03 June 2020

Corporate Insanity and Legitimacy?

Strange times indeed. 'The Corporate Insanity Defense' by Mihailis Diamantis in (2020) 111 Journal of Criminal  Law and Criminology comments
Corporate criminal justice rests on the fiction that corporations possess “minds” capable of instantiating culpable mens rea. The retributive and deterrent justifications for punishing criminal corporations are strongest when those minds are well-ordered. That is when misdeeds are most likely to reflect malice, and sanctions are most likely to have their intended preventive benefits. But what if a corporate defendant’s mind is disordered? Organizational psychology and economics have tools to identify normally-functioning organizations that are fully accountable for the harms they cause. These disciplines can also diagnose dysfunctional organizations where the threads of accountability may have frayed and where sanctions would achieve little by way of deterrence. Punishing such corporations undermines the goals of criminal law, leaves victim interests unaddressed, and is unfair to corporate stakeholders. 
This Article argues that some corporate criminal defendants are entitled to raise the insanity defense. Recognizing the corporate insanity defense would better serve victims’ and stakeholders’ interests in condemning and preventing corporate misconduct. Statutory text makes the insanity defense available to all qualifying “defendants.” When a corporate criminal defendant’s “mind” is sufficiently disordered, basic criminal law purposes also support the defense. Corporate crime in such cases may trace to dysfunctional systems or subversive third-parties rather than to corporate malice. For example, individual corporate employees may thwart well-meaning corporate policies to pursue personal advantage at the expense of the corporation itself. In such cases, corporations may seem more like victims of their own misconduct rather than perpetrators of it. 
Justice and prevention favor treatment of “insane” corporations rather than punishment. Treatment would be an opportunity for government experts to reform dysfunctional corporations in a way that predominant modes of corporate punishment cannot. Effective reform takes victims seriously by minimizing the chance that others will be harmed. It also spares corporate stakeholders unnecessary punishment for corporate misconduct that could be sanctioned in more constructive ways. This is what the corporate insanity defense offers.
Ingenious but unpersuasive.

'Corporate Law Versus Social Autonomy: Law as Social Hazard' by Michael Galanis in (2020) Law and Critique states
 This article argues that corporate law has become the legal platform upon which is erected a social process impeding society’s capacity to lucidly reflect on its primary ends; in this sense, corporate law is in conflict with social autonomy. This process is described here as a social feedback loop, in the structural centre of which lies the corporation which imposes its own purpose as an irrational social end, i.e. irrespective of its potentially catastrophic social consequences. The article argues that resolving the conflict between corporate law and social autonomy is impossible, because it presupposes a change of social paradigm towards one where corporate law as business organisation law has no obvious fit. This questions the social legitimacy of corporate law, signifies its non-permanence and thus opens up the field for seeking radical alternatives in the future. 
Galanis argues
Even the keenest ‘black-letter’ admirer of existing laws would accept that social institutions ought to be open to change, in order to adapt to evolving social goals. However, adaptation is not always possible or at least as straightforward in practice, so that even radical action, such as the recent response to the coronavirus pandemic, may not have a lasting effect or may even exacerbate social hazards. Social institutions and their users can function as forces of inertia, so that society is unable to effectively meet its challenges by redefining its ends. Institutions appear as if they have acquired a dominant agency of their own, even when inertia is socially hazardous. 
This article claims that what is currently regarded as standard corporate law has a role in the emergence and persistence of such an inertia problem in our society. Within capitalism, corporate law is a central institutional component of a ‘social feedback loop’—i.e. a self-reinforcing social process—by which the primary corporate purpose, namely wealth accumulation, is amplified and imposed upon society as a supreme and indisputable social end. The mechanics of this loop are fairly simple. Firstly, as an extremely effective device for protecting corporate wealth and for promoting organisational expansion, the basic anatomy of corporate law has found an unprecedented fit with the primary capitalist purpose of infinite wealth accumulation. It has enabled business growth to the extent that economic activity is primarily organised within and between private, manager-controlled bureaucracies. Thus, corporate law is the legal platform for the bureaucratisation of the economy. At the corporate level, bureaucratic organisation tends to suppress the questioning of objectives. Therefore, once these are internally set by management, they are constantly reproduced by a feedback process within the corporate organisation. Secondly, due to its social dominance, the bureaucratic corporation externalises those privately-set objectives so that they are eventually elevated to social ones and this creates a wider social feedback loop. Corporate law is thus a legal structure for this social process which has become so pervasive that it hinders society’s reflective capacity in relation to its objectives. This capacity is the essential basis of social autonomy, since an autonomous society is founded on the recognition that social goals are endogenously fashioned and therefore subject to social scrutiny without predeterminations. 
In other words, by providing the legal foundation for the proliferation of the bureaucratised business organisation, the structural core of the feedback loop, corporate law serves as an institution rendering our society essentially heteronomous, i.e. a society founded on the belief that its primary ends are exogenously and eternally determined. This way, material accumulation acquires eternal validity as a primary social end and its consequences are ignored or marginalised. Corporate law is thus inevitably in conflict with social autonomy and therefore it is a socially hazardous institution. 
On this basis and drawing from the theory on bureaucracy and Castoriadis’ social philosophy, this article argues that the social legitimacy of corporate law needs critical re-examination. While engaging in a detailed discussion of alternative organisational forms is beyond this article’s scope, the finding that corporate law is socially hazardous is in itself important: it sets the basic parameters for further research on how business organisation law can be radicalised, in order to dismantle the social feedback loop presented here and sustain social autonomy. The discussion will proceed as follows. The next Part will examine the role and organisational impact of corporate law as a vehicle for business. The third Part will analyse the social significance of these organisational changes to argue corporate law is a socially hazardous institution which reproduces social heteronomy by locking social ends within a capitalist frame. The fourth Part will explore the possibility of instituting social autonomy, as a social ideal, but show that corporate law in its current form can have no obvious place in a society organised on this basis. In the light of these findings, the concluding section summarises the basic parameters of future reform for restoring the social legitimacy of business organisation.

