Property

'Proprietary Data, Open Data, Data Commons: Who Owns the Data? How to Best Reconcile Conflicting Interests in Exploiting the Value of Data and Protecting Against its Risks' by Luisa Kruse and Maximilian Grafenstein comments

 The European data strategy aims to make the EU a leader in a data-driven world. To this aim, the EU is creating a single market for data where 1) data can flow across sectors for the benefit of all; 2) European laws like data protection and competition law are fully respected; and 3) the rules for access and use of data are fair, practical and clear. In order to structure the corresponding initiatives of legislators and public authorities, it is important to clarify the data ownership models on which the initiatives are based: Proprietary data models, Open Data models or so-called data commons models. Based on a literature analysis, this article first provides an overview of the discussed economic and social advantages and disadvantages of proprietary and Open Data models and, against this background, clarifies the concept of the data commons. In doing so, this article understands the data commons concept to mean that everyone has an equal right in principle to exploit the value of data and control its associated risks. Based on this understanding, purely technical power of the data holder to exclude others from “her” data does not mean that she has a superior or even exclusive right to generate value from the data. By means of legal mechanisms, the competent legislator or public authorities may therefore counteract such purely de facto powers of data holders by opening their technical access control over data for other parties and define the conditions of its use. In doing so, the interests of the data holder in keeping the data for themselves must be weighed up against the interests of data users in using the data as well as the interests in controlling the related risks of all parties affected by this use. While this balancing exercise may be established, in a more or less general manner, by the European or national legislator or even by municipalities, data intermediaries will have to play a central role in ensuring that this balancing of interest is resolved in specific cases. Data intermediaries may do this not only by specifying the general data usage rules provided by the legislators and municipalities in the form of context-specific access and use conditions but above all by monitoring compliance with these conditions.

Solutionism?

'Where Technology Leads, the Problems Follow. Technosolutionism and the Dutch Contact Tracing App' by Lotje E. Siffels and Tamar Sharon in (2024) 37 Philosophy & Technology 125 comments 

In April 2020, in the midst of its first pandemic lockdown, the Dutch government announced plans to develop a contact tracing app to help contain the spread of the coronavirus – the Coronamelder. Originally intended to address the problem of the overburdening of manual contract tracers, by the time the app was released six months later, the problem it sought to solve had drastically changed, without the solution undergoing any modification, making it a prime example of technosolutionism. While numerous critics have mobilised the concept of technosolutionism, the questions of how technosolutionism works in practice and which specific harms it can provoke have been understudied. In this paper we advance a thick conception of technosolutionism which, drawing on Evgeny Morozov, distinguishes it from the notion of technological fix, and, drawing on constructivism, emphasizes its constructivist dimension. Using this concept, we closely follow the problem that the Coronamelder aimed to solve and how it shifted over time to fit the Coronamelder solution, rather than the other way around. We argue that, although problems are always constructed, technosolutionist problems are badly constructed, insofar as the careful and cautious deliberation which should accompany problem construction in public policy is absent in the case of technosolutionism. This can lead to three harms: a subversion of democratic decision-making; the presence of powerful new actors in the public policy context – here Big Tech; and the creation of “orphan problems”, whereby the initial problems that triggered the need to develop a (techno)solution are left behind. We question whether the most popular form of technology ethics today, which focuses predominantly on the design of technology, is well-equipped to address these technosolutionist harms, insofar as such a focus may preclude critical thinking about whether or not technology should be the solution in the first place. 

At the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in early 2020, governments and health authorities around the world turned to digital technology for support in addressing the rapid spread of the virus. Particularly promising was the idea of auto-mating contact tracing; a public health strategy for containing infectious disease outbreaks that involves identifying infected individuals and informing the people they have been in contact with that they are at risk (EC, 2020; WHO, 2020). Digitizing (part of) the contact tracing work would enable the employment of this tried-and-tested method on the large scale of infections that COVID-19 brought with it (de Jonge, 2020; Ferretti et al., 2020; Wacksman, 2021). At the same time, digital contact tracing raised substantial privacy and surveillance risks (Ada Lovelace Institute, 2020; McGee et al., 2020), had a high probability of false positives (Lee, 2020; Vaughan, 2020), and its overall effectiveness was (and remains) questionable (Chiusi, 2021; ter Haar et al., 2023). Many countries ended up developing smartphone- based apps that automatically trace points of contact between individuals, and alert users when they have been in contact with someone carrying the virus. The design of the apps and its consequences for citizens’ privacy was fiercely debated and differed per country, with the Bluetooth-based and decentralized design being the most widespread (Shahroz et al., 2021; Lanzing et al., 2022). At the time of writing, most of the apps are no longer in use (EC, n.d.). 

On April 7 2020, during the first lockdown, the Dutch government also announced plans to develop a contact tracing app, the Coronamelder. The announcement was a response to the overburdening of manual contact tracers, who could not keep up with the growing need for contact tracing. Half a year later, in the fall of 2020, the Coronamelder was released for public use. But where initially the app was supposed to address the overburdening of manual contact tracers by providing support, the app now no longer seemed to have anything to do with this overburdening. The aim of the app had changed drastically. In this paper we contend that throughout the process of developing and rolling out the Coronamelder, the problem the app was initially meant to solve changed over time without the solution – a smartphone-based contact tracing app – undergoing any modification. We argue that this makes it a prime example of technosolutionism. 

Numerous critics have argued that the pandemic has shown how, in times of crisis, there is a tendency to turn to digital solutions to address public policy problems (Klein, 2020a, 2020b; Morozov, 2020). Many references to technosolutionism in relation to contact tracing apps were made, both in general (Harjric, 2020; Michael et al., 2020; Mann et al., 2022), and in the Dutch context (Appelman et al., 2020). 

However, with some exceptions (Campbell-Verduyn & Gstrein, 2024; Maschewski & Nosthoff, 2022), there has been little effort to describe the political development and rollout of contract tracing apps and the specific role technosolutionism played in it. Moreover, most discussions of contact tracing apps and technosolutionism make use of what we call a thin conception of technosolutionism. This overlooks its constructivist dimension and equates it with the simpler concept of “technological fix”, thereby failing to recognize the potency – and dangers – of technosolutionist thinking in public policy contexts, and how it might be prevented in the future. Through this article, we hope to contribute to the literature on technosolutionism in several ways: by elaborating a thick conception of technosolutionism that embraces a constructivist approach, by showing what technosolutionism in the context of public policy making does, and by showing which harms a technosolutionist problem construction can provoke. We do this by following the problem that the Coronamelder was supposed to solve, and how it shifted to fit the Coronamelder solution, rather than the other way around, in the period between April and December 2020. Our analysis focusses specifically on the way government officials who were involved in the development of the app conceptualized the problem it sought to solve. We reviewed policy documents during this time that highlight the purpose and development of the app, including advice from committees, press conferences, parliamentary debates and letters from the Minister of Health to inform Parliament. We specifically sought out policy documents where the aim or purpose of the app are described, explicitly and implicitly, as well as the app’s effectiveness. Subsequently, to clarify our findings we had several conversations with persons involved in the development of the app, amongst whom government officials. 

