The First Interim Report of the Senate Select Committee on Foreign Interference Through Social Media, which quotes my submission, features the following recommendations:
R 1 The committee recommends that the Australian Government clearly delegate lead accountability for cyber-enabled foreign interference to a single entity in government.
R 2 The committee recommends that the Australian Government take a proactive approach to protecting groups that are common targets of foreign interference but are not classified as government institutions.
R 3 The committee recommends that the Australian Government establish appropriate, transparent, and non-political institutional mechanisms for publicly communicating cyber-enabled foreign interference in our elections and review the processes and protocols for classified briefings for the Opposition during caretaker with respect to cyber-enabled foreign interference.
R 4 The committee recommends that the Australian Communications and Media Authority's report into the functioning of the Australian Code of Practice on Disinformation and Misinformation be publicly released as a matter of priority.
R 5 The committee recommends that the Australian Government publicly release the Electoral Integrity Assurance Taskforce's terms of reference.
R 6 The committee recommends that the Australian Government establish clear requirements and pathways for social media platforms to report suspected foreign interference, including disinformation and coordinated inauthentic behaviour, and other offensive and harmful content, and formalise agency remits, powers and resourcing arrangements accordingly.
R 7 The committee recommends that the Election Integrity Assurance Taskforce undertake an audit to assess capability relevant to detecting disinformation prior to the coming election and, further, that the Australian Government consider providing information about relevant capabilities and resourcing to this committee as appropriate to assist in our deliberations.