01 June 2020

Natural Law

'What Role for the State? (And a Comment on the Common Good)' by Matthew J. Lister in (2019) 44 Australasian Journal of Legal Philosophy comments
In his Natural Law and the Nature of Law, Jonathan Crowe has written an important and interesting book, one that should be read by people interested in jurisprudence, ethics, and political philosophy. Its distinctive strength is in the way Crowe shows how much can be done within a natural law framework that does not assume a theological background. A distinctive feature of Crowe's approach to natural law, one that distinguishes it from other well-known approaches, is its argument that only a minimal state, if any state at all, is required by or even compatible with natural law. It is this claim that I focus on in this paper. I show that these anti-state arguments do not work, and that a much more robust, largely state-like, type of political society is necessary if the requirements of natural law that Crowe accepts are to be met. In doing this, I also draw some related conclusions about the proper understanding and reach of the common good. In arguing for this conclusion I do not attack Crowe's general approach, but rather make what I hope to be an internal critique of the argument. If I am successful in this, then there will be reason for people who are sympathetic to the overall project to reject some of Crowe’s sub-conclusions, even if they wish to remain working in the natural law tradition overall. And, there will be reason to accept that something like the modern state will be necessary - at least for some time and for people like us - if we are to live good lives.

Roosters, Eggs and Wednesbury Reasonableness

In Zhong v Attorney-General [2020] VSC 302 Croucher J  comments
[8] Now, Mr Zhong is back in this Court again, still unrepresented, seeking judicial review of those most recent decisions. The amended originating motion, supporting affidavits and submissions in this Court were all drawn by Mr Zhong. Those documents contain a farrago of claims, some of which are hard to follow or are misconceived. Many are just scurrilous and should not have been made. Nevertheless, among his many complaints, Mr Zhong contends that his conviction makes about as much sense as the trial, conducted in Switzerland in 1474, at which a rooster was convicted of laying an egg. While nicely put, the difficulty with that complaint, and several others, is that they tend impermissibly to invite merits review. Mr Zhong also appears, at times, to think that merely to utter such a submission means that it must be accepted. That said, I have taken complaints like those, in substance, to be grounds alleging something akin to “Wednesbury unreasonableness”. Mr Zhong also claims that, despite his written and oral requests, the Attorney erroneously has declined to provide reasons for her decision. 
[9] The Attorney makes three principal responses. First, she submits that neither decision is reviewable. Secondly, it is submitted that, even if the decisions — or the processes by which those decisions were reached — are reviewable, Mr Zhong’s claims, in substance, impermissibly invite merits review, have previously been adjudicated on appeal or are otherwise not made out. Thirdly, while it is conceded by the Attorney that no reasons were provided to Mr Zhong, it is submitted that he made no request for reasons under s 8 of the Administrative Law Act 1978 (Vic) (“the ALA”) and that neither the common law nor the Charter requires the giving of any such reasons. 
[10] The state of the law binding on this Court appears to be that the Governor’s exercise of the prerogative of mercy in not reviewable at all. Some recent decisions, however, in other jurisdictions with analogues of s 327 of the CPA, have allowed that at least the process by which the Attorney’s decision to decline to refer a case to the Court of Appeal is reviewable. But those decisions are not binding on this Court. That said, it is unnecessary to determine those issues finally, because I am satisfied that none of Mr Zhong’s grounds can succeed in any event. In consequence, the answers to the important questions concerning reviewability should await a case in which they might be determinative of the outcome. Similarly, while the applications raise nice questions concerning whether the Attorney has an obligation to provide reasons under s 8 of the ALA, I am not satisfied that Mr Zhong made a request for reasons. Nor am I persuaded that the Attorney has a duty to provide reasons at common law or pursuant to the Charter.  