The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we distinguish between a thick and thin conception of solutionism, where the thick conception follows Morozov’s (2013) definition of technosolutionism, which involves a constructivist and temporal element of looking back from the solution and constructing a problem that justifies its implementation. Taking inspiration from Latour (2003), furthermore, we argue that it is not the fact that problems are constructed per se that is problematic with technosolutionism. Rather, that technosolutionist problems are not constructed well. In the context of public policy making, we contend, good problem construction implies careful deliberation and discussion of alternative solutions. Something we find to be painfully lacking in technosolutionism, we argue in Section 3, as we show how the problem definition follows the solution and is twisted to fit the solution, rather than the other way around. In Section 4 we zoom in on how technosolutionist problems are constructed. We show several moments of contestation, negotiation and stabilization in the construction of the problem that the Coronamelder sought to solve, which help us identify technosolutionism as a mechanism. In Section 5, drawing on our analysis, we describe some of the general harms of technosolutionism in the public policy context. These include a subversion of democratic decision making, the presence of new and powerful actors in the form of Big Tech companies, and the creation of what we call “orphan problems”: problems that initially triggered the development of a technosolution, but were abandoned when they no longer fit the technosolution. We believe that the ethical reflection which had been applied to the Coronamelder at the time was ill-equipped to address these harms that technosolutionism brings forth, since its focus was exclusively on the design of the technology. This focus precludes critical thinking about whether or not the technology should be developed in the first place. We contend that this type of ethical reflection is prevalent in ethics of technology and argue for a broader ethical reflection, one that includes consideration of democratic values and the question of how technological (vs. non-technological solutions) may impact them.

Protests

The recommendations in the Hodgkinson External Review Report for the University of Sydney Senate, commissioned after protests mid-year, are as follows. The University has resolved to accept the recommendationsin principle. 

• The prohibition on encampments as a form of protest on any University campus should be maintained as part of the current review of the Campus Access Policy. 
• The prohibition against any form of protest within a building on the University campus, and the impeding of access to and exit from any building by protest, be maintained following the review of the Campus Access Policy. 
• The University prohibit any student from addressing those present in a lecture, seminar or tutorial prior to the commencement of the lecture, seminar or tutorial on any subject matter. A breach of the prohibition may be considered misconduct. 
• The University should hold Organisations responsible if posters identifying them or an event which they are involved in are put up on campus in breach of the Advertising on Campus Policy. 
• That the University develop a range of sanctions including the withholding of funding to an Organisation which can be imposed on an Organisation found to be in breach of University policy. 
• Where an Organisation is repeatedly acting in breach of University policy, consideration should be given to precluding its office and position holders (or some of them) from being eligible to hold an office in that or any other Organisation receiving University funding. 
• The University should continue to support its review of its complaints procedures with a view to a complete overhaul and simplifying every aspect of it. The review of its complaints procedures should consider establishing a single central office to receive and process all complaints. 
• The University should strengthen existing mechanisms for alternative dispute resolution processes, such as mediation, as part of its review of the complaints procedures. Complainants should be advised, where appropriate, that alternative dispute resolution is an option available to them. 
• The University should publish a regular report to the Senate containing the number of complaints received, the nature of the complaints, the number of complaints resolved since the last report and the timeframe for the resolution of outstanding complaints. The information contained in the report should be presented in such a way that it does not identify the individuals mentioned in the complaints. 
• The University should publish a public report that identifies the range of penalties imposed in matters where a breach of University policy has been substantiated. 
• The University should amend its policies and procedures to make clear that each person utilising a word or phrase is responsible at the time the word or phrase is used to identify to the audience the context in which it is used. (New Civility Rule) 
• A failure to conduct a lecture, seminar, tutorial or a meeting which takes place within any of the University’s facilities in accordance with the New Civility Rule should be recognised as misconduct and treated accordingly. 
• The University’s policies be amended to make clear that Organisations are responsible for conducting all meetings held by them using University facilities in compliance with the Civility Principles. Where an Organisation breaches this requirement, it will be liable to sanction for breach of the University’s policy. 
• The University policies should be amended to require Organisations, when conducting a meeting using University facilities, to comply with the University’s Civility Principles. 
• In order to hold an office or position within an Organisation the persons holding that office or in that position must have completed the Engaging with Civility module. 
• Where an Organisation permits a person to hold an office or act in a position, and that person has not completed the Engaging with Civility module, both the Organisation and individual should be held accountable. Where a person holds an office or occupies a position without completing the Engaging with Civility module, the person's breach of the policy would amount to misconduct. 
• An Organisation should be held responsible for a breach of the policy where it permits a person who has not completed the Engaging with Civility module to hold an office or occupy a position and subject to sanction which could include the withdrawal of their funding in whole or in part. 
• The policy review presently being undertaken and the Policy Working Group should be supported with a view to achieving a review of all of the University’s policies and the simplification of them. 
• The University should approach both the NSW Police and the Federal Police with a view to entering into with them formal protocols which set out how they can assist the University if the need arises. 
• That attaching banners to the footbridges be prohibited.

Bugs

Statistics from today's annual report to the national parliament on the Surveillance Devices Act 2004 (Cth): 

• In 2023–24, 6 law enforcement agencies were issued 636 surveillance device warrants, a decrease of 46 from the 682 issued in 2022–23. 

• In 2023–24, 12 applications for surveillance device warrants were refused by an issuing authority, compared to the one refused in 2022–23. 

• In 2023–24, 18 computer access warrants were issued to law enforcement agencies, an increase of 7 from the 11 issued in 2022–23. No computer access warrants were refused in 2023-24, compared to 2022–23 where one computer access warrant was refused. 

• One data disruption warrant was issued during 2023–24, an increase of 1 from the 0 issued in 2022–23. No data disruption warrants were refused in 2022–23 or in 2023-24. 

• In 2023–24, 2 network activity warrants were issued, a decrease of one from the 3 issued in 2022–23. No network activity warrants were refused in 2022–23 or 2023–24. 

• In 2023–24, 244 applications to extend surveillance device warrants were granted, representing an increase of 145 from the 99 granted in 2022–23. Applications to extend warrants are often required due to the prolonged nature of investigations for complex and serious crime (where evidence gathering may not have been completed within 90 days). 

• In 2023–24, 17 retrieval warrants were issued to law enforcement agencies in order to retrieve lawfully installed surveillance devices, a decrease of 4 from the 21 issued in 2022–23. 

• In 2023–24, 10 tracking device authorisations were issued, a decrease of 7 from the 17 issued in 2022–23. No tracking device retrieval authorisations were issued in 2023-24, as was the case in 2022–23. 

