In James v District Court at Whanganui [2022] NZHC 2196 the New Zealand High Court has unsurprisingly been underwhelmed by the contention that dogs - however cute - are sovereign citizens.
The Court states
[1] This is an application for judicial review of a decision by the District Court at Whanganui [Jones v Whanganui District Council [2021] NZDC 3864] in relation to a prosecution taken by the second respondent, the Whanganui District Council, against the applicant under the Dog Control Act 1996.
[2] Under s 42 of the Dog Control Act 1996, dog owners must register their dogs with the local authority each registration year.
[3] The applicant owns a dog – a Hungarian Vizsla named “Connor”.
[4] In March 2020, the Council sent an invoice to the applicant for $50, due on 20 March 2020, being the registration fee for Connor for the period 1 July 2020 to 30 June 2021. The applicant did not pay the invoice. As a result, on 6 May 2020 the Council issued an infringement notice of $300 for failure to register the dog pursuant to s 42 of the Dog Control Act 1996 (the infringement notice). A summary of rights was attached to the infringement notice, including the ability to request a hearing.
[5] The applicant wrote to the Council, responding to the infringement notice, on 18 May 2020. The effect of the letter was the applicant declined to pay the infringement fee and denied the jurisdiction of the District Court to proceed with “summary judgement”. The applicant did not request a hearing.
[6] On 6 June 2020 the Council issued a Reminder Notice to the applicant in respect of the infringement notice. The infringement notice remained unpaid and on 28 July 2020 the Council lodged the infringement notice with the Court.
[7] Once filed, the infringement notice was deemed to constitute a Court order that the applicant pay a fine equal to the amount of the infringement fee then remaining unpaid for the offence, together with costs of the prescribed amount.3 [8] On 29 July 2020, pursuant to s 21(3D) of the Act, a Notice of Fine was issued by the Court against the applicant for $330, for failure to register the dog Connor (Notice of Fine).
[9] On 6 August 2020 the applicant applied to the Court under s 78B of the Act to correct irregularities in proceedings for an infringement notice. Although the nature of that document is somewhat unclear, the applicant appears to suggest that the irregularity relied on was “mistaken identity”, the dog Connor was a legal person and accordingly did not have to be registered. It said in part:
The Person prosecuted is dead/a Legal Fiction and cannot contract with the Prosecuting Authority without the express written consent of the Man James – Consent has been denied the Prosecuting Authority to proceed with Summary Judgement. By the same mechanism that the Whanganui River was made a Person, so too the “Dog” is a Legal Person, entitled to all the Protection and Privileges afforded a Person under Statute. A Person does not have to Register with a Local Authority or wear a collar or be restrained by a leash.
[10] On 14 August 2020 the Registrar of the Court advised the applicant that his application under s 78B of the Act was declined (the Registrar’s Decision). On 18 September 2020 the applicant filed an application for review of the Registrar’s Decision. The Council applied for orders striking out the applicant’s causes of action and dismissing the application for review in its entirety, on the grounds that the application was made out of time and the application was untenable with the causes of action not reasonably arguable.
[11] On 4 March 2021, Judge Crayton in the District Court granted the Council’s application to strike out and dismiss the application for a review. Costs were granted.
Preliminary matters
[12] There are a number of issues raised in the applicant’s statement of claim and considered in the District Court judgment which James confirmed do not form part of his argument before me. However, these matters coloured both the applicant’s written and oral submissions so, for completeness, I record them here. There is a degree of overlap between these issues.
[13] Two themes underlie the applicant’s statement of claim and submissions. They are: (a) The notion that he is a “sovereign” person and therefore (by implication) beyond the jurisdiction of the Court. (b) Linked to that, a submission that the District Court relies on consent for legitimacy and he has not given consent to its processes.
Identity of the applicant
[14] As to the first of these overarching points, the applicant asserts that he is a “Sovereign Man under Common Law” and therefore beyond the jurisdiction of the New Zealand judicial system.
[15] In his statement of claim the applicant pleaded that the Court “addressed the Artificial Person James Jones, the Deceased Estate JAMES JONES and the Vessel Mr James Jones, thus causing confusion and failing to establish true identity and any possibility of jurisdiction”. This was one of the grounds on the basis of which James asked this Court to declare the District Court judgment null and void.
[16] While the applicant said he did not wish me to consider this issue, I note that the Courts have observed in similar proceedings that “incomprehensible statements about birth right and being a natural person not susceptible to the laws of this country are regularly and properly rejected by the Courts”. Such assertions are “legally unsound”.
Joinder of second respondent/non-appearance of first respondent
[17] The applicant argues in his written submissions that joinder of the Whanganui District Council as second respondent was wrong, because the applicant did not consent to it.