[11] Accordingly, I would dismiss these applications. 
[12] Whether Mr Zhong has persisted in seeking to overturn his conviction out of a genuine sense of outrage, or in pursuit of forgiveness, or to play Jesus to the lepers in his head, or perhaps just in the hope of rebuilding his relationship with his daughter, I cannot say. Nor, of course, is it mine to reason why. But, whatever his motive, no one could deny that he has been dogged in what has turned out to be a long and losing fight. 
[13] That said, perhaps all is not lost for Mr Zhong. Despite the orders I must make, I am nevertheless concerned about aspects of his trial and the safety of his conviction. I am also troubled that neither the Attorney nor this Court had access to the complete trial transcript or trial exhibits. These matters have driven me to the unusual course of making an unsolicited recommendation to the Attorney that she might consider a fresh petition in any event. Indeed, I would go so far as to say that, even on the limited material before this Court, if, as a member of the Trial Division, I had been asked (along with other judges) to provide an opinion to the Attorney pursuant to ss 327(1)(b) and (3) of the CPA, I would have opined that she should refer the whole case to the Court of Appeal pursuant to s 327(1)(a). 
[14] If a new petition is to be filed, this time, it must include the complete trial transcript and all trial exhibits. Also, it should be far more targeted than previous petitions, and should exclude the reams of drivel and bile with which Mr Zhong has burdened Attorneys past and present. I think he would need (and it would be preferable for all if he had) expert legal help to achieve that. Maybe a kindly barrister or two would pitch in.
The rooster case - alas the poor bird got toasted - appears in 'Nature on Trial: The Case of the Rooster That Laid an Egg' by E V Walter in (1985) 10(10) Comparative Civilizations Review, drawing on the problematical 1906 The Criminal Prosecution and Capital Punishment of Animals by E P Evans.

30 May 2020

Big Data and Anti-trust

'Big Data and Competition Analysis Under Australian Competition Law: Comeback of the Structuralist Approach?' by Baskaran Balasingham and Hannah Jordan comments
 Competition assessment in Australia has traditionally been based on an evaluation of the market structure relying on five factors, namely the degree of market concentration, the height of barriers to entry, the extent of product differentiation, the extent of vertical integration, and the nature of arrangement between firms. These factors, known as the ‘QCMA factors’, are characteristic of competition in the manufacturing industries of the ‘old economy’. Since the ascendancy of Chicago and Post-Chicago School thinking competition analysis in Australia has also taken into consideration non-structural factors. However, in light of the dominance of big tech companies in online markets, the so-called ‘Neo-Brandeisian School’ has advocated focusing on structural elements that are characteristic of online markets. This article examines to what extent the QCMA factors still a suitable structural framework for the assessment of competition in online markets.

Floodgates

In commenting on the High Court decision in Love v the Commonwealth (2020) 94 ALJR 198 earlier this year I cautioned against claims that there would be a 'floodgates' effect. That caution appears to be substantiated in Webster v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCA 702 dealing with the determination nation of identity.