• In 2023–24, information obtained under the SD Act contributed to 148 arrests, 102 prosecutions, and 18 convictions. In 2022-23, information obtained under the SD Act contributed to 75 arrests, 87 prosecutions and 52 convictions.

National AntiRacism Framework

The Australian Human Rights Commission has released its ambitious The National Anti-Racism Framework: A roadmap to eliminating racism in Australia, with 'a call to action for reform across Australia’s systems and structures, including in the justice and legal system, health, education, workplaces, media and the arts, and data'. 

 Recommendations are 

 1. The Australian Government commit to this National Anti-Racism Framework to eliminate racism in Australia. The National Anti-Racism Framework should set out national commitments over a 10-year period, with two 5-year implementation plans created for each of the implementation plans identified below. The National Anti-Racism Framework should: • acknowledge the systemic and structural nature of racism, including the historical and ongoing impacts of settler colonisation on First Nations peoples • be intersectional, community-centric, and recognise racism as a complex and shifting phenomenon • embed truth-telling and self-determination for First Nations peoples • be adequately, appropriately, and sustainably funded • include mechanisms for co-design and participation of First Nations peoples and other negatively racialised communities in the Framework’s operation • set measurable targets as informed by the needs of First Nations and other negatively racialised communities • identify how the Framework interacts with other national frameworks, agreements, and plans, particularly those that address intersecting forms of discrimination • include a monitoring, evaluation, and learning framework with public reporting at regular intervals. 

 

2. The Australian Government establish a National Anti-Racism Taskforce, to be co-chaired by the Race Discrimination Commissioner and a Secretary (representing the Australian Government’s Secretaries Board), with senior government membership from across federal, state and territory jurisdictions, and relevant peak organisations, to oversee and advise on the implementation of the National Anti-Racism Framework. Australian governments fund and work in partnership with the National Anti-Racism Taskforce to develop and implement: a. National Anti-Racism Framework First Nations Implementation Plan and b. National Anti-Racism Framework Implementation Plan. 

 

3. Australian governments, in partnership with the Coalition of Peaks, develop a nationally recognised definition of First Nations cultural safety, with minimum standards, for application across sectors, including health. 

 

4. Australian governments fully implement their commitments under the National Agreement on Closing the Gap, including to work in genuine partnership with, and adequately fund, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples and organisations to participate in shared decision making across government portfolios. 

 

5. Australian governments prioritise their commitment to building the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander community-controlled sector and provide ongoing and adequate funding for the sector and organisations to deliver culturally safe services, particularly for rural and remote communities. 

 

6. Australian governments provide adequate funding to local governments to establish or improve local anti-racism initiatives and programs informed by the Framework. 

 

7. The Australian Government fund the Australian Human Rights Commission to co-design, with communities that experience racism, a Monitoring, Evaluation, and Learning Framework (‘MEL Framework’) that operates for the lifespan of the National Anti-Racism Framework. This MEL Framework should complement accountability mechanisms under the National Agreement on Closing the Gap. An independent organisation should then be procured, with guidance from the Race Discrimination Commissioner and the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, to undertake the monitoring, evaluation, and learning with insight from First Nations and other negatively racialised communities. 

 

8. The Australian Parliament enact a national Human Rights Act incorporating findings from the Australian Human Rights Commission’s 2023 report Free and equal: Revitalising Australia’s commitment to human rights. 

 

9. The Australian Government comprehensively incorporate the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples into domestic law, including: a. taking steps to implement the UNDRIP into law, policy, and practice b. working in partnership with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples to create a National Action Plan to implement the UNDRIP c. independently auditing existing laws, policies, and practice for compliance with the UNDRIP. 

 

10. The Racial Discrimination Act 1975 be amended to include a positive duty, to eliminate racial discrimination, a. by an employer, business or undertaking b. in the provision of goods and services, with a particular focus on health, education, retail and hospitality, sport, housing, and financial settings c. in the access to places and facilities d. in the provision of land, housing and other accommodation.  

 

11. The Racial Discrimination Act 1975 be amended to provide powers to the Australian Human Rights Commission to assess compliance with the positive duty in recommendation 10 and for enforcement. This includes providing the Australian Human Rights Commission with the power and funding to: a. undertake assessments of the extent to which an organisation has complied with the duty, and issue compliance notices if it considers that an organisation has failed to comply b. enter into agreements/enforceable undertakings with the organisation c. apply to the Court for an order requiring compliance with the duty. 

 

12. Australian governments introduce effective legal protections against online hate, with particular attention given to regulation and enforcement against, and liability of, digital platforms. These protections should be informed by consultation with First Nations and other negatively racialised communities. 

 

13. The Australian Government take immediate steps to ensure that migration and citizenship laws comply with international human rights law, with particular attention given to inequities experienced by negatively racialised people seeking asylum, and refugees and migrants. 

 

14. The Australian Government consider options for legal reform that are not already addressed with or under recommendations 10-11 on the introduction of a positive duty to eliminate racism, including but not limited to: a. addressing systemic and institutional racism experienced by First Nations and other negatively racialised people b. addressing religious-based discrimination c. addressing intersectional experiences of racism d. eliminating racism as is required under Australia’s obligations under the International Convention for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination. 

 

15. The Australian Government review the effectiveness of current protections against exploitation in employment and migration legislation, and develop further strategies to address unlawful arrangements experienced by migrants in precarious work, particularly those on temporary visas including people seeking asylum and international students. 

 

16. The Australian Government establish an independent review of counter-terrorism laws, policies, and practices to investigate potential discriminatory application and effect on different communities and to recommend ways to address it. 

 

17. The Australian Government investigate options for legal protections against caste discrimination, including potential reform of existing legislation. 

 

Workplaces and Employment 

 

18. All employers ensure that senior leadership have responsibility for organisational change on intersecting forms of discrimination, including racism, and that it is not solely placed on Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander and other negatively racialised employees. 

 

19. Medium and large employers in all sectors develop internal workplace anti-racism strategies. Strategies must include measures for preventing and responding to racism in the workplace, as an interim measure until recommendation 10 is implemented. 

 

20. Employers, including governments, commit to the development and implementation of ongoing, mandatory workplace anti-racism training, resources, and educational materials with anti-racism organisations or practitioners. 

 

21. Medium and large employers in all sectors develop an internal cultural safety framework for First Nations staff. This should complement their internal anti-racism strategies for all staff including non-Indigenous staff who experience racism. 

 

22. Medium and large employers in all sectors develop, implement, monitor, and evaluate strategies for hiring, promotion, and retention of staff identifying as First Nations and from other negatively racialised backgrounds to increase representation in the workforce, particularly in leadership and senior roles. 

 

23. Australian governments incorporate cultural safety codes of practice into workplace health and safety legislation. 

 

24. Australian governments establish a cross-sector First Nations Workforce Development Strategy that incorporates data sharing agreements and accountability mechanisms. 

 

25. Australian governments fund the Australian Human Rights Commission to convene a national council of state and territory anti-discrimination and human rights bodies, work, health, and safety agencies, and relevant peak organisations to develop nationally consistent standards for employers and employees to report experiences of racism and racial discrimination in the workplace. 

