'Zoopolis, Intervention, and the State of Nature' by Oscar Horta comments that
In Zoopolis, Donaldson and Kymlicka argue that intervention in nature to aid animals is sometimes permissible, and in some cases obligatory, to save them from the harms they commonly face. But they claim these interventions must have some limits, since they could otherwise disrupt the structure of the communities wild animals form, which should be respected as sovereign ones. These claims are based on the widespread assumption that ecosystemic processes ensure that animals have good lives in nature. However, this assumption is, unfortunately, totally unrealistic. Most animals are r-strategists who die in pain shortly after coming into existence, and those who make it to maturity commonly suffer terrible harms too. In addition, most animals do not form the political communities Zoopolis describes. The situation of animals in the wild can therefore be considered analogous to one of humanitarian catastrophe, or to that of irretrievably failed states. It matches closely what a Hobbesian state of nature would be like. This means that intervention in nature to aid nonhuman animals should not be limited as Donaldson and Kymlicka argue.Horta continues
Zoopolis: A Political Theory of Animal Rights is a novel, brilliantly argued and very instructive book. It addresses some of the most important topics in animal ethics in a fresh and original way, and opens new lines of inquiry. This paper focuses on what I consider the most significant problem Zoopolis tackles: whether and to what extent we should aid animals living in the wild. This controversial problem has received some recent attention (Sapontzis 1984; Ng 1995; Bonnardel 1996; Kirkwood and Sinsbury 1996; Bovenkerk et al. 2003; Clement 2003; Cowen 2003; Fink 2005; Clarke and Ng 2006; Nussbaum 2006: ch. 6; Dawrst 2009; Simmons 2009; Horta 2010a; McMahan 2010a, 2010b; Palmer 2010; Cunha 2011; Torres Aldave 2011) but remains relatively neglected. In fact, some may be surprised by my choice of focus here, but no other human practice affects a larger number of individuals than our decision regarding what we owe to animals in nature.
Zoopolis claims that nonhuman animals living in the wild should be recognized as forming sovereign communities of their own, analogous to human sovereign political communities, which should be respected. Accordingly, like in the case of aiding other human societies, aiding animals in nature is sometimes permissible, and sometimes obligatory. But Zoopolis claims intervention must not disrupt the very structure of the assisted communities, and should not be rejected by the animals involved. Also, the aim of such assistance should be to bring the animal community back to a state in which it may self-regulate without external help. In practice, this means supporting many forms of intervention in nature to help animals, but it rules out some forms of substantial intervention. So, for instance, whilst Donaldson and Kymlicka would support vaccinating an animal population to save its members from a lethal epidemic, they would oppose altering trophic chains to avoid mass starvation, even if this could be done harmlessly (e. g., by supplying both food and contraceptives so that the additional food does not result in future starvation).
Many will find that Zoopolis overestimates our duties towards animals in the wild. In fact, most assume that we have no reason to aid them because (a) we have no such moral obligations or (b) such animals do not really need our help. I agree with Zoopolis’ refutation of (a) (see ch. 2, especially 24, 29, 35), but with regards to (b) I will argue that animals in nature are in a far worse situation that Zoopolis assumes. Therefore, I will advocate more extensive intervention.
Zoopolis claims that nonhuman animals living in the wild should be treated as members of sovereign communities. The authors write:
"What sort of competence is needed for sovereignty? We would argue that for wild animals — as indeed for humans — what matters for sovereignty is the ability to respond to the challenges that a community faces, and to provide a social context in which its individual members can grow and flourish (175)."
These two conditions are not specified in detail. The authors do not, for example, indicate the extent to which the relevant challenges must be successfully met by animals in nature or what kinds of social context animal communities have to form. The first half of this paper discusses the first condition, the second the latter condition.'Cosmozoopolis: The Case against Group-Differentiated Animal Rights' by Alasdair Cochrane argues that
relational position and group-based distinctions are less important in determining the rights of animals than Zoopolis concludes. In particular, it argues that the theory of animal rights developed in Zoopolis is vulnerable to some of the critiques that are made against theories which differentiate the rights of humans on the basis of group-based distinctions. For example, in the human context, group-differentiated theories of rights have been criticised on a number of important grounds: for failing to extend to non-associates rights that ought to be so extended; for granting too much weight to the rights of associates over non-associates; for wrongly treating groups as homogenous entities; and for also assuming that these groups necessarily have value as they exist presently. This paper outlines how modified versions of these critiques can be levelled at the theory of animal rights defended in Zoopolis.'A Defense of Animal Citizens and Sovereigns' by Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka responds that
In their commentaries on Zoopolis, Alasdair Cochrane and Oscar Horta raise several challenges to our argument for a "political theory of animal rights ", and to the specific models of animal citizenship and animal sovereignty we offer. In this reply, we focus on three key issues: 1) the need for a group-differentiated theory of animal rights that takes seriously ideas of membership in bounded communities, as against more "cosmopolitan" or "cosmozoopolis" alternatives that minimize the moral significance of boundaries and membership; 2) the challenge of defining the nature and scope of wild animal sovereignty; and 3) the problem of policing nature and humanitarian intervention to reduce suffering in the wild.A pointer to Donaldson and Kymlicka's 'Unruly Beasts: Animal Citizens and the Threat of Tyranny' and Kymlicka's 2013 Hart Lecture is here.