Rares J states
39 While, at first glance it might seem unusual to make such a finding on the basis of what necessarily must be a story passed orally down in a family over 100 years, that is the very process of establishing substantive elements of a native title claim group’s traditional laws and customs. A society that has no written tradition, such as all Aboriginal Australian societies are, can only pass its essential features from generation to generation by word of mouth. Societies that do not have the written word to record their laws, customs or history, depend on traditions of orality. As Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ recognised in Yorta Yorta 214 CLR at 454 [80], the proof of traditional laws and customs in existence at a time earlier than described in the evidence is capable of being inferred from more recent evidence. Here, on the evidence before me, Walter Richards was born about 30 years after white settlement disturbed the traditional people’s way of life in Wathaurong country. His family oral history is that he identified to them as a Wathaurong man and he was born and lived in Wathaurong country for over 30 years.  
40 I am satisfied that Mr Webster has biological descent from a Wathaurong man, his great grandfather, and accordingly he has met the first limb of the tripartite test. 
The second and third limbs 
41 It is convenient to deal with the second and third limbs of the tripartite test together since the issue between the parties is whether the Yunupingu people’s “cultural adoption” of Mr Webster and his family’s recognition of that “adoption” can satisfy those limbs. 
42 The second and third limbs of the tripartite test appear to refer to a mutuality of recognition by the person who has biological descent from a particular society (or people) and elders or others enjoying traditional authority among that particular indigenous society (or people) recognise or acknowledge that that person is a member of that society (or people). This appears to have been how the majority analysed the tripartite test in Love 94 ALJR 198 at 216 [70], 217–218 [78]–[79] per Bell J, 255 [278], 256 [281], 256–257 [286]–[288] per Nettle J; 270 [370]–[371], 271–272 [375]–[388] per Gordon J, 290–291 [458]–[462] per Edelman J. 
43 I reject Mr Webster’s argument that, in applying (and, I emphasise, applying) the tripartite test, a person can be found to be an Aboriginal Australian through mutual recognition in a different society or people than the one from which he or she has descended biologically. The essence of the second and third limbs of the test is that the person must be seen as incorporated as a member into a society (or people) because he or she is descended from its common forebears. That concept derives from the legal conception of common law native title in Australia. That conception has a fundamental precept that the common law native title holders have a spiritual connection to, and relationship with, the relevant land and waters that derives from, or is reflected in, their traditional laws and customs. 
44 Mr Webster referred to Gordon J’s and Edelman J’s reasons where they said, respectively, that the determinative question is Constitutional, so that neither of the Native Title Act or Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) is of assistance, the Court can act on evidence that lacks specificity, and that the tripartite test “is not set in stone” (Love 94 ALJR at 264 [334], 270 [368], 290 [458]). However, their Honours expressed those reasons in the context of applying, not departing from, the tripartite test. 
45 Here, Mr Webster’s biological descent from the Wathaurong people is unconnected to what he described as his “cultural adoption” by the Yunupingu people. Thus, their recognition of him is outside any application of the tripartite test. 
46 The validity of the act of incorporating an outsider into an indigenous society can only be ascertained by evidence of that society’s laws and customs governing a particular occasion or event at which such an “adoption” can take place. 
47 There is no evidence of the laws and customs of the Yunupingu people, including particularly in relation to the existence or process of any mechanism of “cultural adoption”. It is not possible to know, on the evidence, if or how the late Mr M. Yunupingu could perform this process or what place his great grandson had to recognise it under the laws and customs of the Yunupingu people. 
48 It is not unknown for indigenous people to adopt or accept into their society persons born to one or more parents who is not one of its members. But the relevant process, under the society’s laws and customs, needs to be before the court, to some degree, in order that its significance and the adherence to its requirements can be assessed, where in a case like this, it is the only means by which Mr Webster claims to satisfy the second and third limbs of the tripartite test. His (and Mr Madgwick’s) honest belief that something happened that amounted to “cultural adoption” and, through that something, Mr Webster’s status changed to being that of an Aboriginal Australian because of the actions of the late Mr M. Yunupingu is not sufficient to satisfy me that, in fact, Mr Webster gained or has that status within the meaning of the third limb of the tripartite test.
Rares J goes on to comment
Bell J expressed the ratio decidendi in Love 94 ALJR at 218 [81] as follows:
I am authorised by the other members of the majority to say that although we express our reasoning differently, we agree that Aboriginal Australians (understood according to the tripartite test in Mabo [No 2]) are not within the reach of the "aliens" power conferred by s 51(xix) of the Constitution. The difference with respect to Mr Love is a difference about proof, not principle. (emphasis added)
50 The Minister noted that Nettle J maintained that the indigenous society or people had to exist today for a biological descendent to be able to establish that he or she is not an alien. His Honour said (Love 94 ALJR at 256 [281]):
It was contended by the Commonwealth that it might often prove difficult to establish that an Aboriginal society has maintained continuity in the observance of its traditional laws and customs since the Crown's acquisition of sovereignty over the Australian territory. No doubt, that is so. But difficulty of proof is not a legitimate basis to hold that a resident member of an Aboriginal society can be regarded as an alien in the ordinary sense of the term. It means only that some persons asserting that status may fail to establish their claims. There is nothing new about disputed questions of fact in claims made by non-citizens that they have an entitlement to remain in this country. (emphasis added) 
51 Bell J recognised in Love 94 ALJR at 218 [80] that the Court was not dealing with a situation in which the tripartite test was, or could be, problematic. Where a person can prove that he or she is a biological descendant from a particular Aboriginal Australian ancestor, but the society or people to which that ancestor belonged has ceased to exist, it is difficult to understand how that person is no less what his or her birth entailed in terms of direct descent from the original inhabitants of Australia before British sovereignty. 
52 It is one thing to be a member of an existing indigenous society or people and to have legal rules (such as the tripartite test) by which that membership can be assessed. It is another thing to deny that a person, who can prove that he or she is a direct biological descendant of persons who were in Australia before British sovereignty, is an Aboriginal Australian just because a consequence of that sovereignty was the destruction or disappearance of the antecedent society. I noted in Warrie v Western Australia (2017) 365 ALR 624 at 736 [450] the human tragedy that the historical displacement of Aboriginal Australians can create when their descendants seek to establish or ascertain, many years later, their true indigenous heritage and identity. Mr Webster may be in a similar and equally unfortunate position. However, his claim has failed because he based it on being able to satisfy the tripartite test.

