'Surveillance Policy Making by Procurement' by Catherine Crump
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The Seattle police obtained a surveillance drone with the approval of a city council that did not realize what it was doing. Following a council review that lasted literally two minutes, the Oakland police created a data information center that networked together all of the city’s existing surveillance infrastructure. In San Diego, elected representatives were only dimly aware that the law enforcement agency they supervised had built and deployed innovative facial recognition technology.
In an age of heightened concern about the militarization of local police and surveillance technology, how is it possible for municipal law enforcement agencies to obtain cutting edge and potentially highly intrusive surveillance equipment without the knowledge of elected leaders and the general public? The answer lies in the multi-billion-dollar process of federal procurement, a process with which the federal government funnels resources to local law enforcement agencies to purchase surveillance equipment. Because of the way in which federal procurement operates in practice, the absence of a political check on the use of surveillance technology often poses significant privacy concerns. Surveillance policy making by procurement thus raises a host of questions related to the delicate balance between administrative and political policy making, privacy, and public safety.
This article is the first to comprehensively consider the intersection of procurement and local surveillance policy making. Using case studies from Seattle, Oakland, and San Diego, it exposes the practice of surveillance policy making by procurement. It argues that, although a large and persuasive literature touts the value of deference to the expertise of agencies in technical policy making, local elected representatives should have the lead role in formulating surveillance policy, with input from both law enforcement agents and members of the public. Surveillance technology invariably raises questions regarding how data will be collected, retained, used, and shared. Communities have differing values and needs, and the political process is best suited to ensuring that legitimate community concerns are brought to bear on surveillance policy making. The article concludes by proposing politically feasible steps to strengthen democratic control of police surveillance while maintaining appropriate deference to the legitimate role of limited administrative policy making in the law enforcement context.
The Seattle police obtained a surveillance drone with the approval of a city council that did not realize what it was doing. Following a council review that lasted literally two minutes, the Oakland police created a data information center that networked together all of the city’s existing surveillance infrastructure. In San Diego, elected representatives were only dimly aware that the law enforcement agency they supervised had built and deployed innovative facial recognition technology.
In an age of heightened concern about the militarization of local police and surveillance technology, how is it possible for municipal law enforcement agencies to obtain cutting edge and potentially highly intrusive surveillance equipment without the knowledge of elected leaders and the general public? The answer lies in the multi-billion-dollar process of federal procurement, a process with which the federal government funnels resources to local law enforcement agencies to purchase surveillance equipment. Because of the way in which federal procurement operates in practice, the absence of a political check on the use of surveillance technology often poses significant privacy concerns. Surveillance policy making by procurement thus raises a host of questions related to the delicate balance between administrative and political policy making, privacy, and public safety.
This article is the first to comprehensively consider the intersection of procurement and local surveillance policy making. Using case studies from Seattle, Oakland, and San Diego, it exposes the practice of surveillance policy making by procurement. It argues that, although a large and persuasive literature touts the value of deference to the expertise of agencies in technical policy making, local elected representatives should have the lead role in formulating surveillance policy, with input from both law enforcement agents and members of the public. Surveillance technology invariably raises questions regarding how data will be collected, retained, used, and shared. Communities have differing values and needs, and the political process is best suited to ensuring that legitimate community concerns are brought to bear on surveillance policy making. The article concludes by proposing politically feasible steps to strengthen democratic control of police surveillance while maintaining appropriate deference to the legitimate role of limited administrative policy making in the law enforcement context.
