24 December 2019

Mediation and 'Smart' Contracts

'The Role of International Mediation in Data Protection and Privacy Law - Can It be Effective?' by Sinta Dewi, Robert Walters, Leon Trakman and Bruno Zeller in (2019) 30 Australian Dispute Resolution Journal 61 comments
The role of international mediation and mediation more generally in data protection and privacy law can be an effective tool to resolving data disputes. This article will examine the data protection laws of Indonesia, Australia, Singapore, the Philippines, European Union and China. This comparative examination is timely, with the creation of the Convention on Enforcement of International Settlement Agreements Resulting from Mediation (Singapore Convention) which opened for signing on 7 August 2019 and the associated Model Law. If implemented and utilised, the Singapore Convention has the potential to become an effective legal mechanism to assist in resolving cross-border personal data disputes.
'Smart Contracts: A Requiem' by Eliza Mik in Journal of Contract Law (Forthcoming) comments
"Smart contracts” are technologies that facilitate the generation and transfer of blockchain-based crypto-assets. The unfortunate labeling of these technologies as ‘contracts’ has spawned a plethora of legal theories, which are built on unsubstantiated technical claims, terminological misunderstandings as well as on a general disillusionment with traditional institutions. Concepts such as “validation” or “self-enforcement,” both of which constitute permanent fixtures of the “smart contract” narrative, seem to have hijacked common sense with promises of certainty and guaranteed performance to the point where a structured and logical argument is rendered difficult. It is necessary to clarify the meaning of the term and remind those who debate the legal enforceability and validity of “smart contracts” of the basic principles of contract law. In particular, it is necessary to recall that contract law is indifferent to the manner parties express their agreement

23 December 2019

Algorithms

National Disability Insurance Scheme Plan Decision-Making: Or When Tailor-Made Case Planning Met Taylorism and the Algorithms?' by TerryCarney, Shih-Ning Then, Christine Bigby, Ilan Wiesel and Jacinta Douglas in (2019) 42(3) Melbourne University Law Review comments
The National Disability Insurance Scheme (‘NDIS’) has been criticised for failing adequately to live up to the promise of individualised resource packages tailored to the needs of each participant, instead applying bureaucratic, standardised administrative logics. This paper analyses the legal architecture, policy assumptions and administration of the NDIS to establish the extent to which its guiding philosophy lies in professional person-centred case planning, an insurance logic, or principles of equity and efficiency of decision-making; and then assesses the contribution of legal remedies in ensuring fidelity of purpose to policy goals. It is argued that whatever the validity of criticism of NDIS Taylorist administrative standardisation and data-driven planning, it is neither an error of law nor responsive to merits review avenues. Undue weighting of equity and efficiency goals over the preferences and needs of individual participants nevertheless remains ethically problematic in unduly elevating an ethics of justice (impartial planning based on abstract principles applied consistently to all participants) over an ethics of care that views each participant as unique, as arguably the NDIS was designed to promote.

Fraud

'Has the Golden Age of Fraud Passed?' by Mark Leeming in (2019) 19 Oxford University Commonwealth Law Journal 298 comments
Takhar v Gracefield Developments Ltd [2019] UKSC 13; [2019] 2 WLR 984 holds that a litigant can apply to set aside a judgment procured by fraud even if the fraud was discoverable by reasonable diligence during the trial. The unanimous decision realigns United Kingdom law with the position in Australia and Canada. However, the four judgments delivered disclose four quite different approaches of judicial technique. This note considers those approaches as well as addressing three topics of more general significance: the way in which broadly expressed dicta may be read down, the role of an historical approach in developing the body of judge-made law, and the relationship between rules and principles in the legal system.