 

26. The Independent Parliamentary Standards Commission develop behavioural codes of conduct for all Australian Parliamentarians and staff that take a zero-tolerance approach to racism with appropriate sanctions. Australian Parliamentarians and their staff be required to complete regular anti-racism training that addresses workplace behaviour and prevents racism in all public communications.

 

Education and Public Awareness 

 

27. Australian governments fund a holistic cultural safety and anti-racism review of existing policies and practices that affect staff and students in primary and secondary schools, through consultation with children and young people. The findings must inform the development and implementation of cultural safety and anti-racism reforms. 

 

28. Australian governments commission and fund comprehensive mandatory professional development for primary and secondary school staff (including leadership staff members) to build schools’ capacity to identify, prevent, and manage incidents of racism and develop the skills, tools, and capability to have discussions about racism and its effects in contemporary Australia. 

 

29. Australian governments and education providers (early childhood to tertiary) co-design and incorporate into curricula nationally consistent anti-racism resources and educational materials for staff and students that focus on recognising and rejecting racism: in partnership with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander organisations and practitioners, including material about the historical and ongoing impacts of settler colonisation. This should be supplemented by local, place-based materials a. b. in partnership with non-Indigenous anti- racism experts from negatively racialised communities, including material about Australia’s migration histories, contemporary forms of racism, and ongoing impacts of discriminatory policies. 

 

30. Australian governments and education providers (early childhood to tertiary) implement curricula reform: a. in partnership with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander organisations and practitioners to embed First Nations knowledges, scholarship, and texts across all disciplines b. on the advice of other negatively racialised organisations and practitioners to better integrate knowledges, scholarship, and texts authored by non-Indigenous negatively racialised people. 

 

31. Australian governments and education providers (early childhood to tertiary) co- design with community experts, a nationally consistent, effective, comprehensive, and culturally safe mechanism for students, staff, families, and communities to safely and without fear of repercussions, report experiences of racism across educational settings and improve accountability, support, and redress services. 

 

32. Australian governments provide ongoing funding to the Australian Human Rights Commission to develop and maintain its public awareness and education campaigns and materials to improve racial literacy and understandings of intersecting forms of discrimination, in partnership with community-led organisations. 

 

33. Australian governments fund public awareness and education on anti-racism for the community sporting sector, in partnership with the Australian Sports Commission. 

 

34. Australian governments increase funding for research to address gaps in existing research and contribute to the evidence base on the efficacy of anti-racism initiatives and interventions in education settings, including systemic reforms. 

 

Justice 

 

35. Australian governments raise the minimum age of criminal responsibility to 14 years in all jurisdictions, without exception. 

 

36. The Australian Government establish an independent mechanism to monitor and report on the status of the implementation of the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody. This role should be overseen by the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, with adequate funding from the Australian Government. 

 

37. All Australian governments expedite putting into place national preventive mechanisms for all places of detention, consistent with Australia’s obligations under the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 

 

38. Australian governments conduct an external audit that investigates systemic racism, including police misconduct and negligence, and develop holistic reforms to institutional practices across all stages of the justice process from initial contact with law enforcement through to post-prison release. 

 

39. Australian governments fund existing, or develop new, community-specific approaches to diversion and rehabilitation for people in contact with the justice system, including community-based approaches to sentencing, alternatives to custody and court processes, and restorative and transformative justice solutions. 

 

40. Australian governments explore and fund community-informed and early intervention solutions beyond civil and criminal penalties to address far-right extremism and white supremacy in communities, particularly as they intersect with other forms of discrimination. These solutions must include centring community wellbeing, providing redress for the harms experienced by targeted individuals and communities, and a focus on atrocity-prevention. 

 

41. Australian governments provide ongoing funding to legal and support services, including community-controlled services, to provide culturally safe and trauma-informed access to justice for First Nations and other negatively racialised people. 

 

42. Australian governments increase funding to community-controlled agencies that support First Nations children and families in order to reduce child protection interventions. 

 

43. Australian governments review the adequacy and effectiveness of any anti- racism and cultural safety training within the justice system, including for police, legal aid providers, first responders, support services, and the courts, and implement mandatory and ongoing anti-racism and First Nations cultural safety training for leadership and staff. 

 

44. Australian governments, alongside police, relevant complaints-handling mechanisms, and non-government organisations, implement co-ordinated strategies to address personal and structural barriers to reporting experiences of racism. 

 

45. Australian governments support comprehensive, community-led data collection consistent with the principles of Indigenous Data Sovereignty on interactions with the justice system, including arrests, outcomes of justice, and the experiences of individuals within court processes. This is to be completed alongside work to implement recommendation 59 on a National Anti-Racism Data Plan. Media and the Arts 

 

46. Media organisations adopt guidelines that are grounded in an anti-racist approach to reporting about First Nations and other negatively racialised communities, such as Media Diversity Australia’s Race Reporting Handbook. 

 

47. The Australian Government strengthen regulation of media organisations on reporting related to First Nations and other negatively racialised communities, informed by the Australian Human Rights Commission’s forthcoming research on media regulation and standards. 

 

48. Australian governments and media organisations provide ongoing funding for community media outlets, including for First Nations-controlled media outlets. 

 

49. Digital platforms develop stronger, transparent protocols to allow users to report and remove racist content, including mis- and disinformation. These protocols should be informed by the Commission’s forthcoming research on interventions to address mis- and disinformation and online hate. 

 

50. Australian governments, media and arts organisations, and other private sector organisations fund campaigns, initiatives, and projects that are community-led and take a strengths-based approach to storytelling about First Nations and other negatively racialised communities. 

 

51. Media and arts organisations conduct regular audits of content to assess biases and gaps in the representation of diverse voices, and to collect and publish metrics on workplace representation of First Nations and other negatively racialised communities. This must include an assessment of whether media and arts organisations are meeting content targets and targets to improve the representation of First Nations and other negatively racialised staff. 

 

52. The Australian Government establish a research fund to better understand experiences of racism and effective anti- racism strategies to create a more accessible, diverse, equitable, and representative media and arts landscape in Australia. 

 

Health Data 

 

53. Australian governments identify racism as an urgent national health priority with significant impacts on the physical and mental wellbeing of First Nations and other negatively racialised communities. Solutions should prioritise partnership and shared decision making with at-risk communities, including people with disability and older persons. 

 

54. Australian governments mandate comprehensive cultural safety and anti-racism education throughout all health curricula, and within all workforce practice standards and regulation requirements. 

55. Australian governments fund healthcare providers to partner with First Nations peoples on the integration of traditional healing practices that acknowledge historical trauma into mainstream healthcare systems.  

58. The Australian Government fund a body comprising First Nations experts on Indigenous Data Sovereignty to partner with First Nations communities to embed Indigenous Data Sovereignty and Indigenous Data Governance on a national and state and territory level.   

