entirely unnecessary' given that Ravenscroft performed well and was a hdecorated UK officer. 

Ravenscroft was handed a two-year community corrections order: 180 hours of unpaid community work and requirement for mental health treatment and rehabilitation. 

We might wonder about the efficacy of any vetting protocols at the three employers.

06 June 2022

Emergencies

'The Defence Act 1903 (Cth): A Guide for Responding to Australia's Large-Scale Domestic Emergencies' by Zoe Lipsis in (2022) 45(2) Melbourne University Law Review comments 

 Drawing upon the Australian 2019–20 bushfire season and the COVID-19 pandemic, this article examines case studies highlighting the legislative impact of the increased domestic deployment of the Australian Defence Force (‘ADF’). Leveraging compa rable provisions from an analogous statutory regime, namely pt IIIAAA of the Defence Act 1903 (Cth), it considers how existing legislative provisions can provide guidance for the development of a statutory framework to govern future deployment of the ADF in response to Australia’s large-scale domestic emergencies. 

 Lippis states 

Encapsulating the tension between the civil–military divide, the domestic utilisation of the Australian Defence Force (‘ADF’) has been a ‘critical and controversial issue’ since Federation. With increased calls for the domestic deployment of the ADF, as a result of regional instability, terrorism, and natural disasters, debate has been reignited regarding the use of the military for purposes outside their traditional external defence role. The catastrophic bushfire season of summer 2019–20 reinstated the domestic utilisation of the ADF on the national political agenda.4 As the Morrison government unilaterally mobilised the military to provide support to civilian agencies,5 scrutiny of the military’s internal role intensified. Furthermore, the arrival of the COVID-19 pandemic on Australian shores in January 20206 prompted additional questions surrounding the ADF’s domestic role. For the second time in 2020, ADF members were deployed across Australia, this time to assist civilian agencies as they battled an insurmountable global public health emergency. 

Drawing upon these case studies, this article will examine the impact of legislation upon the increased domestic deployment of the ADF. Leveraging upon comparable provisions from an analogous statutory regime, namely pt IIIAAA of the Defence Act 1903 (Cth) (‘Defence Act’),8 it will consider how existing legislative provisions provide guidance for the development of a statutory framework to govern future internal deployment of the ADF during large-scale domestic emergencies. 

The article will commence by examining, in Part II, the ADF’s recent role in response to domestic crises, most particularly the Australian 2019–20 bushfire season and the COVID-19 pandemic. It will proceed in Part III to consider the existing legal basis for the domestic deployment of the military for disaster relief activities, including the Defence Assistance to the Civil Community (‘DACC’) policy framework. Following an analysis of the benefits of a legislative regime to govern ADF domestic operations, the article will examine in Part IV how pt IIIAAA of the Defence Act can provide guidance for the creation of a comparable Commonwealth legal framework for the domestic deployment of the ADF during large-scale disaster relief activities. The final section of the article, Part V, will recommend legislative provisions for inclusion within a new statutory regime, based upon an analysis of analogous provisions within pt IIIAAA. It will propose that while the DACC policy regime has served Australia well to date, the anticipated increase in requests for ADF domestic assistance warrants serious consideration as to whether a legislative framework is required to underpin such operations in the future. The article will conclude by proposing that existing provisions of the Defence Act provide significant guidance for the development of a Commonwealth statutory regime to govern future ADF assistance during large-scale domestic emergencies.