Libra

The European Central Bank has offered cautions about Facebook's Libra, commenting
Stablecoin initiatives such as Libra aim to overcome shortcomings in cross-border payments by building a new separate payments ecosystem that does not rely on existing clearing and settlement arrangements. By doing so, they aim to offer cheaper and more efficient payment solutions and foster financial inclusion. At the same time, as I argued in my remarks before the ECON committee, innovations – including stablecoins – will only be beneficial if the associated risks are mitigated through effective regulation and oversight. ... 
stablecoin arrangements could lead to significant market concentration. If the entities that govern stablecoin arrangements control large digital platforms, they could impact the level playing field by promoting the use of their own solutions, with possible lock-in effects, and/or blocking other service providers or payment methods from their platforms. Moreover, the potential combination of social media data with financial data could give stablecoin operators a strong competitive advantage and undermine market contestability. The European System of Central Banks has been monitoring this in the broader context of the entry of large technology companies or “bigtech firms” into the European retail payments market. 
If stablecoin initiatives achieve scale and if retail users treat stablecoins as an alternative to bank deposits, a potentially sizeable amount of retail funds could be transferred from the banking system into non-bank entities. Although stablecoins promise “stability” and the possibility of converting coin holdings back into fiat currency at any time, the value of a stablecoin will crucially depend on its governance and risk management, and on the value of the underlying assets or fund portfolio. A mere promise that the proceeds from the sales of coins will be invested in low-risk financial instruments will not be enough to ensure the stability of the coin. In this respect, the term “stablecoin” is a misnomer. It should be clear to stablecoin users that losses could occur and that they would not be covered by the traditional financial stability net, which includes deposit guarantee schemes and central banks’ role as lenders of last resort. If successful, Libra’s complex arrangement of functions such as issuing tokens, managing reserve assets and operating a payment system could become a sizeable self-contained financial ecosystem. It is critical that the same rules are applied to all activities that give rise to the same risks, irrespective of the technologies used or the identity of the service providers. In other words, “same business, same risk, same rules” should be a guiding principle in the regulatory approach to stablecoin initiatives and placed at the core of technology-neutral regulation. 
There is broad agreement at the global level that stablecoin arrangements, including Libra, should not commence operation before their public policy and regulatory risks are evaluated and adequately addressed. The ECB concurs with the joint statement by the EU Council and the European Commission2 on the need for legal clarity on the status of stablecoin arrangements and for these to be subjected to clear and proportionate regulatory and oversight frameworks. Efforts are under way at the EU and global level to assess the risks of the Libra project, examine the applicability of the existing rules and identify gaps in the current regulatory and oversight framework. Given Libra’s cross-border nature, international coordination is crucial to ensure consistency and prevent regulatory arbitrage. xxxx In accordance with its mandate, the ECB intends to apply its oversight framework for payment systems to stablecoin arrangements. The ECB is also reviewing its existing oversight framework for payment instruments, schemes and arrangements to clarify which aspects of stablecoin arrangements that facilitate the transfer of value between end-users fall within the Eurosystem oversight competence. Finally, the ECB will work with other international authorities to ensure that the Eurosystem requirements remain relevant by closing any gaps that innovative solutions might create. We also support the creation of cooperative oversight frameworks whenever a payment arrangement is relevant to multiple jurisdictions.

Death, Silence, Denunciation

'The Constitution After Death' by Fred O. Smith, Jr. comments
From mandating separate and unequal gravesites, to condoning mutilation after lynchings, to engaging in cover-ups after wrongful police shootings, governmental actors have often degraded dignity and perpetuated stigma in death. This Article offers, for the first time, an account of the constitutional law of the dead and takes aim at a legal rule that purports to categorically exclude the dead from constitutional protection. The rule rests on two faulty premises. The first is that the dead are incapable of being rights-holders, and therefore cannot be deprived of such rights. The second is that there are no sound policy reasons for recognizing constitutional rights of the dead. 
The first premise is undone by a robust common law tradition of protecting the dead’s dignitary interests and testamentary will. As for the second premise, posthumous legal rights can serve important functions. Such laws can promote uniquely human pursuits by: protecting individuals’ memory; enforcing their will; and accommodating their diverse spiritual beliefs after death. Posthumous legal rights can also foster equality by shielding against the stigma and terror that have historically accompanied the abuse of the dead. Moreover, posthumous rights can remedy and repel the “legal estrangement” that the degradation of marginalized groups’ memories can foster. 
The Constitution need not remain silent when governmental actors engage in abusive or unequal treatment in death. Understanding the dead as constitutional rights-holders opens the door to enhanced accountability through litigation and Congressional enforcement of the Reconstruction Amendments. Beyond that, understanding the dead as rights-holders can influence the narratives that shape our collective legal, political, and cultural consciousness. As the nation struggles with how to understand intergenerational mass horrors that still haunt, recognizing the dead as legally cognizable beings of memory, will, and spirituality can, enrich these debates, and enliven our imaginations.
In Australia the Governor-General Amendment (Cessation of Allowances in the Public Interest) Bill 2019 (Cth) - a private members Bill in the Senate - seeks to strip allowances (notably pensions) from Governors-General over misbehaviour.