59. The Australian Government adopt and fund a National Anti-Racism Data Plan (‘the Plan’). This Plan must outline a national approach to collecting, using, and managing data on experiences, reports, and impacts of racism across states and territories and local jurisdictions. To achieve this, the Australian Government resource the Race Discrimination Commissioner to: a. establish an advisory group comprising anti-racism data experts or practitioners from First Nations and other negatively racialised communities, and representatives from government agencies to oversee the Plan 

 

56. Australian governments provide adequate funding to develop targeted programs to address health issues disproportionately affecting at risk-groups within First Nations and other negatively racialised communities, particularly in rural and remote communities. b. inform and develop the substance of the Plan on the advice of the advisory group c. lead consultations with communities, academics, and data experts to inform the priorities, outcomes, and other details of the Plan d. ensure findings and outcomes from recommendations 58 and 60-63 are incorporated into the Plan. 

 

57. Australian governments provide adequate funding for interpreter services to be provided as standard within services, including Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander language interpreters. This funding must also cover training on effective interpreter use and the recruitment of interpreters to meet evolving language needs. 

 

60. The Australian Government and relevant non-government organisations commit to collecting data about experiences of racism, including systemic and structural racism, in ongoing national surveys. The Australian Government provide appropriate funding where necessary to relevant agencies and non- government organisations to collect this data. 

 

61. Australian governments fund the Australian Human Rights Commission, anti-discrimination and human rights bodies, and work, health, and safety agencies to collect intersectional data under their respective mandates. The Australian Human Rights Commission be tasked to work in partnership with these bodies to develop an approach with advice from the body established under recommendation 58 on collecting disaggregated, intersectional data on complaints and reports, particularly as they relate to race/ ethnicity and racism in employment settings. 

 

62. Australian governments commit ongoing and adequate funding to existing or prospective third-party reporting mechanisms that take an anti-racist approach to collecting data about racism as it affects different communities to continue collecting this data and to strengthen or establish initiatives, including providing support services (e.g. psychological and legal support) to targets or witnesses of racism. 

 

63. The Australian Government review the Australian Standards for the Classification for Cultural and Ethnic Groups and the Standards for Statistics on Cultural and Language Diversity and develop new standards on the collection of administrative data about ethnic identity by adequately funding: a. the Australian Human Rights Commission to lead independent consultations on community understandings of race and ethnicity, with supporting research b. the Australian Bureau of Statistics to revise the data standards, informed by the research in (a) and from other relevant stakeholders. Outcomes from these processes should inform whether a question on ethnic identity should be introduced into future Australian Censuses. This may involve the establishment and funding of a Working Group, convened by the Australia Bureau of Statistics and as part of work under the National Anti-Racism Data Plan, to develop a question.

Open

'The future(s) of open science' by Philip Mirowski in (2018) 48(2) Social Studies of Science comments 

Almost everyone is enthusiastic that ‘open science’ is the wave of the future. Yet when one looks seriously at the flaws in modern science that the movement proposes to remedy, the prospect for improvement in at least four areas are unimpressive. This suggests that the agenda is effectively to re-engineer science along the lines of platform capitalism, under the misleading banner of opening up science to the masses. We live in an era of trepidation over the future of science. It is all the more noteworthy, then, that science policy circles have embraced an open infatuation with ‘open science’. The whole thing kicked off in the later 2000s, with rumors concerning something called ‘Science 2.0’. In January 2012, the New York Times (Lin, 2012) then had the good sense to promote the rebranding of this imaginary as ‘open science’. The British Royal Society intervened close on its heels in 2012, with a public relations document entitled Science as an Open Enterprise (Royal Society, 2012). Subsequently, this was rapidly followed by popularizing books (Nielsen, 2012; Weinberger, 2012) and a plethora of government white papers, policy documents and articles (e.g. OECD, 2015; CNRS, 2016; Strasser and Edwards, 2015; Vuorikari and Punie, 2015; Weinberger, 2012). All sorts of institutes and think tanks (the Ronin Institute, Center for Open Science, openscienceASAP, UK Open Data Institute, PCORI, Laura and John Arnold Foundation) sprouted across the landscape, dedicated to propounding the virtues of open science for all and sundry. The NIH even teamed up with the Wellcome Trust and the Howard Hughes Medical Institute to offer a much ballyhooed ‘Open Science Prize’ consisting of six awards to various teams of the not-very-princely sum of $80K with which to launch (?) their prototypes. The concept was trundled out to the public in the format of a 2017 PBS television Series ‘The Crowd and the Cloud’, funded by the NSF. Congressional mandates stipulating ‘openness’ were hidden in the US ‘Crowdsourcing and Citizen Science Act’, itself folded into the 2016 ‘American Competitiveness and Innovation Act’. 

Back in Europe in 2013, the G8 Science Ministers formally endorsed a policy of encouraging open science. In May 2016 the EU Competitiveness Council issued a mission statement that all scientific articles should be ‘freely accessible’ by 2020 (Enserink, 2016). ‘The time for talking about Open Access is now past. With these agreements, we are going to achieve it in practice’, the Dutch state secretary for education, culture, and science, Sander Dekker, added in a statement. Lord knows, the last thing an EU bureaucrat has patience with is talking about something not at all well understood. This, in turn, led to a programmatic ‘Vision for Europe’ in 2016 of ‘Open Innovation, Open Science’. The taken-for-granted premise that modern science is in crying need of top-to-bottom restructuring and reform turns out to be one of the more telling aspects of this unseemly scrum, a melee to be in the vanguard of prying science ‘open’. But the language is deceptive: In what sense was science actually ever ‘closed’, and who precisely is so intent upon cracking it open now? Where did all the funding come from to turn this vague and ill-specified opinion into a movement? 

To even pose these questions in a sober and deliberate manner, while making direct reference to the actual history of science, constitutes a challenge to the prophets of openness, because it conflicts with their widespread tendency to treat the last three or more centuries of science as operating in essentially the same monolithic modality. The so-called ‘scientific method’, once it appeared, persisted relatively unchanged, or so goes the undergraduate version of Western Civ. To evade the admission that scientific research and dissemination might actually have been structured differently across diverse epochs and geographical eras, the prophets of openness instead rapidly pivot to a completely unsupported theory of technological determinism to motivate their quest. Change is inevitable, they preach, due to some obscure imperatives concerning the computer and the internet and social media. Once scientists acquiesce to the implacable imperatives of the information revolution, it is said, they will discover that science itself should necessarily become more ‘open’, and the whole society will naturally benefit. 