[18] The applicant’s consent to joinder is not necessary. On 7 July 2021 Cull J directed that the applicant serve the proceedings on the Whanganui District Council. On 1 September 2021 Grice J noted in a minute that the second respondent is entitled to be named as a respondent to this application as it relates to a decision made in proceedings to which it, the Council, was a party. In this Court the applicant asked to be addressed as James.
[19] Subsequently, on 11 February 2022 Churchman J recorded that counsel for the first respondent had notified the Court the first respondent would abide the decision of the Court. The Court granted leave to counsel to withdraw.
“Claim of right”/identity of the dog
[21] On 27 June 2020 James published a “Public – Proclamation” in the local Whanganui newspaper which said:
PUBLIC – PROCLAMATION Take Notice all affected and Interested Parties. I James, a Sovereign Man, have created a new Person. A Vizsla Dog, date of Birth 1 December 2019 being the Private Property of James and is known as and answers to Connor, is by this Public Proclamation declared a Person and subject to all the privileges and protection of a Person. The name of the new Person is Connor James. This Proclamation is the Common Law Right of James. An Estoppel is hereby created against any affected or interested Party who does not respond within Ten [10] Days from the first appearance of this Public Proclamation to the electronic address jim@Jamessonofjames.com and cannot subsequently claim Colour of Right or Protection of Law.
[22] Connor is the dog at the heart of this proceeding. Judge Drayton in the District Court addressed the legal submission arising from the “Public Proclamation”. The applicant says the Proclamation is a “claim of right” and provides “lawful excuse” The effect, he says, is that Connor should be treated as a legal person and therefore not subject to the Dog Control Act 1996.
[23] Again, the applicant did not wish me to focus on this aspect of his claim.
Application
[24] The applicant has applied for judicial review (“under Common Law jurisdiction”) of a decision of the District Court at Whanganui (Court) to issue a Notice of Court Fine under the Summary Proceedings Act 1957 (the Act). The statement of claim seeks to challenge both the Registrar’s Decision (the initial decision of the Court to issue the Notice) and the subsequent District Court judgment. The statement of claim sets out two causes of action – first that the Registrar failed to observe due process and, second, the Court (Judge Drayton) failed to observe due process.
The Registrar failed to observe due process
[25] The gist of this claim appears to be that, in issuing the Notice of Fine, the Court Registrar failed to observe due process of law because the applicant was not aware that the Notice of Fine would be issued and was not given the opportunity to be heard and to consent, prior to it being issued. The applicant says this amounted to a failure to observe natural justice, due process and procedural fairness. The applicant further alleges that in issuing the notice of fine without the applicant’s consent, the Registrar acted unlawfully/ultra vires. ...
[29] The second respondent also submits that, even if the Registrar or Court had abused its process and there was jurisdiction for a judicial review application, the Court’s discretion should not be exercised in this matter because the applicant has not identified any statutory defence which would have been available to him to successfully defend the infringement offence. The applicant appears to acknowledge that he owns a dog and that the dog is not registered with the Council.
Discussion
[30] As I have noted, the applicant’s case proceeds on the basis of his submission that his consent was required to the process he now challenges. This submission seems to incorporate both the broad proposition that the District Court processes require the consent of the participants, and the more specific argument that a consent requirement must be read into s 21 of the Act.
District Court as “de facto” court; consent required
[31] As to the general proposition, I understand the applicant’s argument to be that the District Court is a “for-profit trading entity”. As a creature of statute it has no inherent jurisdiction and is a “de facto” court. It relies on contract and consent to “do business” with those who come before it.
[32] The only part of this submission that is legally correct is that the District Court does not have inherent jurisdiction. The High Court is the only New Zealand Court that has an inherent jurisdiction. The District Court’s jurisdiction is determined entirely by statute. That jurisdiction is partly set out in Part 4 of the District Court Act 2016, but there are many other statutes conferring civil jurisdiction on the court. The District Court does not require consent to act within its statutory jurisdiction.
Consent under s 21 Summary Proceedings Act 1957
[33] Section 21 of the Act sets out in a comprehensive fashion the process to be followed in issuing infringement notices. At the point when the Council filed a copy of the Reminder Notice in the Court, provided the particulars of the Notice were verified by the Court, the Court was deemed to have made an order, as if on the determination of a charge in respect of the offence, that the defendant pay a fine equal to the amount of the infringement fee then remaining unpaid for the offence (in this case, $300), together with costs of the prescribed amount.
[34] Section 21 imposes an automatic process which the Court must follow. It does not require the applicant’s consent and neither can the applicant “deny jurisdiction” in order to effectively stay the process. ...
[38] I conclude that, although the s 21 process offered opportunities for the applicant to object and be heard, it does not require the applicant’s consent to the process proceeding.