The Explanatory Memorandum states

The purpose of the Governor-General Amendment (Cessation of Allowances in the Public Interest) Bill 2019 is to cease paying allowances to former Governors-General, or a spouse of the former Governor-General, where they have engaged in serious misconduct. The Bill provides two avenues for ceasing to pay allowances when it is considered to be in the public interest. Firstly, the Minister may make a declaration through a legislative instrument that the former Governor-General, or a spouse of a former Governor-General, cease to be paid an allowance. Alternatively, a House of Parliament may pass a resolution declaring that the former Governor-General, or a spouse of the former Governor-General, cease to be paid an allowance. The Governor-General Act 1974 (the Act) outlines the allowances payable to a former Governor-General after they leave office. There are currently no provisions in the Act to stop paying such allowances where it is no longer in the public interest to do so. For example, a former Governor-General is entitled to receive an allowance even if they have been convicted of a crime. There are already similar provisions for ceasing entitlements to former Governors in state and territory legislation. Under the Governors (Salary and Pensions) Act 2003 (Queensland), a former Governor may have their entitlement ceased if a tribunal makes a finding that the Governor misbehaved in a way that justifies ending the entitlement.

In identifying Clauses the Memo states 

Clause 1: Short Title 1. This clause is a formal provision specifying the short title of the Bill. 
 
Clause 2: Commencement 2. This clause provides for the commencement of the Act. It provides that the whole of this Act will commence on the day after it receives Royal Assent. 
 
Clause 3: Schedules 3. This clause provides that an Act that is specified in a Schedule is amended or repealed as set out in that Schedule, and any other item in a Schedule operates according to its terms. 
 
Schedule 1--Amendments Governor-General Act 1974 
 
Item 1 4. This item inserts the definition of a cessation event under subsection 2A(2). 1 
 
Item 2 5. This item inserts new subsection 4(2A). This provides that a spouse is not eligible to receive an allowance under subsection 4(2) if a cessation event happened before the person's death. 
 
Item 3 6. This item inserts new section 4AGA in the GovernorGeneral Act 1974 which provides that payment of a standard allowance may be ceased if it is in the public interest to do so. A standard allowance means a retirement allowance, a spouse allowance or an associate allowance. 
 
Subsection 4AGA(2) provides that a cessation event happens following a Ministerial declaration under section 4AGB or a House of Parliament passing a resolution under section 4AGC.  This item inserts new section 4AGB which provides that a Ministerial declaration may be made to cease paying a standard allowance to a former Governor-General or their spouse.   
 
Subsection 4AGB(1) provides that the Minister may make a declaration that a former Governor-General, or the spouse of a former Governor-General cease to be paid a standard allowance if the Minster is satisfied that a former Governor-General had engaged in serious misconduct. For the purposes of this Bill, serious misconduct involves inappropriate, improper, wrong or unlawful conduct. Examples of serious misconduct could include corruption, sexual misconduct, sexual harassment, theft, fraud and other criminal behaviour. 
 
Subsection 4AGB(2) provides that the Ministerial declaration must specify who the declaration applies to, the reasons for making the declaration and provide a summary of information used by the Minister in making the declaration. 
 
Subsection 4AGB(3) provides that the declaration is a legislative instrument. 
 
Subsection 4AGB(4) provides that the Minister should not make a declaration if the Minister is satisfied that such a declaration would interfere with an ongoing investigation or prosecution relating to the former Governor-General's misconduct. 
 
Subsection 4AGB(5) provides that serious misconduct includes an omission to act. 
 
Subsection 4AGB(6) provides that the Minister must disregard certain circumstances when making the declaration including when the former Governor-General was appointed, when the misconduct took place and whether the misconduct took place in Australia or outside of Australia. 
 
This item inserts a new section 4AGC which provides that a House of Parliament may pass a resolution declaring that a former Governor-General, or a spouse of a former Governor-General cease to be paid a standard allowance. For the purposes of this section, the references to serious misconduct under section 4AGB remain relevant.

CDR Intermediaries

The ACCC has released a consultation paper on expansion of the Consumer Data Right rules through facilitation of the participation of third party service providers. Delays to rollout of the CDR were noted here.