The layers of confusion surrounding open science rival a millefeuille, and can be just as sticky. The quickest way to cut through the confection is to acknowledge that science has been constituted by a sequence of historical regimes of epistemic and logistical organization, long before the current craze for ‘openness’; this proposition could be perhaps patterned after the arguments made in what has been called the literature on ‘historical epistemology’ (e.g. Daston, 1994; Hacking, 1992). Much of this literature tends to make its case in the format of what used to be called ‘stage theories’: descriptions of historical sequences of relatively internally coherent modes, hegemonies or regimes, structured according to certain key self-images and practices, and punctuated by periods of instability and transition. Indeed, I shall argue that the open science movement is an artifact of the current neoliberal regime of science, one that reconfigures both the institutions and the nature of knowledge so as to better conform to market imperatives. 

But before that, it is necessary to take note of the slippery connotations and motives behind the open science movement. For some, it denotes mere open access to existing scientific publications; for others, it portends a different format for future scientific publication; for yet others, it signifies the open provision of scientific data; for others, it is primarily about something like open peer review; and for still others, the clamor for openness purports to welcome the participation of non-scientists into the research process, under the rubric of citizen science. Of course, these are individually wildly disparate phenomena; but it is noteworthy that many of the proponents and cheerleaders glide rather effortlessly between these diverse conceptions, and that in itself provides a clue to the deep structure of the emergent world of open science. Each ‘reform’ might accidentally have been deemed the imperative of the ‘same’ technological development or, conversely, they might each exemplify a more profound shift in epistemology. Thus, rather than track each of the above sub-components individually, I will approach the problem of understanding open science from the broader perspective of asking: What sort of thing is it that open science proposes to fix about older science? 

Mody (2011) writes that if an ‘epochal break has any features worth studying, they should be visible, in some way, down at the microlevel of practice’ (p. 64). I agree with this precept. The way to make the case for a structural break in the nature of modern science is to link some broad abstract cultural ideas about knowledge to pronounced transformations of scientific practice at the microlevel. The primary manifestations of the new regime are the marriage of an ethos of what has been called ‘radically collaborative science’ with the emergent structures of ‘platform capitalism’, all blessed under the neoliberal catechism of the market as super information processor. The ultimate objective of this paper is to describe how this marriage works; but it turns out to be more informative to begin by surveying the infirmities of recent science that the open science advocates claim they can fix.

AI, Trade and the WTO

The WTO 'Trading with intelligence: How AI shapes and is shaped by international trade' report comments

The widespread and transformative impact that artificial intelligence (AI) is currently having on society is being felt in all areas, from work, production and trade to health, arts and leisure activities. New applications of AI are expected to create unprecedented new economic and societal opportunities and benefits. However, significant ethical and societal risks are also associated with the development and application of AI. These risks have implications for all these areas too, including trade. AI is a global issue, and as governments increasingly move to regulate AI, global cooperation is more important than ever. 

Against this backdrop, the present report examines the intersection of AI and international trade. It begins with a discussion of why AI is a trade issue, before delving into the ways in which AI may shape the future of international trade. It discusses key trade-related policy considerations raised by this technology and provides an overview of government initiatives taken both to promote and to regulate AI. The report also highlights the looming risk of regulatory fragmentation and its impact, in particular on trade opportunities for micro, small and medium- sized businesses. Finally, the report discusses the critical role of the WTO in facilitating AI-related trade, ensuring trustworthy AI and addressing emerging trade tensions. 

Why is AI a trade issue? 

AI is distinct from other digital technologies in several key ways, and it has the potential to affect international trade significantly. It is a general-purpose technology, capable of adapting to a wide range of domains and tasks with unprecedented flexibility and efficiency. It relies on large datasets to learn and improve its performance and accuracy. AI's functions and efficiency can evolve rapidly, leading to dynamic shifts in its capabilities and autonomy. Finally, its inherent complexity and opacity, as well as its potential failures and biases, raise significant concerns related to matters such as how to understand the reasons for and basis of AI decisions and recommendations, or regarding ethics and broader societal implications. AI can be leveraged to overcome trade costs associated with trade logistics, supply chain management and regulatory compliance. By enhancing trade logistics, overcoming language barriers, and minimizing search and match costs, AI can make trade more efficient. It can help to automate and streamline customs clearance processes and border controls, navigate complex trade regulations and compliance requirements, and predict risks. AI-based tools can be used in trade finance, and can significantly enhance supply chain visibility by providing real-time data analytics, predictive insights and automated decision-making processes. All of this could lower trade costs and, as a result, level the playing field for developing economies and small businesses, helping them to overcome trade barriers, enter global markets and participate in international trade. 

AI can transform patterns of trade in services, particularly digitally delivered services. It can enhance productivity, especially in services sectors that rely on manual processes, by enabling low-skilled workers to leverage best practices of more high-skilled workers more effectively. For example, generative AI can amplify the performance of business consultants by up to 40 per cent compared to those not using it. Greater productivity gain is also observed for lower-skilled workers (Dell’Acqua et al., 2023). Research also shows that access to generative AI increases the productivity of call centre workers by an average of 14 per cent, and by 34 per cent specifically for novice and low-skilled workers (Brynjolfsson et al., 2023). AI can also foster the development of innovative services and increase demand for them. However, while AI can enhance trade in digitally delivered services significantly, it has contributed to reducing the demand for certain traditional services. AI-enabled automation can also reduce the necessity to outsource certain services. 

AI can increase demand and trade in technology-related products. Because AI systems often rely on real-time data streams and seamless connectivity, the adoption of AI is spurring demand for complementary goods related to information and communications technology (ICT) infrastructure and information technology (IT) equipment. These include computer and telecommunications services, specialized development tools and software libraries. For example, the global market for AI chips was valued at US$ 61.5 billion in 2023 and it has been projected that it could reach US$ 621 billion by 2032 (S&S Insider, 2024). As many of these goods and services are often supplied by a small number of economies, international trade serves as a major channel to foster AI development worldwide. Further upstream in the value chain, trade in the extraction and processing of critical metals and minerals, as well as trade in energy, are also likely to gain in importance. In addition, AI has substantially heightened the demand for data, fundamentally reshaping the landscape of data usage and trade. 

By affecting productivity, and through shifts in production dynamics, AI may reshape economies' comparative advantages. AI is expected to enhance productivity across all economic sectors in both developed and developing economies, and to change the composition of inputs required for production, placing greater emphasis on capital investment, rather than on labour inputs. This shift in production dynamics could reshape trade patterns. Conversely, new sources of comparative advantage may emerge from factors like educated labour, digital connectivity and favourable regulations. Because AI is energy-intensive, economies with abundant renewable energy may also gain comparative advantages. However, although AI can potentially benefit all economies, the development and control of AI technology are likely to remain concentrated in large economies and companies with advanced AI capabilities, resulting in industrial concentration. The adoption of AI can drive productivity increases across various sectors and reduce trade costs, leading to global gains in trade and GDP. Simulations using the WTO global trade model show that, under an optimistic scenario of universal AI adoption and high productivity growth up until 2040, global real trade growth could increase by almost 14 percentage points. In contrast, a cautious scenario, with uneven AI adoption and low productivity growth, projects trade growth of just under 7 percentage points. The simulation further shows that, while high-income economies are expected to see the largest productivity gains, lower-income economies have better potential to reduce trade costs. 