IoT Chameleons

'De-camouflaging Chameleons: Requiring Transparency for Consumer Protection in the Internet of Things' by Rónán Kennedy in (2019) 10(1) European Journal of Law and Technology comments
Information and communications technology (ICT) and the development of the so-called 'Internet of Things' (IoT) provide new and valuable affordances to businesses and consumers. The use of sensors, software, and interconnectivity enable very useful adaptive capabilities. However, the rapid development of so-called 'smart devices' means that many everyday items, including software applications, are now impenetrable 'black boxes', and their behaviours are not fixed for all time. They are 'chameleon devices', which can be subverted for corporate deceit, surveillance, or computer crime. While aspects of the IoT and privacy have been discussed by other scholars, this paper contributes to the literature by bringing together examples of digital devices being surreptitiously diverted to purposes undesired by the consumer, reconceptualising these in the context of Foucauldian governmentality theory, and setting out a variety of proposals for law reform.
Kennedy argues
Information and communications technology (ICT) and the development of the so-called 'Internet of Things' (IoT) provide new and valuable affordances to businesses and consumers. The use of sensors, software, and interconnectivity (marketed as 'smartness') provide digital devices with very useful adaptive capabilities. The rapid development of so-called 'smart devices' means that many everyday items are now impenetrable 'black boxes'. However, unlike non-computerised devices, their behaviours are not fixed for all time, and they can be subverted for corporate deceit, surveillance, or computer crime. They become 'chameleon devices', hiding in plain sight. 
While aspects of the IoT and privacy have been discussed by other scholars, this paper contributes to the literature by highlighting the lack of consumer awareness of, and legal protection against, the unauthorised re-purposing of data by end-user devices. It presents examples of digital devices being surreptitiously diverted to purposes undesired by the consumer, placing these in the context of Foucauldian governmentality theory, and setting out a variety of proposals for European law reform, aiming at ensuring that Internet of Things devices operate in a moral, ethical, and legal fashion that is in keeping with public policy goals. Its key contribution is the notion of IoT devices as chameleons - capable of changing their behaviour and appearance to fit in with their surroundings but with an agency and agenda other than what they seem to be, whether that is at the behest of their manufacturer, law enforcement and security services, or criminals.
It explores two case studies which highlight different aspects of this developing phenomenon. First, the scandal surrounding Volkswagen's purported low-emissions diesel cars demonstrates the extent to which regulated entities can invade privacy by enrolling individuals in a massive corporate fraud. Second, the monitoring capacities of many Internet-connected devices provide new opportunities for surveillance. The weak security, lack of industry capacity, and widespread adoption of IoT devices mean that end-users are becoming particularly vulnerable to identity theft or to unwittingly providing infrastructure for criminality. This article places these troubling developments in the context of Foucauldian governmentality theory, demonstrating that each is an example of 'resistance' to the development of new means of power through ICT. It highlights how the capacity of ICT to bring together information across time and space also enables manufacturers, state actors, and criminals to act across these dimensions in ways that were hitherto impossible, maintaining or obtaining a degree of control over devices long after they are sold. It builds on existing literature on 'Foucault in Cyberspace', updating Boyle's critique of technological libertarianism for the Internet of Things and taking into account Cohen's proposals for the development of a new regulatory state. It connects this to the often under-appreciated issues that arise when regulation depends, to an ever-increasing degree, on technical standards and the expanding legal protections for trade secrets.
A new challenge posed by the IoT is how to respond to 'chameleon devices' which change their behaviour in response to external conditions. Existing literature has accepted the inevitability of IoT-related privacy breaches, been largely descriptive, or proposed only moderate reform that allows the market to continue to innovate. However, the article adopts Shaw's more radical critique of market-driven post-humanism as something which must be restrained, and builds on this to outline proposals for reform which would better protect the interests of consumers in an increasingly digitally-intermediated society. 
It therefore puts forward three possible responses: global labelling standards that clearly indicate transparency and privacy protections to consumers; mandatory open source in some instances or code escrow in others; and licensing requirements for software engineers. It explores in detail the extent to which certain provisions of the General Data Protection Regulation could assist with these proposals: the requirement in Articles 13 (2) (f), 14 (2) (g) and 15 (1) (h) that those subject to automated decision-making, including profiling, be provided with 'meaningful information about the logic involved'; the possibility under Article 12 (7) that this information 'be provided in combination with standardised icons in order to give in an easily visible, intelligible and clearly legible manner a meaningful overview of the intended processing'; and the support which Article 42 gives for the development of data protection seals and marks.
However, it highlights the limitations of these legislative provisions, particularly due to the recognition of the rights to trade secrets or intellectual property under recital 63. It therefore closes with recommendations for further reform of the law in this area that will assist in de-camouflaging the ever more present chameleon devices in our midst.