The paper states that the ACCC
introduced the foundational rules for the Consumer Data Right (CDR) regime in the lock-down version of the rules, released in September 2019 (rules). Consistent with the position in the Rules Outline released in December 2018, the rules do not provide for the use of third party service providers who collect or facilitate the collection of CDR data on behalf of accredited persons (intermediaries). The ACCC noted that it intended to develop rules to accommodate business models that use intermediaries in a subsequent version of the rules. The rules permit disclosure of CDR data by an accredited person to an outsourced service provider, provided certain conditions are met, but do not otherwise permit disclosure of CDR data to non-accredited third parties. As noted in the Rules Outline, the ACCC took this position for the first version of the rules having regard to concerns raised by stakeholders regarding the risk of reduced consumer protections and the potential to undermine the CDR accreditation regime. Instead, the ACCC committed to considering the ability for consumers to direct the sharing of CDR data to certain non-accredited third parties (including professional advisors, such as accountants and lawyers) in a subsequent version of the rules. ... 
The ACCC is seeking views from stakeholders on how the rules should permit the use of intermediaries that collect or facilitate the collection of CDR data from data holders on behalf of accredited persons. The ACCC is also seeking views on expanding the rules to permit the disclosure of CDR data from accredited persons to non-accredited third parties and the appropriate consumer and privacy protections that should apply to such disclosures.
The paper states
Intermediaries 
The ACCC recognises the important role of intermediaries in the financial services sector, and the data economy more generally, in facilitating the efficient and secure collection of data. Accommodating intermediaries in the CDR regime will support increased uptake of CDR and development of new products and services by providing flexibility for potential accredited data recipients looking to enter the CDR regime. The ACCC understands that there are a range of innovative business models that intend to operate in the CDR regime, including software as a service or platform as a service providers. These business models include those that may assist in or facilitate the collection of CDR data and those that may offer ‘end-to-end’ services that collect and use CDR data. 
In response to the CDR exposure draft rules, the ACCC received submissions from a number of parties that indicated their interest in becoming accredited at the unrestricted level in order to act as an intermediary in the regime. If the rules provide for an accredited intermediary to collect CDR data on behalf of a data recipient, it could facilitate entry into the CDR regime of data recipients with a lower tier of accreditation if the intermediary will manage risks associated with the data recipient collecting, storing or using CDR data. The ACCC is therefore also interested in understanding views on how the rules should permit the disclosure of CDR data between accredited persons, including between an accredited intermediary and an accredited data recipient. 
The ACCC is seeking views on how intermediaries should be provided for in the rules, including what obligations they should be required to meet and the appropriate level of transparency for consumers where an intermediary is used by a data recipient to collect and/or use CDR data. 
The ACCC is considering both outsourcing and accreditation models for regulating intermediaries and recognises that it may be appropriate for the rules to provide for both models dependent on the nature of the services provided by an intermediary to an accredited person. Under an accreditation model, an intermediary would become accredited in its own right and would be subject to the obligations of an accredited person under the CDR regime. The current outsourcing model in the rules permits the disclosure of CDR data by an accredited person to an outsourced service provider provided certain conditions are met, including that the accredited person has a CDR outsourcing arrangement in place that meets the requirements in rule 1.10. Under rule 7.6, the accredited person is responsible for the use or disclosure of CDR data by an outsourced service provider. 
Consultation questions: intermediaries 
The ACCC has developed guiding questions for responses. You do not need to respond to each individual question and may decide to raise additional issues. Where possible, please explain your reasoning. 
1. If you intend to be an intermediary in the CDR regime, or intend to use an intermediary, please provide a description of the goods or services you intend to provide to accredited persons or to CDR consumers using an intermediary. Do you intend (or intend to use an intermediary) to only collect CDR data, or collect and use CDR data? What value or economic efficiencies do you consider that intermediaries can bring to the CDR regime and for consumers? 
2. How should intermediaries be provided for in the rules? In your response please provide your views on whether the rules should adopt either an outsourcing model or an accreditation model, or both and, if so, and in what circumstances each model should apply. 
3. What obligations should apply to intermediaries? For example, you may wish to provide comment on: a. if intermediaries are regulated under an accreditation model, the criteria for accreditation and whether they should be the same or different to the criteria that apply to the current ‘unrestricted’ level, and the extent to which intermediaries should be responsible for complying with the existing rules or data standards; b. if intermediaries are regulated under an outsourcing model, the extent to which contractual obligations should be regulated between accredited persons and intermediaries; c. if the obligations should differ depending on the nature of the service being provided by the intermediary. 
4. How should the use of intermediaries be made transparent to consumers? For example, you may wish to comment on requirements relating to consumer notification and consent. 
5. How should the rules permit the disclosure of CDR data between accredited persons? For example, you may wish to comment on requirements relating to consumer consent, notification and deletion of redundant data, as well as any rules or data standards that should be met. 
6. Should the creation of rules for intermediaries also facilitate lower tiers of accreditation? If so, how should the criteria and obligations of new tiers of accreditation differ from the current ‘unrestricted’ accreditation level, and what is the appropriate liability framework where an accredited intermediary is used? 
Permitting CDR data to be disclosed to non-accredited third parties 
The ACCC is also seeking views on how the rules should provide for the disclosure of CDR data by an accredited person to non-accredited third parties, with the consent of a consumer. As noted above, the rules permit disclosure of CDR data by an accredited person to an outsourced service provider, provided certain conditions are met, but do not otherwise permit disclosure of CDR data to non-accredited third parties. 
The ACCC considers that allowing CDR data to be shared with non-accredited third parties, such as accountants, will be an important expansion of the CDR regime. The ACCC recognises there are existing mechanisms that facilitate the transfer of data from consumers to third parties. Enabling sharing of CDR data with third parties in the CDR regime is likely to increase benefits for consumers, where appropriate consumer and privacy protections are also provided for in the rules. 
The ACCC considers that an important principle for the development of these rules is that consumers must give fully informed consent when CDR data is disclosed to non-accredited third parties. Additionally, the ACCC considers that while the rules may authorise the transfer of CDR data from accredited persons to non-accredited third parties, this would not be a requirement and accredited persons should be able to make commercial decisions regarding whether to offer this functionality to consumers. 
Consultation questions: permitting CDR data to be disclosed to non-accredited third parties 
7. If the ACCC amends the rules to allow disclosure from accredited persons to non- accredited third parties and you intend to: a. receive CDR data as a non-accredited third party, please explain the goods or services you intend to provide, the purposes for which you propose to receive CDR data, and how this may benefit consumers; b. be an accredited person who discloses CDR data to non-accredited third parties, please explain the intended goods or services you intend to provide and how they may benefit consumers. 
8. What types of non-accredited third parties should be permitted to receive CDR data? Why is it appropriate for those types of third parties to be able to receive CDR data without being accredited? 
9. What privacy and consumer protections should apply where CDR data will be disclosed by an accredited person to a non-accredited third party? 
10. What degree of transparency for CDR consumers should be required where an accredited person discloses CDR data to a non-accredited third party? For example, are there particular consent and notification obligations that should apply?