The global trade and GDP impact of AI varies significantly across economies and sectors, depending on choices made concerning innovation and policies. While trade growth in high-income economies remains relatively stable across projected scenarios, low-income economies could experience much higher trade growth under the scenarios of universal AI adoption and high productivity growth (18.1 percentage points) compared to those of uneven AI adoption and low productivity growth (6.5 percentage points). The simulation results suggest that if developing economies improve their AI readiness by strengthening digital infrastructure, enhancing skills and boosting innovation and regulatory capacity, they will be in a better position to adopt AI effectively. 

These simulations show that digitally delivered services1 are expected to experience the highest trade growth. In an optimistic scenario of universal AI adoption, digitally delivered services are projected to see cumulative growth of nearly 18 percentage points relative to the baseline scenario, the largest increase across all sectors. The expected impact of AI on real trade growth also differs within sectors. Potentially digitally delivered services such as education, human healthcare, and recreational and financial services, as well as manufacturing sectors such as processed food, are projected to experience significant trade growth, largely driven by trade cost reductions. Meanwhile, sectors related to natural resource extraction and manufacturing sectors such as textiles are expected to see limited growth. 

The policies of AI and trade 

The discussion on how AI might reshape international trade raises important policy questions. The risk of a growing divide resulting from applications of AI is significant, as are data governance challenges and the need to ensure that AI is trustworthy and to clarify how it relates to intellectual property (IP) rights. The implementation of AI at the domestic, regional and international levels entails both benefits and risks, and a lack of coordination could cause increasing regulatory fragmentation with regard to AI. Addressing the risk of a growing AI divide is essential to leverage the opportunities offered by this technology. Currently, the capacity to develop AI technology is concentrated in a few large economies, and this is creating a significant divide between economies that are leading research and development (R&D) in AI – in particular China and the United States – and the rest of the world. This imbalance could be further exacerbated by the use of government subsidies to develop AI. The risk of industry concentration within a few large firms could also intensify the divide between firms. These features, combined with the opacity of AI algorithms and the possibility of tacit collusion among competitor firms to maintain higher prices, present challenges for competition authorities. 

The rise of AI is raising important data governance issues that will need to be addressed to prevent further digital trade barriers. Cross-border data flows are essential to AI, as vast amounts of data are needed to train AI models, as well as minimize possible biases. Thus, restrictions on data flows can slow AI innovation and development, increase costs for firms, and negatively impact trade in AI-enabled products. A recent study (OECD and WTO, 2024) found that if all economies fully restricted their data flows, this could result in a 5 per cent reduction in global GDP and a 10 per cent decrease in exports. However, the large datasets required by AI models raise significant privacy concerns. Therefore, a reasonable trade-off between accessing large amounts of data to train AI models and protecting individual privacy must be found. 

Ensuring that AI is trustworthy without hindering trade can be challenging. “AI trustworthiness” means that it meets expectations in terms of reliability, security, privacy, safety, accountability and quality in a verifiable way. However, given the behaviour and opaque nature of AI systems, as well as the potential dual-use of some AI products (i.e., for both civilian and military applications), striking a balance between ensuring that AI is trustworthy and enabling trade to flow as smoothly as possible may prove especially challenging. The evolutionary nature of AI makes regulation a perennial moving target. “Traditional" regulations and standards for goods, which normally focus on tangible, visible and static product requirements, may not be fully capable of addressing all of the different types of potential risks, including the ethical and societal questions that may result from the integration of AI into goods and services. Regulating to address questions of public morals, human dignity and other fundamental rights, such as discrimination or fairness, is not only challenging, but is also prone to causing regulatory fragmentation because the meaning and relative importance of such values may vary across societies. 

AI also poses new conceptual challenges for the traditional, “human-centric” approach to IP rights. Issues that deserve particular attention include the protection of AI algorithms and of copyrighted material for training AI, and the protection and ownership of AI generated outputs. These questions may call for a re-evaluation of existing IP legal frameworks. 

The immense potential of AI has prompted governments around the globe to take action to promote its development and use while mitigating its potential risks. At the domestic level, more and more jurisdictions are putting in place AI strategies and policies to enhance their AI capabilities. The number of economies having implemented AI strategies increased from three in 2017 to 75 in 2023. According to Stanford University's 2024 "AI Index", 25 AI-related regulatory measures were adopted in the United States in 2023, compared to just one in 2016, while the European Union has passed almost 130 AI-related regulatory measures since 2017. However, most domestic AI policy initiatives are being implemented by developed economies, which could further deepen the existing AI divide between developed and developing economies: while around 30 per cent of developing economies have put AI policy measures in place, only one least-developed country (LDC) – Uganda – has done so according to data from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) AI Policy Observatory. Also high on governments’ policy agendas are domestic initiatives to promote access to data through open data and data-sharing initiatives, with a view to fostering domestic innovation and competition, protecting privacy and controlling the flow of data across borders. What is emerging is a landscape of fragmented measures and heterogeneous domestic initiatives, which may lead to regulatory fragmentation. 

This fragmentation extends beyond AI-specific regulations to include sector-specific legislation, such as IP and data regulations, which also impact AI. In addition, the design of some border measures imposed on the hardware components and raw materials crucial to AI systems can affect competitors in other economies, leading to trade- distorting effects and further exacerbating fragmentation. The economic costs of regulatory fragmentation, in particular for small businesses, highlight the importance of mitigating regulatory heterogeneity; according to OECD and WTO (2024), the economic costs of the fragmentation of data flow regimes along geo-economic blocks amount to a loss of more than 1 per cent of real GDP. The increasing number of bilateral and regional cooperation initiatives on AI governance, many focusing on different priorities, add to the risk of creating a multitude of fragmented approaches. 

For example, while some bilateral cooperation initiatives focus primarily on aligning AI-related terminology and taxonomy, and on monitoring and measuring AI risks, others prioritize collaboration to promote alignment in general terms or focus primarily on AI safety and governance. Likewise, some regional initiatives prioritize human rights and ethics, while others focus on economic development and growth. 

Regional trade agreements (RTAs) and digital economy agreements are important vehicles to promote and regulate AI. AI-specific provisions have started to be incorporated into such agreements, but they mainly take the form of “soft” – i.e., non-binding – provisions focusing on the importance of collaboration to promote trusted, safe and responsible use of AI. Several AI-specific provisions explicitly refer to trade. Digital trade provisions included in RTAs, such as provisions on data flows, data localization, protection of personal information, access to government data, source code,2 competition in digital markets, and customs duties on electronic transmissions, are also important for AI development and use. The number of RTAs with digital trade provisions has been growing steadily since the early 2000s, and by the end of 2022, 116 RTAs – representing 33 per cent of all existing RTAs – had incorporated provisions related to digital trade (López-González et al., 2023). However, the depth of digital trade provisions included in RTAs varies significantly, reflecting diverging approaches. Few developing economies and LDCs have negotiated digital trade provisions. Disciplines on trade in services in RTAs are also an important channel through which governments' trade policies and trade obligations can affect the policy environment for AI, but the level of commitments undertaken differs significantly across economies. 