Fake News

'Protecting Elections from Disinformation: A Multifaceted Public-Private Approach to Social Media and Democratic Speech' by Yasmin Dawood in (2020) 16 Ohio State Technology Law Journal 1 comments
 This Article argues for a multifaceted public-private approach to the challenge of protecting the electoral process from the harms of disinformation. Such an approach employs a suite of complementary strategies — including disclosure rules, political ad registries, narrow content-based regulations against false election speech, self-regulation by online platforms, norm-based initiatives, civic education, and media literacy. It also deploys a mix of regulatory styles, namely, legal regulation (regulation imposed by the state), self-regulation (regulation by private actors), and co-regulation (regulation through cooperation between private actors and public actors). This Article has shown how the approach in Canada is multifaceted in both of these respects. In addition to incorporating a wide range of tactics by both public and private actors, the Canadian approach has adopted a mix of regulatory styles. The Article also canvasses the advantages and drawbacks of each individual tactic. 
In addition, this Article focuses on the dilemma posed by protecting the electoral process from disinformation while also protecting the freedom of speech. It argues that a multifaceted public-private approach allows for the trade-off between disinformation and free speech to be optimized. The combined and interactive effects of a multifaceted approach provide helpful protections against some of the harms of disinformation. More importantly, the adoption of these multifaceted public-private strategies signals the importance of electoral integrity to citizens thereby bolstering public trust in elections, a key ingredient of long-term democratic stability.
'Optimal Social Media Content Moderation and Platform Immunities' by Frank Fagan in (2020) European Journal of Law and Economics (forthcoming) comments
  This Article presents a model of the lawmakers' choice between implementing a new content moderation regime that provides for platform liability for user-generated content versus continuing platform immunity for the same. The model demonstrates that lawmakers prefer platform immunity, even if incivility is increasing, if the costs of implementing a platform liability regime are greater than the costs of enforcing status quo law. In addition, inasmuch as implementation of a platform liability regime is coupled with new speech restrictions that are unconstitutional or prohibitively costly, lawmakers prefer immunity, but platforms are free to set strong content moderation policies consistent with existing law. Thus, the private governance function of platforms highlighted by Balkin and others is directly related to lawmakers' ability to enact and enforce alternatives, and further, it goes beyond mere private enforcement of existing free speech restrictions. Inasmuch as lawmakers are prohibited from suppressing unwanted speech by constitutional limits as well as lawmaking and enforcement costs, they give platforms wider discretion to make private suppression decisions. The status quo governance function of platforms, therefore, includes a private lawmaking function for determining which types of speech to suppress, albeit one bounded by the state’s appetite for alternatives.