Another New Zealand sovereign citizen judgment - Simon v Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections [2022] NZCA 222.
The Court states
[1] Mr Simon is facing a number of sexual and violence charges. He is currently detained at Spring Hill Corrections Facility. In December 2021 Mr Simon applied for a writ of habeas corpus. Venning J dismissed the application. Mr Simon appeals.
[2] On an application for habeas corpus by a person detained in prison the Department of Corrections has the onus of proving that the applicant is being detained lawfully. It can do so by producing a committal warrant or other authorisation to detain. It is then for the applicant to show that the document produced does not justify detention in the particular circumstances.
[3] Mr Simon filed written submissions and addressed us orally. He explained that he had not received the respondent’s submissions prior to the hearing in the High Court. This was, apparently, the result of a delay within the prison in providing Mr Simon with the submissions. As a result, we invited Mr Simon to make the submissions he wished to make in the High Court as well as to identify any error in the Judge’s decision.
[4] Mr Simon argued that there is a distinction between himself, as a “natural person” and the “legal person/corpus body” named in the warrant. From Mr Simon’s assertions that he could not be compelled to enter into any contract, we infer that he regards the authority of the court as a matter of consent by him and that since he does consent to be bound by the authority of the Court, the warrant is not a valid basis on which to detain him.
[5] Arguments similar to this, based on the concept of the “ sovereign citizen ” are regularly made in New Zealand courts. However, they have no legal basis and cannot succeed. All persons in New Zealand are subject to the laws made by the New Zealand Parliament and to the authority of the courts in enforcing those laws.
In respect of para 5 the Court refers to
See, for example, Warahi v Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections [2022] NZCA 105 at [10]–[11]; Warren v Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections [2017] NZSC 20; Rangitaawa v Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections [2013] NZCA 2 at [5]; Martin v Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections [2016] NZHC 2811 at [20]; Wallace v Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections [2017] NZSC 1 at [4]–[5].
In Rangitaawa v Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections [2013] NZCA 2 the Court states
[5] The appellant does not challenge the existence of the warrants and the bail judgment mentioned above. However, he claims he is not subject to the jurisdiction of the District Court. He is, rather, subject to the jurisdiction of his hapu. There have been a number of decisions of this Court in which it has been made clear that arguments based on an assertion that the New Zealand Parliament does not have power to make laws affecting some or all the persons living in New Zealand cannot succeed. All New Zealand Courts are bound to accept the validity of Acts of Parliament, including, in the present case, the Land Transport Act 1998 and the Crimes Act 1961. All persons living in New Zealand are subject to the jurisdiction of the New Zealand Courts.
[6] The appellant also claimed that he is Rangatira Graham Rangitaawa and that the person having that name is a different person from Graham Colin Rangitaawa. However, as he acknowledged himself during the hearing before us, it was Rangatira Graham Rangitaawa who pleaded guilty to the offence for which the sentence of imprisonment for nine months was imposed. In his written submissions, he suggested that Graham Colin Rangitaawa was “a legal entity in ‘trust’ with the Registrar-General in office with Internal Affairs New Zealand”. We do not need to engage with that proposition. We are satisfied that, having pleaded guilty to the count for which the sentence of imprisonment was imposed, the appellant is the person who is required to serve that sentence.