Health Data

The Adelaide Advertiser reports that  under a national government initiative medical general practices can gain a $50,000 a year incentive payment by providing patient data on ten performance measures  (inc the patient’s weight and alcohol use). Patients are reportedly  not being asked for their permission and are unaware of the disclosure.

The Advertiser states that  nine in ten GP practices have already handed over de-identified patient data (gaining an aggregate $20.3 million) and 395 practices were granted an exemption over concerns about data security.

The expectation is that data on e information on diabetes status, smoking, weight classification, alcohol use and influenza immunisation status will enable the tracking of treatment and improve the management of patients with key chronic health conditions.

Given concerns regarding the potential ease of re-identification the Australian General Practice Alliance (AGPA) has unsurprisingly stated “the likelihood that it could be re-identified in the event of a breach is very high”.

The Advertiser states
Under the guidelines for the program GPs are meant to ask their patients for permission to transfer the data but this has not been happening and patients are not being given the chance to opt out. Asked whether patients’ permission was being sought, Royal Australian College of General Practitioners (RACGP) president Dr Harry Nespolon said the short answer was “no”. The collection of the data was covered by legislation that allows doctors to collect quality assurance type data. “As long as it’s de-identified you can do it,” Dr Nespolon, pictured, said.  ... 
The Department of Health said participating practices have to be accredited in accordance with the RACGP Standards for General Practices which outlines requirements for patient consent.“All current software extractors have opt out features as part of their system. Practice participation ... is voluntary,” the department said.
Concerns about consent and inappropriate sharing were highlighted in my (2019) 16(6) Privacy Law Bulletin article earlier this year regarding the HealthEngine litigation.