The NZ High Court in William aka Larsen v New Zealand Police Company [2022] NZHC 2374 has reiterated disquiet with sovereign citizen claims.
Churchman J states
[5] The statement of claim refers to events which occurred on 20 February 2022 and subsequently. The following events occurred that day: A logging truck was observed driving towards the Rimutaka Hill with no registration plates and was in poor condition. The truck was stopped by police. The driver was asked to turn the engine of his truck off so that the police could speak to him. He refused. The driver was asked to provide his details but also refused saying that he did not have to provide them. A police check confirmed the driver as Scott William Larsen. A check of police records showed that Scott William Larsen had a fines warrant and was a forbidden driver. Scott William Larsen was arrested. He refused to get out of the truck’s cab or unlock the door and indicated that he did not accept the jurisdiction of the police officers to arrest him. In order to effect the arrest, the driver was sprayed through the slightly open driver’s window which resulted in him getting out of the cab and being transported to the Upper Hutt Police Station. The truck was seized and impounded. Scott William Larsen was charged with a number of offences including: ➢ being the driver of a motor vehicle during a period that he had been forbidden to drive; ➢ operating a vehicle in a transport service without a licence; ➢ resisting police in the execution of their duty.
[6] Because of the confused nature of the statement of claim, it is not possible to discern exactly what happened next but it seems that the plaintiff was convicted and fined, and his truck was sold to pay the fines.
Analysis
[7] The plaintiff contends that neither the police nor Justice system have any authority over him and categorises their actions in apprehending and prosecuting him as amounting to fraud, slavery, malfeasance of public office [sic] and deception.
[8] The statement of claim is full of pseudo-legal mumbo jumbo that is characteristic of the “sovereign citizen” school of thought.
[9] The Court of Appeal in Warahi v Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections described the sovereign citizen movement as:
...an ideology that first emerged in the United States in the 1970s. [The] core belief, for present purposes, is that [Sovereign Citizens are] not subject to the jurisdiction of the State (including legislation enacted by Parliament or decisions made by the Court). This belief is based (at least in part) on the dual persona-theory the proposition that individuals have two personas, one of the flesh and blood and the other a separate legal or “corporate” personality that is subject to the jurisdiction of the State. Followers of the Sovereign Citizen movement believe that it is possible to dissociate themselves from their legal or corporate persona, and hence free themselves from the jurisdiction of the State [they believe they have] successfully done this and, as a result, the State has no authority over [them].
[10] The Courts have consistently held that it is an abuse of process for a litigant to attempt to employ sovereign citizen concepts in seeking to avoid or defeat any State, regulatory, contract, family or other obligations recognised by law.
[11] Consistently with the other cases where the sovereign citizen theory has been invoked to attempt to escape the jurisdiction of the Court, I hold that these proceedings are plainly an abuse of the process of the Court, and strike them out.
In Bakhash v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2022] QIRC 362 the Commission states
[9] Mr Bakhash filed submissions on 25 August 2022. Mr Bakhash submits his appeal consists of two parts: Firstly, I absolutely hold steadfast to the belief that I do have a reasonable excuse for not following this Direction. My right to refuse an injection is based on my inalienable right as an independent sovereign citizen to refuse this mandated and coerced medical injection. This right is not extinguished by any chief health officer’s Direction or any such narrow rulings by any court. ...
[14] The department submits that the appeal should not be heard because it has no reasonable prospects of success. The department notes the assertions by Mr Bakhash that the direction violates his personal rights and right to informed consent have been addressed extensively by the Commission, and it is exceedingly unlikely that the matters will be interpreted differently by the Commission in this case if the matter proceeds.
[15] The department relies on the numerous cases where the Commission has found that the direction is lawful and reasonable, and submits that it was open to the department to form a reasonable belief that Mr Bakhash was liable to discipline for failing to follow a lawful and reasonable direction.
[16] The department submits that to the extent that Mr Bakhash asserts his right to informed consent involves some degree of novelty, he is mistaken.
[17] The department further notes Mr Bakhash's appeal notice advances the argument that the disciplinary action was not appropriate in the circumstances. The department notes that the commission has found disciplinary action up to and including termination of employment to be fair and reasonable in cases similar to that of Mr Bakhash. ...
[20] The letter Mr Bakhash attached to his submissions traverses a number of arguments that have been unsuccessfully raised on numerous occasions in this Commission, including but not limited to: A number of statutory instruments that Mr Bakhash submits render the direction unlawful, including the Privacy Act 1998, the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld), the Commonwealth Constitution, the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), and the Biosecurity Act 2015 (Cth); Mr Bakhash cannot provide informed and valid consent to have the vaccine; Mr Bakhash does not require any pharmaceutical medication for his health; and Vaccines do not prevent individuals from contracting COVID-19 or spreading COVID-19.
[21] In Elliott v State of Queensland (Queensland Health), I made the following observations in relation to such arguments that have previously been heard and determined before this Commission:
[29] The commission has now dealt with a great many appeals of this nature. Consequently, a reliable body of jurisprudence has been developed dealing with increasingly common themes in the arguments advanced by appellants like Ms Elliott, who have not complied with a vaccine mandate applicable in their respective departments of employment.
[30] Notwithstanding that these decisions are available publicly on the Queensland Courts website, appellants continue to file these appeals challenging the validity of directions for them to be vaccinated and relying on arguments such as 'vaccines are not safe' or 'mandates are coercion' or 'human rights infringements' or 'risk assessments were not provided' or 'consultation did not occur' et cetera.
[31] It is more than apparent that the vast majority of such appellants have no regard for the reported decisions or if they do, they simply press on, expecting that somehow the outcome will be different in their case. With the exception of a small number of decisions returned to departments for technical inadequacies, no appellant has succeeded on the increasingly tedious suite of arguments of this nature.
[32] The continued use of the commission's resources to receive and repeatedly dispense with the same arguments cannot be in the public interest. In circumstances where there is now a reliable body of decisions dispensing with similar arguments, it is my view that appellants seeking to reagitate settled arguments should be required to justify why they ought to be heard.