The last few years have witnessed a wave of international initiatives related to AI. While there are elements of complementarity among such initiatives and alignment on core principles, different initiatives prioritize different aspects of AI governance. A number of initiatives also contain various common elements that have important trade and WTO angles, such as the recognition of the role of regulations and standards, the need to avoid regulatory fragmentation, the importance of IP rights, the importance of privacy, personal data protection and data governance, and the importance of international cooperation, coordination and dialogue. Several of these initiatives also address the environmental impacts of AI. 

However, there is still no global alignment on AI terminology. Differing priorities, the overlap between initiatives, and lack of global agreement on key terminology could pose challenges at the implementation stage, limiting efforts to prevent fragmentation and to put in place a coherent global AI governance framework. Nevertheless, beyond initiatives to govern AI, an increasing number of international organizations, such as the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) and the World Bank, are developing courses on AI and integrating AI in their technical assistance activities, some of which have a trade component. The WTO, as the only rules-based global body dealing with trade policy, can contribute to promoting the benefits of AI and limiting its potential risks. It can play an important role in limiting regulatory fragmentation, promoting the development of trustworthy AI and access to it, and facilitating trade in AI-related goods and services, thereby enabling the growth of AI and promoting innovation through IP. 

What role for the WTO? 

WTO rules and processes promote global convergence. The WTO is a forum that promotes transparency, non-discrimination, discussion, the exchange of good practices, regulatory harmonization, non-mandatory policy guidance, and global alignment through the negotiation of new binding trade rules on trade. Transparency provisions included in WTO agreements allow WTO members, as well as economic operators and consumers, to be kept abreast of latest regulatory developments. One example is the enhanced transparency provisions in the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Agreement. By requiring early notification of regulatory measures and allowing opportunities to provide comments on these measures at a draft stage, the TBT Agreement can help to prevent obstacles to trade, as well as promote and accelerate global convergence. WTO members are increasingly notifying a wide range of regulations on digital technologies to the TBT Committee. For instance, more than 160 notifications have been made on regulations addressing cybersecurity and the Internet of Things (IoT)/robotics, both of which are relevant for AI. More recently, the TBT Committee has started receiving notifications of AI-specific regulations. Another example is the WTO Trade Policy Review Mechanism, which contributes to transparency in members’ trade policies. Finally, in terms of possible new substantive rules, various issues negotiated under the Joint Statement Initiative on E-commerce, which currently brings together 91 WTO members, may matter for AI. 

The WTO also provides a global forum for constructive dialogue, the exchange of good practices, and cooperation. This enables discussion among members of how best to design nuanced, flexible and adaptable regulatory solutions to address the goods, services and IP-related aspects of AI in a coordinated manner. In some areas, the WTO also promotes regulatory harmonization and coherence by encouraging the use of international standards, mutual recognition and equivalence, and through various "soft law" instruments, such as voluntary committee guidelines. 

The WTO is the cornerstone of global efforts to facilitate trade in services and goods that enable or are enabled by AI. Various aspects of the WTO rulebook can contribute to promoting the development of and access to AI. For example, the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) plays an important role in shaping a policy environment that facilitates the development and uptake of AI. A majority of WTO members (out of 141 schedules of commitments, 84, or 60 per cent, contain commitments on computer services) have made specific commitments on market access and national treatment related to ICT services, which play a fundamental role in enabling and promoting AI. However, commitments in other sectors remain limited, and barriers to services trade remain high in overall terms. When it comes to goods, the Information Technology Agreement (ITA) aims to increase worldwide access to high-technology goods essential to AI by eliminating tariffs on the ICT products it covers. Meanwhile, the TBT Agreement can help to ensure that, when governments adopt AI standards and regulations, these are, to the extent possible, not trade-restrictive, and are optimal for attaining policy objectives. The Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement aims to foster a balanced IP system that incentivizes innovation through the enforcement and protection of IP rights, while promoting dissemination of and access to technology, to the mutual benefit of both producers and users of technological knowledge. Various WTO agreements also include provisions to promote the transfer of technology, and this can play an important role in the development of AI. Finally, the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA) 2012 promotes access to internationally available new AI technologies. Various principles, provisions and guidelines in the WTO rulebook can support trade in AI systems and AI-enabled products by minimizing international negative spillovers. Examples include the non-discrimination principle and the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS), which recognizes that certain investment measures can restrict and distort trade and states that members may not apply investment measures that discriminate against foreign products or lead to quantitative restrictions. When it comes to technical regulations, standards and certification procedures, the TBT Agreement provides that regulatory intervention shall not be discriminatory nor any more trade-restrictive than necessary to achieve the intended policy objectives, and that it should, when justified, be subject to periodic reviews. And the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) can play a crucial role in navigating the dual aspects of AI development, by promoting technological innovation while preventing negative spillovers in international trade from government financial support. 

The WTO can help to prevent and settle trade tensions and frictions. The practice of raising "specific trade concerns" (STCs) allows WTO committees to serve as a venue for defusing potential trade tensions with regulatory measures in a cooperative, pragmatic and non-litigious way. In the TBT Committee, for instance, members have already been using this practice to discuss and address concerns with regulations involving a wide range of digital technologies and issues, including IoT, autonomous vehicles, 5G in robotics, industrial automation, cybersecurity, and more recently AI. The WTO also serves as a global forum to settle trade-related disputes. While there has been no dispute on AI so far, the WTO Dispute Settlement System has dealt with resolving disputes related to various aspects of the digital economy. 

The WTO promotes inclusiveness through special and differential treatment and technical assistance for developing economies. WTO agreements recognize the constraints faced by developing economies and, for this reason, include various special and differential (S&D) treatment provisions to help them to implement WTO rules and participate more effectively in international trade. Technical assistance and capacity-building are key pillars of the WTO’s work and play a fundamental role in furthering understanding of the WTO rules and agreements, as well as of other topics relevant to trade. Multi-stakeholder programmes, such as Aid for Trade and the Enhanced Integrated Framework, could, however, be leveraged further to help developing economies seize the benefits of AI for trade. 

As a forum for negotiation, discussion and rule-making, the WTO provides a multilateral framework that can help address the trade-related aspects of AI governance. Nevertheless, AI may have implications for international trade rules. Although it is a new technology, AI is developing rapidly, and is certainly already advanced enough to be a subject of discussions at the WTO. Its cross-cutting nature requires a cross-cutting policymaking approach to promote policy coherence. 

While AI governance extends beyond trade, trade remains a crucial element within AI governance. The WTO can contribute significantly to developing a robust AI governance framework. This report is a first attempt to explore some key implications of AI for trade and trade rules. As AI continues to evolve, governments should continue to discuss the intersection of AI and trade and its possible implications for the WTO rulebook.