'Demystifying CLS: A Critical Legal Studies Family Tree' by James Gilchrist in (2020) 41(1) Adelaide Law Review 123 comments
From the first Conference on Critical Legal Studies in 1977, difficulties have arisen when trying to qualify what can be defined as critical legal studies. As either a jurisprudential banner or a specific reference, the term critical legal studies can lead to a variety of different meanings with little consistency. This article argues that due to the broad application of critical legal studies across different times and jurisdictions, it would benefit from a structured system of categorisation. By identifying various critical legal studies, this article briefly defines and categorises each major limb in relation to one another, in turn forming a critical legal studies family tree. Once this overview has been presented, this article focuses on the United States of America (‘US’)-based branch of Critical Legal Studies demonstrating how this method of categorisation provides clarity. Specifically, this demonstration addresses the roots and death of the US-based Critical Legal Studies and its effect on the continuation of critical legal studies works after this event.
Gilchrist argues
More than 40 years after the first Conference on Critical Legal Studies in 1977, the movement itself has ground to a halt, with ‘Critical Legal Studies’ (or ‘CLS’) remembered as a historical movement of ‘left intelligentsia’ against legal liberalism. At the same time, critical legal studies, concerning fields of legal inquiry that are posed to critique law from a critical position, or through a critical lens, are flourishing. Such is the multifaceted nature of the term ‘critical legal studies’ that differentiations often rest with necessary further identification of specific themes, theorists, or scholars. However, this adds complication to an already difficult area to navigate. This article proposes that the non-doctrinal approach taken by scholars of the Critical Legal Studies movement ‘mystifies’ critical legal studies as a term. To combat this mystification, this article proposes a critical legal studies family tree as an act of demystification. Focusing on the US-based Critical Legal Studies movement, this article will demonstrate the clarity this framework brings via the proposal of two different US-based Critical Legal Studies. For ease of understanding and clarity, this article adopts two different expressions of the term ‘critical legal studies’: the term is capitalised (and at times abbreviated) when referring to the Critical Legal Studies movement; and is written in lower case when referring to the broader application of critical legal studies.
Broadly, the approach undertaken in this article is inspired by Duncan Kennedy’s critique of structures and the specific quote in ‘Legal Education as Training for Hierarchy’, that there is ‘endless attention to trees at the expense of forests’. In its original context, the quote relates to pedagogical structure in law schools, however Kennedy’s observation can also be levelled at existing works which attempt to clarify or demystify critical legal studies. While this article addresses the specifics and minutiae relating to CLS, its primary goal is a meta-analysis to categorise the often-singular grouping of critical legal studies. There is also an attempt at irony through this ‘forest type’ meta-approach and the designation of a family tree.
The foundation of this family tree draws from existing work in this area by Margaret Davies, Costas Douzinas and Adam Gearey. In their clarifications, Douzinas and Gearey categorise critical legal studies through national identities. The authors identify similarities between the national varieties but address their individuality based on geographic lines, specifically looking at different branches of Critical Legal Studies in the US, United Kingdom (‘UK’), Australia, and South Africa. Taking a different approach to the same problem, Davies designates a broad and narrow categorisation to critical legal studies, designating the US Critical Legal Studies movement as narrow and critical race theory as broad. However, while Douzinas and Gearey, and Davies’ approaches provide some clarity, they have limitations.
Notably, Douzinas and Gearey’s categorisation becomes muddied with the (re)location of the critical legal scholars they assign to specific locations, a point which the authors themselves identify. The authors’ acknowledgement of this issue highlights the placeholder nature of these categories, rather than creating a definitive structure. Similarly, it can be inferred from Davies’ approach that a dichotomy is imposed, and a designated critical legal studies is either broad or narrow. Whilst imperfect, both approaches are useful as a starting point to think about the categorisation of different critical legal studies. Building upon these ways of thinking about critical legal studies, this article’s presentation of a critical legal studies family tree aims to reduce complication and assist in the exploration of critical legal studies’ complexities.
The core of this article is a literal genealogy; however, given Michel Foucault’s influence on critical legal studies it would be remiss not to mention his reading of genealogy. Notably, Foucault applied his interpretation of genealogy in The History of Sexuality, however, he provided a concise overview of this method in the short essay, ‘Nietzsche, Genealogy, History’. In this essay, Foucault outlines that his reading of genealogy draws on Friedrich Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morals, specifically highlighting Nietzsche’s differentiation of the often synonymous origin, ancestry, and beginning. For Foucault, this is not an exercise in splitting hairs, but an interrogation of words and histories that are often overlooked — those in the most ‘unpromising places, in what we tend to feel is without history’. Focusing on the different applications Nietzsche uses for words related to ‘the start’, Foucault argues that it is possible to travel past ideals of ‘lofty origins’ to ‘lowly beginnings’, and in turn, new historical perspectives.
In a broad sense, the rationale Foucault provides through genealogy aids the justification to re-examine critical legal studies. As this article argues, the history of critical legal studies is, for the most part, settled; but this has led to a conflation between the variety of different critical legal studies. However, whilst the Foucauldian development is relevant in this general way, its specific methodology is not applicable to the very literal genealogy presented here through the critical legal studies family tree. Instead, this article proposes that through the creation of a family tree, different branches of critical legal studies can be clearly separated. To demonstrate the effectiveness of the critical legal studies family tree, this article first presents an overall understanding of the structure and its interrelated limbs. Having established the outline of the family tree, the focus shifts to a specific branch, undertaking a detailed assessment of the US-based Critical Legal Studies movement.
After addressing the roots of CLS, focus then turns to the proposed death of Critical Legal Studies in the mid-1990s. This article argues that this death adds to the mystification of critical legal studies, however the family tree may assist in counteracting this mystification and providing clarity. Specific attention is given to the death and its relation to three interconnected areas: the scholars who founded Critical Legal Studies; their location at Harvard Law School; and the rivalry between Critical Legal Studies and law and economics.
It must be noted, however, that the focus on these three areas should not be read as a rejection of internal issues in the US-based CLS, or conflicts between other left critiques of law, such as critical race and feminist legal theory; or similarly, issues with external parties, such as the Federalist Society at Harvard. Instead, through the interaction between key scholars, their location, and the rivalry of their approaches, this broad meta-analysis will demonstrate a cause of death and a way to understand the position of the Critical Legal Studies that continues posthumously.
